The Impact of the Post-Cold War European Minority Rights

Regime on Inter-Ethnic Relations

in Estonia and Latvia

Lynn M. Tesser
Visiting Assistant Professor
School of International Service
American University
4400 Massachusetts Ave.
Washington, DC 20016
202-886-1860
tesser@american.edu

**Draft – Please ask for author’s permission to quote.**

Paper presented at the 9th Biennial International Conference of the European Union Studies
Association, Austin, TX (3/31-4/2 2005). The Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars in Washington, D.C. provided generous support for research and writing.
 2

By the mid-1990s, a set of standards concerning minority protections emerged from elite-
level dialogue between European states, particularly within the forums provided by international
institutions. Developing a post-Cold War minority rights ‘regime’ was thought to be critical,
particularly for Western elites, in stemming population flows westwards precipitated by
emerging ethnic tensions. Post-Cold War standards have been delineated within key agreements
of the two organizations most involved in the development of a new minority rights regime: the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (COE).
These include the OSCE’s 1990 Copenhagen Document and 1991 Geneva Report as well as the
COE’s 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Post-Cold War
‘European’ norms ultimately include the following principles: (1) the notion of identity being an
individual’s choice;1 (2) the idea that ‘individuals belonging to national minorities’ should have
unimpeded access to human rights accorded to all individuals; 2 (3) the idea that they must free
from state-sponsored discrimination and share equality before the law; 3 (4) the right to maintain
and develop minority culture privately and publicly;4 (5) the right to form contacts with
foreigners of the same cultural background;5 (6) the right to charge their respective governments
of violating the above in European-wide forums; 6 and finally responsibility for (7)
demonstrating loyalty to the states individuals belonging to national minorities call home.7
Normative pressure and membership conditionality have been the two methods of
bringing these norms to Central and East European countries (CEECs). 8 Used to the greatest
extent by the OSCE, normative pressure or socialization involves efforts to get CEEC elites to
change policy in line with post-Cold War norms without making membership conditional on
doing so, relying instead on various forms of persuasion. Since the OSCE admitted most CEECs
relatively quickly after 1989 and several during the Cold War, this institution has been resigned
to rely primarily on normative pressure. Beyond creating the post of the OSCE High
Commissioner on National Minorities (OSCE HCNM) in December 1992 as a conflict
prevention measure, one that helped raise the organization’s profile once the EU began to consult
the OSCE HCNM on a regular basis, the OSCE used other means to influence minority policy
that fit within the rubric of normative pressure: (1) the establishment of field offices (or
missions) within countries thought to have the potential for conflict to monitor treatment of
minorities and to interact regularly with officials, (2) short-term visits by experts and/or elites
from other OSCE member states to determine the extent to which these countries have adopted

1
Copenhagen Document (Section IV, Article 32), Framework Convention (Section I, Article 3).
2
Copenhagen Document (Section IV, Article 32.6), Geneva (Section V), Framework Convention (Section I, Article 3).
3
Copenhagen Document (Section I, Article 5.9), Geneva (Section IV), Framework Convention (Section II, Article 4).
4
Copenhagen Document (Section IV, Article 32), Geneva (Section III), Framework Convention (Section II, Articles 5, 12, 13, and
14).
5
Copenhagen Document (Section IV, Article 32.4), Geneva (Section VII), Framework Convention (Section II, Article 17).
6
Of these three documents treating minorities more extensively, only Copenhagen references this idea (Section I, 5.21) -- though
not with much force. I nevertheless include this general principle because the right for persons belonging to minorities to take
charges against their governments to a higher, European-wide power has nevertheless been a part of the emerging post-Cold War
framework. The European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, after all,
provide for the right of individuals to bring charges against their governments before the European Commission of Human Rights
and the European Court of Human Rights. For other means of redress see Heffernan 1997, 79.
7
Only the Framework Convention (Section 3, Article 20) lists this idea with respect to national legislation and the rights of the
titular majority as well as other minorities. Yet, I include it because it is a key (though not often outwardly stated) assumption of
contemporary standards.
8
Kelley 2004, 19.
 3

policies in line with OSCE guidelines,9 (3) declarations and official statements evaluating current
policies that might also indicate recommendations for future changes as well as the formal
statement of norms in official documents such as the Copenhagen Document or the Framework
Convention, and (4) dispatching teams of legal experts to provide advice during the policy-
making process.10 Particularly unique to the OSCE’s methods has been the establishment of
missions that bring a small number of people in to work on a daily basis with local officials on a
variety of issues -- not merely concerning human and minority rights, but also on topics such as
strengthening independent judiciaries, the rule of law, and independent media.11
Conditionality, on the other hand, has been used more by the COE and especially the EU
-- though the former also used normative pressure to coax CEECs to adopt policies in line with
post-Cold War norms. Conditionality creates greater incentives to change given linkages to
membership in Europe’s most prominent international institutions. EU conditionality has
involved: (1) promises of aid and trade preferences, (2) monitoring and benchmarking (i.e. the
submission of yearly progress reports that rank applicants’ success in meeting membership
requirements, other reports and decisions made at meetings requiring specific action by
candidates, evaluations prior to formal accession negotiations to identify discrepancies between
EU and national law), (3) accession negotiations that involved deliberations over 31 chapters as
well as ongoing benchmarking and monitoring,12 and (4) declarations from the Presidency and
resolutions from the European Parliament along with other official declarations and demarches
urging reform.13
Given that COE membership became a de facto prerequisite for joining the EU by 1993,
CEECs were keen to follow through on promises made to join even after they became member
states. Paradoxically, the EU has had the most leverage to achieve CEECs compliance with post-
Cold War norms on minority rights while having the least involvement in the construction of the
regime. While the OSCE and COE were actively involved in its development in the early 1990s,
it was not until the EU’s statement of the 1993 ‘Copenhagen criteria’ for membership that some
emphasis on minority rights emerged. The three primary conditions included: (1) the existence
of stable democratic institutions including rights, respect for, and protection of minorities as well
as the rule of law; (2) the presence of a market economy capable of withstanding competitive
pressures; and (3) the ability to take on all of the requirements that come with membership,
including monetary, economic, and political integration.14
Existing scholarly work on international institutions’ impact on minority rights policy in
post-Cold war Central Europe tends to focus on two interrelated questions: (1) what explains
the variation in the extent to which elites/governments harmonize minority/citizenship policies
with European norms?,15 and speaking more theoretically (2) what are the underlying causes for
why norms are adopted in the first place -- actors’ interests or identity? 16 Concerning the
former, the insightful work of Judith Kelley has gone far in helping to understand the variation in
outcomes. A recent article explores three factors with the potential to impact overall domestic
elite preferences: (1) the extent of domestic opposition to minority protections in government

9
Kelley 2004, 17.
10
Kelley 2002, 14.
11
Hopmann 2005.
12
Kelley 2002, 14.
13
Kelley 2004, 19.
14
Bulletin of the European Communities, Vol. 26, No. 6 (1993): 13.
15
Kelley 2003a, 2004 and Checkel 1999
16
Moravcsik 1995 and Checkel 1997
 4

and parliament, (2) authoritarian-style leaders, and (3) the extent to which ethnic minorities have
representatives in government and parliament. 17 Beyond noting the same variables, her
methodologically sophisticated contrast of conditionality and socialization’s impact in four
CEECs (Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, and Romania) shows that conditionality has ultimately been
more effective in bringing about elite behavior change than normative pressure. 18 When
domestic opposition exists to adopting the post-Cold War minority rights regime, socialization
lacks conditionality’s leverage, a form of influence that more often alters elite behavior and leads
to the regime’s frequent adoption.
Concerning the second, more theoretical question on interests and identity, a larger debate
exists between liberals and constructivists over what ultimately drives norms’ formal acceptance:
interest-driven incentives or norms that ultimately form part of identity. Liberals tend to argue
that European norms present politicians and other actors with a set of behavior-influencing
incentives that ultimately lead to their adoption. Along these lines, Andrew Moravcsik asserts
that these standards tend to only be ratified in functioning democracies possessing the social
organization capable of forming various interest groups that then pressure political leaders to
adopt such norms.19 Constructivists, on the other hand, claim that norms actually constitute
actors’ identities that, in turn, affect how they define their interests in the first place. 20 Along
these lines, Jeffrey Checkel, points to the Ukrainian government’s recent adoption of a more
civic-oriented citizenship policy and accordance of cultural autonomy to national minorities --
changes that could not have stemmed from the only weakly organized interest groups Moravcsik
points to.21
While it is certainly important to explain why elites formally adopted minority
protections and citizenship policies in line with post-Cold War norms, a key question has been
left unanswered -- the longer-term impact of minority rights conditionality. There is indeed
good reason to question whether elites’ formal acceptance of such norms actually can change
average citizens’ sense of social and political obligation to honor them or even the lingering
personal prejudices of elites, both important aspects of less conflictual inter-ethnic relations.
After all, the overall emphasis on states choosing to be bound by European norms after 1989
hides certain post-Cold War realities. Countries situated between Germany and Russia have
found themselves in structurally insecure geopolitical positions since the Soviet withdrawal,
giving them little choice but to enter key West European security organizations for which the
adoption of European standards is required. Like the League of Nations system from the
interwar period, the lack of a genuine choice in formally adopting contemporary norms indicates
that minority rights protections in CEECs are not primarily driven less by a domestic give-and-
take between minorities and the titular nationality, one more likely to deliver legitimacy to their
adoption.
This paper addresses the next key question -- specifically, what impact does minority
rights conditionality, and to a lesser extent socialization, have on inter-ethnic relations? This is
particularly important now that many CEECs have joined the EU, leaving this institution without
its most powerful and effective change-inducing mechanism. In regard to policy changes made
against elites’ and broader societies’ desires, we must also ask whether the minority rights
regime always increases the genuine acceptance of these rights. Furthermore, why in some cases
17
Kelley 2003a, 37.
18
Kelley 2003b and 2004.
19
Moravcsik 1995, 158.
20
Checkel 1997, 473.
21
Checkel 1997, 482.
 5

might policy changes spurred by conditionality bring improved inter-ethnic relations, little
change, or instead a backlash to the liberal values underlying minority rights?
Conventional wisdom among many scholars, policy-makers, and especially within the
European political elite maintains that the implementation of the contemporary regime will
primarily deliver positive results. The benefits of socialization and especially of EU (and NATO)
conditionality seem quite clear in the shift of Latvian and Estonian policy towards their large
Russian minorities. Both countries liberalized initially restrictive citizenship policies allowing
only a fraction of their large Russian populations to naturalize automatically in response to EU
and NATO membership conditionality. In rushing to meet these membership obligations,
Latvian and Estonian elites went even farther than other CEE elites in satisfying the demands of
accession, demands that were not necessarily aligned with societies’ desires. As Evald Mikkel
and Geoffrey Pridham note: “Latvia and Estonia are characterized by a high discrepancy in EU
positions between elite and mass. The high levels of elite consensus on the need for accession
contrasts with the lowest levels of support for EU integration among all accession countries…
The main argument for the majority of Estonians and Latvians was simply choosing ‘the lesser
evil.’22 While likely a function of their former placement within the Soviet Union proper, one
that made both countries more desperate to join the West to counter Russian centrist and
Eurasianist foreign policy makers’ tendencies to still see Latvia and Estonia in Russia’s
immediate sphere of influence, elites’ emphasis on meeting the demands of international
institutions also likely stemmed from the greater presence of Western émigrés within post-Cold
War governing structures given the forced retirement of the largely-Russian dominated political
elite in the early 1990s.23 The Latvian and Estonian émigré elite embraced Western liberal values
to a greater extent than the indigenous elite along with society given their experience living in
the West during the socialist era.
Efforts to adopt contemporary norms have contrasted with both countries’ post-1989
pursuit of ‘ethnic democracy,’ the (re)construction of institutions to ensure the titular
nationality’s political dominance. By disenfranchising many ethnic Russians, for example, the
first Estonian parliament elected in 1992 was 100% Estonian -- voted in by an electorate that
went from approximately 65% Estonian in 1990 to over 90% in 1992.24 The desire to fortify the
titular nationalities hardly seems surprising in light of several factors: (1) the sharp shift in the
distribution of nationalities during the Cold War, leading Russians to increase substantially in
proportion to Latvians and Estonians, (2) Russians’ tendency to dominate the political and
economic elite during the Soviet era, 25 and (3) the fact that Soviet domination in these countries
had a strong ethnic flavor given the sizeable import of Russians. In 1989, Estonia’s population
was 61.5% Estonian (down from 88% in 1934) while Latvia’s 77% ethnic Latvian majority in
1935 contrasted with a mere 52% in 1989.26 The situation is particularly acute in Latvia’s six
largest cities wherein the population influx from the Russian interior has made Russians a
majority, a situation that diminished the importance of the Latvian language. 27 This explains
why the overall share of people able to speak Russian (84.4%) remains higher than those able to
22
Mikkel and Pridham 2004, 744.
23
Jennifer Skulte-Ouaiss, “Change and Continuity: The Role of the Returned Diaspora in Postcommunist Politics in the Baltics,”
talk given at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (26 January 2005).
24
Day and Shaw 2003, 218.
25
Beyond this, fluency in Russian was a requirement for many jobs during the Soviet era – leading to a high level of
unilingualism among Russians and bilingualism among Latvians and Estonians (60, 345-GartNotes). Thus, a mere 22% of non-
Latvians had some knowledge of Latvian while a significant 68.7% of Latvians could claim knowledge of Russian in the mid-
1990s (Herd and Löfgren 2001, 277).
26
Pettai and Kreuzer 1999, 151.
 6

speak Latvian (81.7%).28 Regardless of their forming majorities, both Latvians and Estonians
were underrepresented in Soviet era power structures (39.7% of the elite in Latvia and 43.1% in
Estonia), though conditions improved during the Gorbachev era. This picture was sharply
reversed in the 1990s. By 2001, the new electorate was 90% Estonian in Estonia and 78%
Latvian in Latvia.29 Nationalists justified excluding Russian residents from political participation
not merely to turn the tables on Russianization, but to give Estonians and Latvians political
power beyond their proportions.
There is good reason to believe that relatively low support for joining the EU and voting
‘yes’ in the referenda on EU entry resulted, in part, from the disjuncture between substantial
public support for promoting ethnic democracy and far weaker support for providing ethnic
Russians with minimalist post-Cold War protections, leaving the adoption of the regime as the
unfortunate means to a much desired end. Results from the May 2003 Eurobarometer indicated
that less than half of Estonians (42%) and Latvians (47%) surveyed thought their country would
benefit from joining the EU with 33% of Estonians and 29% of Latvians believed otherwise. 30
Similarly, 42.6% of Estonians voting in the 2003 EU accession referendum supported EU
membership as did 48.57% of Latvians.31 Other reasons for relatively low levels of support
include: (1) the EU’s excessive regulation that could well put a damper on the Baltic’s high
economic growth rates; (2) increased ties with Nordic countries possessing a variety of interest
and pressure groups exhibiting relatively strong Euroskepticism;32 and (3) unhappy memories of
being part of a ‘union’ along with glorified pictures of independence during the interwar period. 33
In fact, the Latvian word for union ‘Savieniba’ is used in both the names of the USSR and the
EU -- Padomju Savieniba and Europas Savieniba respectively.34
Concerning the Estonian case in particular, rising Euroskepticism in the first half of 2001
was a reflection of unhappiness with government policies. Given that EU entry was of high
priority among ruling elites, the public threatened to withhold its support for accession to punish
the government.35 Public support for EU entry increased following the election of a new
president in October 2001, and later in January 2002, with the formation of a new governing
coalition.36 Nevertheless, Merje Feldman wrote in 2001 that “the Estonian government has been
widely criticized by both the opposition and the public for ‘giving in’ to western institutions on
citizenship and minority rights issues. Estonia’s leading researchers of ethnicity and citizenship
problems note that government efforts at ethnic integration are motivated largely by attempts to
appease and deter ‘Eurocrats’ and the international media.”37 This is in line with 1999 survey
results indicating that 63% of ethnic Estonian respondents felt that ethnic Russians “are
endangering the preservation of the Estonian nation.”38 By requiring the implementation of
27
“Latvia’s President Asks Parliament to Reconsider Language Law,” The Jamestown Monitor, Vol. 5, Issue 138 (19 July 1999).
Available at: www.jamestown.org.
28
RFE/RL’s Baltic Report (24 March 2001).
29
Pettai and Kreuzer,151.
30
Mikkel and Pridham 2004, 744.
31
Mikkel and Pridham 2004, 739 and 743.
32
Mikkel and Pridham 2004, 725.
33
Mikkel and Pridham 2004, 725.
34
Mikkel and Pridham 2004, 721.
35
Mikkel and Pridham 2004, 725. A June 2003 public opinion survey listed the three main concerns associated with EU entry:
price increased (93%), the ‘brain drain’ (77%), and liberalized policies towards foreign land and property acquisition (Mikkel and
Pridham 2004, 747 (footnote 24).
36
Mikkel and Pridham 2004, 726
37
Feldman 2001, 8.
38
Feldman 2001, 14.
 7

policies allowing easier naturalization of non-Estonians, the EU can then be constructed as a

threat to Estonian identity.39 For a time, in fact, support for EU accession was greater among the
country’s Russians than Estonians, with the former being less worried about the perceived
dangers EU membership might present to national sovereignty. This imbalance lasted until July
2001. Then support among both remained roughly equal to July 2003 when Estonians’ support
for entry continually increased and Russians’ decreased.40
An examination of the impact of minority rights conditionality and socialization in
Estonia and Latvia brings mixed results. The case studies that follow indicate that conditionality
and socialization had less of a genuine impact in Latvia in regard to changing attitudes towards
Russians, while recent signs in Estonia are a bit more positive. For Latvia in particular,
conditionality-driven liberalization has not deliver decreased tensions in inter-ethnic relations in
the longer term, particularly given the fact that now membership conditionality no longer exists
as leverage. This is evident in the lack of change in elite discourse concerning the minority,
leaving continuing controversy over recent reforms to phase out Russian-language education in
state-run high schools to appear as outright assimilation. Estonian elites, on the other hand, have
gone further in de-securitizing political rhetoric concerning the minority and have done more to
mask the assimilatory aspects of the country’s integration program. Whereas ‘integration’ in
Latvian elite discourse means shutting down formal, state-supported Russian-language education
along with other incentives to learn Latvian, Estonian elites use the same term to refer to efforts
to create more of a multicultural system. Perhaps having seen the controversies raised by
education reform in Latvian, the Estonian government has dropped plans to shift state-supported
education solely to Estonian.
Nevertheless, demographic data suggest that Estonian and Latvian worries over cultural
survival will hardly disappear. According the UN Economic Commission, the population of both
countries will drop significantly during the next fifty years. With the lowest fertility rate in
Europe at 1.09 child per woman, Latvia’s population is estimated to drop by 31% by this time
and Estonia’s by 34%.41 While Russia’s continued economic and social problems suggest a
continued migration of Russians to the Baltic states, Russia’s population too has been declining
(by nearly 9 million from 1993-2003)42 leaving the government to consider ways of encouraging
migration.43 These statistics along with the likelihood of continued out-migration of Estonia’s
and Latvia’s young people, suggests a need to introduce these countries to the kind of
immigration that has led to concerns over national identity within the western half of Europe.44

Latvia
The specific cases analyzed here provide an overview of major legislation passed in
Estonia and Latvia due overwhelmingly to conditionality, meaning that it had questionable elite
39
Feldman 2001, 16.
40
Mikkel and Pridham 2004, 741.
41
RFE/RL’s Baltic Report (8 May 2000). Available at: www.rferl.org.
42
“Russia’s New Immigration Rules Won’t Lead to Exodus from Estonia – Minister,” Baltic News Service (5 November 2004).
43
Paul Goble, “A Demographic Threat to Russian Security,” RFE/RL Newsline (16 February 2001). Indeed, recent changes to
Russian citizenship legislation do not go terribly far in encouraging immigration. The Russian Duma passed a new citizenship
law in February 2002 listing the following requirements: 1) knowledge of the Russian Constitution, (2) the ability to speak
Russia, 3) a lawful source of income, and 4) legal residence in Russia for at least five years. Those likely to be refused include
convicted criminals and applicants diseases considered socially dangerous [“New Russian Citizenship Law Important for
Russians in Latvia,” BBC Monitoring (22 February 2002].
44
While birth rates might have been higher among non-Estonians (the proportion of non-Estonians born in 1989 was 39%, rising
to 48% in 2000), their proportion of the population is expected to remain around 30% of the population (Tammaru and Kulu
2003, 109 and 114). Need figures for Latvia.
 8

and mass support in and of itself: Latvia’s and Estonia’s amended citizenship and language laws
adopted in 1998 and 1999 respectively, a 2001 Estonian amendment dropping language
requirements for candidates running in local and parliamentary elections, and Latvia’s 2002
election law that ended requirements for parliamentary candidates to be fluent in Latvian.
Perhaps to cater to two primary constituencies -- domestic and international audiences --
liberalizations spurred by conditionality were often followed by reaffirmations of the pursuit of
ethnic democracy, particularly in Latvia. Both cases also include a discussion of recent
developments in inter-ethnic relations related to the impact of international institutions pressures
on inter-ethnic relations.
Latvia’s citzenship law adopted in 1994 was amended to extend this right to stateless
children born after 21 August 1991 and to abolish the ‘window system’ limiting the number who
could apply each year (a figure that had been set at .1% of Latvian citizens or about 2,000
depending on their length of residency).45 While restrictive, this law actually liberalized initial
citizenship legislation plans from 1991 that would have given citizenship primarily to those who
had held it prior to the Soviet occupation in 1940 as well as their descendents, leaving
approximately one third of the country’s population stateless unless they: could demonstrate
sufficient command of Latvian, show familiarity with the constitution, prove residence for 16+
years in the country, and take an oath of allegiance. 46 Given the as-yet undetermined nature of
citizenship laws up until 1994, non-citizens faced limitations up until then on receiving state
benefits, travel, and on employment.47
Such restrictive tendencies ultimately stemmed from political parties’ emphasis on
creating an ethnic democracy, one that could undo the injustices of the Soviet past that privileged
Russians. Prominent in this effort were the Fatherland and Freedom party (FF) and the Latvian
National Independence Movement (LNNK). It was, in part, due to their absence in the
government from the fall of 1993 to late 1995 that helped bring about the 1994 law. Even more
significant was COE conditionality in tandem with OSCE involvement. OSCE HCNM pressure
began in 1993 along with COE criticism after the country’s 1989 language law was amended to
require fluency in Latvian for numerous jobs in the public and private sectors in 1992. Latvian
President Guntis Ulmanis then returned the law to parliament for reconsideration, a move that
enabled Latvia to join the COE in 1995, not to mention Ulmanis’ overall change in the direction
of harmonizing with EU norms.
The 1998 amendments to Latvia’s citizenship law were, by far, the clearest indication of
the effectiveness of minority rights conditionality. Little disagreement exists that the
amendments were primarily due to external pressures -- EU conditionality in particular. After
submitting its EU membership application in 1995, Latvia was excluded from accession talks at
the end of 1997 given the slow progress of naturalization. 48 A survey conducted shortly
thereafter indicated that a majority of the political elite supported speeding up naturalization by
way of liberalization -- with the exception of FF/LNNK. 49 It was only after a “lengthy and
stormy debate,” in fact, that the Latvian Saeima succeeded in its third attempt to adopt the
amendments.50 Urged along by President Guntis Ulmanis, MPs from the ruling Latvian Way

45
Smith 1999, 508.
46
Morris 2004, 552.
47
Kelley 2004, 73.
48
Morris 2004, 557.
49
Morris 2004, 557.
50
Nikolai Lashkevich, “Latvia Accepts Europe’s Conditions,” Izvestia (24 June 1998): 1,3 [Reprinted in the Current Digest of
the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 50, No. 25 (1998): 18.
 9

party along with the Proprietor (Saimnieks) faction along with a few others prevailed over the
fiercely opposed FF/LNNK.51
With the end of the window system and the inclusion of stateless children born after 21
August 1991, Latvia could simplify the naturalization process for its then 700,000 non-citizens
provided that they can write and talk about everyday topics in the state language and know the
country’s constitution and history.52 The 18,000-20,000 children born to this group since Latvia’s
independence would also become citizens provided that their parents publicly demonstrate their
consent.53 Concern existed that omitting the language test for minors might lead to further
pressure from Russia and possibly also the West to do the same for others, leading toward a bi-
national state rather than an “integrated” one.54 Such thinking was likely behind reports of a
Latvian government commission approving a plan providing cash payments to all ethnic
minorities wishing to leave Latvia -- including $4,000 plus travel expenses according to a
Russian government report.55
The 52% approval for these changes in a referendum signaled significant public support.
Yet, it remains questionable whether the ‘yes’ vote came from the desire to join the EU and
NATO and the ensuing requirements of adopting the contemporary minority rights regime, or
from a general realization that resident Russians must be accepted. Guntis Ulmanis’ change of
heart concerning citizenship and urging of public debate on the matter no doubt made clear of the
necessity of liberalizing citizenship law to join the EU as well as NATO.
To reaffirm its commitment to promote Latvian nationality (perhaps to make up for
liberalization to citizenship policy), the Latvian parliament amended the language law in July
1999 formally intended to reverse Soviet-era Russification policy. With virtually unanimous
support from MPs of the three parties comprising the new governing coalition (People’s Party,
Latvia’s Way, and the FF/LNNK coalition), 56 the law demanded that public sector and most
private sector organizations: (1) conduct all record-keeping and official business in Latvian, (2)
conduct all correspondence with the government in Latvian, (3) use the state language in
advertising as well as in conveying information on all issues of general interest (i.e. public
health, work safety, employees’ rights), and finally (4) require translation into Latvian all
meetings and other public events held in another language (mainly Russian). For those working
in the service sector, both employees and the self-employed must know and use the state
language to the extent necessary to perform their duties. The revised law also required that all
public events be conducted in Latvian.
The OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel along with EU External Affairs Commissioner
Hans van den Broek criticized the law and tried to delay its passage on the basis of going to far
in regulating language use in the private sector. Along with the OSCE mission in Riga, their
criticism “grew harsh ahead of the vote in parliament, to the point of warning Latvia that it
would jeopardize its case for admission to the EU by adopting a ‘discriminatory’ law.” 57
However, their efforts succeeded only in getting most fence-sitters to make up their minds. The
51
Ibid.
52
Nikolai Lashkevich, “Lines for Citizenship Forming in Latvia,” Izvestia (25 November 1998): 3 [Reprinted in The Current
Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 50, No. 47 (1998): 20].
53
Dmitry Zharnikow, “Noncitizens in Latvia Should Have it Easier Now,” CDPSP, Vol 50, No. 40 (1998): 19.
54
“Referendum Approves Far-Reaching Liberalization of Latvia’s Citizenship Law,” The Jamestown Monitor, Vol. 4, Issue 182
(5 October 1998). Available at: www.jamestown.org.
55
“Latvia Pays Ethnic Groups to Leave,” BBC World Service (13 April 1999). Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk.
56
“Latvia’s President Asks Parliament to Reconsider Language Law,” The Jamestown Monitor, Vol. 5, Issue 138 (19 July 1999).
Available at: www.jamestown.org.
57
“Language Law Adopted,” The Jamestown Monitor, Vol. 5, Issue 134 (13 July 1999). Available at: www.jamestown.org.
 10

vote left only 16 opposed with 73 in favor and 8 abstentions. Those opposed were
unsurprisingly deputies from the group consisting mainly of socialists, communists, and anti-
independence activists: “For Human Rights in a United Latvia.”58
Due to external pressure, newly-elected President Vaira Vike-Freiberga returned the
language law to parliament for reconsideration. She criticized the law for going against Latvia’s
constitution and international commitments as well as for lacking legal precision. More
specifically, she urged that the law: (1) restore Latvian as the country’s dominant language by
strengthening its role while allowing speedier integration of non-Latvians by allowing them to
use their own languages, and (2) omit those parts restricting the education and freedom of
expression of non-Latvians, and to allow state interference in the private sphere only when going
against the public interest. On television she made clear the connection between changing the
language law and joining Europe’s key international organizations: “If we have set our sights on
Europe, we need to prove ourselves capable of bringing our laws into conformity with European
standards…”59 Parliament approved a revised law on 9 December 1999 that took into account
Vike-Freiberga’s criticisms.60
Not long afterward, however, the President contradicted these pro-integration efforts and
statements in characterizing Latvian’s resident Russian non-citizens as a “wedge” or fifth column
that the Russian government could utilize in its alleged planned invasion of Latvia and Estonia.
While such talk was an awkward move to secure influence in the EU and NATO in addition to
aid (not to mention contradicting foreign policy orchestrated by the Latvian Foreign Ministry), it
showed how easily the elite may move back and forth on the issue of the Russians. Here, Vike
Freiberga’s remarks suggest deportation of the ‘non-natives,’ 61 comments that do not bode well
for integration.
A final case of liberalization due primarily to minority rights conditionality concerned
amendments to Latvia’s electoral laws in May 2002. These changes eliminated the need for
candidates in parliamentary and local elections to demonstrate proficiency in Latvian, thus
allowing Russian-speakers with little or no knowledge of the state language to gain office in
municipal and district councils as well as in the national parliament. 62 These amendments
essentially were a condition of ending the OSCE’ mission in Latvia as well as gaining entry to
NATO and were a reaction to EU warnings of potential cooling of relations with Latvia if
parliament did not change the election law.63 The mission’s closure, in particular, signaled OSCE
approval of Latvia’s citizenship and language policies.64 Vike-Freiberga urged for the language
proficiency requirement to be dropped beginning in December 2001, a move that was initially
resisted by some political parties given upcoming October 2002 parliamentary elections and the
potential backlash that would result if they went against previous legislation on Latvian’s status.
To lay the political grounds for change, the parliament strengthened Latvia’s legal provisions

58
Ibid.
59
Leonid Panin and Yury Zubkov, “Russian Lodges Complaint Against Latvia With European Bodies,” Current Digest of the
Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 51, No. 28 (1999): 260.
60
Morris 2004, 548.
61
Yevgeny Vostrukhov, “Vaira Vike-Freiberga Makes a Sensational Disclosure,” Current ‘Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.
52, No. 18 (2000): 16 and Yevgeny Vostrukhov, “What Prompted Latvia’s President to Accuse Russia of Aggression and
Russians of Disloyalty?” Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press (2000): 19.
62
“Latvia Amends Electoral Legislation to Drop Language Requirements for Candidates,” The Jamestown Monitor, Vol. 8, Issue
93 (13 May 2002). Available at: www.jamestown.org.
63
Valentinas Mite, “Latvia Adjusts Language Laws, But the Issue Remains Deivisive,” RFE/RL Newslines (20 May 2002).
64
“Latvia Amends Electoral Legislation to Drop Language Requirements for Candidates,” The Jamestown Monitor, Vol. 8, Issue
93 (13 May 2002). Available at: www.jamestown.org.
 11

excluding the use of other languages in local councils and the national legislature. This move
made the May 2002 liberalization generally acceptable -- indicated by the absence of protests
and pickets on voting day. With resistance coming mainly from FF MPs, 67 deputies voted for
the legislation concerning parliamentary elections and 71 on the law concerning municipal,
district, and regional elections. Latvia’s Way and the People’s party gave robust support to the
amendments. The COE, OSCE, NATO, and the US embassy in Riga applauded their efforts and
ultimately removed any remaining obstructions for the commencement of NATO entry
negotiations.65 As with previous liberalizations, this was accompanied by a largely symbolic
move to reiterate Latvian’s status as the official language. In April 2002, the parliament
overwhelmingly approved amendments to strengthen the status of Latvian -- claiming that all
individuals have the right to engage with state institutions in Latvian and that Latvian is the
parliament’s working language.66 As Nils Muiznieks, the director of the Latvian Center for
Human Rights and Ethnic Studies, noted: “Latvian politicians are afraid. On the one hand, they
think the Latvian public is stupid. On the other hand, they fear they will be punished by voters
for not defending the Latvian language. What they did, they decided to go through this whole
theater of amending the Latvian Constitution. They are mostly trying to strengthen the [status
of] Latvian as compensation for doing away with these language requirements [in the election
law.]”67
Ultimately, these three conditionality-inspired liberalizations each resulted in an effort to
undo their effects: first, with the 1999 language law following the 1998 citizenship
liberalization; second, with Vike-Freiberga’s labeling of the Russians as a ‘fifth column’ aiding
and abetting the Russian government in an alleged attack after supporting changes to the 1999
language law; and finally, with a subsequent amendment in April 2002 that reiterated the Latvian
language’s status as the official language in local offices as well as in parliament in response to
the changes to the election laws. One might also interpret Latvian education reforms similarly.
Russian-speaking secondary schools were to switch most of their classes to Latvian in 2004. By
a large majority, in fact, the Latvian parliament passed a law reducing the use of Russian in
education in February 2004. The law requires a minimum of 60% of courses in public schools
be taught in Latvian beginning in September 2004. The government’s primary reasoning for the
reform is to promote the integration of minorities. 68 This is indicative of the fact that “the
Latvian debate on minority protection is still predominantly a security discourse. The
mainstream political forces continue to regard a large number of Russian-speakers in the country
as a serious threat to the Latvian state as well as to the preservation of Latvian language and
culture… The invitation of Latvia to join NATO, which must have reduced external security
concerns, has had little effect on the perception of minorities as an internal security problem.” 69
This is likely to continue given continued Russian protests against reform and their recent efforts
to unify.
The reforms, in fact, have both increased Russian efforts to unify and have led to
worsening inter-ethnic relations according to a 2004 survey. Concerning the former, Latvia’s
Russian-speakers formed a new organization in September 2004 called the United Congress of
the Russian Community in Latvia (OKROL).70 With about 50,000 registered members, OKROL

65
Ibid.
66
“Parliament Passes Constitutional changes Strengthening Language,” RFE/RL Baltic Report (16 May 2002).
67
Quoted in Mite 2002, 11.
68
“Latvia Passes New Language Law,” BBC News (5 February 2004).
69
Järve 2003, 24-25.
 12

has become the largest public organization in the EU. 71 It has several aims: (1) giving official
status for Russian (possibly as a second state language), (2) acquiring the right to an education
in one’s native language, (3) giving citizenship to all residents, and (4) the creation of cultural,
legal, and economic structures for Russians.72 Given the two main goals of OKROL -- to gain
civil rights and to oppose the school reform in force as of September 1, 2004 mandating that
teaching in Russian not take up more than 40% of school time in Russian secondary schools, 73
the school reform was the main catalyst for the founding of OKROL.
Nevertheless, economic issues are particularly important to OKROL, particularly given
reaction to Russians’ perceived economic prowess. According to Jakovs Pliners, delegate in
OKROL’s congress and member of parliament, “there are lots of Russian-speaking businessmen
who wish to come together, to help one another, to shape foreign contacts, to help in building up
Russian education and culture.”74 Since Russian speakers play a significant role in Latvia’s
business world, some Latvian politicians along with the media criticize their apparent economic
dominance. Many too suspect that Russian-speaking businessmen have a significant number of
ties with Russia. Latvia’s Russians, in fact, tend to make up nearly half of the country’s
approximately 100 millionaires.
Unsurprisingly, the Latvian government has not warmed to the emergence of OKROL
and refuses to register it. While the refusal likely stems from concerns over potential Russian
influence, the government’s case has rested on a technicality, namely two alleged errors in the
group’s rules according to OKROL’s co-chairman Mikhail Tyasin. 75 When interviewed about the
Russians around the same time, Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga reiterated her emphasis
on integration as assimilation: “they must realize that this is an independent country and become
Letts of Russian descent, but still Letts. If they want to be Russians – let them go to Russia.”76
Particularly in response to the education reforms, public opinion results suggest Estonian-
Russian relations are worsening, largely as a result of the language reforms. While a 2004 Baltic
Social Sciences Institute (BSZI) survey showed that 84% of Latvian respondents and 82% of
their non-Latvians counterparts agree on the need for a unified society allowing different
nationalities to live side by side, another 2004 BSZI survey on “The Integration of Young Non-
Latvians into Latvia’s Society” showed that 70% of Latvian respondents “get angry when
thinking about the way in which Russian speakers are opposing teaching in the Latvian
language” and 60% of non-Latvian respondents have negative emotions “when thinking about
the way in which Latvians are forcing them to learn the Latvian language.”77
While the education reforms are in line with European norms, they -- along with
political rhetoric suggesting that the Russian minority is a security threat -- are presently the
primary bone of contention within domestic Estonian-Russian relations. As a 2003 report on
integration in the Baltics notes: “the Latvian debate on minority protection is still predominantly
a security discourse. The mainstream political forces continue to regard a large number of
70
Built by the Russian Federation, Riga’s Moscow Bulding is the planned venue for the organization’s founding congress [Ilze
Grinuma, “OKROL Will Speak on Behalf of Russians,” Diena (11 September 2004) – listed in BBC Monitoring].
71
“Latvian Authorities Refuse to Register Russian-speaking Organization,” BBC Monitoring (29 September 2004).
72
Ilze Grinuma, “OKROL Will Speak on Behalf of Russians,” Diena (11 September 2004) – listed in BBC Monitoring.
73
Vladimir Simonov, “Russian-Speaking Population of Latvia Protests Against Latvianization,” RIA novosty (15 September
2004) (Factiva).
74
Ilze Grinuma, “OKROL Will Speak on Behalf of Russians,” Diena (11 September 2004) – listed in BBC Monitoring.
75
“Latvian Authorities Refuse to Register Russian-speaking Organization,” BBC Monitoring (29 September 2004).
76
Quoted in Vladimir Simonov, “Russian-Speaking Population of Latvia Protests Against Latvianization,” RIA novosty (15
September 2004) (Factiva).
77
“Latvian School Attendance Signals Greater Public Integration,” BBC Monitoring (27 September 2004).
 13

Russian-speakers in the country as a serious threat to the Latvian state, as well as to the
preservation of the Latvian language and culture.” 78 While the Latvian government has
technically followed the demands of the EU and NATO conditionality, evidence does not exist to
suggest that thinking has changed concerning ethnic Russians. Along these lines, OSCE HCNM
Rolf Ekeus has had no objections to the presumed necessity of the education reforms. He
understands the need for Latvia’s citizens to know the state language, particularly to help
increase the domestic competitiveness of Latvia’s young people. 79 Meanwhile, Vike Freiberga
reiterates the non-assimilatory nature of the policy: “The purpose of the reform is not to
assimilate children of other nationalities. No one has ever forced national minorities in Latvia to
give up their language, culture, or national heritage.”80
Perhaps the problem lies in international institutions not going far enough in developing
the regime. As Will Kymlicka notes: “the OCE and OSCE norms do not in fact address the
challenges raised by national minorities. There is no discussion of how to resolve (often
competing) claims relating to territory and self-government, how to assign official language
status and no guarantees that minorities can pursue higher-level education or professional
accomplishment in their own language. States can fully respect these standards and yet
centralize power in such a way that all decisions are made in forums controlled by the dominant
national group… In short, these norms do not address the clash between minority self-
government claims and centralizing state policies that generated destabilizing ethnic conflicts in
the first place.”81 While the post-Cold War European minority rights regime has helped to slowly
given Latvia’s Russians many of the same rights as ethnic Estonians, it has not significantly
diminished the drive towards assimilation, one that continues to bring tensions to Estonian-
Russian relations.

Estonia
The effects of the post-Cold War minority rights regime on Estonian-Russian relations
appears mixed -- yet, shows more beneficial effects on inter-ethnic relations for Latvia.
Conditionality and socialization appear to have augured greater change in elite-level discourse,
change that stems from a somewhat less assimilatory understanding of ‘integration.’ The
Estonian government made integration a high priority thanks to the 1997 Agenda 2000 report
urging the country to integrate Estonia’s Russian speakers, the commencement of accession
negotiations, and later NATO’s emphasis on integration in 1999.82 June 1999 brought the
government’s adoption of a document entitled “Bases of the Estonian State Integration Policy”
while March 2000 brought the “State Programme ‘Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007,’ 83
a plan that was significant in its stated aim at creating a multicultural rather than an ethnic
democracy. The latter document notes that “integration in Estonian society means on the one
hand the harmonization of society – the creation and promotion of that which unites all members
of society – and on the other hand the opportunity to preserve ethnic differences – the offering to
ethnic minorities of opportunities for the preservation of their cultural and ethnic distinctiveness.

78
Järve 2003, 23.
79
“OSCE Commissioner Advances Education Reform,” RFE/RL Baltic Report (19 December 2003) and “OSCE High
Commissioner has no Objections to Use of Latvian in Minority Schools,” RFE/RL Baltic Report (5 June 2003).
80
“President Says Students Will Benefit from Introduction of Primary Language in Schools,” RFE/RL Baltic Report (19 May
2003).
81
Kymlicka 2005, 4.
82
Feldman 2001, 7.
83
Feldman 2001, 7.
 14

What is of significance here is that integration is clearly a bilateral process – both Estonians and
non-Estonians participate equally in the harmonization of society.” 84 The program has three
main areas of concern: (1) linguistic-communicative integration with the general goal of
creating “an Estonian language environment,” (2) legal-political integration with the aim of
increasing rates of non-citizens’ naturalization, and (3) socio-economic integration concerned
with raising the economic success of the less competitive northeast.85
Both documents were followed in May 2004 by the government’s approval of an
integration program specifically for 2004-2007, one that aims to naturalize more than 5,000
people yearly to diminish the country’s still sizeable number of stateless persons (160,000). 86
While ‘integration’ initially signified a unidirectional process wherein non-Estonians were
assumed to assimilate to Estonian culture, the reports published in 2000 and 2004 signal that the
meaning of integration has shifted to signify general societal integration. 87 Though there may be
a clear focus on promoting Estonian language and culture within the integration program, there is
more room for difference in Estonian elites’ of integration policy while ‘integration’ for Latvian
elites means finding additional ways to make non-Latvians learn the Latvian language.
Moreover, Vike-Freiberga’s remarks certainly have not helped to deliver a more diversity-
friendly integration program.
Nevertheless, criticism of Estonia’s program has been raised -- particularly in regard to
the difficulty of passing the language exam, and political support for the overall program had
declined by 2003.88 This may have something to do with the nature of the its emergence. Rather
than being the result of Russian pressure, its birth coincided with the nationalistic upswing in
1999 when Pro Patria returned to power in a coalition government with the Reform Party and the
Moderates -- the latter having gained a significant number of seats. After having merged with
its electoral partner the Estonian National Independence party in 1995, this conservative
Christian Democratic party has been the frontrunner in government from 1992-1996 and then
again from 1999-January 2002.89 Pro Patria has consistently and unabashedly promoted
assimilation to Estonian culture, but had acceded to Moderates’ interest in developing an
integration plan, presuming that the party would be able to influence its content in the direction
of pure assimilation. Beyond the Moderates’ interest in developing a more liberal program,
pressures coming from the EU in particular encouraged action. 90 Even after the March 2003
elections brought a new government into office -- with the newly formed Res Publica leading a
coalition with the People’s Union and Reform parties, the ‘European factor’ gave Res Publica an
incentive to keep the Ethnic Affairs portfolio -- one that was important for continuing the
integration program given that the portfolio’s minister also chairs the government’s Integration

84
State Programme 2000, 3. Reading further, one notes that diversity is used in the service of unity: “A multicultural society can
only function successfully when its members are linked by a sufficient common core. The common core creates a basis for
mutually enriching interaction and the recognition of common interests, and helps different ethnic groups to feel secure in
Estonia. The main content of the state programme is indeed to support the integration of individuals around the strong common
core in Estonian society. The strong common core of Estonian society is territorially defined by Estonia and is founded on the
common language – Estonian, which is the basis for the functioning of institutions in the public sphere. The integration of
individuals around the strong common core in Estonian society takes place through the achievement of the aims of the linguistic-
communicative, legal-political and socio-economic areas of integration” (emphasis added) (State Programme 2000, 13).
85
State Programme 2000, 3 and Day and Shaw 2003, 214.
86
Estonian Government Wants at Least 5,000 New Citzens Annually,” Baltic News Service (6 May 2004).
87
Smith 2002, 106.
88
Laitin 2003, 206 and 217.
89
Day and Shaw 2003, 221.
90
Laitin 2003, 200-201.
 15

Foundation.91 Given that Res Publica lacked a definitive policy on integration, media reports
suggesting the sacking of the Ethnic Affairs portfolio might have become a reality.92
Secondly, survey data show mixed results of efforts to raise the level of Estonian
proficiency. According to the 2000 census, 80% of the population spoke Estonian either as its
mother tongue or as a second language while only about 66% claimed the same at the outset of
the 1990s.93 Moreover, David Laitin’s 2002 survey suggests weak integration rather than
straightforward assimilation to Estonian culture. The indicators he points to include the
following: (1) Estonians surveyed plan to learn Russian more than Finnish or German, (2)
nearly 50% of Estonians wish to have Russian as one of the languages for their children to learn,
(3) Estonian schoolchildren feel greater cultural similarity with Estonian Russians than their
parents did, and (4) Estonian respondents feel they have more in common with Estonian
Russians than with Germans, Finns, or Russia’s Russians.94 Given that the survey was conducted
in areas with high Russian concentrations compared to the rest of the country (Ida Virumaa and
Harju), however, one must wonder whether the results apply to the rest of the country.
On the other hand, a 2003 survey commissioned by the Integration Foundation claimed
that formal efforts to help Russian-speakers learn the Estonian have not been successful. Very
few of the 251,000 non-Estonians projected to be employed or seeking employment from 2003-
2005 possess the required competency in Estonian. The survey also found that 2/3 of Russian-
speaking respondents do not think learning Estonian is necessary for their daily lives, and while
55% want to take the language exam by January 2005, only 14% indicate that they will definitely
take it.95 While the number may well increase given that students taking the exam beginning 1
January 2004 will have all of their tuition expenses reimbursed, 96 this compensation will go only
to those individuals already possessing basic knowledge of Estonian -- a condition of the EU
Phare funding aiding this compensation program.97 Moreover, naturalization rates have generally
been declining. 22,773 individuals naturalized in 1996, down to 9,969 in 1998 and 4,534 in
1999.98 [need recent info]
Third, while Estonian citizenship and minority policy have liberalized thanks to
international institutions’ involvement, simultaneous efforts have also been taken to strengthen
Estonian identity, perhaps to offset the impact of these pressures -- or at least to provide the
appearance of doing so. Like Latvia, Estonia’s initial legislation (1992) accorded citizenship
only to those who had been citizens prior to the country’s forced annexation to the USSR as well
as to their descendents -- though Estonia’s citizenship law did not include a quota system.
Liberalization came in 1998 on the subject of stateless children, coinciding with the beginning of
EU entry negotiations. Toward the end of the calendar year amendments to the citizenship law
passed by a vote of 55-20.99 Yet, Estonia was quicker to liberalize its local election laws by
allowing all permanent residents living in Estonia the right to vote in elections according to the
May 1993 Law of Local Elections. This was not due to international pressure, but likely driven

91
The Estonian government founded the Integration Foundation in March 1998 to help integrate non-Estonians into society and
to coordinate projects in line with this goal.
92
Laitin 2003, 202.
93
?????
94
Laitin 2003, 212.
95
Aleksei Gutner, “Russian Minority Slow in Learning Estonian,” The Baltic Times (9 January 2003) (Factiva).
96
Melanie O’Connell, “Minister – More Encouragement for Naturalization Needed,” The Baltic Times (31 July 2003) (Factiva).
97
“Russian-Language Newspaper in Estonia Decries Citizenship Language Test,” BBC Monitoring (17 March 2003).
98
Feldman 2001, 7.
99
Kelley 2004, 108.
 16

by high percentages of non-Estonians living in certain areas, particularly in Ida-Virumaa

county.100 Most non-Estonians (around 80%), in fact, live in two counties: one third in Ida-
Virumaa and a half in Harju county where they make up 79% and 41% of their respective
populations.101 Given a different demographic makeup, Latvia continued to limit voting in local
elections to citizens until under the pressure of international institutions’ conditionality.
Yet, the Estonian election laws remained controversial in regard to the language
proficiency requirements placed on candidates. They were required to meet the language law’s
requirements.102 After the nationalist-leaning opposition increased its influence in late 1998 --
the same time when Estonia liberalized its citizenship laws enabling those children born of
resident aliens in Estonia to receive citizenship without have to take a language test, the language
issue in regard to elections became quite important, with the nationalists making it into a
campaign issue.103 A year later the Estonian parliament passed a bill mandating members of all
municipal and district councils as well as parliamentary deputies to have enough ability in
Estonian to take part “in the assembly’s work and [understand] the contents of legal acts -- as if,
in a way, to compensate for liberalizing citizenship.” 104 These requirements were later dropped,
however, once doing so became a condition of NATO entry.105
Concerning language legislation, it was only after Pro Patria sponsored amendments
passed in 1999 that included requiring proficiency in Estonian for employees in the private
sector, NGOs as well as for the self-employed that international institutions launched a concerted
effort to bring change. Under relatively intense pressure, the Estonian parliament later passed
amendments to language legislation that dropped the Estonian language requirement for jobs in
the private sector (even including those with heavy customer contact such as in stores); yet,
maintained the requirement for those in ‘vital’ positions within the service and public sectors. 106
These changes were met with praise from the EU, with EU enlargement minister Gunter
Verheugen claiming that the language law was thus completely in line with OSCE and EU
norms.107 However, this did not keep the Interior Ministry from considering repatriation of
Russians. A draft repatriation proposal was leaked to the press in September 2000. Composed
by Jaak Valge, the head of the ministry’s department responsible for dealing with aliens, the
document recommended repatriating all aliens considered “ill-adjusted and not integrated into
Estonian society.”108 The government then backtracked in claiming that the proposal is not the
Interior Ministry’s official policy.109
The next liberalization came with the end of language requirements for candidates
running for office in parliament and in local councils noted earlier. Passed in November 2001 by
100
Narva’s municipal officials’ appeal for permission to use Russian was denied in late July 2004. According to the Local
Government Organization Act, Estonian must be the language of city council and governments sessions after the Act went into
force in 2002. The Narva City Council has dealt with the Act by first holding an unofficial, discussion-oriented session in
Russian and then a formal one where any decisions made are given in Estonian. Also controversial – though not related to the
denial – has been the closing of Narva’s education department. -- a development that would release all those able to speak
Estonian. (need to say in own words)
101
Tammaru and Kulu 2003, 111.
102
Kelley 2004, 98.
103
Kelley 2004, 99.
104
“Estonia’s Legislators Will Need to Know Estonian Language,” The Jamestown Foundation Monitor, Vol. 5, Issue 1 (4
January 1999). Available at: www.jamestown.org.
105
Kelley 2004, 99-100.
106
Kelley 2004, 103 and 221.
107
“EU Praises Changes to Estonian Language Law,” RFE/RL Baltic Report (3 July 2000).
108
“Repatriation Study Provokes Controversy,” RFE/RL Baltic Report (1 September 2000).
109
Ibid.
 17

a vote of 55 to 21 with one abstention, the changes led the head of the OSCE’s mission to
recommend closure. The day before parliament passed a bill that would counter the effects of
such legislation. Proposed by the Pro Patria Union, the bill declared Estonian as the body’s
working language by a vote of 68 to 0 with 1 abstention, legislation that was motivated by a
desire to balance the abolishment of Estonian for candidates in the parliament and local council
elections.110 It was followed by a bill making Estonian the official language in local councils
passed in early December 2001, requiring official documents and council sessions to be in
Estonian. However, another language may be used if it is the language of the locality’s majority,
provided that the government gives its permission.111
While Res Publica proposed further liberalizing citizenship -- to give it to those resident
since August 1991 who complete civics courses,112 representatives of Estonia’s eight largest
parties formally agreed in January 2003 not to relax Estonia’s citizenship and language policies
regardless of who gains entry into the government after the March parliamentary elections. 113
However, an October 2003 Supreme Court decision relaxed citizenship restrictions by ruling that
resident Soviet and Russian veterans must be allowed to receive permanent residency permits,
rather than five-year permits.114
Despite simultaneous urges to meet international institutions’ demands and further
Estonian identity, signs nevertheless exist to indicate the more positive impact of minority rights
conditionality as well as socialization in Estonia. While the Estonian media has not provided a
particularly positive view on the government’s integration program and political support for the
program weakened in 2003,115 media discourse has shifted in its characterization of minorities.
While Russian speakers have been referred to as ‘colonizers,’ ‘occupants,’ ‘aliens,’ and ‘illegal
immigrants’ -- all questioning their loyalty to an independent Estonia, recent change in this
discourse has been characterized as “’discovering’ the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia.” 116
Changing sentiment has also come from academics and politicians signaling that the Russian-
and Estonian-speaking populations are at a point in which integration is thinkable. Merje
Feldman claims that “Estonians feel that their state and culture are no longer threatened whereas
non-Estonians have come to terms with the collapse of the Soviet Union and have given up
hopes for automatic citizenship or acceptance of Russian as the second official language.” 117 Yet,
Feldman questions whether the Estonian language press reflects greater tolerance.118
Results of public opinion surveys indeed suggest improved Estonian views on
integration. When asked ‘who should be citizens?’ in 1995 and 2000, noticeably more Estonian
respondents selected the requirement of being born in Estonia in 2000 -- 36% compared to 29%
in 1995 (though the percentage claiming that all those resident for 10+ years should be citizens
had dropped from 30% in 1995 to 21% in 2000). 119 When asked to evaluate Estonian citizenship
policy in 1994, 1997, and 2000, fewer respondents over time indicated that it was “too lenient,
harmful to the interests of the Estonian nation:” 36% in 1994, 24% in 1997, and 21% in 2000. 120
110
“Estonian Made Working Language of Parliament,” RFE/RL Baltic Report (13 December 2001).
111
“Estonian made Official Language of Local Councils,” RFE/RL Baltic Report (21 December 2001).
112
“Res Publica Proposes Easier Citizenship for Russians,” RFE/RL Baltic Report (24 July 2002).
113
“Parties Agree: No Changes to Citizenship and Language Policies,” RFE/RL Baltic Report (28 January 2003).
114
“Restrictions on Citizenship Loosened,” RFE/RL Baltic Report (13 October 2003).
115
Laitin 2003, 209 and 217.
116
Kouts and Tammpuu 2002, 308.
117
Feldman 2001, 16.
118
Feldman 2001, 17.
119
Hallik 2002, 78.
120
P. 132 in Lauristin and Heidmets 2002 (need article cite)
 18

Surveys from 1996 and 2000 showed a decrease in support for encouraging non-Estonians to
leave the country. Whereas 75% thought “that the Estonian state should support or promote non-
Estonians in leaving Estonia” in 1996, 46% agreed “that ‘it would be beneficial for Estonia in
case non-Estonians leave or emigrate’” (sic) in 2000. 121 Yet, these surveys showed little change
in the number of respondents questioning non-Estonians loyalty (49% in 1996 and 45% in
2000).122 Finally, a 2000 survey showed that nearly 75% of respondents saw some benefit to
diversity.123
More recently, integration in the area of education also looks a less overtly like
assimilation in Estonia. In June 1993, the Estonian parliament passed the Law on Basic and
Secondary Schools mandating Estonian as the singular language of instruction all state-run
secondary schools by 2000. While the COE and OSCE both urged change since its passage in
1993, it was not until later in September 1997 when parliament amended the law to postpone the
full implementation of instruction in Estonian to 2007 in Russian-language secondary schools --
thanks to the European Commission’s initial Agenda 2000 report in July 1997 criticizing the
government’s plan to close Russian-language secondary schools.124 Beyond the exercise of
straightforward conditionality, Elena Jurado has pointed to other factors in domestic politics that
explain why the government became more receptive to change. 125 The government went even
further in January 2000 by proposing an amendment that would allow up to 40% of courses to be
taught in a minority language without a planned phasing out of the program. 126 2002
amendments later discarded the mandatory transition to Estonian, even after 2007. 127 By going
beyond the EU’s expectations, Jurado claims that OSCE socialization and COE emphasis on
taking an ethical approach to minority rights have been effective in bringing genuine change in
elite attitudes.
While such change is indeed difficult to verify, the Estonian government’s report entitled
“Integrating Estonia 1997-2000” notes that Estonian voters have been voting less frequently
along national lines since the 1999 local elections.128 Stephen Day and Jo Show point to
additional indicators of decreasing distrust between the two nationalities: Pro Patria’s step down
as the main governing party, the “ongoing merger of Russian and Estonian parties,” and the less
nationalistic approaches of recent governing coalitions. 129 Ultimately, such an approach has led
to a lesser degree of protest than Latvia has witnessed in response to education reform. Instead
of increased signs of Russian speakers mobilization (as indicated by the formation of OKROL in
Latvia), Russian mobilization in Estonia shows signs of weakening. Following the March 2003
parliamentary elections, no Russian parties were able to gain representation in the Estonian
parliament -- down from the six seats Russian nationalist parties gained in the 1999 elections.
121
p. 144 in Lauristin and Heidmets 2002 (need article cite)
122
Ibid.
123
20% of Estonian respondents ‘fully agreed’ and 54% ‘rather agreed’ with the following statement. “People with different
languages and culture, living in one country, enrich the society” [p. 334 in Lauristin and Heidmets (need article cite)].
124
Jurado 2003, 415-416.
125
Jurado 2003, 417.
126
Jurado 2003, 418.
127
After a school’s board of trustees has submitted a proposal for instruction in a language other than Estonian, the school’s
respective local council must then submit an application to the government to request permission. The 2002 amendments passed
by a vote of 44-34. The United People’s Party, the Center Party, and a majority of Reform deputies voted for the amendments, a
majority of deputies from People’s Union abstained, and Pro Patria Union and the Moderates voted against them [“Estonian
President Promulgates Law Preserving Russian High Schools,” Baltic News Service (12 April 2002) and “Estonia Passes
Amendment Leaving Russian Classes in High Schools After 2007,” Baltic News Service (26 March 2002)].
128
Day and Shaw 2003, 235.
129
Day and Shaw 2003, 235.
 19

Neither the Russian Party of Estonia with its miniscule 0.18% win nor the United People’s Party
with 2.1% of the vote could meet the 5% threshold. 130 Both parties programs had focused on
liberalizing Estonia’s citizenship and language laws as well as on social problems. While local
analysts claimed the immediate cause was the preceding visit by Lyubov Sliska of United Russia,
a State Duma deputy -- suggesting Moscow’s support, the fact that only 170,000 ethnic
Russians of Estonia’s 500,000 Russian speakers were eligible to vote could not help but play a
role (though clearly not a decisive one given previous successes).131
What this information ultimately suggests is that conditionality and socialization had a
greater genuine impact on Estonia, leading to a shift in general and especially elite attitudes
toward the Russian minority. Nor has Estonia chosen to take Latvia’s harder line on education
reform -- thus diminishing prospects for Russian mobilization. While good reason exits to
attribute all of these changes to international institutions’ involvement, evidence exits to suggest
that Estonia was more open to multiculturalism to begin with. For example, the 1992
Constitution has provisions for cultural autonomy. For example, individuals have the right to be
responded to in their language by local governments and state agencies in places where over half
of the permanent residents identify with a national minority. While only citizens can be part of
the ‘national minority,’ the Constitution makes allowances for areas in with the language of the
majority is not Estonian, thus allowing permanent residents to qualify. 132 Yet, this does not
follow from the recent past. Anton Steen has noted that the Estonian elite tended to be more
confrontational during portions of the earlier 1990s, likely due to the following factors: the
sizeable increase of Russian settlers following significant deportations after World War II, the
harshness of the period of Soviet occupation, and the lack of integration between the Estonian
and Russian communities.133 Given the more homogenous nature of Estonian society, the
deportation of Estonians and the immigration of Russians had to have been difficult. 134 This has
resulted in a significantly lower number of mixed marriages in Estonia than Latvia -- 8.8%
compared to 19.9%.135 Perhaps knowledge of these differences led Estonian elites to proceed
with greater caution -- after the initial, post-Soviet nationalizing phase had subsided.

Conclusion
As for other CEECs, Latvia and Estonia have found themselves under substantial
pressure to adopt post-Cold War norms on minority rights. This paper has considered the
implications of pressures to adopt these norms for inter-ethnic relations. While both the Latvian
and Estonian political elite has demonstrated keen interest in creating ethnic democracies,
Estonia has shown more signs of heading in the direction of multicultural democracy. Not only
have Estonian elites defined ‘integration’ in a more inclusive manner, but presently the Estonian
parliament does not have any representatives of Russian parties 136 -- a situation not due entirely

130
“Russia’s Nationalists a Waning Force Abroad,” The St. Petersburg Times (7 March 2003) (Factiva).
131
Ibid and “Not a Single Russian Party Managed to Get into the Estonian Parliament,” Russian Press Digest (4 March 2003)
(Factiva).
132
Smith 2002, 92.
133
Steen 2000, 76.
134
Ibid., 81.
135
Ibid., 83.
136
Yet, Estonian Russians are part of an effort to create a Russian party in the EU. With a slogan of “for the unity of Russians in
a united Europe,” Russians from six EU member states signed a declaration establishing the Russian Party of the European Union
in June 2004. The party was created to protect Russian nationality and language within Europe and applauds the idea of creating
“a Europe of nations, not a Europe of states [“New Party to be Set Up to Defend Ethnic Russians in EU,” BBC Monitoring
Europe (5 June 2004) and “Declaration Signed for Creation of Russian Party in EU,” Baltic News Service (4 June 2004)].
 20

due to restrictions on naturalization (given previous Russian representation) as 19% of non-

Estonians had the right to vote in 2004. 137 That Estonia has not taken Latvia’s route concerning
education reform means that Estonian high schools will not be required to shift over a certain
percentage of classes to Estonian as their Latvian counterparts have been. This is indeed a far
cry from the 1993 law mandating instruction in Estonian in state-funded Russia secondary
schools beginning in 2000. Nor have as many calls been heard in Estonia for making Russian a
state language, perhaps a result of the government’s less overtly assimilatory understanding of
integration. Nevertheless, after having passed legislation meeting the demands of either the EU
or NATO, both countries often opted for legislation promoting the titular majority -- as if to
undue the effects of adhering to international institutions’ pressures.

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