NOTES IN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
[

A year after the 2004 national and local elections, the Press Secretary told reporters
that the opposition was planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape
of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). The conversation was audio taped allegedly through wire-tapping. Later, in a
Malacaang press briefing, said Secretary produced two versions of the tape, one
supposedly the complete version, and the other, a spliced, doctored or altered version,
which would suggest that the President had instructed the COMELEC official to
manipulate the election results in the Presidents favor. It seems that the Secretary admitted
that the voice was that of President, but subsequently made a retraction.

Later, former counsel of deposed President Joseph Estrada, subsequently released an

alleged authentic tape recording of the wiretap.

Respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary warned reporters that those who had
copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be
held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. . In another press briefing, DOJ Secretary
ordered the NBI to go after media organizations found to have caused the spread, the
playing and the printing of the contents of a tape of an alleged wiretapped conversation
involving the President.
ALSO, the NTC issued this press release:
NTC GIVES FAIR WARNING TO RADIO AND TELEVISION OWNERS/OPERATORS TO
OBSERVE ANTI-WIRETAPPING LAW AND PERTINENT CIRCULARS ON PROGRAM
STANDARDS.

Petitioner filed a petition against respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC, praying to
annul void proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful, unconstitutional and oppressive
exercise of authority by the respondents.

Alleging that the acts of respondents are violations of the freedom on expression and of
the press, and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern,
petitioner specifically asked this Court:
 
[F]or [the] nullification of acts, issuances, and orders of respondents committed or made
since June 6, 2005 until the present that curtail the publics rights to freedom of expression
and of the press, and to information on matters of public concern specifically in relation to
information regarding the controversial taped conversion of President Arroyo and for
prohibition of the further commission of such acts, and making of such issuances, and
orders by respondents.
 Petitioner also argued that respondent NTC acted beyond its
powers when it issued the press release.

Respondents denied that the acts transgress the Constitution, and

questioned petitioners legal standing to file the petition. Among the
arguments they raised as to the validity of the fair warning issued
by respondent NTC, is that broadcast media enjoy lesser
constitutional guarantees compared to print media, and the warning
was issued pursuant to the NTCs mandate to regulate the
telecommunications industry.
It would seem, then, that petitioner has not met the requisite legal standing,
having failed to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.

in line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a case involves
an issue of overarching significance to our society, we therefore brush aside
technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of this petition,[ seeing as it
involves a challenge to the most exalted of all the civil rights, the freedom of
expression.

The petition raises other issues xxx the most decisive one which in the case
at bar is whether the acts of the respondents abridge freedom of speech and
of the press.
 BUT, aside from the primordial issue of determining whether free speech
and freedom of the press have been infringed, the case at bar also gives this
Court the opportunity:

(1)to distill the essence of freedom of speech and of the press now beclouded
by the vagaries of motherhood statements;

(2) to clarify the types of speeches and their differing restraints allowed by
law;

(3)to discuss the core concepts of prior restraint, content-neutral and

content-based regulations and their constitutional standard of review;

(4) to examine the historical difference in the treatment of restraints

between print and broadcast media and stress the standard of review
governing both; and

(5) to call attention to the ongoing blurring of the lines of distinction

between print and broadcast media.
FREDOOM OF EXPRESION, a fundamental principle of every
democratic government, and given a preferred right that stands on a higher
level than substantive economic freedom or other liberties. The cognate
rights codified by Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution, copied almost
verbatim from the First Amendment of the U.S. Bill of Rights, were considered
the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of
free speech. This preferred status of free speech has also been codified at the
U.S. Bill of Rights, First Amendment. (Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.)

In international level, its recognition now enshrined in international law as a

customary norm that binds all nations.
Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR)
states: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this
right includes the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers. Although the UDHR is not binding as a treaty, many
of its provisions have acquired binding status on States and are now part of
customary international law.

Article 19 forms part of the UDHR principles that have been transformed
into binding norms. Moreover, many of the rights in the UDHR were
included in and elaborated on in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), a treaty ratified by over 150 States, including the
Philippines. The recognition of freedom of expression is also found in regional
human rights instruments, namely, the European Convention on Human
Rights (Article 10), the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 10),
and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Article 9).
 In Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, in which it was held:

 
At the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and
punishment. There is to be no previous restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for
damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.

Gonzales further explained that the vital need of a constitutional democracy for
freedom of expression is undeniable, whether as a means of assuring individual self-
fulfillment; of attaining the truth; of assuring participation by the people in social,
including political, decision-making; and of maintaining the balance between stability
and change.As early as the 1920s, the trend as reflected in Philippine and American
decisions was to recognize the broadest scope and assure the widest latitude for this
constitutional guarantee. The trend represents a profound commitment to the principle
that debate on public issue should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.
 
 The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it
extends protection to nearly all forms of communication. It
protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular as well as
political causes, and is not confined to any particular field of
human interest. The protection covers myriad matters of public
interest or concern embracing all issues, about which
information is needed or appropriate, so as to enable members of
society to cope with the exigencies of their period.

The constitutional protection assures the broadest possible

exercise of free speech and free press for religious, political,
economic, scientific, news, or informational ends, inasmuch as
the Constitution's basic guarantee of freedom to advocate ideas
is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional
or shared by a majority.
 
While all forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of freedom
of expression clause, the freedom of film, television and radio broadcasting is
somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and
other print media xxx,

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that
the right to free speech and a free press is not susceptible of any limitation.
BUT the realities of life in a complex society preclude a literal interpretation of
the provision prohibiting the passage of a law that would abridge such freedom.

xxx freedom of expression is not an absolute, nor is it an unbridled license that

gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of
those who abuse this freedom.
XXX, all speech are not treated the same. Some types of speech may be subjected to
some regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in order that it may not
be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or society.
Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a
combination of three tests, i.e.,

(a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a
rational connection has been established between the speech restrained and the
danger contemplated;

(b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation
of type of situation; and

(c) (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech
may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely
lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the
evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high.
 
 As articulated in our jurisprudence, we have applied either the dangerous
tendency doctrine or clear and present danger test to resolve free speech
challenges. More recently, we have concluded that we have generally adhered
to the clear and present danger test.

xxx of press freedom as part of the larger right of free discussion and expression.
Its practical importance, though, is more easily grasped. It is the chief source of
information on current affairs. It is the most pervasive and perhaps most powerful
vehicle of opinion on public questions. It is the instrument by which citizens keep their
government informed of their needs, their aspirations and their grievances.

It is the sharpest weapon in the fight to keep government responsible and

efficient. Without a vigilant press, the mistakes of every administration would go
uncorrected and its abuses unexposed. Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the
period under the 1935 Constitution, has recognized four aspects of freedom of the
press. These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from punishment
subsequent to publication; (3) freedom of access to information; and (4) freedom of
circulation.
Petitioner argued that respondents press statement constitutes a form of impermissible
prior restraint, a closer scrutiny of this principle is in order, as well as its sub-specie of
content-based (as distinguished from content-neutral) regulations. At this point, it should
be noted that respondents in this case deny that their acts constitute prior restraints.

The determination in every case of whether there is an impermissible restraint on the

freedom of speech has always been based on the circumstances of each case, including
the nature of the restraint. And in its application in our jurisdiction, the parameters
of this principle have been etched on a case-to-case basis, always tested by
scrutinizing the governmental issuance or act against the circumstances in which
they operate, and then determining the appropriate test with which to evaluate.

Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior
restraint is largely freedom from government censorship of publications, whatever the
form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative
or judicial branch of the government.
Thus, prior restraint precludes governmental acts that required
approval of a proposal to publish; licensing or permits as
prerequisites to publication including the payment of license taxes
for the privilege to publish; and even injunctions against
publication. Even the closure of the business and printing offices
of certain newspapers, resulting in the discontinuation of their
printing and publication, are deemed as previous restraint or
censorship.

Any law or official that requires some form of permission to be

had before publication can be made, commits an infringement of
the constitutional right, and remedy can be had at the courts.
Xxx ensconced in our fundamental law is the hostility against all prior restraints on speech,
and any act that restrains speech is presumed invalid, and any act that restrains speech is
hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows, it is
important to stress not all prior restraints on speech are invalid. Certain previous restraints
may be permitted by the Constitution, but determined only upon a careful evaluation of
the challenged act as against the appropriate test by which it should be measured against.

Hence, it is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some form of
restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is -

(1) a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech,
or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined
standards; or

(2) a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject
matter of the utterance or speech. [61] The cast of the restriction determines the test by
which the challenged act is assayed with.
When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation,
...only a substantial governmental interest is required for its validity. Because
regulations of this type are not designed to suppress any particular message, they are not
subject to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approach somewhere
between the mere rationality that is required of any other law and the compelling interest
standard applied to content-based restrictions. The test is called intermediate because the
Court will not merely rubberstamp the validity of a law but also require that the
restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote an important or significant governmental
interest that is unrelated to the suppression of expression.

On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press
based on content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive
impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule
will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming
the presumed unconstitutionality.
Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint will
be struck down.

With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the type
of harm the speech sought to be restrained would bring about especially the gravity and
the imminence of the threatened harm otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior
restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, but
only by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality
already on ground. As formulated, the question in every case is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.

Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged acts in the case at bar need to be
subjected to the clear and present danger rule, as they are content-based restrictions.
The acts of respondents focused solely on but one object a specific content fixed as these
were on the alleged taped conversations between the President and a COMELEC
official. Undoubtedly these did not merely provide regulations as to the time, place or
manner of the dissemination of speech or expression.
 Finally, respondents argument that the challenged act is valid on the ground that broadcast media
enjoys free speech rights that are lesser in scope to that of print media. We next explore and test the
validity of this argument, insofar as it has been invoked to validate a content-based restriction on
broadcast media.

Our cases show two distinct features of this dichotomy. First, the difference in treatment, in the
main, is in the regulatory scheme applied to broadcast media that is not imposed on traditional print
media, and narrowly confined to unprotected speech (e.g., obscenity, pornography, seditious and
inciting speech), or is based on a compelling government interest that also has constitutional
protection, such as national security or the electoral process.
 
Second, regardless of the regulatory schemes that broadcast media is subjected to, the Court has
consistently held that the clear and present danger test applies to content-based restrictions on media,
without making a distinction as to traditional print or broadcast media.

More recently, in resolving a case involving the conduct of exit polls and dissemination of the
results by a broadcast company, we reiterated that the clear and present danger rule is the test we
unquestionably adhere to issues that involve freedoms of speech and of the press.[89]
 
This is not to suggest, however, that the clear and present danger rule has been applied to
all cases that involve the broadcast media. The rule applies to all media, including broadcast, but
only when the challenged act is a content-based regulation that infringes on free speech, expression
and the press.
).
That broadcast media is subject to a regulatory regime absent in print media is observed
also in other jurisdictions, where the statutory regimes in place over broadcast media
include elements of licensing, regulation by administrative bodies, and censorship. As
explained by a British author:
 
 
The reasons behind treating broadcast and films differently from the print media differ in
a number of respects, but have a common historical basis. The stricter system of controls
seems to have been adopted in answer to the view that owing to their particular impact
on audiences, films, videos and broadcasting require a system of prior restraints, whereas
it is now accepted that books and other printed media do not. These media are viewed as
beneficial to the public in a number of respects, but are also seen as possible sources of
harm.

Having settled the applicable standard to content-based restrictions on broadcast media, let
us go to its application to the case at bar. To recapitulate, a governmental action that
restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest
scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all
kinds of media, including broadcast media.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different
kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which even if
violated have only an adverse effect on a persons private comfort but does
not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but
their violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression
of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a
vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to
restrain freedom of speech and of the press.

The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and public
interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the
Constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom of
speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement
of the circumference of all these factors to determine compliance with the
clear and present danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as
devaluing violations of law.
By all means, violations of law should be vigorously
prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil
consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their
violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free
speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach
can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the
respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and
present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold
the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no
showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping
law clearly endangers the national security of the State.
….We slide to the issue of whether the mere press statements of the Secretary of Justice
and of the NTC in question constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has
transgressed the Constitution. In resolving this issue, we hold that it is not decisive that
the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with
formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by
respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent
Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement
as the regulatory body of media.

…. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an
official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an act does
not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular.
Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will
result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press
statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute
impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.
 
 There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained
acts on record. The warnings given to media came from no less
the NTC, a regulatory agency that can cancel the Certificate of
Authority of the radio and broadcast media. They also came from
the Secretary of Justice, the alter ego of the Executive, who wields
the awesome power to prosecute those perceived to be violating the
laws of the land.

(Chavez vs. Gonzales, NTC; G.R. 168338; February 15, 2008)

Petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the
following remarks: 

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;

 
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang
babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana
ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol
pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito. x x x

Two days after, before the MTRCB, affidavit-complaints were lodged with the
above broadcast.

After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB,

preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in
accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the
MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of
Procedure.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, however,
petitioner sought to withdraw his motion for reconsideration, followed by the
filing with this Court of a petition for certiorari .

 
In Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB issued a decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered,

finding respondent Soriano liable for his utterances and thereby imposing on him
a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his program, Ang Dating Daan.
 

Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
injunctive relief,xxx.
THE ORDER OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PROMULGATED BY
RESPONDENT [MTRCB] DATED 16 AUGUST 2004 AGAINST THE
TELEVISION PROGRAM ANG DATING DAAN x x x IS NULL AND VOID
FOR BEING ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION

 
(A) BY REASON THAT THE [IRR] IS INVALID INSOFAR AS IT
PROVIDES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
ORDERS;
(B)  BY REASON OF LACK OF DUE HEARING IN THE CASE AT BENCH;
(C)  FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE
LAW;
(D)  FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION; AND
(E) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXPRESSION.
A perusal of the MTRCBs basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the
possession by the agency of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the
challenged order of preventive suspension. And this authority stems naturally
from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation and
supervision.

The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the
MTRCBs authority and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more
particularly under its Sec. 3(d), as quoted above, which empowers the
MTRCB to supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x
x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs
and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in
accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or
broadcast by television.
 
We cannot agree with petitioners assertion that the aforequoted IRR
provision on preventive suspension is applicable only to motion
pictures and publicity materials. The scope of the MTRCBs
authority extends beyond motion pictures. What the acronym
MTRCB stands for would suggest as much. And while the law
makes specific reference to the closure of a television network, the
suspension of a television program is a far less punitive measure that
can be undertaken, with the purpose of stopping further violations of
PD 1986. Again, the MTRCB would regretfully be rendered
ineffective should it be subject to the restrictions petitioner
envisages.
[

Just as untenable is petitioners argument on the nullity of the

preventive suspension order on the ground of lack of hearing. As it were,
the MTRCB handed out the assailed order after petitioner, in response to a
written notice, appeared before that Board for a hearing on private
respondents complaint. No less than petitioner admitted that the order was
issued after the adjournment of the hearing, proving that he had already
appeared before the MTRCB. Under Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD
1986, preventive suspension shall issue [a]ny time during the pendency of
the case. In this particular case, it was done after MTRCB duly apprised
petitioner of his having possibly violated PD 1986 and of administrative
complaints that had been filed against him for such violation.
 
At any event, that preventive suspension can validly be meted out even
without a hearing.
 Petitioner next faults the MTRCB for denying him his right to
the equal protection of the law, arguing that, owing to the
preventive suspension order, he was unable to answer the criticisms
coming from the INC ministers.

Petitioners position does not persuade. The equal protection clause demands
that all persons subject to legislation should be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities
imposed. It guards against undue favor and individual privilege as well as hostile
discrimination. Surely, petitioner cannot, under the premises, place himself in
the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not facing
administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offers no
proof that the said ministers, in their TV programs, use language similar to
that which he used in his own, necessitating the MTRCBs disciplinary
action. If the immediate result of the preventive suspension order is that
petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is unable to answer his critics, this
does not become a deprivation of the equal protection guarantee.
 Petitioner next injects the notion of religious freedom, submitting that
what he uttered was religious speech, adding that words like putang babae
were said in exercise of his religious freedom.
 
The argument has no merit.
 
The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioners utterances in question
can come within the pale of Sec. 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution on
religious freedom. The section reads as follows:
 
No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil
or political rights.

 
There is nothing in petitioners statements subject of the complaints expressing
any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical
mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible
exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a
religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person
cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners attempts
to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need
to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its
veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts
Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language
used in retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made
his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they constitute no
intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival
religious group. They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the
level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have
chosen to contradict and disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road.
 Petitioner urges the striking down of the decision suspending
him from hosting Ang Dating Daan for three months on the main
ground that the decision violates, apart from his religious freedom,
his freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Sec. 4, Art.
III of the Constitution, which reads:
 
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievance.
 
 
He would also have the Court declare PD 1986, its Sec. 3(c) in
particular, unconstitutional for reasons articulated in this petition.

 
[

Prior restraint means official government restrictions on the press or other

forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. The
freedom of expression, as with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights,
is, however, not absolute. It may be regulated to some extent to serve important
public interests, some forms of speech not being protected. As has been held, the
limits of the freedom of expression are reached when the expression touches
upon matters of essentially private concern.

In the oft-quoted expression of Justice Holmes, the constitutional guarantee

obviously was not intended to give immunity for every possible use of
language.From Lucas v. Royo comes this line: [The freedom to express ones
sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the
honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments must be expressed within the
proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of others.
 Petitioner asserts that his utterance in question is a protected form of speech.
 
The Court rules otherwise. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-
value expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading
advertisement, insulting or fighting words, i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security.

 
The Court finds that petitioners statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average
child. Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech. In Fernando v. Court of Appeals, the Court expressed
difficulty in formulating a definition of obscenity that would apply to all cases, but nonetheless stated the
ensuing observations on the matter:

 
There is no perfect definition of obscenity but the latest word is that of Miller v. California which
established basic guidelines, to wit:

(a) whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest;

(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and

(c) c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
. Following the contextual lessons of the cited case of Miller v. California, a patently
offensive utterance would come within the pale of the term obscenity should it appeal
to the prurient interest of an average listener applying contemporary standards.

A cursory examination of the utterances complained of and the circumstances of the

case reveal that to an average adult, the utterances Gago ka talaga x x x, masahol ka pa
sa putang babae x x x. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito]
kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! may not constitute obscene but merely
indecent utterances. They can be viewed as figures of speech or merely a play on words.
In the context they were used, they may not appeal to the prurient interests of an adult.
The problem with the challenged statements is that they were uttered in a TV program
that is rated G or for general viewership, and in a time slot that would likely reach even
the eyes and ears of children.

Even if we concede that petitioners remarks are not obscene but merely indecent
speech, still the Court rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional
protection of free speech. Said statements were made in a medium easily accessible to
children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances are to be treated as
unprotected speech. (Eliseo Soriano vs. Ma. Consoliza P. Laguardia,et.al;G.R.
Nos.164785; April 29, 2009)
Complainant requested the presiding judge, for an investigation of respondent Escritor, court
interpreter in said court, for living with a man not her husband, and having borne a child within this
live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the
image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear
that the court condones her act. Consequently, respondent was charged with committing disgraceful
and immoral conduct under the Revised Administrative Code.

Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband
having died in 1998. She admitted that she started living with Luciano without the benefit of
marriage more than 20 years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman.
She also admitted that she and Luciano have a son. But as a member of the religious Jehovahs
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, she asserted that their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation.
In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness.

For Jehovah's Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of the congregation who have been
abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations.
The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over
the world except in countries where divorce is allowed.
By invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of
her congregation, in asserting that her conjugal arrangement does
not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct for which she
should be held administratively liable, the Court had to determine
the contours of religious freedom under Article III, Section 5 of
the Constitution, which provides, viz:

Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
There has never been any question that the state has an interest in protecting the
institutions of marriage and the family, or even in the sound administration of justice.
Indeed, the provisions by which respondents relationship is said to have impinged, e.g.,
Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code, Articles
334 and 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and even the provisions on marriage and family in
the Civil Code and Family Code, all clearly demonstrate the States need to protect these
secular interests.

Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred
position in the hierarchy of rights the most inalienable and sacred of human rights, in
the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that the states interest is
important, because our Constitution itself holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The
State must articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the
exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule
otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself.
Thus, it is not the States broad interest in protecting the institutions of marriage and the
family, or even in the sound administration of justice that must be weighed against
respondents claim, but the States narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for
the cohabitation which respondents faith finds moral. In other words, the government
must do more than assert the objectives at risk if exemption is given; it must
precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be undermined if
exemptions are granted.

To paraphrase Justice Blackmuns application of the compelling interest test, the States
interest in enforcing its prohibition, in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a
free exercise claim, cannot be merely abstract or symbolic. The State cannot
plausibly assert that unbending application of a criminal prohibition is essential to
fulfill any compelling interest, if it does not, in fact, attempt to enforce that
prohibition. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. The
State has never sought to prosecute respondent nor her partner. The States asserted
interest thus amounts only to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
As previously discussed, our Constitution adheres to the
benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause. Thus, in arguing that respondent should be held
administratively liable as the arrangement she had was illegal
per se because, by universally recognized standards, it is
inherently or by its very nature bad, improper, immoral and
contrary to good conscience,the Solicitor General failed to
appreciate that benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does
not offend compelling state interests.
 
Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct
circumstances, respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized
as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental
right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be
upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed.

In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands

accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest
sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the
very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom.

In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed
to subscribe to the Infinite.
a)The public morality expressed in the law is necessarily secular for in our
constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from
establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions. Thus, when
the law speaks of immorality in the Civil Service Law or immoral in the
Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers ,or public morals in the
Revised Penal Code, or morals in the New Civil Code, or moral character
in the Constitution, the distinction between public and secular morality on
the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, should be kept in mind;

(b) Although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent

neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests;

(c) The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bar should be
understood only in this realm where it has authority.
As previously stated, the compelling state interest test involves a three-step process. We explained
this process in detail, by showing the questions which must be answered in each step, viz:

First, [H]as the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise of religion? The
courts often look into the sincerity of the religious belief, but without inquiring into the truth of the
belief because the Free Exercise Clause prohibits inquiring about its truth as held in Ballard and
Cantwell. The sincerity of the claimants belief is ascertained to avoid the mere claim of religious
beliefs to escape a mandatory regulation. xxx
xxx xxx xxx

Second, the court asks: [I]s there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement
of religious liberty? In this step, the government has to establish that its purposes are legitimate
for the state and that they are compelling. Government must do more than assert the objectives at
risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be
undermined if exemptions are granted. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Third, the court asks: [H]as the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve
the legitimate goal of the state? The analysis requires the state to show that the means in which it is
achieving its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means, i.e., it has chosen a way to
achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties xxx.(Estrada
vs. Escritor)
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondent’s right to religious freedom
has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between keeping her employment
and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the one hand, and giving
up her employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts
a burden on her free exercise of religion.

The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her religious belief. Respondent
appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not merely using the
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” to avoid punishment for immorality. She did not
secure the Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the moral standards are
strict and defined, much less only after an administrative case for immorality was filed
against her. The Declaration was issued to her by her congregation after ten years of
living together with her partner, Quilapio, and ten years before she entered the judiciary.
Ministers from her congregation testified on the authenticity of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’
practice of securing a Declaration and their doctrinal or scriptural basis for such a
practice. As the ministers testified, the Declaration is not whimsically issued to avoid
legal punishment for illicit conduct but to make the “union” of their members under
respondent’s circumstances “honorable before God and men.” xxx Respondent’s request
for exemption from the flag ceremony shows her sincerity in practicing the Jehovah’s
Witnesses’ beliefs and not using them merely to escape punishment. She is a practicing
member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Jehovah ministers testified that she is a
Ginamit ang compelling state interest test sa Estrada v. Escritor upang
malaman kung ang respondent doon ay nararapat na bigyan ng exemption
laban sa kasong administratibo bunga ng pakikisama niya sa lalaking hindi
niya asawa ayon sa Civil Code. Karaniwan, bilang kawani ng pamahalaan,
mahaharap ang respondent sa kasong disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Bagkus, inilahad ng respondent na bagama't walang basbas ng pamahalaang
sibil ang kanilang pagsasama, may basbas naman ito ng kanilang relihiyon na
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society. Kaya't
hindi siya nararapat na sampahan ng kasong administratibo bunga nito.
Sa kadahilanang aminado naman ang Solicitor General na tunay at tapat ang
paniniwala ng respondent sa kaniyang relihiyon, at nagdudulot ng ligalig sa
kanyang paniniwala ang banta ng disciplinary action bunga ng kasong
disgraceful and immoral conduct, nagpasiya ang Korte Suprema na nararapat
na patunayan ng pamahalaan kung tunay nga na may compelling secular
objective na nagbunsod dito upang hindi payagan ang pakikisama ng
respondent sa lalaking hindi niya asawa. Nararapat din, ayon sa Korte
Suprema, na ipakita ng pamahalaan na gumamit ito ng least restrictive means
sa pagpigil ng karapatan ng mga tao sa pagtatanggol nito ng compelling state
interest.
Ukol dito, inihayag ng Korte Suprema na "the government must do more than
assert the objectives at risk if exemption is given, it must precisely show how
and to what extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are
granted.“ Sa kalaunan, bigo ang pamahalaan na patunayan ang pakay nito sa
pagbabawal sa relasyon ng respondent. Bunsod nito, binigyan ng exemption
sa parusa ang respondent batay sa kanyang religious freedom.

Malinaw sa Estrada v. Escritor na sa ilalim ng compelling state interest test,

ipinagtutunggali ang religious freedom ng mga mamamayan at ang interes ng
pamahalaan sa pagpapatupad ng patakarang sinasabing nagpapahirap sa
religious convictions ng ilan. Kapag hindi nanaig ang interes ng pamahalaan,
magbibigay ng exemption sa patakaran ang Korte Suprema para sa mga
mamamayang naninindigan para sa kanilang religious freedom. Isinaad din sa
Estrada v. Escritor na nakagawian na ng Korte Suprema na magbigay ng
exemption sa halip na magpawalang-bisa ng mga patakaran ng
pamahalaan pagdating sa usapin ng religious freedom.
“IN case of Ayer Productions v. Capulong A
limited intrusion into a person’s privacy has long
been regarded as permissible where that person is a
public figure and the information sought to be elicited
from him or to be published about him constitute
matters of public character. The interest sought to be
protected by the right to privacy is the right to be free
from “unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful
publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an
individual which are outside the realm of legitimate
public concern.”
Commercial speech simply means communication whose sole purpose is to
propose a commercial transaction. It is also protected speech, but it has not
been accorded the same level of protection as that given to what is called
“core” speech such as political speech.

In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the

Philippines vs. Secretary Duque, The absolute ban on advertising is unduly
restrictive and is more than necessary to further the avowed governmental
interest of promoting the health of infants and young children. It ought to
be self-evident that the advertisement of such products which are strictly
informative cuts deep free speech. The laudable concern of the respondent
for the promotion of the health of infants and young children cannot justify
the absolute overarching ban.
 
”Based on the above cases, it is obvious that commercial speech is protected
as long as it is factual and not contrary to public order and public morals.
 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine, that “a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application, is void as violative of the first
essential of due process of law”

* This doctrine applies to free speech only.

 On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second
Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because
of their sexual orientation and gender identity.

and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

x x x refers to a person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and
intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than
one gender.”
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality
which offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the
natural use into that which is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the
woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and
receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women “ye are indeed a people
transgressing beyond bounds.” (7.81) “And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see
what was the end of those who indulged in sin and crime!” (7:84) “He said: “O my Lord! Help Thou
me against people who do mischief” (29:30).
 Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious
matters.”[1][24] Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious
justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” [1][25] We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause
for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the
exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the

Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the
COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings
beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated,
government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have
primarily secular effects.
MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES v. ATTY. ROBERTO "ARGEE"
C. GUEVARRA (A.C. No. 11394,December 01, 2016)

In 2009, respondent wrote series of posts on his Facebook account, insulting and
verbally abusing complainant. Some of the posts include the following excerpts:

Quack Doctor Becky Belo: I am out to get Puwitic Justice here! Kiss My
Client's Ass, Belo. Senator Adel Tamano, don't kiss Belo's ass. Guys and
girls, nagiisip na akong tumakbo sa Hanghalan 2010 to Kick some ass!!! I will
launch a national campaign against Plastic Politicians No guns, No goons, No
gold - IN GUTS I TRUST!
Dr. Vicki Belo, watch out for Josefina Norcio's Big Bang on Friday - You will
go down in Medical History as a QUACK DOCTOR!!!! QUACK QUACK
QUACK QUACK. CNN, FOX NEWS, BLOOMBERG, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
L.A. TIMES c/o my partner in the U.S., Atty. Trixie Cruz-Angeles

Argee Guevarra is amused by a libel case filed by Vicki Belo against me through her
office receptionist in Taytay Rizal. Haaaaay, style-bulok at style-duwag talaga.
Lalakarin ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan at Reyna ng Payola ang kaso... si Imelda
Marcos nga sued me for P300 million pesos and ended up apologizing to me, si
Belo pa kaya?
Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language, were designed to
inspire public hatred, destroy her reputation, and to close BMGI and all its clinics,
among others, complainant lodged the instant complaint for disbarment against
respondent.

At the outset, the respondent never denied that he posted the purportedly
vulgar and obscene remarks about complainant and BMGI on his Facebook
account. In defense, however, respondent claimed that the complaint was
filed in violation of his constitutionally-guaranteed right to privacy,
asserting that the posts quoted by complainant were private remarks on his
private account on Facebook, meant to be shared only with his circle of
friends of which complainant was not a part. He also averred that he wrote
the posts in the exercise of his freedom of speech, and contended that the
complaint was filed to derail the criminal cases that his client, Norcio, had
filed against complainant. He denied that the remarks were vulgar and obscene,
and that he made
 ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the respondent’s
constitutional right to privacy and freedom of speech.

RULING:
NONE.
No violation of right to privacy. Facebook is currently the most
popular social media site, having surpassed one (1) billion
registered accounts and with 1.71 billion monthly active users.
Social media are web-based platforms that enable online
interaction and facilitate users to generate and share content.
There are various classifications of social media platforms and
one can be classified under the "social networking sites" such as
Facebook.
Facebook is a "voluntary social network to which members subscribe
and submit information. x x x It has a worldwide forum enabling friends
to share information such as thoughts, links, and photographs, with one
another." Users register at this site, create a personal profile or an open
book of who they are, add other users as friends, and exchange messages,
including automatic notifications when they update their profile. A user can
post a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be made
visible to anyone, depending on the user's privacy settings

To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose,

Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the
accessibility of a user's profile, as well as information uploaded by the user.

In H v. W, the South Gauteng High Court of Johannesburg, Republic of

South Africa recognized this ability of the users to "customize their
privacy settings," but with the cautionary advice that although Facebook,
as stated in its policies, "makes every effort to protect a user's
information, these privacy settings are however not foolproof."
Consequently, before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her
online social networking activity - in this case, Facebook - it is first
necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts
private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto
or to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize in cyberspace
through the utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In other words,
utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world,
of the user's invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.

The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and
insulting complainant, which posts respondent insists were set to private
view. However, the respondent has failed to offer evidence that he
utilized any of the privacy tools or features of Facebook available to
him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a select few.
Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that
the subject posts, as well as the comments thereto, were visible only to him
and his circle of friends, respondent's statement is, at best, self-serving, thus
deserving scant consideration
Moreover, even if the Court were to accept respondent's allegation that
his posts were limited to or viewable by his "Friends" only, there is no
assurance that the same - or other digital content that he uploads or
publishes on his Facebook profile - will be safeguarded as within the
confines of privacy, in light of the following:
1. Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by
giving its users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable
way";
2. A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are
total strangers;
3. The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds;
and
4. A user's Facebook friend can "share" the former's post, or "tag"
others who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its
being visible only to his or her own Facebook friends.
Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to
"Friends" does not guarantee absolute protection from the
prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one's
circle of friends. The user's own Facebook friend can share said
content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless
of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not
with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is
tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared
the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting
of which was set at "Friends." Under the circumstances,
therefore, respondent's claim of violation of right to privacy is
negated
The claim that the subject remarks were written in the
exercise of his freedom of speech and expression is bereft of
merit. Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is
not absolute. While the freedom of expression and the right of
speech and of the press are among the most zealously protected
rights in the Constitution, every person exercising them, as the
Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith. As such, the
constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be
availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others,
destroy their name or reputation or bring them into
disrepute. A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks
complained of disclosed that they were ostensibly made with
malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of
complainant and BMGI.
 SUB JUDICE RULE

…proscribes public comment on pending litigation on

the ground that it would interfere with the
administration of justice.

“Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence

the courts in administering justice in apending suit or proceeding constitutes
criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the court” (Pp. vs.
Alarcon; Pp. vs. Godoy)
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities
and institutions of higher learning, has been enshrined in our Constitutions of
1935, 1973, and 1987. In Garcia, this Court espoused the concurring opinion
of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, which enumerated "the four essential freedoms" of a university:
To determine for itself on academic grounds (1) who may teach, (2) what
may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who may be admitted to
study. An educational institution has the power to adopt and enforce such
rules as may be deemed expedient for its government, this being incident to
the very object of incorporation, and indispensable to the successful
management of the college. It can decide for itself its aims and objectives and
how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or interference except
when there is an overriding public welfare which would call for some
restraint.
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third
freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an
atmosphere of anarchy.

Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution

requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly
educational program and the creation of an educational environment
conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the
protection of the students, faculty, and property.

Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a

necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling
discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline
the student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach." Incidentally,
the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its
students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.
Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more
evident than in "who may be admitted to study." If a school has the freedom to
determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine
whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions
such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges.

The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even

after graduation for any act done by the student prior thereto. In
University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals,We upheld the
university's withdrawal of a doctorate degree already conferred on a student
who was found to have committed intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation
xxx.
G.R. No.211362               -------------------------------- February 24, 2015
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine Military Academy, represented by
his father RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts on his own behalf, and BERTENI CATALUNA
CAUSING, Petitioners, vs. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY
ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA and HC MEMBERS,
and the CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB), Respondents.
RIGHT TO PUBLIC INFORMATION
- public right

includes :

1. Right to information on matter of public concern;

2. Corollary right of access to official records and

documents.

…thus, Jurisprudence had recognized the right of newspaper and newspaper

staff to have access to public records.

Mandatory publication of laws is a means of implementing the right to

information!
Right to information is only limited on matters of public
concern and is subject to limitation provided by law.

Hence, may not be extended on –

1. trade secrets or confidential and financial information;

2. Information affecting national security
3. Diplomatic correspondence affecting national security and
interest;
4. Matter still pending decision;
5. Confidential records of different branches of the government.
“No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.” (Article III,
Section 10, Constitution)

! Only legal and lawful contracts are protected.

Reasons:
1. Implement freedom of contracts
2. Protect property rights
3. Safeguard the integrity of contracts against unwarranted
interference by the sate.

Being the case, Article 1306, Civil Code, among others, provides,

“Contracting parties may establish stipulations, clauses, terms and

condition not contrary to law, morals, good customs….” (Autonomy of
Contracts)
 Is the non - interference clause absolute?

Take note!

“For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
obligation as between parties but the reservation of essential attributes
of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of legal
order” ( Abella vs. NLRC)
There is impairment when the law is made to apply retroactively
so as to cover contracts entered into prior to its enactment.

AND, such retroactive effect diminishes the efficacy of the

contracts!
Respondent China Banking Corporation mainly argues the violation of the
constitutional proscription against impairment of contractual obligations in that
neither the provisions of Pres. Dec. No. 902-A as amended nor the Interim
Rules empower commercial courts "to render without force and effect valid
contractual stipulations.“

The non-impairment clause first appeared in the United States Constitution as a

safeguard against the issuance of worthless paper money that disturbed
economic stability after the American Revolution. This constitutional provision
was designed to promote commercial stability. At its core is "a prohibition of
state interference with debtor-creditor relationships."
This clause first became operative in the Philippines through the Philippine Bill
of 1902, the fifth paragraph of Section 5 which states "[t]hat no law impairing
the obligation of contracts shall be enacted." It was consistently adopted in
subsequent Philippine fundamental laws, namely, the Jones Law of 1916,73 the
1935 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution, and the present Constitution.

Nevertheless, this court has brushed aside invocations of the non-impairment

clause to give way to a valid exercise of police power and afford protection to
labor.
In Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corporation v. Puerto Azul Land, Inc. which
similarly involved corporate rehabilitation, this court found no merit in Pacific Wide’s
invocation of the non-impairment clause, explaining as follows:

We also find no merit in PWRDC’s contention that there is a violation of the

impairment clause. Section 10, Article III of the Constitution mandates that no law
impairing the obligations of contract shall be passed. This case does not involve a
law or an executive issuance declaring the modification of the contract among debtor
PALI, its creditors and its accommodation mortgagors.

Thus, the non-impairment clause may not be invoked. Furthermore, as held in Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr. even assuming that the same may be invoked, the non-impairment clause
must yield to the police power of the State. Property rights and contractual rights are
not absolute. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations is limited
by the exercise of the police power of the State for the common good of the general
public.( Pryce Banking Corporation vs. China Banking Corporation, GR.172302;
February 18, 2014)
To be an EX POST FACTO LAW, the law must:

1. refer to criminal matters;

2. be retroactive in its application; and

3. to the prejudice of the accused

Hence, even if the law be penal and retroactive, it will still not be ex post
facto, if it does not operate to the disadvantage of the accused.
“No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.”

Thus, penal law (RPC) provides –

Art. 274. Services rendered under compulsion of debt.

Art. 287. Light Coercion – shall seize anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose
of applying the same to the payment of the debt.
Art. 273. Exploitation of Child Labor – impose upon anyone, under pretext of
reimbursing him of a debt incurred by ascendant/s.

However,

Art. 314 . Fraudulent Insolvency. Any person who shall abscond with his property
to the prejudice of his creditor, shall suffer xxxx.

Also, read: Republic Act No. 8484 ( Access Device Regulation Act)
“No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist
except as a punishment for crime whereof that party
shall have been duly convicted.”

Other exception –

“All citizens may be required, under conditions provided by

law, to render personal military or civil service. (Art. III Sec. 4)

* Posse Comitatus – power of the state to require all able-bodied citizens

to perform civic duty to maintain peace and order.
“No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non - payment of poll tax”

Thus, penal laws (RPC) provide the following:

Art. 274. Services rendered under compulsion of debt.
Art. 287. Light Coercion – shall seize anything belonging to his debtor for the
purpose of applying the same to the payment of debt.
Art. 273. Exploitation of Child labor- impose upon anyone, under the pretext of
reimbursing him o debt incurred by ascendant/s.

However,
Art. 314. Fraudulent Insolvency. Any person who shall abscond with his
property to the prejudice of his creditors, shall suffer xxxx.

Also, read:

Republic Act No. 8484 (Access Device Regulation Act)

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.

The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity
in the following order:
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of
the aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the
preceding paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no
known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other
authorized parties to file similar petitions. Likewise, the filing of the petition by
an authorized party on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of all
others, observing the order established herein.
Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the
respondent shall file a verified written return together with
supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain
the following:

(a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not
violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and
security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission;
(b) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine
the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or
persons responsible for the threat, act or omission;
(c) All relevant information in the possession of the respondent
pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved
party; and
d) If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the actions
that have been or will still be taken:

(i) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;

(ii) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person
identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons
responsible;
(iii) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or
disappearance;
(iv) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as
any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;
(v) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance;
and
(vi) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the
prosecution of the case.

A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.

Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. “ The following pleadings and motions are
prohibited:
(a) Motion to dismiss;
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper
and other pleadings;
(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
(f) Third-party complaint;
(g) Reply;
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;
(i) Intervention;
(j) Memorandum;
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and
(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order.
Interim Reliefs. ” Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before
final judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any of the
following reliefs:

(a) Temporary Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge,

upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the
aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be
protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or
private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If
the petitioner is an organization, association or institution referred
to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the protection may be extended to
the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private
institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner
or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in
accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.
Inspection Order. ” The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and
after due hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a
designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of
inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any
relevant object or operation thereon.

The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be
supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal
knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved
party.

If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the

privileged nature of the information, the court, justice or judge may conduct
a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
Production Order. “ The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after
due hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects
or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute
or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and
permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the
movant.

The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the

privileged nature of the information, in which case the court, justice or judge
may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
SEC. 16. Contempt. “ The court, justice or judge may order the respondent
who refuses to make a return, or who makes a false return, or any person who
otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court to be
punished for contempt. The contemnor may be imprisoned or imposed a fine.

SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. “ The parties
shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. The respondent who is a
private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of
duty. The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that
extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations
was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent public official or
employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed to evade responsibility or liability.
SEC. 18. Judgment. ” The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days
from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the
petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege
of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the
privilege shall be denied.

SEC. 19. Appeal. “ Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to
the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or
law or both. The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date
of notice of the adverse judgment. The appeal shall be given the same priority
as in habeas corpus cases.
SEC. 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. The court shall not
dismiss the petition, but shall archive it, if upon its determination
it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the failure of petitioner
or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives.
SEC. 21. Institution of Separate Actions. ” This Rule shall not preclude the filing
of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions.

SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. “ When a criminal action has
been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs
under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs
available under the writ of amparo.

SEC. 23. Consolidation. “ When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the

filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal
action.

When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a
petition for a writ of amparo, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal
action. After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to apply
to the disposition of the reliefs in the petition) Rule on the Writ of Amparo
[A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, 25 September 2007.(
Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved
under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present
constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not
be sued during his or her tenure.The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987
Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and
why this must be so:

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office
of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of
his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the
discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.x x x
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to
hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced
disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the
theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of
international law or customary international law in accordance with the
incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply
to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed
to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual
respondents’ criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In
other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of
criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an
administrative rule may have been committed.

As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo), the

writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective
procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights
to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit,
however, "is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings."
As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo
(Manalo), the writ of amparo was conceived to provide
expeditious and effective procedural relief against violations or
threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and
security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however,
"is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings."
Court said in Razon v. Tagitis:

It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings]; it
determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings] for
purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance [or extra-judicial killings].

(Rubico vs. GMA, et.al.GR.183871; February 18, 2010)

The case hinges on the issue as to whether or not petitioner’s right
to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the
issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the
privilege of the writ of amparo.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a

remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced

disappearances or threats thereof.
The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., made a
categorical pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is
confined to these two instances of "extralegal killings" and "enforced
disappearances," or to threats thereof, thus:

x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of

"extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present
form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal
killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced
disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest,
detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized
groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the
fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law."
It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available
under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What
it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial.

Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for
the protection of his right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the
protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo because the HDO is a
continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The Court is thus called upon
to rule whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under
Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to
liberty; and (3) right to security.

In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., the Court explained

the concept of right to life in this wise:

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the
right to be alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is
preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure
quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a
life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated
by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the
government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his
person and property.
The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of
Manila, et al. v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., in this manner:

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice

Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free
from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed
into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the
citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the
facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator,
subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common
welfare." x x x
Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.thoroughly expounded on
the import of the right to security, thus:

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various

permutations of the exercise of this right.

First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas"
clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates
that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief
and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people." (emphasis supplied) Some scholars
postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but
essentially an individual international human right. It is the "right to security
of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from fear." Article 3
of the UDHR provides, viz:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is
actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with
violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of
violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.

The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. As we have
stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, "xxx a person’s right to travel is subject to the usual
constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such
cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for
humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s sound discretion."

Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of

the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to
establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it
amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there
exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.(Fr. Reyes vs. Gonzales
et.al;GR.182162, December 3, 2009)
We rule in favor of petitioners. The Procedure for Testimonial Examination
of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is Covered Under Section 15, Rule
119.

The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open

court.

This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the
accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face
to face. The requirement is the “safest and most satisfactory method of
investigating facts” as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility
through his manner and deportment while testifying.

It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the

conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as
testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of
conditional examination of witnesses – both for the benefit of the defense, as
well as the prosecution. The Court's ruling in the case of Vda. de Manguerra
v. Risos explicitly states that –

“x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the

different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action.
These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as
modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure , which took effect on
December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and
prosecution witnesses
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of
depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories,
before any judge, notary public or person authorized to administer oaths at any
time or place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine consular official,
commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state
or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to
the other party.

But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of
a prosecution witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the
testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before
the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not
before the very same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a
detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial
judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and
properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness'
testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused.

This is the import of the Court's ruling in Vda. de Manguerram where we further
declared that While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its
witness in order to prove its case, we cannot disregard the rules which are designed
mainly for the protection of the accused's constitutional rights.The giving of testimony
during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the
trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.(GO vs.
People;GR.185527; July 18, 2012)
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and
their families. 
Based on the records, Nagares extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given, and thus
admissible. As found by the Court of Appeals, (1) there is no evidence of compulsion or
duress or violence on the person of Nagares; (2) Nagares did not complain to the officers
administering the oath during the taking of his sworn statement; (3) he did not file any
criminal or administrative complaint against his alleged malefactors for maltreatment; (4)
no marks of violence were observed on his body; and (5) he did not have himself
examined by a physician to support his claim. Moreover, appellants confession is replete
with details, which makes it highly improbable that it was not voluntarily given.(People
vs. Nagares;GR.175330;January 12, 2010)
Right to be Informed

-transmissionof a meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial

and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional rights.

- meaningful advocacy of the rights of the accused

 Kinds of coerced or involuntary confession

-1. coerced confessions, product of third degree methods such as

torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation;
-2. Uncounselled statements without the benefit of the Miranda
Warnings. (pp. vs. Vallejo)

-Note!
-Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to
spontaneous statements not elicited through questioning by authorities
but given in an ordinary manner.
ENRILE vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN(3RD Division) G.R. No. 213847; August
18, 2015

FACTS: On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and
several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported
involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014,
Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition,
praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be
found against him. The Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile’s
motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity
considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed
under the custody of the law. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of
Enrile. On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile
voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was
later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital
following his medical examination.
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital , and
his Motion to Fix Bai. In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be
allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the
evidence of his guilt was strong;(b) although he was charged with plunder, the
penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and
(c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be
seriously considered. July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed
resolution denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly :x x x [I]t is only after
the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made a
determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he
demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to
fix the amount of his bail. To be sure, no such determination has been made by the
Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail
hearing can even commence.

It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail. x x
x x Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he
is charged with plunder, “the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him
is reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua.” He anchors this claim on Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years
old and that he voluntarily surrendered. “Accordingly, it may be said that the crime
charged against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable.”
The argument has no merit.
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s
is not taken into consideration. These circumstances will only be
appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should the
accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x x x Lastly, accused
Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not a
flight risk and his physical condition must also be seriously considered by
the Court. Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being
a flight risk are among the factors that are considered in fixing a
reasonable amount of bail.

However, as explained above, it is premature for the Court to fix the

amount of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt
against accused Enrile is not strong. WHEREFORE, premises
considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7,
2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
COURT’S RULING: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The presumption of
innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by
the constitutional right to be released on bail, and further binds the court to
wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused. It is worthy
to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing
additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance
of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court.
The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose.

Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the

accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and
the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.
Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life
imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is subject to judicial discretion

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not

evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses,
or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies
within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in
Concerned Citizens v. Elma,

“such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to

ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether
or not he should be granted provisional liberty.”

It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a

matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a
hearing with notice to the Prosecution.
As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be
imposed upon Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the presence of
two mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that the presence or
absence of mitigating circumstances is also not consideration that
Constitution deemed worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is
"charged with an offense punishable by.”

It is, therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that

has bearing and not the possibility of mitigating circumstances
being appreciated in the accused’s favor.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is
guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required
by the court.

The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the

international community arising from the national commitment under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth

and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section
II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights.”
” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or
arrested can participate in the proceedings before a
court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality
of the detention and order their release if justified. In
other words, the Philippine authorities are under
obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail.”
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the
grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to
extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee
will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that
there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that
the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His
personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal
or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of
this country
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another
compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which
the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of

the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the
merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration
is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true
objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
The Court has already held in Dela Rama v. The People’s Court:
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the
following:

x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law

in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner,
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance,
and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration which
should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the
proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to
admit the prisoner to bail; x x x
xxxx
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored
the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the
trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile
health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari;

ISSUES the writ of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the
Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No.
SB-14-CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014;
An accused right to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial is guaranteed in
criminal cases by Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution.

This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an
innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation
or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible
time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever
legitimate defense he may interpose.

Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial,

we reiterate the old legal maxim, justice delayed is justice denied. This oft-
repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so
in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a
speedy trial.
 “No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.”
(Right against Self Incrimination)

-Simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of
guilt.

-what is avoided is the use of physical and moral compulsion to extort communication from the
accused

- It would prevent extorting communication by duress

-prohibited
on ground of public policy; would place the witness under strongest temptation to
commit perjury;

-available not only in criminal prosecutions but all other government’s proceedings including
civil, administrative and legislative;

-may be availed by the accused and any witness to whom a question calling for an
incriminating answer is addressed.

- questions are incriminating when the same could expose a person to subsequent prosecution;
Note! (Right against Self Incrimination)

The right to refuse is limited to testimonial evidence or acts requiring

the use of metal faculty or discretion!

Thus, the following acts are not violations:

a) substance emitted from the body of the accused

b) hair samples
c) DNA
d) fingerprinting
e) photographing
f) paraffin testing
 We further emphasized in Uy that speedy trial is a relative
term and necessarily a flexible concept.  In determining
whether the right of the accused to a speedy trial was violated,
the delay should be considered, in view of the entirety of the
proceedings.  Indeed, mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday
life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all,
do not exist in a vacuum.
 We expounded more extensively in Corpuz on the right of the accused to a speedy trial and
disposition of the case against him, thus:
 
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case
against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the
administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in
the trial of criminal cases.  Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case
is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays.  The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not
susceptible by precise qualification.  The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative
term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
 
While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly,
expeditious and not mere speed.    It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a
system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate.  It is consistent with delays
and depends upon circumstances.  It secures rights to the accused, but it does not
preclude the rights of public justice.  Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights
given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not
weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent
 In Corpuz the test for determining whether an accused was indeed deprived of his right to a speedy trial
and disposition of the case against him:
 
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length
of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his right; and
(d) prejudice to the defendant. 

Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the
speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial
incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the
possibility that his defense will be impaired.  Of these, the most serious is the last,
because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of
the entire system.  There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall
accurately the events of the distant past.  Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to
trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of
anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility.  His financial resources may be drained, his
association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.
Delay is a two-edge sword.  It is the government that bears the burden of
proving its case beyond reasonable doubt.  The passage of time may make it
difficult or impossible for the government to carry its burden.  The
Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary
efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate
that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly
prosecuting criminals. 

As held in Williams v. United States, for the government to sustain its right to
try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the accused
suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the
ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than
is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.
 We held in Corpuz that:
 
In the unanimous Resolution of December 12, 2003, the Sandiganbayan
ruled as follows:
 
In the cases at bar, the dismissal made in open court by the Chairman,
which was not reduced in writing, is not a valid dismissal or termination of
the cases. This is because the Chairman cannot unilaterally dismiss the same
without the approval or consent of the other members of the Division. The
Sandiganbayan is a collegiate court and under its internal rules prevailing at
the time (Rule XVIII, Section 1(b) of the 1984 Revised Rules of the
Sandiganbayan, which is now Section 1(b), Rule VIII of the 2002 Revised
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan), an order, resolution or judgment, in
order to be valid - that is to say, in order to be considered as an official action
of the Court itself - must bear the unanimous approval of the members of the
division, or in case of lack thereof, by the majority vote of the members of a
special division of five.
We agree with the foregoing ratiocination. Section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, mandates that a judgment must be written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and
shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon
which it is based. The rule applies to a final order dismissing a criminal case
grounded on the violation of the rights of the accused to a speedy trial. A verbal
judgment or order of dismissal is a violation of the provision; hence, such order
is, in contemplation of law, not in esse, therefore, ineffective.

Justice Nario failed to issue a written resolution dismissing the criminal cases for
failure of the prosecution to submit its report on the reinvestigation of the cases
within the sixty-day period fixed by the graft court. Moreover, the verbal order was
rejected by majority vote of the members of the Sandiganbayan Special Division. In
fine, there has been no valid and effective order of dismissal of the cases. The
Sandiganbayan cannot then be faulted for issuing the assailed resolutions.(Jacob vs.
Sandiganbayan; GR.162206;November 17, 2010)
Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on a particular
person as a suspect.

R.A. No. 7438 has reinforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of
persons under custodial investigation. The pertinent provisions read:
SEC. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial Investigation; Duties
of Public Officers.
a. Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be
assisted by counsel.
b. Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who
arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall
inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice,
who shall at all times be allowed to confer private with the person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own
counsel, he must be provided by with a competent and independent counsel.
xxxx
f. As used in this Act, custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an
invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting
officer for any violation of law.
The phrase preferably of his own choice does not convey the message that
the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to
preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from
handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation
would be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct
the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one
reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.

Thus, while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial
interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel or where the preferred
lawyer is not available is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the
suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the counsel chosen for him
and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed
engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the
counsels appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing
officer.
We held that the modifier competent and independent in the 1987
Constitution is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the
accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation,
an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and
capable lawyer. An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically
requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client
from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.

Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily
and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the
consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional
rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional
rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent.
The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent
the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a
suspect in a crime. The lawyers role cannot be reduced to being that of a
mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it
indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused. The
accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent counsel.

Where the prosecution failed to discharge the States burden of proving with
clear and convincing evidence that the accused had enjoyed effective and
vigilant counsel before he extra judicially admitted his guilt, the extrajudicial
confession cannot be given any probative value.(Lumanog versus People;
GR.182555;September 7, 2010)
Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was
invoked by the OSG, requires a motion by the proper party, thus:

SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. -- Upon motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition

which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge
against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall
order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such
purpose.
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is
apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his
discretion to investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason of such
affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper
defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit
the accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered.
Moreover, the aforementioned Section 12(a) of Rule 116 mandates the
suspension of the arraignment and the mental examination of the accused
should it appear that he is of unsound mind.
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him under the Bill of Rights carries with it the correlative
obligation to effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him
to effectively prepare for his defense.

At the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the mind
or exhibition of mental deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to
justify suspension of the proceedings, the trial court must be fully satisfied
that the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the law
secures or gives.
Solemn and inflexible is the constitutional behest that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law. Absolute heedfulness of this constitutional injunction is
most pronounced in criminal cases where the accused is in the
gravest jeopardy of losing his life.

It constantly behooves every court to proceed with utmost care in each of

such cases before it, and nothing can be more demanding of judges in that
respect than when the possible punishment would be in its severest form like
death -- a penalty that, once carried out, is irreversible and irreparable.
(People vs. Alcalde,GR.139225; May 29, 2002)
In Pastor, the Court, holding that there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial
judge must conduct a searching inquiry, nevertheless came up with the following
guidelines:
 
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the
law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial
and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that
the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of
physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge's
intimidating robes.
 
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred
with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a
plea of guilty.
 
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age,
socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy
index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
 
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty
under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently,
an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because
of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or
express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor
under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the
admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances
attending it, that increase punishment.
 
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully
explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of
the court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of
the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
 
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood
by the latter.
 
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly
guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or
furnish its missing details.(People vs. Talusan,GR:179187;July 14, 2009)
  
The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution which provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence
of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
xxx
 
x x x Conformably with our decision in People v. Salas, [the] escape should have been
considered a waiver of their right to be present at their trial, and the inability of the court to
notify them of the subsequent hearings did not prevent it from continuing with their trial.
They were deemed to have received notice. The same fact of their escape made their failure to
appear unjustified because they have, by escaping, placed themselves beyond the pale and
protection of the law. This being so, then pursuant to Gimenez v. Nazareno, the trial against the
fugitives, just like those of the others, should have been brought to its ultimate conclusion.

Thereafter, the trial court had the duty to rule on the evidence presented by the
prosecution against all the accused and to render its judgment accordingly. It should not wait
for the fugitives re-appearance or re-arrest. They were deemed to have waived their right to
present evidence on their own behalf and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who
testified against them.(Bernardo vs. People; GR.166980; April 4, 2007 )
“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act.”
Elements:
1. a valid complaint or information;
2. filed before a competent court;
3. to which defendant had pleaded;
4. of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or which
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

Take note!

Double jeopardy attaches in errors in judgment but not in errors in

jurisdiction.

Double jeopardy attaches in dismissal on ground of violation of speedy trial

act, even if at the instance of the accused.
Double Jeopardy provides –

a) Protection against second prosecution for the same offense after

conviction;
b) Protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.

However,

“The rule on identity does not apply when the second offense was not
in existence at the time of the first prosecution.”

Take note!

“The constitutional prohibition bars not only new and independent

prosecution but also an appeal in the same action after jeopardy had
attached. As such, every acquittal becomes final immediately upon
promulgation and cannot be recalled for correction or amendment.”

(Macapagal-Arroyo vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. 220598 April 18, 20217)

Further,

Rule 117, Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. –

When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against
him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by
a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge,
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for
any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
  
But !
Under the Doctrine of Supervening Event, however, the accused may be
prosecuted for another offense if a subsequent development changes the character
of the first indictment under which he may have already charged or convicted.
  

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which
necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the
following instances:

(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge;(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were
discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the
offended party except as provided in section 1(f) of Rule 116
.
   In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the
judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver
offense. Rule 117, SE. 7, Rule on Criminal Procedure)

Take Note: it appears that double jeopardy still attaches if the judgment or decision is acquittal!
Important point!

“The essence of quasi-offense lies on the execution

of the negligent or imprudent act that, if done
intentionally, would be punishable as a felony. Thus,
the law punishes the negligent or careless act and not
the result thereof.”

Jason Ivler vs. Modesto ( G.R. 72716 November 17, 2010)

 On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused in this case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb,
Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel
Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the charges against them on
the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

 
On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate
relative of the victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming
that it denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated
the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a
tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in
the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the
evidence and prosecution witnesses.
 But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it
places the accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section
21, Article III, that:
 
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. x x x
 
To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy
of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is
reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of
the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to
prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the
infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated
litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources,
stamina, and the will to fight.
 
 As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan:
 
[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to
subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense would arm the
government with a potent instrument of oppression. The provision therefore
guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense,
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as
well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Societys awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for
the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a
single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of
criminal laws.
 
Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible.
But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused
gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has
occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65.
 Complainant Vizconde cites the decision in Galman v. Sandiganbayan as authority
that the Court can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present case. But the
government proved in Galman that the prosecution was deprived of due process
since the judgment of acquittal in that case was dictated, coerced and scripted. It
was a sham trial. Here, however, Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a sham
review of the decision of the CA. He has made out no case that the Court held a phony
deliberation in this case such that the seven Justices who voted to acquit the accused, the
four who dissented, and the four who inhibited themselves did not really go through the
process.
 
Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Courts appreciation
of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses credibility. He ascribes
grave error on the Courts finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the
value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words, private
complainant wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment
based on such a re-evaluation. This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a
repeated attempt to secure Webb, et als conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al
is final and can no longer be disturbed. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,;G.R. No.
176864- versus -HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB,et.al ;GR 176864; January 18, 2011)