FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

A. Prior Restraint
1. Near v. Minnesota – The US Supreme Court held the Minnesota statue which required publications to
seek official approval before publication by showing “good motives and justifiable ends” for their content,
or risk censorship is a prior restraint of the press that constitute infringement of the liberty of the press
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Note: The First Amendment protects citizen’s freedom of speech from the federal government’s censorship. The
Supreme Court used the Fourteenth Amendment (doctrine of incorporation) to apply the First Amendment to state
governments. The Supreme Court reasoned that the relevant statute allowing prior restraint could lead to a system
of complete censorship under the guise of preventing public nuisance. The Minnesota statute required publications
to seek official approval before publication by showing “good motives and justifiable ends” for their content, or risk
censorship. However, under the First Amendment, even if the liberty of press is abused by miscreant purveyors of
scandal, it “does not affect the requirement that the press has immunity from previous restraints when it deals with
official misconduct.” Therefore, neither the federal nor any state government could censor publications in advance
(with certain exceptions such as wartime). Subsequent punishment for such abuses may be a more
appropriate remedy.
2. New York Times v. US – The Supreme Court noted that “any system of prior restraints comes to this
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity” and “the Government thus carries a
heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.” In this case, the government
had failed to carry that burden.
3. Freedman v. Maryland – The Supreme Court held that Freedman’s refusal to submit the film to the Board
in violation only of Section 2 did not restrict Freedman to an attack on that section alone. The Court found
validity in Freedman’s contention that Section 2 effected an invalid prior restraint on the freedom of speech
because the structure of the other provisions of the statute contributed to the infirmity of Section 2, and that
he did not assert that the other provisions were independently invalid. The Court found that the statute
lacked sufficient safeguards against undue inhibition of protected expression, and that rendered the Section
2 requirement of prior submission of films to the Board an invalid previous restraint in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

B. Subsequent Punishment
1. People v. Perez – The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as
to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of
Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is
within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention
and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and
of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted
authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State.
2. Dennis v. US - The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the convictions of a group of Communist Party organizers
who were tried and convicted under the Smith Act for advocating the overthrow of the U.S. government.
Eugene Dennis and his collaborators had actively worked to recruit, educate, and teach new members and
to prepare for revolution, which was illegal under the Smith Act. The Court reasoned that the willingness
and capability of the defendants to foment rebellion constituted an organized conspiracy that qualified as a
“clear and present danger,” and that in light of this the provisions of the Smith Act were legitimate
restrictions on free speech.
“Clear and present danger depends upon whether the mischief of the repression is greater than
the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability.”
3. Abrams v. US - the Supreme Court upheld the immigrants’ sentence of 20 years in prison for violating a
1918 amendment to the 1917 Espionage Act. The law made it a crime willfully to speak or publish
 “disloyal” language about the American political system or to incite or advocate “any curtailment of
production . . . necessary or essential to the prosecution of the war . . . with intent . . . to curtail or hinder
the United States in the prosecution of the war.” Justice Clarke applied the clear and present danger
test advanced by Holmes in Schenck v. United States (1919) and found that the natural effect of Abrams
and his colleagues’ actions was to “defeat the war plans of the Government” through the “paralysis of a
general strike.”
4. Schenck v. US - the printed or spoken word may not be the subject of previous restraint or subsequent
punishment unless its expression creates a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantial evil.
5. Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans - The closure of the radio station is a violation of the constitutional right of
freedom of speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast are
entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government still has the right to be protected against
broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of freedom of
expression is the “clear and present danger” rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used in such
nature as to create this danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it. However,
Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising. The
freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The people
continues to have the right to be informed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to have the
pervasive influence to the people being the most accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations
deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression
clauses of the Constitution.

C. “Speech Plus” : Symbolic Speech

1. U.S. v. O’Brien – burning of card issued by the government pursuant to a valid statute is prohibited.
Therefore, it is not protected, and the statute is constitutional.
2. Texas v. Johnson - burning of flag is valid exercise of free speech and protected under the law.
3. Tinker v. Des Moines School District - the Supreme Court ruled that neither students nor teachers “shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” The Court took the
position that school officials could not prohibit only on the suspicion that the speech might disrupt the
learning environment.

D. Assembly and Petition

1. PBM Employees v. PBM – Human rights and civil liberties should always prevails against economic
rights.
2. Primias v. Fugoso - Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It
is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free
speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable
ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. The fact that speech is likely to result in
some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the
probability of serious injury to the state.
3. Navarro v. Villegas - The right to freedom of speech and peaceful assembly, though granted by the
Constitution, is not absolute for it may be regulated in order that it may not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right of community and society, This power may be exercised under
the police power of the state, which is the power of the state, which is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, and good order, safety and general welfare of the people.
Respondent Mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate
and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order.
4. JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing - the mayor's ordinance which prohibit the petitioners to rally violates their
constitutional right to free speech and peaceable assembly. It is settled law that as to public places,
especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the
applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group.
5. Malabanan v. Ramento - The Court to lay down the principles for the guidance of school authorities and
students alike. The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational
institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest
is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there is a showing of a clear
and present danger to a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. As a corollary, the utmost
leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable
character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent,
whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the
assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are
devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be
conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the
non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not
be disproportionate to the offense. 
6. Dusit Hotel v. CA - By shaving their heads and cropping their hair, the Union officers and members
violated then Section 6, Rule XIII of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code. This rule
prohibits the commission of any act which will disrupt or impede the early settlement of the labor disputes
that are under conciliation. The Unions violation of the Hotels Grooming Standards was clearly a deliberate
and concerted action to undermine the authority of and to embarrass the Hotel and was, therefore, not a
protected action.

E. Free Speech and Suffrage

1. Gonzales v. COMELEC – The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the
holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the
prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of
votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or
against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.
Freedom of expression is not an absolute. The Court spoke of two tests that may supply an
acceptable criterion for permissible restriction. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that
may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the “clear
and present danger” rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of
the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be
prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established. The "dangerous
tendency rule" is such that “If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to
prevent, then such words are punishable.” It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is
it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about
the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.
2. Sanidad v. COMELEC - While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner’s freedom of expression,
it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced
by respondent to justify such abridgment. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction
of petitioner’s freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.
3. National Press Club v. COMELEC - the law banning political ads has since been repealed but the court
made important observation which is still pertinent. The technical effects of Art. IX (C) (4) of the
constitution may be seen to that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercise of supervisory or
regulatory authority on the part of the COMELEC for the purpose of serving equal opportunity among
candidates for political office, although such supervision or regulation may result in same limitation of the
rights of free speech and free press. The applicable issue is the general, time honored are that statute is
presumed to be constitutional that party asserting unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly
and convincing, proving that assertion.
4. Adiong v. COMELEC - The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile"
places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and
void on constitutional grounds.

F. Use of Private Property as a forum for others’ speech

1. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins - A state law which requires owners of large shopping enters to
allow members of the public to enter their property to distribute petitions does not constitute a taking of
property, even though the law limits the property owner’s right to exclude others from its property. In this
case, the shopping center has acquired “public nature” rather than “commercial nature”.