PBOAP vs. DOLE, G.R. No.

202275 JULY 17, 2018

FACTS:
1. On January 2012, with the declared goal of improving road safety by improving
working conditions, benefits and compensation of public utility bus drivers, the
Department of Labor and Employment issued Department Order No. 118-12 also
known as Rules and Regulations Governing the Employment and of Working
Conditions of Drivers and Conditioners in the Public Utility Bus Transport Industry.
2. Following D.O. No. 118-12, the National Wages and Productivity Commission
released Guidelines No. 1, series of 2012, which aimed to make the wage of bus
drivers competitive. The Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board also
released Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 which was about the new Labor
Standard Compliance Certificate.
3. The petitioners Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, and other
bus associations, filed this petition directly before the Supreme Court, alleging that
the above government issuances were unconstitutional for violating the constitutional
rights of public utility bus operators to due process, equal protection and non-
impairment of obligations.
4. The respondent government agencies argue that petitioners do not have the standing
to sue because the issuances were not targeted towards bus operators and not against
associations.

ISSUES:
Whether or not PBOAP has legal standing as a third-party representing their member bus
operators?

RULING:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the case should be dismissed for lack of merit because,
among other missing requisites for the Court to exercise its power of review, the
petitioners did not possess the legal standing to bring the case before the Court.
2. The Supreme Court held that in recent jurisprudence the Court has eased the strict
requirement that the parties must show personal and substantial interest in the case in
that they stand to have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act being challenged. There are now exceptions to the general rule
such as citizen standing, taxpayer standing, voter standing and third-party standing.
3. The Court has allowed in the past for associations to represent their members in
cases assuming a third-party standing. The Court said for there to be a valid
assumption of standing as a third-party:
a. "the party bringing suit must have suffered an 'injury-in-fact,' thus giving him or
her a 'sufficiently concrete interest' in the outcome of the issue in dispute"
b. "the party must have a close relation to the third party"
c. "there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her
own interests."
4. In the present case, the petitioners failed to establish who their members are or if
these members allowed them to sue on their behalf. The Court noted that it seems the
certificates of incorporation of the petitioners has already been revoked by the
Securities and Exchange Commission for various reasons, thus they have no capacity
to exercise corporate power or to sue in their corporate names.
5. The reasons cited: “far-reaching consequences” and “wide area of coverage” fail to
show an actual justiciable issue and are not transcendent enough since administrative
issuances of the government are of wide coverage.
6. The Court finally held that the petitioners failed to allege any breach of the
constitutional text.