Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Institutions evolve in natural manner in which the organic world evolves by which
they are generally transmuted.
In ancient India there were three grades of arbitrators, the PUGA, the SRENI and
the KULA, who, formed different degrees of the Panchayet.
1784 British Parliament passed a statute, viz., 24 Geo. III, Ch. 25, (25th Act passed
during the session that started in the 24th year of the reign of George III)
establishing a Board of Commissioners for Indian affairs.
*** 24 Geo. III, Ch. 25, -The Pitt’s India Act, 1784 also called the East
India Company Act, 1784
1787 Lord Cornwallis in 1787 proceeded to give effect to the directions he had
received in England, viz., to frame rules for administration of justice founded
on the ancient law and local usages prevailing in India.
The common feature of all these Regulations was the recommendation for
arbitration.
The spirit in which these laws were enacted can best be illustrated by the
following quotations from the Regulation of 1781, viz.—
(1) “The Judge do recommend, and so far as he can without
compulsion prevail on the parties, to submit to the arbitration of one
person to be mutually agreed upon by the parties”, and
(2) “No award of any arbitrator or arbitrators be set aside, except
upon full proof, made by oath of two credible witnesses, that the
arbitrators had been guilty of gross corruption or partiality, in the
cause in which they had made their award.”
1793 Regulation XVI of 1793
• The 1987 regulation had problems hence Regulation XVI of 1793 was
brought.
• It was more comprehensive.
• It Provided that Courts could refer dispute to one arbitrator with
consent of parties in suits for accounts, partnership—debts, non-
performance of contracts, where valuation exceeded
200 sicca rupees.
• It Laid down specific provisions in matters ancillary thereto.
1795 & 1803 Regulation XVI of 1793 was extended by 1795 & 1803 Regulations.
1813 Regulation VI of 1813 laid down provision for arbitration in disputes about
land disputes for the first time.
1822 Bengal Regulation VII of 1822 extended scheme of arbitration from Civil
Courts to Land Revenue Courts.
1833 British Parliament enacted statutes 3 & 4 Will. IV, Ch. 85 establishing a
Legislative Council for India. (* 85th Act passed during the session that
started in the 3rd and 4th year of the reign of William IV) . It did away with the
regime of Parliamentary Regulations
**1833 Act is also called The Saint Helena Act 1833 or the
Government of India Act 1833 (3 & 4 Will 4 c 85)
1859 Act VIII of 1859 codified Civil Procedure and provided for arbitration between
parties.
• Sections 312 to 325 dealt with arbitration between parties to a suit.
• Sections 326 and 327 dealt with arbitration without the intervention
of a Court.
1877 & 1882 Act VIII of 1859 was followed by later Codes relating to Civil
Procedure, viz.—Act X of 1877 and Act XIV of 1882. No material change
relating to the Law of Arbitration
1899 India Arbitration Act IX of 1899 was first substantive law on the subject. It
was mainly confined in operation to Presidency towns.
Up to 1899 arbitration was limited to disputes which had arisen, but Act IX of
1899 defined “submission” as meaning “a written agreement to submit present or
future differences to arbitration.”
1908 Civil Procedure Code 1908
• No substantial change in provisions relating to arbitration
• Only put relevant sections in separate schedule as Special Committee
thereon hoped to have comprehensive legislation on the subject in near
future
• Report of the Special Committee, namely.—“We have determined
therefore to leave the arbitration clauses much as they are in the
present Code: but we have placed them in a schedule in the hope that at
no distant date they may be transferred into a comprehensive
Arbitration Act”
1934 In 1934 the English Act was passed in England in May 1934.
1938 The Government of India took the matter up after that date, and in
1938 selected Mr. Ratan Mohan Chatterjee, Attorney-at-Law, as Special
Officer, in connection with the proposed change in the Law of
Arbitration.
1940 Thereafter the Arbitration Act of 1940, came into force on the 1st July
1940, saving from its operation references then pending. For the First
time Country wide legislation was enacted.
Just as the Indian Arbitration Act of 1899 was based on the English Act
of 1889, so the Indian Arbitration Act of 1940 was based on the English
Act of 1934.
1966 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
was established by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1966 to
promote the progressive unification and harmonisation of
international trade law.
It is the core legal body of the UN system in the field of international
trade law. It specialises in reforms in commercial law worldwide for a
period.
India is a founding member of UNCITRAL. India is only one of eight
countries which have been a member of UNCITRAL since its inception
1996 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was enacted. It Received the
assent of the President on August 16, 1996 and published in the Gaz. of
India, Extra., Part II, Section 1, dated 19th August, 1996, No. 55, pp. 1-36. The
Preamble states:-
“An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to domestic
arbitration, international commercial arbitration and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards as also to define the law relating to conciliation and for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto ”
PREAMBLE.
—WHEREAS the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
has adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in 1985;
AND WHEREAS the General Assembly of the United Nations has recommended that all countries give
due consideration to the said Model Law, in view of the desirability of uniformity of the law of arbitral
procedures and the specific needs of international commercial arbitration practice;
AND WHEREAS the UNCITRAL has adopted the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules in 1980;
AND WHEREAS the General Assembly of the United Nations has recommended the use of the said
Rules in cases where a dispute arises in the context of international commercial relations and the parties
seek an amicable settlement of that dispute by recourse to conciliation;
AND WHEREAS the said Model Law and Rules make significant contribution to the establishment of a
unified legal framework for the fair and efficient settlement of disputes arising in international
commercial relations;
AND WHEREAS it is expedient to make law respecting arbitration and conciliation, taking into account
the aforesaid Model Law and Rules;
PART I ARBITRATION PART II
CHAPTER I General provisions (Section 2-6) ENFORCEMENT OF CERTAIN FOREIGN
CHAPTER II Arbitration agreement (Section 7-9) AWARDS
CHAPTER III Composition of arbitral tribunal CHAPTER I New York Convention Awards
(Section 10-15) (Section 43 -52)
CHAPTER IV Jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals CHAPTER II Geneva Convention Awards
(Section 16-17) (Section 53-60)
CHAPTER V Conduct of arbitral proceedings
(Section 18-27) PART III
CHAPTER VI Making of arbitral award and CONCILIATION (Section 61- 81)
termination of proceedings (section 28-33)
CHAPTER VII Recourse against arbitral award
Section34. Application for setting aside arbitral PART IV
awards. SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS (Sec 82-
CHAPTER VIII Finality and enforcement of arbitral 86)
awards
Section 35. Finality of arbitral awards. THE SEVEN SCHEDULES
Section 36. Enforcement.
CHAPTER IX Appeals- Section 37. Appealable
orders.
CHAPTER X
Miscellaneous ( Section 38- 43)
READING MATERIAL
1-“Tagore Law Lectures, 1942 - Law Arbitration in British India by Nripendra Nath
Sircar, Lecture 1 — Introductory” SCC online
Link of the Article- SCC online- My Library- Browse Articles -Tagore Law Lectures-
Arbitration- introduction :- https://www.scconline.com/Members/BrowseResult.aspx
SUBSTITUTION OF AN ARBITRATOR
Section 15 and 29 A - If an arbitrator is terminated from
his mandate, another arbitrator may be appointed as a
substitute by following the appointment procedure. In
such a case, the arbitral hearings can be repeated at the
discretion of the arbitral tribunal.
JURISDICTION OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL, KOMPETENZE
KOMPETENZE RULE- Section 16.
Hence, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was enacted, based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, 1985. The new Act came into force with a breath of fresh air of an expedited
and improved procedure. It also attracted cross border trade and investment after the remarkable shift of global
policy in 1991. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 consolidated and amended the existing Arbitration Act,
1940, Arbitration (Protocol & Convention) Act, 1937 and the Foreign Awards Act, 1961.
THE ADVENT OF 1996 ACT
Despite the far-reaching improvements made in the statute, arbitration failed to emerge as a sound and reliable
resolution mechanism due to a multitude of reasons. Due to the lack of a fee matrix, the arbitrators bombarded
the parties by charging exorbitant fees. The application to the High Court seeking an award to be set aside under
Section 34 automatically stayed the enforcement of the award, thereby prolonging the remedy to the award
holding party. Furthermore, there was no time limit to ensure that the promise of the expedite procedure is
actually fulfilled.
After facing serious challenges with the 1996 Act, the government invited suggestions from several eminent jurists
and amended the Act in 2015. The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 brought sweeping changes
to the procedure and entailed a series of strong judicial interpretations. The amendment was essentially founded
on the principles to strengthen the arbitral tribunal and minimise the scope of intervention by the court.
Despite these improvements, the lack of institutional arbitration culture was felt strongly as most of the
arbitrations were ad hoc. A High-Level Committee to Review the Institutionalisation of Arbitration Mechanism in
India was constituted on 13th January 2017 and headed by Justice B.N. Srikrishna. In line with the committee’s
recommendations, the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019 was passed. The highlight of the
amendment was the introduction of the Arbitration Council of India (ACI) to promote arbitration and grade
arbitration institutions. This is still to be enforced as per law.
ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996
The 1996 Act seeks to consolidate and amend the law relating :
-domestic arbitration,
-international commercial arbitration,
-enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
-and to define the law relating to conciliation
– taking into account the UNCITRAL Model Law and Rules. –
However, the said Model Law and Rules do not become part of the Act so as to become an aid to construe the
provisions of the Act. (Union of India v East Coast Boat Builders and Engineers Ltd., AIR 1999 Del 44).
Under the Arbitration Act, 1940, there was a procedure for filing and making an award a rule of Court i.e. a
decree, after the making of the award and prior to its execution. Since the object of the 1996 Act is to provide
speedy and alternative solution to the dispute, the said procedure is eliminated in the 1996 Act. Even for
enforcement of a foreign award, there is no need to take separate proceedings, one for deciding the enforceability
of the award to make it a rule of the Court or decree and the other to take up execution thereafter. The Court
enforcing the foreign award can deal with the entire matter in one proceeding. (Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v Jindal
Exports Ltd., AIR 2001 SC 2293).
INTRODUCTION TO THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996
COMMENCEMENT OF 1996 ACT –
Though the 1996 Act received the Presidential assent on 16 August 1996, it, being a continuation of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Ordinance, is deemed to have been effective from 25 January 1996 i.e. the date when the first
Ordinance was brought in force. (Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v Jindal Exports Ltd., AIR 2001 SC 2293). Therefore, the
provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, will continue to apply to the arbitral proceedings commenced before 25
January 1996. (Shetty’s Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v Konkan Railway Construction, (1998) 5 SCC 599).
Section 85 (2) (a) of the 1996 Act further provides that notwithstanding the repeal of the Arbitration Act, 1940, its
provisions shall continue to apply in relation to arbitration proceedings that commenced prior to the coming into
force of the 1996 Act on 25 January 1996, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.
Section 21 gives the parties an option to fix another date for the commencement of the arbitral proceedings.
Therefore, if the parties to the arbitration had agreed that the arbitral proceedings should commence from a day
post 25 January 1996, the provisions of the 1996 Act will apply. In cases where arbitral proceedings had
commenced before coming into force of the 1996 Act and are pending before the arbitrator, it is open to the
parties to agree that the 1996 Act will be applicable to such arbitral proceedings. (Thyssen Stahlunion Gmbh v
Steel Authority of India, (1999) SCC 334).
Domestic Arbitration The expression “domestic arbitration” has not been defined in the 1996 Act.
An arbitration held in India, the outcome of which is a domestic award under Part I of this Act, is a domestic
arbitration (Sections 2(2) and 2(7)). Therefore, a domestic arbitration is one that takes place in India, wherein
parties are Indians and the dispute is decided in accordance with substantive law of India (Section 28(1) (a)).
Part I of the 1996 Act Part I restates the law and practice of arbitration in India, running chronologically through
each stage of arbitration, from the arbitration agreement, the appointment of the arbitral tribunal, the conduct of
the arbitration, the award to the recognition and enforcement of awards.
BINDING EFFECT OF AWARD
Once the parties have agreed to refer a dispute to arbitration, neither of them can unilaterally withdraw from the
arbitral process. The arbitral tribunal shall make an award which shall be final and binding on the parties and
persons claiming under them respectively (Section 35), and such award unless set aside by a court of competent
jurisdiction (Section 34), shall be enforceable under the Code, in the same manner as if it were a decree of the
Court (Section 36).
LIMITED JUDICIAL INTERVENTION UNDER THE 1996 ACT
There is no provision for reference to arbitration by the intervention of the Court. Section 5 of the 1996 Act
provides for a limited role of the judiciary in the matters of arbitration, which is in consonance with the object of
the Act to encourage expeditious and less expensive resolution of disputes with minimum interference of the Court
(P. Anand Gajapathi Raj v P.V.G. Raju, AIR 2000 SC 1886).
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
The existence of arbitration agreement is a condition precedent for the exercise of power to appoint an arbitrator
under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. The issue of existence and validity of the “arbitration agreement” is altogether
different from the substantive contract in which it is embedded. The arbitration agreement survives annulment of
the main contract since it is seperable from the other clauses of the contract. The arbitration clause constitutes an
agreement by itself. (Firm Ashok Traders v Gurumukh Das Saluja, (2004) 3 SCC 155).
SECTION 8 OF THE ACT OF 1996
In cases where there is an arbitration clause, it is obligatory for the Court under the 1996 Act to refer the parties to arbitration
in terms of their arbitration agreement (Section 8). However, the Act does not oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide
the dispute in a case where parties to the arbitration agreement do not take appropriate steps as contemplated by Section 8 of
the Act. Similarly, the Court is to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 8 of the 1996 Act only in respect to “a matter
which is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement”. Where a suit is commenced “as to a matter” which lies outside the
arbitration agreement and is also between some of the parties who are not parties to the arbitration agreement, there is no
question of application of Section 8. The words “a matter” indicates that the entire subject matter of the suit should be subject
to arbitration agreement. (Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. V Jayesh H. Pandya, (2003) 5 SCC 531). Section 8 of the 1996 Act is
attracted to only arbitrable disputes, which the arbitrator is competent or empowered to decide (Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading
Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1).
Illustration :
The parties agreed to refer the question of winding up a company to arbitration. However, the power to order winding up of a
company is conferred upon the company court by the Companies Act. As the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to wind up a
company, the Court cannot make such a reference under Section 8. (Haryana Telecom Ltd. v Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd., AIR
1999 SC 2354).
Illustration : ‘The parties agreed to refer the question as to whether probate should be granted or not to arbitration. Since the
judgement in the probate suit under the Indian Succession Act is a judgement in rem, such question cannot be referred to
arbitration (Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka v Jasjit Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 507).
The application under Section 8 of the 1996 Act can be filed in the same suit or as an independent application before the same
Court. Ordinarily the application under Section 8 of the 1996 Act has to be filed before filing of written statement in the
concerned suit. But when the defendant even after filing the written statement applies for reference to arbitration and the
plaintiff raises no objection, the Court can refer the dispute to arbitration’ . The arbitration agreement need not be in existence
before the action is brought in Court, but can be brought into existence while the action is pending. Once the matter is
referred to arbitration, proceedings in civil suit stands disposed of.
CHALLENGING AWARD
The Court to which the party shall have recourse to challenge the award would be the Court as defined in Section 2
(e) of the Act, and not the Court to which an application under Section 8 is made. (P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v P.V.G
Raju AIR 2000 SC 1886). Where during the pendency of the proceedings before the Court, the parties enter into
an agreement to proceed for arbitration, they would have to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the
1996 Act .
Illustration :
The High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, has no power to refer the matter to an arbitrator and to pass a
decree thereon on the award being submitted before it. (T.N Electricity Board v Sumathi, AIR 2000 SC 1603).
SECTION 9 INTERIM MEASURE BY COURT
The Court is empowered by Section 9 of the 1996 Act to pass interim orders even before the commencement of
the arbitration proceedings. Such interim orders can precede the issuance of notice invoking the arbitration
clause. (Sundaram Finance Ltd v NEPC India Ltd, AIR 1999 SC 565).
The Court under Section 9 merely formulates interim measures so as to protect the right under adjudication
before the arbitral tribunal from being frustrated. (Firm Ashok Traders v Gurumukh Das Saluja, (2004) 3 SCC 155).
If an application under Section 9 of the 1996 Act for interim relief is made in the Court before issuing a notice
under section 21 of the Act, the Court will first have to be satisfied that there is a valid arbitration agreement and
that the applicant intends to take the dispute to arbitration. Once it is so satisfied, the Court will have jurisdiction
to pass orders under Section 9 giving such interim protection as the facts and circumstances of the case warrant.
Once the matter reaches arbitration, the High Court would not interfere with the orders passed by the arbitrator or
the arbitral tribunal during the course of arbitration proceedings. The parties are permitted to approach the Court
only under Section 37 or through Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
COMPOSITION OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL (SEC 10-15) CHAPTER 3
The Arbitral Tribunal has been defined by Section 2 (d) of the 1996 Act to mean a sole arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators
appointed in accordance with the provisions of Sections 10 and 11 of the Act. The number of arbitrators should not be an even
number. An arbitrator must be independent and impartial. A prospective arbitrator should disclose in writing to the parties
any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality (Section 12(1), 1996 Act).
The 1996 Act prescribes the procedure for challenging the arbitrator, terminating his mandate, and his replacement by a new
arbitrator (Sections 13 to 15). Arbitration under the 1996 Act is a matter of consent and the parties are generally free to
structure their agreement as they see fit. The parties have been given maximum freedom not only to choose their arbitrators,
but also to determine the number of arbitrators constituting the arbitral tribunal.
There is no right to challenge an award if the composition of the arbitration tribunal or arbitration procedure is in accordance
with the agreement of the parties even though such composition or procedure is contrary to Part I of the 1996 Act. Again, the
award cannot be challenged if such composition or procedure is contrary to the agreement between the parties but in
accordance with the provisions of the 1996 Act. If there is no agreement between the parties about such composition of the
arbitral tribunal or arbitration procedure, the award can be challenged on the ground that the composition or procedure was
contrary to the provisions of the Act. (Narayan Prasad Lohia v Nikunj Kumar Lohia, (2002) 3 SCC 572). Where the agreement
between the parties provides for appointment of two arbitrators, that by itself does not render the agreement as being invalid.
Both the arbitrators so appointed should appoint a third arbitrator to act as the presiding officer (Section 11 (3), 1996 Act).
Where the parties have participated without objection in an arbitration by an arbitral tribunal comprising two or even number
of arbitrators, it is not open to a party to challenge a common award by such tribunal on the ground that the number of
arbitrators should not have been even. The parties are deemed to have waived such right under Section 4 of the 1996 Act.
(Narayan Prasad Lohia v Nikunj Kumar Lohia, (2002) 3 SCC 572).
The determination of the number of arbitrators and appointment of arbitrators are two different and independent functions.
The number of arbitrators, in the first instance is determined by the parties, and in default, the arbitral tribunal shall consist of a
sole arbitrator. However, the appointment of an arbitrator should be in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or in
default, in accordance with the mechanism provided under Section 11 of the 1996 Act.
APPOINTMENT UNDER SECTION 11
High Court –Arbitration other than International Commercial Arbitration
Supreme Court- International Commercial Arbitration
RECOURSE AGAINST ARBITRAL AWARD
Section 34 of the 1996 Act provides for recourse against the arbitral award.The limited grounds for setting aside an
arbitral award are
• the incapacity of the party.
• invalidity of agreement.
• absence of a proper notice to the party.
• award beyond scope of reference.
• illegality in the composition of the arbitral tribunal or in arbitral procedure
• dispute being non-arbitrable.
• award being In conflict with public policy.
Section 34 of 1996 Act is based on Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model law. The arbitrator is the final arbiter of a
dispute between the parties and it is not open to challenge the award on the ground that the arbitrator has drawn
his own conclusions or has failed to appreciate the facts. Court will not re-appreciate the evidence before the
arbitrator, even if there is a possibility that on the same evidence, the Court may arrive at a different conclusion
than the one arrived at by the arbitrator Similarly, if a question of law is referred to the arbitrator and he gives a
conclusion, it is not open to challenge the award on the ground than an alternative view of the law is possible
The Court to which the party shall have recourse to challenge the award would be the Court as defined in Section
2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act read with Section 42
FINALITY AND ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS
Section 35 of the 1996 Act provides that subject to the provisions of Part I of the Act, an arbitral award shall
become final and binding on the parties claiming under them respectively. The award can, therefore, be enforced,
even if there are other issues outstanding in the reference. Section 36 of the 1996 Act renders an arbitral award
enforceable in the same manner as if it were a decree, if no challenge is preferred against it within the time
prescribed for making a challenge or, when upon a challenge being preferred, it has been dismissed.
The arbitral award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the Court once the time expires
for challenging the award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
1. https://blog.ipleaders.in/arbitration-
agreement-primer-checklist/
2. http://rsrr.in/2021/04/20/implications-of-
the-2021-arbitration-amendment-act/
1. https://blog.ipleaders.in/arbitration-agreement-primer-checklist/
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides for judicial intervention in the
following cases in domestic arbitrations:-
1. Making reference in a pending suit (Sec 8)
2. Passing interim orders (Sec 9)
3. Appointment of arbitrators (Sec 11)
4. Terminating mandate of arbitrator (Sec 14(2) )
5. Court assistance in taking evidence (Sec 27)
6. Setting aside an award (Sec 34)
7. Enforcement of an award by way of decree (Sec 36)
8. Entertaining appeals against certain orders (Sec 37)
9. Directing delivery of award Sec 39(2)
10.Reference of a dispute to arbitration in insolvency proceedings (Sec 41)
Reference - SECTION 8
8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.—
(1) A judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an
arbitration agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming
through or under him, so applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on
the substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the
Supreme Court or any court, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no
valid arbitration agreement exists.
(2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is
accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.
[Provided that where the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy thereof is not
available with the party applying for reference to arbitration under sub-section (1), and the
said agreement or certified copy is retained by the other party to that agreement, then, the
party so applying shall file such application along with a copy of the arbitration agreement and
a petition praying the court to call upon the other party to produce the original arbitration
agreement or its duly certified copy before that court.]
(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue
is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an
arbitral award made.
Reference – Factors to be seen
►NOT -REFERRED –
- Reckitt Benckiser (India) (P) Ltd. v. Reynders Label Printing India Private Ltd., (2019) 7 SCC 62.
To Conclude Section 8 -
CASE LAW
Narayan Prasad Lohia vs Nikunj Kumar Lohia & Ors, (2002) 3 SCC 572
Relevant Sections
Sections 4, 5, 10, 11, 16, 34
Narayan Prasad Lohia vs Nikunj Kumar Lohia & Ors, (2002)
3 SCC 572
Facts of the Case
The Appellant and Respondent had a family dispute over business and properties. For
which two arbitrators were hired (Mr. Pramod Kumar Khaitan, and Mr.Sardul Singh
Jain). An award was passed by the two arbitrators on 6th October 1996. On 22nd
December 1997, the first respondent filed an application in Calcutta High Court for
setting aside the award. The contention was that, under Section 10 of The Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1966, an even number of arbitrators cannot be present. Since in
the present matter, two arbitrators were present, it was contended that arbitration
was void and invalid. On the same line of reasoning, it was also contended that the
award is henceforth also void and invalid. A single judge of the Calcutta HC set aside
the award on 17th November 1998, subsequently, an appeal dated 18th May 2000 was
also dismissed. Thereon, the matter was bought before the SC.
Issues before the Court
Whether Section10 is a non-derogable provision in Arbitration? Whether a mandatory
provision of the Act can be waived by the parties?
Narayan Prasad Lohia vs Nikunj Kumar Lohia & Ors, (2002)
3 SCC 572
Ratio Decidendi
The appellant contended that Section 10 is a mandatory provision of the Act. In the present matter, the Arbitral
tribunal was not validly constituted, hence it should be void and invalid. Moreover, if the constitution of the
arbitrators is invalid, it should also render the award void. The appellant also contended that Section 16 does
not provide for any challenge of the constitution of the Arbitration Tribunal. Therefore, an invalidly constituted
tribunal deems lack of jurisdiction. It was also contended that in the case of an even number of arbitrators,
they may have conflicting opinions, which may result in a fresh arbitration altogether. This could be a waste of
time and energy for both parties, and an infringement of public policy. Hence, Section 10 should be considered
a non-derogable provision. In the court’s opinion, that the question, whether Section 10 is non-derogable would
depend on whether a party has a right to object to the composition of the arbitral tribunal, and at what stage.
Para 57 of BCCI
para 31 of HCC
CHAPTER IX
Appeals
37. Appealable orders.—(1)[Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force, an appeal] shall lie from the following orders
(and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from
original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely:—
[(a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under section 8;
(b) granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9;
(c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section 34.]
(2) Appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral tribunal—
(a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of
section 16; or
(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section 17.
(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this
section, but nothing in this section shall affect or takeaway any right to
appeal to the Supreme Court.
Topic 7 – International Commercial Arbitration
International Commercial Arbitration, its nature,
scope, applicability, Role of Indian Courts in
International Commercial Arbitration etc
Ritesh Khatri
Course-In-Charge
FACTORS FOR ICA
• cross-border commercial disputes.
• Increase in international trade and investment
• Enmity is being made between parties as win-lose situations exist in the court
process as they fight to establish their legal rights, as well as people spending
excessive time and money to such fight
• Lord Mustill (1989) – “commercial arbitration must have existed since the dawn of
commerce. All trade potentially involves disputes, and successful trade must have a
means of dispute resolution other than force. From the start, it must have involved
a neutral determination, and an agreement, tacit or otherwise, to abide by the
result, backed by some kind of sanction. It must have taken many forms, with
mediation merging no doubt into adjudication. The story is now lost forever. Even
for historical times, it is impossible to piece together the details, as will readily be
understood by anyone who nowadays attempts to obtain reliable statistics on the
current incidence and varieties of arbitrations. Private dispute resolution has always
been resolutely private”
International - refer to Article 1(3) of UNCITRAL
In Countries which
are signatories to
New York
Held Outside India
Convention Award treated as
International Foreign Award
Non Convention
Parties
Held in India Countries
ARBITRATION
WE SHALL ALSO SEE THAT HOW THE LAW CHANGED AFTER BHATIA INTERNATIONAL
PARTICULARLY IN BALCO
Foreign Terminologies
Lex maritime (“ley maryne”)
A body of oral rules, customs and usages relating to navigation and maritime commerce, the first elements of
which may be traced back to the Rhodian L (c. 800 B.C.), and which developed in medieval Western Europe
from the ninth to the twelfth centuries as part of a wider, customary mercantile law “lex mercatoria” or “Law
Merchant”. infr4, administered by merchant judges.
• The lex loci arbitri is the Latin term for "law of the place where arbitration is to take place"
• That simply means that the law of the place of arbitration will prevail for all purposes,
• However, such a doctrine does not serve the real purpose of international arbitration.
Topic 7 – International Commercial Arbitration
PLACE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, INDIAN LAW,
APPOINTMENT & LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE
IMPORTANT CASE LAWS ON I.C.A.
Ritesh Khatri
Course-In-Charge
Let’s see the arbitration clause in Singer Case
7.2... the laws applicable to this Contract shall be the laws in force in
India. The courts of Delhi shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters
arising under this contract.
Bhatia International or Bulk Trading (as are called in short) is one of those rare judgments, which in one
single stroke managed to completely change the face of a legislation in Arbitration.
FACTS -
The parties to a contract containing arbitration clause resorted to arbitration in accordance with the rules
of International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) to be conducted in Paris.
The respondent in the case (foreign party) wanted to ensure that in the event of a favourable award it
would be able to recover its claim from the Appellant (Indian party). The respondent applied to the District
Judge of Indore under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act asking for certain interim measures to be taken so as
to secure the property of the Indian party situated in India. The Indian party contended that the
application under Section 9, Part I of the Act was not maintainable because Section 2(2) of the Act limits
the applicability of the whole of Part I of the Act to only those arbitrations which take place in India.
ISSUES & APPROACH
• The issue that then arose before the Court was as to whether Part I of the Act,
including Section 9, applied to even those arbitrations which took place outside
India or not.
• The High Court rejected the appellant’s contention who then approached the
Supreme Court.
• Approach I - legislative intent was clearly to limit the scope of provisions of Part I
to domestic arbitrations only and especially not to extend the operation of
Section 9 to arbitrations taking place out of India since the main objective of the
whole Act itself was to minimize judicial intervention in arbitration proceedings.
Section 2(2) provides that Part I shall apply where the place of arbitration is in
India.
• Approach II - Read Sections 2(2) and 2(5) together. use of phrases like ‘all
arbitrations’ and ‘all proceedings’ in the latter indicated Legislature’s intention
that Part I should extend to all arbitrations even those that were conducted
outside India. conflict that ostensibly existed between the two provisions could
be resolved by application of the Doctrine of Harmonious Construction17
according to which Section 2(2) would be interpreted as being inclusive and not
exhaustive in nature. Hence, Part I provisions were made applicable even to
foreign arbitrations.
RATIO
• A three judge bench unanimously held that all provisions of Part I,
including Section 9, apply to all arbitrations irrespective of whether they
took place inside India or outside. The Court further held that while in the
case of ‘domestic arbitrations’, provisions of Part I compulsorily apply; in
‘foreign arbitrations’, Part I applies only in those cases where the parties
have not expressly or impliedly excluded the same.
• Supreme Court carried out a detailed statutory interpretative analysis and
the paramount reason which guided the Court in this exercise was its
conviction that certain disastrous consequences would inevitably’ follow if
the former of the above two stated viewpoints were to be accepted. The
author has hereinafter discussed these consequences below in order to
determine as to whether these ‘consequences’ would have in fact actually
occurred if the Court had adopted the narrow interpretation of the Statute
or not
Supreme Court interpreted the legislature's intentions in
drafting the act to mean that Part I applies to international
arbitrations, unless excluded by the parties. The three-judge
bench of the Supreme Court held as follows:
“To conclude, we hold that the provisions of Part I would apply to all
arbitrations and to all proceedings relating thereto. Where such
arbitration is held in India the provisions of Part I would compulsorily
apply and parties are free to deviate only to the extent permitted by
the derogable provisions of Part I. In cases of international
commercial arbitrations held out of India provisions of Part I would
apply unless the parties by agreement, express or implied, exclude all
or any of its provisions. In that case the laws or rules chosen by the
parties would prevail. Any provision, in Part I, which is contrary to or
excluded by that law or rules will not apply.” (Emphasis added.)
Subsequent to Bhatia International – i.e. Venture
Global Engineering v. Satyam Computer 2008
CLAUSE – (b) This agreement shall be construed in accordance with and governed by the
laws of the State of Michigan, United States, without regard to the conflicts of law rules of
such jurisdiction. Disputes between the parties that cannot be resolved via negotiations shall
be submitted for final, binding arbitration to the London Court of Arbitration.
(c) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this agreement, the shareholders shall at all
times act in accordance with the Companies Act and other applicable Acts/rules being in
force, in India at any time
• Appellant (foreign company) challenged the foreign award which had been rendered in
London under the Rules of London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) in favour of the
respondent (Indian company). The respondent had sought to enforce this award in the
USA. But, the appellant filed a civil suit in an Indian District Court seeking to set aside the
award on the ground of violation of Section 34 in Part I of the Act. The contentions that
were raised against this were that the application was not maintainable since there is no
provision to set aside an award under Part II and that in view of Section 48 in Part II of the
Act, Section 34 will automatically stand excluded. Secondly, it was contended that foreign
award could not be tested on merits on ground of whether it violates the substantive law
of India.
INDTEL TECHNICAL SERVICES(P) LTD v. W S
ATKINS RAIL LTD (25.08.2008 SC)
CLAUSE - 13. Settlement of disputes 13.1. This agreement, its construction,
validity and performance shall be governed by and constructed in accordance
with the laws of England and Wales;
13.2. Subject to Clause 13.3 all disputes or differences arising out of, or in
connection with, this agreement which cannot be settled amicably by the parties
shall be referred to adjudication;
13.3. If any dispute or difference under this agreement touches or concerns any
dispute or difference under either of the sub-contract agreements, then the
parties agree that such dispute or difference hereunder will be referred to the
adjudicator or the courts as the case may be appointed to decide the dispute or
difference under the relevant sub-contract agreement and the parties hereto
agree to abide by such decision as if it were a decision under this agreement
Atkins ….
• INDTEL (an Indian Company) had entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding with WS Atkins PLC (a foreign company).
• The MOU expressly designated English law as the substantive law that
would govern the performance of the contract providing that “this
Agreement, its construction, validity, and performance shall be governed
by and constructed in accordance with the laws of England and Wales”.
• A dispute arose between the parties and INDTEL filed an application under
Section 11 of the Arbitration Act.
• The question before the Court was whether this application was
maintainable in view of the designation of English law and whether its
decision in Bhatia could be extended to cover a situation of this sort
• Supreme Court once again relied on Bhatia and categorically extended the
same to even Section 11 in Part I of the Act.
Citation Infowares Ltd v. Equinox Corp. (2009)
• Clause - 10. Any dispute between the parties hereto to arising from this
Agreement, or from an individual agreement concluded on the basis thereof,
shall be finally referred to a mutually agreed Arbitrator.
• 10.1 Governing law- This agreement shall be governed by and interpreted in
accordance with the laws of California, USA and matters of dispute, if any,
relating to this agreement or its subject matter shall be referred for arbitration
to a mutually agreed Arbitrator.
• RATIO - if the parties intended specifically in this case that the law governing the
contract was Californian law, as expressed in Bhatia International as well as in
Indtel Technical Services case, an implied exclusion of Part I should be
presumed.
There may be presumption where the parties have agreed to hold arbitration in a
particular country. In that circumstance, the presumption would arise that the law
of the country where the arbitration is agreed to be held would apply as a law of
contract. Where there has been no specific expression about the law of contract,
the situation is otherwise. In this case the law of contract is agreed upon as the
Californian law.
It seems that NTPC is followed.
Other Judgements
• Videocon Industries Ltd v Union of India
• Dozco India Private Ltd v Doosan Infracore Company Ltd
• Yograj Infrastructure Ltd v Ssang Yong Engg – 2011 SCC
• BALCO – (2012) 9 SCC 552
• Reliance Industries Limited and Another v Union of India – 2014 SCC
• Sakuma Exports v Louis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse SA – 2013 Arb LR
• Enercon (India) Ltd v Enercon GmbH – 2014 SCC
• Harmony Innovation Shipping Ltd v Gupta Coal India Ltd – 2015 SCC
BALCO
• Bharat Aluminium Co v Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc (BALCO)
• Matter was brought before the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court.
During the case, the court revisited the law laid down in Bhatia
International and Venture Global
• Supreme Court upheld the territorial principle and held that arbitrations
which are seated outside India will not attract Part I. However, the court
held that arbitrations – including international arbitrations – which are
seated in India will be governed by Part I
• BALCO judgment to be applied prospectively.
• Therefore, a party to a pre-BALCO arbitration agreement can successfully
argue that the application of Part I of the act has been expressly or
implicitly excluded.
Facts in BALCO
• Appellants entered into an agreement with the respondents whereby the respondents were required to
supply and install computer based system at one of the appellant premises. The agreement was governed
by the prevailing law of India but it contained an arbitration clause that stated that any dispute that may
arise in future shall be governed by the English arbitration law and the venue shall be London. Thus the
clause in the agreement stated that settlement or adjudication of any dispute in relation to rights or
obligations under the said agreement shall be governed by English arbitration law and the venue for the
arbitration proceedings shall be London.
• A dispute arose between the appellants and the respondents with respect to performance of agreement
and the matter was referred to arbitration. The arbitration proceeding were held in England and two
awards were passed in the proceeding. The Appellants thereafter filed application under section 34 of
Arbitration Act 1996 for setting aside awards. The district court and the High Court of Chhattisgarh refused
the setting aside of the awards and appellants filed an appeal against the said order in the Supreme court
of India.
• The counsel of the appellants relied on previously held judgments of Bulk trading and Venture Global and
submitted that Part I of the Act is applicable to the arbitration proceeding that were held in London and
the awards by virtue of S. 34 of part 1 could be set aside. The Appellants Counsels through their
submissions tried to showcase a relation between the various provisions of the Act to conclude that Part I
is applicable to International Commercial Arbitration that were not held in India.
Observation of Supreme Court
• Part I is applicable to all domestically rendered arbitration proceedings that include arbitration proceeding with no foreign party or arbitration
proceedings with both foreign parties but held in India or international commercial arbitration proceeding that are held in India.
• All provisions of Part I [Section 1, 2 (4), (5), (7)] reinforce that Part I shall be applicable to all arbitration proceedings held in India and cannot by
purpose of interpretation be extended to International commercial Arbitrations held outside India.
• Part I applies to all arbitration proceedings that are held in India and this extends also to those arbitration proceedings that are held under any
statutory legislation that is in force in India.
• Section 2 (7) reinforce that Part I shall be applicable to all arbitration proceedings that are held in India and distinguishes a domestically
rendered award covered by Part I from foreign award covered by Part II. Section 2 (7) excludes the possibility of the award passed in arbitration
proceedings held in India involving two foreign parties being considered as non-domestic award by providing that such an award shall be
domestic award.
• The choice of the country as the seat of arbitration inevitably imports an acceptance that the law of that country shall be applicable to the
arbitration proceedings. “Seat” of arbitration and “place” of arbitration are used interchanging but the seat shall remain the place mentioned in
the arbitration agreement. Parties of different nations are involved in international commercial arbitration and hence the venue for arbitration
might change but the seat shall remain the same.
• Section 48 of Part II does not confer jurisdiction on two courts to annul the award and is provided only to provide alternative to parties to
challenge the award in case law of the country where seat of arbitration is located has no provision for challenge of the award.
• The words “set aside or suspend” in the section 48 does not mean that the foreign award that is sought to enforced can be challenged on the
merits by the Indian Courts and the said provision merely recognizes courts of two nations who are competent to suspend or annul the award
and does not ipso facto confer any jurisdiction on the two courts to annul the award that is made outside India. The Indian arbitration act 1996
does not specifically provide conferment of jurisdiction on Indian court to set aside awards made outside India.
• Interim relief under Section 9 can be awarded in case seat of arbitration in international commercial arbitration is India and thus intervention
under Section 9 can be sought only with respect to domestic awards. Part II has no provision that grants interim relief leading to the logical
inference that Indian court cannot pass interim orders against award rendered outside India.
• The arbitral awards awarded in international commercial arbitration with seat of arbitration outside India shall be subject to the jurisdiction of
Indian courts only when they are sought to be enforced in India in accordance to Part II of the Act.
• Part I of the Act shall not be applicable to non –convention arbitral awards. There is no provision in the Act in respect to enforcement of non-
convention arbitral awards and hence remedy with respect to the same cannot be incorporated in Act and this can only be done on by
necessary amendments that can be introduced only by the Parliament.
Enercon – Seat v/s Venue
• Supreme Court took BALCO and said that the venue of arbitration can
be different from the seat; therefore, choosing a venue does not
imply the seat of arbitration.
• SC - "In the present case, even though the venue of arbitration
proceedings has been fixed in London, it cannot be presumed that
the parties have intended the seat to be also in London. In an
international commercial arbitration, venue can often be different
from the seat of arbitration. In such circumstances, the hearing of the
arbitration will be conducted at the venue fixed by the parties, but
this would not bring about a change in the seat of the arbitration.”
• Seat remained in India.
• Therefore, in determining the seat of arbitration – which is a
significant factor in determining the applicability of Part I – the
language used in the dispute resolution clause is paramount when
discerning the parties' intentions. Further, when determining the
seat, the courts will consider:
• the proper law of the main contract (in the absence of any contrary
indication); - Singer
• the venue; - Ssang Yong
• the law applicable to the arbitration agreement; and
• the closest connection of the arbitration agreement. SulameRica
Others
• CHOICE OF LAW DOCTRINE
• PARTY AUTONOMY
Topic 6 - CONCILIATION
Ritesh Khatri
Course-In-Charge
CONCILIATION
“conciliation” is not defined in 1996 Act. Article 1 of UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules [Appendix 49]
corresponding to section 61(1), refers to “the parties seeking an amicable settlement of their dispute.”
Conciliation may be defined “as a method used by parties to a dispute to reach an amicable settlement
with the assistance of an independent third person or institution.”
History
• Initially, conciliation was statutorily recognised by
• the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
• the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Section 12) and
• the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Section 23)
• it was unable to gain popularity mainly due to the lack of a proper structure and
statutory backing as it was more in the nature of a court annexed conciliation.
• The concept of pre-trial conciliation was put into practice by the High Court of
Himachal Pradesh in 1984 based on the Michigan Mediation in the USA, which was
widely appreciated by the Law of Commission of India in their 77th and 131 reports.
• This was again a court induced model of conciliation which was to be attempted by
parties prior to litigating.
• Enactment of Pt III to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 there is in place, a
legislative framework for the regulation of voluntary conciliation
characteristics
• Vital method to prevent and settlement of dispute through third party
• Settling dispute without litigation
• Method of settlement (spl.)
• Process by which discussion between the parties is kept going through the participation of
conciliator
• Harmony is targeted
• Disputes arising out of legal relationships whether contractual or not Sec 61
• INVITE other to conciliate
• Proceedings to commence only when the reply is received within 30 days else deemed
rejection of the invitation
Some more…
The procedure laid down in Pt III (Sections 61 to 81) reflects certain broad principles:
(3)If the other party rejects the invitation, there will be no conciliation
proceedings.
(4)If the party initiating conciliation does not receive a reply within
thirty days from the date on which he sends the invitation, or within
such other period of time as specified in the invitation, he may elect to
treat this as a rejection of the invitation to conciliate and if he so
elects, he shall inform in writing the other party accordingly.
Some more…
Application & SCOPE
• Read Section 61
• Unless the parties have specifically excluded conciliation procedure, they are free to take recourse to
conciliation even if they had agreed for arbitration [Section 61(1)]. Section 30 lays down that it is not
incompatible with an arbitration agreement for the arbitration tribunal to use mediation, conciliation or other
procedures at any time during arbitral proceedings to encourage settlement of the dispute with the consent
of the parties. Section 77, however, prohibits the parties from initiating arbitral or judicial proceedings during
conciliation proceedings, except for preserving their rights
• An agreement to conciliate or mediate is not to be likened . . . to an agreement to agree, nor is it an
agreement to negotiate, or negotiate in good faith, perhaps necessarily lacking certainty and obliging a party
to act contrary to its interest. Depending upon its express terms and any terms to be implied, it may require
of the parties participation in the process by conduct of sufficient certainty for legal recognition of the
agreement.
• Unlike in the case of arbitration, a written conciliation agreement is not necessary. This reflects the voluntary
and non-binding nature of conciliation. This may also encourage parties for conciliation by oral agreement.
Section 62(1) and (2), however, require that the invitation to conciliate and acceptance thereof should be in
writing.
• Once the parties agree for conciliation, the provisions of Pt III will apply. The only permitted exclusion relates
to the prohibition under any law on reference of certain disputes to conciliation [Section 61(2)]. Like non-
international arbitration, the conciliation procedure is applicable to commercial as well as non-commercial
disputes which are capable of being settled by conciliation.
NO OF CONCILIATORS
• Section 63
• It should be noted that conciliation with two conciliators is conceived under the Rules to be as
appropriate as conciliation with three conciliators, despite the different composition and appointment
procedures. It may be felt, though, that the desirable independence and impartiality is only guaranteed
by a conciliator who is chosen by both parties, as is the case with the presiding conciliator in a panel of
three, while in conciliation with two conciliators each party appoints one of them. However, as stated in
Art 7 [corresponding to section 67 of the Act], every conciliator, irrespective of the manner in which he
was appointed, is expected to conduct the proceedings in an independent and impartial manner.
• This expectation is supported by experience gathered in international conciliation proceedings where
panels of two conciliators are not uncommon. It serves to distinguish between conciliation and party
negotiations which are often conducted through counsel or agents. The notion is reinforced, in an
indirect way, by Art 10 [corresponding to section 80 of the Act] which precludes a conciliator from acting
as a counsel of a party in any arbitral or judicial proceedings in respect of the same dispute. The
probable effect of this provision may be that a party might not wish to appoint his counsel as conciliator.
• Finally, it may be pointed out that an uneven number of conciliators, while facilitating the internal
decision-making process, is not necessary in conciliation since the task of the conciliators is to make
recommendations for a settlement and not to render binding decisions.
Conciliation v. Mediation
While in most countries no distinction is made between conciliation and mediation, in India
however, the introduction of the term mediation while amending section 89 seems to have
implied that the two processes are different. In theory, the difference lies in the role of the
neutral third party who is attempting to resolve the dispute. The traditional understanding
among jurists is that in conciliation the conciliator plays a passive role and his involvement is
limited to ensuring that the parties understand each other clearly. Often the conciliator will
intervene only in case of an impasse. In contrast, a mediator is expected to take a proactive
approach and attempt to resolve the dispute by providing his opinions and advice,
including proposals for settlement.
However, the ADR Rules discussed by the Indian Supreme Court Salem Advocate Bar Association, TN
v UOI in 2005 seems to indicate clearly that the neutral third party plays a more pro-active role
in conciliation and not mediation. On the other hand mediation, according to the Civil
Procedure Mediation Rules, 2003 mentioned in the same judgment, requires the mediator to
only ensure clear communication between the parties and is limited to a mere facilitative role
instead of an evaluative one.
Therefore, despite the differences in opinion regarding mediation and conciliation, it is agreed
that the difference is limited to the matter of the degree of involvement of the neutral third
party in the proceedings. In the light of the Rules discussed by the Supreme Court and the role
of the mediator as enunciated in the Mediation Rules, it can be concluded that as far as India is
concerned the conciliator is expected to play a proactive role and the mediator is to restrict
himself to a conservative or passive role in the dispute resolution process.
TECHNIQUES
There are two commonly accepted techniques of Conciliation:
• facilitative method
• evaluative method.
Under these provisions, if it appears to the court that there exist elements
of a settlement in any suit or proceeding before it, the court is required to
formulate the terms of settlement and give them to the parties for their
observations. Upon receiving the observations of the parties, the court may
reformulate the terms of a possible settlement and refer the same for any
of the following modes of dispute settlement (i) arbitration (ii) conciliation
(iii) judicial settlement through Lok Adalat or (iv) mediation.
Section 89(2)(a) of the CPC further provides that where a dispute has been
referred for arbitration or conciliation, the provisions of the Arbitration
& Conciliation Act, 1996 shall apply as if the proceedings for arbitration or
conciliation were referred for settlement under the provisions of that Act.
Two significant additions in Act 1996
• Section 66 provides that the conciliator has a free reign
over procedural matters and is not bound by the CPC ,
or the Evidence Act.
• Section 74 states that a settlement agreement arrived
at after conciliation shall be treated as if it is an arbitral
award on agreed terms on the substance of disputes
rendered by an arbitral tribunal under section 30.
3. O.P. MALHOTRA & INDUMALTHOTRA, “The Law and Practice of Arbitration and
Conciliation”, 2nd Edn 2006, p1516; Barbara A. Nagle Lechman,”Conflict and
Resolution”, 1st Edn 1997, 129