On Semiotics

Quaestio 1. - Concepts and the Division of Signs

Art. 1: Let us consider an idea or concept, namely, that of a chair. It is evident that the word (by
which we refer to whatever it is that a chair is) is not precisely what the chair is. Perhaps we
could say that the word "chair" is, in-another (that is, in reference to other), what a chair is, or
merely indicates what a chair is, but certainly we couldn't say that about the chair in-itself, that
is, deconsidering any secondary determinations, determinations of anything that isn't the actual
chair. Anyhow, medieval logicians would call that which we used, be it verbally or
gramatically, to refer to the chair as a sign. A sign is something that indicates something else,
and this is exactly what words do. In this terminology, all words are signs. Let us here postulate
a distinction between simple signs and composite signs: "a" is no more neither less a sign than
"and", and yet, one is composed of the other. This happens because in grammar a sign can be
used, in conjunction with others, to create a new one, composed of them. Thus both what we
call "words" and what we call "letters" are signs in the medieval logicians' terminology.

Art. 2: If we so desire, it is possible to decompose all signs even further. For the grammatical
signs are equivalent to audible signs; for example, the symbolic (here meaning "inside our
alphabet") representation "chair" has, in turn, an equivalent representation in sound, that is, the
sound of the word chair.
Petrus Hispanus, a prominent medieval logician (who also happened to be Pope John XXI),
distinguished even further than we already have; sounds either have an inherent meaning or
not. But we shall discuss the determinacy of the meaning of a sign soon. For now let us say
merely that sounds with meanings are called voices, from where come the concepts of univocity
and equivocity. Now, one can say that the concept of animal in that of a man and that of a dog are
univocal, in the sense that both are have share animal having the same meaning. The same can't
be said by the relation the concepts of right as in the opposite of left and right as in correct. These
are equivocal. There is also a third possibility in this distinction: analogy. An ocurrency of
analogous meanings, to cite an example, would be the case of the relation between the foot of the
mountain and the foot of a man.
Art. 3: Now, in relation to that which determines the meaning of a sign, we must say that,
whatever it is, it doesn't exist in the physical world. First, what I mean by meaning here is justly
that identification between the sign and what it represents. This is called intentio by
aristotelians. Let us call it intentionality: the intention, the directedness something has towards
something else, in this case, a sign towards what is represented. Anyhow, it seems wrong to
suggest that the meaning of a sign may be found in its physical constitution. On the purely
physical order, we may analyse wether a paper that has the word chair written on it is in motion
or not, and if the affirmative answer is the case, what type of motion; on the purely chemical
order, we may analyse what elements of the periodic table constitute the paper, the atomic
number of said elements, the number of protons, neutrons and electrons on each of the atoms of
a molecule of each element in a given moment, say. Yet, intuitively, the meaning won't be
found. This is call is called indeterminacy of meaning in analytic philosophy. In order to account
for this phenomenon, we must appeal to a principle that doesn't happen to be material; a formal
principle. Inside the aristotelian terminology, formal is precisely that which determines, while
material is that which is determined. Therefore, let us conclude that the meanings are
determined by their form, which is what directs their directedness, or intentionality.

Art. 4: Notice how even though we posited a solution for the quarrel of the determinacy of
meaning of signs, the buck doesn't exactly stop there. Even then, we still have to explain the
directedness the formal principles of the signs exhibit towards the real world. This happens
because while it seems duly adequate that, for example, the meaning of chair exists by means of
a directedness towards something, we must still ask ourselves what that something is. In this
case, it's reasonable to say that something is what exists in the real world as a chair, namely,
something of the sort of a separate seat for one person, typically with a back and four legs and
usually made of wood. This is where the buck stops, but where were we before, one step earlier,
when we were describing something that is nor material nor the real world?
That medium, the philosophers answer, is the mind. This directedness we've been describing
really leaves us to beg the question not only to what the sign is directed, but to whom, or by
whom. Truly, it wouldn't be possible to describe meanings without a mind for it to mean to.
Here it might be objected that, whatever relation the signs have to the mind, a dependency of
the former to the latter would seem to be incongruent, given a mind can cease to be, for
example, when one dies; antecipating the response that at least one human mind would still
exist independently of another mind ceasing to exist, it is also plausible to say that there could
be no humans and, therefore, no minds for signs to be directed to, in case of, say, a meteor
strikes the Earth tomorrow.
I answer in a twofold manner - (1) regarding a form of theism that postulates a personal God
(notice how I do not say personalist, as that means something else), and (2) disregarding any
form of theism. To start with the first, even if it were the case that no more humans exist, God is
a mind, therefore, the objection does not work. Obviously, this position presupposes God's
existence and His being personal. In any case, disregarding God, even if it were the case that
humans exist no more, it would still, no matter, follow that, while humans and, consequently,
minds exist, it is proper to the mind to connect the real world to these signs we've described.
Considering this possibility, the argument does not follow necessarily, meaning the objection
fails.

Quaestio 2. - Nature and Kinds of Signs

Art. 1: .