THE BASIC CONCEPTS AND META-THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES

OF THE GENERAL THEORY OF ARGUMENTATION

Hasmik Hovhannisyan, Robert Djidjian

Abstract. This paper suggests the system of basic concepts of the general theory of
argumentation and its main meta-theoretical principles. The first task is accomplished by
suggesting a classification of the most widely used concepts of argumentative discourse. The
second goal is achieved by offering convincing answers to the fundamental methodological
difficulties (aporias) at the basis of every scientific theory. These explications allow to suggest a
new vision of general theory of argumentation where logical and psychological aspects of
argumentation are strictly separated.

Two papers by H. Hovhannisyan and H. Hovhannisyan & R.Djidjian published recently in

Metaphilosophy suggested a principally new approach to the problematic of meta-argumentation
as to the general theory of argumentation. H. Hovhannisyan paper showed the fields of
application of the models of meta-argumentation and conducted the analysis of contemporary
conceptions of meta-argumentation (Hovhannisyan 2015). To further the development of the
general theory of argumentation H. Hovhannisyan and R.Djidjian put the emphasis on the set of
major theoretical-methodological difficult questions (aporias) in the process of building the
general theory of argumentation (Hovhannisyan & Djidjian 2017).
We start our analysis by pointing out that in publications on argumentation, especially on its
applicational aspects, the term argumentation is used in several, not explicitly fixed meanings.
Usually authors of theoretical conceptions presume a particular, specific meaning of the notion
“argumentation”. For this reason, opponents would reject the proposed theory simply on the
ground that this theory does not cover some important features of other basic meanings of the
term. Actually this difficulty in the becoming of the general theory of argumentation is caused by
the ambiguity of the natural language – a phenomenon characteristic for many human sciences.
To build a strict theory of argumentation we have first and foremost to define explicitly its terms
and concepts.
It seems to us that a different interpretation of the basic meaning of the concept of
argumentation and understanding of the purpose of the argumentative discourse itself is the main
cause of disagreements and discussions both in the general theory of argumentation and in
modern studies on meta-argumentation. Indeed, it is difficult to develop a convincing
understanding of the term meta-argumentation, if we couldn't succeed in formulating a generally
accepted definition of the term argument itself.
 It seems immutable that as the first group of basic concepts of the theory of
argumentation it is necessary to adopt the corresponding concepts of the theory of the proof of
formal logic: proof, substantiation (обоснование), refutation, logical implication, premise,
necessary inference, plausible reasoning (правдоподобное умозаключение), deduction,
induction.
The second group consists of the basic concepts of modern conceptions of the general
theory of argumentation and the practice of the argumentative process: argumentation,
discourse, persuasion, rhetoric, mobilization of like-minded people and supporters, calls for
action in the name of the goals, propaganda, agitation (Брутян 1992, Brutian ….).
The source of the third group is the conceptual tool of meta-theoretical studies on the
foundations of mathematics. This group of basic concepts of argumentation theory includes such
concepts as axiom, axiomatic theory, formalization, symbolic calculus, contradiction,
consistency and completeness, formal logic, mathematical logic, principles of constructing
theories, meta-theory, language, meta-language, object-language (see Klini 1957).
In the fourth group we include the specific concepts used in modern publications on
meta-argumentation: argumentative statements, argument attack, fundamental argument,
intelligence, understanding of natural language, meta-argumentation (Hovhannisian 2007, Boella
et al. 2009, Villata et al. 2009, Finocchiaro 2013).
The concepts of the first group are strictly defined in all the manuals on formal logic. The
concepts of the second group have quite a noticeable discrepancy inschools and approaches of
the general theory of argumentation.
Apparently, discussions about the main issues of the general theory of argumentation are
due primarily to the fact that they proceed from the notion that the concept argumentation has
one single meaning or, at least, a predominant meaning in the frame of the theory of
argumentation. In fact, the terms of natural language, including the terms used in the theory of
argumentation, usually have several meanings. And only the context of the discussion can clarify
in which of the meanings this term is used in each particular case.
Considering the concept of argumentation, it is easy to see that in all contexts of its use
there is a moment of substantiation of the validity of the statement under discussion (the thesis of
the argumentation). Briefly speaking, where there is no justification of a statement, there is no
argumentation. This allows us to conclude that the main meaning of the concept of
argumentation is the substantiation, justification of the truth of the thesis (see Джиджян 1984).
Accepting this viewpoint of the essence of argumentation, one should realize clearly the
difference between the concept of proof and that of argumentation in regard of the truthfulness
of the thesis. Used in its main, logical sense proof of a thesis requires that premises of the proof
are true and in the process of the proof are used necessary inferences only.
In modern terminology, inferences are divided into two groups – necessary inferences
(deductive reasoning) and probable inferences (incomplete induction and analogy). Only
necessary, deductive inferences are used in mathematical proofs. The further from mathematics
the given science, the lesser is the possibility to achieve strict proofs in its frame. In all the
humanities and even in the natural sciences, where the degree of mathematization is low, along
with the necessary inferences, scientists are forced to use probable inferences, incomplete
induction and analogy.
Thus we have to conclude that proof (in its strict logical sense) provides the strongest
form of demonstration that the thesis under discussion is true. Other forms of argumentation,
using probable inferences are just justifying the thesis under discussion, present particular
reasons in favor of its truthfulness.
The term meta-argumentation primarily can be used as the most general characteristics of
the argumentative theory itself . As it is emphasized in the H. Hovhannisyan article
(Hovhannisyan 2015) at the origin of the meta-theoretical problematic lies the program of
formalism, developed for overcoming the paradoxes in the foundations of mathematics (Hilbert
1927). David Hilbert believed that this goal could be achieved by the complete formalization of
mathematical theories. Yet the prospects of the Hilbert’s program became quite foggy after the
publication of Gödel’s famous theory (Heijenoort 1970). The goal of metatheore formalized
theories are well known – establishing the consistency, completeness, and independence of the
system of axioms of the theory, more precisely, of a formalized calculus (Kleene 1952).
Beyond the field of mathematics, the axiomatic construction of theories is an extremely
rare occasion. So in the field of non-mathematical theories, the main meta-theoretical issue is
presented by general theoretical and methodological difficulties that scientists have to face
building and presenting their theories. So, what are the difficulties (aporias) in building scientific
theories in the field of modern natural sciences and humanities?
In our previous paper on general theory of argumentation we have demonstrated that
beyond the field of mathematics the main meta-theoretical issue is presented by general
theoretical and methodological difficulties (aporias) that scientists have to face building and
presenting their theories. Just the answers to these difficult and basic questions should be
accepted as general methodological principles. So let us examine the ways of solution of the
above said aporias.
The first difficulty (aporia) of methodologists and theorists of scientific knowledge arises
from the existence of alternative competing theories. Faced with such problem methodologists
usually consider the competing conceptions as scientific hypotheses, and then try to evaluate
them in regard of the future prospects of their justification guided by the so-called
methodological criteria verifiability, falsifiability, predictive power, etc. (Popper 1963, Lakatos
1970, Gardner 1982). But the history of science teaches us that the theoretical and
methodological assessments and predictions are unproductive. In the struggle of alternative
conceptions the winner is revealed by history, and no system of methodological criteria could
replace it. So as the first meta-theoretical principle can serve the following clear statement:
a good theory is that one which has survived the critique of history.
The second aporia is associated with the historically recorded fact that the pursuit for a
deeper understanding of the radically new scientific conceptions brings forth alternative
philosophical interpretations of fundamental principles of natural sciences. As an example of this
kind confrontation can serve the famous debate between Bohr and Einstein about the nature of
causality in quantum mechanics (Shilpp 1958, Bolles 2004). Similar difficulties are resolved by
the history of development of scientific knowledge, mainly through elaboration of the meanings
of the major theoretical and philosophical concepts and their strict definitions. This type
historical progress in understanding fundamental concepts of sciences brings us to the second
meta-theoretical principle: progress in understanding scientific concepts is achieved by their
critique and re-definition.
The third aporia is illustrated by questions like "What is gravity?" that a correspondent
asked Isaac Newton immediately after the publication of "Mathematical Principles of Natural
Philosophy" (Westfall 2007). Albert Einstein, a devoted follower of Faraday-Maxwell field
conception, was haunted by a similar "innocent" question - "What is the field?" In general, it is
not difficult to get rid of uncomfortable questions by an evasive answer, suggesting that only
future developments can provide required answers. But one can suggest also a more specific and
radical answer: the essence of gravity (of the field, etc.) is disclosed by the law of gravity itself
and there is no sense seeking its deeper meaning. The last approach is applicable to all “basic
concepts” – the main building blocks of axioms and fundamental laws of nature. All other
concepts of a corresponding theory are defined by basic concepts. Yet a basic concept being a
basic concept could not be defined by any other concept of a given theory. So the main source of
its sense and meaning is the axiom or fundamental law of which it is a cardinal part. The above
considerations result in the formulation of the third meta-theoretical principle: the sense and
meaning of a basic concept is expressed by the axiom (fundamental law) of which it is a
cardinal part.
The fourth aporia is due to inadequate understanding of the essence of reductionist
approach. Reduction means the explanation of properties and attributes of phenomena of the
given level of nature by properties of its structural elements that build up the analyzed level of
the natural world. Actually, any scientific theory is a reduction of the given level of the natural
world to the laws and properties of the lower structural layer, which contains the objects that are
the immediate elements forming the objects under study.
An inadequate understanding of the essence of scientific reduction – the explanation of
properties of the given level of the objects of the natural world by properties of objects of the
"directly adjacent" level – gives rise to erroneous attempts of reducing the given level of
phenomena to a deeper level. An example of such an inadequate understanding of the scientific
reduction can serve sociobiology attempting to explain the properties and laws of social life by
the gene level of the structure of the living world. The basis of this erroneous position is the lack
of adequate understanding of the essence of scientific reduction. The internal structure of the
elements of the objects of the given level does not play and can’t play a significant role in the
functioning of the given level. The internal structure of atomic nucleus can’t play any significant
role in the laws of atoms’ electromagnetic radiation just because of the short range of nucleaer
forces.
This discussion brings us to the following formulation of the fourth meta-theoretical
principle: phenomena of the given level of nature are guided only by interactions of its
structural elements and can’t be influenced by interactions and laws of the structural elements
of its structural elements.
The fifth aporia is linked to the conviction of many researches in social sciences and
humanities that their studies are faced with the problem of "hermeneutic circle": to understand
the whole one needs to understand its parts, but for the understanding of individual parts one
needs to have an idea of the whole. A convincing resolution of hermeneutic circle in main
features proposed by the founder of hermeneutic methodology F. Shleiermacher (Shleiermacher
1838) is the content of the fifth meta-theoretical principle: each new cycle of the searching
thought from parts to the whole and back from the whole to its parts significantly deepens the
understanding of parts and provides continuous development of cognition of the whole.
The sixth aporia is due to the conviction of the prominent representatives of the
humanities that in their area of research the main task is understanding, while the main goal of
natural science research is explanation. The attention of scientific community has been focused
on understanding as the central axis of the methodology of humanities (so called
Geistwissenschaften) already by representatives of the hermeneutic school with the two pillars of
their approach – understanding and interpretation.
In actuality, understanding has three different meanings: a) understanding reality, b)
understanding texts, c) understanding human action and underlying motives of human soul.
 In all cases, explanation is based on understanding, since there could be no reasonable
explanation without proper understanding.
Understanding reality requires revealing general laws of the field under examination.
That is the reason that the laws of nature became the main goal of physicists.
The truth of understanding is demonstrated by explaining important or difficult
phenomena. That is the reason that natural scientists are so eager to explain. By contrast, in
humanities reasonable explanation is quite a rare case. This point of humanities is quite
explainable. A convincing explanation should be based on the knowledge of general laws. Yet to
our times there is no example of a fundamental law in social sciences. These arguments bring us
to the sixth meta-theoretical principle: all sciences strive for convincing explanations which, in
their turn, require basic understanding of reality, knowledge of its fundamental laws.
(Unfortunately, knowledge of fundamental laws is a thing yet unreachable for humanities and
social sciences. And that is the reason that there are few explanations in humanities.)
The seventh aporia concerns the problem of justification of theories. All statements
(theorems) of mathematical theories get strict proofs based on axioms, which themselves are not
subject to proof (being usually considered as intuitively clear). And how one should treat the
principles and laws of non-mathematical sciences? Should we seek justification for basic
principles of natural and humanitarian theories? Or, instead of the truth of basic principles one
should consider the acceptability of the basic principles of the theory, based on its success in
addressing the challenges of the area under investigation? The history of science helps us to
formulate the seventh meta-theoretical principle: a theory is alive as long as it is accepted by
scientific community. Theories are accepted according to their success in addressing the
challenges of the area under investigation.
The eighth aporia is related to radical changes in foundations of sciences caused by
scientific revolutions in fundamental classical theories. After the discovery of non-Euclidean
geometry, relativistic and quantum mechanics already in the second half of the 20th century it
was hard to find a scientist, who would admit the existence of absolute truths in human
knowledge of the natural world.
But if there is nothing absolutely reliable in scientific knowledge, what is the value of the
so-called scientific progress? This skeptical view in regard of scientific progress is not difficult
to overcome, if we take into account that new revolutionary theories do not simply reject the
previous ("classical") theories, but rather reformulate their certain fundamental principle or law.
In the result of this revision revolutionary theories provide deeper level of understanding of the
field under research. Now we can formulate the eighth meta-theoretical principle: new
revolutionary theories provide higher and more precise level of knowledge leading human
cognition along the path of scientific progress.
Now when meta-theoretical principles are explicitly formulated and the main concepts
are classified what else should be undertaken for finishing the construction of the general theory
of argumentation? We think the time has come for separating the logic of argumentation from
its psychology and application aspects.
So let us divide the general theory of argumentation into three main parts – logic of
argumentation, psychology of argumentation, and application aspects of argumentation. In the
logical part, let us single out the section of the theory of deductive proof and the section of the
theory of inductive (probabilistic) justification. The main sections of the second part could be the
theory of formation of beliefs and convictions, including the general rhetoric and modern PR,
and the theory of mass propaganda. The core of the third part could be presented by the theory of
political agitation and colored revolutions.
Naturally, this general structure of the general theory of argumentation is easy to sketch
out, but serious work is needed to build the complete theory.
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Department of Philosophy and Logic

Armenian State Pedagogical UniversityAfterKhachaturAbovyan
17 Tigran Mets Ave.
Yerevan 375010
Republic of Armenia
hashovhannisyan@hotmail.com 
r.djidjian@gmail.com