Professional Documents
Culture Documents
RM13010
Human Factors
RM13010
Human Factors
AESQRM010202104
SAE Industry Technologies Consortia provides that: “This AESQ Reference Manual is published by the AESQ Strategy
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The Aero Engine manufacturers Rolls-Royce, Pratt & Whitney, GE Aviation and Snecma (now Safran Aircraft
Engines) began a collaboration project with the aim of driving rapid change throughout the aerospace engine
supply chain, improving supply chain performance to meet the challenges faced by the industry and the need
to improve the Quality Performance of the supply chain.
Suppliers to these Engine Manufacturers wanted to see greater harmonisation of requirements between the
companies. Each Engine Manufacturer had Supplier Requirements that were similar in intent but quite different
in terms of language and detail.
This collaboration was formalized as the SAE G-22 Aerospace Engine Supplier Quality (AESQ) Standards
Committee formed under SAE International in 2013 to develop, specify, maintain and promote quality standards
specific to the aerospace engine supply chain. The Engine Manufacturers were joined by six major Aero Engine
suppliers including GKN, Honeywell, Howmet Aerospace, IHI, MTU and PCC Structurals. This collaboration
would harmonise the aerospace engine OEM supplier requirements while also raising the bar for quality
performance.
Subsequently, the Aerospace Engine Supplier Quality (AESQ) Strategy Group, a program of the SAE Industry
Technologies Consortia (ITC), was formed in 2015 to pursue activities beyond standards writing including
training, deployment, supply chain communication and value-add programs, products and services impacting
the aerospace engine supply chain.
AESQ Vision
To establish and maintain a common set of Quality Requirements
that enable the
Global Aero Engine Supply Chain
to be
truly competitive through lean, capable processes
and a
culture of Continuous Improvement.
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The SAE G-22 AESQ Standards Committee published six standards between 2013 and 2019:
In 2021 the AESQ replaced these standards, except for AS13001, with a single standard, AS13100.
The AESQ continue to look for further opportunities to improve quality and create standards that will add value
throughout the supply chain.
Suppliers to the Aero Engine Manufacturers can get involved through the regional supplier forums held each
year or via the AESQ website http://aesq.saeitc.org/.
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AESQ publishes several associated documents through the SAE G-22 AESQ Standards Committee supporting
deployment of AS13100. Their relationship with APQP and PPAP is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: AESQ Standards and Guidance Documents and the link to AS9145 APQP / PPAP
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Table of Contents
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Figures
Figure 1 AESQ Standards and Guidance Documents and the link to AS9145 APQP / PPAP ............................................... iii
Figure 2 The interaction of Human Factors .......................................................................................................................... 6
Figure 3 Example of difference between error and violation ............................................................................................... 7
Figure 4 Example of types of errors ...................................................................................................................................... 8
Figure 5 Example of basic exercise to demonstrate difference ............................................................................................ 8
Figure 6 The Dirty Dozen developed by Gordon Dupont (Transport Canada) ...................................................................... 9
Figure 7 James Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model .................................................................................................................... 11
Figure 8 EASA Management System Assessment tool for SMS .......................................................................................... 14
Figure 9 Problem solving process – Human Factors considerations................................................................................... 18
Figure 10 Performance modes graph ................................................................................................................................. 20
Figure 11 Example of training matrix for Human Factors ................................................................................................... 22
Figure 12 SHELL concept ..................................................................................................................................................... 23
Figure 13 PEAR concept ...................................................................................................................................................... 23
Figure 14 Training syllabus ................................................................................................................................................. 25
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1.0 Scope
This is a guidance document to provide context and learning to deliver the Human Factors
mandatory requirements embedded within AS13100 chapters listed below:
• 5.1.1.1 Top Management shall reflect a commitment to Human Factors
• 5.2.1.1 The organization shall have a policy that includes Human Factors that
promotes:
o Open Reporting.
o Continually improving the maturity of Human Factor deployment within the
organization.
• 4.4.3 The organization’s Quality Management System shall include processes for
Management of Human Factors including:
o Training of employees.
o An open reporting culture, encouraging the sharing of mistakes without fear of
inappropriate retribution.
o Considering Human Factors in investigations.
o Considering Human Factors in the reporting of performance and identifying
improvement plans.
Human Factors should be an integrated part of product and service design, manufacturing /
assembly, and product servicing.
• 7.3.1 Human Factors Awareness. The organization shall provide an appropriate
program of training and awareness of Human Factors based on role, for reference, see
RM13010.
• 10.2.1 The organization shall have a criteria and approach defined for recognizing and
addressing Human Error causes in investigations.
As the document gives guidance, the word “Should” has been used.
2.0 Purpose
This Guidance Document aims to provide supplemental information on Human Factors to
accompany requirements specified in AS13100. It includes detailed explanations of the
requirements and what may be expected as means of compliance. In many cases, shared of
examples from AESQ company members are given to provide guidance.
AS13100 includes requirements for embedding Human Factors within the Aero-Engine
Supply Chain. Human Factors is a well-known and understood discipline in areas of the
Aerospace industry, particularly Maintenance Repair & Overhaul (MRO) and Flight Safety,
but it has not previously been widely considered further down the supply chain into Production
and Design areas. As part of the effort to make Aerospace even safer, it is now considered
an essential element, especially as part complexity increases and part design gets nearer to
operating capability limits.
At the time of writing this document, the Civil Aerospace industry regulators are reviewing the
current Safety Management System requirements where Human Factors requirements
reside with a view to broaden the application deeper into the Operational supply chain. This
material is written in line with knowledge of existing requirements within the EASA Part 145
regulations and may be subject to change or review at any time.
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The latest issue of SAE publications should apply. Nothing in this document should
supersede applicable laws and regulations unless a specific exemption has been obtained.
The documents listed below are intended to support the requirements of this document and
provide guidance on Human Factors and related topics.
SAE Publications:
• IAQG SCMH Section 3.6.2: Human Factors in New Manufacturing
Other Documents:
• Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?qid=1576245532595&uri=CELEX%3A32014R037
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4.0 Definitions
HUMAN ERROR - An action or inaction that unintentionally results in an undesirable or
unwanted condition, deviates from a set of rules or expectations, or leads a task or system
outside acceptable limits.
HUMAN FACTORS - Human Factors is the way the People, Programs and Processes, the
Work Environment, Organization and Equipment all work together as a system. The individual
is at the middle of that system. Any flaws in the system impact the performance of the
individual and any flaws in the individual impact the system.
JUST CULTURE – An atmosphere of trust where people are encouraged to provide essential
information, but in which they are also clear where the line must be drawn between
acceptable and unacceptable behavior.
MEDA - Maintenance Error Decision Aid – originally a tool to investigate contributing factors
to maintenance errors, but has more recently been expanded to violations in company
policies, processes, and procedures that lead to an unwanted outcome.
MAGNIFICENT SEVEN – A list of issues focused on positive aspects of Human Factors that
every employee can take.
OPEN REPORTING – A reporting system that allows people to raise concerns in a
confidential and anonymous manner without fear retaliation and with the confidence that they
will be addressed in a consistent and fair manner.
PFMEA – Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – tool to assess and rank risks to a
process and can also be used to reduce risks for human errors
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"Human Factors is the scientific discipline concerned with the understanding of interactions
among humans and other elements of a system, and the profession that applies theory,
principles, data, and other methods to design in order to optimize human well-being and
overall system performance." (Definition adopted by the International Ergonomics
Association in August 2000).
Indeed, the primary focus of any Human Factors initiative is to improve safety and efficiency
by reducing and managing human error made by individuals and organisations.
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Then, from an operational perspective, it aims to optimise the fit between people and the
systems in which they work, to improve safety and performance.
Error / Violation
One of the key aspects of Human Factors is the understanding of Errors and violations and
how these lead to non-compliance or un-safe acts:
Error
Violation
ERROR
VIOLATION
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To help with determining between an error or violation, here is a useful exercise that can
be used to test people’s understanding and create discussion on the differences between
error & violation, and the types of violations.
Human Factors studies have led to divide primary causes for human errors into 12 main
clusters, the “dirty dozen”:
This dirty dozen is an easy way to talk about HF but there is still only a categorizing of
Human Error.
“The Dirty Dozen refers to twelve of the most common human error preconditions, or
conditions that can act as precursors, to accidents or incidents. These twelve elements
influence people to make mistakes. The Dirty Dozen is a concept developed by Gordon
Dupont, in 1993, whilst he was working for Transport Canada, and formed part of an
elementary training program for Human Performance in Maintenance.
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since 1993 all areas of the aviation industry, not just aircraft maintenance, have found the
Dirty Dozen a useful introduction to open discussions into human error in their businesses,
organizations and workplaces.” - From Skybrary
So, it may be possible to find Dirty Dozen lists similar in design and manufacturing
However, Human Factors can also include all the positive aspects of human performance
known as the Magnificent Seven: the unique things human beings do well.
The dirty dozen is a simple model to help increase the awareness to employees of a common
set of 12 elements that influence people to make mistakes. It can then be used to help assess
the risks of each element & identify mitigating actions that would prevent or reduce the effect
of such factors.
The magnificent seven is a more positive perspective and can be used to promote desired
behaviours and practises that reduce the risk of human error.
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When a quality escape involving a human occurs, it’s most likely to be something is not right
around the employee. The aim of Human Factor approach is to understand and identify the
true root causes of human errors in order to define appropriate barriers and prevent re-
occurrence.
The consequences of one’s mistakes are not always known.
The tendency is to judge the consequence and not to seek the cause or causes of error.
The right to make mistakes needs to be recognized, but that does not mean 'lax'.
Murphy’s law:
Why?
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The system as a whole produces failure when holes in all of the slices momentarily align,
permitting "a trajectory of accident opportunity", so that a hazard passes through holes in all
of the defenses, leading to an accident.
This text comes from Skybrary
https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/James_Reason_HF_Model
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a culture that ensures all staff feel that risks, occurrences and errors can be reported openly
without fear of inappropriate action. However, this does not advocate the need for a 'blame
free' approach, this culture recognises that some blatant negligent actions may require
disciplinary action.
Striving to embed a Just Culture will enable the organisation to embrace such values, embed
learning back into the system, processes and organisation, and will always require continual
effort to endorse through casting the appropriate behaviours at all levels across the
organisation.
Embedding a just culture starts with demonstrating commitments to:
• Inform employees about how they will be treated fairly, and define how differences
between unacceptable, acceptable and blameless behaviour will be treated (see section
5.1 explanation of error and violations);
• Provide means for employees to speak up and report openly without fear of retaliation;
• Respond appropriately to situations in the context of what and how things occurred that
may have led to an incident or issue;
• Take appropriate action
• Engage employees to learn from incidents and issues to find ways in which the
management system, environment and organisation can be improved to reduce
occurrence & impact of human errors.
These commitments should be captured within a company policy.
For more information on just culture and how to embed, there are references to further
literature and information in section 3.
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5) Continually improve through reducing the risk of Human Factors influencing outcomes.
Considerations for the leadership when embedding the policy in the company should include:
• Providing regular awareness training sessions of what is Human Factors and linkage to
the company’s policy (see section 8.0 Human Factors training)
• Ensuring that the influence & risk of Human Factors is assessed regularly, and that plans
are put in place for continuous improvement (see section 7.4)
• Identify how the company’s risk management process considers Human Factors.
• Considering the benefit of having a designated Human Factors management
representative with the responsibility and authority for establishment, implementation and
maintenance of the Program. AS13100 requires this person to have completed
appropriate training.
• Setting up a defined network across the business of people to support the implementation
and sustainment of the Human Factors policy. It might be part of a quality or Health and
Safety Policy.
• Ensuring processes within the management system support the principles outlined in the
policy and provide employees with the means of compliance.
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When considering how to engage the workforce on Human Factors and just culture, there
are simple effective ideas that should be considered and selected based on the type of
message or reinforcement you are looking for. The Human Factors training (see section 7.0)
is a good start to engaging the employees but it is important to consider how to keep the topic
alive and being discussed. A few ideas for helping to promote this are listed below:
To visualise / create impact of key principles of Human Factors – use of posters placed
strategically at points in the facility where risks of human error may be prevalent.
Using visual aids to make employees think before acting, which may be specific to a
task or activity that has a high human error occurrence.
Use of go look see practises or listening sessions with leadership to engage in
conversation with employees – could be discussing recent issues, could be to ask about
how it feels to work in the team / environment. It is best to be seen engaging proactively
not just when there has been a problem!
Consider if a survey would help to engage and measure what the culture “feels like” in
the organisation. Does it mirror the policy and expected outcomes?
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• It is important to recognize the linkage with having a just culture, so the reaction
and treatment of individuals aligns to having a framework where people are treated
fairly based on the findings of such HF investigations. Typically, such
investigations are followed by holding an independent event review panel to review
the outcomes and findings so a course of action can be decided.
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afterwards to identify the recommendations from the investigation and agree appropriate
actions.
Human error investigations are primarily concerned with finding out what happened and why,
with the purpose of proposing recommendations that reduce the likelihood of reoccurrence.
Due to the sensitive nature of these investigations, it is critical that an investigator is fully
trained in carrying out human error investigations.
There should be a clear, and timely, process to distinguish between violations and errors.
Evidence of training and application of the process. There must be evidence of the approach
used to include identification of human error root cause in investigations, inclusion of Human
Factors in root cause training, and examples of human error corrective actions.
Problem definition and Identify and verify root Verify corrective actions
investigation (AS13000 D0 – cause and identify and implement
D2) corrective action preventative action
(AS13000 D4 & D5) (AS13000 D6 & D7)
• Integrate identification
of Human Errors causes • Root cause analysis • Training program and
into general problem includes Human follow-up process
solving process Factor error analysis both recognise the
• Distinguish between tools typically broad
violations and human impact of human
errors factor root causes
• Recognises time critical
nature of Human Factor
caused error
investigation
For investigations where it is likely there has been an element of human error, the
Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) and the Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System (HFACS) tools should be considered. Both tools together provide structure and
commonality across business in the investigation and classification of Human Factors work
pertaining to human error. It is important to move beyond general “human error” labels as
that will only go so far in identifying and not resolving the true root causes.
Fishbone diagrams, DMA, RCCA (e.g. 3x5 why) can drive to root causes but in the case that
human error is the “root cause” further investigation is necessary as human error is the result
(e.g. a system weakness or lake or defences, preventative measures) not the root cause.
Example regarding MEDA (see appendix 3), HFACS (and taking a 3x5 why a little further)
A disruption in field operations, due to an assembly error, caused a fuel leak during revenue
service. The disruption report indicates a fuel leak and the hardware is checked and
assumed to be faulty. Because this interrupted revenue service and was deemed
important/impactful the further investigation utilized the MEDA.
Through this process it was revealed that the engine recently came from an overhaul visit
and the hardware in question was disconnect as part of the module service. The leak was
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not from a faulty hose but a connection point; when the torqued fitting was checked it was
not adequately torqued per the manual. What was originally flagged as a fuel leak/faulty
hardware should be more appropriately categorized as a human error
(assembly/maintenance).
According to HFACS this could be identified as a Skill-based error. Identifying the error type
will enable better corrective actions appropriate to the error type. In this case it is unlikely
that the connection was left loose to do inadequate knowledge of torque wrenches, but rather
it was missed because of distraction and lapse in memory.
Similar to this example, other tools such as the 3x5 why can be helpful in determining
underlying causes, to an extent. A 3x5 why may have also uncovered the loose connection
in the example above and the last why could be that the assembly technician forgot. Utilizing
the Human Factors discipline here will take that analysis farther and identify potential reasons
the task was forgotten, perhaps the distractions were excessive that shift due to any number
of reasons.
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To reduce the risk of Human Error, consider the Human Error Assessment and Reduction
Technique (HEART). This Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) begins with choosing from
predefined conditions and the corresponding unreliability value, then determine if there’s any
Error-Producing Conditions (EPCs), weight them based on influence on the scenario and
determine the corresponding Human Error Probability (HEP) value. This method may help
quantify risk and any process changes impact to an original or baseline risk.
Human Reliability Analysis: Comparison of Methods (Sandia National Laboratories, 2018)
https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1515627
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7.5 Monitoring and continually improving the learning from Human Factors
“The Human Factor training is well received at and it develops continuously. Appropriate
examples from our daily work are an important part of the training.” Feedbacks and lessons
learned are also appropriate to count and share.
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The SHELL concept was first developed by Edwards in 1972, with a modified diagram to
illustrate the model developed by Hawkins in 1975.
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• The others column can be used to adapt and personalize the courses contents for all
category of employees.
• For example, you can use the cells to specify, with a "X", the topic to be treated during
the course for each category of personnel, or you can specify the level of detail each
topic will be treated for each category of employees.
• In the cells there is a "R" for recommended topics and an "O" for optional topics
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production support
Certifying Staff
Managers &
Technicians
Supervisors
HUMAN FACTOR TRAINING
Inspector
Operator
Introduction
Introduction to the course R R R R R
General
The need to take Human Factors into account;
R R R O R
Incidents attributable to Human Factors/human error;
‘Murphy's’ law
Environment
Noise and fumes; Illumination; Climate and temperature; R R R O R
Communication
Within and between teams; Work logging and recording;
R R R R R
Keeping up to date, currency; Dissemination of
information. Shift handover
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Safety Policy includes Just Culture – underpinned by processes and resources (HF
trained investigators etc.)
Senior Management support – Reporting, Stop & Fix etc. - Shadow of the Leader
Domestic agreement on Just Culture with Trade Unions – Stakeholder engagement and
buy-in
Human Factors Training – all employees and targeted refresher every 2 years
Just Culture training – myth busting etc., aligned with People (HR) discipline processes
- again stakeholder engagement is key
Safety Performance Indicators – Reporting & Just Culture – evidence a difference has
been made and improving
Safety Culture surveys – checks that change is sustained or not etc. over time
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Appendix 4 - Acknowledgements
This reference manual represents the consensus of the members of the AESQ. The Team
members who developed this guidance and whose names appear below, wish to acknowledge the
many contributions made by individuals from their respective organizations.
Organization Representative
Safran Catherine Catarina-Graca – Team Leader
Rolls-Royce Christine Brown
Airbus Ludovic Chevet
PCC Richard Bolingbrook
GKN Björkälv Håkan
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Change History
Revision Date Description of Change
March
Initial Release
2021
Email: info@aesq.sae-itc.org
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