XPH and ΔEI in Plato and Others

Author(s): S. Benardete
Source: Glotta, 43. Bd., 3./4. H. (1965), pp. 285-298
Published by: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht (GmbH & Co. KG)
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 S. Benardete,XPH and AEI in Plato and Others 285

und dann der in diesen gereihten Versen erzâhlten Dichtung nux

werden konnte, weil erzahlende Dichtung im Hexameter iiber den
Orakelversdes Prooimions entstanden ist, so leitet sich der iïeloç
âoiôôçdes Epos letztlich vom *êe<miaoiôoç,dem ,,durch Vers das
Orakel Verkiindenden" her1), und es ist weit mehr als nur ein
geistreicher Vergleich einer romantisierenden Zeit, wenn viel
spâter die Tâtigkeit des Sehers und des Sàngers mit êeamœôelv
bezeichnet wird. In [Platon] Axiochos 367d werden die Dichter mit
den Sehern verglichen oî noirjjbiacn^eioréqoiç rà neqi xov fttov&ea-
mcpôovaiv.

XPH and AEI in Plato and Others

By S. Benabdete, New York

G. Redard, in his monograph entitled Recherchessur XPH,

XPHZQAI,ÉtudeSémantique(Paris 1953),has formulated as follows
and del:
the differencebetween %qy\
"Dans les plus anciens textes, del marquela nécessité impérieuse,
à laquelle on se soumet par ordre d'un supérieur et qui est liée
à une situation particulière; l'obligation est extérieure au sujet
[while XQV>like its denominative xqfjo&ai, expresses a process that
"is accomplished in the interior of the sphere of the subject",
p. 40] de qui l'intérêt n'est jamais considéré,elle lui est appliquée:
le 'mouvement' est donc inverse de celui qu'implique l'appro-
priation [the characteristicof xerfl" (P- 56)«
This distinction between "subjective" XQVan(î "objective" del, to
use the terms E. Benveniste has applied in analyses of several pairs
of suffixes in I-E languages2),must be admitted; but since Redard
does not go on to examine how the distinction works out in detail,
it seems worthwhile to try to set out the limits of their usage more

x) Verf., Musikund Dichtungim alten Griechenland,S. 72ff. In denVersen

des Merkurhymnus(2. 1) wird auch ausdrucklich das kitharabegleitete
Prooimion&éomçâoiôrjgenannt.
2) Cf. Nomsd'agentet nomsd'actionen i-e (Paris, 1948), 64- 112; "Fonc-
tions suffixalesen gotique",BSL 1961, 43- 45; also "Présentsdénominatifs
en hittite", 1- 4, in: Corolla Linguistica, Festschrift F. Sommer (Wies-
baden, 1955).

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286 S. Benardete

exactly1). We shall consider for the most part the usage of Plato,
who seems more aware (and for good reason) than any other writer
of the difference, but we shall also indicate how others prior to,
contemporarywith, and later than Plato maintain or depart from
the distinctions to be found in him.
The single instance of bel in Homer serves to isolate a use of bel
that XQVhardly ever usurps. Achilles says, xl bè bel noXe^é^vai
Tqéeooiv Acyelovg (I 337). The implicit answer is that there is no
need of necessity for the Greeks to fight the Trojans, bel, accord-
ingly, can only be used in direct questions with xl or tzcoçif the
question expects a negative answer. One cannot say xl bel Àéyecv;
and imply that the one addressed should tell one what to say, but
it can only mean that there is no more to say2). The differenceis
between the common phrase ovx olb*oxi bel nXelo> teyeiv (Lys. 16.9)
and ëycoye ovx ëxco xl xQ^jteyeiv (PI. Tkt. 200 c 6). xl XQ^I
téyew and
the like invite a reply (cf. Soph. Ph. 135- 6), and it is most unusual
in Attic (and unique in Sophocles) when Antigone says : xl XQV!*>&
xrjvbvaxrjvov êç êewç exi fiMneiv(922). Sophocles goes back to an
Homeric usage (N 275, £ 364, co407), in whom XQVoften has the
non-Attic meaning of "need" (cf. Aesch. Supp. 938). Its occurrence
here in a much-disputedpassage seems a small but solid indication
that the passage is genuine, for Sophocles is the "most Homeric"
of the tragedians.
Not before Demosthenes, I think, would an Attic writer have
written, with Lucian, tzcôçbel laxoqlavovyyqâcpeiv, though its being
a title may have almost made it into an indirect question (as in
its Latin translation),where belis perfectly at home (cf. Dem. 18,1).
In the body of a work, however, it could only mean, "How is there
any need to write history?"3) How unsuitable bel was felt to be in
questions prefaced with xl or nύ comes out in those cases where
either the answerto the XQV question has bel or a direct XQVquestion
is phrased indirectly (cf. Vl.Euthyphr.3c4 with 4d9).

x) T. D. Goodell, "XPH and AEV\ CQ1914, 91-102 has some good

commentson several passages, but his attempt to assimilatethe distinction
between %qf\and àeï to "should" and "must" is inadequate; cf. Redard,
p. 55, n. 1.
2) Cf. Fraenkel on Aesch. Ag. 598 (quoting Paley).
8) Some examples in Plato of xl (rcc5ç)xQV-Phaedo60d6, 117a8; Crat.
391b8; Sph. 228a5, 231cl, 241b5, 250c9 (not); Prm. 137a5, 142c3; PMb.
52d6; Lchs 184el; Rep. 469a4; Lgs 661e6, 777c7, 791el, 873c3, 875d6,
886e6, 960d5; Epin. 979c2.

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 XPH and AEI in Plato and Others 287

PL Pm. 160d3 - 4: êv el ftrj ëoxi, xl XQ^Islvai; noœxov juèv oiSv

avxcj)xovxo inâqxeiv ôeï. 164b 5- 6: êv el fiij ëaxi, xâXXaxl xqfj nenov-
êévai; . . . âXXa\iev nov ôeï avxà elvcu.
Ep. 2 312b 3: nœç XQ^I heiv &?&xa^ aè nqoç àMrjAovç,but 313c 7:
ôncoç ôeï nqoç âMrjAovçfifiàç ëxeiv. This example also shows the
affinity of XQVfor the singular pronoun : ôeï replaces XQVwhen "you
and me" becomes "us" (cf. PL Pit. 286c5, dl; Pi. P. 4,141). Odys-
seus' exhortation to his companions - ov yàq XQ^J &>a>ïô/tevcuovôè
&6' oïovç âéaq>ara (// 154)- seems to be a recognition of this usage
as normal, for in Homer over half the examples of XQVtake ae or
fie and there is none with a plural pronoun1).
PL Lgs. 716b 6: xi x($ àqâv f} ôiavoeïo&ai xal xi pi} xov ë/j,(pQova,
to which Clinias replies : œç xœv avvaxoXovûrjaovxœv èoo/ievovxa>êeco
ôeï ôiavofjôrjvm nâvxa àvôqa. If Clinias had. repeated ôqàv he would
have stuck to XQV> and ^ the verb had not been ôiavorj'frfjvcu, nâvxa
would have xQV (see below). 737 cl - 3: xov avxœv
âvôga required
ôyxov xov acid/too ôeï xàtjaoêai, noaov elvai xgecov. 885b 1 : xl xoft
nàaxeiv, but b3: Qt]xêovâ ôeï nâoxeiv. 933d 6: b'xiXQ^I na&eïv f} àjco-
xo
xeïacu, xifiâxconeql avxov ôocaoxrJQiov, but e5 : xifxaxcoxo ôixaaxrjoiov
8 xl âv avxoïç ôeïv avxôv ôé£fl nàoxeivf) àjtoxiveiv (cf. 979c 2, 5).
Xen. 8ymp. 4 .47 : ênegcoxcoaixoèç iïeovç xl xe XQV*<**> ™ <*>XQV
noieïv, but 48: arj/talvovolfiot . . . â xe ôeï nal â ov XQV noieïv. That
XQYj is used as well here indicates how much noieïv demands xQV'y
cf. Cyrop. 1.6.46; Mem. 4.3.12,8.1).
One consequence of ôeV&restriction to a certain kind of question
is its predilection for negative sentences: ânoocov, ëtprj,ô xi xoti
noieïv. âXX3ovôév, ë(prjô Kvqoç, ânooeiv ae ôeï (Xen. Cyrop. 3.1.6). ôeï
is also, because of its stress on the situation or setting of an action,
far more often than xQVused in the prodosis of conditional sen-
tences: el o'Svôeï xal ifiiv ôirjytfoao&ai,xavxa XQ^noieïv (PL Symp.
172 c 1- 2). If XQVappears with el, it often indicates a choice
("whether"): ôlxa êy)t](pia/xév(ov el xQ^io&zoïç à[ivveiv (Th. 1.40.5;
cf. 119; contrast 144.3). The only early example of XQVin an inscrip-
tion is from 387/6: elxe XQ^Ixa&iaxdvai . . . eïxe avxoxqdxoqa elvai
(Dittenberger, 73,11.16 - 17)2). xQV>furthermore, is almost exclu-
sively the required word in nôxeqov . . .f) . . . sentences, and because
of the "subjective" character of any choice, xQ^Ialgeloâcu is equally

!) Cf. Kent, B. G., JAOS 1946, 44-49.

2) Cf. And. de red. 7; Isocr. Pg. 177; PL Prtg. 313b 4; Rep. 484o4 (cf.
b6); Lgs. 878e8 (cf. 861c 8).

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288 S. Benardete

mandatory1). One could crudely say that active and passive verbs
take del and middles XQV(<£ Redard, p. 41): &v XQVoTo%A£eo&ai
xal 7CSQÎ à del diaxQipeiv(Isocr. ad Nic. 6).
There are four kinds of verbs that almost always take XQV*n
Plato, and the same holds (but less stringently) for all writers before
Demosthenes.
1) Verbs of knowing, believing, and thinking (eîôévcu, oïea&ai,
tfyelo&ai, nefôeo&ai, nioxeveiv). That vo^iÇeivtakes del quite often
seems to be due to its denominative vo/lcoç,which "objectifies" as
it were the thinking or believing, even though in most passages
vo[ii£ei,vhardly bears a trace of its origin. Plato, moreover, seems
to have introduced an innovation of his own. Because ôidvota and
vovç are for Plato not subjective, diavoelo&ai,voelv, and êvvoelvoften
take del2). It is simply thinking and not one's own thinking that
these verbs express. It is perhaps not accidental, therefore, that
Plato has Gorgias say xQW> èwoelv (Grg. 458b 8).
2) Verbs of assertion, naming, praise and blame3). One says xQ^I
tpdvai but del Xéyeiv, since Myeiv is the utterance of a Xoyoçand not
the affirmation of one: xovxo tf/ulvxQ^i<pàvaixal xi\v xov vofdo/iaxoç
âneQyâÇeo&ai dvva/Mv, xal xov ë/MtoQovêni rovrœ xex&x$aidslMyeiv {Lgs.
918b4 - 6)4). <mo<paiveiv and the like also take del: aavrw ngooéxcov
ônmç ftrjdèv noQaxogdielc &v del <f ajtodelCai . . . q>lXovçyàq XQVVt1*
ôvofiâÇeiv(At. Ec. 294- 299). When Xéyeiv means to "name", how-
ever, it too takes XQV ' *àv
(aareqa) de /uerà rwtov (Kqôvov)pqadvxrjri
Uyeiv XQV Aiôç (Epin. 987c 5- c [cf. b7]; cf. Tht. 198el; Tim. 49b 3).
Aeschylus in the Frogs says that the poet should (jfgij)conceal from
view the base but "we" must (del) speak (Uyetv) good and useful
things (1053, 1056).

!) Lys. 1.34; 2.33; 3.36; 6.25; 28.10; Isocr. Ph. 100; Xen. Hipp.2.3;
PI. Tim.55c8; Arist. de an. 402M2.
a) Phaedo75a 11; Crat.399a6; Phaedr.210c 10; Rep. 578o9 (cf. c5);
Tim.56b 7, 58c 5, 64c 8, 84c 8, 90a3; Lgs. 733c 7, d2, 3, 737e7, 762el (cf. e3),
798b4, 804a4, 805d2, 856b5.
<pàvcu:Tht. 197e2; PU. 269e8; Prm. 130c4, 7; Chrm. 163c5; Rep.
8) XQ^I
547a5; Lgs 643bl, 819a8, 822d2, 824a20, 831cl, d2; Epin. 981c5, e2,
4, 982a8. xtâ nQooayogeveiv,xaMv: Sph.220<>5,d2, 237cl; Phib.63b2;
Phaedr.266c2; Rep. 422e7 (cf. éMd±);Lg8. 713a2;808a3, 5, 841e5, 872el;
Eur. Md.61; Ar. fr. 327; Pherecr. fr. 103. XQVxtfiavand the like: Symp.
212b5; Menex.237a4, 239d3; Rep.561c2; Lgs. 730el,4 (cf. 732e7),775b2,
823c 5; Epin. 984e 2.
4) Cf. Alexis fr. 27, line 1: ràç fjôovàç ôeï avKXéyeivràv oéfpqova, line 5:
rà ô' âXXaTtQooêi/jxaç ânavra XQ^lxcdeïv.

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 XPHandAEIin Platoand Others 289

3) Procedural xQVywhich makes its first appearance in Pindar

when he talks about his own doing1), characterizeswhat the inter-
locutors should do to further their discussion. In the RepublicXQV
tends to be found either where another speaker takes over the
argument, or, if the speaker remains the same, a new argument is
introduced: 319b 2 (beginning of argument), 376el (change of
speaker), 394dl (unique optative in Plato, according to Wacker-
nagel, but Ep. 7 347d 6 and Euthyph.4c 8 have it too), 427e4 (change
of speaker),451b9 (new argument),462e7 (newargument),472b3,6
(new argument) 576d9,614a6 (new argument). One may compare
also the Lysis : 2 11b 6 (changeof speaker),231e 5 (changeof speaker
and argument). Some of the more common proceduralphrases are:
ovxavv XQV> XQ^I&aQQ&w2)> XQVoxoneïv or onèipao&ai(but in Demos-
an(l X($ Cr/retv.The
thenes there are 25 del gxotzbïvto two XQV)*)>
orators'equivalents for Plato's procedural%qr\ are their XQ^Ipsftvijo-
neither of which is very commonin Plato, though
êcu or êv&vfisïo&cu,
in the MenexenusSocrates, in imitating a public oration, uses XQ^I
(or something similar) seven times (Lysias has it six
/Lceftvfjaâat
times, never del), and in the Phaedrus Plato has Lysias say èvfru-
jieïo&aiXQV(233d 1; also Menex.249c 3), a phrase that occurs ten
times in Lysias' own speeches (never del)1).
That XQV(XQe(*>v) ^s so mnoh more frequent in the Laws than in
any other dialogue has something to do with the closeness of the
procedure the speakers with the subject matter of the dialogue
of
(cf. Phaedo77e 8- 78a 9). Clinias is to be a legislator for a Cretan
city, and what he, Megillus, and the Athenian Stranger are to do
correspondsto what the legislator of the city is to do (cf. 718b 1 :

x) 01. 1.103; 6.4, 27 (28 has Pindar*s unique del because the circum-
stance is emphasized, aa/xegov. . . êv ôgg); 8.74; 13.90; /. 3.7 - 8.
2) Phaedo 114d 8, 115e7; Sph. 261b5 (cf. 258b9); Ah. 1 127a9; Xflr».
649a5, 657b3; £^n. 987a7.
8) This example shows the uneven rate of decay in the uses of XQV> since
Demosthenes in many other cases preserves the older usage. The same holds
for Aristotle, who not infrequently uses question and procedural XQVm his
finished writings (dean. 415a16;£iV1098»26, 1168b10- 13; Pol. 1330*36- 41,
cf. 1335a35- 37 with 1335b26- 28). Even Polybius preserves the distinction
between moral ôeî and procedural XQV • *<" ?àç yikoyikov ôeï ehai ràv âyaâôv
âvôga xal (pMnargiv . . . ôrav ôè rfjç laroçlaç Jjêoç àvaAa/zpâvflnç, èmka&éoêai
XQ^j ndvrcovrœv roiv&rœvxtX (1.14.5).
4) Procedural xQtiis extremely common, as one would expect, in Hippo-
crates; in the Prognostikon, for example, xÇfhoxènxeaûai occurs at 2, 7, 9,
16, 18.

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290 S. Benardete

what the citizens must do {ôeï), 718b 5: what the legislator is to do

(XQYJ); also 809b7,c2; 890b3,cl).
4) An important sub-division of procedural %qr\ is xq^ ôqâv(noieïv) .
This usage along with %qi]<pdvaiis perhaps the most invariable. In
Aristophanes, for example, there are eleven xQJjôqâv to two ôeï ôqâv,
one of which is with the phrase wç ràyioxa that makes it circum-
stantial (Av. 641), while the other is in an if-clause (L. 1219); and
there are four xQVnoieïv to two ôeï noieïv, one of which is corrupt
(Th. 150), while the other deals with the law (Ec. 767). Young
Socrates' ôeï yàq ôyjnoieïv xovxo at PU. 292 d 8 fits the context, where
his œç ô Xôyoçr\iiïv nqoeiqY\xevmakes it a general procedure and not
one imposed exclusively on himself and the Stranger (cf. Tht. 164a 1 ;
Lgs. 714a8).
One says XQV<pdvaibut qyrjfiiôeïv, and %($oUa&ai but oh/nai ôeïv,
even if the character of the infinitive dependent on ôeïv should lead
one to expect XQVvaL^h*8 *s no* *° say *ka* 9*1$ XQVvaidoes not
also occur, for Xenophon seems in fact to shy away from using
ôeïv unless it takes a genitive (it is also common in Thucydides)1),
but the general feeling seems to be that tprj/itor olofxai expresses
the "subjectivity" of the necessity and hence eliminates the need
to repeat it. Here are some examples from Plato.
Lgs. 731b 3: êvfioeiôfj pèv ôij XQVnavra àvôqa elvai, nqq,ov ôè œç
on [ÀÔlicrtabut 731 d5: ôio ôij &v/ioeiôfjnoéneiv xal nqq.6vcpa/aevênâa-
rore eîvai ôeïv xov âya&ov.The change to ôeïv is also partly dictated
by the change from ndvra âvôga, which most often takes XQV(unlike
ndvraç)2), to xov âya&év.732a 1- 2 : xà aixov nqà xov âXrj&ovç àel xi\iàv
ôeïv tfyov/ievoç*ovxe yàq êavxov ovxe xà êavxov XQ^I tov ye fiéyav âvôqa
èoojuevovaxéçyeiv (cf. Tht. 176a 8, b4).
PU . 286c 5: Xèycoxolwv Sri XQVfy ftejbivrjfiévovç ê/iè xal aé, but dl :
Ô xô re ëtpapevôeïv fiefivfjauai.
I* is on those occasions where XQVan(I ^eî appear together that
the true force of each becomes most evident (see the excellent
ex ample from Demosthenes in Eedard, p. 57).
' PI. Phaedo 99 d 4- e6. Socrates is describing his disappointment
with Anaxagoras' teaching, and his opinion (ëôoÇé poi) that he
needed (ôeïv) to be on his guard lest he suffer mental blindness if
he looked directly at xà noayfiaxa or xà ovxa with his senses, and

xofivaiin Thucydides occurs at least 12 times, and in Xenophon,

x) ë<prj
in his technical opuscula, at least seven.
2) Symp. 193a8, 197e3; Lgs 731b3, 732b2, 879b2, 899a9, 916d6.

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 XPHandAEIin Platoand Others 291

his subsequentconviction (ëdolj é poi) that he should (xQVvai)examine

(oxoneïv) the truth of beings by having recourse to Xoyoi.Socrates*
bringingphilosophy out of the sky down into human affairscompels
the shift from ôsïv to xQVvac (Redard calls %Qfjo&cu an "essentially
human verb", p. 65), and what Benveniste calls *'subjective" and
"objective" thus obtains a philosophic interpretation. This passage
suffices to prove that the distinction between XQV and del in Plato
is a perfectly conscious one, and that as long as Plato wrote dialo-
gues, which are the indispensable means for conveying Socrates'
ô&vxsqoç tzàovç,it must have remained vivid to him. Perhaps this
passage explains as well why the Stranger in the Statesmansays
rjyeïo&at del when he speaks of the change that occurredin celestial
phenomena when God let go the world but vo/ulÇeiv XQVwhen he
speaks of the changes that then occurred roïç êvroç rj^lv oîxovoiv
avxov (270b 10- c5). The celestial change was tqoticovnaaœv eîvai
xaï reXecorârrjvTQonrjv,but the terrestrial changes were
jLceylarrjv
simply juéyiarcu:the lack of perfection in the human world requires
XQr\and the use of speeches1).
Euthyd.299d4- 6. Dionysodoros asks Ktesippos: âya&àov ôoxeï
col xQVval^ r' %Xeivxai nwraxov (ôoxeï usually takes X9Vvac)2)'
Dionysodorus then goes on to ask about gold: ovxovvàel del avxo
ëxeiv Tealnavraxov xai œç [iâXioxa èv éavro). The absence of the
personal pronoun necessitates the use of del. There is the same
contrast at Grito46d 7- 47a 4, where Socrates first formulates the
opinion held by some that rcov ôoÇœvâç ol âv&Qconoi ôogâÇovaivôêoi
ràç jbièvneql noXXovnoisïoiïai, ràç ôè iiy\\ but when he turns to ask
Crito's own opinion (ovx Ixavcbg doxsl aoi Xèyeadai), he says, after
having called him by name, ov ndaaç xQ^jtàç ôoijaç rœv âv&Qœncov
xi[xâvâXXàràç fxh, ràg ô' ov. The subject of n/tav is as and not some
indefinite nva.

*) Contrast rà fièv o$v èv âraÇiq, mvovjuevov âcpçov XQ^IvoplÇeiv, Ôneg œç rà

ôsï vofxiÇeivrà xarà ravrà xai dxravrcoç
noW ôqç to neqi f\ixâç Çq>ovwith ë/x<pQov
xai ôià ravrà nqârrov àei (Epin. 982 a 8, e2). The absence of XQVin the section
of the Timaeus devoted to the work of vovgand its presence in that devoted
to the effects of àvdyxtj might also be explicable along the same Unes (cf.
49b3, 50c7, e4, 55c8, d2, 62d2 (cf. d4), 68e6).
2) Phaedo 61a6, 86d9;Cra<. 396el, 397b7, 428d2;^2/m^. 177d2, 214b 10,
el, 218cl; Lchs. 180a3, 182d3, 187d5,201b2; Grg. 506a6, 527d3; Menex.
237a 4, 239c 5. One should perhaps say not that ôoxeï takes xQVvatbut that
ôoxeï preserves the XQV*^at would have been used in any case, for ôoxeï
seems to be felt even if it governs an infinitive as parenthetical. Such an
explanation would account for tprjfiixQVvat°& well*

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292 S. Benardete

Âel has two disparate uses: when the sentence is general and
when the sentence involves particular circumstances. It is not used
if the sentence gives a particular example. At Grito 47b 5 <pof}elo&ai
XQtjis in order because the fear is fear of the doctor or trainer, but
when Socrates later generalizes about how one should only fear
and respect the knowers and not the many, he uses Set (47dl - 2).
Gratylus 425c 4- 5: el fjiévxi XQfjv[ëàei] avxà dieXêoftaieïxe àXXov
ôvxivovveïxe rifiàç, oiïxcoç ëôei avxà ôiaiQeïoêai (xQrjoxàvëôec: corr.
Ast). The aorist ôœAéo&aiindicates that it is the performance of a
single act of division that is in view, the present ôiaioeïo&at that
it holds on every occasion that such a division is made, with the
eïxe . . . eïxe clause showing that the prodosis makes the subject's
activity the important thing, whereas the apodosis is generally
applicable regardless of who performs the divisions (cf. 424 c 5, 425 a 7
and the whole context).
Philebus 24 e 7- 25 a 4. Everything that admits the more and less,
Socrates tells Protarchus, etc xo xov àjieioov œç eiç êv del nâvxa xavxa
xiêévcu, in accordance with the previous argument in which ëcpapev
o'oa ôiéonaoxai xai bièo%iox(iiowayayévxaç XQVvatnaxà ôéva/iiv juiav
èmarjjbialveaêaixiva qwaiv. What compels the change from del to
XQfjvaiis the stress on the activity of Socrates and Protarchus,
which the phrase xaxà ovvapw underlines. The first clause declares
that the more and less require their placement in the class of the
indefinite, but the second clause makes the discovery of a single
nature the task of Socrates and Protarchus.
Phaedo 83b 5: xavxt] o$v xfj Xvoei ovx olo/Ltévrj ôeïv èvavxiovod'curj
xov œç âArj&œçcpiXoootpov ipvxtf-oîo/uévr]ôeïv, as we have remarked,
is normal, but at 84a 3: ovx âv oîrj&eir] (yrvxtfàvôgoç <pdoao<pov)xrjv
fièv <pdooo(piavXQVVCLI o.vxr\vXvew. XQVvac i&required because "philo-
sophy" is the personified subject (cf. Redard's analysis of Her.
IV. 50.2, p. 40), while the soul of a philosopher is impersonal.
Statesman 268 d 8- e2. The Stranger first discloses the need (del
nQooxQrjoo.o'd'cu) of a myth at this point of the dialogue without
any regard for young Socrates' opinion (cf. d5), and he turns his
declaration into a question by asking, ovxovv XQV>(cf. 287 c 2, 4).
Similarly aùPhlb. 55d7 - 9, Socrates' ôeï vofxlÇetv,which makes the
statement general, acquires a "subjective" turn in Protarchus'
agreement, ovxovv XQV(cf. Tht. 184a 8- b3).
How the presence or absence of the vocative can determine
whether XQT\ or àeï will be used appears most clearly in comparing
two passages in the Laws. (pYifzi, œ nalàeç Kqtjxcôv,XQVvat Kvœaiovç . . .

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 XPH and AEI in Plato and Others 293

Hoivfi fiera rœv âyixojLiévcov elç rrjv awoixlav ravrrjv . . . aÎQeïo&cu

-
(752e4 - 7), but héyco dtf, xa&âneQ elnov wvôyj ôiç yàq ré ye xalov
- Kvcoaiovç ôeïv
çrjiïèv ovôèv fiXârtrei ènifieXrj^fjvai nâvrcov rovrcov
-
xoivfj, nQoaeXofiévovç rœv elç rijv ànovxiav âyixo/tévcov (754 c 2 5;
cf. 752d4, 754c 8).
It is often remarked that XQVis 'moral' while del is not1), but
the fact that rà ôéovra could mean what we call moral duties shows
that duties were not thought of primarily as either impositions on
the person or originating in a person's 'moral sense5 (as with us)
but as requirements of the case which were there to be fulfilled.
This change in the ordinary understanding of morality is perhaps
the greatest single obstacle to our comprehension of ancient ethics.
Ethics, to put it paradoxically, were outside the sphere of the
subject. Ajax says of his son, àXKavrlx' àfioïç avrov èv vôfioiçnarqoç /
ôeï ncoÀoôdfcveiv xàt-ofioiovo&accpvotv(Aj. 548- 9), and this in spite
of the fact that in talking of himself Ajax uses xQV(480). Demo-
critus' invention of the phrase rà xQVêévra (fr. 174, 256) to designate
rà ôéovra (he employs to ôéov as well, fr. 41, 181), seems to be in
line with his penchant for strange words for familiar things (cf.
Arist. Met. 985b 13- 17); but that it never caught on shows how
alien it was to understand %qr\morally2). A passage in the Laws
confirms this. The Athenian Stranger asserts that he who is to be
a good man in anything must (<prj[tl ôeïv) practice it straight from
childhood both at play and in earnest. He then gives the example
of the housbuilder who must (xqyj)play at toy buildings; and the
attempt must be made to turn the pleasures and desires of children
-
by means of games, 61 ayixofievovc avrovç ôeï rêXoçeyeiv (643 b 4 c 8).
' ' of the - -
It is the 'objectivity' goal its being "out there" that
requires ôeï, whereas play, which has no end beyond itself but seems
an autonomous activity, requires xQV-
Laws 688 a 4- b4. The Athenian Stranger recalls that the Cretan
Clinias and the Spartan Megillus urged <hçxqeow elr\ rov vo/zoâérrjv
navra noZé/iov x^Qlv ra vâfiifJLartâèvai, but that he himself had
claimed that the legislator ôéoi ôè ôfj tcqoçTtâaav(âger^jv)/xèvflXéneiv
(cf. 688 a 2). The defective purpose of the Spartan and Cretan laws
necessarily emphasizes the actions of the legislator, but where the
laws are to be laid down in accordance with all of virtue and espe-

x) Cf. Barrett's note on Eur. Hipp. 41.

2) That in the three instances we have of rd XQVèôvra it is the object
of ëgôeiv, suggests that Democritus nominalized the xQ^I^ ^e procedural
phrase â xqtj ëqôeiv,which would be the Ionic form of â XQ^I
ôgâv.

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294 S. Benardete

cially of wisdom, the legislator is completely guided by what is true

1169b 1- 2).
and no private opinion of his own interferes (cf.Arist.i?JVr
Two non-Platonic examples of the opposition between %qyjand
del may be added. Isocrates' Nicocles claims that he admires Saoi
ôiôdaxovai rovç re ôwaarevovraç, œç del rœ nfaj&eixQfjo&ai,xal rovç
îômotolç,œç xqij tiqoç rovç âq%ovïaçdiaxelo&ai (10). He then goes on:
xov pèv oiïv ëregov, œç XQVrvoavvelv, ïooxoàrovç rjxovoare, rov d9
èxàjitevov,â del noielv rovç âQxojnévovç,êyœ neigâco/xai diek&elv(11).
How the rulers need to handle the ruled is first opposed to how
the ruled should behave toward their superiors, but then, from
Nicocles' own point of view, Isocrates' address to him concerned
how he Nicocles should rule, while he himself will explain what
are the needs that the ruled must fulfill. Nicocles the ruler sees
the duties of the ruler under the aspect of XQVand those of the
ruled under that of del, but non-rulers who are teachers like Iso-
crates necessarily have the inverse perspective1).
Xenophon records a conversation that Alcibiades had with
Pericles (Mem. 1.2.40 - 46). Alcibiades asks Pericles what law is,
and Pericles replies that all those are laws which ro nAfj&oç,when
it has assembled and approved them, inscribe, (podÇovâ re del noielv
xal â [xrj.Does to nXfj&oçhold (vojuioav),Alcibiades asks, that râya&à
ôelv noielv f} rà xaxâ. Pericles says, râyaM. Alcibiades then asks
what they are if not ro nXrj&oçbut an oligarchy should inscribe
8 ri xQ^inoielv. Pericles answers, "Everything that the ruling part
of the city deliberates on and inscribes â xQVnoielv, vo\xoçxaXelrai.
Alcibiades then asks if those are law which a tyrant inscribes rolç
noUraiç â XQVnoielv; and Pericles again says that they are called
law. One sees at once that Pericles first used ro nhfj&oças equivalent
to the city as a xoivov, and not as another name for the demos (cf.
4.4.13), but that Alcibiades shifts and brings out its meaning by
opposing it to oligarchs and tyrants. It is for this reason that
Pericles' del becomes Alcibiades' XQVas soon as the partiality or
self-interest of the rulers becomes evident. Pericles' v6[àoçxcdelrai
for the decrees of oligarchs and tyrants, but his vôjjloieïaiv for those
of rà nArj&oç,reflect his uneasy awareness of this difference, even
though he soon proves to be unable to answer Alcibiades, since
he is finally unwilling to admit that ro nkffôoç as demos is not the
whole city (45; cf. 4.6.12).

x) Isocrates has another good example of the self-interest inherent in

XQijand the objective need in ôeï'.tinéôeii-eToïç êmyiyvopévoiç, fie&9&»%Q?\Kal
Ttgàç oi)ç ôsï roùç noXéfxovç èx(péç>eiv(Ph. 111).

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 XPHandAEIin Platoand Others 295

We are now in a position to understand a number of plays and

dialogues where xQV(det)occurs once or twice in the midst of many
instances of del (xqv)- That the relation between xQVan(I àeï does
not by itself carry the weight of the works in which they appear
hardly needs saying, but it does reflect in the following examples
some of the meaning of the whole.
In PrometheusBound Kratos says to Hephaestus about Prome-
theus: Toiâoôé roc âjuagriaç oye ôeï dsoïç ôovvai ôixrjv (8 - 9). ôeï
occurs this once, while throughout the rest of the play only XQV
and xQe(»v(19 times). Plato's Euthyphroseems to indicate that ôeï
ôixrjvôMvai is normal (8b 8, c2, 7, d5; cf. Eut. 2?a.489). It plainly
is a legal term. Kratos, whom we call a personification,sees Pro-
metheus' punishment in terms of law. And yet there is in fact no
law in a real sense in the play, for Zeus' laws lack two of the most
ordinary traits of the law: they are neither xoivovnor old. Zeus'
laws are ïôiotvojjloiand veox^oivopot(150, 402). Kratos, then, points
to the region where the reconciliationbetween Zeus and Prometheus
will take place: Bia, who is silent in the first scene, will be moder-
ated by law. She will be replaced by the union of fita and vé/toç,
which is the core of xgâxoç1).If this interpretation is correct, the
presence of ôeï ôixrjvôovvaiat the beginning of the play parallels
that of the technical term âvxvôixoçat the beginning of the Aga-
memnon(41), the full meaning of which only emerges at the end
of the trilogy (cf. Fraenkel ad loc).
The connection between véfioçand ôeï is illustrated in another
way in the Ecclesiazousae.An old woman sings a song by which she
hopes to entice a young man to come to her: eï xtç âya&àvfiovXexai
naûeïv xi, natf ejxoi XQVxa&evôetv. ov yàq èv véouç xo aocpov ëveoxiv,
âXKèv raïç neneiQau; (893- 896). Since she pretends that it is to a
young man's advantage to sleep with her, the necessity is presented
as a personal obligation; but when the young man Epigenes does
appear and refuses to accompany her, she appeals to a decree, xa&
8 oe ôeï fiaôiÇeivœç ê/ié (1013). The appeal to the law makes the
compulsion general and independent of Epigenes' own inclinations
(cf. 700, 762, 767, 779, 939, 1008, 1050, 1098); and so again the
third old woman says to him, è[ioï yàg âxoÀov&eïvoe ôeï xaxà xov
vofjiov (1077)2).

!) Cf. Benardete, S., RhM 1964, 126-139.

2) Herodotus, in his description of the wisest and most beautiful law
among the Babylonians, says that he who promised to marry an ugly girl
for a sum of money had to (%Qijv) supply guarantors that he would in fact
Glotta XXXXIII 3/4 20

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296 S. Benardete

In Plato's Menothere are only two occasions where XQVappears

(86b 2, d8). In the first, Socrates describes what Meno should do
if he acts on the basis of what he was supposed to have learned
from the slaveboy : iïaQQovvxa XQ^I8 /ay}rvyxdveiç èmoxâ/uevoç vvv . . .
èni%eiQsïv Çrjxeïv xal âva/ÂLfivfjaxeo&ai. Socrates then reformulates
the rule for everyone: olôfievoi ôeïv Çrjxeïv â [irj nç olôev fieXxlovç âv
-
el/ÂSv. . .f) el oîà/bie&aâ //?) èniaxâ^ie&a . . . /j,rjôèôeïv t>r\xeïv(86b 7 c2).
But after Meno has shown that he has understood nothing and
wishes to consideragain whether virtue is teachable or not, Socrates,
forced to abandon the correct procedure,announces his submission
to Meno's command with xi yàç xQ^inovelv(86d3- el). Socrates'
first xofi is the first and last time he attempts to have Meno enter
the discussion as a serious participant, i.e., one who desires and
tries to learn, and his second XQV acknowledgeshis failure: Anytus
will soon be called upon (90a!)1).
The Theaetetuspresents a rather different and more complicated
case. Theaetetus shows himself throughout the dialogue as ex-
tremely reluctant to speak. When he is invited to talk with Socrates
ë/ufteve xfj ôjuoXoyia), he says, àlXà XQ^Itoioxa noielv, el ooi
{&OQQCÔV
ôoxeï (145c 6), and not simply dAAàXQVtavra novelv(cf. Socrates'
reluctance at Rep. 328b 3); and when he shortly afterwards falls
silent, Socrates has to prod him; only then does he agree to give
his opinion about what is knowledge, but he indicates that it is
still under duress: àXXà XQ^I,co Z1., ènevbr\neQijueïç xeXevexe (146c 4).
When, finally, Theaetetus does give his first definitionof knowledge,
Socrates praises him : e$ ye xal yewalcog, c5 naï' XQ^I
7^Q ovxcoç ànoycu-
vôfievovhéyeiv(151e4). The participle, as often, carries the weight
of the sentence, which also helps to explain why XQVis used instead
of ôeï with Uyeiv. Theaetetus' lack of courage requires Socrates'
constant exhortations (cf. 157d3- 5, 158a8- 9, 161a5- 6,197b 7,
204b 2- 3, 205a 1). When Theaetetus offers his second definition,

(ij fxév) do so (I. 196); but in his description of their ugliest law, he says
that every woman has to (ôeï) sit in the sanctuary of Aphrodite until she
has intercourse with a stranger; and the stranger, in turn, once he has
cast some money into her lap, has to (ôeï) invoke the goddess (199). The
beautiful law binds the bridegroom to his promise in deed, but the ugly
law disregards the will of the woman and lets the stranger fulfill the law
with a formula. With XQVone becomes obliged to enter actively into the
practice of something, with ôeï one passively submits: c&nazeo, âaroïç ïaa
you ueXerâvIeïxovraçâ ôeï xàxovovraç (Soph. OC 171- 2).
x) For this interpretation of the dialogue, see Klein, J., A Commentary
on Plato's Meno (Chapel Hill, 1965).

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 XPH and AEI in Plato and Others 297

Socrates again praises him: ovrcojnevrotXQV> & 0., Xéyetvnoofrôficoç

paXkovf\ éç to TtQcbrov&xveiç ânoxolveoêai (187b 8- 9). When, how-
ever, Theaetetus offers his third and last definition, Socrates says
no more than fj xakcbçXéyeiç(201d 4), for Theaetetus is merely
repeating a definition of knowledge that he heard from someone
else (201c 8- d 3). It is no longer his own opinion,though it is on the
declaration of one's own opinion that Socrates' maieutic art neces-
sarily depends (cf. 171d 3- 5). Theaetetus is almost exhausted
(cf. 200e2), and a 'negative' result of the dialogue now assured.
Socratesstill tries to galvanizeTheaetetus into greater spiritedness;
but though he says, axejzréovxal ov nqodoréovovrcoçâvâvôçcoçfiéyav
te xal oepvovXoyov(203e 8- 9), Theaetetus does not yet say ovxovv
XQrj.A later axeitteov of Socrates' (204b 5) gives Theaetetus the
choice of replying with either XQVor &?, but Theaetetus compro-
mises with ôeï ye ôrj,the emphasis of the particles cancelled by the
impersonality of the verb. It is only toward the very end of the
dialogue that Theaetetus says at last, ovxovvXQV ôoàv(206c 6), with-
out qualifying it with some expression of his reluctance. It is a
sign perhaps that the Stranger will be more successful with Theae-
tetus in the Sophist (cf. 225d6, 226a8, 229d7, 246a3). Socrates'
katharsisof Theaetetus' false opinions is but a necessary condition
for his being preparedto discover the sophist (cf. Sph. 230b 4- e3).
In Sophocles' Philocteteswe can observe how an entire play can
find its action reflected in the opposition of XQV&n(îàeï. Odysseus
tells Neoptolemus that he must (ôeï) be noble (50), and this "must"
recurs in the mouth of both (54, 77, 580, 587), but at the point
when Neoptolemus is to accomplish his part in Odysseus' plan, a
remark of Philoctetes- to toc avvrjêeçôo&éoei p* ëêoç (894)-
makes him hesitate: ovx old' onoi XQ^ITanoqov Toéneiv ënoç (897).
Forced to remember his f'usual way", Neoptolemus ceases to be
an instrument of rà déovta and becomes his own agent. The X9V
designates not so much the recovered morality of Neoptolemus as
his sudden recognitionthat he as himself is now involved in Philoc-
tetes' fate. Odysseus, on the other hand, who prides himself on his
-
adaptability - o$ yàq toiovtcov ôeï, toiovtôç eî[i* êyd> (1049)
employs XQVonly once, and then not of himself but of Philoctetes
(save in those
or %Qe<i>v
(1062). Philoctetes, in turn, always uses XQV
cases where del is called for- 287, 292, 418, 328, 1397), and no-
where with greater effect than when in answer to Odysseus' TqoIglv
a' eleïv ôeï xal xaraaxdxpai(tta, he replies, ovôênoTé/• ovô' rjv XQfjV*
Ttâvnaiïeïv xaxov (998- 9). Deianeira likewise never uses ôeï (six
20»

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298 BertrandHemmerdinger

times XQV and xqeiœv),whereas Heracles employs it once to describe

the obligation Hyllus has to obey the "noblest law" (7V.1175).
The rules we have suggested for the use of XQVan(ï àel are by
their very nature subject to exceptions, for they are not mutually
exclusive rules but liable to interferewith one another. A vocative,
for example, may cause an expected del to become XQV* An^ ye#k>
though it would be extravagant to claim that the exceptions prove
the rules, there is usually a reason for the choice of either that a
consideration of its context makes plain. It seems, in any case,
that it would be not wholly trivial or fruitless to test other passages
and works in their light.1)

TpayouSi et l'histoire du texte des tragiques2)

Par Bebtrand Hemmerdingeb, Paris

Le mot xqayovdiveut dire «chanson» en grec moderne. Il repré-

sente évidemment le mot ancien xqaycodia,«tragédie». Le passage
le plus significatifse trouve ... en latin, chez Suétone (c. 69- c. 1 40) :
«tragoedias quoque cantavit personatus» (Néron, 21, 3). Ce pas-
sage et quelques autres permettent à Saumaise d'écrire: «ex quibus
omnibus liquido liquet, eux recentiores Graeci rgaycoôelvcantare
dixerint.» (HistoriaAugusta,Paris, 1620, p. 353). Plus près de nous,
sans connaître la remarque de Saumaise, K. N. Sathas écrit :
«H fieroiTircoatç xœv Mtjecov XQayœôœ, XQayœôla wxl XQayœôoç êv rfj
arj/Ltaaia âôco, aa/Lia xal ipâÀxrjç (xQayovôiGxrjç) enfj^eev êv AXeÇav-
ÔQEiq» (JoTOQIXOV ÔOXLfllOV 71SQI XOV ÛeàXQOV HOl XfjÇ fÂOVCFMfjÇ XCOV

BvÇavxivœv,Venise, 1878, p. at-'note 1). Enfin, les papyrologues

S. Eitrem et Leiv Amundsen dépendent à la fois de Sathas (qu'ils
ne citent pas) et, de la façon la plus indirecte, de Saumaise: «Perfor-
mances of this kind [= of Hellenistic virtuosi] lie behind the expres-

1) Apparent equivalence between xQij&nd ôeï can be deceptive, ei ôè %Q£àv

eon rexfiaiQÔfxevovkèyew, with which Herodotus begins a sentence, seems to
be the same as el rovroiai rexfiaiçôfievovdel Myeiv, with which he resumes it
after he has given the rexfiirJQia(I. 57. 1- 2) ; but the %Qe^condition intro-
duces a procedure (i.e., XQ€°Vrex/ialgeoêai) while the del condition prefaces a
conclusion (i.e. ôeï kéyeiv).
2) Le présent article doit beaucoup au constructive criticism de B. Snell.

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