H.

MODIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
The following are modifying circumstances:
1. Justifying circumstances (6) - Art. 11; Battered woman syndrome under Sec. 26 of R.A. No.
9262 (VAWC);
2. Exempting circumstances (7) - Art. 12;
3. Mitigating circumstances (10) - Art. 13;
4. Aggravating circumstances (21) -Art. 14; and
5. Alternative circumstances (3) - Art. 15.

In addition to above:
1. Absolutory cause - these are exempting circumstances outside Article 12 such as certain
relatives who acted as accessories to the offenders and those covered by Article 332 for
crimes and relatives enumerated therein, among others.
2. Extenuating circumstances - these are mitigating but not found in Art. 13, e.g.,
abandonment in paragraph 3, Art. 333 and concealment of dishonor in Art. 255.

1.ARTICLE 11 -JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES

These are circumstances attendant to the commission of the alleged offense which by their
presence negates the unlawfulness of the acts so committed, so that such person is deemed not to have
transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liability, except in the case of par. 4 of Art.
11 of the RPC.

Basis: Lack of Criminal Intent

There are six justifying circumstances, to wit: (SeRSADO)

1. Self-Defense;
2. 2 .Defense of Relatives;
3. 3. Defense of Stranger;
4. Avoidance of greater evil or injury;
5. Fulfillment of Duty or lawful exercise of right or office; and
6. Obedience to an order issued for some lawful purpose (RPC, Art. 11).
Note: Battered Woman Syndrome is also a justifying circumstance (R.A. No. 9262, Sec.

Effect of Justifying Circumstance

General Rule: There is neither criminal nor civil liability on the part of the person acting with justifying
circumstances because the law deems such acts are lawful. The accused is not a criminal because there is
no crime committed. There being no crime, there can be no civil liability arising from crime (RPC, Art.
100).

Exception: Art. 101. Where "in cases falling within subdivision 4 (avoidance of greater evil or injury) of
Art. 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to
the benefit which they have received.

Since there is no crime, there is no criminal; hence, he should not be called an "offender" but an
"actor".

An accused who pleads a justifying circumstance under Article (Art.) 11 of the RPC admits to the
commission of acts, which would otherwise engender criminal liability.

a. SELF-DEFENSE
Basis: Self-defense includes primarily the defense of one's right to life and security. It also includes the
right to self-help with regard to the defense of one's right to peacefully possess property (CIVIL CODE,
Art. 429), and the right to protect one's honor and dignity which is not the least prized of man's
patrimony. The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system in the civilized world find justification
in man's natural instinct to protect, repel and save his person or rights from impending danger or peril; it
is based on that impulse of self-preservation born to man and part of his nature as a human being.

Rights Included in Self-Defense:

1. Defense of Honor/Person It encompasses defense of one's chastity or reputation (Boado).
2. Defense of Property Rights It can be invoked if there is an attack upon the property although it is
not coupled with an attack upon the person of the owner of the premises. All the elements for
justification must however be present
 i. Elements; (URL)
a. Unlawful aggression (condition sine qua non);
b. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it (if by a peace
officer, reasonable necessity of the means employed to overcome opponent); and
c. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself
ii. Cases:
1. People v. Samson, G.R. No. 214883, 02 September 2015;
To invoke self-defense, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
concurrence of the following: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Contrary to the conclusion of the CA that Gerry’s aggression had already ceased when he was
disarmed, the Supreme Court viewed that the aggression continued. It must be noted that the after
Cristina was able to take hold of the knife, he still continued to move towards her despite of her plea that
he should not come nearer. He grabbed her which could have precipitated her well-grounded belief that
her life was still in danger is he would be able to wrest the weapon from her. It was not farfetched to
presume that, being stronger, Gerry could have easily overpowered Cristina and killed her eventually.

The Court believes that Cristina’s means were reasonable because she had no other available
means or any less deadly weapon to repel the threat other than the knife in her hand, and she did not
have the time or sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate, and choose the weapon to be used. In
predicaments like this, human nature acts in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation. And when it is
apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction that
act or to mitigate the liability of the accused. Moreover, the fact that Gerry was no longer armed does
not negate the reasonableness of the means employed by Cristina. Perfect equality between the
weapon used by the one defending himself and that of the aggressor is not required.

The Court cannot sustain the trial court’s observation that it was Cristina who provoked her
husband when she suddenly pushed him. Her shoving him cannot be considered a sufficient
provocation to the act of aggression. Instead, Cristina acted on an opportunity to save herself from
what she had perceived to be a danger in her life.

Though the CA took the fact of Cristina’s flight and evasion of arrest for four (4) years against
her, the Supreme Court ruled that non-flight may not be construed as an indication of innocence either.
There is no law or dictum holding that staying put is proof of innocence. Cristina explained that she
took flight for fear of her safety because of possible retaliation from her husband’s siblings. The Court
finds her explanation acceptable, as she did not hide from the law, but from those who would possibly do
her harm.

Wherefore, the appeal was granted, and Cristina Samson was acquitted of the crime charged.

2. People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 177302, 16 April 2009;

Unlawful aggression, as defined under the RPC, contemplates assault or at least threatened
assault of an immediate and imminent kind.  There is unlawful aggression when the peril to one's
life, limb or right is either actual or imminent.  To constitute unlawful aggression, it is necessary that
an attack or material aggression, an offensive act positively determining the intent of the aggressor to
cause injury shall have been made.  A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not
sufficient...there must be a real danger to life and personal safety.

Even assuming ex gratia argumenti, that there was unlawful aggression on Chu's part when he chased
Regalado, Lopez was not justified in stabbing Chu since as admitted by him, he did not see accused-
appellant Regalado anymore when he was able to catch up with Chu.  The unlawful aggression of
Chu, had it indeed been present, had already ceased when upon reaching Chu, as Regalado, whom
Lopez allegedly wanted to protect, was no longer there. When an unlawful aggression that has begun
no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former
aggressor.

There was no reasonable necessity in the means employed by Lopez to repel Chu's alleged
aggression. The wounds sustained by Chu indicate that the assailant who inflicted the same was
more in a killing rage than one who was merely acting in defense of a relative. (more than 7 stab
wounds)
3. People v. Arizala, G.R. No. 130708, 22 October 1999;
Accused-appellant argues that since the victim is a Senior Police Officer 4 of the P.N.P. of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, the latters act of attempting to draw his gun from his waist was not
just a mere threatening stance or posture or intimidating attitude. It already posed an imminent
danger to his life and limb that caused him to react immediately, otherwise he would have been
the victim. There was also a reasonable necessity to defend himself because when he stabbed the
late Sgt. Cara, he only acted according to what an ordinary prudent and reasonable man would do.
It was the deceased who provoked accused-appellant to defend himself when the former uttered
invectives implicating him in the illegal logging activities in Salvacion, Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya.

Where an accused pleads self-defense, he thereby admits authorship of the crime, as in this case.
Consequently, the burden of proving the guilt of the accused which lies upon the prosecution is
shifted to the accused who must prove the elements of his defense. He has to justify the taking of
the victim's life by the standards of the law for such absolution. Otherwise, having admitted the
killing, conviction is inescapable. It is necessary that self-defense must be alleged with certainty
coupled with a strong, clear, sufficient and convincing proof that the killing is justified.

If no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, there can be no self-defense,

complete or incomplete. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying
circumstance of self-defense to apply.

Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger

thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude and the accused must present proof of
positively strong act of real aggression. Here, the unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
was not proven. Other than accused-appellants self-serving allegation, the latter failed to prove
that the victim was armed with his service firearm. The prosecution witness Manolito de Guzman
positively testified that though the deceased Sgt. Cara was in police uniform the latter did not
have a firearm or a holster for the same and, indeed, none was retrieved from the scene of the
crime. Finally, the nature and the location of the wounds sustained by the deceased, numbering
14 stab wounds, nine (9) of which were fatal and of the nine (9) fatal wounds, seven (7) were
found at the back, constitute physical evidence that strongly militates against accused-appellants
pretensions of the incident. The presence of the large number of wounds inflicted on the victim
clearly indicates a determined effort on the part of the accused-appellant to kill his prey and belies
the reasonableness of the means adopted to prevent or repel an unlawful act of an aggressor
which is an element of self-defense.

4. Talampas v. People, G.R. No. 180219, 23 November 2011;

In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused and the victim. In this case,
however, it was Talampas who had initiated the attack against Eduardo and Ernesto who was
present during the incident. Neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had committed any unlawful
aggression against Talampas. Thus, Talampas was not repelling any unlawful aggression from
the victim, thereby rendering his plea of self-defense unwarranted.

Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking an accident as a defense. Article
12(4) of the RPC contemplates a situation where a person is in fact in the act of doing something
legal, exercising due care, diligence and prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury to
someone or to something not in the least in the mind of the actor – an accidental result flowing out of
a legal act. Accident presupposes the lack of intention to commit the wrong done.

The records eliminate the intervention of accident. Talampas brandished and poked his revolver at
Eduardo and fired it, hitting Eduardo, who quickly rushed to seek refuge behind Ernesto. At that
point, Talampas fired his revolver thrice. Certainly, Talampas’ acts were by no means lawful,
being a criminal assault with his revolver against both Eduardo and Ernesto.

The fact that the target of Talampas’ assault was Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not excuse his
hitting and killing of Ernesto. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct consequence of
Talampas’ felonious deadly assault against Eduardo. Talampas’ poor aim amounted to aberratio ictus,
or mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him from criminal responsibility nor
mitigated his criminal liability. Lo que es causa de la causa, es causa del mal causado (what is the
cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused). Under Article 4 of the RPC, criminal liability is
incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.

5. People v. Gutual, G.R. No. 115233, 22 February 1996;

It was sufficiently established that the unlawful aggression came from the victim. Indeed, since
he was running amuck, he did not care anymore whom to attack or whether the person to be attacked
was unarmed or armed with a high-powered rifle. Significantly, the entry in the Death Certificate
corroborates the theory of the defense that the victim was in the act of hacking the accused-
appellant when the latter "shot deceased's right hand for the purpose only of throwing the bolo
out of his hand, but the bullet pierced through and hit the deceased's breast.” There was also
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused-appellant. 

The accused-appellant could no longer retreat from the continuing assault by the victim who, as
inexorably shown by his relentless advance towards the accused-appellant, was poised to kill the
latter. The danger to the accused-appellant's life was clearly imminent. It would not then be
proper nor reasonable to claim that he should have fled or selected a less deadly weapon, because in
the emergency in which, without any reason whatever, he was placed, there was nothing more natural
than to use the weapon he had to defend himself. In the natural order of things, following the instinct
of self-preservation, he was compelled to resort to a proper defense. It is settled that reasonable
necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability between the means of
attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which
will enter the principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person
attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense,
and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the
imminent danger of such injury.

6. People v. Narvaez, G.R. Nos. L-33466-67, 20 April 1983;

Appellant admitted having shot the victims. He claims, however, that he did so in defense of his
person and of his rights, and therefore he should be exempt from criminal liability. Defense of one’s
person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance under Art. 11, par. I of the Revised Penal Code,
but in order for it to be appreciated, the following requisites must occur: Unlawful aggression;
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself (Art. II, par. 1, RPC).

There was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleiseher was ordering, and Rubia was actually
participating in the fencing. This was indeed aggression, not on the person of appellant, but on his
property rights.

The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of self
defense or defense of one’s rights under paragraph I of Article 11, RPC. When the appellant fired his
shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
However, the third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of appellant who was defending his property. As a matter of fact, there was no provocation at all
on his part, since he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise produced by the victims
and their laborers. His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him was
no provocation at all.

The crime committed is homicide on two counts. The qualifying circumstance of treachery
cannot be appreciated in this case because of the presence of provocation on the part of the
deceased.

Passion and obfuscation attended the commission of the crime. The appellant awoke to find his
house being damaged and its accessibility to the highway as well as of his rice mill bodega being
closed. Not only was his house being unlawfully violated; his business was also in danger of closing
down for lack of access to the highway. These circumstances, coming so near to the time when his
first house was dismantled, thus forcing him to transfer to his only remaining house, must have so
aggravated his obfuscation that he lost momentarily all reason causing him to reach for his shotgun
and fire at the victims in defense of hit rights.

Appellant’s act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since-not all the elements for
justification are present. He should therefore be held responsible for the death of his victims, but
 he could be credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to
paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

7. Cano v. People, G.R. No. 155258, 7 October 2003;

Evidence shows that petitioner acted in lawful self-defense. Hence, his act of killing the victim
was attended by a justifying circumstance, for which no criminal and civil liability can attach. Article
11 (1) of the RPC expressly provides that anyone who acts in lawful self-defense does not incur any
criminal liability. Likewise, petitioner is not civilly liable for his lawful act. The only instance
when a person who commits a crime with the attendance of a justifying circumstance incurs
civil liability is when he, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to
another, pursuant to subdivision 4 of Article 11 of the RPC. Otherwise stated, if a person charged
with homicide successfully pleads self-defense, his acquittal by reason thereof will extinguish his
civil liability.

8. Velasquez v. People, G.R. No. 195021, 15 March 2017;

It is settled that when an accused admits harming the victim but invokes self-defense to escape
criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and
convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he [harmed] the
victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and
competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the
burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.

Contrary to what a successful averment of self-defense or defense of a relative requires, petitioners

offered nothing more than a self-serving, uncorroborated claim that Jesus appeared out of nowhere to
go berserk in the vicinity of their homes. They failed to present independent and credible proof to
back up their assertions. The Regional Trial Court noted that it was highly dubious that Jesus would
go all the way to petitioners' residences to initiate an attack for no apparent reason.

The Court takes judicial notice of the big difference in the physical built of the parties, private
complainant is shorter in height and of smaller built than all the accused, Victor Velasquez, Sonny
Boy Velasquez, Felix Caballeda and Jojo del Mundo. The said accused could have had easily held the
private complainant, who was heavily drunk as they claim, and disarmed him without the need of
hitting him.

The injuries which Jesus were reported to have sustained speak volumes:
-3 cms lacerated wound fronto-parietal area left
-1 cm lacerated wound frontal area left
- Abrasion back left multi linear approximately 20 cm
- Abrasion shoulder left, confluent 4x10 cm
- Depressed skull fracture parietal area left.

Even if it were to be granted that Jesus was the initial aggressor, the beating dealt to him by
petitioners and their co-accused was still glaringly in excess of what would have sufficed to
neutralize him. It was far from a reasonably necessary means to repel his supposed aggression.
Petitioners thereby fail in satisfying the second requisite of self-defense and of defense of a relative.

b. Defense of Relatives;
Basis: It is found not only upon a humanitarian sentiment, but also upon the impulse of blood which
impels men to rush, on the occasion of great perils, to the rescue of those close to them by ties of blood.

Requisites: Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in
the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that:
1. Unlawful aggression;
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
3. In case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no
part therein.

Relatives that can be defended: (SAD-Bro-SAC4)

1. Spouse; Ascendants;
2. Descendants;
 3. Legitimate, natural or adopted Brothers and Sisters, or relatives by Affinity in the same degrees;
and
4. Relatives by Consanguinity within the fourth (4th) civil degree (RPC, Art. 11(2)).

Note: -Death of one spouse does not terminate the relationship by affinity established between the
surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased.
-There is no distinction in the RPC whether the descendant should be legitimate or
illegitimate; when the law does not distinguish the courts cannot distinguish.

i. Napone v. People, G.R. No. 193085, 29 November 2017;

The petitioners interpose self-defense and defense of relatives. They insist that the actions they
committed and which resulted in Salvador's death were necessary and reasonable under the
circumstances to repel the latter's unlawful aggression towards them and their father.

It has been held that when the accused invokes the justifying circumstance of self-defense and,
hence, admits to killing the victim, the burden of evidence shifts to him. The rationale for this
shift is that the accused, by his admission, is to be held criminally liable unless he satisfactorily
establishes the fact of self-defense. Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove his innocence
by clear and convincing evidence. For this purpose, he must rely on the strength of his evidence
and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution for, even if the latter is weak, it could not be
denied that he has admitted to be the author of the victim's death.

To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove the concurrence of all of
its elements, which are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. Similarly, for defense of a relative to prosper, the following requisites must concur,
namely: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked,
that the person making the defense took no part in the provocation.

In both self-defense and defense of relatives, whether complete or incomplete, it is essential

that there be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. After all, there would be nothing
to prevent or repel if such unlawful aggression is not present. For unlawful aggression to be
appreciated there must be an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof,
not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.

The defense failed to prove self-defense and defense of relative. After a careful examination
of the records, the Court finds that the defense failed to discharge the burden of proving that
the petitioners acted in self-defense or defense of relatives.

The defense would have this Court believe that the Napones proceeded to the place of Janioso
without any malice in mind and with the only goal of rescuing Calib. To refute the accusations
against them, they painted a picture of Salvador mercilessly attacking Senior who merely wanted
to carry his son who was then lying on the ground and covered with blood. They maintain that the
petitioners were forced to retaliate against Salvador who was unlawfully attacking their father.

c. Defense of Stranger;
Basis: The ordinary person would not stand idly by and see his companion killed without attempting to
save his life.

Stranger- Any person not included in the enumeration of relatives under par. 2 of Art. 11. A
person defending his common-law spouse or adopted child will fall under this paragraph

Requisites of Defense of Stranger: (URI)

1. Unlawful aggression;
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
3. The person defending was not Induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.

Note: The person who defends another should not have acted from an impulse of resentment.
Otherwise, this justifying circumstance cannot be appreciated Motive is relevant only in this kind
of defense
 i. Mariano v. People, G.R. No. 224102, 26 July 2017;
To properly invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger, it must be shown that
there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, that the means employed to repel the
victim were reasonably necessary, and that the accused was not induced by revenge, resentment,
or other evil motive.

Petitioner was not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. The victim himself,
Natividad, testified that he had no issues with petitioner before the incident. Thus, all the
elements to invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger were present in this case.

Considering that petitioner was justified in stabbing Natividad under Article 11, paragraph 3 of
the Revised Penal Code, he should be exonerated of the crime charged.

d. Avoidance of Greater Evil or Injury;

i. Elements; (EIP)
1. The evil sought to be avoided actually Exists;
2. The Injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; and
3. There is no other Practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

Note: Art. 101 provides that in cases falling within subdivision 4 of Art. 11, the persons for whose
benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may
have received (BOADO).

-The greater injury spoken of should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence,
more so, the willful inaction of the actor.
-The term "damage to another" covers:
1. Injury to persons and;
2. Damage to property
 Euthanasia or mercy killing is condemned by law although the motive may be to
spare a hopeless patient from prolonged suffering. The killing could not be justified as
avoidance of a greater evil since ending the life of the patient is an evil greater than his
physical sufferings (CAMPANILLA).

ii. People v. Punzalan, G.R. No. 199892, 10 December 2012;

To successfully invoke avoidance of greater evil as a justifying circumstance, the following
requisites should be complied with:
(1) the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
(2) the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; and
(3) there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

Appellant failed to satisfy the third requisite that there be no other practical and less harmful
means of preventing it. Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, infliction of
damage or injury to another so that a greater evil or injury may not befall one’s self may be
justified only if it is taken as a last resort and with the least possible prejudice to another. If there
is another way to avoid the injury without causing damage or injury to another or, if there is no
such other way but the damage to another may be minimized while avoiding an evil or injury to
one’s self, then such course should be taken.

In this case, the road where the incident happened was wide, some 6 to 7 meters in width, and the
place was well-lighted. Both sides of the road were unobstructed by trees, plants or structures.
Appellant was a driver by occupation. However, appellant himself testified that when he shifted
to the second gear and immediately stepped on the accelerator upon seeing the four navy
personnel approaching from in front of him he did not make any attempt to avoid hitting the
approaching navy personnel even though he had enough space to do so. He simply sped away
straight ahead, meeting the approaching navy personnel head on, totally unmindful if he might
run them over.  He therefore miserably failed to resort to other practical and less harmful
available means of preventing the evil or injury he claimed to be avoiding.

iii. Ty v. People, G.R. No. 149275, 27 September 2004;

Ty’s mother was confined in Manila Doctor’s Hospital to which a medical bill amounting to
600,000 pesos was made to be paid to TY, after signing a contract of responsibility with the
hospital. Ty, issued 7 checks to cover the said expenses, all of which were dishonored for being
 drawn against a closed a account. Manila Doctors Hospital then instituted criminal actions against
Ty for violation of BP22.For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the
following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real
and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.

It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence
that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or
reasonable fear for ones life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should
not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show
therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not
only without will but against his will as well. It must be of such character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape.

In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that
she was compelled to issue the checks a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before
her mother could be discharged for fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due to
the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is
speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.

To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so life-threatening such that her
continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-
grounded apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the law’s intent to say that any fear
exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her mother might
commit suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to
deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by
the hospitals threats or demands.

e. Fulfillment of Duty or Exercise of Right or Office;

i. Elements; (PN)
1. The accused acted in the Performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office;
and
2. The injury caused or the offense committed be the Necessary consequence of the due
performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.

Notes: -In the absence of the second requisite, the justification becomes incomplete thereby
converting it into a mitigating circumstance under Arts. 13 and 69 (People
-The deceased who escaped from prison while serving sentence was under the obligation to
surrender, and had no right, after evading the service of his sentence to commit assault and
disobedience with a weapon on his hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to such
extreme means, which although it proved to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances (People
v. Delima,vi G.R. No. 18660, December 22, 1922).

-The executor of death convicts at the Bilibid Prison cannot be held liable for murder for the
executions performed by him because he was merely acting in lawful exercise of his office.
(People v. Delima, G.R. No. 18660, December 22, 1922)

ii. Cases:
1. People v. Peralta, G.R. No. 128116, 24 January 2001;

Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person who acts in the fulfillment of
a duty does not incur any criminal liability. Two (2) requisites must concur before this defense
can prosper: (1) the accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office, (2) the injury caused or the offense committed should be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of duty.

We find the requisites absent in the case at bar. Appellant was not in the performance
of his duties at the time of the shooting for the reason that the girls he was attempting to
arrest were not committing any act of prostitution in his presence. If at all, the only person he
was authorized to arrest during that time was Roberto Reyes, who offered him the services of a
prostitute, for acts of vagrancy. Even then, the fatal injuries that the appellant caused the victim
were not a necessary consequence of appellant's performance of his duty as a police officer. The
record shows that appellant shot the victim not once but twice after a heated confrontation
 ensued between them. His duty to arrest the female suspects did not include any right to
shoot the victim to death.

2. Baxinela v. People, G.R. No. 149652, 24 March 2006;

The fulfillment of a duty is unavailing as a justifying circumstance. In order to avail of this
justifying circumstance it must be shown that: 1)the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed is the
necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office.

While the first condition is present, the second is clearly lacking. Baxinela’s duty was to
investigate the reason why Lajo had a gun tucked behind his waist in a public place. This was what
Baxinela was doing when he confronted Lajo at the entrance, but perhaps through anxiety, edginess
or the desire to take no chances, Baxinela exceeded his duty by firing upon Lajo who was not at all
resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannot be considered due performance of a duty if at that time Lajo
posed no serious threat or harm to Baxinela or to the civilians in the pub.

f. Obedience to an Order of a Superior;

i. Elements;
1. An order has been issued by a superior;
2. Such order must be for some lawful Purpose; and
3. The Means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.

Notes:-Par. 6 presupposes that what was obeyed by the accused was a lawful order. If the
subordinate obeyed an order which is illegal but is patently legal and he is not aware of its
illegality, he is not liable because then, there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good
faith.
-A soldier who acted upon the orders of superior officers, which he, as a military subordinate,
could not question, and obeyed the orders in good faith, without being aware of its illegality,
without any fault or negligence on his part, is not liable because he had no criminal intent and he
was not negligent.

ii. Cases:
1. Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 103501-03, 17 February 1997;

Tabuena and Peralta were acquitted of the crime of malversation. The very fact that they were
merely following the orders of a superior is a justifying circumstance.

Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS
Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly
comply with the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done.
Marcos was undeniably Tabuena’s superior – the former being then the President of the Republic
who unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC.

Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of “Any person who acts in obedience
to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.” The subordinate-superior relationship
between Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in the
MARCOS Memorandum, as it has for its purpose partial payment of the liability of one
government agency (MIAA) to another (PNCC). Tabuena had no reason not to believe that the
55M was indeed part of a due and demandable debt, a portion of a bigger liability to PNCC
(existence of such debts determined from testimonies). So even if the order was illegal and
Tabuena was not aware of the illegality, he would not be liable because there would only be a
mistake of fact committed in good faith.

“Good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of
malversation.” Not every unauthorized payment of public funds is malversation. There is
malversation only if the public officer who has custody of public funds should appropriate the
same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence
shall permit any other person to take such public funds. Where the payment of public funds has
been made in good faith, and there is reasonable ground to believe that the public officer to whom
the fund had been paid was entitled thereto, he is deemed to have acted in good faith, there is no
criminal intent, and the payment, if it turns out that it is unauthorized, renders him only civilly but
 not criminally liable. Maxim: actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea – a crime is not commited if
the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.

g. Battered Woman Syndrome.

VAWC Act of 2004 (Sec. 26R.A. No. 9262)-Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be
suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome do not incur any criminal or civil liability notwithstanding
the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the RPC.

Battery-any act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child resulting to physical and
psychological or emotional distress (R.A. No. 9262, Sec. 3(b)).

Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) It is a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and

behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse
(R.A. No. 9262, Sec. 3(c)).

Note: Only a certified psychologist or psychiatrist can prove the existence of the Battered
Woman Syndrome in a woman (R.A. No. 9262, Sec. 6(2)).

Elements:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating Relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another. commits an Act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological Distress to her

"Cycle of violence" three phases: (TAT)

1. The Tension-building phase - where minor battering occurs and the woman usually tries to pacify
the batterer to prevent escalation of violence;
2. The Acute battering incident - where there is brutality, destructiveness, and sometimes, death and
the woman believes it is futile to fight back based on past painful experience; and
3. The Tranquil, loving (or at least, non-violent) phase - where the batterer begs for her forgiveness
and the woman tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again.

Note:The existence of BWS in a relationship does not in itself establish a legal right of a woman
to kill her partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. It is
immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing
the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the
physical harm was committed.

Characteristics BWS: (FIFI)

1. The woman believes that the violence was her Fault;
2. She has an Inability to place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere; She Fears for her
life and/or her children's life; and
3. She has an Irrational belief that the abuser is omnipresent and omniscient

i.Cases:People v. Genosa, G.R. No. G.R. No. 135981, 15 January 2004

The one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one's life; and the peril sought to be
avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.

In the present case there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben
and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior
and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went
to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was
no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety. As to the appellant
contention under the theory of “battered woman syndrome” (BWS), the court held that a battered
wife is “a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior
by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights.
Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the
battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man
once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman." The BWS is characterized by the so-called "cycle of violence," which has three phases:
 (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at
least, nonviolent) phase. In this case, Appellant fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle
of violence". No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court how the fatal
incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building
phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this
stage. However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words,
she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a
similar pattern.

2. ARTICLE 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES: (Non-Imputability)

-Those grounds which the law exempts the offender from criminal liability, even if the act was
criminal. However, it does not relieve him of civil liability except in par. 4 (accident) and par. 7
(insuperable cause) where he is relieved of both civil and criminal responsibility.
-There is a crime but the person who committed the act is not subjected to criminal liability the
burden of proof lies with the defense

There are six exempting circumstances, to wit: (IMACUL)

1. Imbecility or insanity;
2. Minority (as modified by R.A. No. 9344);
3. Accident without fault or intention of causing it;
4. Compulsion of irresistible force;
5. Impulse of Uncontrollable fear;
6. Insuperable or Lawful cause (RPC, Art. 12).

a. Rationale-The exemption from punishment is based on the complete absence or lack of

intelligence, freedom of action, or intent or on the absence of negligence on the part of the
accused.

A crime is committed but the actor incurs no criminal liability because of the complete absence of
the conditions constituting free will or voluntariness of the act.

i. Ortega v. People, G.R. No. 151085, 20 August 2008;

At the time of commission of rape, the accused was 13 years old while the victim was 6. The case
was pending when the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) was enacted amending
among others the age of criminal irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years old. At the time of
the promulgation of judgment, the accused already reached the age of majority.

The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied.  By virtue of R.A. No.
9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old, this law is evidently
favorable to the accused. Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged
rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the
testimony of his mother.  Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never assailed in any of the proceedings
before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was
below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.

b. Justifying v. Exempting;
Justifying Circumstances Exempting Circumstances
As to effect on actor
It affects the act, not the actor It affects the actor, not the act
As to basis
There is no crime, hence there is no criminal There is crime, there is still no criminal

As to effect of criminal liability

The act is considered to have been done The act complained of is actually wrongful,
within the bounds of law; hence, the act is but the actor is not made criminally liable.
legitimate and lawful in the eyes of the law.

As to civil liability
No civil liability can arise from the acts or Civil liability arises from the crime committed
omissions complained of except in cases but shall be borne by persons other than the
falling Art. 11, par. 4, where the law imposes accused. (except Art. 12, par. 4and 7, where
 civil liability upon persons benefiting from no civil liability may be imputable to any
the salvific act. person).

As to lacking elements
Criminal intent is lacking Intelligence and freedom are lacking

1. Imbecility or Insanity;
i. People v. Pantoja, G.R. No. 223114, 29 November 2017;
A scrutiny of the evidence presented by Pantoja fails to establish that he was
completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom of will when he fatally
stabbed the victim. The defense of insanity is in the nature of a confession and
avoidance, requiring defendant to prove it with clear and convincing evidence.

For purposes of exemption from criminal liability, mere behavioral oddities cannot
support a finding of insanity unless the totality of such behavior indubitably shows a
total absence of reason, discernment, or free will at the time the crime was committed.

For the defense of insanity to prosper, two elements must concur: (1) that
defendant's insanity constitutes a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or
discernment; and (2) that such insanity existed at the time of, or immediately
preceding, the commission of the crime.

In this case, while the evidence of the accused does not show that he was completely
deprived of intelligence or consciousness of his acts when he committed the crime,
there is sufficient indication that he was suffering from some impairment of his mental
faculties; thus, he may be credited with the mitigating circumstance of diminished
willpower. 

iii. People v. Racal, G.R. No. 224886, 4 September 2017;

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind
and that all acts are voluntary. 

In the present case, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. 
As correctly observed by the CA, the separate psychiatric evaluations of appellant were taken in
June 2009 and July 2010, which are three and four years after the crime was committed on April
19, 2006. In People v. So, which is a case of recent vintage, this Court ruled that an inquiry into
the mental state of an accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very
moment the felony is committed. Hence, the results of the psychiatric tests done on appellant and
testified to by the defense witnesses, may not be relied upon to prove appellant's mental condition
at the time of his commission of the crime.

In any case, during cross-examination, Dr. Gilboy testified that for a number of years up to the
time that appellant killed Francisco, he had custody of and served as the guardian of his sister's
children. He took care of their welfare and safety, and he was the one who sends them to and
brings them home from school. Certainly, these acts are not manifestations of an insane mind.

On his part, Dr. Gerong testified, on direct examination, that he found appellant to have
"diminish[ ed] capacity to discern what was wrong or right at the time of the commission of the
crime." "Diminished capacity" is not the same as "complete deprivation of intelligence or
discernment." Mere abnormality of mental faculties does not exclude imputability. Thus, on the
basis of these examinations, it is clearly evident that the defense failed to prove that appellant
acted without the least discernment or that he was suffering from a complete absence of
intelligence or the power to discern at the time of the commission of the crime.

Furthermore, appellant's act of treachery, that is by employing means and methods to ensure the
killing of Francisco without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might
make, as well as his subsequent reaction of immediately fleeing after his commission of the crime
and, thereafter, evading arrest, is not the product of a completely aberrant mind. In other words,
evidence points to the fact that appellant was not suffering from insanity immediately before,
simultaneous to, and even right after the commission of the crime.

iv. People v. Roa, G.R. No. 225599, 22 March 2017;

Accused-appellant further argues that the presumption of sanity must not be applied in his case,
because of the rule that a person who has been committed to a hospital or to an asylum for the
insane is presumed to continue to be insane.

In this case, however, it is noteworthy that while accused-appellant was confined in a mental
institution in 2001, he was properly discharged therefrom in 2002. This proper discharge from his
confinement clearly indicates an improvement in his mental condition; otherwise, his doctors
would not have allowed his discharge from confinement. Absent any contrary evidence, then, the
presumption of sanity resumes and must prevail.

The defense failed to present any convincing evidence of accused-appellant's mental condition
when he committed the crime in March 2007. While there is evidence on record of his mental
condition in 2001 and in 2012, the dates of these two diagnoses are too far away from the date of
the commission of the offense in 2007, as to altogether preclude the possibility that accused-
appellant was conscious of his actions in 2007. Absent any supporting evidence, this Court
cannot sweepingly conclude that accused-appellant was mentally insane for the whole 11-year
period from 2001 to 2012, as to exempt him criminal liability for an act committed in 2007.

This conclusion is based not merely on the presumption of sanity, but bolstered by the
circumstances surrounding the incident. There are circumstances surrounding the incident that
negate a complete absence of intelligence on the part of accused-appellant when he attacked the
victim. First, he surprised the victim when he attacked from behind. This is supported by the
companion of the victim, who testified that while they were walking, they did not notice any
danger when they saw accused-appellant standing near the trimobile. Second, accused-appellant's
attempt to flee from the scene of the crime after stabbing the victim indicates that he knew that
what he just committed was wrong. And third, when the police officers called out to accused-
appellant to surrender, he voluntarily came out of the house where he was hiding and voluntarily
turned himself over to them.

The foregoing actions of accused-appellant immediately before, during, and immediately after he
committed the offense indicate that he was conscious of his actions, that he intentionally
committed the act of stabbing, knowing the natural consequence of such act, and finally, that such
act of stabbing is a morally reprehensible wrong. His actions and reactions immediately
preceding and succeeding the act of stabbing are similar if not the same as that expected of a fully
sane person.
Therefore, the Court finds no reasonable basis to reverse the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by
the CA, that accused-appellant's culpability had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

v. Verdadero v. People, G.R. No. 216021, 02 March 2016;

Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. In
People vs. Isla, the SC ruled that in order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability
under a plea of insanity, he must categorically demonstrate that:
1. He was completely deprived of intelligence because of his mental condition or illness;
and
2.Such complete deprivation of intelligence must manifest at the time or immediately
before the commission of the offense.

Generally, evidence of insanity after the commission of the crime is immaterial. It, however, may
be appreciated and given weight if there is also proof of abnormal behavior before or
simultaneous to the crime. Dr. Pagaddu claimed that Verdadero had a relapse at the time of
stabbing. Maynard, Verdadero’s neighbor, observed that Verdadero appeared to be of unsound
mind before and after the stabbing incident. On the day of the stabbing incident, Maynard
perceived that Verdadero was again of unsound mind noting that he had reddish eyes and
appeared to be drunk. These circumstances are consistent with Dr. Paggadu's testimony that
drinking wine, poor sleep and violent behavior were among the symptoms of a relapse, the same
testimony that was used as basis for his previous diagnosis. The evidence on record supports the
finding that Verdadero exhibited symptoms of a relapse of schizophrenia at the time of the
stabbing incident.

vi. People v. Roy, G.R. No. 225604, 23 July 2018;

The court cannot appreciate the exempting circumstance of insanity in favor of appellant.
The defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. Dr. Domingo's report could not
positively and certainly conclude that appellant's state of imbecility afflicted him at the time he
raped AAA.

While the report extensively discussed his condition in early 2013, it does not conclude that he
was afflicted with imbecility, or that he was unaware of what he was doing, at the time he raped
AAA. The report only concluded that at present, the patient is deemed INCOMPETENT to stand
the rigors of court trial. Unfortunately, such incompetence merely means that appellant's mental
state is not fit for trial. It does not mean that he was completely deprived of reason and freedom
of will at the time he committed the crime.

Appellant's actions at the moment of the rape reveal that appellant was aware of what he was
committing, and that what he was doing was wrong. 

Appellant AAA into a secluded spot, thereby isolating himself and AAA to facilitate the
commission of his lust. When AAA tried to call for help, appellant covered her mouth, ensuring
that they would not be disturbed. Such precautions make it difficult to believe that appellant was
in such a state that he could not discern what was right from wrong, or that he was completely
deprived of intelligence or will.

vii. People v. Umawid, G.R. No. 208719, 9 June 2014;

The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance because an accused invoking
the same admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of
such insanity. As there is a presumption in favor of sanity, anyone who pleads the said defense
bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the evidence on
this matter must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of
the offense/s with which he is charged.

Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act, i.e.,
when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a
complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost
consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. Thus, in order to lend credence to a defense
of insanity, it must be shown that the accused had no full and clear understanding of the nature
and consequences of his or her acts.

In this case, Umawid solely relied on the testimonies of Dr. Quincina and Dr. Juliana to
substantiate his plea of insanity. Records, however, reveal that Dr. Quincina’s testimony only
showed that he evaluated Umawid’s mental condition in May 2002, February 2003, and March
2003.18 In other words, he only examined Umawid six (6) months before the latter committed the
crimes and three (3) months and four (4) months thereafter. Notably, he admitted that his findings
did not include Umawid’s mental disposition immediately before or at the very moment when he
committed such crimes.19 As such, Dr. Quincina’s testimony cannot prove Umawid’s insanity.
Neither would Dr. Juliana’s testimony shore up Umawid’s cause as the former failed to attest to
the latter’s mental condition and even referred him to another doctor for further evaluation. Given
these circumstances, Umawid’s defense of insanity remained unsubstantiated and, hence, he was
properly adjudged by the RTC and the CA as criminally liable.

viii. People v. Dungo, G.R. No. 89420, 31 July 1991;

Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence. An insane person has
no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.

One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged cannot in a
legal sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. His
unlawful act is the product of a mental disease or a mental defect.

In order that insanity may relieve a person from criminal responsibility, it is necessary that there
be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be
deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be complete absence
or deprivation of the freedom of the will.
If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was supposed to be mentally ill
during this confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified
person who may have wronged him. Be it noted that the accused was supposed to be suffering
from impairment of the memory, We infer from this confrontation that the accused was aware of
his acts. This event proves that the accused was not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of
lucid intervals

The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he perpetrated the act was sane. The
evidence shows that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the act was carrying an envelope
where the fatal weapon was hidden. This is an evidence that the accused consciously adopted a
pattern to kill the victim. The suddenness of the attack classified the killing as treacherous and
therefore murder. After the accused ran away from the scene of the incident after he stabbed the
victim several times, he was apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila, an indication that he took
flight in order to evade arrest. This to the mind of the Court is another indicia that he was
conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim.
Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused. However, in the
defense of insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in fervor of sanity. The
burden of proving the affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense.
The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

ix. People v. Danao, G.R. No. 96832, 19 November 1992;

The allegation of insanity must be clearly proved. The law presumes all acts to be voluntary. Not
every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is insanity. When insanity is
alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal responsibility, the evidence on this point must
refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. If  
the evidence pointed to insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the accused cannot
be acquitted. he is presumed to be sane when he committed it.

The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense in the nature of a confession and avoidance, and as such
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The evidence before the Court says that appellant was not insane during the commission of the
crime. Insanity must be clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the
ground of insanity. In the absence of such proof, it will be presumed that the offender committed
the crime when he was sane. The presumption is in favor of sanity. The defense must prove
insanity beyond reasonable doubt.

It has been repeatedly held that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to
great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and congent reasons because
the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor
of witnesses while testifying in the case. The trial court had the privilege of examining the
deportment and demeanor of the witnesses and therefore, it can discern if such witnesses were
telling the truth or not.  Moreover, the state should guard against sane murderers escaping
punishment through a general plea of insanity. 

x. People v. Rafanan, G.R. No. 54135, 21 November 1991;

Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense, it was only in People
vs. Formigones that the Court elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity, quoting
extensively from the Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the Revised Penal Code,
thus:

“The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken
into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the
act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts;
that he acts without the least discernment; that there be a complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that
the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a
person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does
not exclude imputability.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the
defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized
by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted
unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless
his insanity and absence of will are proved.”

The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases. A linguistic or
grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones established two (2)
distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition—"complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the [criminal] act,” and (b) the test of volition—"or that there be a total deprivation of
freedom of the will.” But our caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather
than on a test relating to “freedom of the will;” examination of our caselaw has failed to turn up
any case where this Court has exempted an accused on the sole ground that he was totally
deprived of “freedom of the will,” i.e., without an accompanying “complete deprivation of
intelligence.”

Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized
by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations
and delusions.

The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving
his affirmative allegation of insanity.

Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind
immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the
mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment
the act is committed. Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of the two (2) physicians (Dr.
Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not purport to characterize his mental condition
during that critical period of time. They did not specifically relate to circumstances occurring on
or immediately before the day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad statements based
on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia.

xi. People v. Medina, G.R. No. 113691, 6 February 1998;

The decision was not based on the qualifications of Dr. Adigue as a doctor but as a witness. What
mattered was the failure of Dr. Adigue’s testimony to establish the legal insanity of Medina as
shown in the results of the tests she conducted which merely says that Medina has a mild
depression and emotional   disturbances. The testimony also did not establish the complete
deprivation of reason on Medina’s part. Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, requires a
complete deprivation of rationality in committing the act; i.e., that the accused be deprived of
reason, that there be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete
absence of the power to discern. The presumption of law, per Art. 800 of the Civil Code, always
lies in favor of sanity, and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, every person is presumed to be
of sound mind. The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Hence, in the
absence of positive evidence that the accused had previously lost his reason or was demented
moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, the courts will always presume that he
was in a normal state of mind. Care must be taken to distinguish between insanity or lack of
reason and failure to use reason or good judgment due to extreme anger or passion. Moral
insanity or mere mental depravity – results not from the disease of the mind but from a perverted
condition of the moral system; person is sane and is not exempted from the criminal liability.

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been credited in favor of the
appellant. The solicitor general concurs and notes that appellant, after having earlier given
himself up to a certain Col. Faltado, surrendered at midnight on May 20, 1992, or about an hour
after the stabbing incident, to Wilfredo Sevillano, former desk officer of the Batangas City Police
Station. Hence, the evidence sufficiently established the elements of voluntary surrender, namely:
(1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority
or an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary.

xii. People v. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 93752, 15 July 1992;

IMBECILITY MUST CONSTITUTE COMPLETE DEPRIVATION OF INTELLIGENCE IN
COMMITTING THE CRIME — Imbecility, like insanity, is a defense which pertains to the
 mental condition of a person. Our caselaw projects the same standards in respect of both insanity
and imbecility, that is, that the insanity or imbecility must constitute complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the criminal act, or total deprivation of freedom of the will. The above
quoted medical evidence that was admitted into the record in the case at bar does not show
complete deprivation (nor even substantial deprivation) of intelligence on the part of appellant
Buenaflor and he, accordingly, cannot be deemed exempted from criminal liability for the rape of
Isabella Federis. His behavior on the night he raped Isabella showed that he was quite conscious
of his acts and aware of the moral quality thereof.

At the same time, however, the medical evidence of record does show that appellant Buenaflor’s
mental faculties were to some extent retarded or impaired in their development, which
impairment or retardation reflects a diminished level of responsibility for his criminal acts. The
mitigating circumstance contemplated in Article 13 (9) of the Revised Penal Code was present in
the case at bar:

(9) Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will power of the
offender without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.

2.A person under 15 years of age;

Pars. 2. & 3. MINORITY (as modified by R.A. NO. 9344 AND R.A. NO. 10630)

Basis: Complete absence or lack of intelligence.

R.A.No.9344 has modified the following provisions of the RPC:

1. Art.68(1) - repealed in effect because the minor 15 or below is now absolutely exempt
from criminal liability;

2. Art. 12(2) - the age of absolute criminal irresponsibility is increased from 9 to 15;

3. Art. 12(3) - for ages 15 or under, they are not only qualifiedly, but are now
absolutely exempted from criminal liability

Child Committing Serious Crimes -A child shall be deemed a neglected child under PD 603
and shall be mandatorily placed in a special facility within the Bahay Pag-asa called the Intensive
Juvenile Intervention and Support Center (IJISC) if he/she is above twelve (12) years of age up to
fifteen (15) years of age and commits: (KIMP- CAR2D)
1. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is killed or raped;
2. Infanticide;
3. Murder;
4. Parricide;
5. Carnapping where the driver or occupant is killed or raped;
6. Destructive Arson;
7. Robbery with homicide or rape;
8. Rape; or
9. Drugs offenses under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165)
punishable by more than twelve (12) years of imprisonment (Sec. 20-A, as amended by Sec.
6 of R.A. No. 10630). Repetition of Offenses by a Child A child who is above twelve (12)
years of age up to fifteen (15) years of age and who commits an offense for the second time
or oftener and was previously subjected to a community-based intervention program, shall be
deemed a neglected child and shall undergo an Intensive Intervention Program supervised by
the local social welfare and development officer (Sec. 20-B, as amended by R.A. No. 10630).

A person over 15 years of age but below 18 years, unless the felon acted with discernment;
-Child who is above 15 but below 18 without discernment (Exempt from criminal liability but
should undergo Intervention)

Child who is above 15 but below 18 WITH discernment (Exempt; Diversion)

i. Republic Act No. 9344;

(R.A. No. 9344, Sec. 22, as amended by Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 10630):Assessment of Discernment
 -The social worker shall conduct an initial assessment to determine the appropriate interventions
and whether the child acted with discernment, using the discernment assessment tools developed
by the DSWD.

Discernment- mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful
act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the
facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. In this particular case, the
prosecution was able to prove the presence of discernment.

System of Diversion CICL shall undergo diversion programs (Sec. 31 of R.A. No. 9344)for the
kinds of diversion programs without undergoing court proceedings subject to the following
conditions where the imposable penalty for the crime committed:
1.Not more than six (6) years imprisonment
a. There is a victim - mediation, family conferencing and conciliation with law
enforcement officer or Punong Barangay with the assistance of LSWDO or other members of the
LCPC attended by the child and his/her family; or
b. In victimless crimes - diversion and rehabilitation program by the LSWDO in
coordination with the BCPC attended by the child and his/her family;

2. Exceeds six (6)years of imprisonment, diversion measures may be resorted to only by the
court.

3. If the CICL does not qualify for diversion (i.e.or offense if the child does and not his/her fall
under family any do not consent to a diversion, or upon consideration of the social worker and
determination of the prosecutor that diversion is not appropriate, the prosecutor shall conduct a
preliminary investigation and allege in the Information that the child acted with discernment
(R.A. No. 9344, Sec.33 as amended by Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 10630).

Automatic Suspension of Sentence -A child under 18 at the time of commission of the crime
who is found guilty shall be placed under suspended sentence without need of application even if
the child is already 18 or more at the time of pronouncement of guilt, unless declared disqualified
under P.D. No. 603.

The court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court
Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law such as drug and alcohol treatment (R.A. No. 9344,
Sec. 38).
The court shall dismiss the cases against the child whose sentence has been suspended and
against whom disposition measures have been issued (R.A. No. 9344, Sec. 39).
Note: Only when there is (1) refusal to be subjected to reformation or (2) when there is failure
to reform can the child be subjected to criminal prosecution and the judicial system.

ii. Dorado v. People, G.R. No. 216671, 3 October 2016;

iii. People v. Deliola, G.R. No. 200157, 31 August 2016;

The Supreme Court in A.M. No. 02-l-18- SC49 defined the age of criminal responsibility
as the age when a child, 15 years and one (1) day old or above but below 18 years of age,
commits an offense with discernment. In this case, that the accused-appellant acted with
discernment when he raped the victim as demonstrated by the following surrounding
circumstances: (1) the victim was a helpless minor; (2) accused-appellant secured the
consummation of the offense with a weapon; (3) he satisfied his lust by penetrating the
victim from behind; and (4) he threatened the victim not to report what happened.
Accused-appellant shall be criminally liable for the crime of Qualified Statutory Rape. 

Due to the accused-appellant’s age when the crime was committed, the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority should be appreciated; thus, the penalty next lower
in degree than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. In accordance with the controlling
jurisprudence on the matter, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with.
Thus, the ruling of the lower courts was affirmed and impose upon accused-appellant the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Although it is acknowledged that accused-appellant was
qualified for suspension of sentence when he committed the crime, Section 40 of R.A.
 9344 provides that the same extends only until the child in conflict with the law reaches
the maximum age of 21 years old. 

iv. People v. Montecalvo, G.R. No. 193507, 30 January 2013;

The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction is not material.  What matters is that the offender committed the
offense when he/she was still of tender age. 

v. People v. Arpon, G.R. No. 183563, 14 December 2011;

Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the "Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," provides: SEC. 7. Determination of Age.
-- The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority.
He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until
he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years of age or older. The age of a child
may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or
any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may
be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other
persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In
case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
In Sierra v. People, the Court deemed sufficient the testimonial evidence
regarding the minority and age of the accused provided the following
conditions concur, namely: "(1) the absence of any other satisfactory
evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar
documents that would prove the date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence
of testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and minority of the
accused at the time of the complained incident without any objection on the
part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that
the accused's and/or his relatives' testimonies are untrue." In the case at bar,
it was only the testimony of Arpon which showed that he was a minor at the
time the crime was committed. No other evidence was presented to prove his
claim.

vi. People v. Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239, 16 March 2011;

The Court sustained the conviction and did not exempt the accused of his criminal
liability.

Sec. 6 of RA 9344 exempts a child above 15 years but below 18 years of age from
criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with discernment, in which case,
"the appropriate proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall be observed.

Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what
he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstances include the gruesome nature of
the crime and the minor’s cunning and shrewdness.

In the present case, choosing an isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent
detection; and boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her defense are indicative of the then 17
year-old appellant’s mental capacity to fully understand the consequences of his unlawful
action.

As to the issue on Automatic Suspension of Sentence under Section 38 of RA 9344, the

court found that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant.
The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one years. Unfortunately, Jacinto is now 25.

However, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the
welfare of a CICL should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-
one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The
offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in
accordance with the Act. The age of the CILC at the time of the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the
offense when he/she was still of tender age.
 Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in
accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

3. Accident while in the performance of a lawful act with due care;

Accident-a fortuitous circumstance, event, or happening; an event happening without any human
agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstance is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it represents.
Basis: Lack of negligence and intent

i. Elements; (LDAW)
1. A person is performing a Lawful act;
2. With Due care;
3.He causes injury to another by mere Accident; and
4.Without fault or intention of causing it

iii. People v. Mat-an, G.R. No. 91115, 29 December 1992;

There is no doubt that the accused-appellant killed his mother when he hit the latter with a piece of
wood. His contention that her death was accidental and without any criminal intent as he was only
defending himself from the unlawful attack of his brother is unavailing since it was the accused-
appellant himself who started the unlawful aggression when he slapped his sister which led to the
untimely death of their mother.

For the exempting circumstance of accident to be properly appreciated in accused-appellant's favor,

the following requisites must concur: (1) that the accused person was performing a lawful act with
due care; (2) that the injury is caused by mere accident; and (3) that there was no fault or intent of
causing the injury. In the case at bar, accused-appellant is liable for his unlawful act even if he never
intended to hit his mother since his act of hitting his mother was not done in the performance of a
lawful act as required by the aforementioned Article.

iv. People v. Agliday, G.R. No. 140794, 16 October 2001;

An accident is an occurrence that "happens outside the sway of our will, and although it
comes about through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences." It connotes the absence of criminal intent. Intent is a mental state, the
existence of which is shown by a person’s overt acts. In the case at bar, appellant got his
shotgun and returned to the kitchen to shoot his son, who had intervened in the quarrel
between the former and Conchita. It must also be pointed out that the firearm was a shotgun
that would not have fired off without first being cocked. Undoubtedly, appellant cocked the
shotgun before discharging it, showing a clear intent to fire it at someone.

v. Pomoy v. Philippines, G.R. No. 150647; 29 September 2004;

Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to the victim was not
due to the fault or negligence of the accused, but to circumstances that could not have been
foreseen or controlled. Thus, in determining whether an "accident" attended the incident,
courts must take into account the dual standards of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault
or negligence. 

From the facts, it is clear that all these elements were present. The participation of petitioner,
if any, in the victim's death was limited only to acts committed in the course of the lawful
performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its holster,
the release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots - - all of which led to
the death of the victim - - were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of
circumstances beyond the control of petitioner. 

vi. Talampas v. People, G.R. No. 180219, 23 November 2011;

In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused and the victim. Here, it was
Talampas who had initiated the attack only against Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not been at any
time a target of Talampas' attack, he having only happened to be present at the scene of the attack. In
reality, neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had committed any unlawful aggression against
Talampas.Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as a defense.
 Accident is an event that happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about through
some act of our will, it lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences. In short,
accident presupposes the lack of intention to commit the wrong that had been done. Talampas is
guilty for the death of Ernesto under Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code which states that, criminal
liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended. Talampas' poor aim amounted to aberratio ictus, or mistake in the blow,
a circumstance that neither exempted him from criminal responsibility nor mitigated his criminal
liability.

4. Compulsion of an irresistible force;

Basis: Complete absence of freedom
i Elements; (PIT)
1. That the acts were compelled by means of a Physical force;
2. That such physical force must be Irresistible; and
3. That such physical force must come from a Third person (RPC, Art. 12(5)).

-The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who
acts not only without will but against his will.

-The duress, force, fear, or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending and of such a
nature as to induce a well-grounded belief in death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A
threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.

-Passion and obfuscation cannot amount to irresistible force (REYES). The person who used the
force or created the fear is criminally and primarily civilly liable, but the accused who performed
the act involuntarily and under duress is still secondarily liable (RPC, Art. 101).

ii. People v. Anod, G.R. No. 186420, 25 August 2009;

Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts
under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
equal or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom. However, we held that for
such a defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear, or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious
bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. In this case, as correctly
held by the CA, based on the evidence on record, appellant had the chance to escape Lumbayan's
threat or engage Lumbayan in combat, as appellant was also holding a knife at the time. Thus,
appellant's allegation of fear or duress is untenable. We have held that in order for the
circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a
character as to leave no opportunity for escape or self-defense in equal combat. Therefore, under
the circumstances, appellant’s alleged fear, arising from the threat of Lumbayan, would not
suffice to exempt him from incurring criminal liability.

5. Impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury;

Basis: Complete absence of freedom. Actus me invito non est meus actus - An act done by me against my
will is not my act.
i. Elements; (URG)
1. The existence of an Uncontrollable fear;
2. That the fear must be Real and imminent; and
3. The fear of an injury is Greater than, or at least equal to, that committed
Note:Duress as a valid defense should be based on real, imminent, or reasonable fear for
one's life or limb and should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote fear

The compulsion must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for
escape or self-defense in equal combat. It must presuppose intimidation or threat, not
force or violence.

ii. People v. Saldana, G.R. No. 148518, 15 April 2004;

In order that the circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the
compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal
 combat. Moreover, the reason for their entry to the van, where the father of the victims was, could
be taken as their way of keeping Feliciano Tan under further surveillance at a most critical time.

Appellant Morales' contention that their families were similarly threatened finds no support in the
evidence. The records are bereft of any showing that such threats to appellants' families were
made at all. We have held in People v. Borja. that duress as a valid defense should not be
speculative or remote. Even granting arguendo that Saldaña, Bautista, and Esguerra threatened to
harm appellants' families to coerce appellants to receive the ransom money at Gumi, Lubao, such
threats were not of such imminence as to preclude any chance of escape. In fact, as already
discussed, appellants had a real chance to escape when they went to Feliciano's van. Under the
circumstances, even if true, the fear that appellants allegedly suffered would not suffice to exempt
them from incurring criminal liability.

6. Failure to perform an act required by law when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause;
Basis: Lack of intent. Intent presupposes the exercise of freedom and the use of intelligence.
- It applies to felonies by omission.
-A priest cannot be compelled to disclose a confession made to him in his professional character (RULES
OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 24(d)
i. Elements; RFI)
1. That an act is Required by law to be done;
2. That a person Fails to perform such act; and
3. That his failure to perform such act was due to some lawful or Insuperable cause.
ii. People v. Bandian, G.R. No. 46186, 80 September 1986,

Being then only 23  years of age, and therefore inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the
inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such event. The act performed by the appellant  in
the morning in question, by going into the thicket, according to her,  to respond to call of nature,
notwithstanding the fact that she had  fever  for a  long time,  was perfectly lawful.   If by doing
so she caused a wrong  as that of giving birth to her child in  that same place  and later
abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by
strong dizziness and  extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened
by mere accident, with no fault or intention on her part.  The law exempts from liability any
person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, RPC).

In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations,  and granting that the
appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take her
child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it
should be held that the alleged  errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant are true; and it
appearing that under such circumstances  said appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting
circumstances in her favor, she is hereby acquitted of the crime of  which she had been accused
and convicted. 

j. Absolutory causes: -those where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and
sentiment, there is no penalty imposed (People v. Talisic, G.R. No. September 5, 1997).
i. Examples of Absolutory Causes:

1. Spontaneous Desistance in the attempted stage unless the overt act committed already
constitutes a crime other than that intended (Art. 6(3));

2.Death and slight or less serious physical injuries inflicted under Exceptional circumstances
(Art. 247);

3.Attempted or frustrated Light felonies except those against persons or property (Art. 7);

4. Instigation by reason of public policy;

5. Marriage of the offender and the offended party in casesof seduction, abduction, acts of
lasciviousness and rape (Art. 344);

6.Accessories whoareexempt from criminal liability by reason or relationship (Art. 20) andin
light felonies (Art. 16);
 7.Adultery and concubinage if the offended party shall have consented or pardoned the offenders
(Art. 344).

8.Forgiveness by the offended party in marital rape (Art. 344);

9.Certain relatives exempt from criminal liability for Theft, swindling and malicious mischief-
(Art. 332);

10.Trespass to dwelling when the purpose of entering another's dwelling against the latter's will is
to prevent some serious harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person, or for
the purpose of rendering some service to humanity or justice, or when entering cafes, taverns,
inns, and other public houses, while the same are open (Art. 280, par. 3)

ii.Instigation.
1. Entrapment v. Instigation;
Entrapment Instigation
As to nature
Employment ways and means in order to trap Means luring the accused into a crime that he,
capture the lawbreaker in the execution of his otherwise, had no intention to commit, in
criminal plan (People v. Gayoso G.R. "No. order to prosecute him.
206590, March 27, 2017).
As to origin of criminal intent
Originates from the mind of the accused and Originates from the inducer and not from the
the law enforcers merely facilitate the accused who had no such intention and would
apprehension of the criminal through not have committed it were not for the
schemes. prodding of the inducer.

As to criminal liability
Does not bar prosecution and conviction Leads to the acquittal of the accused. The law
enforcers act as active co-principals.

Illustration:
- A, a PDEA agent , gave B , a suspected pusher a P100-bill and asked him to buy some
marijuana cigarettes. Leads to the acquittal of the accused. The Law enforcers act as active co-
principals.

- If the one who made the instigation is a private individual, not performing public functions, both
he and the one induced are criminally liable for the crime committed; the former, as principal by
inducement; and the latter, as principal by direct participation.

2. Cases:
a. People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 88301, 28 October 1991;
The case of the prosecution is clear and positive. Ramos was caught in flagranti selling
marijuana. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the "buy-bust operation" or entrapment,
resorted to by the Narcotics agents has long been recognized as an effective means of
apprehending drug peddlers. It is a procedure or operation sanctioned by the Revised Penal Code,
(People v. Valmores, et al., G.R. No. 58635, June 28, 1983, 122 SCRA 922.) In the case
of People v. Y. Gatong-o, et al., G.R. No. 78698, December 29, 1988, 168 SCRA 716, We
defined entrapment as the "employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or
capturing a lawbreaker" (also People v. Valmores, et al.).

"In entrapment, the idea to commit the crime originates from the accused. Nobody induces or
prods him into committing the offense. This act is distinguished from inducement or
instigation wherein the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator and the accused is
lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. The instigator
practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes
a co-principal." 

b. People v. De Paz, G.R. No. 104277, 5 July 1993;

 There was no instigation in this case. As incontrovertibly disclosed by the evidence for
the prosecution, a buy-bust operation — with PO1 Leo Letrodo as the proser-buyer —
was successfully carried out in this case. Letrodo, after contacting the accused, offered to
buy sticks of marijuana cigarettes from him; the latter then accepted. Consequently,
Letrodo handed the marked P50.00 bill to the accused who then left and returned a few
minutes later to deliver the fifteen sticks of marijuana cigarettes. Letrodo opened up one
stick and, after determining that it contained marijuana, gave the pre-arranged signal to
his teammates who swooped down on the accused. Clearly, the accused was caught in
flagrante. The operation, a definite entrapment, was hatched to expose, arrest and
prosecute the accused, a drug trafficker. Since he was actually committing a crime, no
one else was needed to induce him to consummate his evil intentions. In short, the
criminal intent did not originate from Letrodo, but from the accused himself. Entrapment
has consistently proven to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers. 

The fact that he had the prohibited drug with him and accepted the P50.00 as payment for
it clearly established a consummated sale of the illegal drug which is punishable under
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.

The law does not require the element of intent to sell or possess in order to obtain a
conviction. Nor is it essential that the ownership of the prohibited drug be established or
known. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana requires merely the
consummation of the selling transaction. 

c. People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299, 22 January 1999;

The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and
himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the peace
officer for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal
plan. In People v. Tan Tiong,the Court of Appeals further declared that "entrapment is no bar to
the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker.

The concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to instigation or inducement in

Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to the accused.
It is instigation that is a defense and is considered an absolutory cause. To determine whether
there is a entrapment or instigation, our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the
apprehending officers, not the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. The "objective"
test first applied in United States v. Phelps has been followed in a series of similar cases.
Nevertheless, adopting the "objective" approach has not precluded us from likewise applying the
"subjective" test. In People v. Boholst, we applied both tests by examining the conduct of the
police officers in a buy-bust operation and admitting evidence of the accused's membership with
the notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang. We also considered accused's previous his
convictions of other crimes and held that his opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded
gang strengthened the state's evidence against him. Conversely, the evidence that the accused did
not sell or smoke marijuana and did not have any criminal record was likewise admitted in People
v. Yutuc thereby sustaining his defense that led to his acquittal.

d. People v. Espiritu. G.R. No. 180919, 9 January 2013.

"Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise, had no intention to commit,
in order to prosecute him." It differs from entrapment which is the employment of ways and
means in order to trap or capture a criminal. In instigation, the criminal intent to commit an
offense originates from the inducer and not from the accused who had no intention to commit and
would not have committed it were it not for the prodding of the inducer. In entrapment, the
criminal intent or design originates from the accused and the law enforcers merely facilitate the
apprehension of the criminal by using ruses and schemes. Instigation results in the acquittal of the
accused, while entrapment may lead to prosecution and conviction.

Here, the evidence clearly established that the police operatives employed entrapment, not
instigation, to capture appellant and her cohorts in the act of selling shabu. It must be recalled that
it was only upon receipt of a report of the drug trafficking activities of Espiritu from the
confidential informant that a buy-bust team was formed and negotiations for the sale of shabu
were made. Also, appellant testified that she agreed to the transaction of her own free will when
she saw the same as an opportunity to earn money. Notably too, appellant was able to quickly
produce a sample. This confirms that she had a ready supply of the illegal drugs. Clearly, she was
 never forced, coerced or induced through incessant entreaties to source the prohibited drug for
Carla and PO3 Cariño and this she even categorically admitted during her testimony.

5.ARTICLE 15-ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES

-Those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and
effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. The alternative circumstances are:
(RID) Relationship; Intoxication; and Degree of instruction and education of the offender

The basis of the alternative circumstances is the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions
attending its commission.

a. RELATIONSHIP shall be taken into consideration when the offended party is the:
a. Spouse;
b. Ascendant;
c. Descendant;
d. Legitimate, natural, or adopted Brother or Sister;
e.Relative by Affinity in the same degree of the offender .
-"In the same degree" refers to the ascendant, descendant, brother or sister of the offender's
spouse or the spouse of the offender's ascendant, descendant, or brother or sister. Relatives by
Affinity Includes in-laws, stepfather, or stepmother, stepchild and the like. It is the duty of the
stepparents to bestow upon their stepchildren a mother's/father's affection, care and protection.

Application of Relationship:
1. Crimes against property
a. Mitigating in the crimes of:
i. Robbery (Arts. 294-302);
ii. Usurpation (Art. 312);
iii. Fraudulent Insolvency (Art. 314); and
iv. Arson (Arts. 321-322, 325-326).

b. Exempting in the crimes of:

i. Theft
ii. Estafa; and
iii. Malicious mischief if the offender and the offended party lives together.

2. Crimes against persons

a. Mitigating in crimes classified as less grave felony or light felony and the victim is a relative
of lower degree (concurrence is required).
b. Exempting in crimes
i. Classified as grave felony; or
ii. If the victim is a relative of higher or equal level than the offender (concurrence is
not required)

If the offense of serious physical injuries is committed by the offender against his
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his legitimate other descendants,
relationship is aggravating. But the serious physical injuries must not be inflicted by
a parent upon his child by excessive chastisement

c. Aggravating
i. Homicide or murder: relationship is aggravating regardless of degree
ii. Rape: aggravating where a stepfather raped his stepdaughter or in a case where a
father raped his own daughter

3. Crimes against chastity

a. Aggravating
i. Acts of lasciviousness (Art. 336) - relationship is always aggravating, regardless
of whether the offender is a relative of a higher or lower degree of the offended
party.
  -When the qualification given to the crime is derived from the
relationship between the offender and the offended party, it is neither
mitigating nor aggravating, because it is inseparable from and inherent in
the offense, e.g. parricide, adultery and concubinage

i. People v. Manhuyod, G.R. No. 124676, 20 May 1998;

-Father-daughter relationship in rape cases has been treated by Congress in the nature of a
special circumstance which makes the imposition of the death penalty mandatory. Hence,
relationship as an alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code,
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, should no longer be applied in view of the
amendments introduced by R.A. No. 7659. It may be pointed, however, that without the
foregoing amendment, relationship would still be an aggravating circumstance in the crimes
of rape (Article 335) and acts of lasciviousness  (Article 336).

ii. People v. Orilla, G.R. Nos. 148939-40, 13 February 2004;

- Article 14 does not include relationship as an aggravating circumstance. Relationship is an
alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the RPC. The list of aggravating circumstances
in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is thus exclusive. Alternative circumstances are
not aggravating circumstances per se. The RPC is silent as to when relationship is
mitigating and when it is aggravating. Jurisprudence considers relationship as an
aggravating circumstance in crimes against chastity. However, rape is no longer a crime
against chastity for it is now classified as a crime against persons. The determination of
whether an alternative circumstance is aggravating or not to warrant the death penalty cannot
be left on a case-by-case basis. The law must declare unequivocally an attendant
circumstance as qualifying to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. The Constitution
expressly provides that the death penalty may only be imposed for crimes defined as heinous
by Congress. Any attendant circumstance such as a.) minority, b.) use of Deadly Weapon,
and c.) second ejaculation, that qualifies a crime as heinous must be expressly so prescribed
by Congress.

To determine the proper penalty, the court applied Article 63 of the RPC which states that the
greater penalty, which is death, will be applied when in the commission of rape there is
present one aggravating circumstance. The Supreme Court held that the aggravating
circumstance that is sufficient to warrant the imposition of the graver penalty of death
must be that specifically enumerated in Article 14 of the RPC. Since it is only
relationship that is alleged and proven in this case, and it is not an aggravating
circumstance per se, the proper penalty is the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua.

b. INTOXICATION. To be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of intoxication, it must be shown:

a. That at the time of the commission of the criminal act, the accused has taken such
quantity of alcoholic drinks as to blur his reason and deprive him of a certain degree
of control; and
b. That such intoxication is not habitual, nor subsequent to the plan to commit the
felony. To be mitigating, the accused's state of intoxication must be proved. Once
intoxication is established by satisfactory evidence, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, it is presumed to be non-habitual or unintentional

When intoxication mitigating and when aggravating:

Mitigating Aggravating
If intoxication is not habitual If intoxication is habitual
If intoxication is not subsequent to the plan to If it is intentional (subsequent to the plan to
commit a felony commit a felony)- drinks fully, knowing its
effects, to find a stimulant to commit a crime or a
means to suffocate any remorse.

 Habitual Drunkard-one given to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. The habit
should be actual and confirmed. It is unnecessary that it be a matter of daily occurrence. Even if
intoxication is not habitual, it is aggravating when subsequent to the plan to commit the crime
i. People v. Pinca, G.R. No. 129256, 17 November 1999;
Intoxication may be considered either aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the
circumstances attending the commission of the crime. Intoxication has the effect of
 decreasing the penalty, if it is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the
contemplated crime; on the other hand, when it is habitual or intentional, it is considered an
aggravating circumstance. A person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must
present proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission
of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating reason. At the same time, that
person must show proof of not being a habitual drinker and not taking the alcoholic
drink with the intention to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime.

Appellant belatedly pleads in his Reply Brief that intoxication should mitigate his
penalty. He cannot simply rely on those statements of the prosecution. He himself must
present convincing proof of the nature and the effect of his intoxication. What appears
undisputed in the records, however, is that he had a glass of beer prior to the murder incident.
Under normal circumstances, a glass of beer is not so intoxicating as to diminish a man's
rational capacity. It was not proven at all that such amount of alcohol blurred his
reason. This element is essential for intoxication to be considered mitigating
ii. People v. Mondigo, C.R. No. 167954, 31 January 2008;
The trial court erred in crediting appellant with the circumstance of intoxication as having
mitigated his crimes because "the stabbing incident ensued in the course of a drinking
spree." For the alternative circumstance of intoxication to be treated as a mitigating
circumstance, the defense must show that the intoxication is not habitual, not
subsequent to a plan to commit a felony and the accused's drunkenness affected his
mental faculties. Here, the only proof on record on this matter is appellant's testimony that
before Damaso, Anthony, and Delfin attacked him, he drank "about 3 to 4 bottles of
beer." The low alcohol content of beer, the quantity of such liquor appellant imbibed,
and the absence of any independent proof that appellant's alcohol intake affected his
mental faculties all negate the finding that appellant was intoxicated enough at the time
he committed the crimes to mitigate his liability.

c. INSTRUCTION OR EDUCATION LOW DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION AND EDUCATION

OR LACK OF IT is generally mitigating. High degree of instruction and education is aggravating,
when the offender took advantage of his learning in committing the crime.

As an alternative circumstance, it does not refer only to literacy but more to the level of
intelligence of the accused. It refers to the lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge of the full
significance of one's acts.
Mere illiteracy is not sufficient to constitute a mitigating circumstance. There must be also lack of
intelligence, which must be proved positively and cannot be based on mere deduction or inference.
Generally, lack of sufficient education is a mitigating circumstance in almost all crimes, however,
there are recognized exceptions to this rule which, although not making it mitigating, it also does not
make it aggravating, to wit: (PC-TRM)
a. Crimes against Property, e.g. arson, estafa, theft, robbery
b. Crimes against Chastity;
c. Treason - because love of country should be a natural feeling of every citizen, however unlettered
or uncultured he may be.
d. Rape and
e. Murder or homicide; to kill is forbidden by natural law which every rational being is endowed to
know and feel.

i. People v. Macatanda, G.R. No. L-51368, 6 November 1981.

Citing the case of U.S. vs. Maqui, appellant contends that his lack of instruction and education
and his being a Moslem belonging to a cultural minority should mitigate his liability, and the
penalty imposed by the trial court should be reduced accordingly. Under the circumstances of the
present case, the Maqui case may not be invoked as a precedent, Maqui was an uncivilized Igorot.
In the present case, owing to appellant’s plea of guilty, the records discloses no evidence
presented to prove the mitigating circumstances of lack of instruction, which needs to be proven,
as all circumstances modifying criminal liability should be proved directly and positively.

The mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction does not apply to crimes of theft and robbery.
Membership in a cultural minority does not per se imply being an uncivilized or semi-
uncivilized state of the offender, which is the circumstance that induced the Court in the Maqui
case, to apply lack of instruction to the appellant therein who was charged also with theft of large
cattle.