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The design of decision-making:

participatory budgeting and the
production of localism
a a
Eilidh Moir & Michael Leyshon
a
Geography, College of Life and Environmental Sciences,
University of Exeter, Cornwall Campus, Penryn, TR10 9EZ, UK
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Local Environment, 2013
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The design of decision-making: participatory budgeting and the

production of localism
Eilidh Moir∗ and Michael Leyshon
Geography, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, Cornwall Campus,
Penryn, TR10 9EZ, UK
Downloaded by [University of Toronto Libraries] at 08:27 26 February 2013
This paper examines participatory budgeting (PB) as an instrument of localism – the

devolution of political governance with the aim to produce sustainable democratic
communities. This will be achieved through a detailed exploration of the decision-
making mechanisms for creating local governance through PB schemes designed and
organised by the Cornwall Council (UK). First introduced in the UK by the previous
Labour administration in 2008, PB has become a tool of the Conservative-Liberal
Democrat coalition government and is central to the neoliberal ethos of Big Society
and localism. In a time of rapid political change, we respond to Eaton’s [2008. From
feeding the locals to selling the locale: adapting local sustainable food projects in
Niagara to neocommunitarianism and neoliberalism. Geoforum, 39, 994–1006, 996]
suggestion that greater attention be paid to “the specificities of particular neoliberal
projects” by focusing on the micro-politics of PB. We draw upon empirical evidence
from PB pilot schemes run in rural Cornwall in 2008, examining the effect of
“nudging” decision-making. Grounding this inquiry in the existing literature on
neoliberal statecraft, this paper investigates the role of government technologies
which seek to frame local governance using mechanisms of libertarian paternalism
[Painter, J., 2008. European citizenship and the regions. European Urban and
Regional Studies, 15, 5–19; Painter, J., 2010. Rethinking territory. Antipode: A
Radical Journal of Geography, 42, 1090– 1118; MacLeavy, J., 2008. Neoliberlising
subjects: the legacy of new labour’s construction of social exclusion in local
governance. Geoforum, 39, 1657–1666]. We argue in this paper that neoliberal
ideology has integrated the epistemology of behavioural economics. We draw
conclusions commensurate with the outcomes of PB projects conducted in Latin
America, namely that citizens can be steered towards making certain decisions. We
assert that in order to direct decision-making successfully, governmental “top-down”
frameworks and goals need to be married with local geographies and “bottom-up”
local desires and aspirations, thereby enabling a “countervailing power” [Sintomer,
Y., Herzberg, C. and Rocke, A., 2008. Participatory budgeting in Europe: potentials
and challenges. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 32, 164–
178] to develop. This power is exercised by a participating and scrutinising citizen
that contribute towards, and balance, governmental practices of PB. With a wider
governmental emphasis on designing or “architecting” choice in opportunities for
local governing, there is now an even greater necessity to recognise the context of
geography in local government community-orientated initiatives.
Keywords: big society; governance; participatory budgeting; localism; soft paternalism
∗
Corresponding author. Email: esm204@exeter.ac.uk
# 2013 Taylor & Francis

2 E. Moir and M. Leyshon
Introduction
The launch of Big Society, as part of the Conservative Party manifesto in March 2010, set in
motion a number of initiatives, ideas and forecasts for the future of sustainable local democ-
racy and governance in the UK (e.g. neighbourhood grants to encourage the development of
local groups and encourage social enterprise) (Blond 2010, Cabinet Office 2010). These
policy objectives have been reiterated on a number of occasions, for example, from the
launch of the Big Society Bank to support entrepreneurship through creating local economic
partnerships, to attempts to simplify the registering of charities, and the introduction of
mechanisms for transparency and accountability in government (Mohan 2012). This shift
in government policy is part of a wider political agenda to produce new modalities of
active citizenship by offering citizens more choice in local decision-making (Thaler and
Sunstein 2008, John et al. 2009, Pykett et al. 2011).

One method of attempting to enhance individual choice has been through the inte-
gration of participatory budgeting (PB) projects into local government policy-making
that enable citizens to play a role in budgetary deliberation processes. PB, first introduced
in the UK by the Labour administration in 2008, is best described as a means of providing
financial incentives in exchange for participation. Through PB, a government grant (or
other funding sources) is presented to communities for locally directed expenditure. Com-
munity groups and individuals submit grant proposals and compete against one another for
funding. A selection board, usually comprising local government officers, decides which
proposal(s) deserve funding. In this way, PB can be seen as an example of soft paternalism1
(Colander and Qi Lin Chong 2009): local authority strategic targets are met through struc-
tured or architected schemes which encourage local decision-making and solution-forming.
The previous UK Labour government (1997– 2010) deployed PB as a practical mech-
anism of their policy initiative on “localism”, which aimed to alter the culture of local
engagement and of fiscal responsibility in line with the Party’s Third Way philosophies.2
PB survived the transition from Labour to the coalition Conservative-Liberal Democrat
Government in 2010, and in 2011 the Communities in the driving seat: a study of Partici-
patory Budgeting in England (Department for Communities and Local Government) report
charted the effects of participatory schemes, good practice and how to maximise the cost-
effectiveness of schemes in a Big Society context. What can be seen, therefore, is that both
Labour’s localism and the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Big Society reflect an increas-
ingly conscious reliance on how to frame choice through understanding or manipulating
the behavioural economics3 in participatory schemes. As we show in this paper, PB in par-
ticular can be used to steer thought and action to achieve certain strategic outcomes
(Norman 2010). What is apparent in the deployment of PB initiatives is the emergence
of a centre-local hierarchy, pulling communities and citizens into a social contract with
the government to fulfil localism agenda(s). Within these hierarchies can be seen a politics,
one which governs communities and thereby creates asymmetrical relationships to allow
governmental control through the guise of increased local responsibility and autonomy.
Granting more powers of control to local government and inviting community participation
places additional burdens on communities to self-govern. Thus, PB represents a change in
the relationship between the state and society as government becomes more reliant on com-
munities to deliver policy.
In this paper, we provide a critical analysis of the political philosophy of soft paternal-
ism in the context of local government decision-making. We achieve this through examin-
ing how the Cornwall Council (UK) designed and organised decision-making mechanisms
for producing local governance through PB schemes. The key objective of this paper is to
Local Environment 3
reflect on the intricacy of political geographies in “designed” governing projects. We

demonstrate how designing choice opportunities for citizens in local governing has differ-
ential spatial effects. This is exemplified with an analysis of empirical data from two PB
pilots which took place in Redruth and Bodmin, Cornwall, in 2008. We use the concept
of “choice architecture” (designed mechanisms of decision-making) to explore further gov-
erning rationalities of PB, interrogating three main points; first, the geographies of place and
how governmental sensitivity to these determines the structure and implementation of PB
projects in communities. Second, we evaluate mechanisms of soft paternalism as modes of
power through which community participatory schemes are structured to create asymmetri-
cal relationships in order to meet specific needs. Finally, we explore the extent to which the
politics of “nudging” can achieve a compromise between government strategies and local
need(s). We begin here by outlining the rationalities of choice architecture and its contem-
porary integration into political strategies for local governing (for choice architecture, see
Thaler and Sunstein 2008; for analysis of governance and governing in rural communities,
see Hunt and Wickham 1994, Norman 1990, Lemke 2002, Kooiman 2003, Walters and
Haahr 2005, Curry 2009). We then move to discuss decision-making and examine how par-
ticipatory democracy engenders behaviour change. Following on from this discussion, we
look at participatory democracy and our pilot case studies to inspect critically the level and
modes of soft paternalism in governing through PB. The final section of this paper reflects
on the lessons learnt from rural PB schemes in Cornwall and how architecting choice
requires mediation with local geographies of participation, capacity and willingness.
Soft paternalism in localism and the big society

The philosophical onus for a Big Society centres upon social responsibility, increased
democracy, improvements in welfare, and a stronger, more cohesive, empowered commu-
nity (Blond 2010). The assumption, on the part of the government, is that if the state steps
back, communities will engage in localised decision-making and community-based delib-
eration will come to dominate the structure of local governance. The central ideas of the Big
Society, of self-efficacy, volunteerism and moral responsibility, aim to encourage a “neigh-
bourhood army” of professional community organisers to assume the coordination and
activity of governing. In doing so, government seeks to stimulate an “organised” and cohe-
sive society with the capacity to overcome local issues with local solutions, and find ways to
improve citizen happiness and well-being (Rogerson et al. 2010). It is the notion of
“empowerment” that government uses to legitimise intervention into civic life through neo-
liberal rationalities of “unravelling . . . public institutions, practices and sensibilities”
(Newman in Pykett et al. 2011, p. 8; see also Blakeley 2010). Through the process of unra-
velling these institutions and practices, the central government is presented with an oppor-
tunity to construct new thought and behaviour through the reconciliation of “personal
freedom of choice, supporting the establishment of a more caring and supportive system
of government” (Newman in Pykett et al. 2011, p. 1). This “new”, architecture, governmen-
tal system has been created around soft paternalistic mechanisms to encourage
governmentally perceived “right” and “better” choices for citizens. Governing through
soft paternalism introduces a new rationale of government, one which seeks to evoke
pre-determined behaviour by embedding architected choice opportunities into the civic
realm. Governments, e.g. in Brazil, have begun to use this aspect of behavioural economics
to find “the conditions of possibility within which [governance] can flourish” (Newman in
Pykett et al. 2011, p. 1). Moreover, through Labour’s localism and the Conservative-Liberal
Democrat Big Society, approaches to devolving power, service provision and decision-
making to communities have been developed to reinterpret the scale at which governing
occurs (Clarke 2009). In re-scaling governance, the relationship between the state and
society has been transformed, seeking to empower communities and citizens in fostering
partnerships. This new interpretation of state– society working uses the ideals and rhetoric
of, and for, localism to justify local government reform to strengthen communities, service
delivery and democracy. However, a hierarchical relationship between the state and society
remains in place.
Politicians have deployed a number of behavioural economic techniques to guide civic
thought and action by coercing citizens into participating in desired activities including
temporal ordering, calculating technologies, spatial design and choice architecture. These
methods of soft paternalism are now known as nudge strategies4 (Thaler and Sunstein
2008, John et al. 2009, Jones et al. 2010, Pykett et al. 2011), a type of behavioural econ-
omics now common in political rhetoric (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Studying the use of
nudging in decision-making is a relatively new idea “imported” from the USA, which
aids in developing ideas on libertarian paternalism by progressing the notion of the
citizen-consumer. Although having been used formally and informally for decades through-
out government (Colander and Qi Ling Chong 2009), the rhetoric of nudging as a method of
soft paternalism has recently gained political, social and financial popularity as a way of
designing governance through a psychological approach to influencing decision-making
(Lockton 2008). Nudging behaviour towards certain “desirable” outcomes helps policy-
makers articulate “prompt social norms” (Jones et al. 2010, p. 486), whilst ameliorating
an individual’s cognitive biases, understanding, interpretation and rationalisation. Thus,
through exercising nudges, behaviour, strategy and social motivation can be manipulated
to predict and achieve certain ends (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, Jones et al. 2010). It is,
therefore, through understanding how people comprehend systems, technologies and
designed entities that choice opportunities can be structured and suggestions presented to
influence an individual’s thought and action (Tversky 1972, Norman 1990, Thaler and
Benartzi 2004, Vincente 2006).
The Big Society is predicated on devolving further powers to the citizens in their
locality while local government actors relinquish the power of responsibility and account-
ability. However, critics argue that this political move is a form of governmental scapegoat-
ing and could lead to further unevenness in and between communities, dividing those who
have the skills, resources, time and training to devote to Big Society ventures, and those
who do not (Bednarek 2011, Mohan 2012). In 2011, the Archbishop of Canterbury,
Dr Rowan Williams, attacked the principles of the Big Society saying that the UK was wit-
nessing reform “for which no one voted” (The guardian 2011), and that David Cameron’s
Big Society agenda sparked fear in the citizen. Similarly, the pressures of the Big Society on
increasingly small local authority budgets led to the Liverpool City Council’s rejection of
plans for the Big Society in February 2011 (BBC News 2012). Through localism, the pre-
vious Labour government aimed to embed evenness within and between communities
(March and Heath 2004, Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). The current Con-Lib Alliance govern-
ment appears to be extending this approach in an attempt to empower citizens to self-govern
by “creating a country which feels like a community” (David Cameron, speech on Big
Society, May 2011). The danger inherent in the introduction of practices of soft paternalism,
presenting choice opportunities to communities and steering decision-making down certain
paths, is that democracy and governance will become more unequal as a stratified civic
realm emerges, bringing fewer advantages for the poorer, disengaged sectors of society.
Nevertheless, the introduction of paternalistic practices has begun to change the way in
which decisions are made in civil society.
Local Environment 5
Soft paternalism and decision-making

Barnett et al. (2008) argue the polycentricism of governing is perhaps best explained by
reference to soft paternalism as a political project of coercion (see Lawn 2006, Clarke
2009). Soft paternalism came to the academic fore in 2008 following the publication of
Thaler and Sunstein’s Nudge (2008). The book discusses methods of achieving predictable
outcomes through behavioural economics using libertarian paternalistic mechanisms such
as choice architecture (Lockton 2008). Choice architecture, a component of libertarian
paternalism, is fundamentally based on presenting options to citizens in a way “consistent
with the desired [political] action” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 90). Delivering a choice
architecture requires the participation of a citizen and this can be achieved through what
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) call “nudging”. To nudge is a method of government that
invites citizens to make decisions that will effect significant changes in their thinking, be-
haviour and lifestyle. Paternalistic mechanisms have, therefore, become desirable for gov-
ernmental attempts to normalise citizen behaviour (Tversky 1972, Norman 1990, Foucault
1991, 2004, Thaler and Benartzi 2004, Vincente 2006).
The idea of “nudging” towards better decision-making has been part of Barack Obama’s
approach to “change . . . from the bottom up” (Time Magazine, 2 April 2009). Cass
Sunstein, the author of Nudge (2008), took up the position of Administrator of the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in 2009 and advised on changes to
healthy eating campaigns, healthcare reform and fuel efficiency. The success of incentivis-
ing decision-making through behavioural economics has been transferred across the Atlan-
tic. Taking inspiration from President Obama’s OIRA, the concept of guiding decision-
making using social norms, and an architecture of choice through deliberative participatory
processes, have become commonplace in British politics. In 2010, David Cameron’s newly
elected coalition government established the Behavioural Insights Team. A group of seven
behaviouralists and economists, the Team examined ways in which to influence civic
decision-making in speeding, smoking, tax demands and food labelling, to name a few.
These influences speak of natural responses, such as shock, sadness, guilt or the desire
for more information on certain topics. One specific “success” of this approach was
reported by The Independent newspaper (3 January 2011) which states that “one exper-
iment involved Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) secretly changing the
wording of tens of thousands of tax letters, leading to the collection of an extra £200 m
in income tax”.
If we consider government as the architect of choice options, choice architecture can be
seen as an attractive tool especially when applied to strategies for deliberative participatory
processes. It essentially meets two objectives; helping the political realm achieve its policy
aims and engaging the state with society (Barnett et al. 2008). Taking into account geo-
graphical, historical, cultural and societal differences, individualised diffusionistic, or
nudge, narratives can be applied to move away from infantilising citizens and discounting
their ability to make rational decisions. Soft paternalism, if exercised sensitively, has the
capacity to encourage joint governmental-community working if a meeting of top-down
and bottom-up priorities is integrated into a collective framework seeking to produce and
maintain a more active and engaged community.
John et al. (2009) posit a further strand of choice architecture but one that is founded in
deliberative democracy. The “think” strategy rests upon citizen decision-making: the
freedom of citizens to weigh up opportunities using civic orientation, not nudges from gov-
ernment. Miller (2008) argues that the “think” strategy is one which extends the “moralising
effects of public deliberation” (in John et al. 2009, p. 364). However, Miller contends that
this strategy supports and even encourages decision-making using, very often, ill-informed
bias, preferences and information.
Both the “nudge” and “think” strategies display individual strengths and weaknesses in
their ability to engage citizens and create democratic choice. However, the ultimate aim of
government remains the same in both approaches: to achieve pre-determined outcomes. Be-
havioural economics (nudge) and deliberative democracy (think) can, therefore, comp-
lement one another, as in essence, they embody the same foundations: a “response to the
contingencies of our bounded rationality” (John et al. 2009, p. 369). Soft paternalism in
decision-making is, therefore, an evolution of libertarian paternalism (Jones et al. 2010)
that not only requires a change in the way civic engagement occurs, but also in the
culture and psychology of participation and decision-making in governance. Jones et al.
(2010, p. 7) highlight the psychology of libertarian paternalism and a determination of
the state to guide citizen action and decision-making through “discernable psychological
patterns and tendencies”. Further, they note “that state policy is much more likely to
work and be cost-effective if it exploits related psychological techniques” (Jones et al.
2010, p. 7). As highlighted by John et al. (2009, p. 363), one of these psychological tech-
niques is accessing citizens’ “boundedly rational decision-mak[ing]” capabilities. Humans
are limited by cognitive capacity and make decisions based upon a “cognitive inner world”
(John et al. 2009, p. 363) permitting the recognition of some aspects and rejection of others.
Rationality is, therefore, constructed by the way in which the mind frames the inner world,
with partial understanding and lapses in information playing a large role in how decisions
are made. Selecting certain options is not irrational, however, but rather based upon an
incomplete evaluation of all options and centring upon individual goals, personal reasons
and projections into the future. Rationality thus “rests on the interaction of the cognitive
structure and the context in which individuals operate” (John et al. 2009, p. 363). As
such, advocates of soft paternalism argue that poor decisions are often made. For govern-
ment to intervene in decision-making, John et al. (2009) assert that it should be approached
in three key ways: first, in assessing the individual’s personal attachment to their personal
decision-making frames; second, in grasping the exercise of heuristics in creating alterna-
tive decision-making options; third, in understanding how issues are comprehended by
individuals and what attention they give to these problems (Thaler and Sunstein 2008).
In understanding these concepts, government can then begin to construct soft paternalistic
nudges to alter civic behaviour and guide individuals towards certain decision-making
options.
Soft, or libertarian, paternalism can be distinguished from “hard” paternalism in that it
does not close off alternative options. Instead, choices remain open but are presented in a
way that is preferred by government. However, how these choices are architected and what
constitutes a “better choice” is at the discretion of the architect (Friedman and Friedman
1980, Van De Veer 1986). Looking at the role of local government as the architect of
choice in PB, exercising soft paternalism is an attractive way of ensuring that areas in
need of development are targeted, that the spending of budgets is conducted in ways con-
sistent with governmental aims, and that the local authority can be seen to have fulfilled
central government requirements for participatory governance (Barnett et al. 2008).
Thus, in architecting choice in this way, there is no neutrality in design; it is done with a
set of predefined criteria and outcomes in mind (Thaler and Sunstein 2008).
Governmental exercise of modes of libertarian paternalism, therefore, evokes a signifi-
cant moral argument in the architecture and manipulation of decision-making to align with
certain priorities. There is a risk of creating “false dichotomies” where only two options are
presented when in fact many more may be available, or “decoy effects” when the
Local Environment 7
introduction of a third, marginally more attractive option, removes focus from two pre-
viously thought to be preferred outcomes, either accidentally or deliberately (Lockton
2008). For government to remain “soft” in its paternalism, they must avoid these pitfalls
to allow open and unrestricted choice, thereby being seen to uphold democratic and free
decision-making. It is thus the moral judgment of government and the recalibration of
the relationship between government and society which are significant in exercising
these techniques.
Libertarian paternalistic techniques of behaviour change are closely linked to Foucault’s
(1991) conceptualisation of governmentality. To Foucault, governmentality is a merging of
forms of knowledge and power techniques to produce rational technologies that seek to
shape conduct. Governmentality comprises two key elements; firstly, reasoning, or why
space is governed in a particular way, known as rationalities, and secondly, technologies;
the mechanisms which implement rationalities. According to Foucault, these elements

are intertwined and by using both technologies and rationalities, conduct, or behaviour,
can be “shaped and reshaped” (Dean 1999, 18 in Gordon 1991, Lemke 2001, Murdoch
2005). Foucault sought to identify where nodes of power lie in society if they were no
longer held by the central government. Engaging in soft paternalistic techniques of govern-
ing requires a mentality of governance that attempts to alter “the conduct of conduct” (Dean
1999, p. 10, Walters 2004). Through the ideas of localism and the Big Society, decision-
making powers are diffused throughout society as a multitude of actors adopt a role in
governance.
In Foucauldian terms, the individual and the state are dependent on one another, and in
governing society through soft paternalism the conduct of one “co-determines [the] other’s
emergence” (Lemke 2002, p. 191). Through governmentalising engagement opportunities,
government is able to permeate thought, decision-making and actions of the citizen. Gov-
ernment can be seen to remain at a distance from the community but simultaneously guide
behaviour and decision-making to align with preferred outcomes. Through the lens of gov-
ernmentality, soft paternalistic interventions, therefore, seek to mobilise local capacity for
governing through outwardly promoting greater egalitarian modes of self-governance, local
ownership and locally driven development.
Despite the apparent resurgence of neoliberal sensibilities in government advocacy of
increased individual responsibility, the move towards behavioural economics can be
viewed as a “respon[se] to the failings of a neoliberal society” (Jones et al. 2010, 15).
These failings are manifold: a largely disengaged populace, uneven community willingness
and capacity to participate in local governing, and the inability of government to access
communities and citizens. These have necessitated further governmental dependence on
“psychological understandings of citizens [and] the existence of a more complex kind of
policy experiment” (Jones et al. 2010, p. 15). The use of behavioural interventions, such
as recognising individual’s behaviour traits, embedding spatial and temporal strategies
for engagement and encouraging social norms, are all modes of contextually orientating
governance through attempting to elicit certain behaviours.
Although it is possible for participatory schemes to take place without nudging, the
deployment of paternalistic rationalities and mechanisms presents the possibility of exacer-
bating divisions in society rather than extending political inclusion. In using paternalistic
exercises, communities are separated into who can and will participate from those who
cannot or will not. Further, a large proportion of participatory schemes (e.g. The Children’s
Fund in Newcastle taking place in May 2008 and Everyone Counts in Walsall linked to the
Every Child Matters outcomes highlighted by the central government: Participatory Bud-
geting 2008) are ephemeral governing projects, based upon limited resources and
support and thus appear sporadically with little opportunity for ongoing civic participation.
Although theoretically communities appear to meet government targets, such as improving
local conditions or spending designated funding, through carefully designed and structured
engagement projects, we must question the extent to which the “quick wins” government
achieves longevity. Moreover, any “successes” attained by such projects are area-specific
leading to further social, cultural or economic unevenness in society.
Soft paternalism is evident in contemporary political efforts to produce “citizenly beha-
viours” (Pykett et al. 2011, p. 1) whilst in “. . . the pursuit of policy goals” (Halpern et al.
2004, p. 3). The exercise of these “citizenly behaviours” can be seen in unifying approaches
encouraged by the central government to allow social enterprises, local charities and com-
panies to take control of certain citizen service provisions. This process unsettles state mon-
opolies (for example, through opening up opportunities for community-run or privately run
services), attempts to make government more accountable and devolves further power to
neighbourhoods (Rogerson and Sadler in Rogerson et al. 2010). Essentially, soft paternalist
techniques are now exercised by an “avuncular state” (Jones et al. 2010, p. 50), aiming to
elicit behaviour change by structuring and co-ordinating civic engagement and action to
align with strategic outcome priorities. Behaviour change as a result of participatory
schemes can be most clearly seen in the case of Porto Alegre, Brazil, as we now discuss
further.
Participatory democracy and behaviour change

Participatory democracy signifies both the coming together of forms of representative and
direct democracy, as well as points of conflict in communities (Aragones and Sanchez-
Pages 2009). To overcome local challenges and mobilise forms of democracy simul-
taneously, PB can be exercised as a mode of soft paternalism to harmonise the practice
of deliberative democracy and establish a co-constitutive democratic system. However,
this hybrid form of democracy produces a fuzzy new composition of governance, designed
to incorporate and empower the citizen but still stringently led by government.
PB first formally emerged in the city of Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 1989 (Porto Alegre,
Participatory Budgeting 2008). An innovative system for making budgetary dissemination
more democratic and transparent, participatory governance through devolved budgets
allowed a complex structure of governing to emerge in the city, designed and tailored to
the needs of Porto Alegre’s citizens. PB was looked to by the city’s government as a
mode of redesigning governance to ensure that democracy, openness, accountability and
inclusion were incorporated into the structures of governing at all levels.
The form of PB developed in Porto Alegre reflected the unique social, political, cultural
and historical geography of the city and the disparate communities living in and around the
area. The Porto Alegre city authority sought to create a “window of opportunity” (Sintomer
et al. 2008, p. 166) for participatory democracy from both the top-down and bottom-up to
allow citizens to take more control of decision-making and increase accountability and
transparency in government. It was a slow evolution of change but one that created and soli-
dified new processes and terms of governance in the city. Stability in governing has
emerged and despite a general election in the city in 2004, the system of participatory gov-
ernance in place since 1989 has not been altered. To date, over 100 European cities have
implemented forms of participatory democracy, such as Paris, Rome and Seville.
However, despite widespread use and relative success, PB has not been implemented to
any great extent in the UK. In 2005, the City of London attempted to introduce PB but
Local Environment 9
low citizen participation and insufficient budgets did not provide the projects with any cre-
dence or longevity (Sintomer et al. 2008, Participatory Budgeting 2008).
Other PB projects pursued in England from 2008 to 2009 generally spoke of improving
societal conditions and a number were structured around disengaged communities and
those in poverty (see, for example, Walsall, West Midlands and Tower Hamlets, London;
Participatory Budgeting 2008, Department for Communities and Local Government
2008b). However, the projects lacked long-term funding, firm government-local joint lea-
dership and effective community engagement strategies (World Bank 2007). The form of
decentralised governance introduced by the government of Porto Alegre underpinned
democratic consolidation through “expanding the universe of spaces of popular delibera-
tion” by “restoring conditions for governance” (Koonings 2004, p. 84), instilling ideas
and practices of pluralism in governance, and strengthening participation, empowerment
and inclusion. Those which emerged in England focused more on bounded communities
requiring an exclusive membership of these groups for participation. The opportunities
to roll these projects out further were thus limited. In addition, conditions were placed
upon participating communities, forced to adhere to thematic constraints more often than
not surrounding wider governmental aims such as improving the health or environment
of areas. These themes would have an impact on civic life in the community but are essen-
tially governmental defaults and do not allow free reign of the citizen for deliberation over
the spending of a local budget.
The successes of participatory governance in Porto Alegre have been attributed to “a
combination of a strong and pragmatic political will on the part of the local government
on the one hand, and of bottom-up mobilisation on the other side” (Sintomer et al. 2008,
p. 167; see also Santos 2005). It is this meeting of top-down and bottom-up that provides
the balance for participatory governance to emerge, for it to be trusted as a means of
improving local conditions and possess some form of permanence. The balance, produced
largely by a “countervailing power” (Sintomer et al. 2008, p. 167; see also Avritzer 2002)
through a participatory and scrutinising citizen which encourages the state to rely on
society, and vice versa, in a co-dependent relationship with a common aim. This power
stabilises government intervention into PB and thus allows communities to assume more
control over budgetary expenditure.
In Cornwall, England, PB was a mechanism of governance designed to alleviate the
complexity of decision-making and create an active citizenry able to self-govern. PB pro-
vided a solution to co-ordinating localism in reducing the bureaucracy, cost and size of gov-
ernance networks, and implementing a simplified route to participatory and direct
governance. In the Labour government’s White Paper, Strong and Prosperous Communities
(Department for Communities and Local Government 2006b), PB was cited as one of the
key measures to devolve decision-making to the community. A more concentrated, small-
scale endeavour, PB has appeal to local governments because of its seemingly ephemeral,
straightforward, manageable processes of allocation and spending of local grants. As an
“empowerment tool” and one concerned with instilling sustainable self-governance in com-
munities, PB was thus intended to allow citizens more control over decisive powers gov-
erning their local area.
PB is intended to “increase transparency, accountability, understanding and social
inclusion in local government affairs” (Church Action on Poverty 2008, p. 4) by informing
citizens of what government can provide and asking communities to identify their priorities
for spending, facilitated by local authority officers. PB provides the mechanism through
which responsibility materialises in creating an environment for self-governance through
budgetary decision-making. In 2008 and 2009, the Cornwall Council piloted schemes for
PB, under the name U-Choose for Cornwall after the launch of the central Government’s
PB draft-strategy and consultation in summer 2008. In the White Paper Communities in
Control: Real People, Real Power (2008), the then Labour government stated that “all
local authorities will be using some form of participatory budgeting by 2012” (Department
for Communities and Local Government 2008a, p. 8). This commitment provided for the
Cornwall County Council an opportunity to showcase how participatory governing could
be performed once it was integrated into the broader localism agenda for later development
into a new unitary authority established in April 2009. The frameworks and directives given
to local government to develop communities, such as the Sustainable Communities Act
(2007), the Communities’ Empowerment Plan (2007) and the National Empowerment Fra-
mework (2009), fed into the discursive drive of the central government for local Councils to
recognise the opportunities that embedding participatory governing could provide. This
“new progressive political agenda” initiates a “constructive interaction” (Koonings 2004,

p. 81) between politics, resources, citizen engagement and activity. Avritzer (2002) and
Koonings (2004, p. 81) term the product of constructive interaction “participatory
publics”, groups of citizens who are enabled, through engagement and participation tech-
niques, to transform and take on the ownership of governance for their area (Sintomer
et al. 2008).
Employing new modes of soft paternalism to elicit behaviour change is contentious; it is
shrouded in moral argument surrounding the “cajol[ing] [of] people in the direction of personal
responsibility and choice” (Halpern et al. 2004, p. 7). As noted above, soft paternalism is not
universally accepted as a moral method of governing. As posited by Margo Huxley (in Pykett
et al. 2011, 3), there exists a “liberal anxiety about the paternalist and manipulative potentials
of ‘nudging’”. Huxley contends that in altering behaviour through architected choice, citizens
cannot be considered “free subjects” (Pykett et al. 2011, 3) if shaped, guided and steered by
governing mentalities and rationalities designed to incite specific behaviours. There is, then, a
hesitancy of government to allow citizens to engage in unrestricted governing. The role of gov-
ernment as an avuncular “enabler”, “to encourage in us behaviour that is in our own best inter-
ests” (Halpern et al. 2004, 60) means that government determines “default” behaviours, for
example, in setting agenda to eat more healthily (recommending five portions of fruit and veg-
etables per day), exercising more (guidelines presented by government quasi-autonomous non-
governmental organisations such as the Women’s Sport and Fitness Foundation) or continue in
education after age 16 (as seen in the publication of the White Paper, Higher Education: stu-
dents at the heart of the system, 2011). These defaults not only intend to encourage behaviour
change, but also attempt to instil values of discipline and readiness to engage with governmen-
tal ideals in order for policy aims to be met. The discourse of “encouragement” necessitates a
change in the relationship between government and the citizen from the purely paternalistic,
“you must”, to one that is more choice orientated, “you are able to”. Nevertheless, this relation-
ship is built upon a politics which establishes how, where and when choices, decisions and
options will be taken, by whom and what the outcomes of these will be.
The politics of performing localism reflects the causal effects of a shift in the balance of
power and decision-making from government to more fluid and interactive mechanisms
designed for communities to make their own decisions (Halpern et al. 2004). This shift
is popularly characterised as a move from “old” to “new” forms of governance, where
old governance represents the previous status quo of centralised and institutionalised gov-
erning in “a top-down” fashion (Walters 2004). New governance, therefore, reflects a neo-
liberal move away from centralised governing and towards a more pluralised, network of
governance, placing governance in the hands of the citizen and private sectors, the third
sector, communities and the individual.
Local Environment 11
In Cornwall, specific projects such as PB initiatives were favoured by the local authority
to deliver on their promise of localism. This was in part an attempt to foster closer local
government-community working and be seen by the central government to have conformed
to recommendations. However, as one Cornwall Council officer5 involved in structuring the
PB projects noted, “it puts neighbour against neighbour. There [is] a feeling that it [is] not
good to get communities to vote against each other . . . there’s no reason to have a compe-
tition” (primary interview data). We can see that through these projects a politics emerged
which was governed by both the local and central government, with policy goals, frame-
works, mandates and specific outcomes in mind. This politics determined the amount of
funding made available for localism endeavours, which communities would be involved,
the thematic and target-based structure of the projects and what the intended outcomes
should be. This politics, although steered by the central government as a result of
funding being drawn down from governmental departments (e.g. Communities and
Local Government), was largely shaped in Cornwall by local government needs and
focused upon wider aims such as anti-social behaviour, the development of communities
in deprived areas and environmental protection. To enable this politics to be put into prac-
tice, PB, following the successful example of Porto Alegre, Brazil, became an attractive
mechanism of civic improvement to the local authority.
Participatory budgeting
In examining government intervention into participatory governance, we draw here on
empirical data from two PB pilot schemes in Cornwall in 2008, each of which produced
very different results. The Cornwall Council’s policy U-Choose for Cornwall (Cornwall
Council, 2012b) aimed to engage residents in community identified initiatives. The
schemes were advertised, structured and funded by the Cornwall Council. Citizens and
communities were invited to submit applications for project funding which were then
reviewed by the Council, partnership organisations and residents, then short-listed to be
put to citizen vote at an open meeting. The U-Choose framework gave residents the oppor-
tunity for open discussion to resolve community needs. The winning projects were then
funded by the Council and/or partnership organisations up to a maximum of £500 per
project with up to twelve projects receiving budgets.
Cornwall is a largely rural county located to the South West of England. Taking the
shape of a peninsula, Cornwall has a population of around 500,000 residing in an area of
1400 square miles. The case studies we present in this paper are taken from Redruth
North in West Cornwall and Bodmin in East Cornwall. The characteristics of each area
are somewhat similar; however, West Cornwall has a high percentage of low-income
estates (2553 households) and a large number of elderly people living on low incomes
(1478 households), and East Cornwall possesses high numbers of people living in agricul-
turally active villages (766 and 823 households, respectively) and a high number of close-
knit communities (1311 households).6
The two pilot areas are alike in that they are both areas of high indices of deprivation
(e.g. represented by the South West Observatory 2010) and largely rural communities
(classified by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) as
Rural 80 2009), but there are fundamental differences in their social and participatory geo-
graphies. The divergent outcomes of the pilots, as we discuss below, reflect the differences
in governmental attention to the geography of participation, and in gauging the level of
intervention required for each area. In attending to the geography of Redruth North, gov-
ernmental implementation of PB, a mechanism of soft paternalism, can be seen to have
resulted in a balancing of top-down and bottom-up priorities and needs. However, through
inattention to this geography in Bodmin, what resulted was a heavily paternalistic project
and one met with intransigence by local residents.
The empirical evidence used in this paper is presented in narrative form. We provide
here a summary of events which represents nudging as a state instrument for decision-
making. The evidence we gathered has come from interviews with two of the Cornwall
Council’s localism officers engaged in the design and management of the PB pilots.
These officers helped formulate the structure of each PB pilot, including where it took
place, who took part, how funding would be procured and the theme that would be used
for participants to structure their proposals for funding. What was evident at the time of
interviewing was that each officer played a role in paternalising the pilots and how, in
implementing a nudge through theming the projects, they could be seen as architects of
the deliberative participatory process. The officers played a “back role” in the schemes,
designing projects and handing over their management to local groups and individuals
(as will be discussed below). We consulted Cornwall Council data to gather accounts
from local residents, local bodies and organisations who participated in the schemes.
What these data provided was the general feeling of those who participated, such as the
Town Council and local community groups, and how they viewed their role in the pilot.
Using Cornwall Council publications, we were able to ascertain the successes of the
schemes according to governmental markers for what would constitute achievement: for
example, in meeting the assigned objectives for each pilot. We begin here with an overview
of the PB pilot put into action in Redruth North in 2008.
Redruth north
Prior to the launch of the PB programme in Redruth North, few structured governance
opportunities or managing community budgets had been provided for local residents. An
area afflicted with high levels of crime and anti-social behaviour, an Audit Commission
report in 2005 showed that three-quarters of people in Redruth felt they were unable to
influence decisions affecting their neighbourhood (Audit Commission 2012, Cornwall
Council 2012a). In 2008, Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, Cornwall County Council
and local organisations such as the Redruth North Partnership7 (RNP) held a series of
neighbourhood meetings to engage with local residents and discern their priorities. At
the time, residents asked for more local uniformed policing, better services for young
people, increased community-safety work by wardens and tackling disturbances created
by youths. In marrying these priorities with local government strategic aims, outlined in
the Community Safety Partnership Plan (2008), these goals then formed the initial priorities
to structure the pilot.
In combing these priorities with local government strategic aims, the local authority
themed the pilot “community safety” to guide residents in structuring their applications.
Continuing to engage with local residents, Cornwall County Council officials, local
police and members of the RNP met throughout the months of September and October
2008 to discuss the framework for the pilot. As an umbrella body of organisations and
local groups operating in the local area, the RNP was granted the role of organiser and facil-
itator of the project by the Council. Funding was provided by One Cornwall8 and Kerrier
District Council,9 and a panel was established to evaluate development proposals submitted
by the local community, consisting of members of the RNP, community volunteers, Town
Council and Cornwall County Council officials.
On 9 October 2008, the Cornwall Council launched a call for submissions for the U-
Choose scheme in Redruth North (Redruth North Partnership 2008). Fifty-two local resi-
dents, alongside the RNP, voted to support 12 projects proposed by residents (One Corn-
wall, issue 17, February 2009, Cornwall Council). These projects included the
establishment of RedYOUth, an organisation which provides structured activities for disad-
vantaged and vulnerable youths in the Redruth area (Cornwall Council 2012b).
The pilot essentially reorganised the relationship between the local authority and the
community in permitting the RNP to take control of organising and facilitating the
project. The RNP was tasked to address the needs of local people. The decision to do
so reflected the Cornwall County Council’s sensitivity to the geography of Redruth: a
historically politically disengaged populace (a poll taken by the Audit Commission in
2009 showed that three-quarters of people in Redruth felt they were unable to influence
decisions affecting their neighbourhood: Audit Commission 2012) but one with strong
local connections and appetite for engaging in participatory initiatives (shown in the con-
vening of the RNP to bring together resident’s associations and community groups to
tackle local issues: Redruth North Partnership 2008). In permitting the RNP a leadership
role, the exercise of soft paternalistic techniques through embedding the theme of “com-
munity safety” allowed the authority to remain in control of the scheme but at a distance.
The theme incited a stronger focus of local residents in their applications but also
ensured the local authority that the outcome of the pilot would meet governmental objec-
tives. The Cornwall County Council thus regulated the project but allowed a degree of
local autonomy. We turn here now to the second example of PB in Cornwall, in the area
of Bodmin.
Bodmin
Bodmin is a market town with a population of 19,500. The town council had extensive
experience of community engagement schemes prior to the Cornwall County Council’s
PB planned pilot in 2008. The Town Council and the Bodmin and Surrounding Area
Forum had historically assumed much of the engagement and participation work for the
area and had established a system for the allocation of small community grants for resi-
dents’ projects (for example, Police Community Safety Officer grants to improve facilities
in rural communities). Concurrently, the North Cornwall District Council10 ran a commu-
nity chest programme (between £100 and £2000 granted on a first come first serve basis to
assist community projects in the area: Thisiscornwall 2012), also providing funding for
community-led ventures for residents living in Bodmin. The area was, therefore, accus-
tomed to participatory governing schemes, especially those which offered budgets for
local expenditure. However, in structuring the pilot for the Bodmin area the local authority
did not take this historical engagement into consideration. Instead, the Cornwall County
Council used the same format as in Redruth North and attempted to engage with local resi-
dents on local issues of concern. The close-working between residents and the Town
Council and the availability of funding for local projects meant that the local authority’s
initial engagement with those living in the area did not highlight any conclusive problems
to be addressed as concerns were already communicated to local bodies. In an interview, a
community engagement officer noted:
with hindsight, Bodmin and Surrounding Area Forum already [had] a small fund for each of the
parishes to apply for, North Cornwall District Council [also ran] a very successful community
chest which also gave funding to people . . . [the issue was with] fairness as a rule, if you apply
for funding, if you fit the criteria, there is the money and you tend to get the funds. (primary
interview data 6 February 2009)
As engagement for the pilot was not conducted by the District Council operating in the
area, extant knowledges of local needs were not conveyed by the County Council, thus con-
tributing to the problems facing the planned PB pilot. Another interviewee noted that the
Cornwall Council “services are not engaged . . . there’s a role for town and parish councils
[but] they’re going to become powerless if we don’t get this articulation and communication
right” (primary interview data, 27 July 2009).
Despite this lack of information, the local authority proceeded to structure the pilot
without joint-working with local organisations. No theme was proposed for the pilot but
instead, a strict framework was imposed to ensure a flow of processes (Bodmin Town
Council 2012a). The Council attempted to employ learning from the Redruth North
scheme, largely as a result of the huge volume of applications submitted, and decided to
place conditions on the pilot: applications were only to be accepted from organisations
and individuals who were “fully constituted and recognised” in the area; caps were
employed on the maximum amount of money that could be applied for; and a “quota
system” was established to make sure that a “minimum number of projects are accepted
from rural parish areas (minimum of four projects from outside of the Bodmin electoral div-
isions)” (Minutes: Bodmin Town Council Meeting 2008, Bodmin Town Council 2012a,
2012b); Cornwall County Council 2009). The decision was made by the County Council
to cap the number of applications because it was felt that too many applications could
pose problems when it came to assessment. As a result, only thirty-two proposals were
considered.
The process of assessing full proposals was structured by the County Council. A PB
event was to be held in the Town Council’s Shire Suite in central Bodmin on a Saturday
during the day. All proposals were required to be submitted before this time, so applications
could be assessed and short-listed. They were then to be presented at the event and each
proposer would be given three minutes to describe their ideas. Attendees could then vote
for the project that they felt deserved the funding by grading the project on a scale from
one to ten. The winning projects would be required to provide updates to exhibit how
they used the money. Inserting a nudge is part of the process of decision-making and we
can see that an absence of this part of the process in Bodmin led to it being more controlled
than in Redruth North (for example, a quota system was established to make sure that a
certain number of projects were accepted from rural parish areas). There were more con-
ditions and rules to be adhered to, perhaps to avoid complications if the predicted high
number of applications were submitted. However, at the submission deadline, only one
project proposal had been submitted, not enough to run the PB scheme, or invite residents
as decision-makers. We can see, therefore, that policy is not diffuse, and it can perhaps best
be viewed as part of a stage-managing process within a framework that appears to offer
choice.
The Bodmin PB pilot can, therefore, be seen to have circumvented existing participa-
tory practice in the area; through bypassing already established networks between residents,
the Town Council and District Council failed to stimulate meaningful engagement. Disre-
garding these essential specifics significant to Bodmin, the local authority’s approach to the
pilot attempted to weave in lessons from the Redruth scheme through establishing a firm
framework for the mechanisms of the pilot. However, without an understanding of the appe-
tite for PB and of the existing similar schemes in place, this planning and framework was
largely redundant. In paternalising the pilot, the local authority created an initiative that not
only resembled others in place, but it was not as flexible or locally orientated as those
already co-ordinated by local organisations in Bodmin.
Lessons from Redruth North and Bodmin

In examining the differences between the PB projects in Redruth and Bodmin two impor-
tant factors emerge; first, in the geography of participation, the level of prior governmental
engagement between the local authority and communities; and second, in governmental
intervention and the exercise of paternalistic techniques of control of the process to
ensure predictable outcomes.
The Redruth pilot was promoted and structured for an area which “historically lack[ed]
any engagement with local government structures” (Participatory Budgeting 2008, Stcleer-
parishcouncil 2012), meaning that the opportunity to participate and play a role in shaping
the future of their community was unchartered territory for the local community. Redruth
North, without prior opportunity to engage in PB schemes, thus provided a space where
a new idea could flourish because there lacked a normalisation of behaviour to participate
in such initiatives. A cohesive citizen was formed through the invitation to residents by the
local authority to participate in structuring the PB project. Residents then united to form a
decision-making body to actively engage with the scheme to make decisions, or govern,
their local area. A countervailing power was thus produced whereby residents could act
as organisers, advocates and decision-makers for the futurity of their community. Neverthe-
less, the choice architecture implemented by the authority through theming the project as
“community safety” created an “infantilising rationality”. As a new project, the community
could be steered in their approach, thoughts and behaviours to align with that of govern-
mental aims (Jones et al. 2010). Redruth North thus became a site for guiding and moulding
residents into an engaged citizen through choice architecture, marrying the concerns of the
local community with that of the local authority. This blending of top-down and bottom-up
needs, nevertheless, allowed asymmetrical relations to form as the local authority remained
ultimately in control of the funding for the scheme.
In contrast, the Bodmin PB pilot was layered on to an area with already existing struc-
tures of participatory engagement and funding with a wider remit than that which could be
provided by U-Choose. Further, the financial incentives provided for the area by the local
authority were also lower than those provided by the Town Council and the Bodmin and
Surrounding Area Forum. There was no scope to normalise behaviour or deploy infantilis-
ing rationalities as participatory citizens had already been formed through civic engagement
with the Town Council and the Bodmin and Surrounding Area Forum. There was, therefore,
no meeting of top-down and bottom-up needs, nor the creation of a countervailing power,
reflected in the strict paternalistic framework constructed by the local authority for the pilot.
One Cornwall Council officer interviewed noted, “as a new concept its hard to sell. . . If I
knew then what I know now I might have been tempted to have a lot more input with com-
munity groups rather than parish councils and it might have been a good idea to say we’ve
got £10,000 to spend on village halls, it was too wide” (primary interview data). In Bodmin,
residents were presented with a framework and criteria for the proposed initiative, one
which can be construed as exhibiting highly governmentalised and strict processes to
ensure that the pilot met certain priorities. The pilot thus lacked what we can call a
nudge: a guide and incentive, different to the ones already in place, to cajole residents
into taking part.
The case studies we have outlined reflect the variation in use of governmentalised pater-
nalistic techniques in PB projects and there are three points which bring together the
exercise of these methods in social control. First, Foucault’s (1991) concept of governmen-
tality can aid an explanation of the architecture behind choice opportunities but in practice,
governmentalised approaches do not always lead to the achievement of governmental aims.
Governmentality emphasises that “modern forms of power operate through diffuse net-
works, which seek to utilise systems of freedom (or self-conduct), as a basis for governing”
(Jones et al. 2010, p. 8, Norman 2010). Having an understanding of the mentality of gov-
erning, or the conduct of conduct, allows government to employ technologies or modes of
governance such as soft paternalism. Exercising these strategies, as seen in architecting
choice through the implementation of a nudge, redefine the balance of power between gov-
ernment and the community and allow the community to become a countervailing power.
Outwardly, the community is seen to be acting independently of government but in essence,
dominant relations of control are steering thought and behaviour. However, in creating rigid
frameworks for PB, as seen in the pilot in Bodmin, the governmentality governing this prac-
tice created a structure that was unyielding and overtly governmentally orientated, thus the
community did not embrace the initiative. Governmentality, then, although a valuable tool
in understanding and structuring engagement activities so as to achieve desirable outcomes,
needs to be balanced and conducted somewhat surreptitiously in order for community buy-
in to be attained. Sensitivity to the spatial context of the PB project and the geography of
participation already in the area can, therefore, be viewed as beneficial indicators of the
level of paternalism required for the area.
Second, soft paternalism can be seen to have been used as a mode of power and
social control; however, in architecting choice, freedom of choice is only a façade. Sub-
jects become “normalised by so-called infrastructures of feeling [as] top-down spatial
techniques . . . are simply used to meet the behaviour-change goals of a professional
cartel” (Jones et al. 2010, p. 14). Gauging the level of paternalism has to be carefully
navigated to ensure that citizens feel they are in control of governing. It is here that lib-
ertarian paternalistic mechanisms of governing problematise neoliberal government
agendas (Jones et al. 2010). Neoliberal approaches to state activity advocate the
increased autonomy of the citizen and the community, but in exercising choice architec-
ture and governmentalising governing opportunities, government undermines this ideo-
logical premise. Libertarian paternalism thus counteracts neoliberalism and essentially
tries to compensate for the neoliberal failings of the modern state in creating Janus-
faced participatory governance.
Finally, despite competing entities, a compromise can be reached between neoliber-
alism and libertarian paternalism in order to enable freedom of choice, supply helpful
nudges and restrain government. Choice architecture is a convincing mode of govern-
ance to steer or nudge decision-making in order to improve communities but as the
above case studies show, there is a stark warning that the geographies of place need
to be assimilated into frameworks for libertarian paternalistic techniques. Brautigam
(2004), amongst other theorists of PB, asserts that there is a semi-prescriptive formula
that could enhance the effectiveness, success and sense of ownership felt by citizens
engaged in PB. For example, “blueprints” should be avoided and “a menu of possible
strategies” (Brautigam 2004, p. 667) put forward for participating citizens to choose
from. Essentially, then, it is the localisation of paternalistic endeavours that needs to
be achieved so that each project is tailored towards individual communities, geographies,
individuals and capacities. Taking into account geographical, historical, cultural and
societal differences, individualised diffusionistic, or nudge, narratives can be applied
to move away from infantilising citizens and discounting their ability to make rational
decisions. Soft paternalism, if exercised sensitively, can, therefore, encourage joint
governmental-community working if a meeting of top-down and bottom-up priorities is

integrated into a collective framework seeking to produce and maintain a more active
and engaged community.
Conclusion
At the start of this paper, we set out to examine the extent to which the Cornwall Council
deployed soft paternalism to implement PB and how this was achieved through carefully
producing architected or pre-determined modes of citizen engagement to resolve local
issues and concerns. As an “experiment in democracy” (Giddens 1998, p. 75), PB is an
attempt to provide a semblance of autonomy for communities, individuals and citizens
through shifting responsibility and decision-making to local communities. International
Institute for Environment and Development (2012) argues that local organisations not
only possess greater knowledge and understanding of local communities, but also elicit a
sense of trust and partnership with local residents. Governmental engagement with these
groups and granting permission for them to assume leadership of PB schemes can be advan-
tageous for convening cohesive citizens. However, our case studies illustrate that rather
than governance taking place in communities, it remained in local government. This in
part can be explained by the ephemeral nature of PB projects that make it difficult to main-
tain continuing citizen participation. The transient nature of citizens created through PB was
relatively unsuccessful in changing the culture of participation and engagement in partici-
patory governance. The highly managed approach to participatory governance in Cornwall,
conforming to neoliberal ideologies of greater civic governance but deploying libertarian
soft paternalistic tactics, prevented a transformation in the culture of participation. In
seeking to ensure certain conduct and normalise citizen behaviour, the Cornwall Council
restricted the evolution of bottom-up governing. The practices employed by the Cornwall
Council and the default norms dispensed to elicit desirable behaviour resulted in an uneven
practice of PB: communities with active, engaged citizens are able to flourish under such
frameworks, while those with less participative residents may be unsuccessful. We argue
that to navigate the complexities of local governing, participatory initiatives must, there-
fore, be sensitive to local geographies. Further, a blanket approach to participation and
engagement schemes is ineffective. Default frameworks for action and integrating individ-
ual characteristics of place can be seen to help shape participatory schemes according to
community desire, ability and need.
For Labour, ideas of decentralisation were entwined with visions of “greater equality of
opportunity” (Willett and Giovannini 2011, p. 3; see also Mather 2000). However, as Norman
(2010) argues, although Labour set about rescaling (down-sizing) government to project the
appearance of decentralisation, they were simultaneously centralising and imposing greater
control over local government and communities. Through governmental rhetoric around
ideals for localism and the mobilisation of active citizens, what can be seen to have
emerged is “centralised decentralisation” (Willett and Giovannini 2011, p. 12). With over-
arching aims for “. . . people to be given more control over their lives; consulted and involved
in running services; informed about the quality of services in their area; and enabled” (Strong
and Prosperous Communities, Department for Communities and Local Government 2006a,
2006b, p. 7), the dominant discourse from central government sought to normalise, engage
and mobilise individuals and citizens. Indeed, through the more recent Con-Lib Alliance Loc-
alism Act (2010–2012), communities are granted increased opportunities to challenge service
providers and service delivery, to bid for self-running of these services, to buy community
assets and to call local referendums on local issues.
Tomaney and Pike (2006) assert that the devolution of responsibility and decision-making
away from the central government “. . . appears to bring government closer to the people and
opens spaces for new actors to influence and shape the priorities of local and national devel-
opment policy” (Tomaney and Pike 2006, p. 130). PB, as a new mode of democracy, through
extending participatory methods of governing, permits governance to advance past represen-
tative structures and allow the citizen to directly engage in agenda and policy-setting. The dis-
cursive space created by government through rhetoric forges a new politics of accountability
whereby the state is not directly held responsible for local decision-making and agenda-
setting (Blakeley 2010). Staeheli and Mitchell (2008) notes that initiatives such as localism
through PB have been used for many years as a means for the local to find solutions to
local issues. She suggests, therefore, that government is predisposed to rely upon commu-
nities to solve local problems. Staeheli and Mitchell (2008, p. 18) recognise this as a
“moral politics and a moral geography. . . [not] an abdication of responsibility”. Devolved

decision-making through localism, therefore, presents a contradictory and inconsistent dis-
course of local autonomy, allowing the central government to assert local control. PB, and
indeed localism, thus represents an example of what Willett and Giovannini (2011, p. 14)
call the “democratic vacuum pending on England, and all the political, social and economic
imbalances ensuring from this” (see also Jones et al. 2010).
The evolution of participatory governing in Cornwall can be likened to what Sintomer
et al. (2008, p. 174) call the strong “link between participation and a comprehensive modern-
isation process”. Labour’s modernisation agenda sought to rejuvenate relations between gov-
ernment and society through new modes of governing such as PB. Furthermore, in the
redesign and modernisation of governing through a Big Society, the Con-Lib Alliance
would like to effect real change in participatory governing. Despite the modest outcomes
of PB in Cornwall, and of that in the City of London, across England there have been
cases of successful participatory governing schemes, for example, “You Decide!” in Tower
Hamlets, London (£2.4 million spent by residents), “Everyone Counts” in Walsall and
“Your Voice, Your Choice” in Leicestershire (see Participatory Budgeting 2008). These
schemes have begun to echo the format of those developed in Latin America with a stronger
implementation of “decentralisation. . . making policies more responsive to the preferences of
local citizens” (Aragones and Sanchez-Pages 2009, p. 57). However, the challenge remains,
as Sintomer et al. (2008, p. 175) note, to balance the empowerment of citizens with the con-
vening of citizens, governing autonomy, trust and confidence, between government and
society. Further, there needs to be a change in “internal structures and management pro-
cedures” in order to produce empowered citizens as participatory citizens (Fedozzi 1999,
2000). We have argued that this can only be achieved through careful consideration of
spatial difference. Fusing top-down and bottom-up priorities within a choice architecture
that “engage[s] citizens in more reflexive and sustained considerations of their own behav-
iour” (Jones et al. 2010) is central to this process. In moving away from infantilising citizens
and discounting their ability to make rational decisions, to recognising the historical, social
and political geographies of place, mechanisms of soft paternalism have the potential to
encourage future joint state–society decision-making.
Notes
1. “Soft Paternalism” is an umbrella term for a number of methods, such as libertarian paternalism,
which enable choice to be influenced but also the freedom of that choice to remain intact (see
Thaler and Sunstein 2008).
2. See, for example, “You Decide!” in Tower Hamlets, London (£2.4 million spent by residents)
and “Everyone Counts” in Walsall and “Your Voice, Your Choice” in Leicestershire (Participa-
tory Budgeting 2008).
3. Behavioural Economics is the study of economic, cultural and social effects on, for example,
decision-making.
4. Methods of influencing behaviour through certain techniques such as putting “healthy foods” at
eye-level in restaurants/cafeterias, or settling defaults in insurance and healthcare policies.
5. The council officers’ name has been anonymised to protect their identity.
6. Data taken from Cornwall Council Area Profiles, Penzance and Bodmin: Cornwall Council.
7. A collection of six residents associations in the Redruth North electoral ward, the Town and
County Council, and partners and agencies from the local area.
8. The transition body from a two-tiered local authority to a unitary.
9. The previous district council, dissolved on 1 April 2009.
10. The previous District Council before Cornwall became a unitary authority in April 2009.
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Sunstein 2008, John et al. 2009, Pykett et al. 2011).

reﬂect on the intricacy of political geographies in “designed” governing projects. We

Soft paternalism in localism and the big society

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the mechanisms which implement rationalities. According to Foucault, these elements

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governmental-community working if a meeting of top-down and bottom-up priorities is

“moral politics and a moral geography. . . [not] an abdication of responsibility”. Devolved

local authorities in England [online]. Available from: http:// www.archive.defra.gov.uk/

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