National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594

Office of the Chairman

June 24, 1936

Honorable Donald D. Engen
Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
Washington, D.C. 20591

Dear Mr. Engen:

Thank you for your letter of May 5, 1986, in response to the National
Transportation Safety Board's Safety Recommendation A-86-20. This Safety
Recommendation resulted from the Safety Board's participation in the
investigation of an accident involving an Arrow Airlines, Inc., McDonnell
Douglas DC-8-63, N950JW, at Gander, Newfoundland, Canada, on December 12,
1985. Our discussion of your response follows:

A-86-20

Issue an Air Carrier Operations Bulletin to all Air Carrier

Operations Inspectors directing them to: (1) review the operations
specifications and associated operational documents for carriers
under their jurisdiction to verify that the provisions for use of
actual weights, versus average weights, are complete and accurate,
and clearly understood, and (2) reemphasize to each air carrier the
need to use actual . weights for passengers if the passenger
complement dictates.

The Safety Board is pleased to learn that the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) has issued Action Notice 8300.2, '"Expanded Procedures for
Computation of Weight and Balance," to the Flight Standards Division Managers
and all General Aviation, Air Carrier, and Flight Standards District Offices.
The Safety Board has reviewed this notice and its enclosures and finds that
the FAA's action complies with the intent of this recommendation. Safety
Recommendation A-86-20 has been classified as "Closed—Acceptable Action."

Your efforts to improve aviation safety are appreciated.

Sincerely,

Patricia A. Goldman
Acting Chairman
) r> . r> --•• "
*- 0 • 0 -
©
US Department 800 Independence Ave., S.W.
of Transportation Washington. D.C. 20591

Federal Aviation
Administration

MAY 5 1986

The Honorable Jim Burnett

Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board
800 Independence Avenue, SW. ,
Washington, D.C. 20594 ' "

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to NTSB Recommendation A-86-20 issued by the

Board on February 14, 1986. This recommendation resulted from
the Board's participation in the investigation of an accident on
December 12, 1985, involving an Arrow Airlines, Inc.,
McDonnell Douglas DC-8-63, N950JW. The investigation was
conducted by the Canadian Aviation Safety Board.

The airplane crashed shortly after takeoff from Gander,

Newfoundland, Canada, where it had stopped to-refuel on a
military contract flight. The flightcrew of N950JW were
operating under 14 CFR Part 121 rules as Flight MF128R from
Cairo, Egypt, to Fort Campbell, Kentucky. All 248 passengers,
who were soldiers from the U.S. Army 101st Airborne Division,
and the crew of 8 were killed in the impact and postcrash fire.

A-86-20. Issue an Air Carrier Operations Bulletin to all Air

Carrier Operations Inspectors directing them to: (1) review the
operations specifications and associated operational documents
for carriers under their jurisdiction to verify that the
provisions for use of actual weights, versus average weights,
are complete and accurate, and clearly understood, and
(2) reemphasize to each air carrier the need to use actual
weights for passengers if the passenger complement dictates.

FAA Comment. Enclosed for the Board's information is a copy of

an Action Notice, with attachments, dated April 3, 1986. This
notice was sent to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Flight
Standards Division Managers and all General Aviation, Air
Carrier, and Flight Standards District Offices. The guidance
material in the notice will be incorporated in FAA Order 8300.9,
Airworthiness Inspector's Handbook, in a subsequent change.

60 Yum* ol Ak Trmttlc
— A Standard for
 2

The n otiee requests that FAA principal maintenance inspectors,

in co njunction with the principal operations inspectors, review
the o perations specifications (Part E) and associated
opera tional documents for certificate holders under their
juris diction. This review is to ensure that the provisions for
use o f actual weights versus average weights are complete,
accur ate, and clearly understandable. The notice also requests
that inspectors reemphasize to each certificate holder the need.
to us e actual weights for passengers if the passenger complement
dicta tes.

I consider the FAA's action to be completed on this

recommendation.
,*
I trust that this action will meet with the Board's approval.

Sincerely,

Donald D. Engen
Administrator

Enclosure
 US
£ rvr trvt.1 11 n-rmr - DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
ftUTJUN NuTIUfc FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION A 8300.2

Subject: ACTION: ACTION NOTICE - Expanded P r o c e d u r e s f o r Approval Date: A p r i l 3 , 1986

Computation of Weight and Balance

From: ^. . ~ ,-,-, • . . - . j _-, . ~ , Expiration Date: A p r i l 1 , 1987

Director of F l i g h t Standards, AFS-1

To- ..,•._ • , « • . . Reply to

All Regional Directors & AED-1 Attn of:
Attn: Flight Standards Division Managers & AEU-200 Hess:426-8094
All GftDO's, ACDO's, FSDO's

This action notice is in response to National Transportation Safety

Board (NTSB) Safety Reconmendation A-86-20 (copy attached). T h e guidance
contained herein will b e incorporated into Order 8300.9, Airworthiness
Inspector's Handbook, in a subsequent change.'

Principal naintenance inspectors, in conjunction with the principal

operations inspectors, are requested to: (1) review the operations
specifications (Part E) and associated operational documents for
certificate holders under their jurisdiction t o ensure that the provisions
for use of actual weights versus average weights are complete, accurate,
and clearly understandable, and (2) reemphasize to each certificate holder
the need to use actual weights for passengers if the passenger complement
dictates.

6
Attachments

NOTE: THE CONTENTS OF THIS ACTION NOTICE, IF APPROPRIATE, SHALL BE INCORPORATED INTO THE
DIRECTIVES SYSTEM WITHIN SIX MONTHS AFTER THE DATE OF APPROVAL.
Distribution: A-X-l; A-X(FS)-2; A-FFS-1,2,7(MAX); Initiated By: AFS-220
AED-1, AEU-200 (1 copy e a . )
FAA Form 1320-Tast (M5) um t o m 2-2M6
.*w- : .- _ ATTAcmrnr. l
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C. 20594 '
Safety Recommendation /
%7YBO^

Dates February 14, 1985 . & •

In reply refer to: A-86-20

Honorable*~Donald D. Engen
Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
Washington, D. C. 20591

On December 12, 1985, an Arrow Airlines, Inc., (Arrow) McDonnell Douglas

DC-8-63, N950JW, crashed shortly after takeoff from Gander, Newfoundland, Canada,
where it had stopped to refuel on a military contract flight from Cairo, Egypt, to Fort
Campbell, Kentucky. The flightcrew of N950JW were operating under 14 CFR Part 121
rules as flight MF128R from Cairo to Ft. Campbell via Cologne, West Germany, and
Gander. All 248 passengers, who were soldiers from the U.S. Army 101st Airborne
Division, and the crew of 8 were killed in the impact and postcrash fire. The Canadian
Aviation Safety Board (CASB) is directing the ongoing investigation to determine the
cause of the accident. The National Transportation Safety Board is participating in the
investigation under the aircraft accident investigation provisions of Annex 13 of the
International Civil Aviation Organization.
Per Arrow procedures, the flightcrew used an "Adjusted Weight Units Loading
System" which indicates a weight figure of 42,500 pounds for a planned load of
250 passengers and entered this figure on the load sheet. This weight represented a
standard "average" weight per passenger of 170 pounds, including carry-on baggage. The
Adjusted Weight Units Loading System is described in Arrow Flight Operations Bulletin
No. 85-22, issued October 31, 1985, with an effective date of November 15, 1985. The
bulletin states, in part, that, "This procedure shall be used on all passenger operations of
DC-8 aircraft operated by Arrow Air, Inc." It further states, "The Adjusted Weight Units
Loading System takes the place of the Weight and Balance Form, Load Manifest, or other
system previously used for passenger operations." In general, this method provides the
flightcrew a rather simplified system for calculating airplane weight and balance data for
takeoff and landing performance. The system incorporates a loading table for use by the
flightcrew from which "adjusted weight units" are taken and entered on the load sheet for
passenger, baggage/cargo, and fuel weights. Simple addition of the various values leads to
a total airplane weight and a eenter-of-gravity value.

The Safety Board examined bulletin No. 85-22 and found that it contains no method
for calculating weight and balance for a passenger load that deviates from the standard
average weight. However, Arrow's DC-8 Airplane Operating Manual, Weight and Balance
Section, prescribes that, "actual passenger weight should be used when large groups of
passengers are carried whose average weight does not conform to the Normal Standard
Weight. For example, a group of large athletes, or a plane load of men would exceed the
average...." Also, Arrow's Operations SoecificationsT which were approved by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), state that, "Actual passenger weights are
normally used." It is unclear at this time how the flightcrew of N950JW could have
complied with the requirements of the manual or operations specifications because
bulletin No. 85-22 apparently superseded all other weight and balance systems in effect at
Arrow for DC-8 passenger operations and because ho forms or loading tables were
provided for calculating weight and balance when nonstandard passenger loads, such as
troops, were carried. The investigation has not established how Arrow obtained approval
from the FAA for the provisions of bulletin No. 85-22 without including a method for*^
weight and balance calculations for actual passenger weights that deviate from thejr.
standard average weights. Several airlines use the Adjusted Weight Units Loading System; *
however, .they incorporate provisions for both average and actual passenger weight ~
calculations. ' "t"
The. instructions contained, in Arrow's DC-8 Airplane Operating Manual are
consistent with the provisions of FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 120-27A, "Aircraft Weight
and Balance Control," which provides guidance to operators to establish an "approved"
weight and balance program under 14 CFR Part 121. AC 120-27A contains instructions
for development of weight and balance procedures to be included in an operator's
operations specifications. The procedures must show that the method used will
demonstrate that the airplane is properly loaded and will not exceed approved weight and
balance limitations. The instructions contain provisions for both average and actual
passenger weight calculations. ;..' •
The investigation has revealed that the standard average weight of 170 pounds used
by the flightcrew of N950JW is considerably lower than the actual weight of the
passengers and carry-on baggage carried aboard the accident flight. This conclusion is
supported by the following evidence:
1. From U.S. Army records, it was determined that the average ante-
mortem weight of the passengers (without uniform) was about 164
pounds.
2. The carry-on baggage carried on the accident airplane nearly filled the
baggage holds of the two Boeing 737 airplanes used to shuttle the troops
from their base in the Sinai Desert to Cairo, where they boarded
N950JW.
3. N950JW transported a group of soldiers from the United States to Cairo
on December 10/11, 1985. The U.S. Army determined that the actual
weight of the passengers and carry-on baggage of that flight was 54,726
pounds, or about 219 pounds average weight per passenger. These troops
were of comparable age and size to those aboard the accident flight. It
was not established whether that weight information was given to the
flightcrew.
•»
4. Witnesses have stated that the amount of carry-on baggage on flight
MF128R from Cairo exceeded the amount on the inbound flight to Cairo,
presumably because the passengers were required to wear civilian
clothes upon departure from Cairo and they carried aboard their field
uniform (fatigues, helmet, boots, weapon, etc.). Witnesses also have
stated that, during the stop at Gander, additional carry-on items were
purchased.
Although the U.S. Army estimated the weight of each passenger departing on
flight MF128R from Cairo as 210 pounds, including carry-on baggage, investigators have
not located the precise documentation provided to the flightcrew in Cairo before
departure. The CASB investigators currently estimate that the actual weight of each
passenger carried on the accident airplane was at least 220 pounds, including carry-on
baggage. Calculating the weight of the passengers based on this weight figure results in a :
passenger weight of 54,560 pounds at Cairo, Cologne, and Gander, about 12,000 pounds in j';_
excess of the takeoff weight used by the accident flighterew. This excess is based solely i^
on revisions to passenger and carry-on baggage weight figures and docs not consider %-:<
possible errors involving the weight of baggage carried in the cargo holds- •-_>" -V-^.-^
• ' ?+>£?•;
Although the investigation has not, at this time, reached definitive conclusions "•'_.-
regarding the effects of these weight discrepancies on the takeoff performance of the
accident airplane, or their relationship to the cause of the accident, there arc obvious
performance penalties and safety issues involved in such operation. Further, the Safety
Board, as well as the CASB, is concerned that flightcrews of other operators carrying
military personnel on charter or contract flights, or on other flights on which passenger
loads are not representative of the standard average weight, may be using the procedures
apparently used by Arrow flightcrews.
Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal
Aviation Administration
Issue an Air Carrier Operations Bulletin to all Air Carrier Operations
Inspectors directing them to: (1) review the operations specifications
and associated operational documents for carriers under their
jurisdiction to verify that the provisions for use of actual weights, versus
average weights, are complete and accurate, and clearly understood, and
(2) reemphasize to each air carrier the need to use actual weights for
passengers if the passenger complement dictates. (Class II, Priority
Action) (A-86-20)
BURNETT, Chairman, GOLDMAN, Yice Chairman, and LAUBER, Member,
concurred in this recommendation.

Jim Burnett
airman

/
 ^-xauaKLc^x i
-7/26/85 8300.9

FIGURE 6-30. EXAMPLE CPERATIONS SPECIFICATIONS - AIRCRAFT WEIGHT AND

BALANCE

UNITED VTATtS Or AMtKICA

DEPARTMENT OP TRANSPORTATION
P C I X I I A L AVIATIOM A B K I M i m i A T I O N
Part % Page 1 of 1
OPERATIONS 8PEanCATIONS
PHEFACZ PAGE
AIRCRAFT WE3SHT AND BALANCE 0OHTROL

The following procedures have been establiahed t o aaintain control of weight and
balance of the ABC A i r l i n e s ' aircraft operated under the t e r n s of these s p e c i f i -
cations (identified below) and to insure that these aircraft are loaded within the
gross weight and center of gravity limitations.
Determination of Weight of Passengers and Crew. Procedures by which either actual
or approved average passenger weights nay be used are provided for in the
operator's weight and balance control «rm»1.
Determination of Weight of Baggage.
(a) When computing the weight and balance of the aircraft, the average passenger
baggage weights used are in accordance with the operator's weight and balance
control manual.
(b) The average passenger baggage weight authorised in paragraph (a) shall not be
used in computing the weight and balance of charter flights and other special
service involving the carriage of special groups.
Periodic Aircraft Weighing. All aircraft will be weighed in accordance with the
procedures for establishing individual or fleet aircraft weights as outlined in
the operator's aircraft weight and balance control manual.
Loading Schedules and Identification of Aircraft. The following loading schedules
are used for routine operations:
Aircraft Type Type of Loading Schedule

1. Convair Model 3A0 {Passenger) Tabular

2. Douglas Model DC-6B (Passenger) Tabular
3. Douglas Model DC-7C (Passenger
and Cargo) Tabular
4. Lockheed Model 188 (Passenger) Index
5. Boeing Model 707-123 (Passenger) Computer
6. Boeing Model 727 (Passenger) Computer

loading Instructions. Loading Instructions relative to the above—listed loading

schedules are set forth in ABC Airlines' Stations Manual Volume X and Flight
Operations Manual Volume C.

Effective date.

Chap 6 Page 1081 (thru 1086)

 s.

CONCURH6NCES
RTG. SYMBOL

INITIALS/SIG.

/eoc
£(__jT—A^o—t-'<-J

'OV I 3 1989 yduil^ RTG. SYMBOL

INITIALS/SIG.

The Honorable Herbert Kohl f.fc CLUAJ+ISS

United States Senate H-3-*?

Washington, D. C. 2 0510 RTG. SYMBOL

Dear Senator Kohl: INtTIALS/SfG.

T7c<-i\Mi~l
Administrator Busey has asked me to reply to your letter of
October 26, 1989, on behalf of your constituent, Mrs. Virginia M-C-tf
Maisa, concerning information on the investigation of the Arrow RTG. SYMBOL
Air accident at Gander, Newfoundland, on December 12, 1985. /h'S-f
INITIALS/5
Under the provisions of Annex 13 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, the State of occurrence is rea^irec^oTrt Jk.
to investigate accidents which occur within its territory. The
State of registry and the State of operator are entitled to RTG. SYMBOL
n-n
participate in the investigation. Therefore, in the case of the
Arrow Air accident, Canada was responsible for conducting the Mr I -i
INITIALS/SIG.
investigation and determining the probable cause. Representa-
tives of the National Transportation Safety Board, the Federal
Aviation Administration, McDonnell-Douglas, and Arrow Air
participated in the investigation in accordance with Annex 13, RTG. SYMBOL
ilKL
but the final report was written and approved by the Canadian
Aviation Safety Board (CASB). INITIALS/SIG.
ALS/SIG.

The official CASB Aviation Occurrence Report was released to the 4 ML

public on December 8, 1988. Enclosed for your convenience is a
copy of the official report and the Dissenting Opinion Report. RTG. SYMBOL

On March 23, 1989, the Honorable Benoit Bouchard, Minister of MS-l/SIG^[ 11

INITIALS/BIG.
Transport, Ottawa, Canada, requested that an independent and
separate review of the CASB Aviation Occurrence Report on the
Arrow Air accident and the Dissenting Opinion Report be reviewed
to determine whether further investigation of or inquiry into theRTG. SYMBOL
accident was warranted.
1NITIALS/SIO.
The Honorable Willard Z. Estey, a retired Canadian Supreme Court
Justice, was appointed to review the report and transcripts of
evidence taken by the CASB in its public hearings, together with
all exhibits, reports, and reviews received or conducted by the
CASB during the course of the investigation. Justice Estey, in
his review, concluded that further investigation of the Arrow Air
accident was not warranted. A copy of that report is enclosed.

FAA Form 1360-14 (6-81) O F F I C I A L F I L E COPY .G.P-O.: 1985 — 572-590

flff/630b6*f
 2

The United States, as a "contracting state" to the International

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) agreements, is obligated to
comply with the standards in ICAO Annex 13. We believe that the
Canadian investigation, and our participation in it, satisfied
both the letter and spirit of Anriex 13.
We sympathize with the families that experienced the tragic loss
of sons and relatives in the Arrow Air accident. It is always
our hope that an accident investigation will result in findings
and conclusions that are supported unequivocally by the factual
data. Unfortunately, this does not always occur. In this case,
we agree with Justice Estey's conclusion that further investiga-
tion of this accident is not warranted.
I trust that this letter is responsive to your inquiry. Please
feel free to contact us in the future if we can be of assistance.
Sincerely,
Original Signed By
MONTE R. BELGER

Monte R. Belger
Associate Administrator for
Aviation Standards
5 Enclosures
Constitutent•s Correspondence
COOK:AAI-101:X79625:11/02/89:gab
cc: AAI-100/1, AVS-l
Document: KOHL
 \

CONCURRENCES
RTG. SYMBOL

INITtALS/SIG.

£ML
NOV I T 1989
i/-/3-f7
RTG. SYMBOL

The Honorable Dave Durenberger INITIALS/SIG.

United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510 X.fej>
Dear Senator Durenberger: if -tJ -9?
RTG. SYMBOL

Thank you for your letter of October 27 on behalf of your INITIALS/SIG.

nnx-p.
constituents, Dr. and Mrs. J. D. Phillips, requesting information
on the investigation of the Arrow Air accident at Gander, JSC
Newfoundland, on December 12, 1985.
Under the provisions of Annex 13 to the Convention on ,
M>
International Civil Aviation, the State of occurrence is requirecJLc'
to investigate accidents which occur within its territory. The
State of registry and the State of operator are entitled to
participate in the investigation. Therefore, in the case of the
Arrow Air accident, Canada was responsible for conducting the H-<
RTG. SYMBO.
investigation and determining the probable cause. Representa-
tives of the United States National Transportation Safety Board, Rax-1
the Federal Aviation Administration, McDonnell-Douglas, and Arrov INITIALS/SIG.
Air participated in the Canadian investigation in accordance with
Annex 13, but the final report was written and approved by the
Canadian Aviation Safety Board (CASB). ll/1 2
RTG. SYMBOL

The official CASB Aviation Occurrence Report was released to the A-B
public on December 8, 1988. Enclosed for your convenience is a INITIAL!LS/SIG.
I ftft
copy of the official report and the Dissenting Opinion Report. tUdk
DATE,

On March 23, 1989, the Honorable Benoit Bouchard, Minister of

RTG. SYMBOL
4 kk
Transport, Ottawa, Canada, requested that an independent and
separate review of the CASB Aviation Occurrence Report on the
Arrow Air accident and the Dissenting Opinion Report be reviewed INITIALS/SIG.
to determine whether further investigation of or inquiry into the
accident was warranted. DATE

The Honorable Willard Z. Estey, a retired Canadian Supreme Court RTG. SYMBOL
Justice, was appointed to review the report and transcripts of
evidence taken by the CASB in its public hearings, together with INITIALS/SIG.
many exhibits, reports, and reviews received or conducted by the
CASB. Justice Estey, in his review, concluded that further
investigation of the Arrow Air accident was not warranted. A
copy of that report is enclosed for your review.

F A A Form 1360-14 (6-81) O F F I C I A L FILE COPY •Ct U.S.G.PO.: 1985 — 572-590

4? Vo sort I
 2

The United States, as a "contracting state" to the International

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) agreements, is obligated to
comply with the standards of accident investigation in ICAO
Annex 13. We believe that the Canadian investigation, and our
participation in it, fully satisfied both the letter and spirit
of Annex 13, a copy of which is enclosed for your review.
We sympathize with the families that experienced the tragic loss
of sons and relatives in the Arrow Air accident. It is always
our hope that an accident investigation will result in findings
and conclusions that are supported unequivocally by the factual
data. Unfortunately, this does not always occur. In this case,
we agree with Justice Estey's conclusion that further investiga-
tion of this accident is not warranted.
Sincerely,
Jriginal Signed By
r
illiam B. Hendrickp
William R. Hendricks
Director of Accident Investigation
5 Enclosures
Transmitted Correspondence

COOK:AAI-101:X79625:11/09/89:gab
cc: AAI-1/100, A&x-i, Avs-i
Document: DURENBER
 National Transportation Safety Board
^&$rf\ Washington, D.C. 20594

*i£v. &
Office of the Chairman

June 24, 1986

Honorable Donald D. Engen
Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
Washington, D.C. 20591

Dear Mr. Engen:

Thank you for your letter of May 5, 1986, in response to the National
Transportation Safety Board's Safety Recommendation A-86-20. This Safety
Recommendation resulted from the Safety Board's participation in the
investigation of an accident involving an Arrow Airlines, Inc., McDonnell
Douglas DC-8-63, N950JW, at Gander, Newfoundland, Canada, on December 12,
1985. Our discussion of your response follows:

A-86-20

Issue an Air Carrier Operations Bulletin to all Air Carrier

Operations Inspectors directing them to: (1) review the operations
specifications and associated operational documents for carriers
under their jurisdiction to verify that the provisions for use of
actual weights, versus average weights, are complete and accurate,
and clearly understood, and (2) reemphasize to each air carrier the
need to use actual weights for passengers if the passenger
complement dictates.

The Safety Board is pleased to learn that the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) has issued Action Notice 8300.2, ""Expanded Procedures for
Computation of Weight and Balance," to the Flight Standards Division Managers
and all General Aviation, Air Carrier, and Flight Standards District Offices.
The Safety Board has reviewed this notice and its eaclosures and finds that
the FAA's action complies with the intent of this recommendation. Safety
Recommendation A-86-20 has been classified as "Closed—Acceptable Action."

Your efforts to improve aviation safety are appreciated.

Sincerely,

£&r7L*n '

Patricia A. Goldman
Acting Chairman
I p
o
©
US Department 800 Independence Ave.. S.W.
of Transportation Washington. D.C. 20591

Federal Aviation
Administration

MAY 5 1986

The Honorable Jim Burnett

Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board
300 Independence Avenue, SW. ,
Washington, D.C. 20594 '"

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to NTSB Recommendation A-86-20 issued by the

Board on February 14, 1986. This recommendation resulted from
the Board's participation in the investigation of an accident on
December 12, 1985, involving an Arrow Airlines, Inc.,
McDonnell Douglas DC-8-63, N950JW. The investigation was
conducted by the Canadian Aviation Safety Board.

The airplane crashed shortly after takeoff from Gander,

Newfoundland, Canada, where it had stopped to-refuel on a
military contract flight. The flightcrew of N950JW were
operating under 14 CFR Part 121 rules as Flight MF128R from
Cairo, Egypt, to Fort Campbell, Kentucky. All 248 passengers,
who were soldiers from the U.S. Army 101st Airborne Division,
and the crew of 8 were killed in the impact and postorash fire.

A-86-20. I.ss'ue an Air Carrier Operations Bulletin to all Air

Carrier Operations Inspectors directing them to: (1) review the
operations specifications and associated operational documents
for carriers under their jurisdiction to verify that the
provisions for use of actual weights, versus average weights,
are complete and accurate, and clearly understood, and
(2) reemphasize to each air carrier the need to use actual
weights for passengers if the passenger complement dictates.

FAA Comment. Enclosed for the Board's information is a copy of

an Action Notice, with attachments, dated April 3, 1986. This
notice was sent to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Flight
Standards Division Managers and all General Aviation, Air
Carrier, and Flight Standards District Offices. The guidance
material in the notice will be incorporated in FAA Order 8300.9,
Airworthiness Inspector's Handbook, in a subsequent change.

SO r « M of Ak TrmfHc Contrvl I
 2
The notice requests that FAA principal maintenance inspectors,
in conjunction with the principal operations inspectors, review
the operations specifications (Part E) and associated
operational documents for certificate holders under their
jurisdiction. This review is to ensure that the provisions for
use of actual weights versus average weights are complete,
accurate, and clearly understandable. The notice also requests
that inspectors reemphasize to each certificate holder the need,
to use actual weights for passengers if the passenger complement
dictates.

I consider the FAA's action to be completed on this

recommendation.
, • . ' . '

I trust that this action will meet with the Board's approval.
Sincerely,

Donald D. Eng<
Administrator

Enclosure
 —• »•»•« H&r c.

tOTinil iinTlor U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Al/HUN NUIlUt FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION A 8300.2

Subject: ACTION. ACTION NOTICE - Expanded Procedures for Approval Date: April 3, 1986
Computation of Weight and Balance

From: _. . r m • L I PI.' J _J ,«, ., Expiration Date: April 1. 1987

r
Director of Flight Standards, AFS-1 '

°' A l l Regional Directors & AEU-1 Attn of:

Attn: Flight Standards Division Managers & AEU-200 Hess:426-8094
All GftDO's, ACDO's, FSDO's

This action notice is in response to National Transportation Safety

Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendation A-86-20 (copy attached). The guidance
contained herein will b e incorporated into Order 8300.9, Airworthiness
Inspector's Handbook, in a subsequent change.

Principal maintenance inspectors, in conjunction with the principal

operations inspectors, are requested to: (1) review the operations
specifications (Part E) and associated operational documents for
certificate holders under their jurisdiction to ensure that the provisions
for use of actual weights versus average weights are complete, accurate,
and clearly understandable, and (2) reemphasize to each certificate holder
the need to use actual weights for passengers if the passenger complement
dictates.

'^'y'£S$ffi/*?**Y
><r6hn S.TferH
C
Attachments

NOTE: THE CONTENTS OF THIS ACTION NOTICE, IF APPROPRIATE, SHALL BE INCORPORATED INTO THE
DIRECTIVES SYSTEM WITHIN SIX MONTHS AFTER THE DATE OF APPROVAL
Distribution: A - x - i ; A-X(FS;-2; A-FFS-l,2,7(MAX); Initiated By: AFS-2UU
AEU-1, AEU-200 (1 copy e a . )
FAA Form 1320-Taal CMSJ u» **»m 2»m
.4 »

*tSb » National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594
A
Safety Recommendation
<*583*
Dates February 14, 1986
In reply refer to: A-86-20
Honorable Donald D. Engen
Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
Washington, D. C. 20591

On December 12, 1985, an Arrow Airlines, Inc., (Arrow) McDonnell Douglas

DC-8-63, N950JW, crashed shortly after takeoff from Gander, Newfoundland, Canada, ,
where it had stopped to refuel on a military contract flight from Cairo, Egypt, to Fort
Campbell, Kentucky. The flightcrew of N950JW were operating under 14 CFR Part 121
rules as flight MF128R from Cairo to Ft. Campbell via Cologne, West Germany, and
Gander. All 248 passengers, who were soldiers from the U.S. Army 101st Airborne
Division, and the crew of 8 were killed in the impact and postcrash fire. The Canadian
Aviation Safety Board (CASB) is directing the ongoing investigation to determine the
cause of the accident. The National Transportation Safety Board is participating in the *
investigation under the aircraft accident investigation provisions of Annex 13 of the
International Civil Aviation Organization.
Per Arrow procedures, the flightcrew used an "Adjusted Weight Units Loading
System" which indicates a weight figure of 42,500 pounds for a planned load of
250 passengers and entered this figure on the load sheet. This weight represented a
standard "average" weight per passenger of 170 pounds, including carry-on baggage. The
Adjusted Weight Units Loading System Is described in Arrow Flight Operations Bulletin
No. 85-22, issued October 31, 1985, with an effective date of November 15, 1985. The
bulletin states, in part, that, "This procedure shall be used on all passenger operations of
DC-8 aircraft operated by Arrow Air, Inc." It further states, "The Adjusted Weight Units
Loading System takes the place of the Weight and Balance Form, Load Manifest, or other
system previously used for passenger operations." In general, this method provides the
flightcrew a rather simplified system for calculating airplane weight and balance data for
takeoff and landing performance. The system incorporates a loading table for use by the
flightcrew from which "adjusted weight units" are taken and entered on the load sheet for
passenger, baggage/cargo, and fuel weights. Simple addition of the various values leads to
a total airplane weight and a eenter-of-gravity value.
The Safety Board examined bulletin No. 85-22 and found that it contains no method
for calculating weight and balance for a passenger load that deviates from the standard
average weight. However, Arrow's DC-8 Airplane Operating Manual, Weight and Balance
Section, prescribes that, "actual passenger weight should be used when large groups of
passengers are carried whose average weight does not conform to the Normal Standard
Weight. For example, a group of large athletes, or a plane load of men would exceed the
average...." Also, Arrow's Operations Specifications, which were approved by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), state that, "Actual passenger weights are
normally used." It is unclear at this time how the flightcrew of N950JW could have
complied with the requirements of the manual or operations specifications because
 -3-
passenger carried on the accident airplane was at least 220 pounds, including carry-on
baggage. Calculating the weight of the passengers based on this weight figure results in a
passenger weight of 54,560 pounds at Cairo, Cologne, and Gander, about 12,000 pounds in
excess of the takeoff weight used by the accident flightcrew. This excess is based solely
on revisions to passenger and carry-on baggage weight figures and does not consider
possible errors involving the weight of baggage carried in the cargo holds.
Although the investigation has not, at this time, reached definitive conclusions
regarding the effects of these weight discrepancies on the takeoff performance of the
accident airplane, or their relationship to the cause of the accident, there arc obvious
performance penalties and safety issues involved in such operation. Further, the Safety
Board, as well as the CASB, is concerned that flighterews of other operators carrying
military personnel on charter or contract flights, or on other flights on which passenger
loads arc not representative of the standard average weight, may be using the procedures
apparently used by Arrow flighterews.
Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal
Aviation Administration
Issue an Air Carrier Operations Bulletin to all Air Carrier Operations
Inspectors directing them to: (1) review the operations specifications
and associated operational documents for carriers under their
jurisdiction to verify that the provisions for use of actual weights, versus
average weights, are complete and accurate, and clearly understood, and
(2) reemphasize to each air carrier the need to use actual weights for
passengers if the passenger complement dictates. (Class n, Priority
Action) (A-86-20)
BURNETT, Chairman, GOLDMAN, Vice Chairman, and LAUBER, Member,
concurred in this recommendation.

Bvf Ji/n Burnett

/ Chairman
 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
ACTION NOTICE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION A 8300.2

Subject: ACTION: ACTION NOTICE- Expanded P r o c e d u r e s f o r Approval Date: A p r i l 3 , 1986

Computation of Weight and Balance

From: „. . £ „, • , , -.; , , ___ , Expiration Date: April 1, 1987

Director of Flight Standards, AFS-1

°' All Regional Directors & AEU-1 AttnV

Attn: F l i g h t Standards Division Managers & AEU-200 Hess:426-8094
All GADO's, ACDO's, FSDO's

This action notice i s in response t o National Transportation Safety

Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendation A-86-20 (copy a t t a c h e d ) . The guidance
contained herein w i l l be incorporated i n t o Order 8300.9, Airworthiness
I n s p e c t o r ' s Handbook, in a subsequent change.'

P r i n c i p a l maintenance inspectors, in conjunction with the p r i n c i p a l

operations inspectors, a r e requested t o : (1) review the operations
specifications (Part E) and associated operational documents for
c e r t i f i c a t e holders under t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n t o ensure t h a t t h e provisions
for use of actual weights versus average weights a r e complete, a c c u r a t e ,
and c l e a r l y understandable, and (2) reenphasize t o each c e r t i f i c a t e holder
the need t o use actual weights for passengers if the passenger complement
dictates.

-Johfi' St ^ e £ i ^ *
b
Attachments

NOTE: THE CONTENTS OF THIS ACTION NOTICE, IF APPROPRIATE, SHALL BE INCORPORATED INTO THE
DIRECTIVES SYSTEM WITHIN SIX MONTHS AFTER THE DATE OF APPROVAL.
Distribution: A-X-l; A-X(FS)-2J A-FFS-1,2,7(MAX); Initiated By AFS-i>2u
AEU-1, AEU-200 (1 copy e a . )
FAA Form 1320-T«*t IMSI UM MMI** 2-2M6
oc: AOA-l/ASF-l/ASF-100
ASF-110:RDCook:sg:x73 IS 0:1/25/33
A0A#A871215030

?!r. S s r n a r i ^ . - D e s e h e n e n
Cltair^an, Canadian A v i a t i o n S a f e t y Board
P . O . J-ox 3 1 2 0
sits v'ista Terminal
Ottawa, Oneiric, Canatfe £12 iT8

near ;-'r. Diicheaea:

"h»F!K jQ-j for .;ivir.t; t:ie F33eral Aviation Administration (FAAJ

tie opportunity to review the 3raft Aviation Occurrence
3e?crt >5-i!50902 (T2fcK'?) of tse Canadian Aviation Safety
iserc's (CA52) investigation into t^« 3ccest»er 12, 1955, Arrow
air, JC-5-C3 accident at Ganger International Airport,
." n jf cuudiarjd .

0-j,r different aiaeiplicea wxtain FAA have reviewed the CASS

report at-a offer tae following coawentss

1. Sect-ioff 1.17.15 ind 2.11: The Soard'a statements and

conclusions regarding F*A surveillance cf Arrow Air »re based O B
wuat we believe is aa incomplete review of all available facts.
The ioriri attributes eany cf its conclusions in thi3 area tc the
results of the January 1936 indepth inspection of Arrow. Many
of the inspection tctc's "findinga" were later, after an indepth
r?vic-y by the FAA's Hissi Flight Standards District Office,
found tc be invalid for a variety of reasons. Our FAA's
Southern Region Flight Standards Division and the Miaal Flight
Standards District Office would be willing to discuss their
tfisi>s «itli your investigators.

2. Section 1.6s On pa^e 10 of the report, the reference to F&A

Fora j?? should read FAA Fors 337.

I would ilk* to acataeBd the CA3B for the aspth and detail of its
investigation and the thoroughness in the preparation of this
dccu&ent«

I copi thiJ information .ill oe helpful in coopletin^ your final

report.

Sincerely,
©
U.S. Department
Memorandum
of Transportation
Federal Aviation
Administration

ACTION: Draft Aviation Occurrence Report 85-H50902 rj*i. £ ,0 1338

Da,e; W
(T26HP) Gander I n t ' l A r p t . Newfoundland 12/12/85;
ASF-110, Route S l i p of 12/22/87

Reply to
Manager, F l i g h t Standards D i v i s i o n , ASO-200 Attn of: Cook:x7421

Manager, Accident I n v e s t i g a t i o n D i v i s i o n , ASF-100

Our South F l o r i d a F l i g h t Standards D i s t r i c t Office and our Regional Staff have

r e v i e w e d t h e Canadian A v i a t i o n Safety Board ( t h e Board) Report, and o f f e r the
following comments for your c o n s i d e r a t i o n .

1. Section 2 . 5 : The Board has concluded t h a t i c e was p r e s e n t on the leading

edge of t h e wing when i t landed a t Gander. In our o p i n i o n , t h e r e i s evidence
a v a i l a b l e i n S e c t i o n 1 . 7 . 5 of the B o a r d ' s r e p o r t which makes t h i s conclusion
a r g u a b l e . There i s f u r t h e r evidence presented both in the s u b j e c t r e p o r t and
i n t h e p u b l i c t e s t i m o n y g i v e n a t O t t a w a t h a t m a k e s t h e c o n c l u s i o n of
a d d i t i o n a l i c e a c c u m u l a t i o n d u r i n g t h e ground time even more s u s p e c t .
However, s i n c e c o n c l u s i v e e v i d e n c e of i c e , or l a c k of i c e , w i l l n e v e r be
a v a i l a b l e , we accept the p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s p r e s e n c e .

We b e l i e v e , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e aerodynamics a n a l y s i s of what occurred during

t h e l a n d i n g and s u b s e q u e n t t a k e o f f n e e d s t h e s u p p o r t of a d d i t i o n a l
e n g i n e e r i n g / p e r f o r m a n c e data for the DC-8 a i r c r a f t . S p e c i f i c a l l y , we b e l i e v e
t h a t t h e premise s t a t e d by the Board ( i . e . , t h a t the approach angle of a t t a c k
of a DC-8 would be l e s s than a c r i t i c a l angle of a t t a c k with i c e a c c r e t i o n ) ,
s h o u l d have c o n f i r m i n g d a t a a v a i l a b l e from e i t h e r t h e m a n u f a c t u r e r or the
s o u r c e ; s h o u l d be v e r i f i e d by n o n - b i a s e d s i m u l a t i o n a n a l y s i s ; and should be
made a p a r t of t h e r e p o r t . However, i f t h i s premise cannot be supported in
t h i s m a n n e r , t h e n a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of an a l t e r n a t i v e c a u s e would be a
necessity.

2. S e c t i o n 2 . 9 : This o f f i c e concurs with the Board's determination that

c u r r e n t FARs do n o t r e f l e c t r e c e n t advances in the understanding of f a t i g u e .
We s u p p o r t c o n t i n u e d r e s e a r c h i n t h e f i e l d and change of r e g u l a t i o n s where
a p p r o p r i a t e . However, t h e B o a r d ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t f l i g h t c r e w f a t i g u e as a
c o n t r i b u t i n g c a u s e of t h e a c c i d e n t i s s p e c u l a t i v e and o v e r l o o k s s e v e r a l
pertinent facts.

Many p i l o t s , e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e o v e r 40 y e a r s of a g e , consume a t l e a s t one

a s p i r i n d a i l y a s a p r o p h y l a c t i c a g a i n s t h e a r t d i s e a s e . The age of the Arrow
crewmembers, in the c o n t e x t of the widespread knowledge of a s p i r i n as a h e a r t
d i s e a s e p r e v e n t a t i v e , makes t h i s s c e n a r i o a t l e a s t as probable as the B o a r d ' s
conclusion. The p r e s e n c e of a s p i r i n becomes even more benign when evaluated
 2

against the testimony of numerous eyewitnesses to the crews' disposition in

the hours prior to the accident. Witnesses at the crew's hotel, the Cologne
Airport and Gander Airport, unanimously testified to the apparent good spirits
and attitude of all crewmembers. Such behavior is not consistent with persons
suffering from simultaneous chronic and acute fatigue.

3. Section 1.17.15 and 2.11; The Board's statements and conclusions

regarding FAA surveillance of Arrow Air reflect invalid conclusions based on a
superficial and, in some instances, incomplete review of available facts.

The Board attributes much of their conclusion in this area to the results of
the January 1986 in-depth inspection of Arrow. They cite "numerous examples
of non-compliance with FARs." If the Board had followed up that inspection
report, they would have found that numerous of the teams "findings" were later
found to be invalid for a variety of bonafide reasons. The total civil
penalty levied against Arrow as a result of the 1986 inspection was $14,000.
When comparad against the results of numerous in-depth inspections of other
carriers since then, it is obvious that the Arrow civil penalty was less than
"average," indicative of minor violations in limited areas of their opera-
tions. It is an egregious exaggeration to say that the final results of the
1986 inspection were either similar to the 1984 inspection or prevalent in all
areas of Arrow Air operations.

Additionally, the Board contends that the increased surveillance and followup
called for by the 1984 NATI inspection apparently was not accomplished by the
FAA. In reality, the surveillance record clearly shows that in the 18 months
prior to the accident, FAA surveillance and followup of Arrow was executed to
a greater degree, in both quantity and quality, than ever before in the
company's history. After the accident, this office prepared a document which
comprised the FAA surveillance history of Arrow for the 12 months preceding
the accident. This record shows that all areas of the Arrow company were
receiving adequate surveillance. The Board may not have had this surveillance
history summary. If they did, they appear not to have evaluated it closely.

4. Section 1.6: On Page 10 of the report, the reference to FAA Form 377
should read FAA Form 337.

If we may be of further assistance or provide any additional information or

comments, please feel free to contact me or my staff at any time.

William M. Berry./jr.
 Afli

©
US. Department Southern Region P. 0. Box 20636
of Transportation Atlanta, Georgia 30320
Federal Aviation
Administration

OCT 2 ! 1988

Mr. Peter Eoag

Superintendent of Operations
Canadian Safety Board
?. 0. Box 9120
Al-a Vieta Terminal
Ottawa, Ontario. Canada K1G2T8

Dear Mr. Boag

A e n a v e receive,i request from our FAA Office of Accident

Investigation in Washington t.o furnish you supplemental
information relative to statements contained in the January 29,
198B, letter signed by the FAA Administrator. After discussion
with the Acting Director of Flight Standards Service and the
Manager of the Accident. Investigation Division, it was agreed
directly.

The information which follows was supplied by our office in

Miami, Florida, and is a synopsis of the data that was referred
to in the Administrator's letter when he stated "an incomplete
V ^ I T I _j TJ .---. +* ill available fact.' Peferences No. 1 through No. 4
which follow immediately. provide easy reference to the basic
documents of this matter, all of which are available, but not
included with this letter due to time and space constraints. The
surveillance records referred to in the body of this letter are
not included for the same reasons, but are available in Work
Program Management System (WFMS) records. •

Reference No. 1 CASE Draft Aviation Occurrence Report

85-H50902 (T28KP)

Reference No. 2 FAA Administrator's letter to CASE

Chai rm an. M r. De s chen e s, Jan 29, 1988;
Subject: FAA Response to CASE Draft
Occurrence Report 85-H50902 (T26HP)

Reference No. 3: FAA :ial Inspection Report: Arroi

J-
a

s e c t i o n t mo. , n«.? i^'ef- r-t-n-^r Ho. J 1 "-*.,! i:'ir.-:

categories: m s wnicn r e c j u i r T d con>.-c
but d i d n< .1 M •_'•.' i. 4_ ( ~ 1 1 X '-• I • _• tT 1IJ ~ . i '.• Z* _• '-• iim.SOl
findings which not only required correctivf- action, bur resulted
in formal enforcement proceedings against. Arrow Air, Inc. 7h*
minor findings detailed in Reference No. 3 were corrected by
Arrow Air, Inc., and th<= specifics of those corrections are
derailed in Reference No. 4 Each major finding by the
inspection team resulted in an tin Kent Invest!•mr •>. <•
(SIR). The team identif ns ana
airw T.naT. re: Subsequent is
which included review by regional
ialists aa6 Fegional Cout • - ' determined -"•-* - — - ^ that *---of ••*t--- '''- *----•
s, 8 were not violations vert; dismissed
ere violations and a civil penalty was assessed; 4 were
at ions and warning/correction letters were issued; <..ne EIF is
pending a.S o r tina\ A summary of the EIR's is as
follows:

QPJkR^IliiM
JTD jTTT TT Mrs
UBJECT

86SO650016 Ops Specs-Operating Areas

88SO650017 0ps Spocs-Lease Agreements

86.30650013 PAR/SAP in Training Program

-36306 50019 Weight & Ealance Control Civil Penalty

.Assessed

86SO650O2O Crew Duty Time Civil Penalty

Assessed

86S065002I Crew Feet Time Civil Penalty

Assessed

86SO650 022 Crew Duty Time No Action

36SO650023 Crew Duty Time

fir. F.Ofifs 0 0 2 4 Crew Dutv Time No Action

 3

86SO6M:092 A i r c r a f t Storage Procedures Letter of

Correction

'6SO650093 Manua I Be v i s ion Da t e Warning Letter

1 +• - ,-. c +
^ • ] Civil Penalty
Hl^il' veauire
Assessed
i n s Peo i..ioii
or. No Action

C' 0 i: 0 H iJ> • J 0 9 6 1J *-• ' - • * J :

-i
'ecoiMs

R H ? 0 rS)";fi0 H 7 Repair Action No Action

6 6 5 0 6 5 0 098 Weight * Balance Civil P e n a l t y

Assessed

8630650099 W e i g h t & B a .1 a n o e Civil P e n a l t y

Assessed

86SO650100 Inspection Records Warning Letter

S6S0650101 Use of Foreign Air Pending

Carrier P a r t s

This closer e x a m i n a t i o n of the a v a i l a b l e data r e v e a l s that fully

50*;. (9 of 18) of the inspection team's p r e l i m i n a r y major f i n d i n g s
(EIFs) were n o * substantiated by the facts of the c a s e s . The
total civil penalty levied against Arrow Air, Inc., as a result,
of the 19 8 6 i n v e s tig a t i o n « a s $ 14 , 0 0 0 . 0 (0 .

Num* >*.-- 11 c iVr- hfi>l conducted at other

m-cieptn i n s p When
carriers since then.
e c t i o n scompared
nav against these s u b s e q u e n t
inspections, the magnitude of the A r r o w n o n c o m p l i a n c e was n o
worse than " a v e r a g e , " indicative of v i o l a t i o n s in limited a r e a s
of their o p e r a t i o n .

-' ..-•. >•>.=•! 1 v Board contends that the increased s u r v e i l l a n c e

and loiiowup called ior 7 the 1984 NATI inspection apparently
was not acco iplished by the FAA. E x a m i n a t i o n of the s u r v e i l l a n c e
record clearly shows that in the months prior to the accident,
 i - J - i •-' " •-! J.1 gr^st^r
h-f:-r
•y . After the accident, this office piv
ri i £• + y - ,-1 document which comprised the FAA surveillance
history of Arrow for the 12 months preceding the accident. This
record sncwx tna.t a 1 the Arrow >-i t.T TJ
ere receiving:
adequate surveiiianci

ry, Jr.
light Standards Division
 /\R(ZQCU Aitt.

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF FLIGHT STANDARDS

SUBJECT: Arrow Air

The following actions have been taken since the Arrow crash in December
1985.

1. A high level "Executive Review Group" consisting of DOD, DOT, and FAA
representatives completed a review of all polices and procedures related to
military use of air carriers. A final report was issued April 1, 1986.

2. KAC pilot observers are now allowed in air carrier cockpits.

3. A special inspection program for military charter operations was

initiated. Seventeen of these indepth inspections were completed through
1987. Military charter operators continue to be inspected as part of the
NASI? program.

4. The military has been invited to accompany FAA during special

inspections and to attend both in and out briefings of the carriers
involved. The inspection reports are provided to MAC as soon as they are in
final for::..

5. Safety information is exchanged on a daily basis between the FAA and the
military.

6. A MAC liaison officer is assigned to FAA headquarters. He has access to

automated data, enforcement information, inspection schedules as well as
provide input on military needs or priorities.

7. An FAA inspector has been assigned at Scott AFB, Illinois, Military

Airlift Command, Headquarters.

8. Improvements to FAA surveillance activities have been implemented. IE:

geographic responsibilities, national work programs, re-structuring of
certificate management functions, new guidance materials.

9. The overall number of field inspectors has been increased.

Other information

1. Arrow currently operates four DC-8 aircraft in cargo only

operations.

2. We currently have a regulatory project underway to tighten up the

flight and rest requirements for international operations.

Prepared by: David R. Harrington

AFS-200
267-8166
 \'v'

&
US. Department
Memorandum
of Transportation
Federal Aviation
Administration

DEFORMATION; DRAFT AVIATION OCCURRENCE REPORT

Sub,ec,: Da,e:
85-H50902 (T26HP) Gander International Airport, • •> - ,1Q
Newfoundland, 12 December 1985; ASF-110 route slip " 'y 8 &
dated 12/22/87
Reply to
From: At,n0,:
Director of Flight Standards, AFS-1 Hess:267-8094

0
Manager, Accident Investigation and Coordination Branch, ASF-110

We have reviewed the subject report and have no comments a t t h i s time.

<?ir^ v
r t L. Goodrich
 6K
7>c^f? /M^^/i - " - ^ ° r ^ '

^ ^ -» c- <-*/•*> / ? ' f »' T ^ ^ , |

After a Busy Day, Wind Down in Onr Dlasion Lounge.

FAAForm 1360-38 (7-76) FORMERLY FAA FORM 2 8 0 0 - 2
DATE

REMINDER MEMO
WORK ORDER

> AVOID ERRORS — PUT IT IN WRITING <

ROUTING SYMBOL

' &£ &C*

SUBJECT:

^ /7/U^-t &c**«-^£^y freest C<-J e-<£___

SIGNATURE
E / " > } S ROUTING SYMBOL
 Q
US. Department
Memorandum
of Transportation
Federal Aviation
Administration

subject: ACTION: Draft Aviation Occurrence Report Date: IAM I 2 1988

85-H50902 (T26HP) Gander International °
Airport, December 12, 1985
DHSU
Reply to
From: Manager, Aircraft Certification Division, ANM-100 Attn.of: FTS795-6319

TO: Manager, Accident Investigation Division, ASF-100

Attn: Robert D. Cook, Manager, Accident Investigation
Coordination Branch, ASF-110

Thank you for giving us the opportunity to review the draft of Aviation
Occurrence Report 85-H50902 (T26HP) of the CASB investigation into the
December 12, 1985, Arrow Air DC-8-63 accident at Gander International
Airport, Newfoundland.

Our different disciplines in engineering including Airframe, Systems,

Propulsion and Flight Test Branches have completed their review of the
draft in their respective areas of concern and can find nothing further
to add.

We would like to commend CASB for the depth and detail of their
investigation and the thoroughness in the preparation of this
documentation.

^M/^^A^^
.Leroy Keith
 l+y 2*^ d Ml/1./M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DATE

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

ROUTE SLIP 12-22-87

NAME ROUTING SYMBOL

M. Craig Beard AWS-1

PER YOUR REQUEST FOR YOUR SIGNATURE

FOR YOUR INFORMATION COMMENT

PER OUR CONVERSATION TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION

NOTE A N D RETURN PLEASE ANSWER

DISCUSS WITH ME PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE
FOR YOUR APPROVAL OF

REMARKS:
Attached i s t h e d r a f t copy of t h e Canadian
Aviation Safety Board (CASB) aviation
o c c u r r e n c e r e p o r t of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n
involving Arrow Air (DC-8-63) at Gander,
Newfoundland on December 12, 1985. This
r e p o r t is d i s t r i b u t e d to your o r g a n i z a t i o n
for y o u r ' r e v i e w and a p p r o p r i a t e comments.
T h e ' r e p o r t i s a d r a f t r e p o r t and t h e c o n t e n t
i s not to be made p u b l i c . Please p r o v i d e

ASF-110. If f u r t h e r information i s needed,

p l e a s e f e e l free to contact t h i s o f f i c e . As
t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n p r o g r e s s e s , I will keep
you informed.
VJj-b/U TELEPHONE NO. ROUTING SYMBOL
FROM: Robert D. Cook
Manager, Accident Investigat an &
P-v-vr-fl-ina-Hon FORMERLY
Branch
PAA Form 1 3 6 0 - 1 3 ( 4 - 4 7 )
FAA FORM 2641
I 767-81QO ftSF-no
* U . S.QPO: 1 I I O - « 2 3 - « t <
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