Attorney-at-law / Lawyer (APD)

• that class of persons who are licensed of cers of the court empowered to appear,
prosecute, and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities, and
liabilities are developed by law as consequence (Cui v. Cui)

Legal Prof Reviewer

Attorney-in fact (ASN)
by Ari. :) • an agent whose authority emanates from a Special Power of Attorney
and is not necessarily a lawyer.
Lawyer - is a person who is qualified to advise people about the law and represent them in
court. Qualified - Trained (4 years in law school) & Licensed by the Supreme Court (Bar exam),
and have taken their oath.

Counsel de parte - is an attorney retained by a party litigant, usually for a fee, to prosecute or
defend his cause in court. The term implies freedom of choice either on the part of the attorney to
decline or accept the employment or on the part of the litigant to continue or terminate the retainer at any
time.

Counsel de officio - is an attorney appointed by the court to defend an indigent defendant in

a criminal action or to represent a destitute party in a case.

Amicus Curiae - one (such as a professional person or organization) that is not a party to a particular
litigation but that is permitted by the court to advise it in respect to some matter of law that directly
Amicus Curiae (AID)
affects the case in question • Attorney that is impartial and experienced, invited by the Court to appear as amici curiae to
help in the disposition of issues submitted to it. (Rule 138, Sec. 36, ROC)

Practice of Law - Practice of law means any activity in or out of court which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.

Moral Turpitude - A phrase that describes wicked, deviant behavior constituting an immoral,
unethical, or unjust departure from ordinary social standards such that it would shock a
community. Moral Turpitude (JHMG)
• Everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty or good morals (Rule 138, Sec. 27, Rules of
CECILIA PAGADUAN V Civil Service Commission Court);

Cecilia (Pagaduan) filed a complaint against Rema (Salvador), the Municipal Budget Officer of
Tuguegarao City, charging the latter for falsification and misrepresentation when she stated in
her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) that she possesses the necessary budgeting qualification and
indicated therein that she performed bookkeeping and accounting functions for Veteran’s
Woodworks from 1990 to 1992 when she was never employed by the company. In her defense,
Rema averred that she was employed by Alfonso Tuzon, who was granted full management,
direct supervision and control of Veterans Woodworks’ logging operations; her name does not
appear on the VVI payroll because Tuzon’s office was independent of the original staff. Cecilia
also filed a case for falsification of public documents before the MTCC of Tuguegarao City.

In the administrative case, Rema was found liable for Simple Misconduct only and the CSC
approved her qualification as it was a “related field”. Cecilia did not appeal this ruling. The
MTCC subsequently convicted Rema for falsification of public documents; she did not appeal
this ruling, instead she applied for probation which was granted by the MTCC.

Consequently, Cecilia filed a second administrative complaint against Rema, this time for
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. In her defense, Rema alleged res judicata,
forum shopping and double jeopardy, but the case proceeded, and she adopted her defenses in the
criminal case. After hearing, the CSC Regional Office found Rema liable for conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, and imposed on her the penalty of dismissal from the service.

On appeal to the Civil Service Commission, the latter reversed and set aside the CSC RO ruling.
Thus Cecilia elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which initially sided with her, and stated
that following precedents, a conviction for falsification of public documents constitute the
offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Rema moved to reconsider. This time
around, the CA reversed itself, ruled in favor of Rema and agreed with the findings of the CSC
that the act of falsification committed by Salvador did not involve moral turpitude as it was a
mere error of judgment on her part.

Thus Cecilia elevated the case to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE - WON Rema was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude

(2) WON her conviction and eventual discharge from probation prevent another administrative
case to be filed against her.

RULING: (1) YES. Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. The crime of
falsification of public documents is contrary to justice, honesty and good morals and therefore,
involves moral turpitude. The court found that she made an untruthful statement in a narration of
facts and perverted the truth with a wrongful intent. Considering that the principal act punished
in the crime of falsification of public document is the violation of the public faith and the
destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, the elements of the administrative offense of
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude clearly exist in this case.

(2) NO. Probation does not erase the effects and facts of conviction, but merely suspends the
penalty imposed. The purpose of the Probation Law is to save valuable human material, unlike
pardon, probation does not obliterate the crime for which the person under probation has been
convicted. The reform and rehabilitation of the probation cannot justify her in the government
service. Furthermore, probation only affects the criminal liability of the accused and not her
administrative liabilities, if any. Petition: Granted.

P.D NO. 968 Section 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application at any time of
said defendant, suspend the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for
such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.
-
ATTY. POLICARPIO CATALAN JR., vs. ATTY. JOSELITO SILVOSA
A.C. No. 7360 July 24, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Catalan filed a case for disbarment against Respondent Atty. Silvosa on the
following grounds: 1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for
which he previously appeared as prosecutor; 2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague
Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio for P30,000 and 3) the Sandiganbayan convicted respondent in a
criminal case for direct bribery.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private counsel in a case where he previously
appeared as public prosecutor, hence violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
responsibility. Atty Catalan alleged that the respondent and the accused are relatives and have the
same middle name. In a case for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was a
respondent. Prosec Toribio testified Atty. Silvosa, while still a public prosecutor, offered her
P30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the charge of murder. Atty. Catalan also presented
the Sandiganbayan’s decision in a criminal case convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on
May 18, 2006.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was only for the purpose of reinstatement of bail and
denies any relationship between the accused. Atty. Silvosa dismisses at the same time the
allegations of Prosec. Toribio and such allegations were “self - serving” and purposely dug by
Atty. Catalan and his puppeteer to pursue persecution. While admitting of his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan, respondent asserts that “conviction under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the
Bribery of public of cial
Revised Penal Code do not involve moral turpitude.

IBP FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION:

Reprimand- dismissed from work

The IBP ruled that respondent was guilty only of the first charge by appearing and filing a
motion to post bail bond pending appeal and thus violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and gave the penalty of reprimand. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the report and recommendation however modifying the penalty to suspension from the
practice of law for 6 months.

ISSUES:
WON respondent should be disbarred for doing a crime involving moral turpitude

HELD:

Yes. The respondent is guilty of violating Rule 6.03. Rule 6.03 which states that “A lawyer shall
not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service.”

When the evidence against him was shown; the one he was found guilty of extortion and was
convicted by the SandiganBayan, Atty. Silvosa himself admitted, against his interest, that he is
under probation.
extortion-the act of getting something by force or threat

Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude is
defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust
act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious
intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and
society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a
betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted
rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime
involving moral turpitude.

Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa's conviction of the crime. The court
imposed a penalty more severe than suspension because it found that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed
to flout the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar. His
excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is
unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The practice of law
is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise this privilege.

JOSELITO SILVOSA is disbarred and his name is ordered stricken in the roll of attorneys.

Re: Decision Dated March 17. 2011 in Criminal Case No. SB-28631, People of the
Philippines Former Prosecutor Joselito Barrozo
motu proprio- On his own impulse
This disbarment case against former Assistant Public Prosecutor Joselito C. Barrozo (respondent)
is taken up by this Court motu proprio by virtue of its power to discipline members of the bar
under Section I1 Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Jennie Valeriano (Valeriano) was a respondent in several cases for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 which were assigned to respondent as Assistant Public Prosecutor of Dagupan
City, Pangasinan. According to Valeriano, the respondent told her that he would resolve the cases
in her favor in exchange for P20,000.00. Hence, Valeriano went to the Office of Regional State
Prosecutor to report the matter. The Regional State Prosecutor introduced her to agents of the
NBI who, after being told of respondent's demand, immediately planned an entrapment
operation. During the operation conducted on February 15, 2005, the respondent was caught
red-handed by the NBI agents receiving the amount of P20,000.00 from Valeriano.

A case for direct bribery under paragraph 2, Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code was filed
against the respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City. The case, however, was
later on endorsed to the Sandiganbayan as respondent was occupying a position with a salary
grade of 27 or higher. Sandiganbayan then found the respondent guilty. Respondent's MRs and
petition for certioraris were denied.

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter from Wat & Co. of Hong Kong stating
that its client in Hong Kong received a letter from the Philippines signed by "Atty. Joselito C.
Barrozo," asking for long service payment from the employers of domestic helper Anita G.
Calub who passed away on March 4, 2013. Upon checking online and discovering that said
person was convicted of direct bribery, Wat & Co. requested the OBC to inform it if the
respondent is still a lawyer qualified to practice law.

Prompted by Wat & Co.'s letter, the OBC inquired from the Department of Justice (DOJ)
whether respondent is still connected thereat. In reply, the DOJ informed OBC that respondent
had already resigned from his position. On November 15, 2012, OBC wrote Wat & Co. to
confirm that respondent was indeed convicted of direct bribery by final judgment and that the
Philippine Court has yet to rule on his disbarment.

In view of the foregoing and considering that respondent's conviction is a ground for disbarment
from the practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the Court through a
Resolution dated December 11, 2013 required respondent to comment on why he should not be
suspended/disbarred from the practice of law.

Answer:
Respondent identified the issue in this case as whether he can engage in the practice of law
despite his conviction. He then argued that he did not engage in the practice of law as his act of
signing the claim letter does not constitute such practice. He averred that he signed it not for any
monetary consideration, but out of his sincere desire to help the claimants. And since there is no
payment involved, no lawyer-client relationship was established between him and the claimants.
This therefore negates practice of law on his part.

OBC Recommendations:
OBC recommended disbarment of the respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not disbarment is proper in this case
Ruling: Yes. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, one of the grounds for the
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. And
with the finality of respondent's conviction for direct bribery, the next question that needs to be
answered is whether direct bribery is a crime that involves moral turpitude.

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all
lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only
to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry
in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is
burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.

Hence, for committing a crime which does not only show his disregard of his oath as a
government official but is likewise of such a nature as to negatively affect his qualification as a
lawyer, respondent must be disbarred from his office as an attorney.

Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys.

MERCURIA D. SO v. MA. LUCILLE P. LEE, BM No. 3288, 2019-04-10

On May 19, 2017, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter from Mercuria D. So
(So) alleging that Lee is a defendant in Civil Case No. 740 and is not fit for admission to the Bar
considering her irresponsible attitude towards her monetary obligations. Attached in the said
letter was a copy of the Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money So had filed against Lee.

In her Comment, Lee claimed that she was unaware of the pendency of Civil Case No. 740 as
she learned of it only when she registered for the oath taking. She admitted that she obtained a
P200,000.00 loan from So but had already paid a total of P140,000.00 for 10 months. Lee
explained that due to the losses her business suffered, she failed to pay the subsequent monthly
payments. She pointed out that she did not intend to evade her obligation to So, but had asked the
latter to give her ample time to settle it.

The OBC noted that Lee was an applicant of the 2016 Bar Examinations and in her application,
she declared that a civil case was filed against her on January 29, 2014 docketed as Civil Case
No. 1436 titled "Nonoy Bolos v. Ma Lucille Lee Jao" for collection of sum of money. It
highlighted that Civil Case No. 1436 pertained to the several loans Lee had incurred with Joseph
"Nonoy" Bolos (Bolos) in the aggregate amount of P1,450,000.00."... the Court held in abeyance
Lee's request to be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys in view of the pendency of Civil Case
Nos. 740 and 1436, and required her to manifest the status of the aforementioned cases.
Lee manifested that Civil Case No. 740 had been dismissed in view of the Compromise
Agreement she had entered into with So. She manifested that she already paid So in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the approved Compromise Agreement. In her March 2019
petition, Lee reiterated the dismissal of Civil Case No. 740 and the satisfaction of her obligation
in accordance with the Compromise Agreement with So. In addition, she noted that a Judgment
by Compromise had been issued dismissing Civil Case No. 1436 in view of the Compromise
Agreement she had executed with Bolos. It was agreed upon that Lee would pay Bolos at least
P15,000.00 a month starting one month after she signs the Roll of Attorneys.

The OBC recommended that Lee be allowed to retake the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of
Attorneys subject to the condition that she inform the Court within one month from the time she
has made her first payment of P15,000.00 to Bolos and to inform the Court upon full payment of
the debt in accordance with the terms and conditions of the compromise.

ISSUE: WON LEE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH AND
SIGN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

RULING: Yes. The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those
who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege.

As defined, acts tainted with moral turpitude are of such gravity that manifests an individual's
depravity or lack of moral fiber. As such, the pendency of a civil case alone should not be a
deterrent for successful Bar examinees to take their Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of
Attorneys especially since not all charges or cases involve acts evincing moral turpitude. The
facts and circumstances of each case should be taken into account to establish that the applicant's
actions tarnished his or her moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.
Jeopardized-put someone into position in which there is a loss, threat or harm
If it were otherwise, one's entitlement to be a member of the legal profession would be seriously
jeopardized by the expedient filing of civil cases, which do not necessarily reflect one's moral
character.
Thus, the pendency of Civil Case Nos. 740 and 1436 against Lee is not enough reason to prevent
her from taking her Lawyer's Oath and signing in the Roll of Attorneys. The existence of these
civil cases alone does not establish that she committed acts tainted with moral turpitude.
In sum, the pendency of civil cases alone should not prevent successful Bar examinees to take
their Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys, unless the same involves acts or omissions
which had been previously determined by the Court to be tainted with moral turpitude.
WHEREFORE, the Court adopts the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant to
ALLOW Ma. Lucille P. Lee to retake the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to
the condition that she: (a) notify the Court within one (1) month from making her first monthly
payment to Joseph Bolos; and (b) inform the Court upon full satisfaction of her monetary
obligation in accordance with the terms and conditions of the January 29, 2019 Judgment by
Compromise.
-

Republic vs Marcos

FACTS: RTC acting as a probate court in Special Proceeding, issued an Order granting letters
testamentary in solidum to respondents Marcos upon filing of bond by the Marcos. Petitioner
Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration in so far as the RTC Order
granted letters testamentary to respondents. This motion was denied by the RTC. Petitioner filed
with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Ruled 45 of the Rules of Court,
questioning the aforementioned RTC Orders granting letters testamentary to respondents. But
this Court referred the petition to the CA since it was the latter who has jurisdiction concurrent
with this Court over the Case. Subsequently, CA issued a Decision, dismissing the referred
petition for having taken the wrong mode of appeal. CA’s basis was Supreme Court Circular
2-90. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Petitioner then
files this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S:
1) WON it was proper for the petitioner to appeal the case directly to SC.
2) WON respondents Marcos can act and serve as executors

HELD:
1) NO. Supreme Court Circular 2-90, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948
provides the instances for a direct appeal to the Supreme court from the RTC and all those
instances provide that the subject matter involved must be a question of law only and no
questions of fact. In the present case, petitioner Republic seeks to determine of whether or not
respondents should be disqualified to act as executors. This subject matter is a question of fact.
Also, the above-mentioned provision clearly shows that the other subject matter of therein
petition, that is, the propriety of granting letters testamentary to respondents, do not fall within
any ground which can be the subject of a direct appeal to this Court.

Furthermore, the filing of the case directly with this Court runs afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will
not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.
Hence, the proper remedy of petitioner Republic was to appeal to the CA, not to this Court.
2) YES. Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who are incompetent to serve as
executors and Marcos does not fall in any of those grounds. Respondent Marcos does not
specifically fall in the ground of “want of integrity” and “conviction of an offense involving
moral turpitude” (these are the grounds raised by the petitioner) since there are no evidence on
record, oral or documentary, to substantiate and support the said allegation that respondent
Marcos have been convicted of a number of cases.
Also, the cases filed against Imelda Marcos have been reversed by this Court. Hence, the
so-called "convictions" against respondent Imelda Marcos cannot serve as a ground for her
disqualification to serve as an executor.
As to the eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand Marcos, CA acquitted respondent
Ferdinand Marcos II of all the four charges. He appealed his conviction relating to four
violations of Section 45 of the NIRC hence those cases should not serve as a basis to disqualify
him to be appointed as an executor of the will of his father. More importantly, even assuming
that his conviction is later on affirmed, the same is still insufficient to disqualify him as the
"failure to file an income tax return" is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
-
EDGAR Y. TEVES, Petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO
G. TEVES

Facts:

Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of
Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. Respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a
petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, he was convicted
of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section
89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991.

Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because he was
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office. The COMELEC First Division disqualified the petitioner
from running for the position of member of the House of Representatives and ordered the
cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy. Upon MR, COMELEC en banc denied the motion
saying that since petitioner lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections, it thereby
rendered the instant MR moot and academic.

Issue: Whether petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.
Held: No.

The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a
public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or
by law.

Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A.
3019. The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The
second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.

In Teves v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having
pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local
Government Code of 1991. The evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner
Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question.

Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife,
still he would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent
Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their
property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.

Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section
89(2) of the LGC of 1991.

However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involves
moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute
must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves
immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.

The Court clarified that not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this
reason that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine."
In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes
mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not.
Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by
law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral.
The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude.

Consequently, considering all circumstances, the Court held that petitioner’s conviction does not
involve moral turpitude.

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution
categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is
left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit.

In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it
without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever
reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits
lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own
wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse.