Marine Policy 116 (2020) 103923

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Marine Policy
journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

Transforming traditional management into contemporary territorial-based

fisheries management rights for small-scale fisheries in Indonesia
Abdul Halim a, *, Neil R. Loneragan a, b, c, d, Budy Wiryawan a, Rod Fujita e, Dedi S. Adhuri f,
Adrian R. Hordyk b, c, g, M. Fedi A. Sondita a
a
Department of Fishery Resources Utilization, Faculty of Fisheries and Marine Sciences, IPB University, Bogor, Indonesia
b
Environmental and Conservation Sciences, College of SHEE, Murdoch University, Murdoch, Western Australia, 6150, Australia
c
Centre for Sustainable Aquatic Ecosystems, Murdoch University, Murdoch, Western Australia, 6150, Australia
d
Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Murdoch, Western Australia, 6150, Australia
e
Environmental Defense Fund, 123 Mission Street, San Francisco, CA, 94105,, USA
f
Research Center for Society and Culture, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta, Indonesia
g
Institute for the Oceans and Fisheries, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Fisheries management rights (FMRs), such as territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs), are a promising approach
Fisheries open access for fisheries management that, if implemented on larger geographic scales, may be able to reduce the risk of
TURFs fisheries decline, particularly for small-scale fisheries (SSF). SSF are significant throughout Asia, Africa and South
Customary marine tenure
America for millions of fishers and supporting the livelihoods of coastal communities. This research evaluates the
Rights-based fisheries management
Data-limited fisheries
potential of TURFs as a management tool in Indonesia and develops this into a concept of contemporary FMRs. In
Indonesia, the adat communities, i.e. those communities where customary tenurial claims are still practiced,
acknowledged under law and respected by migrant communities, have been able to implement TURFs. In Maluku
and West Papua regions, TURFs (�customary marine tenure or petuanan laut) are possible because tenure rights
are recognized and confer the essential TURFs elements of exclusivity and security. We investigate the potential
for scaling up TURFs by transforming petuanan laut that has enabled the successful implementation of sasi laut, a
traditional measure to regulate the utilization of marine resources, into modern FMRs, especially for SSF. Ele­
ments of policy reform, the use of science-based fisheries management principles, and data-limited stock
assessment methods to inform adaptive management are also considered. We discuss the adoption of FMRs into
relevant law to allow the scaling up of TURFs throughout Indonesia. The FMRs are conceived as a privilege
granted by government to an entity or group that comes with resource stewardship responsibilities and should be
revocable if they are breached.

1. Introduction existing fisheries management measures applied to small-scale fisheries,

Small-scale fisheries are globally important, providing food security
and livelihoods for local communities, including millions of small-scale
fishers and their families [1–3]. In the latest FAO landings statistics,
Indonesia is the 2nd greatest producer of marine capture fisheries
globally [4] and small-scale fisheries are a significant component of
production but more also very significant in terms of livelihoods for
coastal communities. Presently, Indonesian small-scale fishers are
exempted from capture fisheries management measures, as they are not
subject to fishing license and fishing vessel monitoring system re­
quirements, nor must they pay fisheries fees [3]. Even if the above
their implementation, especially monitoring compliance, would be very
difficult as small-scale fishers are scattered in more than seventy thou­
sand villages along the coastal areas of the Indonesian archipelago and
land their catch primarily at small wooden jetties or directly on the
beach with little or no enforcement presence [3]. Consequently,
small-scale fisheries contribute significantly to unregulated fisheries and
unreported landings as they are not recorded in the government fisheries
statistics. It is therefore important to explore management options that
could prove feasible and effective for the small-scale fisheries of
Indonesia.
Indonesia is an archipelagic nation, with over 13,466 islands within

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: halimabdul1213@gmail.com (A. Halim).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103923
Received 3 December 2019; Received in revised form 20 February 2020; Accepted 11 March 2020
Available online 19 March 2020
0308-597X/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
A. Halim et al.
the one of the largest exclusive economic zones in the world. For the
purpose of fisheries management, Indonesian waters are divided into
eleven Fisheries Management Areas (FMAs) (Wilayah Pengelolaan Peri­
kanan/WPP) (Fig. 1) and all FMAs extend across more than one pro­
vincial border. The FMA is considered a geographical unit for
developing fisheries management plans and programs that are expected
to be implemented through a designated technical unit under the Min­
istry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF) [5]. In 2016, based on a
recommendation from the national scientific commission on stock
assessment, the MMAF declared that overfishing was occurring for a
number of groups of species in Indonesian waters including, small
pelagic, sedentary, demersal and reef associated species, throughout the
eleven Fisheries Management Areas of Indonesia (through decision
number 47/KEPMEN-KP/2016). Overfishing can occur in both
large-scale and small-scale fisheries under a nation’s regulatory frame­
work that lacks effective management tools, as well as through illegal,
unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing by foreign or domestic ves­
sels. Recent estimates of total catches, based on catch reconstructions
globally [6] and within different regions (e.g. four south-east Asian
countries [2]) have indicated that the IUU component may comprise an
additional 40% of the reported catches. Overfishing is driven mainly by
food and market demand for seafood that generates high levels of fishing
effort and rapid technological advance, leading to intense pressure on
fish stocks, sometimes to the point of collapse [7–10]. This phenomenon
can incentivize increases in fishing effort (the number of fishers and
fishing trips) as well as fishing power (the efficiency of harvest), which
often takes the form of the use of larger and more powerful vessels using
less selective gear, capable of catching larger volumes of fish. Much is at
stake in securing the effective management of Indonesia’s fishery re­
sources for biological sustainability and economic productivity. The
Indonesian government, together with fisheries stakeholders, is likely to
benefit from exploring alternative fisheries management tools that could
address the root causes of overfishing, namely a human motivation to
race to fish, that might not yet be effectively addressed by the present
fisheries management measures.
Typical approaches to fisheries management seek to enforce effort
limits with restrictions on inputs such as permits, gear, or fishing sea­
sons, or by restricting total allowable catches and area restrictions to
Fig. 1. Map of Indonesian Fisheries Management Areas (FMAs) showing the location of adat communities and adat law communities in Indonesia, adapted from
MMAF [35]. For definition of adat communities and adat law communities see Section 3.1.1.
2
Marine Policy 116 (2020) 103923
conserve the young or breeding aggregations. Some of these approaches
frequently fail because fishers invest heavily in those inputs that remain
unregulated and race against each other to catch as many fish as possible
before catch limits are reached in the absence of strong governance
systems [8,11–13]. Fishers are incentivized to focus on perceived
short-term gains at the expense of long-term benefits to themselves and
society. In addition, as fishing costs continue to increase, net revenues
will decrease to economically unsustainable levels, putting the liveli­
hoods of many Indonesian fishers in jeopardy. Generally, the conven­
tional approaches to fisheries management address some of the
symptoms of overfishing rather than the main drivers, and therefore fail
to meet their desired economic and conservation goals [8]. Neverthe­
less, some area restriction approaches e.g., periodic closure of fishing
grounds and no take reserves, have shown positive effects on conser­
vation outcomes in term of fish biomass and average size of fish
compared to those areas outside of reserves [14–16].
Rights-Based Fisheries Management (RBFM) is an alternative man­
agement approach aimed at incentivizing resource stewardship, rather
than increases in fishing effort and fishing power, thereby reducing the
risk of overfishing and stock collapse [8,12,13,17–19]. Fishing rights
work because they align fishing business incentives with long-term
natural resource conservation, principally by allowing fishers who
participate in resource stewardship to capture the benefits of that
stewardship [8,12,13,17,20]. They are effective when fishers or com­
munities have the ability to secure fishing opportunities and prevent
others from free-riding on their stewardship of the fish stocks, which is
strengthened and formally recognized by laws. The implementation of
RBFM, can take many forms, such as catch shares and territorial use
rights in fisheries (TURFs), and seem to be associated with reduced risk
of fishery collapse and with stock recovery [12]. Various terms have
been used to describe practices or measures that embody many of the
principles of RBFM but are tailored to different fishery contexts, such as
TURFs, catch shares, managed access, Individual Transferable Quotas
(ITQ), Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ), Individual Vessel Quota (IVQ),
Community Development Quota (CDQ), and Cooperative Quotas [8,12,
13,17–25].
Indonesia has a centuries-long history of traditional practices for
managing coastal natural resources, with distinct variations in these
A. Halim et al.
practices occurring in different locations [26–32]. In western and cen­
tral Indonesia, such as Aceh and North Sulawesi (Fig. 1), local com­
munities have been practicing communal control over access to natural
resources in coastal areas [14,16,31,32], whereas in eastern Indonesia,
such as Maluku islands and West Papua (Fig. 1), stronger traditional
(adat) community claims have been applied not only to control access to
resources but also to own proportion of certain territories (waters and
land) in the coastal areas, including the natural resources therein
[26–29,32]. This customary marine tenure (adat claim) is known locally
as petuanan laut, and is an acknowledged and respected tenurial claim
that forms the key enabling condition for the successful application of
traditional marine resource management measures known as sasi laut.
Sasi literally means ‘prohibition’ and laut means marine (sea waters), so
sasi laut means prohibition of taking/harvesting certain living resources
from the sea waters. The communal territorial ownership in the form of
petuanan laut that has enabled the implementation of sasi laut, a tradi­
tional management measure to regulate the harvest of marine resources
is a good example of a functioning ‘territorial use rights in fisheries
(TURFs)’ in Indonesia (see Refs. [21,22]; for the case in Pacific). The
presence of these traditional communities, and their rights and practices
is recognized by the Indonesian Constitution (UUD 1945), as manifested
in Article 18B amendment of UUD 1945: “the State recognizes and re­
spects the units of customary law community and its traditional rights as
long as it still exists and in accordance with the development of society
and principle of the Union State of the Republic of Indonesia that is
governed by law”, and in Article 28 I paragraph (3): “cultural identity
and traditional community rights are respected in accordance with the
development of times and civilization”.
Recognizing RBFM as a promising tool for fisheries management, an
informal ‘RBFM Interest group’ in Indonesia was formed in 2016 to
facilitate public discourse, focus group discussions and consultative
meetings involving academics, researchers, government officials and
policy makers, NGOs and practitioners, to evaluate the suitability and
applicability of the RBFM principles for Indonesian fisheries. Based on
the results of three interest group discussions and consultation meetings
between August 2016 and January 2017, this group determined that: (a)
RBFM is not a new idea in Indonesia, and that if enabling conditions
exist – such as those equivalent to petuanan laut in Maluku islands, it is
suitable and applicable for the management of fisheries in Indonesian
waters, (b) to replace the term rights-based fisheries management
(RBFM) with Hak Pengelolaan Perikanan/HPP (Fisheries Management
Rights/FMRs) (see Halim et al. [33]), and (c) to promote the adoption of
FMRs into Indonesian fisheries legislation. The selection of the new term
Fisheries Management Rights (FMRs) has taken into account the lessons
from a decision by the Constitutional Court to annul the Coastal Waters
Commercial Use Right (Hak Pengusahaan Perairan Pesisir/HP-3) in Law
No. 27/2007 on Coastal and Small Islands Management (see section
3.1.2 below for more detail), considering the potential legal issues that
could arise between FMRs and HP-3 around the word ‘rights’. The
coastal waters commercial use right was introduced by Law No.27/2007
to provide an alternative rights-based mechanism to regulate the use of
coastal and/or marine resources in coastal and marine waters, but was
annulled by the Indonesian Constitutional Court in 2011 because it was
conflicted with the provisions of article 33(3) of the Indonesian
Constitution (see Section 3.1.3). The FMRs similarly cover both ‘access
rights’ to catch/collect fisheries resources and ‘management rights’ i.e.
accountability of the rights holders to steward and ensure effective
management of the fisheries to achieve sustainability.
This paper builds on the initial work by the RBFM Interest Group in
Indonesia to further investigate the historical efficacy of petuanan laut,
sasi laut and other traditional fisheries management practices and con­
siders how they may be transformed to meet the challenges of modern
fisheries management and allow their nationwide application
throughout Indonesian. A new form of these modernized traditional
fisheries management practices termed ‘territorial-based Fisheries
Management Rights’ was synthesized and proposed as a potential tool
3
Marine Policy 116 (2020) 103923
for small-scale fisheries management, especially for near-shore fisheries.
The information collected through a literature search, and interviews
with experts and practitioners, were triangulated during three work­
shops and focus group discussions of the ‘RBFM Interest group’ held in
Jakarta between August 2016 and January 2017 (see Appendix 1).
2. Methods
Qualitative research methods consisting of: (a) legal content anal­
ysis, (b) literature review, and (c) triangulation through expert focus
group discussions, were applied to evaluate the suitability of FMRs for
application to fisheries management in Indonesia. This evaluation was
used to develop and propose a new, contemporary form of petuanan laut
and sasi laut, which combines its traditional components with a modern
RBFM framework. The contents of laws on rights-based natural resource
management in Indonesia were analyzed, including the prominent ar­
ticles on Coastal Waters Commercial Use Right (Hak Pengusahaan Per­
airan Pesisir/HP-3) in Law No. 27/2007 on Coastal and Small Islands
Management annulled by the Constitutional Court in year 2011
(Table 1). Also, the contents of Law No.1/2014 concerning Amendment
of Law No. 27/2007 on Coastal and Small Islands Management were
examined to learn how it has responded to the annulation of the article
on HP-3 (see Table 1). Law No.5/1960 concerning the Basic Agrarian
Law (Peraturan Dasar Pokok-Pokok Agraria/PPA) was also analyzed as it
defines the Control State Right (Hak Menguasai Negara/HMN). The
Indonesian Constitution states that natural resources within the entire
Indonesian jurisdiction are owned by the Indonesian people. This col­
lective ownership is then delegated to the State to regulate their utili­
zation through the Control State Right. The literature on the
implementation of both rights-based traditional and modern coastal and
marine resources management practices in Indonesia were reviewed,
together with literature on RBFM elsewhere around the world. The re­
view was completed with a focus on identifying the lessons learned from
different applications and the weaknesses (failures) and strengths (suc­
cesses) of different approaches using territorial-based RBFM. A new
form of contemporary petuanan laut that enabled implementation of sasi
laut, termed territorial-based Fisheries Management Rights (territorial-
based FMRs) was then developed, building on the existing, relevant
traditional practices in Indonesia, enriched by contemporary science on
fisheries management. This concept was explored and refined further
through a series of expert focus group discussions involving government,
parliamentarians, academics, NGOs and practitioners, to further
develop the territorial-based FMRs concept to ensure that it was suitable
and applicable to Indonesian fisheries, especially small-scale, near-shore
fisheries.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. The legal and cultural context of RBFM in Indonesia
3.1.1. The presence of adat communities in Indonesia
Law No. 27/2007 on Coastal and Small Islands Management defines
three types of community living in the coastal areas of Indonesian
namely: (a) Adat community (masyarakat adat); (b) Local community
(masyarakat lokal), and (c) Traditional community (masyarakat tradi­
sional) (Table 1). This law defines an adat community as group or coastal
community that from generation to generation has been living in certain
geographical areas because of the presence of ancestral origin bonding,
strong relationship with coastal and small-island resources, and exis­
tence of values system that defines economic, politic, social and law
undertaking. (“Masyarakat adat adalah kelompok masyarakat pesisir yang
secara turun-temurun bermukim di wilayah geografis tertentu karena adanya
ikatan pada asal-usul leluhur, adanya hubungan yang kuat dengan sum­
berdaya pesisir dan pulau-pulau kecil, serta adanya sistem nilai yang
menentukan pranata ekonomi, politik, sosial, dan hukum”). An Adat com­
munity is therefore differentiated from other communities in the coastal
A. Halim et al.
Table 1
National legislation and their articles that are related to fisheries management
rights and recognition of coastal resource utilizations practices based on tradi­
tional (adat) rights in Indonesia (see also Ross et al. [34]).
Law Articles and Description
Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar Article 18B(2): The state recognizes and
1945) respects traditional communities along
with their traditional customary rights
as long as these remain in existence and
are in accordance with the societal
development and the principles of the
Unitary State of the Republic of
Indonesia, and shall be regulated by
law. (“Negara mengakui dan menghormati
kesatuan-kesatuan masyarakat hukum
adat beserta hak-hak tradisionalnya
sepanjang masih hidup dan sesuai dengan
perkembangan masyarakat dan prinsip
Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia yang
diatur dalam undang-undang”).
Article 28I(3): The cultural identities
and rights of traditional communities
shall be respected in accordance with
the development of times and
civilizations (“Identitas budaya dan hak
masyarakat tradisional dihormati selaras
dengan perkembangan zaman dan
peradaban”)
Law No.5/1960 concerning the Basic Article 47(2): Rights of using water and
Agrarian Law (Peraturan Dasar Pokok- breeding and catching fish shall be
Pokok Agraria/PPA) regulated by Government Regulation
(“hak guna-air serta pemeliharaan dan
penangkapan ikan diatur dengan
Peraturan Pemerintah”)
Law No.27/2007 concerning Coastal and This law introduces coastal waters
Small Islands Management commercial use right (Hak Pengusahaan
Perairan Pesisir/HP-3) as a mechanism
to utilize natural resources in the coastal
areas and small islands as described in
articles: 1(18), 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21,
22, 23(4)(5), 50, 51, 60(1) 71 and 75.
All these articles were annulled by the
Constitutional Courts in 2011 (see
section 3.1.2).
Article 61(1): Government recognizes,
respects and protects the rights of adat
communities, traditional communities
and the local wisdom in coastal and
small islands areas that have been
utilized for generations; (“Pemerintah
mengakui, menghormati, dan melindungi
hak-hak Masyarakat Adat, Masyarakat
Tradisional, dan Kearifan Lokal atas
Wilayah Pesisir dan Pulau-Pulau Kecil
yang telah dimanfaatkan secara turun-
temurun”).
Article 61(2): Recognition of adat
communities, traditional communities,
and local wisdom as stated at sub-article
(1) used as reference in sustainable
management of coastal areas and small
islands (“Pengakuan hak-hak Masyarakat
Adat, Masyarakat Tradisional, dan
Kearifan Lokal sebagaimana dimaksud
pada ayat (1) dijadikan acuan dalam
Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan Pulau-
Pulau Kecil yang berkelanjutan”)
Law No.1/2014 concerning Amendment This law amended the articles on coastal
of Law No. 27/2007 concerning Coastal waters commercial use right (Hak
and Small Islands Management Pengusahaan Perairan Pesisir/HP-3) as
introduced by law No.27/2007
concerning Coastal and Small Islands
Management. The coastal waters
commercial use right as described under
articles mentioned above was replaced
with license/permit system described in
articles: 1(18)(18A), 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
4
Table 1 (continued )
Law
Ministry of Internal Affairs Regulation
No.52/2014 concerning Guideline of
Acknowledgement and Protection of
Adat Law Community
Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries
Regulation No. 8/PERMEN-KP/2018
concerning Procedure for Declaration
of Management Area of Adat
Community in Spatial Utilization of
Coastal and Small Island
Marine Policy 116 (2020) 103923
Articles and Description
21, 22, 22A, 22B, 22C, 23, 50, 51, 60,
71, 75 of this law No.1/2014 (see
section 3.1.2).
Article 19(1): Each person conducting
coastal water and small islands resource
utilization for activities: (a) salt
production, (b) marine bio-
pharmacology, (c) marine
biotechnology, (d) sea waters utilization
other than energy harvest, (e) marine
tourism, (f) installation of underwater
pipes and cables, (g) removal of sinking
ship cargo, is required to obtain
management permit (“setiap orang yang
melakukan pemanfaatan sumber daya
perairan pesisir dan perairan pulau-pulau
kecil untuk kegiatan: (a) produksi garam,
(b) biofarmakologi laut, (c) bioteknologi
laut, (d) pemanfaatan air laut selain
energi, (e) wisata bahari, (f) pemasangan
pipa dan kabel bawah laut, (g)
pengangkatan benda muatan kapal
tenggelam, wajib memiliki izin
pengelolaan”).
Article 19(2): Management permit for
activities other than those referred to in
paragraph (1) shall be provided in
accordance with the provisions of the
legislation. (“izin pengelolaan untuk
kegiatan selain sebagaimana dimaksud
pada ayat (1) diberikan sesuai dengan
ketentuan peraturan perundang-
undangan”).
Article 19(3): In the event of resource
utilization activities of coastal and
small-islands waters that have not been
regulated by the provisions referred to
in paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) is
regulated through Government
Regulation (“dalam hal terdapat kegiatan
pemanfaatan sumber daya perairan pesisir
dan perairan pulau-pulau kecil yang belum
diatur berdasarkan ketentuan
sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) dan
ayat (2) diatur dengan Peraturan
Pemerintah”).
This regulation describes the
procedures for acknowledgement and
protection of an adat law community.
Article 2: Governor and head of district/
mayor carry out acknowledgement and
protection of adat law community
(“Gubernur dan bupati/walikota
melakukan pengakuan dan perlindungan
masyarakat hukum adat”).
Article 4: Acknowledgement and
protection as mentioned in Article 2 is
conducted through the following steps:
(a) identification of adat law
community, (b) verification and
validation of adat law community, and
(c) establishment of adat law
community (“pengakuan dan
perlindungan sebagaimana dimaksud
dalam Pasal 2 dilakukan melalui tahapan:
(a) identifikasi Masyarakat Hukum Adat;
(b) verifikasi dan validasi Masyarakat
Hukum Adat; dan (c) penetapan
Masyarakat Hukum Adat”).
This regulations describes procedures to
secure the spatial areas in the coastal
and small-islands belonging to adat law
community into various government
zoning (development) plan documents
in the coastal areas namely: Coastal and
small-islands zoning plan (Rencana
(continued on next page)
A. Halim et al. Marine Policy 116 (2020) 103923

Table 1 (continued ) Table 2

Law Articles and Description
A summary of the 12 adat law communities (Masyarakat Hukum Adat/MHA) in
coastal and small-islands of Indonesia that have been recently recognized by the
zonasi wilayah pesisir dan pulau-pulau government of Indonesia with varying degrees of adat practices in natural
kecil/RZWP-3K), National strategic
resource management [35; pers. com with Tely Dasaluti of MMAF, August
areas zoning plan (Rencana zonasi
2019]. Note – not all adat law communities listed below practice communal
kawasan strategis nasional/RZ KSN),
Special national strategic areas zoning
tenure claim.
plan (Rencana zonasi kawasan strategis Name of adat law Area of locality Location Legal recognition
nasional tertentu/RZ KSNT), and Inter- community (district/city (decrees)
region zoning plan (Rencana zonasi and province)
antar wilayah)
1) MHA Pulau Siompu island of South Buton Head of South
Siompu Siompu sub- district of Buton District
district. Southeast Regulation No.24
and small-island areas by the presence/proof of adat institutions, adat
Sulawesi Year 2017,
(customary) laws in the community and the nature of their relationship province concerning
with the natural resources. Government, through the Ministry of Marine Protection and
Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF) in collaboration with local governments management of
and NGOs is currently mapping all existing adat communities in coastal marine resources
based on local
and small-islands of Indonesia and assisting them to obtain a formal wisdoms within
government recognition through the head of district (bupati) or the head Siompu island of
of city (walikota) decrees (pers. comm. with Tely Dasaluti of MMAF, south Buton
August 2019). The adat community that has been acknowledged district.
2) MHA Kadiye South Wangi- Wakatobi Head of Wakatobi
through the head of district or head of city decree, in accordance with
Liya Wangi sub-district district of District Regulation
Ministry of Internal Affairs Regulation No.52/2014 concerning Guide­ Southeast No. 40 Year 2017,
line of Acknowledgement and Protection of Adat Law Community, is Sulawesi concerning
termed as an adat law community (masyarakat hukum adat/MHA). As of province Protection and
today, twelve adat communities have obtained formal recognition from management of
coastal and marine
the Indonesian government as adat law communities (see Table 2; resources based on
Fig. 1.). Kadie Liya adat
community of
3.1.2. The practices of customary marine tenure in Indonesia south Wangi-Wangi
sub-district of
The term customary marine tenure refers to social processes and
Wakatobi disctrict.
activities used to uphold control over territory and access to marine 3) MHA Wabula Wabula sub-district Buton district Head of Buton
resources by an institution that has continuous links with the past, as it of Southeast District Regulation
adapts to handling contemporary issues adopted from Hviding and Sulawesi No.13 Year 2018
Ruddle [36]. These customary practices are widely observed throughout province concerning
Recognition and
the coastal areas of Indonesia. In general, they could be categorized into
protection of
two main groups: practices that only recognize the control over access to Wabula adat
marine resources; and those that recognize both control over access to community on
resources and defined territory in the sea [27,30,32]. The control of marine resource
management based
access only practices allows those who live outside their communities (i.
on adat law.
e. people who live outside the area with no connection to communi­ 4) MHA Kakorotan Kakorotan village Kepulauan Head of Kepulauan
ty/outsiders) to access marine resources (e.g. fishing or collecting of Nanusa sub- Talaud Talaud District
benthic and sedentary animals), as long as they comply with the rul­ district district, North Regulation No.36
ings/local customary practices on fishing gears and practices defined by Sulawesi Year 2017
province concerning
the local community leaders. Access control practices are found in Aceh
Protection and
province (known as panglima laot/sea commander), in West Nusa management of
Tenggara province (awig-awig/rules), and North Sulawesi province marine resources
(mane’e/mannami/weaving coconut leaves) (Fig. 1). based on local
wisdoms within the
Panglima laot refers to the incorporation of traditional wisdom in
adat law areas of
coastal resource management, a practice by that the people of Aceh have Kakorotan village,
used since the era of the Sultanate of Iskandar Muda (1607–1636) [31, Nanusa sub-district
37]. The term “panglima laot” refers to both the name of the organization of Kepulauan
and the title of the elder fishers who lead the organization. This insti­ Talaud district.
5) MHA Pulau Negeri Haruku of Central Head of Central
tution consists of a loose network of local fisher associations with a set of
Haruku Haruku island sub- Maluku Maluku District
rules and regulations. Historically, panglima laot was a formal institution district district of Regulation No.81
established under the Sultanate of Aceh (Kesultanan Aceh) [31,37,38]. Maluku Year 2017,
The Sultan is obliged to ensure that marine resources under his Sultanate province concerning Adat
law and local
are utilized in a way that increase the prosperity of his subjects. The
wisdoms on
Sultan then instructs his Ulee-Balang (equivalent to the head of district) management and
to declare sea adat law and assign a panglima laot to fulfil the obligation protection of
above [37]. This sea adat law mainly regulates the utilization of fish marine resources of
resources, including fishing time, placement of fish aggregating devices, Negeri Haruku of
Haruku Island sub-
and the use of allowable fishing gears [37]. The regulation also includes
district.
the mechanism to settle conflicts and sanctions for violations of the 6) MHA Kataloka Seram Bagian Head of Seram
regulations. In this tradition, there is no communal claim over an Timur district Bagian Timur
ownership of resources as they believe that God creates natural (continued on next page)

5
A. Halim et al. Marine Policy 116 (2020) 103923

Table 2 (continued ) Table 2 (continued )

Name of adat law Area of locality Location Legal recognition Name of adat law Area of locality Location Legal recognition
community (district/city (decrees) community (district/city (decrees)
and province) and province)

Negeri Kataloka of of Maluku District Regulation natural resources

Pulau Gorom sub- province No.16 Year 2018 based on Petuanan
district concerning Arguni,
Recognition and Petuanan Wertuar
protection and and Pik Pik Sekar
management of adat laws of
coastal and marine village/island of
resources Arguni and Ugar,
management based Distrik Arguni dan
on Negeri Kataloka Distrik Kokas of Fak
adat community of Fak district.
Seram Bagian 12) MHA Pulau Owi village of Biak Numfor Head of Biak
Timur district. Owi dan MHA Distrik Biak Timur district of Numfor District
7) MHA Tanimbar Tanimbar Kei Maluku Head of Maluku Pulau Auki and Auki village of Papua Regulation No.34
Kei village of Kei Kecil Tenggara Tenggara District Distrik Padaido province Year 2018
Barat sub-district district of Regulation No.166 concerning
Maluku Year 2018 Protection and
province concerning management of
Protection and coastal and marine
management of resources based on
coastal and marine Pulau Owi dan
resources based on Pulau Auki adat
Tanebar Evav communities of
(Tanimbar Kei) Biak Numfor
adat community of district.
Kei Kecil Barat sub-
district of Maluku
Tenggara district. resources equally for all human beings (pers. comm. with the elders of
8) MHA Pulau Mangur Niela Tual city, of Head of Tual City panglima laot, in Aceh, January 2017). Similar practices and norms are
Mangur dan village, Kur Selatan Maluku Regulation No. 43
MHA Pulau sub-district and province Year 2017,
also observed in Bali and Lombok of West Nusa Tenggara, known as
Kaimear Kaimear village, concerning Adat awig-awig and in North Sulawesi, known as mane’e, where local com­
Pulau-Pulau Kur law and local munities initiate and establish rules and mechanisms for coastal
sub-district wisdoms on resource utilization through the local adat systems. Local organizations
management and
are then established and granted mandates to implement and enforce the
protection of
marine resources of rules and impose fines on violators.
Mangur island and Customary marine tenure practices that recognize control over ac­
Kaimear island of cess to resources and to certain territories on the coastal areas (known as
Tual city. petuanan laut), are found in Maluku islands, West Papua and their sur­
9) MHA Kampung Sorong Head of Sorong
Malaumkarta Malaumkarta, district of District Regulation
rounding areas (Fig. 1, Table 2) where “outsiders” are excluded from
Distrik Makbon West Papua No.7 Year 2017, access to marine resource, unless they have gained access permission to
province concerning Adat utilize marine resources from the local community. This communal
law and local ownership concept does not imply a free-for-all and open access to those
wisdoms on
traditional communities (i.e. the resources are not common property as
management and
protection of defined by Hardin [39], but are subject to cultural values related to the
marine resources at proper utilization of natural resources [32]. It means that a social group
kampong claims ownership of the resources, and therefore excludes others, and
Malaumkarta, that among the owning groups, there are rules and norms that regulate
Makbon, district of
Sorong.
who may utilize particular resources and how, when, and where the
10) MHA Werur Distrik Bikar of Tambrauw Head of Tambrauw resources are utilized [21,29,32,40,41]. The existence of communal
Tambrauw district district of District Regulation property rights not only suggests that individual self-interest does not
West Papua No.12 Year 2019 necessarily dominate natural resource use in traditional communities,
province concerning
but that such communities have the ability to work together to create
Recognition and
protection of Werur institutions, rules and norms, which function to avoid the ‘tragedy of the
Distrik Bikar adat commons’. Such forms of communal ownership sustain the equal dis­
community on tribution of the resources among the community members [32,41].
coastal and marine This petuanan laut concept has enabled the communal owners of
resource
management based
coastal areas in the Maluku region (Fig. 1) to control and manage the
on adat law at utilization of coastal and marine resources in accordance with the
Tambrauw district. established communal rules and norms [27,32,38,41]. The possessor(s)
11) MHA Arguni, Distrik Arguni and Fak Fak Head of Fak Fak of the rights can range from a particular segment of a fam (clan), a
MHA Wertuar Distrik Kokas of Fak district of District Regulation
settlement unit (a sub-village), village, federation of villages, up until
dan MHA Pik Fak district West Papua No.4 Year 2019
Pik Sekar province concerning the whole ethnic group across distinct ethnical group boundaries. The
Recognition and control over sea territory by the holder of the petuanan laut is recognized
protection and and adhered to within the society, which makes that particular territory
management of the property right of the holders [30,32,38]. That property right is
coastal and marine
strengthened by the fact that the holder can transfer the ownership of

6
A. Halim et al.
the rights through various means of agreements and/or contracts to
another individual and/or entities outside the community [30,32,38]. In
this society, all community members belonging to the communal group
that holds the property rights are recognized as having use rights
(known as hak makan ¼ right to eat) over the resources [30,32,38].
Therefore, they have rights to utilize natural resources within the
petuanan laut areas in accordance with the communal rules and norms
applied in that particular society.
The strong recognition of petuanan laut within these societies has
enabled and facilitated the successful implementation of sasi laut, a
traditional measure to control the exploitation of marine resources
within their petuanan laut areas. To implement sasi means to declare
prohibitions on harvest, capture or illegal taking of certain natural re­
sources (both on land and in the sea waters) of economic or subsistence
value to the community [27–29,32,38,42]. In marine areas, sasi laut has
been applied mostly for sedentary species such as top shell (Tectus [ ¼
Trochus] niloticus), green snail (Turbo marmoratus), sea cucumber (Hol­
othuroidea) and a limited number of coastal finfish species, such as
engraulids (Thrissina baelama), locally known as lompa [29,42].
3.1.3. Coastal waters commercial use rights (Hak Pengusahaan Perairan
Pesisir/HP-3)
In 2007, the Indonesian government enacted Law No. 27/2007 on
Coastal and Small Islands Management, which introduced a Coastal
Waters Commercial Use Right (Hak Pengusahaan Perairan Pesisir/HP-3) –
the right to use coastal and/or marine resources in coastal and marine
waters up to 12 nautical miles (nm) from the shoreline (Table 1). It was a
right available to an individual, adat communities, and legal entities
such as marine enterprises, fisheries and other enterprises for activities
on the surface of the water, in the water column and on the sea bed along
the coastline and in coastal waters [43]. It was not available in areas
specifically designated for conservation zones, fish sanctuaries, sea
transport lanes, harbors and beaches.
In 2011, the Constitutional Court determined that the HP-3 was
invalid, as it was considered to conflict with article 33(3) of the
Constitution. This article states that: ‘The land and water and the natural
resources contained therein shall be controlled by the state and shall be
used for the greatest prosperity of the people” (Bumi dan air dan
kekayaan alam yang terkandung di dalamnya dikuasai oleh Negara dan
dipergunakan untuk sebesar-besar kemakmuran rakyat). The Court
concluded that the HP-3 would lead to the parceling (pengkaplingan) of
coastal areas, creating areas of private ownership in the hands of in­
dividuals, legal entities and certain communities. The Court also found
that the provisions establishing the HP-3 resulted in the state relin­
quishing its constitutional obligation ‘to control’ (Table 1) and that the
arrangements establishing the HP-3 did not support ‘the greatest pros­
perity of the people’. Hence, it appears as though the Court concluded
that the rights under the HP-3 instrument were private property rights
[43].
The Court might not have considered that the HP-3 would also be
applied to adat communities because if so, HP-3 would not have been a
private property right but more in the form of a communal property
right [43]. Communal property rights (ownership) have been applied in
many parts of Indonesia for centuries, as illustrated by the concept of
petuanan laut, described earlier in the Maluku Islands and its sur­
rounding areas. Therefore, the decision of the court to annul the HP-3
does not directly relate to communal property rights [43].
The implication of this Court decision is that the introduction of any
new rights-based instrument in natural resource management by the
Indonesian government requires three attributes [43]: (a) the new in­
strument must not alienate governments from their obligation to control
the use of land, water and the natural resources, (b) adequate provisions
and mechanisms are present to guarantee, protect and fulfill the existing
rights of local communities and ensure that traditional rights for the use
of natural resources are respected, and (c) it works for the greatest
prosperity of the people. Waddell [43] described five minimum
7
Marine Policy 116 (2020) 103923
requirements of the new instrument as:
1. It does not limit access by local communities to resources or work
opportunities;
2. It does not benefit those with access to capital and technology to the
detriment of those who, on average, have limited education and
access to capital;
3. It will not lead to a concentration of resources in the hands of the
private sector;
4. It will not discriminate against local communities (directly or indi­
rectly); and
5. It does not reduce the level of participation by the community in
determining natural resources use.
Following the annulment of the articles on HP-3 above, Law No. 27/
2007 on Coastal and Small Islands Management was then amended by
Law No.1/2014 concerning Amendment of Law No. 27/2007 on Coastal
and Small Islands Management (Table 1). In this amendment the HP-3
arrangement was replaced with a licensing (permit) mechanism
known as ‘location permit’ (izin lokasi). Article 16 (1) of Law No.1/2014
above stated that “any person who conducts utilization of an area
(location) portion of coastal waters and utilization of a portion of small
islands on a permanent basis, must have location permit (“setiap orang
yang melakukan pemanfaatan ruang dari sebagian Perairan Pesisir dan
pemanfaatan sebagian pulau-pulau kecil secara menetap wajib memiliki Izin
Lokasi”). Further, it is stated in Article 16 (2) that the location permit is
the basis for issuance of the management permit. This means that a
location permit is intended to ‘secure’ the area only, but in order to
utilize the natural resources within that secured area, the person/body
should apply for a management permit (izin pengelolaan). These location
and management permits seem to be the equivalent manifestation of the
secure and exclusive aspects of the RBFM principles. However, the type
of natural resource utilization activities that are the subject of this law
do not include capture fisheries (fisheries resource utilization). The
types of resource utilization regulated through this law, as stated in
Article 19 include: (a) salt production, (b) marine bio-pharmacology, (c)
marine bio-technology, (d) utilization of sea water other than for energy
source, (e) marine tourism, (f) installation of underwater cables and
pipes, and/or (g) removal of cargo from sinking ships.
The lessons from the annulment of HP-3 are relevant for any attempt
to introduce rights-based fisheries management (RBFM) in Indonesia, as
it shows that the State (Central Indonesian Government) must maintain
a level of control over the use of natural resources, such as that through a
licensing mechanism. This paradigm of Control State Right (Hak Men­
guasai Negara), as applied in Indonesia, is described in further detail
below.
In addition, this Law No. 27/2007 on Coastal and Small Islands
Management, including its amendment Law No.1/2014, provides the
legal basis for provincial governments to develop marine and coastal
zoning (spatial) planning within the ocean, coastal zones and small
islands of their jurisdictions. Currently, ~24 provincial governments,
including those of Southeast Sulawesi, Maluku, North Maluku and West
Papua provinces have completed their marine and coastal areas zoning
plans. These plans will guide their future policies concerning spatial
allocation and utilization of their ocean, coastal and small islands areas.
In provinces where adat law communities existed, such as those in
Maluku and West Papua, their communal territorial ownerships are
well-recognized and adopted into these coastal area zoning planning
documents. In general, provincial governments recognizes the needs to
support the economic activities of small-scale fishers, as reflected in
zoning plans that prioritize setting aside areas near shore, especially for
fishing-related activities of small-scale fishers.
3.1.4. The Control State Right as introduced by the Indonesian Basic
Agrarian Law
Article 33(3) of the Indonesian Constitution mentioned earlier
A. Halim et al.
implies that the entire natural resources within the Indonesian juris­
diction are owned by the Indonesian people [44]. Article 9 of Law
No.5/1960, concerning the Basic Agrarian Law (Peraturan Dasar
Pokok-Pokok Agraria/PPA), further emphasizes that only Indonesian
citizens may have the relationship with the earth, water and air space.
As described by article 2(1) of Law No. 5/1960, the earth, water and air
space including natural resources contained in it, is controlled by the
State as an organization representing the people’s authority. As
described under Article 2(2) of Law No.5/1960, the right for the State to
control (natural resources) confers the authority to:
1. Regulate and administer the allocation, use, supply, and mainte­
nance of the earth, water, and airspace;
2. Determine and regulate legal relationships between people and the
earth, water, and airspace; and
3. Determine and regulate legal relationships among people as well as
legal acts concerning the earth, water, and airspace.
In practice, based on Article 2(4) of Law No.5/1960, the right of
control by the State can be delegated to local governments and adat and
traditional communities, for as long as necessary, provided it is not
against the national interest. This Article interprets the definition of
control by the State in Article 33 of the Constitution narrowly and
specifically as the central government. Thus, according to this law, only
the Central government determines policies regarding natural resources
through legislation, (including their utilization and management), while
Provincial and District governments develop the implementing policies
and regulations based on that legislation [44].
3.2. Examining rights-based fisheries management and the efficacy of sasi
laut
3.2.1. The conception of rights-based fisheries management
Rights-based fisheries management (RBFM) is often grouped into
two categories – area-based RBFM and catch quota-based RBFM [12,23,
25,40,45]. Area-based approaches allocate a secure, exclusive area of
the seafloor to participants (e.g., communities, fishing cooperatives) and
are also known as territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs) [12,25,46].
Area-based RBFM is mostly applied to regulate the use of sedentary
marine species such as abalone, sea cucumber, and shellfish (Tectus [ ¼
Trochus] niloticus) near shore [27,29,32,42,45,47]. Catch quota-based
RBFM establishes a catch limit, assigns shares of the catch to partici­
pants (e.g., individuals, communities, cooperatives) and holds each
participant accountable for staying within their limit [11,12,25,48].
These are sometimes called catch shares and include arrangements
through individual fishing quotas (IFQ), individual transferable quota
(ITQ), and community development quotas (CDQ) [11,12,48].
The concept of RBFM, especially quota-based RBFM, has been a long-
standing subject of discourse by experts and practitioners since the
early-1980s, when it was assumed, by some, that a “right to fish” (pre­
sumably a quota-based right such as an ITQ) was equivalent to an
ownership of fish still swimming (not yet caught) in the water [49,50].
This misconception has generated some opposition to RBFM because it
resulted in the framing of RBFM as privatization of public resources by
some authors [49,50]. Macinko and Bromley [49] found that the
concept of rights in fisheries systematically emphasized the introduction
of private property rights as the only necessary condition to solve the
global fisheries problem [49]. This argument seems to be based in large
part on the notion that fisheries resources are not owned and therefore
lack property rights [49], but in reality, they are owned by the State. The
inaccurate extension of “ownership” of a quota share (under RBFM) to
“ownership” of fish stocks (which are owned by the state under RBFM),
could mislead fisheries management policies and their governance to
achieve fisheries sustainability.
Under RBFM, property rights to the fish stock are not conferred;
rather, access privileges such as a right to a share of the allowable catch
8
Marine Policy 116 (2020) 103923
are conferred [11,12,23]. To avoid potential confusion around inter­
pretation of the word ‘rights’ compared to that of ‘property right’,
countries around the world have used different terms to describe
rights-based fisheries management including catch share, limited access,
access privileges and managed access, which are then each defined in
accordance with local social, legal and fisheries contexts.
Area-based management rights approaches or TURFs, have been
implemented by traditional coastal communities in the eastern and
western Pacific Ocean including the coastal waters of Brazil [51], Chile
[45,47], Mexico [52], Fiji, Samoa, Palau, Vanuatu [21,23,40], Japan
[53,54] and Indonesia [27,32] for centuries, with varying degrees of
success. Similar to successful TURFs in Indonesia, in Chile they have also
been reported as being successfully implemented for the management of
benthic and sedentary organisms such as loco (an abalone-like species of
snail, Concholepas concholepas), sea urchin (Loxechinus albus) and
seaweed (Gracilaria chilensis and Sarcothalia crispata) [45,47]. It should
be noted that in recent years, illegal harvest and increased costs asso­
ciated with surveillance appears to have reduced the effectiveness of this
system [55]. Further, Johannes [40] identified success factors contrib­
uting to the rise of traditional management systems, including TURFs in
the Oceania region (i.e. countries such as Vanuatu, Samoa, Cook Islands,
Fiji, Palau, and Tuvalu). These include a growing perception of resource
scarcity, the revival of traditional village-based authority and marine
tenure through legal recognition and government support, better con­
servation education, and effective assistance and advice from regional
and national governments and NGOs.
Recently the practice of implementing TURFs has been advanced by
pairing TURFs with marine reserves [20,56]. TURFs are a management
approach that aligns fishers’ incentives with sustainability by allowing
TURF participants exclusive access to increased fish populations adja­
cent to the reserves, and marine reserves have been shown to be effective
for ecosystem protection and to some extent for fishery enhancement
[12,56,57]. In some cases, marine reserves have been established within
or adjacent to TURFs managed under one management plan, which
might be established as permanent no-take reserve or seasonal,
species-specific temporary reserve [56]. These paired TURFs-marine
reserves are currently established in Belize, Brazil, Chile, Fiji,
Vanuatu, Samoa, Japan, Mexico, the Philippines and Spain [56].
Recently, the establishment of TURFs seems to have facilitated the
expansion of the no-take reserve component of Belize’s MPA system
[58]. Nowadays, several modern TURFs paired with networks of marine
reserves have been established within and/or adjacent to marine
tenurial areas of adat communities in the Raja Ampat of West Papua
province to control access to fisheries resources through adat regulations
[59].
Although, the key attributes of RBFM are likely to differ from country
to country, two key attributes differentiate them from other fisheries
management tools, namely secure and exclusive access for the rights
holders [12,25,45]. The security of the right derives from tenure dura­
tions that are long enough for participants to capture the benefits of their
stewardship activities. Exclusivity refers to the fact that only eligible
fishery participants can access the resource. In effective RBFM systems,
these two attributes are clearly recognized and enforceable under the
law [25].
3.2.2. Strengths and weaknesses of sasi laut in Indonesia
The origin of the word sasi in Maluku and its surrounding areas
(Fig. 1) is unclear, but it has been consistently used to mean a ban on the
use of a specific piece of land, tree or sea during a certain period of time
[26]. Since its inception, sasi has continuously evolved and has always
been part of and/or shaped by the socio-political, cultural and religious
organization of rural society in Maluku [26]. Sasi has experienced sub­
stantial changes in the past centuries, so that it has evolved from “a
ritual protection of communal resources to a regime of agro-ecological
control of private and common resources regulated by government,
and from there to a largely commercialized and privatized means of theft
A. Halim et al. Marine Policy 116 (2020) 103923

prevention” (Table 3 [26]). Sanctions have also shifted from those based Table 3
on animistic beliefs and social sanction (e.g. public humiliation) to The perceived strengths of sasi laut practiced around Maluku islands from the
economic fines. However, the older practices and ideas have not dis­ lens of natural resource management in Indonesia (developed from Novaczek
appeared, but are less dominant and remain part of the sasi institution; et al. [28]). NGO ¼ non-government organization.
they could resurface again, if they once again become viewed as legiti­ Practice Strength Sources
mate and effective [26]. 1) Presence of customary The practice of customary von Benda-
Currently, sasi in Maluku is imposed on specific resources both on marine tenure rights marine tenure known as Beckmann et al. [26];
land (e.g. coconut and sago trees) and sea (e.g. top shell (Tectus [ ¼ (petuanan laut), respected petuanan laut Novaczek et al. [28];
Trochus] niloticus) and sea cucumber) to protect them from theft [26,27, by government and acknowledged traditional Adhuri [32];
communities community rights over Thorburn [60]
32]. Sasi might be declared through adat (traditional customs) or belief certain areas in the coasts
systems (e.g. sasi negeri) performed at sacred places in the villages and with distinct natural
religious rituals (e.g. church sasi, performed by the priest at church, and boundaries (such as reef
mosque sasi, performed by the imam at mosque). Therefore, sasi refers to edges, bays, etc.). It is
respected by government
a traditional and/or religious system of natural resource management
and communities and
that imposes temporal prohibitions on resource harvest on land and in provides the key enabling
the sea by protecting them from theft. Sasi also refers to a traditional condition for the adat
institution that regulates utilization of natural resources and the envi­ community to declare sasi
ronment [26]. Sasi laut (marine sasi) describes specific rules and regu­ laut.
2) Seasonal closure and Both sasi laut closing von Benda-
lations governing access to fishing areas, fishing gear, target species, and
opening of sasi laut are (prohibition placed in Beckmann et al. [26];
the time and location of harvests [27,42,60]. Sasi laut incorporates a set conducted through adat effect) and opening Novaczek et al. [28];
of institutional roles with varying degrees of influence wielded by rituals and/or religious (prohibition lifted) are Adhuri [32]; McLeod
traditional, religious and government authorities [32,42,61]. ceremonies. declared through adat et al. [42]; Thorburn
rituals and/or religious [60]
In Maluku, three key actors play important roles in the imple­
ceremonies lead by adat
mentation of sasi – the head of the village (under formal government and/or religious leaders.
structure), the local church/mosque and the kewang, a traditional The declarations take
institution established to execute the sasi. The kewang is an autonomous place in either sacred
institution that writes and enforces the sasi rules in association with the places in the village or
church/mosque. This has
traditional council of clan leaders. The enforcement activities by the
increased the compliance
kewang vary from village to village, e.g. relying only on reports from of community as it is
residents to those who are quite active and patrol to detect in­ perceived as directly
fringements (Table 3). In many instances, members of the community involving their ancestors
and God the Almighty.
believe that violations of sasi could lead to sanction by God that is more
3) Limit access to particular When sasi laut is in effect, Novaczek et al. [28];
compelling than sanctions imposed by the kewang [29]. coastal and marine no one is allowed to McLeod et al. [42]
The present status of sasi laut varies greatly from place to place resources that are harvest the particular
(Tables 3 and 4). In some localities such as the Kei islands (Fig. 1), most important to the resources (commonly:
villages have abandoned sasi, whereas those for example in Nolloth community and/or trochus and sea
susceptible to cucumber) that are the
village of Saparua Island of Maluku, sasi laut practices that were no
overexploitation due to subject of sasi laut. The
longer functioning and were lost, have been successfully revitalized their high economic time to close the sasi laut
(Table 3 [32]). In Tanimbar Kei Islands, sasi laut has been reported to be values. (usually when the animals
functioning well to regulate the utilization of top shell (Tectus [ ¼ Tro­ are still in their juvenile
stages) has been informed
chus] niloticus) [32,42,62], flying fish eggs and finfish through local
by their traditional
regulation of Ohoi Tanimbar Kei No.1/2013. This regulation specifies ecological knowledge
the methods for harvesting flying fish eggs, while local regulation of passed on from generation
Ohoi Tanimbar Kei No.2/2013 specifies the finfish fishing activities that to generation.
outside fishers are permitted to use by the local adat authority. In the 4) Perceived fair distribution When sasi laut is lifted, the Novaczek et al. [28];
of benefits of natural community members Adhuri [32]; McLeod
Padaido Islands of West Papua, the sasi local rules and norms have been
resources to communities jointly harvest the et al. [42]
adopted into formal local regulations through village regulation [63]. resources. This ensures
Sasi has been reported to be successfully applied to only a few sedentary that all community
marine species such as top shell (Tectus [ ¼ Trochus] niloticus) and sea members receive the
cucumber and did not address very well the needs for habitat protection benefits fairly. In places
where sasi laut works well,
and other potential sources of resource overexploitation ([29], Table 4). the yield is sold in the
The role of adat, religious and/or village leaders in the successful markets and the money
implementation of sasi is critically important as they legitimately from the sale is used for
inherited power and control over most of their traditional societies’ way village improvement.
5) Rules and/or norms of sasi Most traditional Novaczek et al. [28];
of life, including the authority to write the rules and norms of sasi. In this
laut are developed and regulations are not Harkes and Novaczek
traditional system, effective mechanisms to control the power exercised enforced through local codified. In Maluku, the [29]
by the leaders are rarely in place and/or very weak, which makes it very mechanisms. kewang – an adat
prone to ‘abuse of power’ (Table 4). Adhuri [32], reported that in Nol­ institution- supported by
loth village of Saparua Islands, the head of the village declared sasi laut NGOs writes sasi laut rules
and/or norms together
for top shell (Tectus [ ¼ Trochus] niloticus) due to increasing market with the clan leaders. The
demand and established ‘new’ rules of sasi laut. This new rule granted kewang is also responsible
village administration total control of the harvest when sasi laut was to for enforcing the rules at
be lifted, by hiring outsiders (non-community members) to harvest the sea, including imposing
sanctions for any
top shell. Although the head of village argued that all benefits from
violations of the rules.
selling the harvested top shell were to be allocated for the public good,
(continued on next page)
such as road and toilet constructions, community members questioned

9
A. Halim et al. Marine Policy 116 (2020) 103923

Table 3 (continued ) Table 4

Practice Strength Sources
The perceived weaknesses of sasi laut practiced around Maluku island from the
lens of natural resource management in Indonesia (developed from Novaczek
6) Participation of The kewang that enforce Novaczek et al. [28]; et al. [28]).
community members in sasi laut rules has both Harkes and Novaczek
reporting violations. financial and human [29] Practice Weaknesses References
resource limitations for 1) Poor leadership of sasi Sasi is part of an adat rituals Novaczek et al.
patrolling the area institutions therefore, its efficacy is [28]; Adhuri
regularly. In many highly defined by the quality [32]; McLeod
instances, they rely of the adat institutions and et al. [42]
mostly on reports from their leadership. It has been
community members of reported that often, the sasi
any violations that they leadership (elite) have
may have observed. misused sasi laut to extract
7) Continue socialization of The communities are Novaczek et al. [28]; marine resources for their
the presence of sasi laut continuously reminded Adhuri [32]; McLeod own benefit (elite capture of
and their rules and and made aware et al. [42] the resource). Also,
sanctions to residents especially when sasi laut is sanctions for sasi laut
in effect, through various violation that are supposed
means, including placing to go for village
signs of sasi laut in the improvements or other
waters. community related
8) Respected roles/norms of The established roles and/ Novaczek et al. [28]; programs have been
all institutions involved or norms of formal and McLeod et al. [42] reported to be used for the
informal institutions (i.e. personal needs of the sasi
village as defined under institution leaders.
formal government law, 2) Conflict over sasi Although sasi laut is an adat Novaczek et al.
kewang, adat, and leadership ritual, it is applied to natural [28]; Adhuri [32]
religious institutions) in resources whose
relation to management authority has
implementation of sasi also been defined through
laut are respected. formal law of the Republic of
9) Manifestation of the local The sasi laut is the von Benda- Indonesia. The potential
customs to steward manifestation of adat Beckmann et al. [26]; (latent) conflicts, for
communal resources practices to protect Novaczek et al. [28] example among adat
communal resources, in- institution, religious
line with contemporary institutions and village
principles of sustainable institution (i.e. village as
resource use: e.g. sasi laut defined under formal
applied for sea cucumber, Indonesian law), over sasi
was observed to protect laut institution and
the collection of juveniles leadership is real and has
until they grow large been reported to occur in
enough to reach maturity, some places in Maluku.
before they are declared 3) Changes of village In a case where sasi laut is Novaczek et al.
to be open for harvest. administrative boundaries instituted through a formal [28]; Adhuri [32]
10) Sasi practice is resilient Sasi, including sasi laut von Benda- government village
and adapts to changes in practices has proven Beckmann et al. [26]; institution, changes in
resource use and resilient and capable of Novaczek et al. [28]; village administrative
customary practices adapting to changes of Harkes and Novaczek boundaries, as a result of
traditions, norms, etc. in [29]; Adhuri [32] village expansion and/or
the villages for centuries. merging, affect the efficacy
Sasi laut for example was of sasi laut. For example, the
once reported lost in whole sasi area may no
Nolloth village of Saparua longer be within the control
Island of Maluku, but later of one village and/or that
successfully revitalized. village now includes more
communities into the sasi
rituals.
the financial transparency and whether the benefits were truly allocated 4) Unsuccessful mediation of Conflicts over land rights Novaczek et al.
to the community. For these reasons, some scholars have questioned the land rights conflicts that have arisen partly due [28]
conservation and equity aspects attached to the tradition of sasi laut, and to changes of village
administrative boundaries.
argued that its proponents have tended to ignore or downplay the
Mediation of this conflict has
adverse impacts of the sasi practice [61]. proven to be difficult and
this has affected the
community compliance over
3.3. Harmonization of key terminologies sasi rules and norms.
5) Socio-cultural influences Nowadays, communities Novaczek et al.
Rights-based fisheries management (RBFM) is a term used to from outside the including those in Maluku, [28]; Harkes and
communities that do not have become more Novaczek [29]
describe an approach to fishery management that focuses on the rights
support adat (sasi laut) heterogeneous due to influx
(along with responsibilities) held by individuals, communities, com­ practices of people from outside. In
panies and government [64]. The key elements of ‘rights’ in RBFM this new society, some
therefore relates to access to, and taking/harvesting and management of introduced new values
the fishery, which involve use rights and management rights [64]. As brought by the migrant
people might not always
further described by Charles [64], use rights consisted of access rights conform with the
that relates to participation in the fishery and quantitative withdrawal
(continued on next page)
rights, pertaining to the amount of fishing effort or taking of a specific

10
A. Halim et al.
Table 4 (continued )
Practice Weaknesses References
implementation of sasi laut
practices. In more
heterogeneous communities,
sasi laut practices have been
reported to be significantly
degraded.
6) Lack of alternative income Maluku islands are well- Novaczek et al.
generation for local known globally as the Spice [28]; Harkes and
communities Islands, and most local Novaczek [29]
people’s livelihoods have
been derived from nutmeg
and cloves plantations. The
collapse of clove prices has
forced more local people to
look for other sources of
income, mainly from fishing.
catch. One of the main conclusions from the series of discussions con­
ducted by the ‘RBFM Interest group’ was that in the context of fisheries
management in Indonesia, the term Fisheries Management Right/FMR
(hak pengelolaan perikanan/HPP) is suitable, specific and thought to be
more acceptable than Rights-Based Fisheries Management (RBFM). This
conclusion was based on two main reasons: (a) mandate of Law
No.5/1960 concerning Basic Agrarian Law (Peraturan Dasar
Pokok-Pokok Agraria), Article 47(2) that requested the Indonesian gov­
ernment to develop a government regulation on rights of using water
and breeding and catching fish (“hak guna-air serta pemeliharaan dan
penangkapan ikan diatur dengan Peraturan Pemerintah”), and (b) the FMRs
term also emphasizes aspects of resource stewardship and the need for
fishery sustainable management, rather than only the rights to use and
harvest the fish resources.
The literature on RBFM has a diversity of descriptions of this term,
including the two major categories of RBFM, area-based and catch
quota-based, described earlier. The term area-based RBFM refers to
territorial use rights in fisheries that mainly include, but are not limited
to, practices that have been practiced for centuries, governed through
traditional rules and regulations as informed by traditional ecological
knowledge, such as customary marine/sea tenure in the Pacific and
Oceania (see Refs. [23,24,40]). The term catch quota-based RBFM refers
to a more recent fishing quota allocations as informed, among others, by
the results of fisheries stock assessments, mainly governed through
modern rules and regulations, including but not limited to individual
fishing quotas (IFQ), individual transferable quota (ITQ) and commu­
nity development quota (CDQ) (see Ref. [11,48]). Taking on the use
right system categorization introduced by Charles [64], each of these
RBFM categories could include both access and withdrawal rights, or
only individual and group access or withdrawal rights.
The terms petuanan laut and sasi laut are also differentiated in rela­
tion to their direct contributions to marine resource management.
Petuanan laut is a form of customary marine/sea tenure that recognizes
communal control over access to resources and to certain territories on
the coastal areas [27–30,32]. The members of the traditional commu­
nities are said to have hak makan (use rights) over the resources within
their communal claims [30,32]. Sasi laut, however, is a form of tradi­
tional practice (harvest strategy) that temporarily prohibits the harvest,
capture, or illegal taking of certain natural resources in the sea waters of
economic or subsistence value to the community. Therefore, from the
lens of marine resource management, both petuanan laut and sasi laut are
a perfect match and inseparable, where petuanan laut defines the access
rights (who has access to the resources) and sasi laut defines the harvest
rights (when, how and how much of the resources can be taken).
Petuanan laut without sasi laut will influence the sustainability of the
resource, as every member of the community can get into the ‘race to
fish’, whereas sasi laut will not function without petuanan laut as people
from outside the traditional community can rush to over-exploit the
11
Marine Policy 116 (2020) 103923
resources, as they are not subject to traditional values of the local adat
community. As described earlier, the combination of petuanan laut and
sasi laut would form a functional Territorial Use Rights in Fishing
(TURFs).
3.4. Compatibility of rights-based fisheries management with petuanan
laut and sasi laut
Territorial Use Rights for Fishing (TURFs) appear to be compatible
with the practice of petuanan laut and its traditional management mea­
sure sasi laut. As described by Christy [46], TURFs govern territories on
the surface, the bottom, or the entire water column within a specified
area. The size of the territory may vary depending on the target species
and the geography of the area, but it should be sufficient to ensure that
the value of the use within the area does not diminish because of
exploitation outside the TURF. The TURFs must be identifiable with
clear boundaries so that they are protected and defendable by laws of the
country [46]. Territorial user rights in fisheries provide interesting op­
portunities for dealing with two major aspects of fisheries management –
the efficient production of net benefits from fisheries and the equitable
distribution of benefits. Therefore, the adoption of TURFs as a means for
fisheries management seems desirable [46]. Empirical evidence suggests
that TURFs can result in effective fisheries management if they are
designed and implemented well [21,28,55,60,65–69].
Territorial user rights in fisheries, as a form of RBFM, and both
petuanan laut and sasi laut practices have many things in common
(Table 5). The key attributes of RBFM – secure and exclusive rights – are
compatible with the enabling condition for sasi laut provided through
customary communal marine tenure (petuanan laut). An analysis of
various successful quota- and territorial-based RBFM practices around
the world (see Bonzon et al. [25]) revealed that their key attributes
shared lot of similarities with petuanan laut and sasi laut practices (see
Table 5). In general, contemporary RBFM is established via a formal
management planning process, while sasi laut practice is created through
adat rituals, religious ceremonies, and/or village declaration that is
accepted by government. In all cases, the roles of responsible parties are
clear and understood, but a high level of acceptance among participants
and communities is required for success and the system must be
culturally appropriate to the participants.
In general, there are many similarities between the recommended
best practices of successful RBFM and petuanan laut and sasi laut prac­
tices (Table 5). Several factors that would limit the effectiveness of
petuanan laut and sasi laut emerge from the above analysis, notably the
lack of contemporary fisheries management science and conservation
measures (#3,4,6, and 9 of Table 5), and the lack of formal legal
recognition of the exclusive access privilege (#1,2,5,7,8 and 10 of
Table 5) and the reliance on input controls (#9, Table 5). Modifying
these attributes of both petuanan laut and sasi laut could result in a more
effective, modern form of petuanan laut and its traditional management
measure sasi laut.
3.5. Transforming petuanan laut and sasi laut traditional management
measure into modern territorial-based fisheries management right
Sasi laut practice as enabled by petuanan laut, a form of territorial-
based RBFM, even with the limitations identified above, has proven to
some degree successful for regulating the utilization of sedentary marine
animals as described earlier [21,28,55,60,65–69]. Further descriptive
analysis indicated that the key attributes of petuanan laut and sasi laut
practices, especially security and exclusivity, are compatible with those
of a successful RBFM (Table 5). The main attributes limiting the effective
functioning of sasi laut as a potential harvest strategy for marine
resource management are mostly related to the need to incorporate
modern science on fisheries management, including for example
data-poor stock assessment methods [70–72], to better inform the har­
vest strategy (Table 5).
A. Halim et al.
Table 5
Descriptive analysis of the attributes of petuanan laut and sasi laut as they are
described against the key attributes of a successful Rights Based Fisheries
Management (RBFM) in Bonzon et al. [25].
Key attributes of
successful RBFM
1) Secure:
Tenure length of fishing
right
2) Exclusive:
Secure privilege
3) All sources:
The system includes all
sources of resource
mortality
4) Scaled: Management
unit at appropriate
biological level (i.e.
effective area of fish
stock), taking into
consideration social
and political contexts.
5) Accountable: Comply
with fishing rights
regulation on resource
use
6) Limited:
Fishing mortality
scientifically set to allow
for a long-term stable
population
7) Tradeable:
Fishing rights are
tradeable
8) Governable:
Management
institution, rules and
regulations, and
enforcement are in
place
9) Harvestable:
Harvest strategy defined
to achieve the goals
10) Resource ownership:
The defined state of
natural resource
ownership in the
particular area
Sasi laut shows promise as a suitable functioning harvest strategy,
especially for managing near-shore fisheries throughout Indonesia.
However, this traditional practice needs to be adapted to accommodate
science-based fisheries management and a more formal participatory
approach to ensure that it is capable of coping with challenges of the
present modern fisheries management. Through the discussions and
Marine Policy 116 (2020) 103923
workshops of the informal Indonesian RBFM Interest Group, six key
attributes of a new, modern petuanan laut and its traditional manage­
ment measure sasi laut in Indonesia emerged: (a) enabling conditions,
(b) utilization principle, (c) fisheries management technicality, (d)
Compatibility with Recommendations from institution, (e) rules development and (f) compliance and sanction
petuanan laut and sasi best practice for RBFM (Table 6). These key attributes were synthesized from the literature,
laut attributes (Bonzon et al. [25]
lessons learned from implementation of similar RBFM concepts in
Can operate for many Long enough to realize Indonesia and around the world, the lessons from Indonesian Constitu­
decades where it is future benefits tional Court decision on HP-3 as described earlier, and various inputs,
working as a customary (recommends at least 10
practice years)
suggestions and confirmation form the participants of focus group dis­
Communal claim of Assigned to an individual cussions and meetings organize by RBFM Interest group in Indonesia.
ownership (marine or group and defendable by The wider implementation of this form of traditional management sys­
tenure) through (formal) laws tem throughout Indonesian waters requires the preconditions of secure
informal (customary/
and exclusivity to utilize and sustainably manage the resources formally
adat) law; unclear
whether defendable by recognized in the law. These secure and exclusive utilization rights must
existing (formal) laws come with responsibilities to ensure that effective management will be
Informed by local and Informed by scientific in place, guided by local knowledge and contemporary fisheries sciences
traditional ecological process to include all or (Table 6). The tenure must be long enough to incentivize fishers and
knowledge and wisdom enough sources of
communities to steward the resources and enjoy the benefits from the
and includes adequate mortality, that benefits can
sources of resource be derived fisheries.
mortality to produce The above key attributes also ensure that governments maintain
local benefits sovereignty over fishery resources and the constitutional responsibility
Scaled to existing Scaled to a formal
to control and manage them for the benefit of the people (Table 6). It
community customary management unit and
area and informed by informed by conventional includes authority to grant management rights and responsibilities to
local traditional fisheries management fishers, communities, fishing associations and cooperatives, or other
ecological knowledge science entities after meeting certain designated conditions they set. This is
and wisdom
Strong and adequate Accountability and Table 6
enforcement to ensure enforcement are adequate The proposed new key attributes of modern petuanan laut and its traditional
compliance with rules. to ensure participants management measure sasi laut, a form of territorial-based fisheries management
Compliance may result follow the rules. rights, in Indonesia. These attributes represent a summary of the discussions and
from fear of
meetings of the informal Indonesian RBFM working group.
punishment from god
and ancestors. Key Attributes Description
Informed by local Informed by conventional
1) Enabling conditions
traditional ecological fisheries management and
Secure Tenure length of share is long enough for participants to
knowledge and wisdom scientific evidence
realize fisheries future benefits.
Exclusive Secure privileges are assigned to an entity (group or
community) and are clearly recognized and legally
Generally not preferred Varies depending on
defensible.
but can be traded with management design and
2) Utilization principle
the agreement of the economic, ecological and
Limited transferability Limited transferability is allowed, subject to the nation’s
‘owner’ of petuanan laut social goals
and each community’s laws and rules governing natural
Mostly traditional and Formal and/or informal
resource use and exchange.
religious institutions. institutions with rules,
Fair benefit Especially for near-shore fisheries, fishing allocation must
Rules are traditionally operating procedures and
distribution provide fair benefits to local people living in proximity to
written involving adat enforcement programs
the resources through their direct and/or indirect
and religious developed through
participation in fisheries management.
leaderships, enforced established authority.
3) Fisheries management technicality
by traditional
Use of science and Science, experimental knowledge and traditional
institutions that often
knowledge knowledge used to inform management goals and success
rely on reports of
indicators.
violations from
Management measures Consider various management measures including
community members
conservation and protected area designations, fish
Seasonal openings and A variety of rules may
sanctuaries or reserves, size limits etc.
closings (i.e. sasi laut) apply to manage harvest
Limit to access Access is limited through appropriate mechanisms in
are a key strategy and control fishing effort, e.
accordance with traditional management and the
g. seasonal openings and
characteristics of the target fisheries.
closings
4) Institution
Customary marine Usually common property
Management authority A management unit is established in accordance with
tenure (Common/ with use rights allocated by
geographical scale and complexity of the management, in-
communal property) the State
line with the institutionalization of Fisheries Management
acknowledged by the
Areas of Indonesia. Joint fisheries management (co-
State
management) should be encouraged.
5) Rules development
Inclusive approach Rules are developed jointly with relevant stakeholders.
6) Compliance and sanction
Tenure holder The tenure holder must comply with regulations and rules.
accountability including those on the defined catch limit.
Stakeholders Stakeholders should actively support the laws and
accountability enforcement of the rules.
Revocable Tenure may be revoked without compensation at any time
when violations of the terms are encountered.
12
A. Halim et al.
typically accomplished by granting a revocable license by the govern­
ment to use or manage fishery resources in a way that is exclusive,
secure and, in some cases, transferable (Table 6). This modernized
petuanan laut and sasi laut is not a stand-alone fisheries management
measure – it must be implemented as part of a comprehensive fishery
management plan for the Indonesian Fisheries Management Area (FMA)
developed through a transparent and inclusive process, guided by the
best available scientific information and local knowledge, including
effective measures to enforce accountability, and balancing use among
competing uses of marine resources.
3.6. Adopting modernized petuanan laut and its traditional management
measure sasi laut as a form of territorial-based fisheries management right
As stated earlier, Indonesia previously introduced the concept of
right-based natural resource management, known as Coastal Waters
Commercial Use Right (Hak Pengusahaan Perairan Pesisir/HP-3), but this
was annulled by the Constitutional Court in 2011. The failure of this
concept should inform the development of key attributes of modernized
petuanan laut and sasi laut, a form of territorial-based FMRs that prevent
the problems identified by the Constitutional Court. First, the Court
recognized that a licensing mechanism could be used to provide certain
management rights to licensees while ensuring sufficient control by the
state to comply with Constitutional requirements. Fisheries Manage­
ment Rights are essentially licenses under which the licensee obtains
certain harvesting opportunities provided that the licensee complies
with the duties and conditions established by the state and described in
the license. The state would retain authority to revoke a license for
failure to comply with its stated conditions. Secondly, FMRs can pre­
serve the rights of indigenous/traditional peoples by formally recog­
nizing their longstanding customs and backing those customs with
national enforcement. Other qualified entities could obtain licenses
upon request by meeting certain requirements through a public process
in which the views of other stakeholders would be considered. By pre­
serving customary traditions and making licensing decisions with public
input and based on objective standards, FMRs would ensure that marine
resources are used for the greatest prosperity of the people.
As described earlier, the key enabling legal foundation, or enabling
conditions for this modernized petuanan laut and sasi laut are secure and
exclusive access that, as a minimum, must both be explicitly recognized
in the law (Point 1, Table 6). The potential for social conflicts during the
implementation of this new FMR concept is very high, especially in areas
where there is no history of local traditions, similar to petuanan laut in
the Maluku Islands of eastern Indonesia. The recognition of these key
enabling attributes in the formal law (i.e. Indonesian Fisheries Law)
would provide a legal basis for enforcing FMRs and any violations could
be prosecuted through the formal judiciary system.
Finally, the scaling up of FMRs throughout Indonesian waters, might
be done through setting aside certain areas in the coasts or waters sur­
rounding small-islands allocated among others purposes for the imple­
mentation of FMRs. This spatial allocation process could be formally
conducted through the provincial coastal areas zoning planning mech­
anisms as described earlier.
4. Conclusions and recommendations
Modernized petuanan laut and its traditional management measure
sasi laut termed territorial-based Fisheries Management Rights (territo­
rial-based FMRs) is a promising tool for fisheries management in
Indonesia that could contribute to addressing the current major problem
of overfishing, especially for small-scale and near-shore fisheries. It
could be developed from the existing local/traditional practices,
enriched with contemporary science on fisheries management and
careful consideration of the ‘management rights’, learning from the
annulment of the Coastal Waters Commercial Use Right (Hak Pengusa­
haan Perairan Pesisir/HP-3) by the Constitutional Court in 2011. This
13
Marine Policy 116 (2020) 103923
tool must not be seen as a stand-alone management measure, but it
should be part of a large-scale fisheries management plan at the scale of
the Indonesian Fisheries Management Areas (FMA), a geographical unit
considered by the Indonesian government to achieve an effective man­
agement impacts at a broad scale.
The territorial-based FMRs should not be conceived of as a property
right, but rather as a privilege of exclusive spatial harvest rights to
groups or communities. They should only be granted by the government
authority after recipients have met clearly defined criteria and they need
to be revocable if these criteria are violated and/or not achieved. A set of
criteria/requirements as preconditions for granting the FMR privilege
must be developed before they are implemented and be informed by the
status (social, economy and ecological conditions) of the target fisheries.
The performance of FMR holders must be evaluated against changes in
the status/conditions of the fisheries. The nature of the fishing privilege
distinguishes FMRs from other fisheries management tools, i.e. rights
that are secure, exclusive and revocable, and legalized in law (e.g.
fisheries law) to ensure that the tenure granted to the holder is
defendable through the formal judiciary system.
The success of this approach is defined by key distinctive attributes of
exclusivity and security, meaning that access to resources is exclusive
and that it is secured for long-enough to allow fisheries resources to yield
ecological and economic benefits. It thus rewards natural resource
stewardship so that socio-economic benefits from long-term natural
resource conservation are secured for the FMRs holders i.e. it provides
incentives to the rights-holders for long-term stewardship of the fish
stocks. At the same time, FMRs holders are accountable to ensure that all
responsibilities as defined in the FMR terms are effectively imple­
mented. Finally, we support the recommendation from the RBFM In­
terest Group, that the government of Indonesia adopt the concept of
fisheries management rights in the fisheries law and further study and
develop technical guidance for its implementation on the ground. This
guidance for implementation should include identifying who is qualified
to receive the FMRs privilege and how rights are allocated to relevant
groups (including for example community group). It should also include
consideration of which government institution is mandated to issue,
monitor and evaluate right holders, etc., to support the sustainable
management of small-scale fisheries in Indonesia.
Declaration of competing interest
None.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Abdul Halim: Conceptualization, Methodology, Formal analysis,
Project administration, Investigation, Writing - original draft. Neil R.
Loneragan: Supervision, Conceptualization, Writing - review & editing.
Budy Wiryawan: Conceptualization, Writing - review & editing, Visu­
alization. Rod Fujita: Writing - review & editing. Dedi S. Adhuri:
Writing - review & editing. Adrian R. Hordyk: Supervision, Writing -
review & editing. M. Fedi A. Sondita: Supervision, Writing - review &
editing.
Acknowledgement
The recommended concept of territorial-based FMRs was formed by
the RBFM Interest group after three focus group discussions and meet­
ings held during 2016 and early 2017 (RBFM Interest Group Indonesia,
unpublished discussion paper on RBFM in Indonesia). We thank the
participants in this group (see Appendix 1), whose participation was
mostly voluntary and self-financed, for their contributions to the
development of the FMR concept present here. However, initially, some
financial support for meeting logistics and participation of key members
came from a number of sources, among others the Environmental De­
fense Fund (EDF) of Indonesia Oceans Program of Indonesia. We also
A. Halim et al. Marine Policy 116 (2020) 103923

acknowledge the contributions of Pamela Baker, Daniel Willard and M. Agus Hermansah for creating the map. This work formed part of the PhD
Khazali of EDF during the earlier development of this FMRs concept and dissertation of AH at IPB University.

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103923.

Appendix

Appendix 1. List of selected focus group discussions and meetings held to conceptualize Fisheries Management Rights (FMRs) in Indonesia, during 2016 and
early 2017

Event Host and date of event List of participants and their affiliations

Focus Group Indonesian Science Institute (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Dr. Dedi Adhuri (LIPI), Dr. T. Rameyo Adi (MMAF), Prof. Sonny Koeshendrajana (MMAF), Dr.
Discussion Indonesia/LIPI) in Jakarta, August 15, 2016. Umi Muawanah (MMAF), Dr. Masyhuri Imron (LIPI), Dr. Abdul Ghofar (UNDIP), Dr. Purwito
Martosubroto (KTI), Dr. Agus A. Budhiman (AP2HI), Dr. Subhat Nurhakim (ISPIKANI), Dr. Arie
Afriansyah (UI), Dr. Luky Adrianto (IPB), Dr. Firdaus Agung (MMAF), Dr. Irfan Yulianto (WCS),
Wawan Ridwan (WWF), Veda Santiaji (WWF), Abdul Halim (YBUL-EDF), Ronny Megawanto
(CI), Cliff Marlessy (LMMA), Pamela Baker (YBUL-EDF), Sudiyono (LIPI), Ina Pranoto (WB),
Elisabeth (UI), Jotham Ninef (IPB), Raymond Yakub (Rare), Desta Pratama (CSF), Muhammad
Khazali (YBUL-EDF), Ratna (LIPI).
Experts Meeting Directorate of Fisheries Resources of Directorate General of Dr. Toni Ruchimat (MMAF), Prof. Indra Jaya (KOMNASKAJISKAN), Dr. Dedi Adhuri (LIPI), Dr.
Capture Fisheries, MMAF in Jakarta on November 17, 2016. Ari Soemodinoto (WCS), Alfa Nelwan (UNHAS), Dr. Besweni (MMAF), Pamela Baker (YBUL-
EDF), Abdul Halim (YBUL-EDF), Dr. Irfan Yulianto (WCS), Veda Santiaji (WWF), Arinta D.H.
(MMAF), Dr. Arwandrija Rukma (Rare), Aris Budiarto (MMAF), Muhammad Khazali (YBUL-
EDF), Imran Amin (TNC), Karto Pulung (MMAF), Prayekti Ningtyas (WCS), Irwansyah (MMAF),
Sunarti (MMAF). Endang Sutardi (MMAF), Wahyuni (MMAF), Panca Berkat (MMAF).
Focus Group Department of Law of the University of Indonesia in Depok, Prof. Melda Kamil Ariadno (UI), Prof. Zahri Nasution (MMAF), Dr. Dedi Adhuri (LIPI), Dr. Luky
Discussion West Jawa, on January 19, 2017. Adrianto (IPB), Dr. T. Rameyo Adi (MMAF), Effin Martiana (MMAF), Dr. Besweni (MMAF), Hary
Christianto (MMAF), Jimmi (MMAF), Taufik Hidayat (Sterling Resources), Bayu Vita (MMAF),
Pamela Baker (YBUL-EDF), Daniel Willard (YBUL-EDF), Tim Hobbs (K&L Gates), Dr. Darmawan
(Rare), Dr. Arwandrija Rukma (Rare), Dr. Umi Muawanah (MMAF), Dr. Mubariq Ahmad (CSF),
Muhammad Khazali (YBUL-EDF), Abdul Halim (YBUL-EDF), Heidi Retnoningtyas (WCS),
Imanda Pradana (Rare), Erfa Canistya (CI), Reny Puspasari (MMAF), Adi Chandra (MMAF),
Jotham Ninef (IPB), Gayatri (MMAF), Sofiah Hidayat (MMAF), Suharyanto (STP), Mohammad
Rifai (MMAF).

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