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Armed Groups and Guided Light Weapons 2014 Update with MENA Focus

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 Armed Groups and

NUMBER 47 • DECEMBER 2014

Guided Light Weapons
2014 Update with MENA Focus

T Armed groups’ reported holdings:

he increasingly sophisticated arsenals of
guided light weapons held by non-state
actors pose an international security global update
threat. Small Arms Survey research indicates Since the previous assessment, the Survey
that since 1998 at least 84 armed groups from recorded 25 new groups as having either
40 countries either possess or have possessed MANPADS or ATGWs, raising the worldwide
ACTORS
ARMED

such systems. These include man-portable air
defence systems (MANPADS) and anti-tank
guided weapons (ATGWs)—systems operable
by a single user or a small crew, where the weap-
ons’ missiles are either manually targeted or
Research Notes
total to 61 active groups. More than half of
these newly listed groups are based in Syria.
Guided light weapons were reported in the
hands of armed groups in Tunisia (al-Qaeda
affiliates) and Ukraine (pro-Russian separatists)

self-guided after launch. This Research Note is
based on new information in the Survey’s data-
base (Small Arms Survey, 2014) since its last
update in March 2013 and complements Research
Note 31 (Rigual, 2013). It describes global pat-
terns in the guided light weapons holdings of
armed groups, noting both the types of weapons
held and their relative sophistication. It also
focuses on patterns of proliferation in the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) region.
for the first time.
The models and types of guided light
weapons identified since Research Note 31
(Rigual, 2013) suggest significant changes in
patterns of proliferation in some countries.
Early generations of Soviet-designed systems
such as Strela-2 or 2M (SA-7a and b) MANPADS
and 9K11-series ATGWs continue to constitute
the majority of guided missiles that armed
groups possess (see Table 1). Newer generation

The central distribution warehouse at the 70-bunker weapons storage facility in Ajdabiya, in March 2011, was freely accessible to Libyan rebels. It contained
hundreds of MANPADS (most notabily 9K32) and ATGWs (9K11 Malyutka, 9K111 Fagot, and the advanced 9K135 Kornet). © Human Rights Watch 2011.

Small Arms Survey Research Notes • Number 47 • December 2014 1

Table 1 MANPADS and ATGWs reportedly held by armed groups (by type of guidance system), 1998–2014
MANPADS

Type of Selecteda modelsb Active non-state armed groupsd reportedly possessing missile systems Total numbera
guidance (country of origin)c with this type of guidance of groups since
1998 (number of
additional groups
since last update)

Passive 9K32 Strela-2 and 2M Abkhazian Congregation of the Caucasus Emirate (Georgia); al-Ansar Brigades (Palestinian 56
infrared (SA-7a and b Grail) Territories); al-Asala Watanmya (Syria); al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades (Palestinian Territories); (+8)
seeker (Soviet Union) al-Qaeda affiliates (Algeria, Kenya, Mali, Tunisia); al-Shabaab (Somalia); Ansar al-shariaa (Libya);
Burundi insurgents; Chadian Union of Forces for Democracy and Development; Chechen rebels;
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia; Free Syrian Army (FSA)–Knight of the Right Brigade
(Morek, Syria); Hezbollah; Hizbul Mujahideen (Kashmir); Iraqi insurgents; Islamic Resistance Movement
(Hamas); Islamic State (IS) (Iraq/Syria); Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (Turkey); Libyan Revolu-
tionary Brigades; Lord’s Resistance Army (Uganda); Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad
(Mali); Palestinian Islamic Jihad; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Rassemblement
des forces pour le changement (Chad); Shan State Army (Myanmar); Somaliland (unilaterally
declared government); Sudanese Revolutionary Front; Syrian anti-government armed groups;
Taliban (Afghanistan); United Wa State Army (Myanmar); pro-Russian separatists (Ukraine)

9K34 Strela-3 Iraqi insurgents; Hezbollah 6

(SA-14 Gremlin)
(Soviet Union)

9K310 and 9K38 Abkhazian Congregation of the Caucasus Emirate (Georgia); al-Asala Watanmya (Syria); Ansar 16
Igla series al-Islam (Iraq); al-Shabaab (Somalia); Brigades Ibn Taymiyyah (Syria); Chechen rebels; Democratic (+6)
(SA-16 Gimlet/18 Grouse) Republic of Congo insurgents; Harakat Hazm (Syria); Hezbollah; Iraqi insurgents; IS (Iraq/Syria);
(Soviet Union) Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Ansar Jerusalem) (Egypt)

9K338 Igla-S Al-Asala Watanmya (Syria); FSA–Farouq Brigade (Harakat Hazm 9th Unit, Syria) (+2)
(SA-24 Grinch)
(Russian Federation)

FIM-92 Stinger Chechen rebels; PKK (Turkey); Taliban (Afghanistan) 4

(United States)

HN-5 (China) Taliban (Afghanistan); United Wa State Army (Myanmar) 4

FN-6 (China) Al-Asala Watanmya (Syria); Daraa Revolution Commission (Syria); Durou al-Thawra (Syria); (+5)
IS (Iraq/Syria); Kataib al-Qasas (Syria)

Manual command Blowpipe Chechen rebels; Taliban (Afghanistan) 2

to line of sight (United Kingdom)
(MCLOS)

Numbera of groups having held MANPADS Active groups: 50 (+15) All: 72

(+15)

missiles—superior in range, engage-

ment method, and guidance systems—
are, however, increasingly documented.
In Syria, for instance, a minimum of
two groups were seen with Russian-
designed Igla-S MANPADS (see
Schroeder, 2014, p. 8). This system,
fielded in 2002, is able to reach targets
at ranges of up to 6,000 m (KBM, 2014),
twice as far as the 1960s-era Strela-2
(O’Halloran and Foss, 2011, p. 37). At
least four groups in Syria—and the non-
state armed group Islamic State (IS) 1
operating in Iraq and Syria (Binnie,
2014b; Semple and Schmitt, 2014) 2 —
are known to possess the Chinese-
produced FN-6, which also has a range of
6,000 m (O’Halloran and Foss, 2011, p. 7).
Focus: guided light weapons
proliferation across the
MENA region
Among the 25 new groups reported to
possess guided light weapons, 24 are
based in the MENA region and more
than half (16) are located in Syria.
They include FSA-aligned rebels, IS,
and al-Qaeda affiliates such as Jabhat
al-Nusra.3
Although armed groups acquire
guided light weapons in many ways,
a significant cause of MANPADS
proliferation in the MENA region is
the collapse of the Qaddafi regime in
Libya, which held significant stock-
piles (UNSC, 2012a, paras. 14–18). As
of 2014, thousands of these MANPADS
were still in the arsenals of armed
groups (UNSC, 2014b, annex XIII).
UN investigators have documented
the presence of MANPADS from
Libya in at least four countries:
Chad, Lebanon, Mali, and Tunisia.
In two cases the weapons were ‘clearly
part of terrorist groups’ arsenals’
(UNSC, 2014b, annex XIII). Indeed,
the Tunisian authorities recovered
at least eight complete Strela-2M
systems in al-Qaeda affiliates’ weap-
ons caches near Medenine (UNSC,
2014b, paras. 102–9). In Mali, among
the 13 Strela-2M MANPADS French
authorities seized from al-Qaeda-
affiliated groups, two were identified

2 Small Arms Survey Research Notes • Number 47 • December 2014

 ATGWs

MCLOS 9K11 Malyutka Al-Shabaab (Somalia); Hezbollah; Iraqi insurgents; IS (Iraq/Syria); rebel groups from Tripoli (Libya); 9
(AT-3 Sagger) Syrian anti-government armed groups (+2)
(Soviet Union)

Semi-automatic 9K111 Fagot Al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades (Palestinian Territories)e; Hezbollah; Hamas/al-Qassam Brigades 7
command to line (AT-4 Spigot) (Palestinian Territories)e; Iraqi insurgents; Libyan Revolutionary Brigades, pro-Russian separatists (+2)
of sight (SACLOS) (Soviet Union) (Ukraine)

9K111-1 and 1M Ahfad al-Rasul (Syria); Hezbollah; Iraqi insurgents; Libyan Revolutionary Brigades; Islamic Resist- 5
Konkurs ance Movement (Hamas) (+1)
(AT-5a and b Spandrel)
(Soviet Union)

9K115 Metis and 9K115-2 Al-Shabaab (Somalia); Hezbollah; Libyan Revolutionary Brigades; pro-Russian separatists 6
Metis-M (Ukraine); Syrian anti-government armed groups (+1)
(AT-7 Saxhorn and
AT-13 Saxhorn-2)
(Soviet Union)

9K135 Kornet Hezbollah; IS (Iraq/Syria); Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas); Libyan Revolutionary Brigades; 6
and Kornet E pro-Russian separatists (Ukraine); Syrian Revolutionary Front (+3)
(AT-14 Spriggan)
(Russian Federation)

Missile d’infanterie Al-Shabaab (Somalia); Harakat Ahrar as-Sham (Syria); Iraqi insurgents; Jabhat al-Nusra (Syria); 9
léger antichar (MILAN) Libyan Revolutionary Brigades; Liwa al-Mouhajirin wal Ansar (Syria); Liwa al-Haqq (Syria); (+ 5)
(France) Peshmerga (Iraq)

HJ-8 FSA (several locations and sub-groups, Syria); Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya (Syria); Sudan (+ 3)
(China) People’s Liberation Movement–North

TOW Al-Omari Brigades of the Syrian Revolutionary Brigade; Ansar al-Islam (Iraq); Firket Fajr el Islam (+ 5)e
(United States) (Syria); FSA–Liwa al-Aadiyat (Syria); FSA–Yarmouk Brigades (Syria); Harakat Hazm (Syria); Hezbollah

Numbera of groups having held ATGWs Active groups: 27 (+17) All: 36

(+ 17)

Numbera of groups having held guided Active groups: 61 (+25) All: 84

light weapons since 1998 (+ 25)
a. Selected groups and model types are presented in Table 1. The full list of models and groups reported to have held guided light weapons since 1998 is available on the Survey’s website and is updated regularly
(see Small Arms Survey, 2014). The number of groups presented here reflect final findings from the database and not totals from Table 1. The table presents conservative estimates.
b. The weapons’ names used here follow producers’ nomenclature with any applicable NATO designations in parenthesis. Each category reflects the types of systems rather than the country of production: it may
include foreign variants when not otherwise specified. All variances of a given system are not specifically listed here.
c. Countries of origin are mentioned for background purposes only. They refer to the countries where the weapons were originally designed and are not necessarily the countries of production of the actual weapons documented.
d. Groups reportedly active as of December 2014. Given the rapid and fluid nature of groups’ alliances and defeats, this list of groups is indicative and may be subject to change.
e. A large number of videos of Syrian armed groups operating TOW missiles are online. Thus, ours may be considered a conservative estimate of the actual number of groups with such weapons. Our estimate reflects
the level of uncertainty in tracking weapons in war zones and the reasonable hesitation in relying on posts made by the groups themselves.
Red: New groups/new weapons since the last database update in March 2013. Sub-groups operating in the same country as sub-regional battalions of a common entity are counted once (e.g. the FSA or IS).
Source: Small Arms Survey (2014)

as originating from Libya (UNSC, played a role in the transfer of Chinese them to Bosnian and Sudanese stock-
2014b, paras. 114–19). FN-6 MANPADS to Syrian rebels piles (Jenzen-Jones, 2013).5 And with
Another source of guided light (Mazzetti, Chivers, and Schmitt, 2013). the IS expansion in Iraq and Syria,
weapons is transfer from state spon- In the region, Syria is a theatre of Western states appear to be inclined
sors. Iran and Syria, for instance, uncontrolled proliferation of guided to support the Kurdish Peshmerga:
supplied Hezbollah—which remains light weapons. Systems originate from Germany confirmed authorizing the
one of the most well-armed groups battlefield captures, but also from delivery of 30 MILAN launchers and
in the region—with various types of foreign sources. A Russian-produced 500 missiles to the group in August
MANPADS (from 9K32 Strela-2 to Konkurs-M ATGW, originally exported 2014, for instance (Germany, 2014).6
9K310 systems, as well as the Iranian- to Libya in 2000, was recovered from Despite international efforts to
produced QW-1 Vanguard) and ATGWs the Ahfad al-Rasul group (UNSC, improve states’ physical security and
(including the BGM-71 TOW, 9K115-2 2014b, para. 171). Social media docu- stockpile management measures and
Metis-M, or 9K135 Kornet) between ment the circulation of large numbers collect and destroy guided light weap-
1980 and 2006 (Wezeman et al., 2007, of US-made TOW 2A ATGWs, with at ons, they remain in wide circulation.7
pp. 409–11; SIPRI, 2014). Qatar supplied least five groups reported to possess As this note suggests, the number of
MILAN anti-tank guided weapons to them (see Table 1).4 HJ-8 ATGWs iden- groups possessing them is rising and
Libyan rebels during the 2011 uprising tified in the hands of several armed the weapons they possess are increas-
(UNSC, 2012b, para. 95) and reportedly groups in Syria bear markings linking ingly advanced. These weapons continue

Small Arms Survey Research Notes • Number 47 • December 2014 3

to pose a threat to both civilian and
military aircraft,8 as well as other tar-
gets. In spite of this threat and efforts
to control their proliferation, some state
sponsors are providing such weapons
to groups involved in theatres of fluid
conflict, raising new challenges.
Notes
1 Formerly known as the Islamic State of
Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).
2 This finding is also supported by a video
circulating online.
3 See UNSC (2014a) for the list of al-Qaeda-
associated groups and individuals iden-
tified by the UN’s Al-Qaida Sanctions
Committee.
4 At the time of writing, news reports and
Twitter pictures seem to indicate that IS
and Jabhat al-Nusra might have seized
TOW ATGWs from Syrian rebels (Gibbons-
Neff, 2014; Weiss, 2014).
5 The final supplier is unconfirmed.
6 For additional information on authorized
arms transfers to the MENA region—includ-
ing to the Peshmerga—see Holtom and
Rigual (forthcoming).
7 For an example of such efforts, see Rigual
(2013, p. 4).
8 This threat is demonstrated by recent
attacks by armed groups with MANPADS
(including al-Qaeda affiliates) against mili-
tary helicopters in Egypt (Binnie, 2014a),
Iraq (Binnie, 2014b), Syria (Cenciotti,
2013), and Ukraine (de Larrinaga, 2014).
See also Rigual (2013). Armed groups in
Syria have released various videos show-
ing their members using ATGWs against
Syrian military forces (see, for instance,
Baartz et al., forthcoming).
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