Europe-Asia Studies

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‘Selective Affinities’: The Reactions of the Council

of Europe and the European Union to the Second
Armed Conflict in Chechnya (1999 – 2006)

Céline Francis

To cite this article: Céline Francis (2008) ‘Selective Affinities’: The Reactions of the Council of
Europe and the European Union to the Second Armed Conflict in Chechnya (1999 – 2006), Europe-
Asia Studies, 60:2, 317-338, DOI: 10.1080/09668130701820192

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130701820192

Published online: 25 Mar 2008.

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 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES
Vol. 60, No. 2, March 2008, 317 – 338

‘Selective Affinities’: The Reactions of the

Council of Europe and the European Union to
the Second Armed Conflict in Chechnya
(1999 – 2006)

CÉLINE FRANCIS

Abstract
This article aims to compare how the main bodies of the European Union and the Council of Europe
reacted to the issues raised by the armed conflict in Chechnya: human rights violations; the necessity
(or otherwise) of political negotiations between the Chechens and the Russians; and Chechen
terrorism. While the requests for political negotiations were quickly dropped by nearly all organs of the
Council of Europe (CoE) and European Union (EU), the issue of human rights abuses uncovered a
chasm between the legislative and decision-making bodies. The terrorist acts had no impact on either
the EU’s or the CoE’s definition of the conflict in Chechnya, but they did influence EU policy. In sum,
this comparison suggests the presence of ‘selective affinities’ between the CoE and EU bodies
depending on the issue involved.

IN JANUARY 2006 THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE Council of Europe

(PACE) and the European Parliament (EP) each adopted a resolution on the conflict
in Chechnya. In its resolution, the EP, as it had done many times before, condemned
the use of violence by the Russian and non-separatist Chechen security forces.1 In its
Recommendation 1733, PACE underlined the insufficient progress made by Russia in
investigating and prosecuting human rights abuses.2 Rather than being merely the
latest in a series of texts condemning Russia for its breach of human rights obligations,
both of these resolutions aimed in particular to highlight the European decision-
making bodies’ failure to address those human rights violations effectively. The EP
criticised the immobility of the Council and the Commission, while PACE concluded

I am grateful to Bruno Coppieters and to anonymous referees for their invaluable comments.
1
EP, ‘Chechnya after the Elections and Civil Society in Russia’, P5_TA(2006)0026, 19 January 2006,
available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type¼TA&reference¼P6-TA-2006-0026
&language¼EN&ring¼P6-RC-2006-0028, accessed 10 November 2007.
2
PACE, ‘Human Rights Violations in the Chechen Republic: the Committee of Ministers’
Responsibility vis-à-vis the Assembly’s Concerns’, Recommendation 1733, 25 January 2006, available
at: http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link¼/Documents/AdoptedText/ta06/EREC1733.htm, accessed
10 November 2007.

ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/08/020317-22 ª 2008 University of Glasgow

DOI: 10.1080/09668130701820192
318 CÉLINE FRANCIS

with its fears that the inactivity of its Committee of Ministers (CM) would eventually
undermine the credibility of the Council of Europe (CoE). In the light of the two
resolutions, one might assume that the decision-making bodies of the CoE and the
European Union (EU) had not responded to the second armed conflict in Chechnya.
Yet they had reacted—and moreover their discussions went beyond human rights to
encompass two additional issues—Chechen terrorism and the necessity (or otherwise)
of political negotiations between the Chechens and the Russians.
There is already a substantial literature on the impact of human rights violations on
the policies of the CoE and the EU during the second Russo – Chechen armed conflict
(MacFarlane 2000; Francis 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; Forsberg & Herd 2005; Fawn 2005;
Henry 2005; Mendelson 2006). However, in this article I intend instead, to compare
how the bodies of the two institutions reacted to the issues raised by the armed conflict
in Chechnya (1999 – 2006): human rights violations, political negotiations and
terrorism. When the reactions of the main CoE and EU decision-making and
legislative bodies are compared, several findings stand out. First, the CoE and the EU
were far from keen to interfere in Russia’s internal affairs when it came to the necessity
of political negotiations with the Chechen authorities. Moscow’s Chechenisation
policy quickly elicited support from all the bodies, notwithstanding the EP. Second,
although both legislative bodies were staunch advocates of human rights, and had in
fact brought to light the nature of the human rights abuses being perpetrated on
Chechen territory, their concrete proposals were not translated into meaningful action
by their own decision-making bodies. Finally, the terrorism in Chechnya did not
impact on the way in which either the CoE or the EU defined the Russo – Chechen
conflict, as primarily one with political roots, but it did affect how the Council and the
EP responded to it. In sum, this analysis supports the presence of a complex pattern of
‘selective affinities’ between the bodies of the CoE and the EU, depending on the issue
in question.
This article draws a comparison between two institutions currently promoting a
shared European identity and shared values of peace and human rights. At the
time of their creation, the CoE and the EU represented two different types of
integration. The CoE was founded in 1949 to harmonise European human rights
values, while the EU, established in 1957, looked to economic integration to resolve
conflicts between erstwhile enemies (Quinn 2001, pp. 855 – 56). During the 1980s
the issue of human rights became more important to the EU and today, together
with democracy, peace, and the rule of law, human rights are seen as the core
values of the institution. Although they still differ in their goals, the EU and the
CoE now proclaim their desire to defend these values together. The EU’s accession
criteria include membership of the CoE and respect for commitments entered into
vis-à-vis this institution. Likewise, active cooperation between the two institutions
has led to co-financed programmes in the fields of human rights, democracy and
the rule of law.3

3
Council of Europe & European Commission, ‘Joint Declaration on Cooperation and Partnership
between the Council of Europe and the European Commission’, 3 April 2001, available at: http://
jp.coe.int/programmes/general/Joint_Declaration_EF.pdf, accessed 4 October 2007.
 ‘SELECTIVE AFFINITIES’ 319

While relations between Russia and these institutions go back to the beginning of
the 1990s, this article focuses in particular on the second armed conflict in Chechnya
(1999). The rationale for this choice is a desire to examine a period when Russia was
already bound by agreements with the CoE and EU. As a fully-fledged member of the
CoE since 1996, Russia has committed itself to respecting that institution’s norms,
including the principle of the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the conventions it has
ratified. Similarly, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) has regulated
EU – Russia relations since 1997. Since the outbreak of the second Russo – Chechen
conflict, the Russian Federation could therefore be subject to a potential application
of the conditionality clause enshrined in this agreement. The end date of the period
covered by this article, 2006, does not correspond to the end of the conflict, as a low-
intensity conflict is still going on in Chechnya at the time of writing. However, this
article focuses on the criticisms of the institutions’ actions as substantiated in recent
texts on this conflict adopted by the EP and PACE.
In the first section of the article, I review the tools and sanctions available to the
CoE and the EU for promoting peace and human rights, and I also outline the
relations between these institutions and Russia. I then trace the history of the reactions
by the EU and CoE bodies to the conflict in Chechnya from 1999 to 2006. I assess their
discursive and substantial reactions to three issues—political negotiations, human
rights and terrorism—and the effectiveness of the mechanisms implemented. The
setting for the conflict and the human rights violations themselves are not covered, as
they have been extensively described in the literature and in human rights reports
(Evangelista 2002; Politkovskaya 2003; Human Rights Watch 2001, 2003). In the last
section, I compare the statements and actions of the CoE and the EU bodies, deriving
some potential explanations for their early support for Moscow’s policy in Chechnya
and the lack of effective responses to human rights abuses. I conclude with the
differences between the reactions to the three issues by the bodies within each
institution—differences that confirm the presence of ‘selective affinities’ between them,
depending on the issue.

The EU and CoE: the European human rights watchdogs

Peace and human rights norms in the CoE and the EU
According to its 1949 Statute, the defence of human rights is the core task of the CoE.
The institution supports and evaluates respect for human rights in member states
through assistance, treaty drafting and monitoring, political dialogue and legal
procedures (Saari 2006, p. 8). Two key bodies are the guardians of CoE values: the
Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) and the Committee of Ministers (CM). In the field of
human rights compliance, PACE, via several of its committees, monitors members’
compliance with human rights obligations in country-based or topical reports which
may lead to resolutions directed at the state in question, or to recommendations to the
CM. The CM, which consists of foreign affairs ministers or their representatives, acts
as a decision-making body which safeguards human rights inter alia by way of political
dialogue or assistance programmes. In the event of a breach of the CoE’s norms,
PACE can suspend a member state’s right to vote, but only the CM has the authority
320 CÉLINE FRANCIS

to suspend or, ultimately, exclude a state from the CoE (Article 8 of the CoE Statute).4
Furthermore, the CoE may suspend cooperation and assistance programmes with the
targeted country (Saari 2006, p. 8). Although this article focuses on these two main
bodies, additional organs also play a role in the protection of human rights. The
Commissioner for Human Rights promotes and monitors treaty compliance via visits,
conferences and assistance programmes in the member states, while at a legal level the
European Court of Human Rights gives protection in the field of citizens’ rights and
freedoms by examining applications lodged by individuals, as well as by states.
Whereas the CoE wished to create a European space composed of countries
respectful of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the EU pursued another
path to tie European countries together: economic integration. Yet the protection of
human rights has increasingly been making its way through European legislation and
policy. Nowadays peace, human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles are
understood as core EU values.5 Their importance has been emphasised within the EU
and also in the EU’s relationships vis-à-vis external countries, in order to ‘promote
coherence between the EU’s internal and external approaches’ (Commission 2001, p.
3). The preservation of peace and the consolidation of human rights were subsequently
listed amongst the goals of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Article
11 TEU).6 The EU has a wide range of tools for promoting these specific goals,
ranging from positive measures, such as bilateral dialogue and assistance, to negative
ones, including intervention in international forums, confidential and public
de´marches, public statements, the suspension of agreements, and diplomatic, trade,
or financial sanctions. On the whole, dialogue and incentives are preferred, but
negative measures may be deemed appropriate when softer measures are clearly
inadequate (Commission 2001, p. 8).

The relations of the CoE and the EUs with Russia

The issue of Chechnya was already a stumbling block when Russia applied for
membership of the CoE.7 After the ebb and flow of the accession procedure, Russia

4
Available at: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/001.htm, accessed 16 November
2007.
5
They were enshrined in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and, more extensively,
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union adopted in 2000 (Emerson 2005).
6
Treaty on European Union (TEU) available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/
2006/ce321/ce32120061229en00010331.pdf, accessed 10 November 2007.
7
Russia was invited as a ‘special guest’ in June 1992, which meant that it would be allowed to acquire
full membership once the conditions stipulated in the Statute had been met. The outbreak of the
Russo – Chechen war and subsequent human rights violations led PACE to suspend the procedure in
February 1995. As Russia was committed ‘to finding a political solution and . . . alleged and
documented human rights violations were being investigated’, the procedure was resumed in
September 1995. Despite the opposition of PACE legal experts, and although there was no end to the
conflict in sight, the Assembly’s deputies—wary of isolating Russia, and hopeful that they could exert
pressure on that country from within—eventually supported its membership of PACE (PACE,
‘Opinion No. 193 on Russia’s Request for Membership of the Council of Europe’, 25 January 1996,
available at: http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link¼/Documents/AdoptedText/ta96/EOPI193.htm,
accessed 10 November 2007, p. 7).
 ‘SELECTIVE AFFINITIES’ 321

eventually joined the CoE in 1996. To remind Russia that its membership was not a
blank cheque, in Opinion 193, ‘On Russia’s Request for Membership of the Council of
Europe’, PACE quoted the responsibilities of, and the promises made by, the Russian
authorities. These promises included, inter alia, the ratification of European
conventions and the future peaceful resolution of conflict. In 2006, Russia was bound
by the Statute of the CoE and by 46 European treaties, including several that protect
human rights.
While Russia is committed to conducting itself according to the ‘noble democratic
ideals’ of European society, as the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrei
Kozyrev, asserted when applying for CoE membership, it also has a vested interest in
trade agreements with the EU.8 Conversely, the Russian Federation is one external
country that undoubtedly comes at the top of the EU’s agenda. The extensive EU –
Russian institutional framework includes the PCA9 and the Northern Dimension, in
addition to bilateral relations in the field of energy and a common economic space,
and the four common spaces created at the St Petersburg EU – Russia Summit in May
2003 (Haukkala 2005, p. 5). Since 1991, the EU has also contributed to the
strengthening of the rule of law and the social aspects of transition via the programme
of Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS).
Like CoE – Russia relations, early EU – Russia developments were also disrupted by
the first Russo – Chechen conflict (1994 – 1996). The ratification of the PCA, which
was signed in 1994, was delayed owing to the opposition of some EU member states
(Austria, Finland, Sweden and Portugal) to the conflict that was tearing Chechnya
apart (Hughes 2007). Russia’s membership of the CoE and the conflict termination in
1996 eventually reduced the tension, and EU – Russia cooperation expanded (Malgin
2001). All these agreements gave rise to a complex institutional pattern leading to
periodical bilateral meetings and regular dialogue. Within some of these programmes,
the EU included its concern for human rights. Both the PCA and the TACIS
programme thus contain a conditionality clause: in the former, a breach of democratic
principles or human rights can prompt a unilateral response from one partner,10 while
in the event of a human rights violation the latter allows the Council, acting on a
decision by a qualified majority, to take any appropriate measure proposed by the
Commission (Fierro 2003, p. 344).
In sum, as a partner of the EU and a member of the CoE, Russia committed itself to
resolving its conflicts peacefully and to respecting human rights. With the outbreak of

8
Secretary General of the Council of Europe, ‘Accession of the Russian Federation to the Council of
Europe. Memorandum by the Secretary General’, CM (96)31, 2 February 1996.
9
The PCA was signed in June 1994 and entered into force in December 1997 for an initial period of
10 years. It includes cooperation in various fields (such as trade, the economy, science, the environment
and transport) as well as a political dialogue.
10
In the case of the PCA, ‘respect for democratic principles and human rights as defined in particular
in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe’ constitutes an essential element of
the partnership. This reference to an ‘essential element’ allows the suspension of the agreement in
accordance with Article 60 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, which stipulates that a
treaty, or part of it, can be suspended in the event of a violation of an essential element (‘Agreement on
Partnership and Cooperation Establishing a Partnership between the European Communities and their
Member States, of the One Part, and the Russian Federation of the Other Part’, Official Journal of the
European Communities, L 327, 28 November 1997; Fierro 2003, p. 218).
322 CÉLINE FRANCIS

the second Russo – Chechen armed conflict in 1999, these two institutions found
themselves confronted with their responsibilities.

The reactions of the EU and CoE to the second armed conflict in Chechnya
(1999 – 2006)
Not once since the outbreak of the conflict opposing the Russian state to the Chechen
separatists has the territorial integrity of Russia been questioned; nor has the
illegitimacy of the separatist Chechen goal. At the very start of the conflict, however,
the EU and CoE made it crystal clear that this conflict had to be negotiated peacefully,
and not resolved by military means. The request to the Russians to start political
negotiations with the government of the Chechen President, Aslan Maskhadov, was
therefore extensively supported by all bodies at the end of 1999 and early 2000. A
similar convergence of views appeared on the two other issues: Russia had to respect
human rights and, while nobody disputed its right to defend itself against terrorist
threats, both the EU and the CoE questioned the proportionality of the means used
for doing so.

The implementation of restrictions by the EU Council of Ministers and PACE

Immediately after the onset of the armed conflict, the views of the EU bodies
converged on the need for a ceasefire and political negotiations with Aslan
Maskhadov. While the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, reiterated
his willingness to put maximum political pressure on the Russian authorities to seek a
negotiated agreement, the EP called for a freeze on TACIS if Russia did not stop its
attacks on civilians and launch negotiations.11 The absence of any steps in this
direction led the European Council to take a tougher stance at the Helsinki Summit
(10 – 11 December 1999). The Heads of State made it clear that, in the absence of
negotiation and ceasefire, the EU Council of Ministers (hereafter EU Council) could
review the Common Strategy,12 suspend some of the provisions of the PCA, apply the
trade provisions strictly, and examine the appropriateness of transferring TACIS
funds to humanitarian assistance.13 As Raimo Lintonen (2004) has illustrated in his
analysis, the involvement of leading countries—France and Germany—was crucial at
the time for the adoption of these conclusions. As Russia made no effort to comply
with the EU’s requirements, several of these measures were eventually implemented:
on 24 January 2000 the EU Council of Ministers instructed the Commission to
suspend the Food Aid Programme (some e30 million of which had not been spent in

11
EP, ‘Parliament Resolution on Chechnya’, 18 November 1999, available at: http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef¼-//EP//TEXTþTAþP5-TA-1999-0099þ0þDOCþXMLþ
V0//EN&language¼SK, accessed 10 November 2007.
12
The Common Strategy between the EU and Russia, agreed in June 1999, was the first
implementation of this new European tool included in the Amsterdam Treaty (Article 13 of the Treaty
on European Union). It was to represent the broad objectives of the member states and the EU in
relation to Russia until 2004.
13
European Council, ‘Helsinki European Council. Presidency Conclusions’, 10 – 11 December 1999,
available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm, accessed 10 November 2007.
 ‘SELECTIVE AFFINITIES’ 323

1999), postpone the ratification of the Scientific and Technological Agreement, and
suspend the possible extension of the additional generalised system of preferences to
Russia. It was also decided to refocus the TACIS programme on ‘core areas directly
promoting democratic values, and to transfer uncommitted balances to humanitarian
assistance and the promotion of networking in civil society’.14 The remaining funds,
some e90 million, were frozen, awaiting an improvement in the situation in the region.
The reactions of the EU Council of Ministers were mild given the seriousness of the
situation: they were aimed primarily at satisfying European public opinion without
irritating Russia or jeopardising EU – Russia relations.
The EU also decided to deal with the deteriorating human rights situation in
Chechnya. In April 2000 it sponsored a resolution to the UN Commission on Human
Rights calling for an independent national commission of inquiry on Chechnya to be
set up. The resolution was adopted despite its rejection by Russia, which saw it as an
attempt to create ‘a mechanism for international interference [in its] internal affairs’.15
And owing to the international community’s reluctance to have this resolution
implemented, it fell into abeyance.
In the meantime, PACE decided to tackle the Chechen issue thoroughly. Like the
EU, the Assembly at its session in January 2000 was greatly concerned about the lack
of political alternatives and the human rights situation in Chechnya, but it was deeply
divided over what response to encourage. It was only three months later that, for the
first time in the history of the CoE, a resolution was passed asking for the withdrawal
of the Russian delegation’s right to vote. PACE asked the CM to suspend Russia’s
membership of the CoE if Russia refused to agree to a ceasefire and seek a political
solution with representatives of a cross-section of the Chechen people, including the
elected Chechen authorities. Member states were also called on to take action by virtue
of Article 33 of the European Court of Human Rights, which is the legal basis for
inter-state claims.16 In comparison with PACE’s usual resolutions, this decision was
unshakable and challenging: Russia was being compelled to show concrete
improvements in its way of dealing with Chechnya.

The CM’s silence on human rights violations

For the EU Council of Ministers and PACE, human rights and political negotiations
were deemed sufficiently important for Russia to be sanctioned for its lack of progress
on these two issues. Despite its role as the decision-making body of Europe’s human
rights watchdog, the CM did not share their perspective. In its replies to PACE, the
CM refused to sanction or even to criticise Russia for its shortcomings. Quite the

14
EU Council, ‘EU Council Conclusions on Russia’, 24 January 2000, available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/russia_docs/pres_00_10.htm, accessed 10 November 2007.
15
Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Press Release. Statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’,
27 April 2000, available at: http://www.great-britain.mid.ru/pressrel/pr21.htm, accessed 13 March
2007.
16
PACE, ‘Conflict in the Chechen Republic—Implementation by the Russian Federation of the
Recommendation 1444 (2000)’, Recommendation 1456, 6 April 2000, available at: http://
assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link¼/Documents/AdoptedText/ta00/EREC1456.htm, accessed 10 No-
vember 2007.
324 CÉLINE FRANCIS

opposite: it continued to welcome the human rights mechanisms implemented by the

Russians, carefully avoiding criticism of them once the ineffectiveness of these
mechanisms became clear. The CM was not, however, without internal pressure. In
May 2000, the Secretary General of the CoE, Walter Schwimmer, expressed his
dismay to the CM about Russia’s failure to respond adequately to the CoE’s request
for information on the implementation of the European Convention for Human
Rights (ECHR) in Chechnya.17 As a result, Schwimmer asked the CM to take ‘any
action they might consider appropriate’ against Russia. The CM refused, concluding
that steps were being taken by Russia to meet its commitments.18 This provoked the
‘strong disappointment and disagreement’ of PACE, whose Standing Committee
requested the CM to take ‘political responsibility and send a clear message to the
Russian authorities’.19
Instead of condemning Russia, the CM decided to fund assistance programmes,
which turned out to be inadequately mandated for monitoring or protecting human
rights. For instance, it decided to send CoE experts to the office of the new special
presidential representative for human rights in Chechnya, appointed in February 2000.
These experts were to contribute to the restoration of human rights and the rule of
law. From June 2000 to April 2003, when the prevailing insecurity made their
continued presence there impossible, they were mandated to collect applications
concerning alleged crimes and human rights violations, but they had no authority to
check whether the complaints had eventually led to the initiation of an investigation.
Furthermore, they had no competence with respect to human rights violations by the
armed forces. As PACE’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights recognised,
‘their [experts’] mandate seems to have been inadequate in view of the gravity of the
situation, given the scale of abuses and the considerable efforts needed to eliminate the

17
By virtue of Article 52, which stipulates that ‘on receipt of a request from the Secretary General of
the Council of Europe any High Contracting Party shall furnish an explanation of the manner in which
its internal law ensures the effective implementation of any of the provisions of this Convention’,
Schwimmer questioned the Russian authorities about the implementation of the Convention in
Chechnya and the risks of its violation in view of the absence of a derogation request. By virtue of
Article 15 of the ECHR, a Contracting State has the right to ask for a derogation in time of ‘war or
other public emergency threatening the life of the nation’. Since 1999, however, Chechnya had not been
in a state of emergency and no derogation had therefore been requested of the CoE. The Russian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov, avoided responding directly to Schwimmer’s request, and
explained that the aim of the conflict was ‘precisely the full restoration of the legal regime of the
Russian Federation within the boundaries of the Chechen Republic that will ensure comprehensive
application of ECHR standards—not the other way round’ [Secretary General of the Council of
Europe, ‘Request for Explanations Concerning the Manner in which the Convention is Implemented in
Chechnya and the Risks of Violation which may Result Therefrom’, SG/Inf(2000)21, 10 May 2000,
available at: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id¼353797&Site¼CM&BackColorInternet¼9999CC&
BackColorIntranet¼FFBB55&BackColorLogged¼FFAC75, accessed 10 November].
18
CM, ‘Press Communiqué of the 106th Session of the Committee of Ministers’, 10 – 11 May 2000,
available at: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id¼354051&Site¼COE&BackColorInternet¼DBDCF2
&BackColorIntranet¼FDC864&BackColorLogged¼FDC864, accessed 10 November 2007.
19
PACE, ‘Conflict in the Chechen Republic—Follow-up to Recommendations 1444 (2000) and 1456
(2000) of the Parliamentary Assembly’, Resolution 1221, 29 June 2000, available at: http://
assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA00/ERES1221.htm, accessed 10 November 2007; PACE
Standing Committee, ‘Declaration on the Conflict in Chechnya’, 16 May 2000.
 ‘SELECTIVE AFFINITIES’ 325

climate of impunity in the Chechen Republic’.20 At least the periodical reviews written
by the experts provided the CM with a regular analysis of the situation on the ground.
At approximately the same time, a European Commission/CoE Joint Programme for
the North Caucasus was designed to promote CoE values ‘in the light of a crisis in one
of the Subjects of the Russian Federation’ (Farquharson et al. 2005, p. 68). The
programme, which included activities to promote the rehabilitation of human rights
and the reform of the judiciary and of education, was run from February 2001 until
December 2004. The assessors reported that the programme was not tailored to the
exceptional circumstances of a conflict: designed primarily to focus on Chechnya, it
was changed at Russia’s request to focus on the North Caucasus and therefore failed
to pay ‘special immediate attention’ to the rehabilitation of human rights in Chechnya.
They concluded that the activities in the Chechen Republic were ‘no more than a drop
in the sand’ (Farquharson et al. 2005, p. 80).

Policy changes in the EU and the CoE: Putin’s election and Chechenisation policy
Within both the EU and the CoE, the stance on political negotiations began to change
in mid-2000. The EU’s restrictions on Russia were removed, while the requests to
negotiate with Maskhadov gradually faded away. There were two main reasons for
this: the election of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency, and the formulation of
his ‘Chechenisation’ policy. With Putin’s election in March 2000, a new era began for
Russia: the dynamic young president, now officially in charge, quickly gained the trust
of Western leaders who were generally willing to believe in his ability to stabilise the
country. Putin’s decision to reject once and for all the option of direct control of
Chechnya, and instead to appoint non-separatist Chechens to manage the Republic,
was a second reason for the European states to trust him: they were hoping that this
new Chechenisation policy would turn out to be the political solution they had been
waiting for since the outbreak of the conflict.21 This might explain the EU Council’s
readiness to cancel EU restrictions as a ‘welcome gift’ after the appointment of mufti
Akhmad-Khadji Kadyrov as head of the Chechen administration in July 2000.
The CM was no less enthusiastic in welcoming Kadyrov’s appointment as one of the
‘first elements of an ongoing political process’.22 Despite some reservations, PACE
followed the EU’s example and retroceded the right to vote to the Russian delegation
in January 2001. While it was Russia’s new political direction that sparked the EU
Council of Ministers’ decision to remove EU restrictions, the PACE decision was
prompted by a willingness to give the Russian delegation a second chance, although

20
PACE, ‘Human Rights Violations in the Chechen Republic: The Committee of Ministers’
Responsibility vis-à-vis the Assembly’s Concerns’, Document 10774, 21 December 2005, available at:
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link¼/Documents/AdoptedText/ta06/EREC1733.htm, accessed 10
November 2007.
21
A similar strategy had already been implemented during the first Chechen war (1994 – 1996), but
unsuccessfully.
22
CM, ‘Conflict in the Chechen Republic—Implementation by the Russian Federation of
Recommendation 1444(2000). Reply of the Committee of Ministers’, Document 8783, 27 June 2000,
available at: http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link¼/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc00/EDOC8783.
htm, accessed 10 November 2007.
326 CÉLINE FRANCIS

the Assembly remained ‘gravely concerned about the human rights situation in the
Chechen Republic’.23 To verify the Russian delegation’s compliance and to help its
members, PACE decided to create a Joint Working Group (JWG), composed of
Russian and PACE deputies, to monitor the human rights situation and encourage
dialogue between Russian authorities, Chechens and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs). Although the statistics gathered by the JWG provided clear evidence of the
ongoing impunity and failure to prosecute cases of human rights violations, its
composition impeded its autonomy and curbed its criticism.
Although the requests for political dialogue between Russia and the Chechen
insurgents were petering out, EU bodies were still prone to voice their human rights
concerns, at least for the first half of 2001. The EU Council of Ministers summarised
its own view of Russia in its report to the Göteborg European Council in June 2001. In
its opinion, it was necessary to integrate Russia into the European community of
nations while continuing to send out an ‘unambiguous message on issues that concern
the basic principles on which EU – Russia cooperation and partnership must rest’.24 If
the EU Council of Ministers had maintained this dual-track policy, it could have been
translated into advocacy for human rights and frank reactions to persisting violations.
In reality, as will become clear, the EU Council of Ministers’ criticisms of the human
rights situation were gradually toned down in favour of cooperation.

The impact of September 11 and the Dubrovka hostage-taking

Hitting the heart of the United States, the unprecedented terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001 triggered immediate domestic and international responses that soon
made it easier to justify the use of force in the so-called struggles against terrorism all
over the world. In Russia, critics promptly softened their tone vis-à-vis the conflict in
Chechnya. Boris Nemstov, who, only a few days before, had proposed a peace plan for
Chechnya, said on 13 September 2001 that ‘all talks should be conducted in the
language of Kalashnikov submachine guns only’.25 Although the Belgian Presidency
of the EU refused to reduce the Russo – Chechen conflict to a counter-terrorist
operation, it would be mistaken to assert that the attacks had no affect at all on the
attention the EU paid to human rights.26 From then on, the EU Council sidestepped
the issue of human rights violations in its direct encounters with Russia. The overall
climate after the hostage-taking in the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow in October 2002,
which ended dramatically with the deaths of 130 hostages, did not encourage a
reversal of the trend. Speaking to the European Parliament (EP), Commissioner Chris
Patten denied that the EU was silent on Chechnya, maintaining on the contrary that
human rights had never been raised ‘as comprehensively’ as during the EU – Russia

23
PACE, ‘Credentials of the Delegation of the Russian Federation’, Resolution 1241, 25 January
2001, available at: http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link¼/Documents/AdoptedText/ta01/ERES1241.
htm, accessed 10 November 2007.
24
EU Council, ‘Report from the Council to the European Council’, 15 – 16 June 2001, available at:
http://www.bits.de/EURA/goeteburgrus.pdf, accessed 10 November 2007.
25
Eurasia Insight, 21 September 2001.
26
‘The European Union’s view that the Chechen issue needs a political solution will not change’,
maintained the Belgian Ambassador André Mernier (Interfax, 28 September 2001).
 ‘SELECTIVE AFFINITIES’ 327

summit of November 2002.27 Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen, however, acknowl-

edged that the EU delegation had not pressed Russia on the issue of human rights.
In fact, the Dubrovka hostage-taking had a major impact on the EP’s policy. For
the first time, EP members corroborated Russia’s claim that the counter-terrorist
operation in Chechnya was ‘part of the international fight against terrorism’.28 The
hostage-taking also influenced the political solution adopted by the EP and for the first
time, it called for negotiations without the separatists. Yet it did not keep this stance
for long; a year after the event, it came back to the request to include ‘all the parties’ in
the negotiation process, thereby including Maskhadov and his government.29 Unlike
the EP, PACE did not change its view, either after 9/11 or after the Dubrovka
incident: ‘there will be no peace in the region, nor an end to terrorist attacks, without a
political solution based on negotiation and on European democratic values’.30

The blessing of the Russian Chechenisation policy

While the Chechenisation policy itself had already put an end to the EU Council’s
requests for negotiations with Maskhadov, the new steps in its implementation
conquered PACE. The first step consisted of a referendum on a new Chechen
constitution in March 2003. Concerned by the absence of essential preconditions such
as security for voters and transparency of the ballot, the PACE rapporteur for
Chechnya, Lord Judd, asked in his January report for the referendum to be
postponed, but his distancing from an outright call for the adjournment of the
referendum during the plenary session eventually led to the adoption of a softer
resolution calling on the Russian authorities to fulfil the necessary conditions for
holding the referendum.31 From then on, PACE stopped calling for negotiations with
other players in Chechen society.
Despite the irregularities witnessed during the referendum, such as corruption and
voter intimidation, the EU Council of Ministers and the EP welcomed the start of this
political process. This support was not really questioned after the second step in the
Chechenisation policy: the presidential elections. The elimination of all of Kadyrov’s

27
‘We continue to raise those issues and to raise them vigorously while of course at the same time
deploring terrorist activities especially the sort of activities which recently caused so much loss of life in
Moscow’ (Chapman 2002).
28
EP, ‘Chechnya’, P5_TA(2003)0335, 3 July 2003, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef¼-//EP//TEXTþTAþP5-TA-2003-0335þ0þDOCþXMLþV0//EN, accessed
10 November 2007.
29
EP, ‘EU – Russia Summit’, P5_TA(2003)0519, November 2003, available at: http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef¼-//EP//TEXTþTAþP5-TA-2003-0519þ0þDOCþXMLþ
V0//EN, accessed 10 November 2007.
30
PACE, ‘Evaluation of the Prospects of a Political Solution to the Conflict in the Chechen
Republic’, Resolution 1315, 29 January 2003, available at: http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link¼/
Documents/AdoptedText/ta03/ERES1315.htm, accessed 10 November 2007.
31
Instead of urging the postponement of the referendum during the plenary session, Lord Judd
submitted an amendment to the wording referring to the conditions for a valid referendum, changing it
from ‘might not be’ fulfilled to ‘unlikely to be’ fulfilled. ‘In doing this, I failed to recognize that by
doing so I had lent myself to an amendment whose overall effect was to remove from the
recommendation an unqualified and clear call to the Russian authorities to postpone the referendum. I
believe this was a grave and inexcusable error of judgment on my part’ (Uzzell 2003).
328 CÉLINE FRANCIS

serious competitors from the race did indeed cause some concern in the EU, but not
enough to jeopardise its support for the Russian policy. Likewise, PACE criticised the
election as violating the Chechens’ right to free elections, but it offered the new
Chechen President help in improving the situation in the Republic.32 The EP was the
only body that reviewed its support, and in its resolution of February 2004 it asked the
EU Council of Ministers to analyse the various existing peace plans in order to find an
alternative to Moscow’s policy.

Renewed discussion of human rights in the Council

While the two legislative bodies continued to be adamant about the importance of the
human rights situation throughout 2003, the EU Council of Ministers was already much
inclined to disregard it.33 The ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’ came at the end of
2003, with a statement from the Italian Presidency. At the November 2003 EU – Russia
Summit, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi asserted that ‘in Chechnya, there has been
terrorist activity that has produced many attacks against Russian citizens and there has
never been an equivalent response from the Russian Federation’ (Castle 2003). Although
the EU publicly disavowed the Italian statement and the EU Council of Ministers swore
that the EU had raised the issue with Russia, the damage was done.34
With many challenging the EU on its position vis-à-vis the human rights situation in
Russia, and the weight of additional events,35 in December 2003 the European Council
eventually decided to call on the EU Council and the Commission for an assessment of
EU – Russia relationships (Kalland 2004). In its assessment the Commission
mentioned that, among other things, the events in Chechnya raised ‘questions about
Russia’s commitment and ability to uphold core universal and European values and
pursue democratic reforms’.36 In the final report adopted in February 2004, the EU

32
PACE, ‘Human Rights Situation in the Republic’, Resolution 1403, 7 October 2004, available at:
http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link¼/Documents/AdoptedText/ta04/ERES1403.htm, accessed 10
November 2007; PACE, ‘The Political Situation in the Chechen Republic: Measures to Increase
Democratic Stability in Accordance with Council of Europe Standards’, Resolution 1402, 7 October
2004, available at: http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link¼/Documents/AdoptedText/ta04/ERES1402.
htm, accessed 10 November 2007.
33
In April 2003, PACE recommended to the CM that it should lobby for the establishment of an
international court to try war crimes and crimes against humanity if impunity persisted. The EP did
not lag far behind: in its resolution of July 2003, it denounced the violations of humanitarian law and
human rights committed against the civilian population ‘which constitute war crimes and crimes
against humanity that must be investigated and prosecuted’ [PACE, ‘The Human Rights Situation in
the Chechen Republic’, Resolution 1323, 2 April 2003, available at: http://assembly.coe.int/
Mainf.asp?link¼/Documents/AdoptedText/ta03/ERES1323.htm, accessed 10 November 2007; EP,
‘Chechnya’, P5_TA(2003)0335, 3 July 2003, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?pubRef¼-//EP//TEXTþTAþP5-TA-2003-0335þ0þDOCþXMLþV0//EN, accessed 10
November 2007].
34
AFP, 6 November 2003.
35
These events included the enlargement of the EU, the lack of consistency between national and EU
policies, and the changes within Russia. For an in-depth analysis see Lynch (2005, pp. 123 – 26).
36
Commission, ‘Communication of the Commission to the European Council and European
Parliament’, COM(2004)106, 9 February 2004, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/
russia/russia_docs/com04_106_en.pdf, accessed 10 November 2007.
 ‘SELECTIVE AFFINITIES’ 329

Council of Ministers asserted ‘the European Union’s determination to build a genuine

strategic partnership with Russia based on equal rights and obligations, mutual trust
and an open and frank dialogue’.37 Hopes were then expressed within the Commission
that the EU’s policy on Russia would be reviewed, but they were soon dashed.38 One
concrete action was nevertheless adopted: the EU – Russia consultations on human
rights. After the rejection, for the third year in a row, of a draft resolution on
Chechnya submitted in April 2004 by the EU to the UN Commission on Human
Rights, the EU began to fear that such rebuttals might sooner or later reinforce
Russia’s discourse on Chechnya’s normalisation, and it therefore sought another way
to raise its concerns. Launched to ‘discuss issues related to human rights and
fundamental freedoms in an open, constructive, and balanced manner’, the EU –
Russia Consultations on Human Rights were agreed upon during the November 2004
EU – Russia Summit and have been held regularly twice a year since March 2005.39
They provide a well-defined framework within which Russia can raise its concerns
about the situation of Russians in the EU and the EU can underline its worries about
Russia’s democratic standards. Although these consultations allow for a regular
review of the human rights situation in Russia (a list of cases requiring more
information is sent to the Russians ahead of the meetings, and the Commission follows
up on it), overall, this mechanism has been a remedial tool incapable of improving the
general human rights situation or helping in the fight against impunity in the Chechen
Republic.

The impact of Beslan on the EU’s attitude to negotiations

In September 2004 the whole world was gripped by the massive hostage-taking in
School No. 1 in Beslan, a small city in North Ossetia. For three days at least 30
terrorists, including Chechens, took more than 1,000 pupils and adults hostage.40 The
final assault eventually led to the deaths of more than 330 people. Despite this tragedy,
the EU’s definition of the conflict and its policies did not change: as Commissioner
Chris Patten’s speech on terrorism to the EP made clear, the conflict in Chechnya had
political roots which had to be tackled as such:
We have had, and will continue to have, our differences with Russia over Chechnya. We have
made, and will continue to make, those differences clear in our meetings with the Russians,
and to discuss them. That is what partners do. . . . We should make clear our support for a
political solution to the conflict. (Patten 2004)

37
EU Council, ‘Relations with Russia’, 2563rd Council Meeting, 23 February 2004, available at:
http://www.elisabeth-schroedter.de/downloads/040223CouncilMeeting_engl.doc, accessed 10 Novem-
ber 2007.
38
Interview with a European Commission Official, November 2006, Brussels.
39
EU Presidency, ‘Presidency Press Statement on EU/Russia Human Rights Consultations’, 1
March 2005, available at: ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/83921.pdf, accessed 13
March 2007.
40
The number of terrorists is still a matter of controversy. While Duma deputy Yury Savelyev
reported that between 58 and 76 hostage-takers were present, the estimated total number was 50 in the
report by the first deputy chairman of the North Ossetian parliament, Stanislav Kesayev, and 34 in the
report by the head of the Beslan Commission, Aleksandr Torshin (Fuller 2007).
330 CÉLINE FRANCIS

Similarly, the EP pinpointed the lack of a ‘viable solution’ in Chechnya as a reason for
the spread of terrorist acts to the neighbouring republics. It repeated that ‘there can
only be an inclusive, negotiated, political solution and not a military solution’ to the
Russo – Chechen conflict.41
Since 2003 PACE, for its part, had no longer supported negotiations: it preferred to
involve itself more fully in the ongoing Chechenisation process by holding the first
roundtable on the Chechen issue in Strasbourg in March 2005. Initially designed as an
event that would bring together all the sides in the conflict, in the end it was closed to
those who refused to recognise the territorial integrity of Russia, or who supported
terrorism. The exclusion from the discussion of separatists who rejected terrorism
ruled out the possibility of drawing up an inclusive political solution to the conflict.
Although it accommodated Russia’s policy on how to resolve the conflict, PACE
nonetheless remained inflexible on the human rights issue. Its resolution and
recommendation of January 2006 were essentially a reprimand to the CM for its
failure
to address the ongoing serious human rights violations in a regular, serious and intensive
manner, despite the fact that such violations still occur on a massive scale and in a climate of
impunity in the Chechen Republic and, in some cases, in neighbouring regions.42

In a parallel move, the EP in its January 2006 resolution urged ‘the Council and
Commission to confront their responsibilities in the face of the most serious human
rights issues in the immediate neighbourhood of the European Union’.43 Like PACE
in 2003, it called on member states to set up a mixed ad hoc international tribunal for
Chechnya to try the perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity. For the
fourth time, it also asked the Council and Presidency to offer mediation, but in vain.

Comparison of the reactions of EU and CoE bodies to the situation in Chechnya

A comparison of the reactions of the EU and CoE bodies to the three issues reveals no
clear demarcation line between the institutions, but instead reveals ‘selective affinities’
between the bodies, depending on the issue in question. While requests for political
negotiations were dropped in favour of Moscow’s Chechenisation policy by all the
bodies except the EP, the legislative and decision-making bodies were opposed to one
another on the human rights issue. Finally, the issue of terrorism did not impact on the
CoE’s policies but it did affect the EU Council of Ministers and the EP.

41
EP, ‘EU – Russia Summit’, P5_TA(2004)0099, 15 December 2004, available at: http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type¼TA&reference¼P6-TA-2004-0099&language¼BG&ring¼P6-
RC-2004-0197, accessed 10 November 2007.
42
PACE, ‘Human Rights Violations in the Chechen Republic: the Committee of Ministers’
Responsibility vis-à-vis the Assembly’s Concerns’, Recommendation 1733, 25 January 2004, available
at: http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link¼/Documents/AdoptedText/ta06/EREC1733.htm, accessed
10 November 2007.
43
EP, ‘European Parliament Resolution on Chechnya after the Elections and Civil Society in
Russia’, P6_TA(2006)0026, 19 January 2006, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?pubRef¼-//EP//TEXTþTAþP6-TA-2006-0026þ0þDOCþXMLþV0//EN, accessed 10
November 2007.
 ‘SELECTIVE AFFINITIES’ 331

Political negotiations: silence after the Chechenisation policy

As Vladimir Putin may have expected when he launched his new strategy for
Chechnya in mid-2000, the Chechenisation policy put paid to nearly all EU and CoE
requests for negotiations with the Chechen President, Aslan Maskhadov. The CM was
the quickest to approve Russia’s new policy: addressing the issue for the first and last
time in its reply to the PACE resolution in June 2000, it clearly considered Akhmad-
Khadji Kadyrov’s appointment to be part of the political process the CoE had been
calling for. The EU Council of Ministers, for its part, stopped requesting negotiations
with elected Chechen authorities after the end of the pressure in July 2000, but it
continued to urge a political solution. This call to ‘reach a political solution’ was
eventually replaced by the EU Council of Ministers’ support for the ‘recently started
political process’, in May 2003.44 PACE adopted a similar stance. At first regretting
Kadyrov’s appointment, and still calling for negotiations with the most representative
and widest possible range of people who had renounced violence, in 2003 the
Assembly decided to commit itself to supporting the newly elected Chechen President.
In this debate the EP’s view clearly diverged from that of the majority. From 1999 to
May 2002, the EP repeatedly called upon Russia to negotiate with legitimate
representatives of the Chechen Republic. A shift appeared in November 2002, when
‘all relevant representatives’ were to be at the negotiation table—a vague formula that
could equally well include or exclude different parties. The terrorist act in the
Dubrovka Theatre in October 2002 might explain this change of opinion on
Maskhadov’s regime. One year later, however, while criticisms of the Chechenisation
policy were mounting inside the legislative body, the EP came back to the request to
involve ‘all the parties’ in the negotiation process, a formula that included
Maskhadov.45 It even asked for an analysis of the alternatives to the Chechenisation
policy, such as the Maskhadov government’s peace plan.46 The death of Maskhadov,
described as ‘the last president of the Republic of Chechnya with a real popular
mandate’, in May 2005 seems to have triggered off a fresh revision of the EP’s view.47
At that time the new leader of the Chechen separatists, Abdul-Khakim Sadullayev,
was completely unknown to the European institutions, but his subsequent decision to
sideline moderate ministers and to appoint the main perpetrator of terrorist acts,
Shamil Basayev, as vice-prime minister, delegitimised the entire government.
Narrowing the scope of its request, the EP then called for ‘all the democratic
components’ of the society to be involved in the negotiations.

44
EU – Russia Summit, ‘Joint Statement’, St Petersburg, 31 May 2003, available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/sum05_03/js.htm, accessed 4 October 2007.
45
EP, ‘EU – Russia Summit’, P5_TA(2003)0519, November 2003, available at: http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef¼-//EP//TEXTþTAþP5-TA-2003-0519þ0þDOCþXMLþ
V0//EN, accessed 10 November 2007.
46
The peace plan, presented by Ilyas Akhmadov in 2003, proposes the conditional independence of
Chechnya. It is available at: http://www.chechnya-mfa.info/paper/en_text.pdf, accessed 16 November
2007.
47
EP, ‘EU – Russia Relations’, P5_TA(2005)0207, 26 May 2005, available at: http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef¼-//EP//TEXTþTAþP6-TA-2005-0207þ0þDOCþXMLþV0//EN&
language¼EN, accessed 10 November 2007.
332 CÉLINE FRANCIS

Human rights violations: empty criticism

This issue reveals another demarcation line between the bodies. This time, both
legislative bodies took a stand against human rights abuses, while the decision-making
organs failed to act on PACE and EP reports. Throughout the period, the legislative
bodies lobbied strongly on the human rights issue as their early hopes—that Russian
human rights mechanisms such as the Office of the Representative would show their
effectiveness—swiftly gave way to deep disappointment and an ever-lengthening list of
violations. Despite the restoring of Russia’s credentials in PACE in January 2001, no
improvement in the human rights situation was reported in the following years. In
April 2003, PACE blamed all the players involved in Chechnya—that is, the Russian
forces and non-separatist and separatist Chechens—for their failure to protect human
rights. Where the Russian authorities were concerned, the Assembly stressed the lack
of criminal investigations which, when they were carried out, in the words of the
PACE resolution ‘[are] depressingly ineffective and mostly fail to secure convictions in
court (if they reach that stage, which is rare)’.48 The EP similarly criticised the
widespread abuses, but unlike PACE it did not keep the issues of human rights and the
political process separate: the human rights violations were the reason why the EP
withdrew its support for the Chechenisation strategy in 2004.
In the end, all these resolutions and recommendations had little or no effect on the
Council or the CM. According to Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Erkii Tuomioja,
speaking at an Amnesty International seminar on Chechnya in 2003, there never had
been a thoroughgoing discussion on the issue of human rights in the EU General
Affairs Council. The EU Council of Ministers’ dual-track policy raised hopes of a
substantive consideration of the human rights situation. Instead, Chechnya has
vanished from the Council’s press releases since the second half of 2001. The human
rights issue was also totally absent from joint EU – Russia declarations, and sometimes
not even properly discussed at summits. While human rights considerations did
occasionally recur in Presidency statements, at times they were totally ignored, as
Silvio Berlusconi’s remark illustrated. One positive spin-off from the crisis in EU –
Russia relations was that at least it led to the organisation of EU – Russia
consultations on human rights. Agreed at a time when Russia was already becoming
more assertive at the international level, this framework allowed Russian NGOs to
voice their concerns and raise individual cases, but Russia’s internal developments in
the past few years do not suggest that this mechanism has been sufficient to increase
the rollback of human rights violations in Russia.
For its part, the CM extended the non-intrusive policy it had displayed in the debate
on political negotiations to the sphere of human rights. Rejecting PACE requests for a
tougher stance, it continued to support projects whose implementation was far from
satisfactory, or whose outcome had little influence on the scale of human rights abuses.
In his highly critical report of December 2005, PACE rapporteur Rudolph Bindig
suggested that an explicit or implicit decision to end the monitoring of human rights in

48
PACE, ‘The Human Rights Situation in the Chechen Republic’, Resolution 1323, 2 April 2003,
available at: http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link¼/Documents/AdoptedText/ta03/ERES1323.htm,
accessed 10 November 2007.
 ‘SELECTIVE AFFINITIES’ 333

Chechnya in 2004 and to hand over the monitoring task to the Committee for the
Prevention of Torture (CPT) and the ECHR might have been taken at the level of the
CM. If so, this would represent a deliberate attempt by the CM to offload its
responsibilities in the sphere of human rights monitoring. Moreover, the ECHR and
the CPT do not have the status to deal with massive human rights abuses: ECHR
decisions only tackle individual cases as an alternative solution to the lack of an
effective remedy in Russia, while the CPT remains powerless in the face of states
impervious to symbolic sanctions, which seems to be the case with Russia.49

The limited impact of terrorism on EU and CoE policies

On this third issue, the bodies shared a broad consensus: the Russo – Chechen conflict
was never defined as a purely terrorist matter, and although terrorist acts were
strongly condemned, the different bodies made it clear that these acts could not serve
as a justification for human rights violations or the lack of a political solution. That
aside, the impact of terrorist acts on CoE and EU policies largely differed: while CoE
policies remained unaffected by terrorism, two particular events altered the EU
approach to the conflict in Chechnya. First, September 11 helped reduce the attention
given to human rights by the EU Council of Ministers. Although this trend had
already been noticeable, it worsened after the attacks in the United States. Second, the
hostage taking in the Dubrovka Theatre in October 2002 induced a change in the EP’s
negotiation requests and its support for Russia’s counter-terrorist operation in
Chechnya. Yet although the EP underlined the presence of terrorist groups in
Chechnya, this did not mean that it had redefined the conflict as a war against terror.
In February 2004, the EP reiterated that ‘to portray the conflict as simply one between
terrorists and forces seeking to uphold law and order is to distort it, even though
terrorist activities continue and have shown signs of increasing’.50 However, rather
than asking for a forceful solution to the conflict, it requested an analysis of alternative
approaches to the conflict and negotiations with ‘all the representatives of the
Chechnyan [sic] society’.

49
The CPT supervises the implementation of the Convention for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Its reports are confidential and are forwarded to the
visited state, which must take them into account. According to Article 10(2) of the Convention, the
Committee may break its confidentiality rule and make a public statement when a member state fails to
cooperate. In the case of Chechnya, the CPT had used its ‘last resort’ twice by the end of 2006: in July
2001 and July 2003. Albeit symbolic, this sanction may carry weight with countries that do not like to
be in the limelight, but it also has consequences for the CPT, whose work and the trust reposed in it by
its member states depend upon confidentiality. For its part, the ECHR had already delivered a number
of decisions by the end of 2006: Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva vs Russia, Isaeva vs Russia, and
Khashyev and Akayeva vs Russia in February 2005; Bazorkina vs Russia in July 2006; and Imakayeva
vs Russia, and Luluyev and others vs Russia in November 2006. Each time, the ECHR condemned
Russia for violations of the European Convention (CPT, ‘European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture: Public Statement Concerning the Chechen Republic’, 10 July 2001, available at: http://
www.cpt.coe.int/documents/rus/2001-07-10-eng.htm, accessed 13 March 2007).
50
EP, ‘EU – Russia Relations’, P5_TA(2004)0121, 26 February 2004, available at: http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/autres/p5_ta-prov(2004)0121_en.pdf, access-
ed 10 November 2007.
334 CÉLINE FRANCIS

Attempt at explaining the lack of substantive reactions

Why did we see this early support for the Chechenisation policy and this lack of
effective responses to human rights abuses, including the failure of the EU Council of
Ministers to abide by its dual-track policy? Where the EU is concerned, the main
explanation obviously lies in the reluctance of member states to take a hard line with
Russia. In recent years, that country’s crucial position in debates on trade and,
especially, on energy issues has resulted in numerous bilateral contacts with EU
member states such as Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France, which have been
more than willing to build privileged security, economic and trade partnerships with
Russia. The Russian authorities preferred this option too, thinking it could be more
successful and less time consuming than the multilateral approach (Baranovsky 2000,
p. 454). These bilateral policies, which led to divisions between member states, had
serious consequences for the coherence of EU policy towards Russia: many EU states
decided to look leniently on Russia’s record of human rights abuses, and if some
breaches vis-à-vis EU policy have sometimes led to reactions from the EU Council of
Ministers, as was the case with Berlusconi’s statements, disavowals at Council-level
remained to a large extent the exception rather than the rule (Lynch 2005, p. 118; de
Bendern & Cameron 2004). The EU Council itself was responsible for this state of
affairs: Russia has been an important trading partner for the EU and a key player in
several international issues, such as the war in Iraq and the situations in Iran and
North Korea. The EU Council therefore promoted a friendly approach, notwith-
standing Russia’s persistent human rights violations. These vested interests in trade
and security led to a lack of consistency on human rights within the framework of the
CFSP: while on the one hand the EU Council submitted several EU resolutions
criticising Russia’s behaviour in Chechnya to the UN Committee on Human Rights,
at the same time, the human rights issue almost disappeared from the EU – Russia
Summit discussions (Smith 2002).
Although it has only a minor role in the CFSP, the Commission repeatedly called
upon the EU Council to hold a frank dialogue with Russia on human rights in
Chechnya. Still, this did not mean that the Commission was actually presenting a
united front to the EU Council—here too there were different agendas: the
Commission’s units in charge of Russia, human rights and humanitarian assistance
all shared a similar view of Russia’s systemic problems with regard to human rights,
while some especially authoritative Commissioners put the EU’s economic interests
first.51 Here in particular it seems that Prodi’s Commission, arguing in favour of
taking a stronger line with Russia, especially in 2003 – 2004, can be distinguished from
the new team under the leadership of José Manuel Barroso.
Like the EU Council of Ministers, the CM had a free hand in reacting to Russia’s
misbehaviour in Chechnya. As noted, in the end it went no further than implementing
a few mostly ineffective programmes. Russia’s influence and the composition of the
CM might help to explain this body’s reticence. Russia is one of the five main financial
contributors to the CoE, as well as the largest state in the institution, and as a member
of the CM it takes part in the decision-making process along with all the member

51
Interviews with two European Commission Officials, November and December 2006, Brussels.
 ‘SELECTIVE AFFINITIES’ 335

states of the EU. While under the rules of the CM a two-thirds majority may be used
when necessary, according to Rudolph Bindig there seems to have been a ‘gentleman’s
agreement’ to adopt decisions only by consensus.52 For instance, owing to a lack of
consensus between its members the CM did not ask for a continuation of CoE experts’
periodical reports. Finally, as the EU member states were adopting a cooperative
position in the Council, we can assume that they probably defended a similar strategy
in the CM.
Why then was PACE—and even more so, the EP—so determined to raise the issue
of human rights, and why did their efforts prove to be in vain in the end? Two main
factors may explain the reactions to the Chechen issue in the EP: the make-up of the
parliament and the role of some deputies. The German Christian Democratic Union
and Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) has dominated the main EP party, the
European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (EPP-ED),
since 1999. Although willing to develop ‘healthy relations’ with Russia, the CSU/CDU
underlined the importance of tackling the issue of democracy and human rights in the
country (Hanns Seidel Stiftung 2005). Thus the CDU/CSU supported EP resolutions
on Chechnya, while German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s friendly relationship with
Vladimir Putin influenced the Council’s decisions.53 Additionally, we should not
underestimate the role in this legislative work played by individuals such as Belgian
deputy Olivier Dupuis who, with his hunger strikes, made it hard for the EP to avoid
the issue of Chechnya. PACE too was constantly lambasting Russia for its poor
human rights records. Here again, personal factors worked in favour of firmness
towards Russia: influential individuals such as Lord Judd, rapporteur on Chechnya
until 2003, and Rudolf Bindig were determined to make Russia accountable for
violations occurring in Chechnya. While Rudolf Bindig had already angered Russia
with his proposal for an ad hoc tribunal for Chechnya in 2003, his uncompromising
final report on CM inaction was the backbone of the last resolution in January 2006.
The lack of impact of these legislative bodies within their own institutions was due
to their restricted roles in the decision-making processes of the CoE and the EU. With
its consultative role in the CFSP, the EP can merely question the Council or make a
recommendation. In the EU’s decisions on Russia, it was therefore confined to a
marginal role. As a guardian of CoE values together with the CM, PACE is expected
to have greater weight in the decision-making process, but its freedom of action is
actually limited: sanctions such as the suspension or exclusion of a member state have
to be adopted by the CM. Similarly, in order to produce their effect, its
recommendations have to be implemented by the CoE decision-making body.
Unfortunately, during this six-year period, PACE’s numerous requests to the CM to
ask Russia to take additional measures to deal with impunity fell on deaf ears.
Confronted by this silence, PACE and its new rapporteur on the political situation
in the Chechen Republic, Andreas Gross, decided to support dialogue with the

52
PACE, ‘Human Rights Violations in the Chechen Republic: the Committee of Ministers’
Responsibility vis-à-vis the Assembly’s Concerns’, Document 10774, 21 December 2005, available at:
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link¼/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc05/EDOC10774.htm, accessed
10 November 2007.
53
I thank Olivier Dupuis for highlighting this point.
336 CÉLINE FRANCIS

non-separatist Chechen authorities. Contrary to PACE expectations, the appointment

of the new authorities did not put an end to the human rights abuses. The Assembly
did not revise its assessment, however—probably in part because it knew that,
whatever criticism it raised about the political process, the CM would not compel
Russia to change its attitude.

Conclusion
Focusing on the period of the second Russo – Chechen armed conflict (1999 – 2006),
this article aimed to analyse, and then to compare, the reactions of the CoE and EU
bodies with regard to three issues: human rights violations, the necessity (or
otherwise) of political negotiations between the Russian and Chechen authorities,
and Chechen terrorism. This comparison revealed several marked trends. First, the
EU and CoE were, to a large extent, far from eager to interfere in Russia’s internal
affairs. As Vladimir Putin perhaps expected when he launched his new strategy for
Chechnya in mid-2000, the Chechenisation policy put paid to nearly all criticisms
and requests for negotiations with the government of Aslan Maskhadov. It did not
garner support from one day to the next: while the CM and the EU Council of
Ministers swiftly backed Moscow’s strategy, PACE took a little more time to
become fully supportive. In 2003, support for the Chechenisation policy was
achieved within the CoE and the EU, with the EP as the only notable exception. The
issue of human rights abuses, by contrast, uncovers a chasm between the legislative
and decision-making bodies. The intense legislative activity of the EP and PACE was
never translated into substantive, meaningful action: the few concrete activities
undertaken, such as the appointment of CoE experts in Chechnya or the EU –
Russia consultations on human rights, were not sufficient to deal with the extent of
human rights abuses. Finally, terrorist acts had no real impact on the EU’s or the
CoE’s definitions of the conflict in Chechnya, which they saw primarily as a political
conflict, although some acts did influence both the Council’s human rights criticisms
and EP policy.
As the case of Chechnya illustrates, the EU and CoE are far from being unitary
players. The points of view of their constituent bodies differed on each of these
three issues, and depending on their weight in the decision-making process the
bodies were eventually either able or unable to impose their own stance. There is,
therefore, no clear-cut division between the CoE and EU approaches to the conflict
in Chechnya. For instance, both the CM and the EU Council of Ministers decided
quite quickly to renounce the necessity of negotiations with Maskhadov. That
aside, there was a difference in their reactions to human rights violations: while the
EU Council adopted early restrictions following Russia’s unwillingness to comply
with EU requirements, the CM consistently refused to blame Russia. Despite being
the executive body of Europe’s human rights watchdog, the CM was clearly the
most compliant towards the Russian authorities. The same goes for the decisions
by the legislative bodies: while both harshly criticised the human rights abuses
perpetrated against Chechen civilians, they disagreed over the Chechenisation
policy, where PACE’s position was closer to that of the CM and the EU Council.
In sum, this article clearly suggests the presence of a complex pattern of ‘selective
 ‘SELECTIVE AFFINITIES’ 337

affinities’ between the bodies of the CoE and the EU depending on the issue in
question.

Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)

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