Ethics and Economics

Alisdair MacIntyre: After Virtue. Chapter 14: "The Nature of the Virtues"

In this chapter, the author approaches the virtue theory. Maclyntyre begins by addressing the
argument that there is not a fundamental conception of the virtues to be found among the
several competing conceptions he has described (outlined by Aristotle, Homer, the New
Testament, Jane Austen and Benjamin Franklin), as well as the numerous additional conceptions
he has not - the author sets out to refute this statement.

I am in the same wavelength as Maclyntyre when he mentions that the different virtue’s
conceptions mentioned offer several interpretations of what constitutes a virtue, in addition to
different priorities and lists of the virtues. Also, I agree when Maclyntre argues that they all share
the fundamental idea of pursuing the good life. Additionally, one of the strongest aspects that
Maclyntyre mentioned was that the concept of virtue is the assumption of an earlier
understanding of social and moral life and the fact that there are three major components to
virtue’s theory: an account of a practice, an account of the narrative and account of what
constitutes a moral tradition. Moreover, I like the idea of using an example to substantiate his
argument on the difference between external and internal goods – he describes a scenario
where a smart child is taught to play chess with the promise of getting a candy in case she wins,
in which Maclyntyre explains that the candy is an external good. Furthermore, another strong
approach mentioned by the author was the fact that a bond of mutual submission and sincere
connection is necessary for every practice and for it to grow, honesty, trust, courage and
impersonal justice are required. Besides that, I agree with Maclyntyre’s thought regarding the
evil practices – the author states that they are a possibility and that practice is susceptible to
moral critique and can become corrupted.

One aspect that I consider not that right is the fact that MacIntyre, in the definition of a practice,
he mentions it as any complex social activity with internal goods but, in that definition, he
forgets about the external goods, which are highly present in practices as well, being the “goods
of competition”. Besides that, a topic that need to be improved in Maclyntyre’s model is that
the essential virtue of constancy can only be described in terms of a whole human life, which
leads to an incomplete account, thus, I believe that the author should follow his suggestion on
answering the question of whether it is “rationally acceptable to see each human life as a unity”
in order to solve this issue.

We can conclude that, despite Maclyntyre’ model not requiring Aristotle’s metaphysical biology,
it can be considered, at the same time, Aristotelian in the three following aspects: it uses a lot
of Aristotelian principles (intellectual virtues, voluntariness and virtues of character) and
demand for similar differences and ideas, it is similar to Aristotle’s conception of pleasure (in
contrast to the utilitarian view) and it combines complexity and evaluation in a way that Aristotle
would approve of.

MARIANA LEMOS 1
 Ethics and Economics
Amartya Sen: Development as Freedom

Chosen Chapter: Chapter One – The Perspective of Freedom

In Development as Freedom book, Sen goes into more detail about what he understands by
freedom and why having freedom has a positive causal relationship with growth, while having
no freedom has a positive causal relationship with poverty. In this book, the author mentions
that, if strengthening and preserving individual freedoms is genuinely essential for development,
then economic, social and political institutions should all work together to support growth in
this way.

One of the strongest approaches of Sen is the fact that he cited freedom’s value and its
effectiveness as two arguments for why it is preferable to other alternative definitions of
economic development. Also, Sen describes development as the process of extending the range
of freedoms that people enjoy and that are available to individuals. Besides that, I agree on the
fact that if obtaining freedom is what development is about, it makes sense to focus on freedom
rather than some of the methods/tools for reaching it. Additionally, I also agree that freedom
may be influenced by economic, social, civil rights and political factors as well as the fact that
development demands the elimination of significant sources of “unfreedom” such as poverty,
tyrant, intolerance, lack of functional education, poor social security, limited economic
opportunities and disregard for public amenities, for instance. Other approach that I found
crucial was when, in chapter one, Sen strongly highlights the importance of wealth for various
reasons - he states that the value of wealth is found in the things that wealth enable us to do,
particularly the meaningful freedom it aids us in achieving; the author also adds that the living
condition and quality of life are determined by wealth and that it improves people’s capacity to
impact both themselves and the world, both of which are essential elements of development’s
process. Sen contends that democracy and the defense of human rights promote development,
which I totally agree.

On the contrary, one aspect that I consider that is missing in Sen’s theory on the factors that
influence freedom is the legal factor.

To sum up, we can conclude that removing unfreedoms that may cause society’s members harm
may be part of the development’s growth. Thus, as referred by Sen in Development as Freedom
book, development should focus on enhancing people’s capacities for them to live the kind of
lives they value.

MARIANA LEMOS 2