Seditious Appetites and Creeds: Shadwell's Libertine and Hobbes's Foole

Author(s): Aaron Jaffe

Source: Restoration: Studies in English Literary Culture, 1660-1700 , Fall 2000, Vol. 24,
No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 55-74
Published by: University of Maryland

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43293691

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 Seditious Appetites and Creeds:
Shad well's Libertine and Hobbes's Foole
by Aaron Jaffe, Indiana University

What Devils Are These?

(The Libertine IV.iii. 146)

Bewarc,
When mutual appetite doth meet to treat,
And spirits of one kind, and quality,
Come once to parley, in the pride of blood
(Jonson, Every Man in Il.iii. 1 7-20)

The Diseases of a Common- wealth . . . proceed from the poyson

of seditious doctrines; whereof one is, That every private man is
Judge of Good and Evi II actions. (Hobbes, Leviathan 365)

It can be hell, only where it is all hell; and a separate world

of devils is necessary for the existence of any one complete
devil. (Coleridge 1 86)

It has been well-documented that new species of theatrical protagonists

abound on the Restoration stage. Among them, certain newcomers, the rake,
the rogue, the wit, the fop, and the libertine, classed by a common genus,
consistently pair wit and decadence, charm and scorn of social convention.1
Scholars typically account for their arrival on three registers, which are by no
means mutually exclusive. For some, they translate to the stage the vogue for
a new sort of courtier brought back from France with Charles II. For others,
they demonstrates the diffusion of certain ideas, synthesizing Epicureanism
and popular Hobbesianism, among circles of the theater and the aristocracy.
For still others, the character and the creed that they personify testify to a
crisis of social, political, and religious duty and identity among the aristocracy.
The libertines of the Restoration stage mimicked, no doubt, the prominent
libertines of the court (George Etherege's Dorimant and Lord Rochester present
notable examples). Court libertines staged their scandals with enough theatri-

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cality to suggest their appeal as theatrical subjects (Rochester's letters pro-
vide many examples), and many of the most infamous court libertines were
also playwrights in their own right or involved with the theater in some way
(George Villiers, the Duke of Buckingham, for example). In the now classic
Etherege and The Comedy of Manners, Dale Underwood identifies the
diffusion of libertine "doctrines and practices" as one of the prime movers in
the Restoration comedy of manners. The term "libertine," he argues, recom-
mends a specific application for the subgenre, one which denotes a complex
of "predilections of temper and behavior" rather than "an intellectual system"
- the very thing which today might be called a "discourse" (11). As this
application suggests, libertine discourse should be considered less as back-
ground material about "the sources and nature of the problems" behind the
scenes than as the literary and dramatic main event, an active field of contes-
tation for "a host of disparities and conflicts wonderfully rife with comic poten-
tialities" played out most famously in comedies such as Etherege's Man of
Mode and William Wycherley's Country Wife (8).2
Though staged during the first spate of libertine plays of the 1 670s - a
period which Maximillian E. Novak appropriately calls "the libertine offen-
sive" - Thomas Shadwell's play entitled The Libertine (1675) does not ex-
emplify this phenomenon. On the contrary, it represents the phenomenon's
trenchant examination and critique. By and large, critics have been at a loss to
account for its stab at the libertine theme.3 Underwood's study, for example,
gives Shadwell's play short shrift, citing it as evidence that libertine doctrine
"had become sufficiently commonplace to be formulated into clichés," setting
a precedent which subsequent investigations into dramatic libertinism have
followed (11). In fact, The Libertine - standing apart from the comedy of
manners genetically, thus outside the immediate purview of most examina-
tions of Restoration libertinism - unflinchingly excoriates both the social im-
plications of libertine doctrines and practices and their misappropriation of
Hobbesian ideas and language.4
Libertinism's supposed debt to Hobbes is well-known and was infamously
so in the period. Connections between Hobbes and libertinism derived from a
ubiquitous mode of misreading Hobbes's work, described definitively by Samuel
I. Mintz in The Hunting of Leviathan. Would-be libertines, would-be oppo-
nents to libertinism, and dramatists eager to poach a heated controversy, it
seems, took heat, not light, from Hobbes, readily mistaking Hobbes's descrip-
tion of the "state of nature" for Hobbes's prescription of "what human con-
duct ought to be" (32). For all concerned, writes Mintz, Hobbes's "state of
nature" merely "announced a programme for libertinism. It told men that
unbridled lust, greed, stealth, force were their right 'by nature' , and hence that
such conduct was entirely 'justifiable', and was limited only by the need for

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self-preservation" (32). Shadwell's Libertine sets out to unmask this ill-use.
Not only does it parody the libertine's personal creed, by exposing its defi-
ciency as Hobbesian philosophy, but also it parodies the use of the libertine as
a dramatic hero, offering instead, as a Hobbesian defense, the comedy of
humours.5
Thomas Shadwell Reconsider' d, a recent issue of Restoration dedi-
cated solely to Shadwell scholarship, documents a sea-change in Shadwell
studies. Until quite recently, when Shadwell received attention, it was only in
light of his infamous run-in with John Dryden. Consequently, he was repre-
sented most often as a kind of literary subordinate, a victim of satire rather
than as a dramatist in his own right.6 In the introduction to the issue, Jack
Armistead notes that renewed scholarly interest Shadwell's comedies has
entailed a reassessment of their literary worth:

The most telling measure of Shadwell's improving

status . . . lies in the magnitude of effort invested in
trying to explain his style and moral viewpoint. These
aspects of his work continue to resist either equivalence
with 'mainstream' Restoration comedy or reduction to a
manageable formula. ( 1 02)

Remarkably, Shadwell's idiosyncratic but persistent "moral viewpoint," which

recent scholars mark as a particularly distinctive feature of Shadwellian com-
edy, also motivated his original feud with Dryden. Ironically, Shadwell comes
into his own for one of the very reasons he fell from stature: the moralistic
bedrock upon which he erects his notion of comedy places him generically at
odds with Dryden.7 The Libertine exists within this context as a brutally
satirical and morally instructive mock-tragedy written by a playwright special-
izing in the comedy of humours.8
In contrast to libertine courtiers and their more celebratory representations
on the Restoration stage, Don John - the libertine of Shadwell's play - is wholly
without charm. And, unlike in earlier and later versions of the Don Juan story,
Shadwell's Don John is neither a cavorting, romantic innocent nor a roguish
trickster.9 As Novak has observed, this take on the myth seems more akin to
Caligula, though perhaps slasher-film serial-killer is an equally apt reference
point. When Shadwell's Don John reveals himself to be a scoundrel, a mur-
der, or a rapist, other characters, though appalled and disconcerted, are mostly
perplexed. They can neither characterize him nor comprehend his motives.
In the second act, for example, Don John and his cronies, Don Lopez and Don
Antonio, escape the destruction of their ship, having kept the crew from the
lifeboat at sword-point. Washing up on shore, the three Dons are met by a

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hermit, who presents himself as a rescuer "bound in charity to serve them"
(ffl.ii.24):

Hermit Gentlemen, I see you are shipwrack'd, and

in distress; and my Function obliges me in charity
to succour you in what I may.
(m.ii.41-3)

After announcing his duty, the hermit attempts to fulfill it, by informing them of
the hospitality of a local Don and offering them "some Cordials." First, the
Dons greedily drink the medicine, and then they respond to their reverential
attendant with stock irreverence, repartee calculated only to offend his oblig-
ing hospitality:

Don John I see thou art very civil; but you must supply
us with one necessary more; a very necessary thing,
and very refreshing.
Hennit What's that, Sir?
Don John It is a Whore, a fine young buxom Whore.
Don Antonio and Don Lopez A Whore, Old man, a Whore.
Hermit Bless me, are you Men or Devils?
(III.ii.69-75)

The surprise of the hermit is as revealing as the mechanical insolence of Don

John, Don Lopez, and Don Antonio. On the one hand, the Dons, acting as if
social proprieties are nothing, exist only to assault and to molest. On the other
hand, the hermit presupposes that the Dons will obey standard social propri-
eties (i.e., respect for the altruistic purposes of hermits). Discovering that the
Dons revile his self-professed obligations, the hermit literally doubts that they
are human beings.
Significantly, the reactions of both the hermit and the Dons follow the same
disjunctive logic: either everyone conforms to a standard of social propriety, or
it is war against all.10 This statement, at the core of Shadwell's play, re-
sembles the classic problem posed in Hobbes's Leviathan ( 1 65 1 ), and it also
glosses a classic misreading ofthat problem: What is the ontological status of
those who refuse to submit to what Hobbes calls the mortal God (the Com-
monwealth, the civil life, and civitas)? Who are those who break social cov-
enants and what will happen to them?
Before the audience has a full sense of the Dons' crimes or their animus,
Don John reviews the relation between the libertine creed and their exploits
"thus far":

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 Thus far without a bound we have enjoy'd
Out prosp'rous pleasures, which dull Fools call Sins;
Laugh'd at old feeble judges, and weak Laws;
And at the fond fantastick thing, call'd Conscience,
Which serves for nothing but to make men Cowards;
An idle fear of future misry ;
And is yet worse than all that we can fear.
(Ii. 1-7)

In an almost pedagogical moment, Don John explains the libertine's vocabu-

lary to his pupils, Don Antonio and Don Lopez, who have renounced "the dull
slavery of Pupillage" (I.i.25). This vocabulary reverses social and moral pro-
hibitions. Sins are how fools name pleasures. Conscience, which heightens
the superstitions of cowards, is likewise a folly. In his first speech, Don John,
in effect, turns Hobbes on his head, transforming Hobbes's own redefinition of
Sin and Conscience into arguments against civil society.
Hobbes scorned those who would claim that "private Conscience" - the
presumption "that whatsoever a man does against his Conscience . . . is
Sinne " - was grounds for civil rebellion {Leviathan 366). He sought thus "to
undercut the standard seventeenth-century belief that conscience was some
quasi-supernatural or special faculty" for identifying sin (Martinich 81-2). In-
stead, Hobbes emphasizes the secular and the learned "publique Conscience,"
the stabilizing moral law in the Commonwealth. Don John twists Hobbes's
rejection of private conscience into a rejection of universal standards of moral-
ity and law, producing instead a kind of amoral relativism. The logic of this
creed is circular: the libertine oversteps laws and magistrates, because laws
and magistrates lack the power to catch him. If the libertine can not be caught,
he can not be guilty ; if he does not fear, besides, then he lacks all conscience
whatsoever. Clearly, Don John, Don Lopez, and Don Antonio are not inter-
ested in freedom of belief but rather freedom of action-that is, freedom to
commit incest, fratricide, and patricide.
Don John, Don Lopez, and Don Antonio are on the lam. Not long before,
each has committed a heinous crime: Don Antonio has impregnated his two
sisters, Don Lopez has murdered his elder brother, and Don John has mur-
dered his father, Don Pedro, the governor of Seville (I.ii.69- 1 27). Superficially
at least, the reckless course of their actions, the unrelenting course of their
appetites, and their libertine creed all recall the Hobbesian view of human
behavior as "motion, [that] produceth nothing but motion" (Leviathan 86).
Their creed especially - with its aversion to all that obstructs these appe-
tites - seems to recall the radically relativistic moralism customarily associ-
ated with Hobbesian thought.1 1 Don John and his cronies explicitly reject

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anything that constrains the free motion of their appetites; Don John, for ex-
ample, claims to have murdered his moralistic father, because "his whole de-
sign was to debar me of my pleasures" (I.i. 9 1 ). For Don John and his cronies,
rigid morality is "sensless"; they view it as an obstacle to sensual gratification.
Accordingly, good and evil are no more than synonyms for appetite and aver-
sion. "My bus'ness is my pleasure," Don John declares, "that end I will
always compass, without scrupling the means; there is no right or wrong, but
what conduces to, or hinders pleasure" (I.i. 140-2).
In contrast with the Dons, their victims abide by moral laws. We see this
when they attempt to account for the Dons' "wickedness." In these circum-
stances, they recognize two deficiencies as the roots of the Dons' moral de-
pravity: they are fearless and they are godless. For the victims, these qualities
are paired: not to believe in God is not to have fear (of mortality, of feasts with
Statues, of God, and so forth). Jacomo, Don John's servant, remarks:

He [Don John] owns no Deity but his voluptuous

appetite, whose satisfaction he will compass by Murders,
Rapes, Treasons, or ought else.
(I.i.224-6)

The believer (and Jacomo finally is a believer) refuses to understand the

atheist in atheistic terms. Jacomo's explanation begs a question that is both
paradoxical and telling: Does the atheist have a god? From Jacomo's per-
spective, his master is not really an atheist; his master's god is "voluptuous
appetite." Jacomo cannot apprehend a perspective that holds God not to
exist; instead, he equates the atheist's perspective with the worship of murder,
rape, treason; that is, the worship of false gods. His comments document the
quiet presence of public morality in the play, a "publique Conscience" that
eventually counters the amoral relativism of the Dons. In a society peopled
(and ostensibly ruled) by believers, the perspectives of believers and atheists
do not have equal weight: the believer's perspective is a transparent field
against which the atheist's perspective seems an abomination. In this light, the
ultimate repudiation of the Dons' renegade attitudes in the last act of the play
not only represents moral justice but, as we shall see, makes good Hobbesian
sense.

Whether the play's victims share beliefs of the 1 7th-centur

lace is beyond our purview here, but the fearless and godle
according to Jacomo, resemble the "other fashionable Gentlem
(I.i.5 1 ). Expanding on Jacomo's association, we could imagine
his companions, like the fashionable gentlemen of Charles's cour
sophical justification of their desires" in Hobbes's philosophy

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Yet Hobbes, despite the appeal of his philosophy to libertines, is not a prescrip-
tive philosopher. He does not propose appetite and aversion as models for
amoral conduct as the Dons and the libertines of Charles's court would have
it, but rather he makes a nominative claim about the transparency of good and
evil in the state of nature.
The passage that inspired much of this misinterpretation comes from the
sixth chapter of the first part of Leviathan €.

But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire;

that is it, which he for his part calleth Good: And the
object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evili, And of his
Contempt, Vile, and Inconsiderable. For these words of
Good, Evill, and Contemptable, are ever used with relation
to the person that useth them. ( 1 20)

This passage is still cited to demonstrate the falsely held assumption that Hobbes
advances ethical and moral relativism - a view as prevalent today as it was
among his 1 7th-century contemporaries (Boonin-Vail 59). As David Boonin-
Vail observes, the remainder of the paragraph from which this passage comes
is rarely cited. In it, Hobbes qualifies his supposed moral relativism:

There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any

common Rule of Good and Evill, to be taken from the
nature of the objects themselves; but from the Person
of the man (where there is no Common- wealth); or, (in a
Common-wealth,) from the Person that representeth it;
or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing
shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule
thereof. (120-1)

No doubt, Hobbes rejects common standards of good and evil in the state of
nature, the condition of people in "a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy
to every man" ( 1 85). This time, by Hobbes's definition, lacks two interdepen-
dent institutions that compel social obedience and public morality, the Com-
monwealth and the Sovereign. These institutions comprise the "common Power
to keep them [the people] in awe" (185). Without the Commonwealth, he
writes, no standards exist to adjudicate good and evil; there is also no industry,
no agriculture, no navigation, no transportation, no commerce, no geography,
no measurement of time, and no letters. In short, Hobbes writes, there is "no
Society; and which is worst of all, continuali feare, and danger of violent death;
And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short" ( 1 85-6). Shadwell's
Don John - or, the "fashionable" gentleman, more generally - borrows

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from Hobbes selectively without registering the crucial elements of Hobbes's
import.
As imaginary readers of Leviathan , Don John, Don Lopez, and Don
Antonio, as mentioned, disregard Hobbes's most prominent idea, the Com-
monwealth. The mutual gain Hobbes associates with civil life is plainly incom-
patible with their debauchery. Instead, they seek to emulate his description of
the state of nature while discarding all positive law, both human and divine.
Their understanding of nature and society is completely binary: society is
enslavement; nature is liberation. Returning to the first scene where the three
Dons outline their libertine creed most comprehensively, Don Antonio de-
scribes nature as a cause of personal destiny:

Don Antonio By thee, we have got loose from Education,

And the dull slavery of Pupillage,
Recover' d all the liberty of nature,
Our own strong Reason now can go alone,
Without the feeble props of splenatick Fools,
Who contradict our common Mother Nature.
(I.i.22-9)

Whereas Don Antonio discounts education, associating it only with servitude,

he claims that "the liberty of nature" provides the true source of reason. At
the same time, those who contradict their natural inclinations contradict reason
also and thus become fools. The lurking connection between nature and the
free run of appetite is illustrated in Don John's reply to Don Antonio:

Nature gave us our Senses, which we please:

Nor does our Reason War against our Sense.
By Nature's order Sense should guide our Reason,
Since to the mind all objects Sense conveys,
But Fools for shaddows lose substantial pleasures,
For idle tales abandon true delight,
And solid joys of day, for empty dreams at night.
Away, thou foolish thing, thou chollick of the mind,
Thou Worm by ill-digesting stomachs bred:
In spite of thee, we'll surfeit in delights,
And never think ought can be ill that's pleasant.
(Li.30-41)

For Don John, nature, still denoting liberation and aligned with reason, is also
a synonym for their appetites. The pursuit of pleasure justifies itself simply
by springing from a natural source. Like Don Antonio, Don John calls those
who (supposedly) deny their own appetites (and who would deny the Dons'

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own appetites as well) fools. Such fools, Don John claims, who resist nature
and who do not follow their appetites, become victims of "chollick of the
mind" - their humors are out of whack. In his eyes, people who deny their
appetites present deserving sacrifices to his own pursuit of pleasure.
Don John's mock epithalamium further clarifies the relationship between
the Dons and the multitude who obediently follows externally imposed laws of
religion, education, the body politic, and so on:

Since Liberty, Nature for all has design'd,

A pox on the Fooll who to one is confín' d
All creatures besides,
When they please change their Brides.
All Females they get when they can.
Whilst they nothing but Nature obey,
How happy, how happy are they?
But the silly fond Animal, Man,
Makes Laws 'gainst himself, which his Appetites sway;
Poor Fools, how unhappy are they?

Let the Rabble obey, I'll live like a Man,

Who, by Nature, is free to enjoy all he can:
Wise Nature does teach
More truth than Fools Preach;
They bind us, but she gives us ease.
I'll revel and love where I please.
She , she 's my infallible guide.
(n.i. 309-20; 33 1-8)

Don John's choice of the epithalamium is parodically apposite; marriage, as a

contract consecrated before both religious (divine) and social (mortal) law, is
the consummate emblem for the intersection of the human being and social
life. Ridiculing this, Don John suggests that it is folly for human beings - who
are at the core but animals - to repress their inevitably bestial inclinations.12
Once again, Don John evokes a Hobbesian idea, the rudimentary equality of
human beings in the state of nature. In that state, all people are leveled in their
animalism. For Hobbes, such equality, in the face of the scarcity of resources,
incites the universal animosity characteristic of the natural condition. For Don
John, quite paradoxically, this state of equality, that is, universal animosity, sup-
ports a kind of aristocracy of appetite. Even if the foolish rabble escape their
bonds of obedience, Don John abhors their "common road of pleasure" (24-5 ;
I.ii.74).
Although Don John describes all other human beings as fools, he himself,
the would-be Hobbesian, in fact resembles Hobbes's "Foole," the figure who

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seeks to break social covenants. The Foole, Hobbes writes, thinks that the
most reasonable actions are those that are most instrumental to his own de-
sires. He deems all social arrangements that interfere with the fulfillment of
his desires to be unjust. His promises are empty, for he foolishly follows the
dictum that promises in themselves - in nature , as Hobbes would say - are
empty, without recognizing that the presence of "Civili power," embodied by
the sovereign, transforms these promises into inviolable covenants. In short,
by refusing to stand in awe of the common power that keeps everyone else in
awe, the Foole acts as if society were in a condition of war. As Hobbes states
unmistakably, the Commonwealth cannot accommodate such men; they will
be destroyed or cast out or both (Leviathan 203-5).
Given their uncanny resemblance to Hobbes's Foole, an exegetic figure,
we need to ask, with the hermit in Act III, whether the Dons represent human
beings at all. On one register, we can view Don John and his cronies as
vehicles of explanation akin to Hobbes's Foole. Like him, Shadwell's Dons
illustrate the absurdity of a particular way of living, which itself proceeds from
misconstruing certain Hobbesian assumptions. Shadwell's parody lies in the
fact that the Dons, the advocates of "Hobbesian" creeds, actually embody
Hobbesian traits of appetite-primarily, the trait of "Naturall lust." Such traits,
for Hobbes, are states of motion that end only with death. How better to
characterize the trajectory of Don John and his companions in the play? In
effect, by figuring Don John and his companions as Hobbesian traits, Shadwell
exposes the hollowness of their creed, asserting that a Hobbesian justification
for libertinism is in truth an a posteriori justification for brutality and sedition.
In a sense, the view of human beings presented in Shadwell's preferred
dramatic form, the comedy of humours, reworks the taxonomy of traits Hobbes
lists in the first part of Leviathan. In comedy of humours, characters pre-
cisely resemble states of motion, or, borrowing Hobbes's words, "Automata
(Engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch)"
(Leviathan 81). Like Ben Jonson's comedy of humours, Shadwell's tech-
nique owes less to folk psychology or the medical doctrines of antiquity than to
a dramatic principle for moving characters across the stage:

Some one particular quality

Doth so posses a man, that it doth draw
all his affects, his spirits, and his powers,
In their conductions, all to run one way.
(Jonson, Every Man Out 105-8)

The humour each character embodies determines all of his or her actions: it
runs the character one way like an automaton. Accordingly, with each char-

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acter reduced to an exaggerated type, the humours playwright exposes the
foibles of the type by "pushing it to a logical extreme" (Rothstein 1 87). Conse-
quently, much of the comedy in the comedy of humours is satire. The Liberz
tine , of course (Shadwell's only original tragedy), is not a comedy, but the
mode of characterization and satire present in comedy of humours, nonethe-
less, inform the play.13 Implausible as heroic tragedy, perhaps The Libertine
may be better understood, in Eric Rothstein's words, as a "tragedy of humours"
(or a tragedy of appetite), or else, when we consider Shadwell's preference
for the comedy of humours and his contempt for the heroic tragedy (a matter
he contested publicly with Dryden), a satirical mock-tragedy using the tech-
niques of the comedy of humours (cf. Rothstein 1 87).
Shadwell's ongoing dispute with Dryden concerning (among other things)
the respective merits of the comedies of humours and heroic tragedies pro-
vides the backdrop for Shadwell's idiosyncratic (and intentionally parodie) choice
of genre. In the prefaces and prologues written during this period, he argues
that the comedy of humours is the most morally and socially responsible form
of theater. In order to understand his perspective and adaptation of the
"humours" technique in The Libertine , we should briefly examine how Dryden,
the form's chief detractor, railed against its exaggerated qualities, and how
Shadwell responded. As Richard Oden argues, the "literary quarrel" began
with Dryden's controversial remarks about Ben Jonson in Of Dramcitick Poetry
in 1668 and ended ten years later with Dryden's savage mock-heroic
MacFlecknoe (c. 1 679) (vii). The notoriously scant critical attention given to
Shadwell's works - and the negligible attention given to The Libertine - is
itself the legacy of Shadwell's infamous skewering at Dryden's hands in Mac
Flecknoe (and later in the second part of Absalom and Achitophel (1682)):

Shad - alone my perfect Image Bears,

Mature in dullness from his tender years;
Shad - alone, of all my sons, is He
Who stands confirm'd in full stupidity;
The rest, to some faint meaning make Pretence,
But Shad - never deviates into Sence.
{Dryden and Shadwell 236)

By annointing Shadwell his heir, Dryden's Flecknoe - modeled on Richard

Flecknoe (d. 1 678), an incompetent Irish writer - annihilated Shadwell's liter-
ary reputation, which depended on his reverence for Jonson ( Norton 1818).
Although the ultimate grounds for Dryden's attack remain enigmatic, many
have argued that he objected to the kind of comedy that was Shadwell's spe-
cialty, the Jonsonian comedy of humours (Oden 3-4). Again, Dryden appears

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to have instigated the controversy by belittling Jonson and the comedy of
humours in Of Dramatic Poesy : "Humour was his [Jonson's] proper Sphere,
and in that he delighted most to represent Mechanick people" (Dryden and
Shadwell 49).
In response to Dryden's devaluation of Jonson perhaps, Shadwell defends
Jonson's form in the preface to The Sullen Lovers (1668), which is itself a
comedy of humours, by invoking the challenge of its technique and, more
crucially here, its intrinsic morality:

[I]n the Writing of a Humour, a Man is confin'd not to swerve

from the Character, and oblig'd to say nothing but what is proper
to it: but in the Playes which have been wrote of late, there is no
such thing as perfect Character, but the two chief persons are most
commonly a Swearing, Drinking, Whoring Ruffian for a Lover, and
an impudent ill-bred tomrig for a Mistress, and there are the fine people
of the Play; and there is that Latitude in this, that almost any thing
is proper for them to say; but their chief Subject is bawdy, and
profaneness, . . . when the most dissolute of Men, that rellish those
things whose things well enough in private, are chok'd at em in
publick: and, methinks, if there were nothing but the ill Manners of it,
it should make Poets avoid that Indecent way of Writing.
{Dryden and Shadwell 25)

Shadwell castigates unnamed fellow playwrights for their immoral heroes.

Their characters, he argues, sink into uniform vulgarity, because they are not
confined to the strictures of the humours technique. The main object of
Shadwell's reproof, the generic male hero - a Swearing, Drinking , Whor-
ing Ruffian - sounds a lot like his own Don John. Shadwell's Don John
parodies this same "dissolute" hero by magnifying his "profaness" into unre-
strained, humour-like appetites. In a masterful application of the humours
technique, Shadwell parodies both the playwright and the creation: the char-
acter for refusing the covenants of society, the playwright for refusing the
humours technique, and both for refusing to submit to a morally superior au-
thority.
Explaining his dramatic agenda in the preface to The Royal Shepherdess
( 1 669), Shadwell, a year later, makes a point again of criticizing the glorifica-
tion of debauchery he perceives in other plays of the day. This time, he uses
explicitly Hobbesian language:

[Tļhe Rules of Morality and good Manners are strictly observed

in it [The Royal Shepherdess]: (Vertue being exalted, and Vice
depressed) and perhaps it might have been better received had

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 neither been done in it: for I find, it pleases most to see Vice
ineouraged by bringing the Characters of debauch'd people upon
the Stage, and making them pass for fine Gentlemen who openly
profess Swearing, Drinking, Whoring, breaking Windows, beating
Constables, &tc. and that is esteem 'd among us a Gentile gayety
of Humour, which contrary to the Customs and laws of all civilized
Nations. But it is said, by some, that this pleases the people, and
a Poet's business is onely to endeavor that: But he that debases
himself to think of nothing but pleasing the Rabble, loses the
dignity of a poet, and becomes as little as a Jugler, or a
Rope-Dancer; who please more then he can do: but the office
of a Poet is, Simul <& jucunda , & idonea dicere vitae. Which
(if the Poets of our age would observe it) would render 'em as
useful 1 to a Commonwealth as any profession whatsoever.
(Dry den and Shadwell 37)

In Shadwell's view, delighting the audience is only half the playwright's duty;
the playwright should also represent life properly. In other words, the play-
wright should use the public stage judiciously by exalting virtue, by denouncing
vice, and by upholding the Commonwealth. Insuring that the audience does
not see the converse, virtue denounced and vice exhalted, is perhaps even
more urgent for Shadwell. The Libertine exemplifies this plea, censuring
immoral characters so unmistakably, it often seems to a contemporary reader
as heavy-handed. In effect, as Richard Oden argues in the preface above and
elsewhere, "Shadwell admonishes Dryden for doing anything to please an
audience, and he rebukes him for the immorality of his noble characters" (4).
Shadwell's charge registered an effect on Dryden, and we see Dryden
responding indirectly and directly in the preface to An Evening s Love_{ 1 67 1 ).
Overall, he maintains the line of argumentation he first develops in Of Dra-
matic Poesy , asserting the preeminence of heroic drama like Shakespeare's
and Fletcher's to comedy like Jonson's. In one significant passage, however,
he refuses the moral obligations Shadwell attributes to the "office of the Poet."
Comedy, Dryden never tires of telling us, is "inferiour to all forms of Dramatick
writing," not in the least, he writes, because

Low Comedy especially requires, on the Writer's part, much

of conversation with the vulgar: and much of ill nature in
observation of their follies. But let all men please themselves
according to their several tastes: that which is not pleassant to
me may be to others who judge better: and, to prevent an accusation
from my enemies, I am sometimes ready to imagine my disgust of low
Comedy proceeds not so much from my judgement as from my temper;
which is the reason why I so seldom write it; and that when 1

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 succeed in it, (I mean so far as to please the Audience) yet I am nothing
satisfi'd with what I have done; but am often vex'd to hear the
people laugh, and clap, as they perpetually do, where I intended
'em no jest; while they let pass the better things without taking
notice of them.
(Dryden and Shadwell 59)

Dryden responds to Shadwell's charge of vulgarity with his own charge of

vulgarity: the problem lies not with immoral characters but instead with genres
like the comedy of humours that demand that audience members exercise
their own moral judgment. It is futile, Dryden suggests, to presume that the
playwright can guarantee the proper transmission of a certain moral message.
If the playwright's proper function is to ensure the accurate transmission of his
satire, what happens when the audience laughs in all the wrong places? What
happens when they hold the fool up as a hero? Dryden's view belies a kind of
moral relativism where no common standards exist between playwright and
public: let all men please themselves according to their several tastes :
that which is not pleassant to me may be to others who judge better.
With respect to The Libertine , Dryden's charge has certain merits. De-
spite Shadwell's stated aim to denounce vice and to exalt virtue, many readers
(mistakenly) exalt the villainous Don John as a hero. In these panegyrics, the
Don becomes "one of the last subversive heroes of the Restoration, [who]
creates social chaos through rational sensuality" (Armistead 103). Even
Coleridge can not help admiring Don John's "super-human" fearlessness: "Who
can deny a portion of sublimity to the tremendous consistency with which he
stands out the last fearful trial, like a second Prometheus?" (Coleridge 190).
Nevertheless, the point Shadwell addresses in his play, the Hobbesian point, is
that personal moral judgment (a creed that posits moral relativism) proves
inconsequential when compared with the moral covenants that hold up and
are upheld by the Commonwealth. Through his "specious reasoning," Hobbes's
Foole may reject justice, decide to break promises, or deny the existence of
God, but as long as there is power (human or divine) presiding over him, his
seditious judgment, while profane, is immaterial ( Leviathan 204).
Through Shadwell's accurate reading of Hobbes and against the backdrop
of Shadwell's literary quarrel with Dryden, the parodie elements of The Lib-
ertine come into focus. When the dead victims return to condemn their male-
factors in Act V, moral covenants are proven to be obligatory, not elective.
Not surprisingly, even in the face of such divine proof, the Dons do not re-
nounce their bankrupt creed. They stand aweless and unrepentant before
their ghostly accusers, irreverently toasting their health. When the drink turns
out to be blood, they throw down the glasses:

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 Don John 'Sdcath, do you mean to affront us?
Statue 'Tis fit for such bloud-thirsty Wretches.
Don John Do you upbraid me with my killing of you;
I did it, and would do it again; I'd fight with all your
Family one by one; and cut off root and branch
to enjoy your Sister. But will you treat us yet no
otherwise?
Statue Yes, I will, ye impious Wretches.
(V.ii.71-78)

At this point - pace Coleridge's admiration - Don John's insults have lost their
promethean edge. One final time, Don John blankly explains his brutal appe-
tites, actions, and creed, asserting tu quoque : if I do horrible things, it is
because you would do them, too; such is the state of nature. The Statue does
not contest this fallacy, because his duties are now radically different than Don
John's. Don John is a mere proponent of the state of nature; the Statue, no
longer Don Pedro or another "silly, fond Animal," is a divine agent, sent to
enforce divine law.14 In short, vengeance is His; a chorus of devils appears
and the forever impenitent Don Lopez, Don Antonio, and Don John descend
into Hell, their proper sphere. Hobbes writes: "As for the Instance of gaining
the secure and perpetuali felicity of Heaven," there is "one way imaginable;
and that is not breaking, but keeping of Covenant" {Leviathan 205).

"What Devils are these?" (IV.iii. 1 46). Why do Don John, Don Lopez, and
Don Antonio act the way we see them act in the play? Although the exact
phrasings may vary, these questions, the ones most frequently posed in The
Libertine , are also the questions facing audiences. Underlying them are two
kinds of questions: a descriptive question - What kind of beings are these? -
and an explanatory question - Why do these beings act so diabolically? To
answer the descriptive question first, while also paraphrasing A.C. Bradley's
famous reading of Iago: Don John and his cronies, if not psychic impossibili-
ties, are at any rate not characters that represent human beings; they are too
mechanical, too motiveless, and too relentless. Other characters recognize
the inhumanity of the Dons, even if they can not account for it. The multitude
of labels they find for Don John and his "barbarous" companions testify to this.
Don John alone is called a "perfidious monster" (44), a "salvage beast" (44),
an "inhumane villain" (44), a "monstrous traitor" (45), a "vile wretch" (47), a
"barbarous wretch" (48), an "inhuman monster" (5 1 ), an "inhumane Mur-
derer" (57), and so on. In the final analysis, for all his pseudo-Hobbesian
posturing and quasi-heroic fearlessness, the libertine is defined simply: he is
but an inhumane monster, "a rash fearless Man guilty of all vice" (8). In Don
John, the anti-hero is stripped of all his would-be charm, atheism, irreverence,

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wit, and liberty, and he is reduced to a monster who has committed "Some
thirty Murders, Rapes innumerable,/ frequent Sacrilege, Parricide" even be-
fore the opening scene (15; I.i.137-38).
Identifying the monster is simple, but explaining him, his actions, and their
effects is more complicated. As demonstrated by the sequence of picaresque
fiascoes that comprise the play, Don John literally ruins the play. Don John -
rather than unbalanced plotting - is responsible for the play's monstrosity, its
"Bosch-like nightmare vision of reality" (Zimbardo qtd. in Armistead). Plot is
secondary to the humour, Shadwell writes in the preface to the Sullen Lov-
ers. To expose the foolishness and villainy of the Dons, Shadwell lets their
overdeveloped, unbalanced, and aberrant appetites run amok. Next to these
appetites and the misdeeds committed to satisfy them, the creed they espouse
seems hollow. Maria, the character who comes closest to exacting mortal
revenge against Don John, also comes closest to apprehending this creed and
its flaws, when she compares Don John unfavorably to a "savage Beast.":

No savage Beast,
Wild Deserts e'r brought forth, provok'd
By all its hunger, and its natural rage,
Could yet have been so cruel.
(n.ii.11-14)

Maria asserts that there is nothing "natural" about Don John's appetites, for
animal appetites are motivated by hunger or rage, not by cruelty. Her com-
ment debunks Don John's creed and its distortion of the famous Hobbesian
premise that the state of nature is a war against all. Fittingly, Don John's
destruction echoes the destruction Hobbes foretold for his Foole. This not
only suggests that Shadwell was a catholic reader of Hobbes, but it also im-
plies that one of the targets of his satire was the corruption of Hobbes in the
name of debauched and seditious ends.15 This kind of satire is consonant with
both the moral principles Shadwell advances in the comedy of humours and
the role that he envisions for the playwright in the Commonwealth: to exalt
virtue and to depress vice. It is worth noting that Hobbes himself envisions the
poet's work in nearly the same terms: "to avert men from vice, and incline
them to virtuous and honourable actions" (Hobbes, "Answer" 450).

NOTES
'To claim that these terms designate even sub-species of the same type courts
some controversy. The argument here is that Shadwell's application in The Liber-
tine mitigates against hair-splitting distinctions and encourages a broader appl
cation. For the various shades of libertinism, sub-libertinism, fellow-traveling in

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libertinism, and (what he takes as) non-libertinism, see Hume. Noting the relative
dearth of properly libertine comedies in the period, Hume disclaims the over-em-
phasis on libertinism in scholarship about Restoration comedy, predicating this
assessment and others on a prescriptive taxonomy, which is, I think, needlessly
inflexible. Hume rejects "libertinism" because he takes it as an imprecise and un-
warranted term of critical disapprobation, substituting instead (libertine-like) char-
acters shaded in various taxonomie and generic terms, including the extravagant
rake (from Jordan), the wild rake, the polite rake, the debauch, the vicious rake, the
judicious rake (again Jordan), the philosophical libertine, and even the Hobbesian
libertinism. His caveats against endowing "libertinism" with monolithic and dis-
torted proportions are well-taken, but they do not empty the term's value as an
umbrella for particular discursive formations. I choose instead to follow Underwood,
for whom "libertinism" stands as a genus, encompassing these related types and,
more crucially, the "doctrine and practices" many contemporary observers tended
to ally with these types.
2For an argument against reading libertinism as a constitutive element of Res-
toration comedy, again see Hume, pp. 48-53. Equating contemporary critical inter-
est in Restoration libertinism with the wailing diatribes of "religious zealots and
bourgeois prudes" against libertinism in the Restoration, he says both pay too
little "attention to the way libertinism was shown" on stage (53). Following Norman
Holland, he argues that in much of would-be "libertine" drama the emphasis at
play's end is on libertinism's reform, not its reward. With the hero eventually
settling down to marriage, so-called libertinism represents, he maintains, merely
the youthful sowing of wild-oats, and thus the concerns of first-and third-estate
moralizing are misplaced. Yet, even considered in this light, one cannot say that
libertinism is unrewarded, the reward being that the hero's reform is permitted after
so much dissolute living. The subgenre's real excitement comes not from how the
rake will be tamed but rather how he will get off; his settling down to marriage
represents a perfunctory gesture, a formality of foreclosure. This possibility sup-
ports a more subversive reading along the lines of J. Douglas Canfield on social
comedy and subversive comedy in Word as Bond and Tricksters & Estates. That
gunslingers hang up their pistols and retire to ranches at the end of Westerns
does not mean that audience members come to the movies to see this; they come
for the shoot 'em up action. Shadwell's Libertine subverts subversion, moves the
question beyond the double bind of reform and reward (beyond the rhetoric of
"religious zealots and bourgeois prudes") by returning it to its Hobbesian roots.
3We find such bewilderment, for instance, in John Traugotťs statement that
Shadwell's protagonist is "a perfectly insane product of [Shadwell sl undeviatingly
senseless mind" (384).
4After taking pains to distinguish libertine discourse from systematic philo-
sophic thought, Underwood asserts that its place in the Restoration comedy of
manners marks the diffusion of ideas derived inter alia from Hobbes as well as
Machiavelli: "an intricate set of contradictions and inconsistencies from which to
no small degree Restoration drama derives its form and meaning." Accordingly,

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"the society of the Restoration comedy of manners may be viewed as in large part
the product of two broadly opposing sets of traditions: on the one hand Chris-
tianity and Christian humanism ... ; on the other, philosophic and moral libertinism.
Machiavellian and Hobbesian concepts as to the nature of man, and Machiavel-
lian ethics" (8). By and large, I agree with Underwood's sense that the heat, if not
the light, surrounding these ideas and public debates played out on the Restora-
tion stage but add the caveat that they played out across the Restoration stage as
well - with a play like The Libertine staking quite different claims in this dialectic
from a play like The Man of Mode.
sMore than one scholar remarks that Hobbes - or, a certain popular reading of
Hobbes's Leviathan current in the court of Charles II and Restoration drama - is
responsible for this new kind of hero. See especially Mintz, The Hunting of Levia-
than 137-42. Others imputing Hobbesian responsibility include Hume, Weber,
Zimbardo, Jensen, and Thompson. Weber even dubs the type the "Hobbesian
libertine-rake," though without much scrutiny of Shadwell's play. Hume also iden-
tifies a "Hobbesian libertine" (of the 1 670s) opposing it with Novak's more moder-
ate "refined libertine" (of the 1690s), and, though shrewdly noting The Libertine's
subversion of the libertine mode, he does not relate this intervention to a return to
Hobbes (45).
'To be sure, the study which relegates Shadwell to mere literary footnote is as
misguided as the study which seeks to examine Shadwell without acknowledging
how the substance of Shadwell's argument with Dryden played a formative role in
his literary work.
7For a comprehensive theory of Shadwell's literary career and its posthumous
deterioration, see Wheatley, who locates Shadwell on one side of an ethical para-
digm shift - from a secular, contextually determined ethics to a concept of virtue
guaranteed by religious belief. After this shift, Wheatley argues, Shadwell's brand
of dramatic moral instruction became all but unintelligible to would-be audiences
and critics.
^Similarly, Canfield, Tricksters & Estates , calls it as a "tragical satire" and an
"antilibertine satire" (211, 220). Hume also sees the play in these terms, calling it "a
sardonic mock-tragedy" and "a diverting travesty of the libertine philosophy and
moral code," though, given the general tenor of his argument, can not help lump-
ing it with forms of critical prudery he finds "ludicrously overemphatic" and "down-
right hysterical]" (54).
9Cf. Canfield's distinction between Tirso's Don Juan ("fundamentally a trick-
ster") and Molière's Dom Juan ("a philosophical voluptuary, a precursor of the
Marquis de Sade" ) ("Classical" 48). Though perhaps more akin to the latter than
the former, Shadwell's Don John fits neither mold easily. The Libertine is radically
different from other Don Juan plays - its ties to Molière's and Tirso de Molina's
versions of the Don Juan myth seem at best incidental.
,0For the hermit, the logic is homologous but a bit different: either one con-
forms to a standard of social propriety, or one is not human. Coleridge's percep-
tive reading of The Libertine , quoted in the epigraph, conveys this point.

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 "The creed that the Dons appear to draw from Hobbes is predicated on some
crucial distortions of Hobbes' philosophy.
12The relationship he desires with Nature is incestuous; Nature, previously
described as his mother, now becomes his bride.
l3Shad well's other tragedy was an adaptation of Shakespeare's Timon of Ath-
ens.

,4"Revenge is Heavens, and/must not be usurp' d by mortals" (III. iii.

15 We know that Shadwell owned Hobbes's works. He even willed the
son John, telling him to "make use of what is good in him [Hobbes]" (S

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