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PROVREM CASE DOCTRINES

I. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES (R57 to R61)

1. Grounds (S1)
2. Requirements (S3)
3. Manner of Attachment (S5)
4. Discharge of Attachment (S5, S12, S13)
5. Third Party Claim (S14)
6. Claim for damages (S20)

LIM vs. LAZARO

G.R. No. 185734               July 3, 2013
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

1) While Rule 57 is silent on the length of time

within which an attachment lien shall continue to
subsist after the rendition of a final judgment,
jurisprudence dictates that the said lien continues until
a) the debt is paid, or b) the sale is had under
execution issued on the judgment or until c) the
judgment is satisfied, or d) the attachment discharged
or vacated in the same manner provided by law. This
rule applies even if a judgment based on a
compromise agreement (not appealable and
immediately executory) has been rendered or the
judgment has become final and executory.
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2) By its nature, preliminary attachment under

Rule 57 is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its
own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize
upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in
the main or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary
or incidental to the main action. As such, it is available
during its pendency which may be resorted to by a
litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and
interests during the interim, awaiting the ultimate
effects of a final judgment in the case. In addition,
attachment is also availed of in order to acquire
jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive
seizure of the property in those instances where
personal or substituted service of summons on the
defendant cannot be effected.
LIGON vs. RTC OF MAKATI
G.R. No. 190028               February 26, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

1) The attachment lien on a property annotated on

its title by order of a court in a pending case shall
subsist and be carried over to the title of any
subsequent buyer of the property in an execution sale.
2) Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy
by which the property of an adverse party is taken into
legal custody, either at the commencement of an
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action or at any time thereafter, as a security for the

satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by
the plaintiff or any proper party. An attachment is a
proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the particular
property, enforceable against the whole world.
3) The attaching creditor acquires a specific lien
on the attached property which nothing can
subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the
attachment or levy itself. Such a proceeding, in effect,
means that the property attached is an indebted thing
and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owner’s
debt. The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale
is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until
the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged
or vacated in some manner provided by law.
4) A prior registration of an attachment lien
creates a preference, such that when an attachment has
been duly levied upon a property, a purchaser thereof
subsequent to the attachment takes the property
subject to the said attachment. As provided under PD
1529, said registration operates as a form of
constructive notice to the whole world.
MANGILA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 125027            August 12, 2002
CARPIO, J.:
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1) Whatever be the acts done by the Court prior

to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of
defendant - issuance of summons, order of attachment
and writ of attachment - these do not and cannot bind
and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction
over his person is eventually obtained by the
court, either by service on him of summons or other
coercive process or his voluntary submission to the
court’s authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other
proper officer commences implementation of the writ
of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the
defendant not only a copy of the applicant’s affidavit
and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment,
as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also
the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a
copy of the complaint.
2) The grant of the provisional remedy of
attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues
the order granting the application; second, the writ of
attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the
writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the
initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant be first
obtained. However, once the implementation of the
writ commences, the court must have acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant for without such
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jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to

act in any manner against the defendant. Any order
issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.
CHUIDIAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 139941       January 19, 2001
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

1) The Rules of Court specifically provide the

party whose property has been attached under a writ
preliminary attachment two courses of action – first,
to file a counterbond in accordance with Section 12 of
Rule 57 and second, to quash the attachment on the
ground that it was irregularly or improvidently issued,
as provided for in Section 13 of Rule 57.
2) Under the second course of action, however,
the rule contemplates that the defect must be in the
very issuance of the attachment writ. For instance, the
attachment may be discharged under Section 13 of
Rule 57 when it is proven that the allegations of the
complaint were deceptively framed, or when the
complaint fails to state a cause of action. Supervening
events which may or may not justify the discharge
of the writ are not within the purview of this
particular rule.
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ALEJANDRO NG WEE vs. TANKIANSEE

G.R. No. 171124             February 13, 2008
NACHURA, J.:

1) Section 1(d) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court

provides, as follows:
Section 1. Grounds upon which
attachment may issue.-At the
commencement of the action or at any time
before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any
proper party may have the property of the
adverse party attached as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered in the following cases:
xxxx
(d) In an action against a party who has
been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt
or incurring the obligation upon which the
action is brought, or in the performance
thereof.
For a writ of attachment to issue under the
foregoing rule, the applicant must sufficiently show
the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because
fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's
mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply
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with his obligation. The applicant must then be able to

demonstrate that the debtor has intended to defraud the
creditor.

2) In Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Court of

Appeals, it was held that “to sustain an attachment on
this ground, it must be shown that the debtor in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation
intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud (dolo
causante as opposed to dolo incidente) must relate to
the execution of the agreement and must have been the
reason which induced the other party into giving
consent which he would not have otherwise given. To
constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1 (d),
Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud should be
committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon.
A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of
contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan or
intention not to pay. Fraud is a state of mind and need
not be proved by direct evidence but may be inferred
from the circumstances attendant in each case. Dolo
incidente is the fraud committed in the performance of
the obligation.
3) The affidavit, being the foundation of the
writ, must contain such particulars as to how the fraud
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imputed to respondent was committed for the court to

decide whether or not to issue the writ. Absent any
statement of other factual circumstances to show that
respondent, at the time of contracting the obligation,
had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, the
affidavit is insufficient to support the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment.
4) The provisional remedy of preliminary
attachment is harsh and rigorous for it exposes the
debtor to humiliation and annoyance. The rules
governing its issuance are, therefore, strictly construed
against the applicant, such that if the requisites for its
grant are not shown to be all present, the court shall
refrain from issuing it, for, otherwise, the court which
issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction. Likewise, the
writ should not be abused to cause unnecessary
prejudice. If it is wrongfully issued on the basis of
false or insufficient allegations, it should at once be
corrected.
TORRES vs. NICANOR SATSATIN
G.R. No. 166759               November 25, 2009
PERALTA, J.:

1) Every (attachment) bond should be

accompanied by a clearance from the Supreme Court
showing that the company concerned is qualified to
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transact business which is valid only for thirty (30)

days from the date of its issuance. However, it is
apparent that the Certification issued by the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) at the time the bond
was issued clearly shows that the bonds offered by
Western Guaranty Corporation may be accepted only
in the RTCs of the cities of Makati, Pasay, and Pasig.
Therefore, the surety bond issued by the bonding
company should not have been accepted by the RTC
of Dasmariñas.
2) Even if the writ of attachment was validly
issued and the trial court subsequently acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant by service of summons
upon him, such belated service of summons cannot
cure the fatal defect in the earlier enforcement of the
writ of preliminary attachment. The trial court cannot
enforce such a coercive process on respondents
without first obtaining jurisdiction over person of the
defendant. The preliminary writ of attachment must be
served after or simultaneous with the service of
summons on the defendant whether by personal
service, substituted service or by publication as
warranted by the circumstances of the case. The
subsequent service of summons does not confer a
retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant because the law does not allow for
retroactivity of a belated service.
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LUZON DEV. BANK vs. ERLINDA KRISHNAN

G.R. No. 203530 April 13, 2015
PERALTA, J.:
1) Section 5 of Rule 57 states that "the sheriff
enforcing the writ shall xxx attach xxx only so much
of the property xxx of the party against whom the writ
is issued xxx, unless the former (latter) makes a
deposit with the court from which the writ is
issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the
applicant, in an amount equal to the bond fixed by
the court in the order of attachment or to the value
of the property to be attached, exclusive of costs."

From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that once

the writ of attachment has been issued, the only
remedy of the petitioners in lifting the same is through
a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-bond.
In Security Pacific Assurance Corporation v.
Tria-Infante, it was held that one of the ways to secure
the discharge of an attachment is for the party whose
property has been attached, to post a counterbond or
make the requisite cash deposit in an amount equal to
that fixed by the court in the order of attachment.

While it is true that the word deposit cannot only

be confined or construed to refer to cash, a broader
interpretation thereof is not justified for the reason that
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a party seeking a stay of the attachment under Section

5 is required to make a deposit in an amount equal
to the bond fixed by the court in the order of
attachment or to the value of the property to be
attached. The proximate relation of the word "deposit"
and "amount" is unmistakable in Section 5 of Rule 57.
Plainly, in construing said words, it can be safely
concluded that Section 5 requires the deposit of money
as the word "amount" commonly refers to or is
regularly associated with a sum of money.
NORTHERN ISLANDS, CO., vs. GARCIA
G.R. No. 203240 March 18, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

1) When the trial court loses its jurisdiction over

the main case due to the perfection of an appeal and
the expiration of the period to appeal of the adverse
party, it necessarily loses its jurisdiction over all
matters merely ancillary thereto. After losing
jurisdiction over the main case, it is therefore
improper for the trial court to still conduct a trial by
commissioners in order to determine the excessiveness
of the preliminary attachment, it being a mere
ancillary matter to the main case. In Sps. Olib v. Judge
Pastoral, it was held that in view of the nature of a
preliminary attachment, the attachment itself cannot
be the subject of a separate action independent of the
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principal action which had already been appealed

because the attachment is only an incident of such
principal action.
WATERCRAFT VENTURE CORP. vs. WOLFE
G.R. No. 181721 September 9, 2015
PERALTA, J.:

1) To constitute a ground for attachment in

Section 1(d) of Rule 57, it must be shown in the
affidavit that the debtor in contracting the debt or
incurring the obligation intended to defraud the
creditor. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the
time of contracting it, the debtor has a preconceived
plan or intention not to pay. The fraud (dolo causante)
must relate to the execution of the agreement and must
have been the reason which induced the other party
into giving consent which he would not have
otherwise given.
Fraudulent intent is not a physical entity, but a
condition of the mind beyond the reach of the senses,
usually kept secret, very unlikely to be confessed, and
therefore, can only be proved by unguarded
expressions, conduct and circumstances. Thus, the
applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must
sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the
alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be
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inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the

debt or failure to comply with his obligation. The
particulars of such circumstances necessarily include
the time, persons, places and specific acts of fraud
committed. An affidavit which does not contain
concrete and specific grounds is inadequate to sustain
the issuance of such writ. In fact, mere general
averments render the writ defective and the court that
ordered its issuance acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

PHIL-AIR CON. CENTER vs. RCJ LINES

GR No. 193821 Nov 23, 2015
BRION, J.:

1) There are various modes of discharging an

attachment under Rule 57, viz.: (1) by depositing cash
or posting a counter-bond under Section 12; (2) by
proving that the attachment bond was improperly or
irregularly issued or enforced, or that the bond is
insufficient under Section 13; (3) by showing that the
attachment is excessive under Section 13; and (4) by
claiming that the property is exempt from execution
under Section 2.
Under the first mode, the court will order the
discharge of the attachment after (1) the movant
makes a cash deposit or posts a counter-bond and (2)
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the court hears the motion to discharge the attachment

with due notice to the adverse party.
The amount of the cash deposit or counter-bond
must be equal to that fixed by the court in the order of
attachment, exclusive of costs. The cash deposit or
counter-bond shall secure the payment of any
judgment that the attaching party may recover in the
action.

The filing of a counter-bond to discharge the

attachment applies when there has already been a
seizure of property by the sheriff and all that is
entailed is the presentation of a motion to the proper
court, seeking approval of a cash or surety bond in an
amount equivalent to the value of the property seized
and the lifting of the attachment on the basis
thereof. The counter-bond stands in place of the
property so released.
2) The discharge of the attachment by depositing
cash or posting a counter-bond under Section 12
should not be confused with the discharge under
Section 13. Section 13 speaks of discharge on the
ground that the writ was improperly or irregularly
issued or enforced, or that the attachment bond is
insufficient, or that the attachment is excessive.
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The discharge under Section 12 takes effect upon

posting of a counter-bond or depositing cash, and after
hearing to determine the sufficiency of the cash
deposit or counter-bond. On the other hand, the
discharge under Section 13 takes effect only upon
showing that the plaintiffs attachment bond was
improperly or irregularly issued, or that the bond is
insufficient. The discharge of the attachment under
Section 13 must be made only after hearing.
3) Under the Rules, the attachment bond answers
for all damages incurred by the party against whom
the attachment was issued. Thus, the applicant cannot
be held directly liable for the costs adjudged to and the
damages sustained by the defendant because of the
attachment. Section 4 of Rule 57 positively lays down
the rule that the attachment bond will pay "all the
costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party
and all damages which he may sustain by reason of
the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge
that the applicant was not entitled thereto."

4) The court should not declare the applicant

directly liable for damages, including the
counter-bond premium, but should instead order the
execution of the judgment award on the attachment
bond. To impose direct liability to the applicant would
defeat the purpose of the attachment bond, which is
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not dissolved despite the lifting of the writ of

preliminary attachment.
5) An order to the applicant to refund the
counter-bond premium is likewise erroneous. The
premium payment may be deemed a cost incurred by
the defendant to lift the attachment. Such cost may be
charged against the attachment bond.
6) Where the law provides the period within
which to file an action in court, the assertion of the
claim or the filing of the action in court at any
time within the prescriptive period is generally
deemed reasonable, and thus, does not call for the
application of laches. As we held in one case, unless
reasons of inequitable proportions are adduced, any
imputed delay within the prescriptive period is not
delay in law that would bar relief.
In Agra, et al. v. Philippine National Bank, it was
held that laches is a recourse in equity and is applied
only in the absence, never in contravention, of
statutory law. Thus, laches cannot, as a rule, abate a
collection suit filed within the prescriptive period
mandated by the Civil Code.
B. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (R58)
1. Definition, Classes (S1)
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2. Grounds (S3), TRO

3. Requirements (S4)
4. Damages (S8)

IDOLOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 141853       February 7, 2001
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

1) Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at

protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an
injunction can be issued, it is essential that the
following requisites be present:
a) There must be aright in esse or the existence of
a right to be protected;
b) The act against which the injunction is to be
directed is a violation of such right.
Hence the existence of a right violated, is a
prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction
is not designed to protect contingent or future rights.
Failure to establish either the existence of a clear and
positive right which should be judicially protected
through the writ of injunction or that the defendant has
committed or has attempted to commit any act which
has endangered or tends to endanger the existence of
said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the
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injunction. The controlling reason for the existence of

the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court
may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous
irremediable injury to some of the parties before their
claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly
adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a
pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences
which cannot be remedied under any standard of
compensation.
2) A mortgagor/debtor has no more proprietary
right over the foreclosed property (right in esse) to
entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction where
it appears that the mortgaged property had already
been sold in a public auction, the sheriff's certificate of
sale was registered with the RD and he failed to
redeem the property within one year from the
registration of the sheriff's sale.
GUSTILO vs. HON. REAL
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1250      February 28, 2001
QUISUMBING, J.:

1) Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is

essential that the following requisites be present: (1)
there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right
to be protected; and (2) the act against which
injunction to be directed is a violation of such right.
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The onus probandi is on movant to show that there

exists a right to be protected, which is directly
threatened by the act sought to be enjoined. Further,
there must be a showing that the invasion of the right
is material and substantial and that there is an urgent
and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a
serious damage.
2) Where the winning candidate had been duly
proclaimed as punong barangay and taken his oath of
office and therefore entitled to all the rights of said
office, his exercise of such rights could not cause an
irreparable injury or violate the right of the losing
candidate as to justify the issuance of a TRO.
3) Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.
20-95 provides:
2. The application for a TRO shall be
acted upon only after all parties are heard in
a summary hearing conducted within
twenty-four (24) hours after the records are
transmitted to the branch selected by raffle.
The records shall be transmitted
immediately after raffle (Emphasis
supplied).
xxx
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4. With the exception of the provisions

which necessarily involve multiple-sala
stations, these rules shall apply to single-sala
stations especially with regard to immediate
notice to all parties of all applications for
TRO.

The foregoing clearly shows that whenever an

application for a TRO is filed, the court may act on the
application only after all parties have been notified
and heard in a summary hearing. In other words, a
summary hearing may not be dispensed with. 

LAGROSAS vs. BRISTOL-MYERS

GR No. 168637 Sep 12, 2008
QUISUMBING, J.:
1) The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to
prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury
to some of the parties before their claims can be
thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to
preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can
be heard fully.
A preliminary injunction may be granted only
when, among other things, the applicant, not explicitly
exempted, files with the court where the action or
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proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or

person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court,
to the effect that the applicant will pay such party or
person all damages which he may sustain by reason of
the injunction or temporary restraining order if the
court should finally decide that the applicant was not
entitled thereto.
The injunction bond is intended as a security for
damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction
ought not to have been granted. Its principal purpose is
to protect the enjoined party against loss or damage by
reason of the injunction, and the bond is usually
conditioned accordingly.
2) In this case for illegal dismissal, the Court of
Appeals issued the writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution and
notices of garnishment issued by the NLRC (in favor
of the employee and against the employer) pending
final resolution of the case by the CA. By deciding,
however, in favor of the employer and declaring that
he had no right to the monetary awards granted by the
NLRC, and that the implementation of the writ of
execution and notices of garnishment was properly
enjoined, the CA in effect ruled that the employee did
not sustain any damage by reason of the injunction.
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Since the injunction bond is intended to protect

the employee against loss or damage by reason of the
injunction only, not a security for the judgment award
by the NLRC, the CA should have ordered the
discharge and release of the injunction cash bond.

its Decision dated January 28, 2005, the appellate

court disposed of the case by granting Bristol-Myers'
petition and reinstating the Decision dated September
24, 2002 of the NLRC which dismissed the complaint
for dismissal. It also ordered the discharge of the TRO
cash bond and injunction cash bond. Thus, both
conditions of the writ of preliminary injunction were
satisfied.
JENOSA vs. DELARIARTE
G.R. No. 172138               September 8, 2010
CARPIO, J.:

1) Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he

who must apply for it must come with equity or with
clean hands. This is so because among the maxims of
equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity, and
(2) he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is
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also expressed in the principle that he who has done

inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a
litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on
the ground that his conduct has been inequitable,
unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to
the controversy in issue.

2) In the instant case, after the parents of the

erring students who participated in an initiation agreed
in writing with the school that their children will have
to transfer to another school, they reneged on their
promise and, instead, sued the school to compel it to
readmit their children. The parents came to court with
unclean hands. A court may deny a litigant relief if his
conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest as
in the instant case.

SOLID BUILDERS, INC. vs. CHINA BANK

G.R. No. 179665               April 3, 2013
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

1) A debtor-mortgagor does do not have a clear

and positive right (right in esse) that would justify the
issuance of a writ of injunction to prevent the
creditor-mortgagee from foreclosing on the mortgaged
property simply on the basis of the alleged usurious,
exorbitant and confiscatory rate of interest. Even
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assuming that the interest rate agreed upon by the

parties is indeed usurious, the nullity of the stipulation
of usurious interest does not affect the lender’s right to
recover the principal loan, nor affect the other terms
thereof. Thus, in a usurious loan with mortgage, the
right to foreclose the mortgage subsists, and this right
can be exercised by the creditor upon failure by the
debtor to pay the debt due. The right of the mortgagee
to foreclose the mortgage cannot be prevented by a
writ of preliminary injunction.
2) A writ of preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary event which must be granted only in the
face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty
of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction is to determine whether the
requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are
present in the case before it. A writ of preliminary
injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante,
upon the applicant’s showing of two important
requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be
protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to
be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be
proven that the violation sought to be prevented would
cause an irreparable injury.
KNIGHTS OF RIZAL vs. DMCI HOMES, INC.
G.R. No. 213948 April 18, 2017
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CARPIO, J.:

1) Injunctive reliefs are meant to preserve

substantive rights and prevent further injury until final
adjudication on the merits of the case. In the present
case, since the legal rights of the Knights of Rizal (to
prevent the construction of a building given permit by
the City of Manila) are not well-defined, clear, and
certain, the petition for mandamus must be dismissed
and the TRO lifted.

2) The general rule is that courts will not disturb

the findings of administrative agencies when they are
supported by substantial evidence. In this case,
DMCI-PDI already acquired vested rights in the
various permits, licenses, or even variances it had
applied for in order to build a 49-storey building
which is, and had been, allowed by the City of
Manila's zoning ordinance. As we have time and again
held, courts generally hesitate to review discretionary
decisions or actions of administrative agencies in the
absence of proof that such decisions or actions were
arrived at with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.

NOVICIO vs. HON. LIM, JR

G.R. No. 193809 March 23, 2015
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BRION, J.:

1) A preliminary injunction is proper when the

plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief
sought and has substantial interest in the right sought
to be defended. While the existence of the right need
not be conclusively established, it must be clear. A
writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely
on initial or incomplete evidence. Such evidence need
only be a sampling intended merely to give the court
an evidence of justification for a preliminary
injunction pending the decision on the merits of the
case, and is not conclusive of the principal action
which has yet to be decided.
In a prayer for preliminary injunction, therefore,
the plaintiff is not required to submit conclusive and
complete evidence. He is only required to show that he
has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in
his complaint.
2) The applicant is entitled to the issuance by the
CA of a preliminary injunction to restrain the RTC
from executing its decision ordering his ejectment
from the disputed land after he has clearly shown that
his ejectment from the land from which he derives his
livelihood would work injustice to him, would
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probably be in violation of his rights and would render

the judgment of the MTC dismissing the forcible entry
case against him ineffectual.
3) When a court denies an application for a writ
of preliminary injunction, it must clearly state in its
order the findings and conclusions based on the
evidence and the law. This is to enable the appellate
court to determine whether the trial court committed
grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in resolving, one way or the other,
the plea for injunctive relief. The court must cite the
legal or factual basis for the denial. When the court
denies the applicant’s motion for reconsideration, its
order must also contain the factual and legal bases for
the denial.
CAYABYAB vs. DIMSON
G.R. No. 223862 July 10, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

1) The operator of a poultry business is not

entitled to injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement
of a CDO issued by the Office of the Mayor due to his
failure to secure a Mayor’s permit. A business permit
must be secured from the municipal business permits
and licensing office in order for the business to legally
operate in the locality. While poultry farming is
 28

admittedly a legitimate business, it cannot operate

without a business permit, which expires on the 31st
of December of every year and must be renewed
before the end of January of the following year.
2) A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO
are injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for the
protection of substantive rights and interests. To be
entitled to the injunctive writ, the applicant must show
that: (a) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to
be protected; (b) this right is directly threatened by an
act sought to be enjoined; (c) the invasion of the right
is material and substantial; and (d) there is an urgent
and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
and irreparable damage.
3) The grant or denial of an injunctive relief in a
pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court
since the assessment and evaluation of evidence
towards that end involve findings of fact left for the
conclusive determination of the said court. Hence, the
exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive
matters must not be interfered with, except when there
is grave abuse of discretion. The burden is, thus, on
the applicant to show that there is meritorious ground
for the issuance of a TRO in his favor, since an
application for injunctive relief is construed strictly
against him.
 29

REPUBLIC vs. REV. CLAUDIO R. CORTEZ

GR. No. 197472 September 7, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

1) Injunction is a judicial writ, process or

proceeding whereby a party is directed either to do a
particular act, in which case it is called a mandatory
injunction, or to refrain from doing a particular act, in
which case it is called a prohibitory injunction. It may
be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for
and as an incident in the main action.
2) The main action for injunction is distinct from
the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction. A preliminary injunction does not xxxxxxx
 30

determine the merits of a case or decide controverted

facts. Since it is a mere preventive remedy, it only
seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury and
irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the
parties are settled. It is usually granted when it is made
to appear that there is a substantial controversy
between the parties and one of them is committing an
act or threatening the immediate commission of an act
that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status
quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had
on the merits of the case. A preliminary injunction is
granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to
judgment or final order.
3) For the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, the applicant is required to show, at least
tentatively, that he has a right which is not vitiated by
any substantial challenge or contradiction. Simply
stated, the applicant needs only to show that he has the
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his
complaint. 
4) On the other hand, the main action for
injunction seeks a judgment that embodies a final
injunction. A final injunction is one which perpetually
restrains the party or person enjoined from the
commission or continuance of an act, or in case of
mandatory injunctive writ, one which confirms the
 31

preliminary mandatory injunction. It is issued when

the court, after trial on the merits, is convinced that the
applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained
of permanently enjoined. Otherwise stated, it is only
after the court has come up with a definite
pronouncement respecting an applicant’s right and of
the act violative of such right, based on its
appreciation of the evidence presented, that a final
injunction is issued. To be a basis for a final and
permanent injunction, the right and the act violative
thereof must be established by the applicant with
absolute certainty.
AMA LAND, INC. vs. WACK WACK
G.R. No. 202342, July 19, 2017
CAGUIOA, J.:

1) Wack Wack Residents’ Association is not

entitled to injunctive relief to prevent the construction
of a condominium building near its premises on the
ground that such construction would violate its
members' right to live in a peaceful, quiet and safe
environment. The annoyance that may be caused by
the noise and dust coming from the construction is
not permanent in nature but merely temporary. Once
the building is completed, said members’ right to live
in a peaceful, quiet and safe environment will be
restored without noise and dust.
 32

2) To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the

petitioner must show that: (1) there exists a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is
directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined;
(3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial;
and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.

3) The grant or denial of the injunctive relief rests

on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance
of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of
evidence towards that end involves findings of fact left
to the conclusive determination by such court; and the
exercise of judicial discretion by such court will not be
interfered with, except upon a finding of grave abuse
of discretion.
 33

C. RECEIVERSHIP (R59)
1. When writ may issue (S1)
2. Requirements (S2)
3. Power of receiver (S6)
4. Termination and Compensation (S8)

LARROBIS vs. PHIL. VETERANS BANK

G.R. No. 135706             October 1, 2004
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

1) When a bank is prohibited from continuing to

do business by the Central Bank and a receiver is
appointed for such bank, that bank would not be able
to do new business, i.e., to grant new loans or to
accept new deposits. However, the receiver of the
bank is in fact obliged to collect debts owing to the
bank, which debts form part of the assets of the bank.
The receiver must assemble the assets and pay the
obligation of the bank under receivership, and take
steps to prevent dissipation of such assets.
Accordingly, the receiver of the bank is obliged to
collect pre-existing debts due to the bank, and in
connection therewith, to foreclose mortgages securing
such debts. Thus, the fact that a bank has been
placed under receivership and a receiver has been
appointed therefor will not suspend the running of
 34

the prescriptive period for collecting debts owing to

it and foreclosing on mortgaged properties.

2) While it is true that the period during which a

bank is placed under receivership is deemed fuerza
mayor which prevents it from doing business, the
bank, through the receiver, is not prohibited from
bringing actions to collect debts owing to it. Given this
rule, the fact of receivership does not suspend the
running of the prescriptive period for collecting debts
owing to it and foreclosing on mortgaged properties.
CHAVEZ vs. CA
G.R. No. 174356               January 20, 2010
ABAD, J.:

1) In an appeal of the order of the RTC

dismissing for lack of jurisdiction an action to recover
possession of coconut land from the defendant, it was
error for the CA to have granted the plaintiff’s
application for the appointment of a receiver where the
applicant herself did not claim that the subject
property is in danger of being lost, removed, or
materially injured, necessitating its protection or
preservation.
An application for the appointment of a receiver
under Section 1(b) of Rule 59 requires that the
 35

property or fund subject of the action is in danger of

being lost, removed, or materially injured,
necessitating its protection or preservation. Its object
is the prevention of imminent danger to the property.
If the action does not require such protection or
preservation, the remedy is not the appointment of a
receiver.
2) In the instant case, the applicant’s main gripe
is that the defendant deprived her of her share of the
land’s produce. She does not claim that the land or its
productive capacity would disappear or be wasted if
not entrusted to a receiver. Nor does the applicant
claim that the land has been materially injured,
necessitating its protection and preservation. Because
receivership is a harsh remedy that can be granted
only in extreme situations, the applicant must prove a
clear right to its issuance.
3) Since the RTC dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction over the case, holding that the issues it
raised properly belong to the DARAB, the CA should
have first determined whether the RTC had
jurisdiction over the case before granting the
application for the appointment of a receiver. After all,
the case before the CA was just an offshoot of the case
brought before the RTC.
 36

KORUGA vs. ARCENAS

G.R. No. 168332               June 19, 2009
NACHURA, J.:

1) With regards to the appointment of a receiver

for a bank, it is not the Interim Rules of Procedure on
Intra-Corporate Controversies, or Rule 59 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure on Receivership that applies but
instead, Sections 29 and 30 of the New Central Bank
Act. Section 30 of the New Central Bank Act provides
that the "appointment of a receiver under this section
shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board."
The term "exclusively" connotes that only the
Monetary Board can resolve the issue of whether a
bank is to be placed under receivership and, upon an
affirmative finding, it also has authority to appoint a
receiver. This is further affirmed by the fact that the
law allows the Monetary Board to take action
"summarily and without need for prior hearing."
And, as a clincher, the law explicitly provides
that "actions of the Monetary Board taken under this
section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final
and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside
by the court except on a petition for certiorari on the
ground that the action taken was in excess of
jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as
to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.” From the
 37

foregoing disquisition, there is no doubt that the RTC

has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a suit that seeks
to place a bank under receivership.
TANTANO vs. ESPINA-CABOVERDE
G.R. No. 203585               July 29, 2013
VELASCO, JR., J.:

1) The applicant’s alleged need to immediately

and regularly receive her share in the income from the
subject property to defray her medical expenses and
support is not a valid justification for the appointment
of a receiver. The approval of an application for
receivership merely on this ground is not only
unwarranted but also an arbitrary exercise of
discretion because financial need and like reasons are
not found in Sec. 1 of Rule 59 which prescribes
specific grounds or reasons for granting receivership.
2) To justify the appointment of a receiver under
Sec. 1(d) of Rule 59, the applicant must clearly show
that the subject fund or property is in danger of being
lost or materially impaired and that placing it under
receivership is the most convenient and feasible means
to preserve, administer or dispose of it.
3) In the instant case, it appears that the applicant
sought receivership mainly because she considers this
 38

the best remedy to ensure that she would receive her

share in the income of the disputed properties. Much
emphasis has been placed on the fact that she needed
this income for her medical expenses and daily
sustenance. But it can be gleaned from her application
that, aside from her bare assertion that the adverse
party solely appropriated the fruits and rentals earned
from the disputed properties in connivance with some
of her siblings, she has not presented or alleged
anything else to prove that the disputed properties
were in danger of being wasted or materially injured
and that the appointment of a receiver was the most
convenient and feasible means to preserve their
integrity.

D. REPLEVIN (R60)
1. When writ may issue (S1)
2. Requirements (S2)
3. Third Party Claim (S7)
4. Judgment and Damages (S9, 10)

SMART COM. vs. ASTORGA

G.R. No. 148132             January 28, 2008
 39

NACHURA, J.:

1) An action for replevin filed by an employer

against a dismissed employee to recover a car given to
the latter as part of the employer’s car plan is well
within the jurisdiction of the regular court despite the
pendency of a related labor case. In Basaya, Jr. v.
Militante, the SC upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC
over the replevin suit, explaining that “replevin is a
possessory action, the gist of which is the right of
possession in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought
therein is the return of the property in specie
wrongfully detained by another person. It is an
ordinary statutory proceeding to adjudicate rights to
the title or possession of personal property. The
question of whether or not a party has the right of
possession over the property involved and if so,
whether or not the adverse party has wrongfully taken
and detained said property as to require its return to
plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor
tribunal and beyond the field of specialization of
Labor Arbiters.
2) The labor dispute involved is not intertwined
with the issue in the replevin case. The respective
issues raised in each forum can be resolved
independently of the other. In thus ruling, the SC is not
 40

sanctioning split jurisdiction but defining avenues of

jurisdiction as laid down by pertinent laws.
HAO vs. ANDRES
A.M. No. P-07-2384             June 18, 2008
QUISUMBING, J.:

1) There are well-defined steps provided in the

Rules of Court regarding the proper implementation of
a writ of replevin and/or an order of seizure. The
Rules, likewise, is explicit on the duty of the sheriff in
its implementation. Section 6 of Rule 60 provides that
the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be
delivered immediately to the plaintiff. In accordance
with the said rules, the sheriff should wait no less than
five days in order to give the complainant an
opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond or
of the surety or sureties thereon, or require the return
of the seized motor vehicles by filing a counter-bond,
before delivering the seized property to the plaintiff.
2) It matters not that the plaintiff is given
possession of the seized property merely for
safekeeping as stated in the depository receipts. The
rule is clear that the property seized should not be
immediately delivered to the plaintiff, and the sheriff
must retain custody of the seized property for at least
five days. Hence, the act of the sheriff in delivering
 41

the seized property immediately after seizure to the

plaintiff for whatever purpose, without observing the
five-day requirement finds no legal justification.
3) The SC has explained that the purpose of the
five-day period is to give a chance to the defendant to
object to the sufficiency of the bond or the surety or
sureties thereon or require the return of the property
by filing a counterbond.
NAVARRO vs. HON. ESCOBIDO
G.R. No. 153788               November 27, 2009
BRION, J.:
1) Prior demand is not required for the filing of
an action for replevin. For a writ of replevin to issue,
all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and
bond, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 60. The bond must
be executed to the adverse party in double the value of
the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned,
for the return of the property to the adverse party if
such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the
adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the
applicant in the action. There is nothing in the rules
that requires the applicant to make a prior demand on
the possessor of the property before he can file an
action for a writ of replevin.
 42

2) In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are

real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article
487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any
one of them may bring an action, any kind of action,
for the recovery of co-owned properties. Thus, any
one of the co-owners is an indispensable party thereto.
The other co-owners are not indispensable parties.
They are not even necessary parties, for a complete
relief can be accorded in the suit even without their
participation, since the suit is presumed to have been
filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
AGNER vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK
G.R. No. 182963               June 3, 2013
PERALTA, J.:

1) If, for some reason, the property subject matter

of the action for replevin is not recovered and
delivered to plaintiff despite the issuance of a writ of
replevin, the trial court may properly grant the
alternative prayer for sum of money, which is
equivalent to the remedy of "exacting fulfillment of
the obligation." Certainly, there would be no double
recovery or unjust enrichment to speak.
E. SUPPORT (R61)

1. Application (S1)
 43

2. Comment, hearing, order (S2. 3. 4)

3. Enforcement of order (S5)
4. Restitution (S7)

DE ASIS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127578 February 15, 1999
PURISIMA, J.:

1) The dismissal with prejudice of an action for

support based on the agreement of the parties is not
res judicata to a subsequent action for support
involving the same parties. In Advincula vs.
Advincula (10 SCRA 189) The minor instituted a case
for acknowledgment and support against her putative
father. On motion of both parties and for the reason
that the "plaintiff has lost interest and is no longer
interested in continuing the case against the defendant
and has no further evidence to introduce in support of
the complaint", the case was dismissed. Thereafter, a
similar case was instituted by Manuela, which the
defendant moved to dismiss, theorizing that the
dismissal of the first case precluded the filing of the
second case.

In the above cited case, it was held that “the Civil

Code provides that the allowance for support is
provisional because the amount may be increased or
 44

decreased depending upon the means of the giver and

the needs of the recipient (Art. 297); and that the right
to receive support cannot be renounced nor can it be
transmitted to a third person neither can it be
compensated with what the recipient owes the
obligator (Art .301). Furthermore, the right to support
cannot be waived or transferred to third parties and
future support cannot be the subject of compromise
(Art. 2035; Coral v. Gallego, 38 O.G. 3135, cited in IV
Civil Code by Padilla, p. 648; 1956 Ed.).

In view of the foregoing premises, it is

indisputable that the present action for support can be
brought, notwithstanding the fact the previous case
filed against the same defendant was dismissed with
prejudice. The dismissal of the first case was not an
adjudication upon the merits, as heretofore shown, the
right of herein plaintiff-appellant to reiterate her suit
for support and acknowledgment is available, as her
needs arise. Once the needs of plaintiff arise, she has
the right to bring an action for support, for it is only
then that her cause for action is accrues.

PEOPLE vs. MANAHAN

G.R. No. 128157 September 29, 1999
BELLOSILLO, J.:
 45

1) Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code

provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be
sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the
law should prevent him from doing so," and "in every
case to support the offspring." Thus, if the accused is
married, he cannot be compelled to acknowledge the
child but he may be ordered to give support. In People
v. Guerrero, it was held that since the rapist was
married, he cannot be compelled to recognize the
offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate."
LIM vs. LIM
G.R. No. 163209               October 30, 2009
CARPIO, J.:

1) Under the relevant provisions of Title VIII of

the Civil Code, as amended, a minor may demand
support from his grandparents if his parents are unable
to give support even if they still exercise parental
authority over him.
2) By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the
liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their
descendants is beyond cavil. The question, however, is
when their liability is triggered. Although the
obligation to provide support arising from parental
 46

authority ends upon the emancipation of the child, the

same obligation arising from spousal and general
familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee's lifetime.
Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the
correlative parental rights) pertains to parents, passing
to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension,
the obligation to provide legal support passes on to
ascendants not only upon default of the parents but
also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficient
support. As we observed in another case raising the
ancillary issue of an ascendant’s obligation to give
support in light of the father’s sufficient means:
3) In accordance with the order of support under
Art. 199, grandchildren cannot demand support
directly from their grandparents if they have parents
(ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of
supporting them.
4) Grandparents’ partial concurrent obligation,
however, extends only to their descendants
(grandchildren by their son) as this word is commonly
understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower
degree, not to the wife of their son, the minor’s
mother. Thus, a wife’s right to receive support extends
only to her husband, arising from their marital bond,
not to her husband’s parents.
 47

GOTARDO vs. BULING

G.R. No. 165166               August 15, 2012
BRION, J.:

1) Once filiation has been established, at least by

prima facie evidence, the obligation to give support
follows as a matter of course. A parent is obliged to
support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
Support consists of everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of
support is variable and, for this reason, no final
judgment on the amount of support is made as the
amount shall be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient.
It may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the
necessities of the recipient and the resources or means
of the person obliged to support.
2) Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just
to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right
associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support
or inheritance. In paternity cases, the burden of proof]
 48

is on the person who alleges that the putative father is

the biological father of the child.
3) One can prove filiation, either legitimate or
illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the
open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. We
have held that such other proof of one's filiation may
be a "baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds
of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court."
4) In Herrera v. Alba, it was explained that there
are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action that parties have to face: a prima
facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the
putative father and the child. A prima facie case exists
if a woman declares — supported by corroborative
proof — that she had sexual relations with the putative
father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to
 49

the putative father. We explained further that the two

affirmative defenses available to the putative father
are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the
mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or
(2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men
at the time of conception.
REPUBLIC vs. YAHON
G.R. No. 201043               June 16, 2014
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

1) The scope of reliefs in protection orders (e. g.

issued under R. A. No. 9262) is broadened to ensure
that the victim or offended party is afforded all the
remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to
the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from
greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any
designated family or household member safety in the
family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from
committing acts that jeopardize the employment and
support of the victim. It also enables the court to
award temporary custody of minor children to protect
the children from violence, to prevent their abduction
by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial
support."
DEL SOCORRO vs. VAN WILSEM
G.R. No. 193707               December 10, 2014
 50

PERALTA, J.:

1) Article 195 of the New Civil Code cannot be

invoked against a foreign national to compel him to
give support to his minor son in the Philippines, the
reason being that Article 15 of the New Civil Code
stresses the principle of nationality. In other words,
insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically
the provisions of the Family Code on support, the
same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy,
foreigners are likewise governed by their national law
with respect to family rights and duties, including the
duty to give support to one’s minor child.
2) In Vivo v. Cloribel, it was held that an alien
cannot invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines as it adheres to the principle that family
rights and duties are governed by his personal law, i.e.,
the laws of the nation to which he belongs even when
staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article
15). In a suit for support against a foreign national,
however, he must allege and prove by way of defense
his national law for the same to apply, otherwise
Philippine law will apply under the doctrine of
processual presumption. This doctrine provides that if
the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and
proved, Philippine courts will presume that the foreign
 51

law is the same as our local or domestic or internal

law.
3) Although the national law of an alien states
that parents have no obligation to support their
children or that such obligation is not punishable by
law, said law would still not find applicability in the
Philippines in light of the ruling in Bank of America,
NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation.
4) In the above cited case, it was held that,
assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter
were properly pleaded and proved in accordance with
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the
jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs.
Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find
applicability. When the foreign law, judgment or
contract is contrary to a sound and established public
policy of the forum such as the Philippines, the said
foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
LIM-LUA vs. LUA
G.R. Nos. 175279-80               June 5, 2013
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

1) As a matter of law, the amount of support

which those related by marriage and family
relationship is generally obliged to give each other
 52

shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the

giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such support
comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity
of the family.
2) Upon receipt of a verified petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for
annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal
separation, and at any time during the proceeding, the
court, motu proprio or upon verified application of
any of the parties, guardian or designated custodian,
may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to
the rendition of judgment or final order. Because of its
provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully
into the merits of the case before it can settle an
application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to
do is determine the kind and amount of evidence
which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the
application. It is enough that the facts be established
by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing
in the record.
3) The matter of increase or reduction of support
should be submitted to the trial court in which the
action for declaration for nullity of marriage was filed.
The amount of support may be reduced or increased
 53

proportionately according to the reduction or increase

of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to support.  As held in
Advincula v. Advincula:
“Judgment for support does not become
final. The right to support is of such nature
that its allowance is essentially provisional;
for during the entire period that a needy
party is entitled to support, his or her
alimony may be modified or altered, in
accordance with his increased or decreased
needs, and with the means of the giver. It
cannot be regarded as subject to final
determination.”
3) American jurisprudence provides that when a
father is required by a divorce decree to make child
support payments directly to the mother, he cannot
claim credit for payments voluntarily made directly to
the children. However, special considerations of an
equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such
payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when
such can be done without injustice to her.
 54

SALAS vs. MATUSALEM

GR No. 180284 Sep 11, 2013
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
1) Under Article 175 (2) of the Family Code, an
action for support filed during the lifetime of the
putative father will survive despite his death during
the pendency thereof. Likewise, the death of the
putative father is not a bar to the action commenced
during his lifetime by one claiming to be his
illegitimate child. The rule on substitution of parties
provided in Section 16 of Rule applies.

2) The action for support must be brought within

the same period specified in Article 173, except when
the action is based on the second paragraph of Article
172, in which case the action must be brought during
the lifetime of the alleged parent. The heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
 55

ABELLA vs. CABAÑERO

G. R. No. 206647 August 9, 2017
LEONEN, J.:

1) For a child to claim support from his putative

father, he must first establish filiation between him
and the former. When filiation is beyond question or
has been established in an action, support may be
demanded and granted in the same action. To establish
filiation, an action for compulsory recognition may be
filed against the putative father ahead of an action for
support. In the alternative, an action for support may
be directly filed, where the matter of filiation shall be
integrated and resolved.

2) A minor may institute an action to compel his

putative father to recognize him as the former’s
natural child and at the same time to obtain relief as
am heir. The two distinct causes of action may be
joined either in an action to compel recognition as an
illegitimate child or an action for support. In other
words, there is no need that the action to compel
acknowledgment should first be instituted and
prosecuted before a minor may file an action for
support or an action to obtain relief as an heir.
***
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