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NEGOTIATION
3.1. Game theory and negotiation.
3.1.1. Game theory definition
Game theory first emerged in 1944 in a book written by John von Neumann and Oskar
Mogenstern. It can best be defined as the study of a choice of strategies between intelligent,
rational decision-makers. It uses mathematical models to explain how individuals choose
between conflict and co-operation, helping to predict outcomes in certain scenarios by modelling
an individual’s best response to the strategies chosen by others.
When applied to negotiation, game theory provides a powerful approach to help
negotiators understand the way a specific negotiation is unfolding and the opportunity to change
the approach in order to achieve a more favorable outcome.
There is no right or wrong game and the most appropriate one depends upon the
circumstances. The key point is that negotiators have a choice as to what game he or she plays.
3.1.2. Prison dilemma
Here is a classic example of
Adam and Bob have robbed a bank and been arrested. They are interrogated
separately. Adam and Bob have the option to confess (move C) or to remain silent
(move S). The police have little evidence, and if both remain silent they will be
sentenced to one year on a minor charge. Therefore, the police interrogators propose a
deal: if one confesses while the other remains silent, the one confessing goes free while
the other is sentenced to three years. However, if both talk, both will still be sentenced
to two years. If each player’s payoff is 3 minus the number of years served in jail.
It seems obvious that both should remain silent, but that’s not likely to happen.
Each player’s move C strictly dominates move S. Furthermore, the best response to move
S is C, and the best response to move C is also move C, therefore the pair (C, C)—both
confessing forms the unique Nash equilibrium of this game. The choice C—confessing—
with payoffs of only 1 may seem counterintuitive if negotiations can take place in
advance, but their terms are non-binding and cannot be enforced. It would be useless to
agree on move S in advance, since each of the players would feel a strong urge to deviate
(cheat). Only if binding agreements are possible, would both agree on the S-S
combination, reaching a higher payoff. Thus, PRISONER’S DILEMMA gives a
paradoxical result. Players will play moves that result in lower payoffs for both than are
possible. This is in part because the rules of the game do not allow binding agreements
3.2. Business negotiation perspectives
3.2.1. Distributive thinking
Distributive negotiation or also called slicing the pie bargaining or win-lose
bargaining is based on the competing style. This type of negotiation emphasizes the
distribution or division of a negotiated thing between the parties involved in the process
of negotiation. It means that one gets, one loses, but everyone tries to protect his benefits,
and no one looks back to the other party’s interests. In the distributive type of
negotiation, there are also some proven principles and strategies. “When it comes to
slicing the pie, the most valuable information is a negotiator’s best alternative to reaching
agreement (or BATNA). Nothing can substitute for the power of a strong BATNA.
Negotiators can enhance their ability to garner a favorable slice of the pie by engaging in
the following strategies: determing their BATNA prior to negotiations; attempting to
improve upon their BATNA; researching the other party’s BATNA; setting high
aspirations; making the first offer; immediately reanchoring if the other party opens with
an “outrageous” offer; resisting the urge to state a range; making bilateral, not unilateral,
concessions; using objective-appearing rationales to support offers; and appealing to
norms of fairness.” (Thompson 2001, 60)