Ramification of FM 3-0 Operation on company level leadership

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 A Ramification of FM 3-0 Operation on Company Level Leadership

Field manual (FM) 3-0 operations, enacted in 2017, revolves around a strategic

framework involving shaping, deterrence, seizing the initiative, dominating, stabilizing, and

enabling civil authority. The new framework seeks to address and prioritize stability and

counterinsurgency operations against peer threats, specifically China, Russia, North Korea, and I

ran. Although the army has not yet mastered the tactical doctrine of FM 3-0, implementation of

the strategy has undoubtedly paid off, consequentially leading to changes in the army leadership.

FM 3-0 Has sparked a conversation around the U.S. maneuver strategy. As defined by the

doctrine, reconnaissance involves obtaining information about the activities and resources of

threat by relevant detection methods, either observation or securing meteorological or geographic

problems. Currently, as it stands, the Russian defense system questionably enjoys air superiority

due to its Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) at virtually every tactical level. The IADS

features 16 unmanned aircraft with an operational range between 200 km to 500 km, which poses

a threat to the three U.S. Aircraft that can operate around 150 km.1 The Russian fire capabilities

are comparatively superior as compared to the U.S. The Russian force structure and tactical

Battalion create an advantage for the enemy due to the higher standard of artillery rounds2.

Therefore, FM 3-0 has forced the U.S. to evaluate these factors and make the required changes.

1
Fishburne, Sam, Joe Dumas, Benjamin Stegmann, and Jim Burds. "Field Manual 3-0: Doctrine

Addressing Today’s Fight." Military Review 9 (2019).

2
Fishburne, et al., Field Manual 3-0: Doctrine Addressing Today’s Fight." (1)
 Therefore, the FM 3-0 has prompted several changes in the leadership positions. First,

how information is dissipated and integrated has been changed. According to FM 3-0,

"information is a weapon against the enemy and control, and it is a means to affect enemy

morale."3 This statement is especially true when applied to the situation in 2014 where the

Russian forces disseminated the ambiguous "There were no Russian forces in Ukraine."4 This

statement created ambiguity and confusion, effectively disrupting operational security at various

levels. Similar calls have been reported in various propaganda reports, which have in the past

cause strife in the U.S. army. Therefore, FM 3-0 has been prompted the need to fight propaganda

by creating narratives of truth and honesty, especially from those in leadership positions.

Second, the adoption of large-scale combat operations is stipulated in FM 3-0, has prompted the

subtle transition from AirLand Battle. As Fishburne et al. (2019) stipulates, the majority of the

senior leaders of today's army started their careers during the era of AirLand Battle, specifically

during the Vietnam war. However, to effectively combat the threat of the Russian army, the U.S.

Army needed to re-strategies and capitalized on winning large-scale ground combat through

modernized training. Senior army leaders, including Gen William Depuy and V-corps

commander, Starry then initiated a dialogue that led to the advent and evaluation of "AirLand

Battle." and the need to refocus on that scale ground combat (LSCO). The LSCO influenced

leadership at the company level by the notable will transition and direction from management to

focus on ground training.

3
FM 3-0, Operations.

4
Fishburne, Sam, Joe Dumas, Benjamin Stegmann, and Jim Burds. "Field Manual 3-0: Doctrine

Addressing Today’s Fight." Military Review 9 (2019).

Third, in terms of the global operational environment, the adoption of FM 3-0 has also prompted

a conversation among those in leadership positions in the global operational environment. As

Fishburne (2019) asserts, that the likelihood for landscape ground combat and modernization

efforts of the Middle Eastern army prompts the need for an honest assessment of the army's

contribution to the national security strategy5. In this manner, similar to the LSCO, army leaders

have put more effort into maximizing large-scale ground combat operations against peer and

near-peer threats.

Conclusion

While the U.S. Army has not achieved full mastery of FM 3-0 doctrine; it has prompted some

changes within the leadership system. Those in leadership positions have become keen on

information dissemination and protection. Furthermore, there has been a noticeable shift from

AirLand Battle to LSCO.

Bibliography

Fishburne, Sam, Joe Dumas, Benjamin Stegmann, and Jim Burds. "Field Manual 3-0: Doctrine

Addressing Today's Fight." Military Review 9 (2019).

5
Fishburne, Sam, Joe Dumas, Benjamin Stegmann, and Jim Burds. "Field Manual 3-0: Doctrine
Addressing Today’s Fight." Military Review 9 (2019).
FM 3-0, Operations.