Seq.

Case Name
No. Principle in Sum Plus Chika2x.
FPJ v Arroyo (PET) - FPJ filed an election protest against GMA, during
the pendency of his protest he died. Susan Roces (FPJ's wife) filed a
petition/motion to intervene to substitute her hsuband in the pending
election protest in order to show the genuine will of the electorate in the
interest of the Filipino people. The Court ruled that a public office is
personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to
the heirs upon death. Thus, the Court consistently rejected substitution
by the widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies
FPJ v. Arroyo - Presidential Electoral during the pending protest case. This rule is not purely personal and
1
Tribunal exclusive. Hence, we have allowed substitution and intervention but
only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment and the party who is
entitled to the avails of the suit. In the case, Mrs. Poe herself denies any
claim to the office of the President and will not directly benefit from the
outcome. Thus, given the circumstances of the case, the protestant’s
widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest. Nobility of
interest is not the point of reference of whether one can intervene in an
election protest.
Pres. Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran
argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from
suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He also says that to allow
the libel case to proceed would produce a “chilling effect” on press
freedom. The contention of this case is that whether or not the Pres.
under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the
petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.The rationale for the
grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure
Soliven v Makasiar Presidential the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance
2
immunity, waived? or distraction, considering that being the Chief Exec. of the Gov't. is a
job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also
demands undivided attention. BUT this privilege of immunity from suit,
pertains to the Pres. by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by
the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's
behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to
prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. Moreover,
there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from

Estrada v. Desierto Presidential
3 immunity, after tenure? not convicted
by impeachment case?
4 Saez v. Arroyo
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the
protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction.
The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President's prerogative.
Estrada contends that he is a President on leave while respondent
Arroyo is an acting president. According to Section 8, Article VII of the
Constitution, “In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office
or resignation of the President, the Vice President shall become the
President to serve the unexpired term. SC ruled that Estrada has indeed
resigned from the presidency. The validity of a resignation is not
governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be expressed or implied. As long as the resignation is
clear, it must be given legal effect. Several acts such as his decision for
a snap eection and his personal statements in the Angara diary
manifests his resignation from the post.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command
responsibility, the following elements must obtain: a. the
existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the
accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his
subordinate; b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the
crime was about to be or had been committed; and c. the superior
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. The
president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces,
necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him
as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility
doctrine.
 Doromal, a former Commissioner of the PCGG, for violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in connection with his
shareholdings and position as president and director of the
Doromal International Trading Corporation which submitted bids
to supply P61 million worth of items to the DECS and the NMYC.
The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of
Doromal as part of the application to bid shows that he can
Doromal v. Sandiganbayan
5
Prohibitions, sec 13
rightfully be charged with having participated in a business which
act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the
Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family corporation in
which Doromal has at least an indirect interest." Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President,
Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants shall not... during tenure, directly or indirectly
participate in any business.
Cory issued EO 284 allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government
offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to
limitations set therein. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being
challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions
to Sec 13, Art 7 other than those provided in the Constitution; CLU
avers that by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution,
Civil Liberties Union v. ES Prohibitions,
6 namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
sec 13
Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice
is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec
8 (1), Article 8. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or
assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or
employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the
Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held
without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of their office.
 Petitioner questions Elma's concurrent appointments as PCGG
Chairman and Chief Presidential Legal Counsel. Is the strict prohibition
under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applicable to the
PCGG Chairman or to the CPLC? In sum, the prohibition does not apply
to respondent Elma since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is
a Cabinet secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary. Even if this
7 PIC v. Elma Prohibitions, sec 13 Court assumes, arguendo, that Section 13, Article VII is applicable to
respondent Elma, he still could not be appointed concurrently to the
offices of the PCGG appointments in question are not covered by
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, said appointments are
still prohibited under Section 7, Article IX-B, which covers all appointive
and elective officials, due to the incompatibility between the primary
functions of the offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC.
The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with
his position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void for
being in violation of the constitutional prohibition under Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Agra’s concurrent designations as
Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting Solicitor General did not come
within the definition of an ex officio capacity. Ex officio likewise
denotes an “act done in an official character, or as a consequence of
8 Funa v. Agra Prohibitions, sec 13
office, and without any other appointment or authority other than that
conferred by the office.” The ex officio position being actually and in
legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official
concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his
services in the said position. The reason is that these services are
already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his
principal office.
The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the
general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the
President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore
Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to
do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs
of the nation demand. The President is not only clothed with
Marcos v Manglapus express and
9 extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with
implied powers, residual power
attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order
and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign foe appears
on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling
presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the
relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief
provision.
 Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce
laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the
exercise of the veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments
that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same
through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the
Gonzales v Hechenova executive very act prohibited by said laws. Respondents' trend of thought, that, if
10
agreements an executive officer believes that compliance with a certain statute will
not benefit the people he is at liberty to disregard it, must be rejected —
we still live under a rule of law. Although the President may, under the
American constitutional system, enter into executive agreements without
previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement,
enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior
thereto.
It is a fundamentally accepted principle in Constitutional Law that the
President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the
President, is the "Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency". As the
President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the
same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his
Cabinet members, who in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus
and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive
department. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of
Carpio v. ES power of administrative the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the
11
realignment, single executive Commander-in-Chief provision "represent only a part of the organic
duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in
nature." His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with,
and a testament to, the constitutional principle that "civilian authority is,
at all times, supreme over the military." The circumstance that the
NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized DILG is
merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of
coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and
the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies
created under the assailed Act.

12 Gonzales v. OP
Pichay v. Office of the Deputy ES for
Legal Affairs Office of the President
13 proper - anything he wants, create,
abolish Exec Depts outside OP -
power to reorganize
Primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman
of the Office of the Ombudsman. The issue is whether the Office of the
President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power
over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the
constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman. The Court resolved
to reverse its September 4, 2012 Decision insofar as petitioner
Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). SC declared Section 8 (2) of
RA No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the
President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence
of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Executive power to remove and
discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, or to exercise
any power over them, would result in an absurd situation wherein the
Office of the Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity
and competence of the very persons who can remove or suspend its
members.
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, seeking to declare as
unconstitutional Executive Order No. 13, entitled, "Abolishing the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and Transferring its Investigative,
Adjudicatory and Recommendatory Functions to the Office of the
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, Office of the President".
Section 31 of E.O. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the
offices under him to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. The
Office of the President must, in order to remain effective and efficient,
be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the
manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. Clearly, the
abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division
specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative
of the President under his continuing delegated legislative authority to
reorganize his own office. Since both of these offices belong to the
Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing
the PAGC and transferring its functions to the IAD-ODESLA is allowable
under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.