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`!*ir.,#'ap," 2000. VoL 73. tip. 61-92
•`t, J` ``! ,': ,.,ul; . ,'rl, .
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tr'(J.. „ ,1 .I, , ( A L: ,

0.P.

THE FIVE WAYS.

ABSTRACT. This is the classical paper by the late Professor Bochenski, in

which logical reconstructions of Aquinas' five ways are presented. After the
logical toolbox is 'inhoduced the Latin original texts of the u8.ag are given, one
after the other, together with their logical analyses and reconstructions. The
conclusion of the r`econstructions` is that only the fec"7zdc} uz.ci is valid, which
establishes that there is at least one efficient cause of all that exists.

To the memory of Paul Bemays,

who often relninded the author
of the need for a logical analysis
of the arguments for God's existence

In this essay a logical analysis of St. Thomas Aquinas' gwc.7.g"a u3.¢ or

"five ways" to prove God's existence, found in his S%7monci rbcoJogr.¢

(Part 1, Question 2, Article 3) is proposed. The meaning of the

premises of these proofs will be explained, their presuppositions
revealed, and the validity of the inferences determined.
After an historical and bibliographical introduction, issues com-
mon to all five ways will be treated and abbreviations and inference
` rules listed. Then each way will be analyzed and formally recon-
structed. Finally the assumptiops upon`which the Ways are founded
will be identified and discussed. J
*Thisisaclassicalpaperpublishedori8inallyundcrthetide"Dieftirifwege"inthefrg3.drrgt7r
Ze2.tschrc/¢j2r p/!!.Jasoptil.e "7id 71rfegofogr.c, volume 36, fascicle 8,1989, pp. 235-265. It is published
inEngli§hhereforthcfirsttime,withthekindauthorizationbothofProfessorBochen§kiand
theFreg.hargt?rZc!.}5chr!/C.IamgratefultoProfessorWalterRedmondforhiscarefultranslation
of the text. A revised version of the paper`will be included also in a volume of Professor
Bochenski. [G. de la S.]
62 THE FIVE WAYS BOCHIINSKl 63

Another purpose of the essay is to acquaint the reader with the following 8. L. Clal`ke by K. Policki, and (8) the most comprehen-
results of recent work in logic, which has been incorporated into the Hlvc work in the field by E. Nieznaliski (published under the name of
analysis. The present contribution, however, differs from. previous J, M. Bochenski cC ¢Z6€), which contains sophisticated logical theory,
treatises in several ways. First, it analyzes all five ways (most of the includes a critical review of the whole receut discussion, and for-
works cited below discuss only the first). Second, it is a commentary |mli7.es anew the classical proofs for God's existence (a translation
and closely follows St. Thomas' words themselves. Third, no attempt Would be desirable).
is made, therefore, to improve on his proofs. Fourth, purely theo-
retical problems (such as that of the first member of a series, the PART I: ABBREVIATIONS, INFERENCE RULES, GIINERAL REMARKS
concept of existence) often treated in the literature are not pursued.
It must be stressed that this study concerns mostly logical ques- A, Abl)reviatiorLs
tions which can be solved only through Zogfc¢/ means. This task
The transcription employs the following symbols in addition to those
requires the use of on¢£faem¢£€.c¢J logic, which alone ,has the needed
of classical logic from the Pr8.„c8.¢8.cz mcz}faem¢£€.c¢:
conceptual tools (polyadic functors, multiple quantification, etcete-
ra); indeed it is difficult if not impossible to analyze these complex `AVJl#,yN for `# is in act regarding}'
proofs for the existence of God without formalization, i.e., without in for `good'
the use of mathematical.logic. `])E(s¢,y)
for `# moves (is in motion) toward}'
St. Thomas Aquinas' five ways are one of the most important 'C("), for `# is conscious (cogrzoscc7as)'
classical texts concerning the proofs for God's existence. Practically `GA(„,,)'
for `#is causedby)'
everything written on the subject since his time refers to them and `CA"(„,,), for `ry is the cause of the necessity of #'
over the centuries they have been taught 'to millions of students. 'CAU(„,,,z) for `#cau§eszin}'
Modern works, however, show little regard for logical matters and 'C¢(„)' for `# is the first cause'
still less expertise in formal logic.I `D(„),
for `#isGod'
However, in the 20th century competent logicians have published `de/' for `definition'
studies, especially on the first way. Jam Salamucha, a priest and `DF(„.,y for `# leads} to (the goal)'
mathematical logician who perished in the Warsaw uprising, pio- I(..'
for `being'
neered the trend in 1934 with his work on the first way.2 Thereafter `crm¢,
for `empirical sentence'
there appeared, in chronological order: (I) review of this work by `ES(tt,ty
for `# is (exists) at time £'
`F("),
I. M. Bochenski, (2) I. Bendiek's important article (1956), (3) Fr. for `# aims atagoal'
Rivetti-Barb6's significant study (1960) followed by (4) critical views `IE(x,ty for `#begins to be at £'
by I. Thomas (1960) and F. Selvaggi (1962), (5) Rivetti-Barb6's new `'og,
for `substitution in a logical law'
analysis (1967), (6) a series of articles by Larouche with a different `M(#)'
for `# is the prime mover'
formalization of the first way Examination of the Axiomatic Founda- `MAD(x,y,a) for `# is movedby} towardz'
tionsoftheTheoryofchange,(7)thereconstructionofthefirstway .MA:J(x,y,zlf for `# is greater than} in aspect z'
`MO(x,yy
for `# is movedbyy'
I This is also true of many recent writings on theodicy. See the comprehensive bibliography `MV(„,,),
for `# moves (is in motion) toward}'
in H. Seidl, 7Y!o7%as I/o~ Aquli".. Di.a Oo!!cfbczueisc; cf. also A. Kenny, 77ie F!`t/a Ways, R. Swinburne, `„'
77!e Eedle»ce a/God (Thomas is treated in foomotes) andj. L. Mackie, Tbe M!.nacde a/ 7:ifeis". for `now,
2 "Dow6d ex morn na istnienic Boga." `IVc(#)' for `# is necessary'
64 THE FIVE WAYS BOCHENSKI

` a(#)' for `# attains the best'

(#)[ap(#) I (Iy, z)[dy(„,y' z) . x(#,,)]]
` OJ(„, ,) , for `# and } are correlated'
(=A;)q,(„)
• ont, for `ontological s entence '
`P(„) ' for `it is possible that # is not (does not exist)' (=„,y,z)[dy(#,,,z).x(#'J)]
` PN (xy for `# is the prime necessary ¢rinet7% mecesso7`a."rm)'
`PO(„' , ) , for `# is in potency toward }' Ill,5
(„)[ap(") J (EJ)dy(„,,)]
` PR(x, yy for `# preceeds (is before) }'
` R.el rf ' for `the series formed by A is infinite' (=J)(„)[ap(„) J ly(#,})]
`U(",,, z)' for `y is reduced (7ied"c£Jwr) from potency to act
I,16; IV10
(",,, oc)[q,(",,' z) I (a!)ly(", !, Z)I
by # toward z'
`ow(a;)' for `A: moves (is in motion)' (=„,,,z)q)(#,,'z)
`V(#)' for `# is caused'
(It, ,, z)[ap(#,J, z) . (=')w, f, z)]

8. Inference Ftules dy I dy I,17,18; II,13; IH,16,17,19,20; IV,10; V,9

¢
The reconstruction of the proofs employs the following rules of
inference: H

Ill,6
(„,J,, 2,)[ap(„,,, 2)) J dy(", z)] I,11 (",,)ap(„,,) J ly
(A;,,, Z)[q)(„,,, Z) J xO, z)I (IJ.)[(o6)X(%) I q)("',)]

(#,y, z)[q>(#,}, z) D [dy(#, z) . xO, z)]] (#)x(„) J dy

Ill,7
dy j ly
(#,), z)[ap(#,), 2;) D Edy(#, z) . xky, z)]] I,12
lyJx
(#, y, z)[[q>(*, )., z) . # = }] I [dy(#, z) . x(*, z)]]

(*,}, z)[[q>(#,), z) . # = }] I IV(a;, Z) . X(#, Z)]] I,18 Ill,8

(A;, z) - [dy(#, z) . X(#, Z)]

(oc,), z)[q](A;, }, z) I -(a: = y)] -¢

(„)[ap(„) J (3J, Z)ly(„, ,, Z)] I.14 I,19; 11,14; Ill,21; V,10

(A,)[q,(X;) J dy(#)]
(„',' z)IV(„, ,, z) J x(„, ,)] (J%) ap(#)

(")[q,(") I (=y, z)[ly(#,,, z) . x(A,,J)]] (J#) dy(„)

 BOGHIINSKl 67
66 TI-IE FIVE WAYS

IV,11
(A,, ,)[[ap(A,, ,) . # = ,] J dy(%, #)] („,,)[ap(#',) I ly(„)]
(#) -ly(„, #) (E!fu.)ty)ap(„,,)

(#,J)[q,(A;,J) I -(a, = J,)] (a")dy(„)

V,4
(")[ap(") j dy(#)`j
(„)[ap(%) I ®)dy(",y)]
(±#)[x(") . q,(*)]
(„,,)[dy(#,,) I x(„,,)]
(I")[x(#) j ly(#)I
(*)[q,(A,) J (Jy)[dy(#,y) . x(oc,,)]]
V'6
(„)[q)(#) I (=y)ty(„',)]
(#)[q,(„) J (=J)ly(„, ,)] (E„)ap(„)

(=#)ap(#)
(=„,,)ly(c¢,J)

(I",,)ly(„,,)
Cn r|`l.a Meaning and, Style Of `deus'

(=#'J)[ap(„,,) . (=Z)lyo'z)] J ap Tllcfivewaysshareacommonstructure.Theybeginwithanempir-

(",,)[ap(„,,) I (=z)dyfy, z)] lcal statement and end with the conclusion "but this everyone calls
(5„,y)ap(#,J)
`God' " or an equivalent statement.
Andhereinliesaproblem.Ithasbeenrightlyobservedthatfroin
ap
Thomas' proofs nothing can be inferred about the %%owber of first
|novers (or causes, etc.). The last two ways do mention a relation of
(a;)lap(a;) D [ly(A;) V -dy(a;)] Ill,18 Godtoallobjects(sentences2.346and2.355:"quodo%7a8.busentibus
(„)[dy(„) J 0(„)] cat causa. . . ", "a quo o"mes res ordinantur. . . "), but this reference
(")[-ly(") J 0(#)] mziybeanoversight,sinceitismissinginthefirstthreewayswhich
fire more carefully constructed. Thomas does not argue that there
(„)[q,(A:) , e(A;)]
is only one God until question 11 of the first part of his Stt"7%¢.
Hence it should be assumed that he is using the word `de%s' in
(„,,, z)[q,(#,,, z) J dy(Z)] IV,6 a very general and vague sense; it designates Pagan gods as well
(=#,,,z)q)(„,y,z) as the one God of the great religions and of philosophers. Hence
'ctG%s' ought here to be interpreted as a general term rather than as
(Ez)dy(z) a description.
ItmayalsobeaskedwhyThomasgivesprecisely/Zt;eproofsforthe
(#,,)[ap(„,,) I dy(„,,)] IV'9 existence of God. First of all, they were probably the proofs he ran
(fro)®)[ap(„, J) . X(",y)] across in his reading. But there may be another reason: he seems as
welltohavebeenfondoftackingextraargumentsontooneormore
(J„)0)[q,(„,,) . x(",J)] I ty(„,,) strongones,aprocedurehefollowsinotherplacesinhistreatiseon
72 THE FIVE WAYS
without pro of.
With this qualification the derivation of sentence 2 i§ a fine argu-
ment formulated almost without gaps. It can be stated a§ follows:
8. What is moved is in potency in regard to that whither
it moves.
4. And the mover is in act in the same respect.
7. Now, nothing can be in potency and act at the same
time in the sane respect.
8. Therefore the mover is not identical with the thing
moved.
The inference rule used,
(„,,, z)[q)(A,, J, Z) J dy(„, z)]
(„,,, z)[ap(",,, z) J xO, z)]
(#, z) - [try(*, z) . x(#, z)]
(a ,,,, z)[q)(A ,,,, Z) I -(# = ,)I
is valid. The only assumptions are statements 3, 4, and 7.
c) Proof of sentence 13
The second part of the text aims essentially at proving sentence 13,
thzit if there is no first mover, there is no mover at all, or in the
formulation:
-(]£)M(£) . -(]#,)I, z)[MAD(a:,}, z) . -(* =.))].
Sentence 11 of this subproof has evoked intense discussion. If it
is taken, as it sometimes is, to mean that infinite series lack first
members, it is false, because there are indeed infinite series which
have first members, such as the series of rational numbers between
1 and 2.
In the first place, however, the text does not make this claim, but
refers only to one particular series, that of movers. Second and more
importantly, sentence 11 is superfluous for the purpose of the proof,
as the following paraphrase shows:
BOCHENSKI 731
(10.1) No infinite series has a fi`rst member
11. if this particular series is infinite, it has no first member,
12. that is, there is no first mover;
18. if there is no first mover, then there is no mover at all,
14. hence there is no mover at all;
(14.1) but there is a mover,
15. therefore there is a first mover.
Itmaybeseenatoncethatsentence.llandthetacitlypresupposed
10.1 can be left out, since the conclusion 15 follows from 18 and 14.1,
also tacitly assumed, in accordance with a variation of 772odrs foJJe7ido
tolhens
-ap , -,P
ly
P
So Thomas had n.o need to claim, although he probably did so,
that infinite series lack first members. It suffices that one concrete
series, that. formed by the relation of moving, has a first member.
And taken in this way sentence 13 is not only plausible but quite
obvious.
If this sentence is to be defended, it must be assumed with Sala-
mucha and others that the moving relation is irreflexive, transitive,
connected and asymmetrical. The mathematical-logical proof that
such a series has a first member was put forward by Salamucha and
moreforciblybyNieznarisld.Moreover,suchrelationsobviouslypos-
sess these properties.
D . Reconstrwlion
1. (%,?, z)[MAD(#,), z) D PO(oc, z)]
2. (#,), z)[MAD(#,}, z) D AGO, z)]
3. (#, z) - [PO(*, z) . AC(.t, z)]
4. (#)[ffl(#) D (I), z)MAD(*,)),z)I
 BOCHENSKl
71
THE FIVE WAYS
70
The usual definition is then appended:
16. And this all understand to be God.
:::,pot:,gt;Lse£Fw:;;;::,ptrtehdefcoa:ee..pka6:#F,r,:,:;cate,„,,or,scts[n
(3)AthirdimportantdistinctionisowingtoG.H.Kaiser(1944.). In the core proof two premises, 1 and 10, are taken as axioms,
Inthefirstu5¢(andalso,owingtotheisomorphism,inthefollowing wl`llc the other two, 2 and 11, are supported by subordinate proofs.
three)itisassumedfirstthateverymoverismovedbyanothermover, The following schema shows the structure of the u3.a:
andsecondthatifthereisamover,theremustalsobeafirst,i.e.,an
unmoved,mover.Thedifferencecanbeformulatedwiththehelpof '1)
abbreviations and logical symbols as follows:
3.7-- -8- -2- + . ; 15-. ,16
(1. ) (*,„ z)[MAD(#,y, z). (]l)MAD[0, i, a). -0 = I).j] lot
(2.)(#,},z)[MAD(„z)I(]},%)[MAjj("{,z).(u)-MAD(£,u,z)]] 11-i

The core proof is seen to be progressive-deductive (15-16), while

:::t:ee;r£Aeijet(i:£U€`;:C;!s:St;;:a:;.t:0:r:y:en±d;,:ac:e:`?::t:h;:::::;t:g%tv¥:i?£e: flcnlences 2 and 11 are backed by regressive deductions.
Thecoreproofisunobjectionablefromalogicalpointofviewin
:X::'e::t::ungehe:ht:td£:t:tc:Lot:a°cfcomuenatn;;nngh:hr°euc]odnsdt:|yctT:nT:it:cd: lhc sense that the conclusion (15) follows from the premises (1, 2,
10, 11) in accordance with valid inference rules.

:h°}:r:fi±er;:;:ta:t:h:::::eu¥cl¥:P:0°:n¥e:O;:b:ontdfy:(r,S°::C:uhnd¥¥s]iiig:?c?:b:}tthe I)) Proof of sentence 2

0ntheotherhandthereisaproblemwiththesubproofofsentence
a. Structure
2, In the formulation of this sentence,
a) The core proof
Five of the 16 sentences (1, 2, 10, 11, and 15) hold a key position (2, ) (#)[rm(#). (a),z)[MAD(#,), z). -0 = #)]]
{ansi£:::sX:sS;nfcteh:hceoyremp¥:o¥Porthr:pce°a:etf:::fiEehs:°=:efes::I: tlic consequent is the logical product or conjunction of two sen-
tence§, or, what amounts to the same thing, sentence 2 is the con-
sentences:
Junction of two principles. One,
1. It is certain and evident to the senses, that something
in the world moves (is in motion).
(2.1. ) (#,y,z)[MAD(#,y, z) I -(# =))]
2.Now,everythingthatmovesismovedbysomethingelse.
10. So if that by which it is moved is (itself) moved, it must States that no mover is identical with what it moves. Thomas gives a
also be moved by something else, and this (again) by dctailedproofofthissentence.However,hetacitlyassumeswithout
something else. proofthatthereissomethingthatmoveswhatisinmotion,thatis,
he assumes the Second sentence
11. Now, one cannot continue thus to infinity.
15.Tshne::fi:roev:td;Sb;eacneys:£i?gt:e::eTetoafirstmoverwhich
(2. 2. ) (%)[m(#). (]}, z)MAD(#,y, z)I
 68 THE FIVE WAYS
God(especiallyq.3onGod'ssimplicity).Itwasafashion,widespread
in his da.y but foreign to present-day tastes (Spanish Nco-Scholastics
may still use this style).
It is also striking how the precision varies in the u8.¢. Thomas took
great care with his first way, some parts of which are a masterpiece
of logical rigorj but the last two are no more than loose drafts.
PART 11: THE FIRST WAY
A. Tewh
First, each statement is listed in the original.8 The consecutive sen-
tence numbers refer to places in the first part of the S"owow¢. For
example, in `2.311', `2' = question two, `3' = article three of this gc/¢es-
£z.a, `1' = the first paragraph of this article (in this case the first u3.a),
and`1'=thefirstsentencewithintheparagraph.Inthecommentary
references include only the last or the last two numbers.
2.3101 Certum est enim et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in hoc
mundo.
2.3102 0mne autem quod movetur, ab alio movetur.
2.3103 Nihil enim movetur, nisi secundum quod est in potentia
ad illud ad quod movetur;
2.3104 movet autem aliquid secundum quod est acfu.
2.3105 Movere enim nihil aliud est quan educere aliquid de
potentia in actum,
2.3106 de poter}tia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum,
nisi per aliquod ens in actu.
2.3107 non autem est possibile ut idem sit simul in actu et
potentia secundum idem. . .
2.3108 Impossibile est ergo quod, secundum idem et eodem
modo, aliquid sit movens et motum, vel quod moveat
seipsum;
2.3109 omne ergo quod movetur, oportet ab alio moveri.
8 Latin text from a. 71/!omae Ag"e."o€ds aperq oan7i2.a, IV. [English text compared [o Author's]
German text, basically from H. Seidl, 77!omas I;o„ Agcit.".. Dj.c Go!!esbewerie, (tr.).
BOCHENSKl 69
'2.3110Siergoidaquomoveturmoveatur,oportetetipsumab
alio moveri, et illud ab alio.
2.2111 Hic autem non est procedere in infinifum,
2.2112 quia sic non esset aliquod primum movens,
2.2118 et per consequens nec aliquod aliud movens,
2.2114 quia moventia secunda non movent nisi per hoc quod
sunt mota a pi`imo movente.
2.2115 Ergo necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum movens,
quod a nullo movetur;
2.2116 et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum.
8. The Meaning Of `Movct:AIr'
Before going into the inference, the meaning of the key word `77}ouc-
£t4r',whichsuffersfromatleastthreeambiguities,mustbedi§cussed.
(I)Itcanbeunderstoodeithera§spatialmovementoras"change"
in general. If spatial motion is meant, it is a doctrine of Aristotelian
physics which today,.since it contradicts the law of inertia, is felt to
be false. If it is`taken as change, it rests on an ontological law in tune
with today'.s outlook and is generally accepted by science.
That Thomas takes `moucj"r' in the first sense, as motion in space,
canbegatheredfromhisexanpleofthesunintheCo72Crt!Ge72Ces1,13
(in Aristotelian astrophysics the sun can have only spatial motion).
The comments below on the second way will confirm this view.
`Movetur' will be translated by `move', since it has come into com-
mon use.4
(2) A second ambiguity, pointed out by Salanucha and all sub-
sequent authors cited above, is that `77}ouc*c"' can mean `moves (is
in motion)' and `is moved'. `Movetur' in the former meaning is a
one-place predicate and in the latter a two-place predicate or rela-
tion. The one-place predicate is symbolized as `ow' and the two-place
predicate as `MO'. Hence `m(#)' is read `# moves (is in motion)' and
`MO(#,})' as `# is moved by )i'. [The English `moves' is ambiguous,
4 The German edition ofAquinas Go!£es Dasc£7i %7!d Wesen, uses the equivalent of `movement'
in the translation (p. 44) but `change' in the commentary.
74 THE FIVE WAYS B0CHENSKI 75

5. (3#)rm(#) PART Ill: THE SECOND Way

6. (#,}, z)[[J\4AD(*,), z) . -(# = )))] I
A. Teat
J (I')[MAD¢, ', z) . -0 - f)]]
7. (]#,},z)[MAD(A;,},z) . -(% =)). 2.3201. invenimus enim in istis sensibilibus esse ordinem caur
•(]£)[MADly,£,z). -ty = £)]] I -(MAD+eJ%/) ont sarum efficientium,
8. -(MAD.elm/) D (]*)M(x;) clef 2.3202. nec tamen invenitur nec est possibile, quod aliquid sit
9. (A;)[M(A;). D(#)] clef causa efficiens sui ipsius;

Sentences 1, 2, and 3 are expressed, but 4 is tacitly assumed. Sen- 2.3203. quia sic esset prius seipso, quod est impossibile.
tence 5 is an evident empirical statement, 6 an ontological statement 2.3204. Non autem est possibile quod in causis efficientibus
perhaps derived from the definition of causality in Thomas' time. procedatur in infinitum
Also, the consequent of sentence 10 seems to depend on the exis- 2.3205. quia in omnibus causis efficientibus ordinati§ primum
tential antecedent (s8. g7.go...). Finally, premises 7 and 8 should fol- est causa medii et medium est causa ultimi,
low analytically from the definition of the infinite usually accepted
before Cantor. Sentence 9 is a definition of `decJs'. 2.8206. remota autem causa removetur effectus:
2.3207. ergo si non fuerit primum in causis efficientibus, non
Derivation erit ultimum nec medium.
2.3208. Sed si procedatur in infinitum in causis efficientibus,
11. (A;,}, z)[MAD(#,}, z) I [PO(#,2;). Acty, z)]] (1,2,a)
non erit prima causa efficiens:
12. (*,}, z)[[MAD(#,}, z) . % = }] D [PO(#, z) .AC(#, z)]] (11,b)
2.3209. et sic non erit nec effectus ultimus, nec causae effi-
13. (#,}, z)[MAD(#,},z) I -(# =))] (12,3,c)
cientes mediae:
14. (A;)[rm(A;). (=), z)[MAD(#,}, z). -(# = })]] (4,13,d)
2.3210. quod patet esse falsum.
15. (]#,},z)[MAD(#,},z) . -(Ac =)i)] (14,5,e)
2.8211. Ergo est necessarium ponere aliquam causan efficien-
16. (]a?,y,z)[MAD(x,},z) . -(a; =}).
•(E')[MAD¢, !, z) . -¢ = f)]] tern primam,
(6,15,I)
2.3212. quam omnes Deum nominant.
IT . -(MAI).elrif) (7,16,g)
18. (=„)M(#) (8,17,g)
u. Parallel4srm
19. (=„)D(#) (9,18,j)
The second has a fairly exact correspondence to the first:
TL. Sununary
1BLway 12 3-9111213141516
The following conclusions about the ¢r677cc} ue.a have been drawn. The 2ndway 1 2 3 4 8 9 5 11 12
derivation is correct. All premises follow from Aristotelian philoso-
phy The structure of the first two ways is nearly isomorphic. Their
`is inexcept 5, motion',
spatial which is the
evident.
claimsSince
made`mot/ect4r' is torest
in the proof be understood as
.substantially
forinal aspect is identical except for the following: the second way
on Aristotelian¢fa)s€.cs. But since such views are no longer defensible, n{lds sentences 7 and 10, the formulation of sentence 12 in the first
the Pr€7»¢ u3.a is not valid. |8 more detailed, sentence 10 of the first way was perhaps meant to
76 THE FIVE Ways BOGHENSRI 77

be implicit in the second, and the single sentence 3 takes the place 5. (#,J,)[[CA(#,,) . -(# =,)] I
of the subproof of2 in the first. - D (]z)[CAty, z) . -dy = z)]] Ont
The sect47.de u3.a, then, offers nothing new of logical interest. But 6. (]#,})[CA(A;,)I) . -(# = }) . (]z)[CAO, 2;) . -¢ = z)]] I
its content differs substantially. In the first place, the empirical 3 -(CA.elrif ) Ont
assumptions are different. The second way makes claims not about
7 . -(CA.elrf ) . (5ir)cp(x) clef
motionbutabqutanordocc"4s¢7`ttrmcj7€;8.c„£8.%77hThisclainmayseem
doubtful, but Thomas is speaking here not merely of causality but 8. (")[C4(#) J D(„)] clef
of a causal series, perhaps wishing in this way to set the second uz.cI
off from the first. The first way speaks of individual occurrences, Derivation
the second of complexes of many. 9. (#,y)[CA(a,,,) J -(# =y)]
(1, 2, k)
Also, the second way refers to priority rather than to act and 10. („)[V(#) I (JJ,)[CA(„,,) . -(# =J)]]
(3, 9, I)
potency (2 and 3 in the first). Sentence 3 is tacitly presupposed, as 11. (±„',)[CA(#,,) . -(" =,)]
in the first way. Otherwise the two proofs are isomorphic, and so the (10, 4, in)
logical comments made on the first way apply also to the second. 12. -(CA.elrf) (6, 5,11, n)
The proof is valid. The premises are derivable from Aristotelian 13. (J„)C¢(„)
(7, 12, g)
ontology,exceptthefirst,whichisevident.Andhere,too,itneednot 14. (±#)I)(„)
(8,13,j)
be assumed that infinite series lack first members, since it suffices
to exclude infinity from the causal series. D. Stt"77,¢ry
The remarks about Thomas' practice of accumulating proofs is
especially relevant here, for if `778oz/ec%r' is translated as `changes', the
Thederivationislogicallyvalid:thetruthoftheconclusiondepends
entirely on. the truth of the premises. As far as the premises are
first proof becomes practically identical to the second. But what-
concerned, the first is an ontological statement and indeed seems
ever the theoretical interpretations, from an historical standpoint,
lo be analytic: the cause precedes what it causes in some sense,
the considerable care Thomas took here should discourage viewing
lf not necessarily in time. Premise 2 states the irreflexivity of the
the second u?.cz as a deliberate reproduction. IIence he must have
considered the two uie as different. precedence relation: nothing can come before itself. Premises 3 and
5 state the principle of causality. Premise 4 is an obvious empirical
It seems, then, that since `owoue£"r' means not `changes' but
`moves',the¢r€"ot".cz.restson(Aristotelian)physicswhilethesccw7idcE 8Latement. None of these claims can be seriously rejected. Hence the
truth of the conclusion depends on premiss 6, whose truth ought to
has only ontological premises. be asserted.
Consequently, if these plausible if not evident principles of Aris-
G. Reconstruction totelian ontology are accepted, the second way should be regarded
ns valid.
Premises

1. (A,,J)[[CA(#,y) . * =,] j PR(#,#)] PART IV: THE THIRD WAY

2. (x) -PR(x,x) A. Teat

3. (#)[V(#) J (JJ)CA(",y)] 2.3301. Invenimos quaedam quae sum possibilia esse et non
4. (=#)V(#) esse;
78 THE FIVE WAYS BOCHENSKI

2.3302. impossibile est autem omnia quae sunt talia semper

1;
esse'
FTfl -
2.3303. quia quod possibile est non esse, quandoque hon est.
2-10 ,
2.3304. Si igitur omnia sunt possibilia non esse, aliquando nihil 14T ` 15-16
fuit in rebus.
2.3305. Sed si hoc est verum, etiam nunc nihil esset, i..-.-.

2.8306. quia quod non est, non incipit esse nisi per aliquid quod So three questions are concerned. (1) Is there anything neces-
est; sary at all? (2) Is there something necessary whose necessity does
2.3307. Si igitur nihil fuit ens, impossibile fuit quod aliquid in- not depend on others? And (8) is this the cause of the necessity of
ciperet esse, everything else and hence God?
Although a purely progressive-deductive pattern can be seen in
2.3308. et sic modo nihil esset:
the third way, unlike the first, there is a certain parallelism between
2.3309. quod patet esse falsum. them, as this table shows:
2.3310. Non ergo omnia entia sunt possibilia,
1st via: 1 2-6 9 10-14 15 16
2.3311. sed oportet esse necessarium in rebus. 8rd via: 1 2-10 11 12-18 14 16
2.3312. Omne autem necessarium vel habet causam suae neces-
sitatis aliunde, vel non habet. But the comparison hides an essential difference. In the first two
ways, the initial empirical sentence begins the proof proper (10-14),
2.3813. Non est autem possibile quod procedatur in infini-
but in the third, the derivative sentence 11 (that there is something
turn inneces§ariis, quae habent causam suae necessi-
necessary) and not the empirical sentence I has this logical function.
tatis, sicut in causis efficientibus, ut probatum est. On the other hand 2-10 of the #grfz.cz u3.cz corresponds not to 2-6 of the
2.3314. Ergo necesse est ponere aliquid quod sit per se neces- /)r5mcb (proof of `ab az€o owouG!"r') but to sentence 12. The following
sarium, non habens causan necessitatis aliunde, table is a better comparison:
2.3315. sed quod est causa necessitatis aliis:
18t via: 1 2-6 9 10-14 15 16
2.3316. quod omnes dicunt Deum. 8rd via: 11 12 12-13 14 16

The logical questions pertaining to the second part of the third

8. Struetwife
The, text falls into three parts: (1) sentence 11 (there is among things
somethingnecessary)(1-11),(2)12-13containstheproofofsentence
14 (there is something which is necessary of itself), and (3) it is said
in 15-16 that this is the cause of the necessity of other things and is ,
called `God'. The following schema pictures the logical structure:
way are the same as in the first and second. Incidentally, Thomas
l'cfers back to his second ua.cb (in sentence 13). The problem of the
vzilidity of the transition from 14/15 to '16 is also common to the
occond and third ways.
For what is logically peculiar to the third way is to be found in the
fll`st part, the proof that there is something necessary. The deriva-
tion of this sentence (5) rests on an invalid rule of inference:
 THE FIVE WAYS BOCHENSKI 81

(#)[ap(„) J (IJ)dy(„,.y)] Derivatin

(IJ)(#)[ap(#) J dy(",J)] 16. -(CAn.elrf) (9, 10, g)

17. (3z)PIV(2:)
(16, 11, g)
a. Reconstruction 18. (=„)IVc(#) J (=J,)PIVO) (12,17,13, o)
19. (=„)IVc(„)
¢' First part (14, 8, g)
20. (=„)PN(#) (18, 19, g)
Prenises 21. (j„)D(„)
(15, 20,j)
1. (oc)[P(*) J (3» -ES(*, J)] Ont
D. Swmmary
2. (x. i) -ES(x, t) = ky, t) -IEky, t) Ont
8. (x, t) -IE(x, i) . ky) -Esky, n) Ont The second part is a correct logical derivation, but the first is not.
I-Iowever, since the validity of the Second depends on the conclusion
4. -(*) -ES(#, „) emp
of the first ( 19), that there is something necessary in the world, the
final conclusion (21) may be accepted as valid only if 19 (or 8) is
Derivation taken as an axiom. But this is not only inevident but also unlikely,
for in the world only non-necessary things are encountered.
5. (aJ)(„)[P(„) I -ES(„, ')] (1, F)
6. (x)P(x) -ky,i) -IEky,i) (2, 5, h) PART V: THE FOURTH WAY
r| . (x)P(x) -ty) -Esky,n)
(3, 6, h)
A. Teat
8. -(#)P(*) (7, 4, i)
2.341. Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid magis et minus`bonum
bJ Second Part et verum et nobile; et sic de aliis huiusmodi.
2.342.Sedmagisetminusdicul?turdediversissecundumquod
Premises
appropinquant diversimode ad aliquid quod maxime
9. (I))[(]x;)[CA7B(#,)) . -(# =))]. est,sicutmagiscalidumestquodappropinquatmaxime
•(]z)[cArty, z) . -o = z)]] I -(cA%.ef%/) calido.
10. ly)[(E#)[CAm(#,,) . -(# =J,)] I 2.348. Est igitur aliquid quod est verissimum et optimum et
J (5z)[CA"0, z) . -¢ = z)]] nobilissimum, et per consequens maxime ens;
\1. -(CAin.elTif ) . (=x)PN(x) 2.344. Nan quae sunt maxime vera, sunt maxime entia. . .
12. (]#)IVc(*) I [(fry)[cA%¢,}) . -(# = y)]v 2.345. Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere est
V -(IJ)[CA"(„,J) . -(„ = J,)]] causa omnium quae sunt illius generis. . .
18. (#) -(]})CA"(#,}) I (±)AV(z) 2.346. Est ergo aliquid quod omnibus entibus est causa esse et
14. -(#)P(%) D (Ex;)IVc(%) bonitatis et cujuslibet perfectionis:
15. (oc)[P„(") I D(#)] 2.347. et hoc dicimus Deum.
82 TIIE FIVE WAYS
BOCHENSKI 83
8. Structwre
7. (]*)[(tt)MA/(o¢, t4, a). -(]u)MA/(u, #, a)] (6, sub z/6)
The text falls into two parts. In the first ( 14), sentence 3 states that 8. (]#)[¢)MA/(%,)I,e).-(]t/)MA/(u,#,c)] (3, 7 sub e/a)
there is a owcz#a.77}"ow e"a, a greatest being, 1 and 2 serve as .premises 9. (]*)[0)MA/(#,}, e) . -(]u)MA/(u, a;, e)] .
foritsfirsthalf("thereissomethingmosttrue,etc."),and4supports J (J#)0)CAU(„,,, e) (4, 8, r)
the transition to the second half ("there is a greatest being"). In the
10. (J„)0)CAU(„,J,, C) (9, 8, g)
secondpart(5-6)itisclaimed-withoutsupport-thatthisgreatest
thing is the cause of the being, etc., of all things. The last sentence 11. (3#)D(#) (5, 10, r)
(7) is the usual assertion about the being called `God'.
The structure of this u3.c} is as follows: D, S"ow"¢ry

=L=L
The derivation is logically valid. Since the first premise is evident,
|hc validity of the proof depends upon the truth of the second,
Which is undoubtedly false: from the fact that there are degrees in
6.,T flome aspect it does not follow that there is some greatest thing in
tha,t aspect.
Attempts have been made to rescue the proof by restricting axiom
The procedure is obviously progressive except for the inference 2 lo a certain set of "perfections" such as beauty, nobility, etc. But
from 4 to 3. Thomas' own example is warmth - hardly such a perfection. And
This uG.a has greaLtly troubled readers of the a"77aowcI. For on the face even with this qualification, the axiom is not evident.
of it not only are the premises implausible, but the logic is curious. Therefore the gt4cut¢ u3.cz is not valid.
It is difficult even to make out the thought behind it.
PART VI: THE FIFTH WAY
a Reconstrachon
A. Text
Premises
2.351. Videmus enim quod aliqua quae cognitione careut, sci-
1. (#,), z)[MA/(#,y, z) 3 (a£)[(tt)MA/(!, ct, z). licet' corpora naturalia, operantur propter finem;
• - (±u)MAJ(I,, f, z)]] 2.352. quod apparet ex hoc quod semper aut frequentius
2. (=#,,, z)MA/(#,,,z) eodem modo operantur ut consequantur id quod est
Optimum.
3. (#,))[MA/(#,}, 6) = MA/(#,), e)]
2.353. Uncle patet quod non a casu sed ex intentione perveni-
4. (oc,}, z)[[MA/(#,), z) . -(]J)MA/(£, #, z)]
unt ad finem.
J CAU(#,,,z)]
2.854. Ea autem quae non habent cognitionem, non ten-
5. (#,y)[CAU(A;,}, e) D D(#)]
dunL infinem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et
intelligente....
Derivation 2.355. Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales
ordinantur ad finem,
6. (]z)(]£)[(t4)MA/(£, tt,z). -(]u)MA/(u, }, z)] (1, 2, p)
2.356. et hoc dicimus Deum.
 BOCHIINSKI 85
84 THE, FIVE WAYS

8. Sapplerneut 6. (#,))[[-c(#) . F(#)] I or(A:,))] . (]z)I(£)DF(z, I).

•(t`' ,)[DF(t`, f) I t' = z]] ont
In comparison to the first three ways, the fifth is quite simple and
7. (a;.,})[[-C(*). F(#)] I or(#,))] emp
gives the impression of being written hurriedly. Although it would
8. (z)[[(f)DF(z, f). (t4, £)[Z)F(tt, }) I tt = z] I D(z)] clef
prove only that there is at least one orderer leading at least some
natural things to their end, Thomas' conclusion (2.355) is much.
stronger: there is a being which leads ¢JZ natural things to their I)o'.fuation
goal.
The logical failing here is so gross that it must be assumed that 9. (]z)[(J)DF(z,i). (tt,£)[DF(c4,}). tt= z]] (6, 7, g)
unless Thomas is simply mistaken, he is tacitly using a proof he later 10. (3#)D(#) (8, 9,j)
develops in q.13,3. First the way itself will be reconstructed, then
this proof from question 11,3. D, St.rmmory

Teat Of 11,3 Tl`eqwz72£¢u5aisnotlogicallyvalid,norisitsconclusion(5)derivable

wl|hout the assumptions from q.11,13. But such supplementation
11.381. Omnia quae sunt inveniuntur ordinata ad invicem dun
quaedam quibusdam deserviunt. 9i%Sc?iedye°nncdetfi%::]hT::S;t]eaitehnetfeygi:§nu£:gp:i:ihs{:se:Soauytt¥u::e°Vert
11.332. Quae autem diversa sunt, in unum ordinem non con-
venirent, nisi ab aliquo uno ordinarentur I.ART vm syNOpsls OF AssuMPTIONs AND RULEs OF INFERENCE
11.333. quia per se unius unum est causa.
The reconstruction identifies a total of 37 premises and 22 inference
The empirical assumption here, that all things in the world are rlllcs. The premises are of four types: definitions and empirical,
organized into a teleological unity, differs from that of the fifth way.
|flJ#:O;::Phical,and formal-1ogicalsentences.Theyaredistributedas
a. Reconstruction
^#9umptions I 11 Ill IV V Total
Premises I)cl'initions 2 2 3. 1 1 9
Ompirical 11211 6
1. (#)[0(#) I F(o')]
I,hilo§ophical 65532 21
2. (IA,)[-C(*) . a(#)] loHical 00100 1
rlb'nl 37
3. (#)[[-C(#) . F(#)] D (]})[DFO, #) . CO)]] 9 8 11 5 4

Derivation
A. Dofinitions
4. (=„)[-C(A;) . F(„)] (1, 2, s)
Nlnc assumptions should be regarded as definitions or immediate
5. (=#,y)[Z)FO,„) . Cty)] (3, 4, t) Consequences of definitions:
That is: there i§ at least one being which leads at least one being
I,8. -(MAD.gJ7i/) I (]#)M(#)
to its goal. Here is a reconstruction of the proof from q.11,3, which
serves as a supplement. I,9. (#)[M(#) I D(#)]
86 TI-in FivE wAys
[1,J . -(CA*elrf ) - (=x)Cp(x)
11,8. („)[Cp(#) J D(„)I
Ill,11. -(CAteJ„/) D (]#)PIV(#)
Ill,14. -(*)P(oc) j (=#)IVc(#)
Ill,15. (A,)[PIV(#) j D(„)]
IV,5. (#,})[CAU(#,}, c) . D(#)]
V,4. („)[0)DF(#,,) J A(")]
T3. Empirical assunn¢tions
Each way, as has been seen, begins with an empirical statement
(2.3101,2.8201,2.3301,2.341,2.351);thethirdway-containsanaddi-
tional empirical assumption (2.3309). They have been included in
the reconstructions in order to parallel Thomas' text. They could of
course be forgone, as Salamucha does, by tinkeringwith the axiomat-I
ics. But thus reducing the number of premises would not follow
Thomas,sinceheobviouslythoughthisrelativelylengthyremarkson
the empirical premises were essentia.1 to the conclusion. Salamucha ,
tried to justify his alteration by taking the empirical assumption of
the S%ononcb as metalinguistic, which shifts the whole argumentation
into the real. Still, his proposal finds no support in the text, where
Thomas moves throughout on the object-language level.
a. Phhosofihical Assumptions
"Philosophical" statements are those taken from Aristotelian philos-
ophy; 21 of them have been isolated in the reconstruction:
First way
1. (2.3103) (#,y, z)[MAD(#,},z) I PO(#,z)]
Everything which is moved is in potency (merely possi- t
ble) in regard to that whither it is in motion.
2. (2.3104) (oc,}, z)[MAD(#,}, z) I AC¢, z)]
Every mover is in act (actual) in regard to that whither
it sets in motion.
BOGI.IIINSKI 87
I 3. (2.3107) (#,2:) -[AC(#,z). PO(#, z)]
One thing cannot be in act and potency regarding the
same [thing] at the same time.
4.. (#)[m(*) D (I), z)MAZ)(*,), z)]
Everything which is in motion, is moved by something.
5. (2.8110) (A:,}, z)[[MAD(a7,), z) . -(A; = })] I
I (±')[MAD¢, I, z) . -¢ = ')]]
If a thing is moved by something else, then there is
still another thing which moves this mover in the same
respect.
6. (2.3111) (]*,), z)[A4AD(a;,}, z) . -(# = }).
•(]})[MADO, £, z) . -¢ = £)]] 3 -(MAD.gJ7z/)
The series thus formed is not infinite.
0,)and way
7. (2.3202) (#,}i)[CA(#,}) D Pjzo, #)]
Every cause precedes what it causes.
8. (2.3203) (#) -PR(#, #)
Nothing precedes itself.
9. (#)[V(A;) D (I?)[CA(#,}) . -(oc =))]]
Everything which is caused is caused by another.
1o. (#,))[CA(#,y) D (]z)CAfy, z)]
If anything is caused, then there is something which
causes the causer (itself).
11. (2.3204) (]x;,y)[CA(A;,}) . -(# =y).
•(]z)[CAky, a) . -Ot = z)]] I -(CA*eJ%/)
The series thus formed is not infinite.
Third way
12. (2.8303) (all)[P(#) D (]£) -ES(a;, I)]
88 THE FIVE WAYS
Iiverything which possibly is not, at some time is not
actually.
13.. (2.3304/5) (]£)(#) -ES(#, #) D (#) -ES(#, „)
If there is a moment when there is nothing, then there
is nothing now.
14. (2:3307) (#, £)[-ES(#, £) D 0, €) -JEO, Z)]
If there is nothing at any moment, then nothing begins
to be at that moment.
15. 0)[(]#)[CA73(%,}) . -(# = })] I (]z)[CAdy, z) . -¢ = z)]]
If the necessity of anything is caused by something else,
thenthenecessityofthecauser(itself)iscausedbysome
(third) thing.
16. (2.3313) (]})[(]#)[CA"(#,y) . -(% =})].
•(]z)[CA%0, z) . -¢ = z)]] D -(CA".eJ%/)
The series so formed is not infinite.
Fourth way
17. (2.342/3) (*,}, z)[MA/(#,}, z) .
I (]£)[(%)MA/(£, %, z) . -(]u)MA/(u, £, z)]]
If anything is greater than something else in some
respect, then there is a greatest thing in this respect.
18. (2.344) (a;,})[MA/(*,}, 6) = MA/(#,y, e)]
A thing i.s good (true, noble, etc.) in the.highest degree
if and only if it is the being in the highest degree.
19. (2.845) (#,}, z)[[MA/(*,), z) . -(]£)MA/(£, %, 2;)] D
I CAU(#,,, z)J
The highest thing within a genus is the cause of every-
thing belonging to the genus.
Fifth way
20. (2.352) (#)[O(A;) I F(#)]
B0CHENSKI 89
What always or usually attains the best acts toward a
goal.
21. (2.354) (#)[[-C(#) . F(#)] D (]7)[Z)F(#,}) . Cfy)]]
Beings lacking reason act toward a goal only insofar as
they are led by a knowing being.
There are also the two assumptions from q.11,8, which do not
roi`in part of the five ways.
These assumptions fall into four classes:
fl) Four (1, 2, 7, 8) may be regarded as analytic. That the thing
moved is in potency (1) and its mover in act (2) follow from the
mcz`ning of the words, and this is also true of the two statements
lhoout priority (7, 8).
b) Four (4, 5, 9,10) are varying forms of the principle of causality,
two (4 and 5) are laws of (Aristotelian) physics, and two (9 and 10)
o|.a ontological laws. It should be noted that two premises (4 and 9)
nl'C tacitly presupposed in the S"on773cb.
c)Three(6,11,15)areprinciplesofthefinitenessofcertainseries.
d) the remaining premises (3,11,14,16) are synthetic ontological
|i:%us¥ite[°r:Sg.£ds)t,aieist¥aatt:ita:env:rp£°st::Cn¥neexcc::sd=y°i;]s¥:t:£:t(£ant
6ome time, and 14 that an intelligence must be assumed in order
lo explain finality in the world. 16 is the (false) principle that there
oxlsts a greatest thing in every Series.
D . I.ogiGal Assunptins
The logical assumptions are all inference rules, with one exception,
which is a substitution of the logical law
ap J Edy V -dy]
``8ed as a premise in the third way (2.3312). Thomas also uses in the
I,hind way (2.3024) the invalid inference rule (F):
(")[q,(„) J (I,)dy(#,,)]
(=y)(#)[q,(„) J dy(„, ,)]
90 THE FIVE WAYS
With this exception - apart from the gap in the fifth way - all
the inference rules he employs are valid. They are 21 in number and
fall into three groups:
a) Many rules mistakenly understood as syllogistic modes: h (Bar-
bc}rcz), i, e, in, p, r, t, u (Dar€Z) and c, k (CczmesJ7ies).
b) Simple rules of predicate logic (not to be taken as syllogistic
modes).
c) three rules of sentential logic: (g, h, i).
Three things should be said about these rules. (1) They are all
valid, with the one exception noted (the fifth way is defective by
failing to support a claim). (2) They are all very elementary. Their
simplicity confirms the suspicion that little formal logic is needed
for doing science. The situation would of course be different if the
theory of infinite series were incorporated into the reconstruction.
(3) The inference rules Thomas uses, elementary though they are,
go beyond the so-called t.raditional logic; no true syllogistic mode is
used at all.
I.. Conclusions
The following sulnmary may be given:
1. The sece47zc!cz uz.a is valid if certain (plausible) principles of Aris-
totelian ontology arc assumed.
2. The other ways, as. they are formulated in this gwc}es!8.o, are
invalid: the first because it rests on an unacceptable physics, the
third and fifth becanse of log.ical defects, and the fourth because it
includes a false premise. This evaluation obviously does not preclude
the possibility of improving these proofs, perhaps with help of ideas
from other parts of the Stt""cz.
8. The argumentation is mostly progressive-deductive, but occa-
sionally regressive-deductive. There is no trace of induction in q.2,3
(as is sometimes claimed in works on this subject).
4. The inference 1.ules used are without exception quite elemen-
tary. They were probably felt to be syllogistic modes, but most of
them do not belong to syllogistics at all. Thomas uses, among other
types, at least four rules of sentential logic.
B0CHENSKI 91
5. All inference rules examined, with two exceptions are cor-
l'ccl from a purely formal-logical viewpoint. The exceptions are the
Invalid inference in the first part of the }cr£€.c3 uz.cz and the deduction
ol'` a single order in the gt4in±cb.
6. The level of logical rigor in this question of the S"ononc}, gaged
on ancient Stoic, 1at:e scholastic, and current standards, is not high.
Thomas's concept of proof is fairly loose, this is obvious especially
when he tacitly assumes statements essential to his proof.
7. The accumulation of non-necessary proofs is probably condi-
Lloned by 13th-century argument fashions.
REFERENCES
^q`ilnas, Th. S. Trfeom¢Agu€7ia!ir apena a."„?.a, JV` Rome: Leonina, 1882.
= . Go!!ef Dczse£.„ t!„d wcfc7.. Salzburg: Salzburg o.I.,1933.
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Mauricto Beuehat
SAINT THOMAS' THIRD WAY: POSSIBILITY
AND NECESSITY, ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE
ABSTRACT. This paper discusses, in a. very detailed fashion, Aquinas' third
wayforprovingtheexistenceofGod.Itrepliestotheobjectionsraisedagainst
it by Anthony Kenny and draws some implications of the proof for the con-
copts of essence and existence. One of these implications is that the third
way is also valid, against Bochenski's contention (in "The Five Ways," this
volume) that i[ is not.

`l'lle lnetaphysical proofs of God

nl`c 8o remote from human reasoning,

r`il(I so complicated,
tl mt they make little impression.
Ir8omefindthemprofitable,
11 18 only during the lnoment
(ll(`t they grasp. them;
n|` liour afterwards they fear
lllcy have been mistaken.

pascal?

STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION

In this paper I intend to consider some relatively recent criticisms

|o St. Thomas' third way for proving the existence of God, and draw
Borne consequences of 'this argument concerning the importance of
the concepts of essence and existence. First of all, I shall briefly
consider the essentials of the proof in order to try to solve the very
lnterestingandharddifficultiesraisedagainst'itbyAnthonyKenny.8
I I gi`ntefully acknowledge the suggestions made by Adolfo Garcia dc la Sicnra andjos€
^I`lol`io Robles upon a.previous version of this paper.
I Po)Lf/es, Entry 381.
A Ji` I`is book 7Yie Fc.I;c Ways. SC. 77!ow!a5 Aqu!.%as' P7oo/5 a/Cod'5 Eri!c7zce.