B O U N D A R I E S AS D E P E N D E N T P A R T I C U L A R S

Roderick M . C H I S H O L M
B r o w n University

Introduction

Stephan K ö m e r has noted that one way o f drawing u p a theory o f

categories w i l l divide all particulars " i n t o (a) a class o f independent
particulars, i.e. particulars w h i c h are ontologically fundamental, and
( b ) a class o f dependent particulars, i.e. particulars w h i c h are n o t on-
tologically fundamental."^ The dependent particulars m i g h t be said
t o be "parasitical u p o n " the fundamental particulars.
I shall here discuss the nature o f spatial boundaries, viewing them
as dependent particulars.

What are Boundaries^

Frege observes: "One o f t e n calls the equator an imaginary {ge-

dachte) line, b u t i t w o u l d be wrong t o call i t a line that has merely
been thought up {erdacht). I t was n o t created by thought as the
result o f a psychological process, but is o n l y apprehended or grasped
by thought. I f its being apprehended were a matter o f its coming i n t o
being, then we could n o t say anything positive about the equator f o r
any time p r i o r t o this supposed coming i n t o being."^ Suarez had
said, o f the outer surfaces o f a b o d y , that they are genuine entities
distinct f r o m the b o d y i t s e l f A n d evidently he held that G o d could
preserve the boundaries o f a t h i n g i n separation f r o m the t h i n g (and
a^so that G o d could preserve the t h i n g i n separation f r o m its boun-
daries).^

1. Stephan Körner, Categorial Frameworks, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970, p.

p. 4.
2. Gottlob ¥xQgt, Foundations of Arithmetic, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1950,
p. 35.
3. See Hugo Bergmann, Das Philosophische Werk Bernard Bolzano, Halle:
Max Nienieyer, 1909, p. 207. Bergmann refers to Suarez'Metaphysicae Disputa-
tiones, X L , 5, Sections 37 and 4 1 .
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Are boundaries parts o f things? T o avoid a mere verbal question,

we w i l l introduce the w o r d " c o n s t i t u e n t " and say that things m a y
have t w o types o f constituent - parts and boundaries. A n d we w i l l
say that a part o f a thing is a constituent w h i c h is n o t a boundary.
Why assume, t h e n , that there are boundaries? The concept is
needed f o r the description o f physical continuity.

Contiguity and Continuity

What is i t f o r t w o things t o be continuous w i t h each other?

Let us recall an ancient p r o b l e m . "Consider t w o discrete physical
bodies t h o u g h t t o be continuous w i t h each other; the east side o f
b o d y A , say, is continuous w i t h the west side o f b o d y B . H o w is this
possible? Either ( i ) the eastmost part o f A is i n the same place as is
the westmost part o f B or (ii) no part o f A occupies the same place as
does any part o f B . I n the case o f ( i ) , we w o u l d have t w o discrete
things i n the same place. B u t this is impossible. I n the case o f ( i i ) ,
since A and B occupy d i f f e r e n t places, there is a place between the
place where A is and the place where B is. B u t i f there is a place be-
tween A and B , then A and B are n o t c o n t i n u o u s . "
Shall we say that, i f t w o things are continuous w i t h each other,
t h e n n o t h i n g can be p u t between t h e m unless at least one o f the t w o
things is moved? This w o u l d be t r u e , b u t i t is t o o broad to capture
the concept o f c o n t i n u i t y . F o r i t holds o f things that are merely con-
tiguous w i t h each other b u t w h i c h are n o t continuous w i t h each
other ( f o r example, t w o blocks pushed together). A similar objec-
t i o n applies t o the suggestion that, i f t w o bodies are continuous w i t h
each other, then there is no space between t h e m .
T h e p r o b l e m requires that we make reference t o the boundaries o f
things.
A r i s t o t l e had said:

The continuous is a species of the contiguous. I call two things continuous

when the limits of each, with which they touch and by which they are kept
together, beocme one and the same, so that plainly the continuous is found
in the things out of which a unity naturally arises in virtue of their contact.*

I f the continuous object is c u t i n half, then does the one boundary

4. AiisXoWe,Metaphysics, 1069a.
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become t w o boundaries, one t h i n g thus becoming t w o things? This is
suggested by the passage f r o m A r i s t o t l e . B u t h o w can one thing -
even i f i t is o n l y a boundary - become t w o things? A n d does this
mean that w h e n t w o things become continuous, then t w o things that
had been diverse become identical with each other, t w o things thus
becoming one thing?
Or should we say that w h e n t w o things become continuous, then
one o f the outer boundaries ceases t o be — in nihilum. This view has
been a t t r i b u t e d t o Bolzano.^ I f we t o o k this view, then we w o u l d
have t o say, o f the thing that is cut i n half, that one o f the t w o
severed halves keeps the boundary and that a new boundary comes
i n t o being w h i c h is then the boundary o f the other half. This w o u l d
seem t o be a clear case o f coming i n t o being ex nihilo. A n d w h a t is t o
determine w h i c h half gets the new boundary and w h i c h half keeps
the o l d one?
Or could i t be that one o f the halves retains the o l d boundary and
the other half is open-ended, having a side w i t h o u t a boundary —
t h o u g h n o t a side that is boundless? B u t w h a t determines w h i c h side
is t o be the one w i t h o u t the boundary? I f i t is possible f o r a thing t o
exist w i t h o u t a b o u n d a r y , w h y assume that either h a l f has a boun-
dary? A n d w h y assume that there is a boundary separating the t w o
halves o f the continuous object?
Or could i t be that, i f t w o things are i n contact, then their boun-
daries coincide or overlap? Descartes, i n speaking o f the relation be-
tween a surrounding b o d y and the body that i t surrounds, speaks o f
" t h e c o m m o n surface w h i c h is a surface that is n o t a part o f one
body rather than o f the other. This w o u l d mean that distinct
boundaries can occupy precisely the same place at the same time.
A n d i t w o u l d also mean that, strictly speaking, more than one
straight line can be extended between t w o points. This is the view
that Brentano suggests.
Let us t r y t o develop the suggestion f u r t h e r .

5. Compare Bernard Bolzano, Paradoxes of the Infinite, New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1950. See paragraph 67 (p. 168). Bolzano speaks here of cer-
tain things but not others "being devoid of limiting atoms."
6. Descartes Principless of Philosophy, Part I I , Principle XV; in E. S. Haldane
and R. T. Ross, Philosophical Works of Descartes,Vol I , Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1931, p. 261.
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Boundaries, Parts and Constituents

We w i l l make use o f the concepts o f constituent, o f de re necessity

and o f coincidence P We presuppose that there is no actual concrete
i n f i n i t e - and hence that there cannot be lines that are i n f i n i t e l y
long or bodies that extend i n f i n i t e l y i n space. The expression " x is
discrete f r o m y " is an abbreviation f o r "there is n o t h i n g that is a
constituent b o t h o f x and o f y . "
There are t w o ways o f d e f i n i n g boundary. We could appeal t o the
fact that a boundary is a dependent particular - a thing w h i c h is
necessarily such that i t is a constituent o f something. Or we could
appeal t o the f a c t that a boundary is a thing that is capable o f coin-
ciding w i t h something that is discrete f r o m i t . One o f these should be
a d e f i n i t i o n and the other an a x i o m .
Let us take the first course and say that a boundary is a dependent
particular:

D l X is a boundary in y =Df x is a constituent of y ; and every constituent of

X is necessarily such that there is something of which it is a constituent

W h y n o t say simply that a boundary is a t h i n g w h i c h is necessarily

such that i t is a constituent o f something? I n such a case, we w o u l d
have t o count as a boundary such a h y b r i d object as the sum or heap
consisting o f Venus and the t o p surface o f a certain table.
I t should be noted that we have d e f i n e d " x is a boundary in y , "
and n o t " x is a boundary of y . " The latter expression w o u l d normal-
l y be taken i n such a way that i t applies o n l y t o the outer boundaries
o f y . Thus, the expression " x bounds y " w o u l d n o r m a l l y be taken t o
abbreviate " x is a boundary o f y . " A n y boundary in y is a boundary
o / a proper part o f y.^
I have said, f o l l o w i n g Brentano, that the concept o f a boundary is

7. The concept of coincidence is used by Franz Brentano, in Philosophische

Untersuchungen zu Raum, Zeit und Kontinuum, ed., Stephan Körner and Rode-
rick M . Chisholm, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1976. Compare also Bren-
tano's Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1973; pp. 351-35%', Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Band I I ,
Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1971, pp. 259-262.
8. Brentano discusses inner and outer boundaries, Raum, Zeit und Kon-
tinuum, p. 15.
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closely related t o that o f total coincidence. I suggest that the relation
is this:

A l For every x , x is a boundary, i f and only i f , x is possibly such that there is

something w i t h which i t wholly coincides

We w i l l consider the logic o f t o t a l coincidence below.

I f we take as o u r primitive concept, that o f being a (proper) con-
stituent, then, as I have noted, we may define the concept o f a (pro-
per) part as f o l l o w s :

D2 X is a part o f y = D f x is a constituent o f y ; and x is not a boundary in y

I f we replace " c o n s t i t u e n t " f o r " p a r t " i n the usual axioms f o r the

concept o f (proper) part, we can retain the axioms o f transitivity and
i r r e f l e x i v i t y , as w e l l as that o f mereological essentialism ( f o r every x
and y , i f X is a constituent o f y , then y is necessarily such that x is
a constituent o f i t ) . B u t although we can say that every part has a
(proper) part, we cannot say that every constituent has a (proper)
constituent. F o r a p o i n t may be a constituent w i t h o u t having a con-
stituent.
The f o l l o w i n g axiom reflects the fact that boundaries are essen-
tially dependent entities:

A 2 F o r every x , y and z , i f x is a boundary in y , and i f z is a part o f y in

w h i c h X is not a boundary, then there is a part o f y discrete f r o m z in
w h i c h X is a boundary

This principle implies that every constituent o f every boundary is a

constituent o f something that is not a boundary. I t is thus incon-
sistent w i t h Suarez' suggestion, referred t o above, according t o w h i c h
G o d could remove j u s t the surface o f a three dimensional object.
The principle does n o t preclude our saying that there are h y b r i d
objects such as the sum o f Venus and a certain surface w h i c h is n o t a
surface o f Venus; b u t i t does i m p l y that, i f there are such objects,
then there are individual things w h i c h are discrete f r o m such objects.
Could G o d preserve any o f the boundaries o f a thing apart f r o m
the thing? We could say that, f o r any thing having boundaries, G o d
could destroy the thing and preserve the boundaries — by destroying
some part o f the thing such that the part did n o t contain any o f
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those boundaries. B u t he c o u l d n ' t preserve the boundaries except by
retaining some part o f the original thing.

Coincidence

We have taken as primitive the concept o f total coincidence. Let

us n o w express this concept by " x w h o l l y coincides w i t h y " ( " x W y " ) .
One a x i o m f o r this l o c u t i o n is A l above:

A l For every x, x is a boundary, i f and only if, x is possibly such that there
is something with which it wholly coincides

I n f o r m u l a t i n g additional axioms, we w i l l use the abbreviations:

" x C y " ( " x is a constituent o f y " ) ; " x D y " ( " x is discrete f r o m y " )
and " x B y " ( " x is a boundary i n y " ) .
The relation o f t o t a l coincidence is symmetrical and irreflexive:

A L I xWy->yWx
AI.2 x W y - > n ( x W x )

Hence " x W y " is not transitive. B u t i f one t h i n g w h o l l y coincides

w i t h a second thing and i f the second thing w h o l l y coincides w i t h
still a third t h i n g , then the f i r s t thing w h o l l y coincides w i t h the t h i r d
thing. I n other words:

[xWy & yWz & ~l(x=z)] - > xWz

We may also a f f i r m that, i f x w h o l l y coincides w i t h y , then every

constituent o f x w h o l l y coincides w i t h a constituent o f y :

A l .3 xWy - > {(z) (zCx) - > [(Ev) (vCy & vWz)]}

A n d i f t w o boundaries w h o l l y coincide, then they are constituents,

respectively, o f t w o things having no parts i n c o m m o n :

A l .4 xWy - > [(Eu) (Ev) (uDv & xBu & yBv)]

T o t a l coincidence may h o l d between surfaces, or between lines, or

between points, b u t i t may n o t h o l d between t w o things o f d i f f e r e n t
dimensions or between solids. I n terms o f the u n d e f i n e d concept o f
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t o t a l coincidence, we may now define the broader concept o f coin-

cidence:

D3 X coincides w i t h y = D f Either (a) x w h o l l y coincides either w i t h y or

w i t h a constituent o f y or (b) a constituent o f x wholly coincides w i t h a
constituent o f y

The first clause o f this d e f i n i t i o n insures that coincidence, unlike

t o t a l coincidence, may obtain between points and lines, between
points and surfaces, and between lines and surfaces; the second
clause insures that coincidence - b u t n o t total coincidence - may
obtain between three-dimensional things.
What, then, o f dimensionality?

Dimensionality

We now define dimensionality - assuming that things may have

either no spatial dimensions, or one such dimension, or t w o , or three.
Thus we take i t t o be a necessary t r u t h that there are exactly three
spatial dimensions.^
We w i l l n o t equate solids w i t h what is 3-dimensional. That sum
consisting o f Venus and the t o p surface o f the table is 3-dimensional,
but n o t a solid. We w i l l say, analogously, that there are no " b r o k e n
surfaces"; hence that 2-dimensional object w h i c h is the sum o f the
f r o n t and back surfaces o f a certain cube w i l l n o t be a surface. A n d
analogously there w i l l be no " b r o k e n lines." Surfaces are like solids
and unlike lines i n that they may have holes.
We now set f o r t h the f o l l o w i n g d e f i n i t i o n s :

D4 X is 0-dimensional (a p o i n t ) = D f x is a boundary and x has no consti-

tuents
D5 X is 3-dimensional = D f x has constituents and is not a boundary

9. One can, o f course, construe time as a " f o u r t h dimension." But i t is not

a f o u r t h spatial dimension. The " f o u r dimensional" things that relativity theory
speaks about are events o f a certain sort - not bodies having f o u r spatial dimen-
sions.
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We have thus defined 0-dimensionaUty and 3-diniensionaUty. Let
us now^ consider 2-dimensionaHty.^ ^
Shall we say that a 2-dimensional object is a boundary w^hich is
possibly such that the o n l y things o f w^hich i t is a constituent are
3-dimensional? N o ; f o r , i f there cannot be things that are i n f i n i t e l y
extended, then any part o f the surface o f a thing must also be a part
o f that 2-dimensional sum composed o f i t and some other part o f the
surface o f the thing. Thus the f r o n t surface o f a cube must be a
part o f that 2-dimensional sum consisting o f its f r o n t surface and
back surface. O u r conception o f coincidence, moreover, requires that
solids have "inner surfaces"; hence the entire outer surface o f a solid
is necessarily such that i t is a constituent o f 2-dimensional v^holes
consisting o f i t and an inner surface.
The concept o f coincidence, however, presents us w i t h one feature
that is peculiar t o 2-dimensional boundaries. A p o i n t is capable o f
coinciding w i t h any number o f points at a t i m e ; and a line is capable
o f coinciding w i t h a n y number o f lines at a t i m e ; b u t a surface can
coincide o n l y w i t h one surface at a t i m e . Let us say, then:

D6 X is 2-dimensional =Df x is a boundary; and for all y and for all z , i f x

wholly coincides with y and x wholly coincides with z , then y = z

(This d e f i n i t i o n , as well as the others here, should be taken to be in

the present tense. I f the definitions are interpreted "tenselessly",
then a t e m p o r a l variable should be taken t o be i m p l i c i t t h r o u g h o u t . )
A n d n o w we may define 1-dimensionality:

D7 x is 1-dimensional =Df x is neither 0-dimensional, 2-dimensional nor

3-dimensional; and x is necessarily such that it is a (proper) constituent
of something that is 2-dimensional

Continuity

T w o three-dimensional things are said t o be discrete when they

have no parts i n c o m m o n . I t is convenient to introduce analogous

10. Brentano discusses dimension in: Philosophische Untersuchungen zu

Raum, Zeit und Kontinuum, p. 13ff. He appears to assume, mistakenly, that the
only boundaries found in surfaces are lines (but smaller surfaces will also be
boundaries in any surface); and analogously for lines and points.
11. This point was made by Michael Zimmerman.
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concepts f o r 2-dimensional things and f o r 1-dimensional things. A n d

so let us distinguish among three subspecies o f discreteness: as a rela-
t i o n between 3-dimensional things; as a relation between 2-dimen-
sional things; and as a relation between 1-dimensional things.

D8 X and y are 3-dimensionally discrete =Df x and y are 3-dimensional; and

nothing 3-dimensional is a part of both
D9 x and y are 2-dimensionally discrete =Df x and y are 2-dimensional; and
nothing 2-dimensional is a constituent of both
DIO X and y are 1-dimensionally discrete =Df x and y are 1-dimensional;
and X is other than y

We may n o w distinguish three types o f contact: t h a t between

3-dimensional things ( " t o u c h i n g " ) ; that between 2-dimensional
things; and that between 1-dimensional things.

Dil X is in 3-dimensional contact with y (x touchesy) =Df is 3-dimensional-

ly discrete from y; and x coincides with y
D12 X is in 2-dimensional contact with y =Df x is 2-dimensionally discrete
from y; and x coincides with y
D13 X is in 1-dimensional contact with y =Df x is 1-dimensionally discrete
from y; and x coincides with y

We may say, then, that a thing x is in contact with a thing y , pro-

vided only that x is either i n 1-dimensional, 2-dimensional or 3-
dimensional contact w i t h y . A n d now we may say that x is con-
tinuous w i t h y , provided o n l y that x is i n contact w i t h y.^ ^

12.1 am indebted to Stephan Körner, who introduced me to this topic when

we were preparing Brentano's Philosophische Untersuchungen zu Raum, Zeit
und Kontinuum for publication. I am also indebted to Robert Frederick, Richard
Potter, James Van Cleve, and Michael Zimmerman.