A Theory of Stereotypes

Author(s): Forrest LaViolette and K. H. Silvert

Source: Social Forces, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Mar., 1951), pp. 257-262
Published by: Oxford University Press
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 A THEORYOF STEREOTYPES 257

tion as the vehicle for the achievement of soci-
ology's advance, although others uphold a contrary
position. Should some theories prove sterile, ade-
quate descriptive materials would endure as a
foundation upon which to construct others.
Furthermore, sociology may never embrace one
theory satisfactory to all. The complexity and
inherent change within the social order make it
possible to envisage a situation where several con-
ceptual schemes, all logically consistent within
themselves, exist side by side. And, finally, a few
sociologists maintain that a search for generaliza-
tions is legitimate and logical, but that failure is
a reasonable possibility and the most that can be
expected is a description of the interrelationships
within a society.27 These views strike somewhat
pessimistic notes; nevertheless they will be totally
disregarded only by confirmed dogmatists.
The influence of social or cultural change on
descriptive research deserves elaboration. Anthro-
pology, it appears, is in a comfortable position on
the strength of the Boasian influence and the
numerous field studies it engendered. Some signifi-
cant theoretical advances may be anticipated in
27Max Gluckman, An Analysis of the Sociological
Theories of Bronislaw Malinowski, Rhodes-Livingstone
Papers No. 16 (Cape Town: Oxford University Press,
1949), p. 18.
the near future. Yet, social or cultural change and
the resultant urbanization of world folk-societies
require further descriptive data on cultures about
which rather complete information has heretofore
existed. Therefore, this change may require a
continual redescription of social units.
Not only should impetus be given to descriptive
studies of societies from diverse frames of reference,
but these must be carried out on a world-wide
scale. Sociologists all too often lull themselves
into a complacency whereby researchin one region,
or even a part of one region, is considereddefinitive.
Generalizations drawn from a theoretical frame-
*workare unscientifically accepted as conclusive
without further checks. Therefore, descriptions of
societies from the vantage point of both time and
space are scientifically imperative.
SU3MARY
Briefly, this article has discussed the necessary
affinity between description and several theoretical
orientations, the interaction between theorization
and description, the importance of description in
methodology, and its role as an area of agreement
in sociology. However, the utility of description
would be increased if it were organized so as to be
applicable to a multitude of theoretical approaches.

A THEORY OF STEREOTYPES*
FORREST LAVIOLETTE AND K. H. SILVERT
TulaneUniversity

ONE of the most familiar concepts in the
fields of political science, sociology, and
social psychology is that of stereotypes.
Within twenty-five years it has taken on the
homely characteristics derived from time and
usage. The word has become so common that
there is doubt whether we should classify it among
the concepts which are recognized as part of our
professional jargon. The concept has also become
academically entrenched; it now has an air of
dignity and respectability as a result of empirical
studies. For some of us it is an explanatory con-
* Read beforethe thirteenthannual meetingof the the stereotype has not yet emerged.
SouthernSociologicalSociety,Biloxi, Mississippi,April
14, 1950.
cept, for others it serves as a descriptive one. No
one has yet been so rude as to investigate the idea
that it might be part of the spate of words and
phrases which intellectuals have developed over
the past several decades in their responses to
rapidly mounting social change. We have needed
and still need explanations of our inter-group
tensions and national difficulties; we sense feelings
of urgency and haste which have resulted in leaving
much of our work in the shadowland of doubtful
theory, a shadowland from which the concept of
Our earliest statement of stereotypes was limited
essentially to the analysis of Lippmann as set

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258 SOCIAL FORCES
forth in Public Opihtion, published in 1922.1 In
amplifying his point of view, Lippmann cited the
Platonic "Fable of the Cave," thus beginning the
notion that stereotypes are "distortions," "carica-
tures," and "institutionalized misinformation."2
As part of this still widely held definition of
stereotypes, we have the easily remembered Lipp-
mann statement that they are "pictures in our
heads." Other characteristics have been enumer-
ated, but suffice it to say here, the emphasis of
the Lippmann point of view is upon distortion and
behavior based upon something which is contrary
to fact.
Quite likely we would discover something about
our social system if we found out why the Lippman
statement has been so influential.3As synthesized
by him, stereotypes have gathered around them-
selves an aura of opprobrium. The American
"thinking man" is not "supposed" to fall into
such stylized modes of thinking; not only have
we had as central the "contrary-to-fact" notion of
stereotypes, but we also have by implication the
notions of rigidity and the lack of ingenuity.4
The inference to be drawn is that one could, if
he but give up his stereotypes, return to a more
realistic world of affairs. Numerous examples can
be cited, especially for the concern about inter-
' The authors have not traced the stereotype in its
European developments.
2 One of the more recent restatements of this is
found in Cuber, Sociology: A Synopsis of Principles
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1947), p. 196.
3 Fredrick G. Irion claims that "time has borne out
Lippmann's view that Americans have little opportun-
ity to get acquainted with each other and their en-
vironment and that they have neither the intellectual
equipment nor the desire to interpret for themselves
what is happening. Because of these limitations, the
means of mass communication rely on stereotypes at
the expense of accuracy."-Public Opinion and Propa-
ganda (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1950), p. 33.
4 Thurman Arnold's analysis of "Government and
the Thinking Man," provides a basic perspective in
this connection. He claims that we have an abstraction
called the "Thinking Man," and that ". . . today
rational thought is the way of economic and legal
salvation. In earlier times when faith was thought to
be better than reason, the men who feared God were at
the receiving end of public exhortation.... It is the
unthinking man or the uneducated who are led astray
by unsound principles such as Communism or Fascism,
which are the modern equivalent of heresy." Folklore
of Capitalism (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1937), p. 5.
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racial or interethnic tensions, where a great deal
of "finger-pointing" has gone on, a labelling of
certain individuals as "stereotype-minded."5
If a person labels, we thus think of him as
prejudiced, as acting irrationally, and as Thurman
Arnold has argued, as a person who is acting
contrary to an American idealized way of making
choices.6 Apparently in post-World War I affairs,
Americans caught a glimpse of the gap between
idealized norms and actual conduct, and the
"contrary-to-fact" theory of stereotypes was used
to explain the nature of the gap as well as its
determinants.
At first sight this notion appears to provide
an adequate point of departure for doing empirical
work. Psychologists and others have shown that
people have fairly clear-cut conceptions of what a
banker, burglar, bootlegger, and so on should
look like. The 1920's was a period of debunking
the individual and his dispositions. At that time
the empiricists started looking upon stereotypes
as related to attitudes. Stuart Rice, in his Quanti-
tative Methods in Politics,7 devotes a full chapter,
"'Stereotypes' in Political Attitudes," to an em-
pirical effort to demonstrate the fact that attitudes
are, among other things, determined by "those
preconceptions which Walter Lippmann has called
'stereotypes'."8 Since then we have had numerous
studies which have shown that the individual
responds to supposed and imputed character traits
of occupational or social types. It is to be doubted
5 Alexander H. Leighton states that "to the stereo-
type-minded staff members the evacuees were Japanese
first and people secondarily.... Because of an inclina-
tion to draw conclusions disadvantageous to the evac-
uees in any doubtful situation, the stereotype-minded
staff members were quick to pick up infractions of regu-
lations and other improper activities, but they were
not successful in securing the cooperation of the resi-
dents for efficient work in their respective jobs...."
The Governingof Men (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1945), p. 84.
Leighton refers to the non-stereotype-minded ad-
ministrators as "people-minded." This latter group of
administrators, he claims, had more education and oc-
cupied the higher ranks of the administrative hierarchy.
This usage is, incidentally, one of the clearest cases in
which the concept of stereotype is used both as an ex-
planatory concept and as a determinant of behavior.
6 We have located no research report, although it may
be available, which analyzes Arnold's claim regarding
the "thinking man."
7New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928.
8 Ibid., p. 54.
 A THEORYOF STEREOTYPES
that any of them has been successful in establishing
a fully systematic theory of stereotypes, although
what they have contributed has been important
in teaching us something about individual be-
havior.9
In a number of text books in the field of social
psychology, the concept of stereotypes is given
-acomplete subsection in the chapter on attitudes.'0
In such cases it is looked upon as a basic response
pattern, differentiated from other responses by
the criteria indicated below." Sherif and Cantril
characterize stereotypes as "Attitudes composed
bodily and uncritically without any basis in ex-
perience or knowledge."'2 To make certain that
they have clinched their point regardingour knowl-
edge, they quote Breslaw's conclusions that " . ..
they are an end product with no necessary relation-
ship to the particular components of that stimula-
tion."'3 This statement appears to be contradictory
to a thesis for which Sherif has recently become
well known. It is he who, more than any other
social psychologist, has during the past fifteen
years demonstrated the structuring of precepts
along social lines. There remains, even in Sherif,
the emphasis upon the earlier Lippmann point of
view, that stereotypes have no "basis in experience
or knowledge."
To discuss stereotypes in terms of attitudes is
to bring only partial clarification to the problem,
9 Eugene Hartley found that subjects would rate
even fictional groups, such as Danirean, Pirenean, and
Wallonian, on a social distance scale. See his Problems
in Prejudice, (New York: King's Crown Press, 1946).
10There are some texts which do not even mention
stereotypes. It is thus difficult to know whether the
concept is theoretically important or not, whether its
inclusion or exclusion was merely the result of some
whim of the author.
"As an example we cite a recent study by Bruno
Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, "Ethnic Tolerance:
A Function of Social and Personal Control," American
Journal of Sociology, LV, (September 1949), pp. 137-
145. In this study the four types of personalities
analyzed were the "tolerant," "stereotyped," "out-
spoken," and "intense." Here a stereotype is an organ-
ization of attitudes. The authors say, "It has already
been mentioned that most of the men voiced their
ethnic attitudes in terms of stereotypes."
12 M. Sherif and Hadley Cantril, The Psychology of
Ego-Involvements (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1947), p. 69 ff.
13For further discussion of this point of view see
Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York: W. W.
Norton and Co., 1948).
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259
although almost all research on them today is
conceptualized within that scheme.14In the field
of intergroup relations, especially of the racial
and ethnic variety, as we have already said, we
have heard a great deal about stereotyped atti-
tudes."5To recapitulate, from the studies of preju-
dice between racial or ethnic groups, we have come
to recognize stereotypes as a special category of
attitudes. Because they are attitudes, they have
the attributes of organized modes of behavior,
they express a functional state of readiness, and
they are organized around and toward some given
object or set of objects. It is to be noted that these
special attitudes are further distinguished by a
significant amount of emotionalism. In addition
to these characteristics, we have come to accept
the idea that they emerge from social interaction
and are therefore social attitudes in the strictest
interpretation that we can make of their genesis.
But even these attributes do not differentiate
them sufficiently from other kinds of attitudes.
This statement of stereotypes is a social psycho-
logical one. Studying stereotypes from this per-
spective allows the investigator to describe and
analyze the function of stereotyped attitudes in
the personal organization of the inidividual. In
this perspective we see them as rationalizations'6
and as specialized selections which the individual
has made and organized into his verbalizations.
They not only enable him to manage his inter-
personal and group relations, but, by holding such
14 The most detailed and important criticism of the
theory of attitudes has been made by Quin McNemar in
"Opinion-Attitude Methodology," Psychological Bul-
letin, 43 (July 1946), pp. 289-374.
15A very long bibliography on the racial and ethnic
variety could be prepared. But to do so, one has to have
some explicit criteria as the authors do not always use
explicitly the concept of stereotypes.
16 Here we follow the statement of Lindesmith and
Strauss. After stating that this term usually refers to
an individual giving "socially acceptable" but "phony"
reasons for one's conduct, Lindesmith and Strauss state
that "a rationalization of one's behavior is therefore
simply a verbalization, which purports to make it in-
telligible to others in terms of symbols currently em-
ployed within a given group. The rationalization enables
other people to 'understand' one's acts, or to assume
one's role. It also permits the person to account for his
behavior to himself. It is no accident that the term is
etymologically related to 'rationale' and 'rational'."
Social Psychology (New York: The Dryden Press,
1949), p. 308.
260 SOCIALFORCES
stereotypes, he symbolically expresses his group
identifications. It is also possible to study how
projections operate to round out the stereotypes
and to give a unique twist to any specific one.
In this perspective we study the relation of a
part to the whole of personal organization, as
the Frenkel-Brunswik group has done in Cali-
fornia.17
From our brief survey of the literature, it appears
that the attributes of stereotypes have not been
examined critically by social psychologists. In
fact we may call their characteristics "claims"
rather than established attributes. The idea that
the individual tends to fill in a limited amount
of direct experience has not been investigated
carefully. The experiments of Sherif with auto-
kinetic phenomena are probably the most precise
studies which we have, although the experimental
work was not done with behavior which he had
defined as stereotyped behavior.18 It is not clear
which psychological mechanisms are involved, and
we do not know under what conditions greater or
lesser amounts of filling in take place. We presume
that some theorists would argue that it is ac-
complished through displacement or projection.
But it is conceivable that the individual does it
17 See "The Anti Democratic Personality," by Else
Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt
Sanford, republished in Readings in Social Psychology,
by Newcomb, Hartley, and Others (New York: Henry
Holt and Co., 1947), pp. 531-541. A good example of
this also is Jerome Himelhoch, "Tolerance and Person-
ality Needs," American Sociological Review, 15 (Feb-
ruary 1950), pp. 79-88.
18 Sherif states, in discussing the experimental results
on the formation of group standards or norms ". that
our experience is organized around or modified by frames
of reference, which are factors in any given stimulus
situation."
". . . The psychological basis of the established social
norms, such as stereotypes, fashions, conventions, cus-
toms, and values, is the formation of common frames
of reference as a product of the contact of individuals.
Once such frames of reference are established and in-
corporated in the individual, they become important
factors in determining or modifying his reactions to the
situations that he will face later alone-social, and even
non-social, especially if the stimulus field is not well
structured.
". .. We have also lumped stereotypes, fashions,
conventions, customs, and values together, without
considering the distinguishing mark of each one of
them." An Outline of Social Psychology (New York:
Harper & Bros., 1948), p. 174.
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just as a consequence of group demands or ex-
pectations. This would be consistent with Sherif's
experimental results as well as with Piaget's.19 It
may not only be personality needs or psychological
mechanisms which account for the selection, elabo-
ration, and filling in aspects of stereotype forma-
tion and structuring, but it is in addition possible
that the process of maintaining one's identification
with and status within a group can account for
this presumed attribute of stereotyped attitudes.
Thus the tendency to think of filling in as only a
completion of perceptual experience is inadequate.
It does not go far enough since the individual
does find himself in situations where he is expected
to act verbally.Y
Two attributes of stereotyped attitudes which
are closely related to each other and are looked
upon as two good reasons for using the concept
are those of persistence and rigidity. About per-
sistence there is a great deal of anecdotal informa-
tion with which we are all familiar, especially the
attitudes which have survived from the Victorian
period. From reading our own history, we know
from our contemporary information that many
people still expect to find the North American
Indians much as they were believed to be when
only the dead Indian was a good one. Again, we
can point to those regarding the Jewish people
in European history, or to those with regard to
the American Negro as found in discussions of
prominent literary writers describing the stereo-
types which have persisted in the fields of en-
tertainment, literature, and art.21 This factor
of persistence raises a question regardingthe nature
of social images and types, a problem which we
19 In discussing the reduction of individual egocen-
trism and the development of logical proof, Piaget
states that "La demonstration est nee de la discussion
et du besoin de convaincre. Ainsi la diminution de
l'egocentrisme et l'augentation de la justification logique
sont solidaires ...." Le jugement et le raisonnement chez
l'enfant (Paris: Delachaux & Niestle S.A., 1947), p. 21.
21 As an example see Abraham Citron, Isidor Chein,
and John Harding, "Anti-Minority Remarks: A Prob-
lem for Action Research," Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology, 45 (January 1950), pp. 99-126.
This is chiefly a study of bigots; the concept of stereo-
types is not used, but the data do make possible the
raising of questions as to motives for filling in.
21 See Sterling A. Brown, "Contributions of the
American Negro," chap. XXXIII, One America, (Rev.
ed. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945), edited by Brown
and Roucek.
 A THEORYOF STEREOTYPES
discuss in more detail in paragraphs below. But
here we want to raise the question as to the re-
lationship between persistence and Lippmann's
reference to "pictures in heads." No one has
examined the possibility that this claimed charac-
teristic of stereotypes might not be the persistence
of certain features over several generations. We
doubt if there are any data available by which
this could be checked, but it is important to
recognize that persistence, along with projection,
displacement, and group demands, could con-
ceivably explain the contrary-to-fact phenomena
which Lippmann and others have emphasized.
The attribute of rigidity has been less clearly
defined than that of persistence. At the present
time we have contending theories which account
for rigidity. But also this appears to be relevant.
We may suspect that we do not know what we are
attempting to describe and to explain. Rokeach
claims that "there is probably nothing more re-
sistant to change than stereotypic attitudes to-
wards outgroups."22Thus the index of rigidity
appears to be the resistance to change, and we
suppose that this means persistence. The word
stereotype itself has probably been chosen to
identify this category of attitudes not only be-
cause it refers to customary modes of action but
also because its use in the printing shop refers
to the rigid metal plate which is put in the press
for reproducing advertisements and cartoons. The
idea of persistence and rigidity go hand in hand
so far as theorizing to date is concerned. Perhaps
persistence refers to their continuation across gen-
erations or duration through time while rigidity
refers to the social psychological phenomena ob-
served in the organization of personal experience
-the lack of flexibility, the intensity of reaction,
and a dependence upon the earlier structuring of
general imagery. Thus persistence and rigidity
can be seen in the penetrations to the smallest
aspect of moral norms of some groups.23When
this deep penetration has evolved, then there ap-
pears to be an unusual amount of ego-involvement;
in other words, stereotyped attitudes become cen-
tralized in the self-conception of the individual.
a2M. Rokeach, "Generalized Mental Rigidity as a
Factor in Ethnocentrism," Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology, 43, pp. 259-78.
23 See Lewis Copeland, "The Negro as a Contrast
Conception," in Edgar T. Thompson (ed.,) Race Rela-
tions and the Race Problem (Durham, North Carolina-
Duke University Press, 1939).
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261
They therefore-embrace a wide range of important
attitudes, contain within their organization a high
level of emotional activity, and organize subordi-
nate roles around them.
The existing literature leads us to the under-
standing that stereotypes are used to refer to
social types in conditions both of stable and in-
stable status relationships. The interconnection
between the former, which may be called the
"conventional usage," and the latter is that both
are attributes of social difference, hence of social
inequality. At a high level of abstraction, we can
say that there is motivation of the individual
toward a security of status and an understanding
of relative position. Such an hypothesis is plainly
not readily susceptible to empirical testing; if
it is to be used, it must be placed in a category
with other "acts of faith." At a secondary level,
however, a query can be made as to whether a
major sociological premise concerning stereotypes
should not be that they are in their functioning a
product of social differences.Their clarity, general-
ity, intensity, and perseverance will depend on
the relative degree of continuity and rate of
change which characterizes the whole of the social
system of which they are a partial product. If
we do not thus relate the social psychological
theory of the stereotype to these more generalized
social arrangements and conditions, then we must
rest content with fuzzy definitions which give the
impression that stereotypes are a product of col-
lective lunacy and cultural intellectual irresponsi-
bility. Such irrationality should be as much anath-
ema to the social scientist as is the proverbial
vacuum to Mother Nature. Further, without such
a relationship to the general body of social theory,
even the irrationality of stereotypes appears with-
out explanation as to their very cause for existing.
The concept of social insecurity, another way of
referring to instable status relationships, is recog-
nized as being vague. At least some of this haziness
can be dispelled by indicating that a major charac-
teristic of intergroup conflict is the effort made
by both super-ordinate and subordinate group
members to eliminate this condition of social in-
security. Efforts are made to annihilate, to evade
by setting the problem-makers off in space,24 to
shift the responsibility to a cultural hero who will
return to settle the issues, to gain control of
or the demand
24 As in the case of Indianreservations
that Japaneseon the West Coastbe resettledinlandor
upon some capturedPacific island.
262 SOCIALFORCES
political and administrative offices, and many
others which are familiar as techniques of groups
in solving social issues.
Another major characteristic of stereotyped at-
titudes with respect to social organization is the
fact that they are organized around basic premises
of group action. The settlement of British Colum-
bia was made by people who had evolved a social
organization which had never had to face the
question of integrating racially different people
into the social organization, at the time it was
evolving its basic premises of action. The people
of British cultural background have worked out
for Caucasiansthe parliamentary system of govern-
ment, a judiciary system which administers "Brit-
ish justice," aesthetic ideals in their social images
which are based upon blondes rather than brunets,
and so on.25For about one hundred years a basic
premise of social action in British Columbia has
been that only peoples of European descent can
be unqualified members of the body politic. Pres-
sure group activity, political organization, accept-
ance into local churches, the selection of spouses
-hundreds of aspects of life in British Columbia
have been related to this basic premise of action.
The historical struggle between groups has been
the struggle to evolve a social organization which
would give all groups a fit place in it. Although the
British ideals claim that all men are created equal
in the eyes of the law, that all peoples should have
equal opportunities for religious worship, for edu-
cational opportunity, and for choice of occupation
-none of these has gone uncompromised in the
everyday struggles related to the formation of a
stable social system in that area of recent settle-
ment. The North American Indians, the Chinese,
the Japanese, the peoples of German descent, some
from the Prairie Provinces, others directly from
Germany-none of them has been exempt from
the formation of stereotyped attitudes, some more
resistant to change than others. Bit by bit the
social structure is becoming organized to make a
place for descendants of immigrants of diverse
racial and cultural origins.
It is not the purpose of this paper, to present
25 Other aspects of this conflict will be found in
Forrest E. LaViolette, Canadian Japanese and World
War II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948),
chap. XII, "The Will of the People."
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specific informationtoward the testing of the
hypothesis that stereotypesmust be considered
in their sociologicalas well as socialpsychological
manifestationsin orderto becomeintelligibleand
whollyuseful as an analyticalconcept;too much
empiricalwork remains to be done for us to
presumean ability to demonstratethe premise
at this time. In light of the proposedreorientation,
thereare somepertinentquestionsto be asked of
the investigatorwhich also serve as a conclusion
to this paper. Some of these propositionsare:
Stereotypesemergefromnconditionsof insecurityand
group conflict.If this propositionbe correcthow are
already developed stereotypes employed, how and
what kinds of new ones develop,if any, when a crisis
emerges?
Is it true that the harsherand more difficultare the
processes of social change, the sharper, more wide-
spread,and moregeneralizedin imagewill be the stereo-
types?
Stereotypesare one of the foci of intergrouprelations.
May we state, then, that the morecentrala stereotype
is to a basicpremiseof groupaction,the moreenduring
it is in time and the morerigidit is in its structuring?
If stereotypesare usedboth for maintainingand chang-
ing status quo situations,isn't the idea of the contrast-
conceptionas well as the self-conceptionto be studied
as a variety of stereotypes?
Sincedifferencesapply both to interculturaland intra-
studiesof stereo-
culturalrelations,wouldcross-cultural
types finddirectapplicationin suchday-to-daymatters
as the conductof foreignaffairs?
If empiricalquestioning substantiates many of the
above questions,how much validity can still be given
to the currentlyheld valuejudgmentthat personswith
"stereotypedminds" are guilty of misuse or non-use
of their intelligences?
A very long list of questionssuch as these can
be devised.It is clear that some long established
techniquesof historicalinvestigationcouldreadily
be used for testing the premisewhich we have
exploredhere; the same is also true for analyses
of group structuresand their functioning.As in
other empiricalinvestigations,however,problems
of the moment might well require the use of
modified or relatively new methodologicalap-
proaches.