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The Socio-Economic Background of the Gwangju

Uprising

Ahn Jean

To cite this article: Ahn Jean (2003) The Socio-Economic Background of the Gwangju Uprising,
New Political Science, 25:2, 159-176, DOI: 10.1080/07393140307187

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New Political Science, Volume 25, Number 2, June 2003

The Socio-Economic Background of the Gwangju

Uprising

Ahn Jean
Kwangshin University

Abstract The Gwangju Uprising is fully explained when it is viewed not as a single
event for 10 days but as the eruption of socio-economic contradictions of South Korean
society in the late 1970s. Located between the Bak Jeong-hee dictatorship and the June
Breakthrough of the working class in 1987, it was an explosion of the confrontation
between monopoly capitalists and the unruling classes that had been alienated in the
process of industrialization in the 1960s to 1970s. This contradiction appeared as the
confrontation of troops commanded by the new military coup leaders versus Gwangju
citizens demanding democratization.

Introduction
It has been more than 20 years since the Gwangju Uprising of May 1980. Though
the Uprising failed at the time, it was an historical turning point for both the
ruling classes and the majority of the people of Korea, and has been a driving
force in the development of Korean society. Where, then, did the power come
from to resist the overpowering armed might of the government’s military
forces? An explanation of its direct and short-term causes cannot fully answer
this question. In order to grasp its causes and characteristics, the Uprising
should not be viewed from the perspective that it was a single event that
took place in only ten days, but should be understood in the context of the
social structure of Korea. Though the Uprising started as a reaction against
the new military authorities’ attempt to obtain power and the Authorities’
violent suppression of the demonstrators, the Gwangju citizens’ subjective
participation in the Uprising and the elevation of the people’s power need to be
noted.
A long-term study of the structural cause of the Uprising requires an analysis
of the power of the people of Gwangju, who did not surrender after the
military’s indiscriminate massacre of the Gwangju citizens, and the Uprising’s
political background, from which this power came, as well as the contradictory
socio-economic structure of Korean society at the end of the 1970s. These are
necessary in order to visualize the May 18 Uprising as a national event, and
avoid limiting it to merely a “Gwangju” uprising. In terms of the incident itself,
the May 18 Uprising was a 10-day-long uprising of a city’s citizens. When its
social and economic causes are analyzed from a long-term perspective, however,
the Uprising appears to be a boiling-over of the long-accumulated contradictions
and political antagonisms inherent in Korean society.

ISSN 0739-3148 print/ISSN 1469-9931 online/03/020159–18  2003 Caucus for a New Political Science
DOI: 10.1080/0739314032000081540
160 Ahn Jean

Perspectives on the Gwangju People’s Uprising: Why is it the “Gwangju

People’s Uprising”?
Various names and perspectives can be employed to investigate the Gwangju
Uprising, from simply asking what the Uprising can teach us about change in
Korean society, to questions on who were the subjects of the Uprising and who
was the Uprising for ultimately. Different perspectives have developed in
accordance with the growth of the reform movements in Korean society.
There are at least three possible categories of perspectives on the Gwangju
People’s Uprising. First, the perspective of the ruling group, which defined the
Uprising as the “Gwangju Riot,” and that later came to speak of it as a
“democratization movement”. For the first seven years after the Uprising, those
who were responsible for the massacre in Gwangju and who held power at the
time, distorted the image of the Uprising, defining it as a “riot” plotted out by
a few “impure” elements in the society, North Korean agents, or a certain
political force (“the riot theory”). The “Gwangju Incident,” the official term for
the Uprising used by the Fifth Republic, was drawn from the “Gwangju Riot”
perspective. This perspective was concocted by the new military authorities who
actually perpetrated the massacre, and was circulated through the conservative
national press. It reflected the interests of the new military authorities, monopoly
capitalists, and the United States government. The new military authorities
suppressed any reference to the objective facts of the Uprising and presented the
Gwangju citizens, the subjects of the Uprising, as rioters.
The “Gwangju Riot” theory, however, could not maintain itself through the
“Gwangju Hearings” under the Noh Tae-woo Administration. Social movement
forces made pressing demands to search out the truth of the Uprising and
numerous relevant materials were disclosed to the nation. In the late 1980s, with
the maturing of the popular movements in Korea, the ruling group, having
failed to justify its origin through various deceptions, was trying to assume
power again, this time by holding an election. It was during this process that the
ruling party accommodated the “over-suppression theory” of liberal political
groups, and applied the name “Gwangju Democratization Movement” to the
Uprising. This was a step in the right direction in that the government finally
admitted the new military authorities’ over-zealous use of force in suppressing
the demonstrations, and the justness of the Gwangju citizens’ resistance. This
perspective, however, had its limits as its premise was the “bilateral responsi-
bility theory” that “both the army and the Gwangju citizens were right.”
The term “Democratization Movement” obstructed an objective understand-
ing of the causes of the Uprising and those responsible for it in the structural
contradictions of Korean society, and relieved some members of the ruling
group from any responsibility, by bringing charges against only a few military
leaders for the conduct of the military during the Uprising. This perspective
defended not only the new military authorities, but also monopoly capitalists
and the United States’ interests that were maneuvering behind the scenes.
Second, the liberal viewpoint of the petite bourgeoisie designated the
People’s Uprising with the title the “Gwangju Revolution” or the “Gwangju
Citizens’ Uprising.” They found that the cause of the Uprising was in the
military’s “over-suppression,” and defined the subject of the Uprising as a
citizens’ community, an abstract entity. From this point of view the Uprising was
 Socio-Economic Background of the Gwangju Uprising 161

viewed as an action of self-defense on the part of the Gwangju citizens because

of the brutal killing of Gwangju citizens by the paratroopers. This liberal
perspective highlighted the “pure” motives of the citizens’ struggle, and was
widely accepted by the nation as a result of the Gwangju Hearings and through
press’ coverage. In terms of the direct cause of the Uprising, this viewpoint
seemed largely to correspond to the historical truth. It also had its significance
in confirming that the military authorities were responsible for the massacre in
Gwangju, and in assuring the moral justness of the Uprising. This perspective
agreed with some of the local petit bourgeois sentiments in the Honam region,
which stressed the citizens’ defiant temperament and their critical attitude
vis-à-vis the ruling powers.
This view, however, presented the military’s immorality or the victims’
individual sacrifice or misfortune as the causes of the problems, and tried to
solve these problems by disclosing the truth or restoring the victims’ honor.
Consequently, like the “democratization movement theory,” this perspective
was also advantageous to the existing ruling structure, in that it suppressed the
fundamental structural contradictions of the society that caused the Uprising,
i.e., the confrontation between the military authorities, who were allied with the
monopoly capitalists, and the citizens they governed. This theory failed to grasp
the historical and structural reasons why the people, living their own daily lives,
had come to the point of arming themselves and fighting back, the final form of
resistance against the ruling structure.
Third, the nationalist popular force and progressive intellectuals advocated
the designations “Gwangju People’s Uprising” or the “Gwangju People’s Armed
Insurrection.” The two former viewpoints, based on a “divide and conquer”
strategy and the ideology of regionalism, emphasized the socio-psychological
characteristics of the residents of specific localities and the direct cause of the
incident, and thus excluded the understanding of its structural causes.1 Accord-
ing to the third perspective, the historical analysis of the Uprising should not be
limited to moral or ethical matters, such as the massacre by the military
authorities or the citizens’ sacrifice, but should search for the causes and
characteristics of the Uprising in the politically, socially and economically
contradictory structure. In other words, these groups stressed the inevitability of
a people’s uprising given the dynamics of changes in social status occurring in
modern Korean history, the ruling class’s methods of control, and the resistance
against these methods. These groups’ perspectives on the Gwangju Uprising
perceived the local characteristics and problems of the Jeonnam area as an
expression of a class problem, emphasizing the general capitalistic contradictions
in Korean society.
Seen from this perspective, however, the causes of the Uprising cannot be
fully explained by the simple fact that the military authorities chose Gwangju on
purpose and fiercely suppressed the demonstrations. If one takes into account
the universality of the contradictions in Korean society, which gave rise to the
people’s uprising and the power-seeking new military authorities’ “choices” or
plans in the specific context of the Gwangju and Jeonnam area, then both the

1
Kim Jin-gyun, Jeong Geun-sik, “The Socio-Economic Background of the Gwangju
Uprising,” Institute of Korean Modern History, Gwangju People’s Uprising (Seoul: Poolbit,
1990)
162 Ahn Jean

structural causes and the direct causes of the May 18 Gwangju Uprising can be
wholly reconstructed. In this respect, a study of the socio-economic background
of the Gwangju Uprising is necessary.
The Gwangju People’s Uprising can be defined as the struggle of democratic
forces against the violent suppression by monopolistic capitalist classes subordi-
nate to a global capitalist system. Hardline forces of the military authorities
guaranteed the capitalists their profits at the expense of the working class, along
with farmers, students, the middle classes, and some of the small and medium-
sized capitalist groups.2 The struggle between these forces originated in the
social friction between the ruling class, (mainly monopoly capitalists that had
formed in the development process of Korean capitalism after liberation), and
the people governed by the authorities.
Around 1980, the Korean monopoly capitalists confronted the people’s
struggle, which had become more active in the open political arena due to the
collapse of the Bak Jeong-hee Regime, and the crisis in the capital accumulation.
The capitalists were in desperate need of a reorganization of the ruling structure
that would secure their continuing accumulation of wealth. With the structural
needs for the reorganization of the ruling structure, the ruling bloc experienced
internal conflicts concerning just how to reorganize. The new military authorities
won over the ruling bloc and tried to suppress the Gwangju people in order to
solidify the Authorities’ grasp on power. This is how the Gwangju Uprising
came about.
In other words, the Gwangju Uprising was “an explosion of the confron-
tation, in its most antagonistic form, between the ruling classes and the ruled
classes, mingled with other complicated elements in a certain time and place,
which was formed by hierarchical and national contradictions, and developed
into a confrontation between democracy and dictatorship at a certain point of
history.”3 It was a people’s uprising to attain democracy against the over-power-
ing might of the military authorities. When the accidental elements—that it took
place in the specific locality of “Gwangju” and at the specific time of May
1980—are added, then the whole reconstruction of the Uprising can be com-
pleted.
The recent dominant perspective that perceives the confrontation between
the monopoly capitalists and the governed people as the social-structural cause
of the Uprising, is divided according to the movement line on the major subject
of the change. Those who emphasize the task of national liberation take the May
18 Gwangju Uprising as a struggle between the Korean nation and the United
States, rather than as a conflict between classes inside the Korean society.4
From this perspective, it was the United States, with its command authority
over the Korean army, that suppressed the Gwangju citizens’ quest for demo-
cratization, and the struggle subject was the ruled people of this new
colony, i.e., the majority of the Gwangju citizens, excluding a small minority
of governmental officials, military leaders and the police. This view point,

2
Kim Jin-gyun, Jeong Geun-sik, ibid., 1990, p. 67.
3
Kim Se-gyun, “The Social Background of the May 18 Gwangju People’s Uprising,”
History and the Sites, 1990, p. 14.
4
Yim Jin-cheol, “Gwangju Uprising from the Viewpoint of the National Liberation,”
University News, May 16, 1988.
 Socio-Economic Background of the Gwangju Uprising 163

however, has limitations for the understanding of the Uprising as it underesti-

mates the importance of state power and its material base, the monopoly
capitalists.
Another progressive perspective considers the Gwangju Uprising as a peo-
ple’s uprising and stresses the working class’s armed uprising and the creation
of a provisional revolutionary power as the class characteristics of the uprising
subject.5 Adherents of this perspective have analyzed the class composition of
the “Democratic Struggle Committee,” the self-governing power organization
that was founded after the citizens’ recapture of Gwangju, and its core armed
organization, the “Strike Forces.” They assert that the majority of the Uprising
participants were from the working class and that the provisional revolutionary
power secured the working class’s hegemony. According to this perspective, the
“Democratic Struggle Committee” was not only the leading body of the people’s
armed uprising, but also the matrix of a true people’s power whose principal
axis was the working class and which the social activist group joined.
It is true that the working class leaped to the forefront of the Gwangju
Uprising and fought with the most devotion during the Uprising. Their struggle,
however, did not reach the level of an organized uprising based on the growth
of the workers or people’s organizations. Moreover, their political standpoint or
hegemony did not become clear during the Uprising. For these reasons, it would
incorrect to define the Gwangju Uprising as a working class uprising.

The Socio-Economic Contradictions of Korean Society in the Late 1970s

As an event, the Gwangju Uprising was nothing more than a struggle between
the Martial Law Army and the students and citizens, an event which took place
from May 18 to 27 in 1980 in Gwangju and in some other parts of the Jeonnam
area. The subject of the Uprising was the students and citizens, and the direct
target of the struggle was the Martial Law Army. The struggle was composed of
student demonstrations and the Martial Law Army’s suppression of them in the
early stages, the people’s armed uprising, and its final brutal suppression by the
Martial Law Army. The Gwangju Uprising, however, was not a mere series of
events for 10 days, but a part of the national struggle for democratization
beginning with Bak Jeong-hee’s assassination on October 26, 1979, and continu-
ing on until May, 1980. Moreover, in the continuity of history, it can be observed
that the Uprising took place in a time of Neo-colonial fascism that was formed
with the establishment of the Yushin (Revitalizing Reforms) System and
continued until the June Uprising in 1987 (a struggle against the April 13
Constitution Protection Measures), and which, it can be said, continues till this
present day. In other words, the Gwangju Uprising is situated at the mid-point
in time between the era of the Yushin Dictatorship, which was formed to
suppress the people’s demand that the ruling classes of imperialism cease to
resist liberal–democratic reforms, and June, 1987, when the ruling classes, faced
with the people’s resistance, actually made some concessions and improve-
ments.

5
Yi Jeong-lo, “A revolutionary perspective turnover of the Gwangju Uprising,” Labor
Liberation Literature, May 1989.
164 Ahn Jean

The people’s political demands during the period of the Gwangju Uprising
were for the transition to a liberal–democratic system, away from a fascist ruling
structure. These demands were expressed as confrontations between the demo-
cratic forces and the anti-democratic forces over the issue of a civilian-led
presidential election. It is here that we can observe the basis of the confrontation,
that of a foreign power and monopoly capitalists versus the people’s forces that
had become alienated in the process of industrialization.6
For a better understanding of this process, we need to examine the structural
contradictions of Korean society, accumulated during its process of industrial-
ization.
Though Korea was liberated from imperialist Japan in 1945, liberation did
not lead to immediate independence, and the reform forces and the anti-reform
forces struggled with each other over the matter of the foundation of a new
nation. Under the United States’ direct control, and with its aid, the anti-reform
forces won over their counterparts in South Korea. Thus came about the
partition of the Korean peninsula.
For eight years, from 1945, the year of liberation, to 1953, the two forces
underwent intense struggles with each other. In South Korea, where the anti-re-
form forces had control, the government took a guiding hand in the country’s
economy in the 1950s, and the dependent capitalism developed and created the
private monopolistic capitalist class on the basis of aid from the United States.
In the late 1950s, this aid-based economy reached a crisis. The crisis, however,
was resolved through the economic development plan that the Bak Jeong-hee
Administration, which came to power through a coup d’état, propelled through
the introduction of foreign loans.
The Korea–Japan agreement in 1965 and the dispatch of South Korean troops
to Vietnam were the starting points of the rapid growth of the Korean economy,
dependent on foreign loans. Despite the students’ ongoing struggles and the
anti-Japanese sentiment of the majority in the nation, the Bak Jeong-hee Admin-
istration pushed through the trilateral integration strategy of Korea–America–
Japan, led by the United States, while securing loans from Japan and the United
States. In return for the dispatch of troops to Vietnam, the Bak Administration
secured loans from the United States, as well as a rapid capital accumulation in
the field of light industry through the ensuing special procurement boom for the
Vietnamese conflict. As the loans came through the government, the government
promoted basic industries, including fertilizer, oil, steel, and electricity, in the
form of national capital. Controlling the distribution of the loan monies, the
government practiced all types of preferential treatment among private busi-
nesses.
Through two economic development plans (1962–1971), the Korean economy
experienced a rapid and powerful surge, with an average yearly GNP growth
rate of 9%. This rapid growth, however, meant the subordination of the economy
to foreign countries, a handicapped industrial structure, the sacrifice of the
agricultural sector, and continual low wages for labor. As 40% of the sources of
revenue for investment were dependent on fiscal loans and commercial loans,
the burden of redeeming the principal and interest grew heavier. Regardless of
the industrial structure inside the nation, an export-oriented development strat-

6
Kim Jin-gyun, Jeong Geun-sik, Ibid., 1990, p. 70.
 Socio-Economic Background of the Gwangju Uprising 165

egy was pursued. As a result, the industrial structure became deformed. For
example, the development of basic industries such as steel languished, while
there was excessive development in the textile sector. Though the agricultural
productivity had as its aim self-sufficiency in food supplies, 1,234,000 tons of
grain were imported. This large-scale import of the United States’ surplus
agricultural products kept the grain price low in Korea, and destroyed the rural
economy. The labor-intensive export industries could expand due to the low-
wages, on the basis of the low grain prices, and severe inflation further
diminished the real wages of laborers. In other words, the high growth of the
1960s was based on cheap labor and a low grain price policy, which brought
about the impoverishment of the rural economy and deepened the relative
poverty of the working class.
Despite the high growth rate of the economy Korean capitalism came to an
economic crisis, in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, due to its internal
contradictions. This crisis basically occurred when the internal contradictions of
the loan economy were revealed under the direct influence of a worldwide
panic.
The high growth rate of Korean capitalism in the 1960s solidified into
monopolistic enterprises, deepening the Korean economy’s dependence on for-
eign economies, due to its loan-oriented wealth accumulation structure. With the
pressure of paying the principal and interest, as well as the increase in imported
goods, Korean light industry became less competitive in the world market and
numerous insolvent enterprises began to appear, leading to another crisis of
accumulation of wealth. During the same period, people’s movements, including
labor movements, which had appeared spontaneously, started to resist the
wealth-accumulation structure, which was based on the low-wage system. As
the workers’ resistance, by those who could no longer tolerate the low wages
and poor working conditions, began to grow, the economic crisis developed into
a political crisis.
The Bak Jeong-hee Administration tried to cope with this crisis by inviting
direct investment of foreign capital and intensifying its own violent control over
the labor. The “Masan Free Export Zone Installation Law” (1969), the
“Provisional Exception Law on Labor’s Union and Labor Dispute Arbitration of
Foreign Investment Enterprises” (1970), and the “Special Measures Law on
National Preservation” (1971) were among the government’s legal countermea-
sures. Faced with this crisis, the monopoly capitalists began to require the
government to massively intervene in the economy in order to continue their
further accumulation of wealth. On August 3, 1972, immediately before the
Yushin Constitution was promulgated, the Bak Administration announced the
so-called “August 3rd Measures” to lessen the burden on insolvent enterprises of
private loans and to secure taxation preferences for the jaebols by law. The
“August 3rd Measures” were violent measures that ignored the basic principle of
capitalism, that of respecting private property, in order to rejuvenate the
monopolistic jaebols at a critical moment of bankruptcy.7
With the “August 3rd Measures,” followed by the “October Revitalizing

7
The major contents of the “August 3rd Measures” were the freezing of private loans,
releasing 50 billion won as the industrial rationalization fund, lending 200 billion won in
low-interest loans, and lowering bank interest rates.
166 Ahn Jean

Table 1. Classes in Korean Society (1955–1980) (Unit % and population in thousands)

Year 1955 1960 1970 1975 1980 1985

Capitalist class 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.4

New middle class 4.1 4.3 5.7 6.8 8.7 11.0
Non-agricultural self-employed 7.5 10.5 13.6 14.7 17.1 21.0
Farmers & fishermen 70.6 65.2 51.7 42.5 33.5 23.9
Working class 9.2 11.8 24.1 31.5 37.2 41.5
Marginal, without property 8.3 7.7 4.3 3.6 2.5 1.2
Population economically active 6390 7522 10.532 11.638 12.708

Reforms,” the Bak Jeong-hee Administration surmounted the crisis in the

accumulation of wealth of the monopoly capitalists, and attempted to convert
the industrial structure through the “Heavy Chemical Industrialization Declar-
ation” in 1973. This change was closely related to world economic conditions in
the early 1970s. At this time, advanced capitalist countries substituted high-inter-
est and high value-added industries for certain heavy industries, and moved
their large-scale facilities of labor-intensive heavy chemical industries to devel-
oping countries. With this change in the international division of labor as its
background, Korean capitalism was able to push its own industrial change into
the export-oriented, heavy chemical industries, which consisted mainly of con-
sumer durables.
The monopoly capitalists thus once again experienced a high growth rate. As
their monopolies intensified, the number of interrelated enterprises owned by
the monopolistic jaebols increased from 125 in 1972, to 412 in 1979. This,
however, deepened the Korean economy’s dependence on the global imperialis-
tic system, not only with its market, but also in the areas of finance and
technology. Korea’s foreign loans increased even more dramatically, especially
from the United States and Japan, as the government took measures to allow
direct foreign investment.
The rapid growth of the economy in the 1960s and 1970s brought about a
rapid change in the class structure of Korean society.8 As shown in Table 1, the
most remarkable changes in the class structure were the growth of the monop-
olistic capitalist class, the rapid growth of the working class, and the decrease of
the farming class.
Owing to the Bak Jeong-hee Administration’s preferential treatment based on
its control over foreign loans, a few monopolistic jaebols grew into a firm ruling
class in Korean capitalism. Though the monopolistic jaebols achieved rapid
growth on the basis of the low-wage policy, as well as the financial and taxation
preferences of the government, they were vulnerable to changes in global
capitalism.
Along with the growth of the monopoly capitalists, the working class also
grew into one of the major classes in Korean society. In 1960, the population of
the working class was only 11.8% of the entire nation. By 1980, however, it had
come to make up a majority share and accounted for the greatest share of
production, making up 37.2% of the national total. This growing working class
8
Jang Sang-hwan, Jeong Jin-sang, Social Movements in South Korea, Gyeongsang
University Publishing Department, 2001, p. 238.
 Socio-Economic Background of the Gwangju Uprising 167

was composed mainly of those who abandoned farming, and was a class in
which female laborers were included, especially those who played a great part
in the labor-intensive export-oriented industries.
For this growing working class, the process of economic development was a
series of severe hardships. This was because the rapid economic growth of Korea
was achieved on the basis of the “low grain price–low wage” policy, and
included the world’s longest working hours and the world’s highest industrial
accident rates. The government and the capitalist class praised the laborers of
this time as “able industrial workers,” but they did not support them in social
and financial areas.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the growth of a new middle class was an
increasing trend. As the industrial structure was reorganized through the
economic development plan promoted by the government, the number of
manufacturing workers increased, along with a steady growth in the number of
managerial staff. This progress of industrialization was accompanied by a
growth in the number of technical experts, forming a new middle class in the
society. This new middle class found itself maintaining a relatively high social
status in the early stages, but lost gradually this position as the society became
more capitalistic. Resisting this decline in their social status, the new middle
class started taking a leading position in formulating public opinion.
Rapid industrialization also brought about a sudden reduction in the number
of peasant farmers, a group that had previously taken up an excessive part of the
work force. In 1960 they constituted 65.2% of the national labor force, but this
was reduced to 33.5% by 1980. This decrease occurred because the farmers lost
their will to work, due to farm surpluses imported from the United States after
1963, and the low grain price policy of the government to keep wages low.
The first generation of peasant farmers who gave up farming and moved to
the cities formed a poorer class. In large cities like Seoul, the so-called “Dal-dong-
ne,” or slums, grew rapidly. According to statistics for Seoul, of the city’s entire
population of 7.5 million, 20% were living in 130,000 “shacks.” Unlike low-in-
come urban dwellers in the West, unauthorized residents in Korean cities
became laborers in the unstable employment environment, or remained as
“semi-proletariat” or merely as jobless. This kind of excessive population in-
crease in the cities was one of the major elements that kept wages low for factory
workers.
The political characteristics of the Yushin system can be described as follows:
first, the National Assembly stopped functioning; second, the President alone
held absolute power over the administrative, legislative, and judicial branches;
third, the President maintained his power through enlarged machineries of
oppression, such as the intelligence agency, the army, and the police. This type
of ruling system might have seemed solid at first sight. It was, however, a very
vulnerable and unstable system when the citizens’ discontent exploded, as it
could not accommodate the complaints of excluded political forces, eliminated
any participation of the governed classes in the structure of power, and left no
space for improvement inside the institutional framework.
The contradictions inherent in the rapid growth of Korean capitalism during
the 1970s started to become noticeable at the end of the 1970s and the early
1980s, during a crisis in the global capitalist system due to soaring oil prices after
the Iranian Revolution at the end of the 1970s, as well as an economic slump in
168 Ahn Jean

the United States. As appears in Table 2, the rate of economic growth dropped
dramatically around 1979.9
The decline in the exports, brought about because of the worldwide econ-
omic depression, weighed on the monopoly capitalists, who had to bear the
expenses for the machinery of oppression of the Yushin regime. This also
worsened the quality of life, especially for the working class, leading to a
political crisis which expressed itself through movements such as the YH
women workers’ sit-in strike in front of the headquarters of the New Democracy
Party, or the Buma (Busan-Masan) Uprising at the end of the 1970s. Shortly
before the October 26, 1979 assassination of President Bak Jeong-hee, there was
internal strife among those in power in the Yushin regime over how to deal with
the people’s call for democratization, as expressed in the Buma Uprising, and
this strife led to the elimination of the country’s president, Bak Jeong-hee.
While the people’s demand for democratization grew more strident after the
assassination, the contradictions inside the Yushin regime were still not re-
solved. The ruling group, consisting mainly of monopoly capitalists, arranged a
successful reorganization of its ruling structure through the May 17, 1980 coup
d’état and the armed suppression of the Gwangju People’s Uprising.10

The Explosion of Socio-Economic Contradictions and the Political Situation in

the Spring of 1980: Democratization Struggles Before and After 1980
The assassination of Bak Jeong-hee was not directly achieved by the people’s
struggle for democratization, though it was an expression of the crisis of the
Yushin system and the contradictions in the accumulation process of Korean
capitalism in the 1970s. The collapse of the Bak Jeong-hee Administration
opened the way for a political struggle between the democratic and the anti-
democratic forces. This struggle developed from the class struggles between the
people’s forces and the monopolistic capitalist class which was allied with the
military authorities.
The monopolistic capitalist class at the time required the government’s full
intervention in the economy in order to adjust the existing structure of capital
accumulation, while the citizens of the country were beginning to demand
fundamental changes in the wealth-accumulation system which had impover-
ished their lives. The people’s demands for reform accelerated in the political
vacuum after the assassination of Bak, and gave birth to various forms of
political mobilization within the general public, such as the “Spring of Seoul” in
1980.
The death of Bak Jeong-hee and the end of the Yushin system did not,
however, mean the collapse of the neocolonial fascist ruling system,11 which was
the superstructure of the capitalist wealth-accumulation structure. Though it had

9
Kim Jin-gyun, Jeong Geun-sik, ibid., 1990, p. 78.
10
At first appearance, the new military authorities seem to have grasped power after the
May 17 coup d’état. The Fifth Republic, a military fascist system, however, revealed its class
characteristics through its economic policies and legislative measures in its early stages.
11
Neocolonial fascism is a terror-dictatorship or a military fascism that appears in the
process of the transition of a neocolonial society into state-monopoly capitalism in order to
solve the crisis in capital accumulation. In the case of Korea, the political system formed after
 Socio-Economic Background of the Gwangju Uprising 169

Table 2. The rate of economic growth (1960–1981) (Unit: %)

Year 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Rate 1.1 5.6 2.2 9.1 9.6 5.8 12.7 6.6 11.3 13.8 7.6

Year 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Rate 9.4 5.8 14.9 8.0 7.1 15.1 10.3 11.6 6.4 ⫺ 6.2 7.1

the people’s resistance as a background, the October 26 assassination was rather

a preventive measure against a people’s revolution, reflecting the ruling classes’
desire to reorganize a fascist system. Accordingly, national power was in the hands
of the reorganized regime inside of the existing power bloc, rather than in the hands
of citizens or political leaders of the conservative opposition parties, despite the
political awakening of the people. These conflicts amongst the governmental
machineries of the Yushin system became pronounced in the aftermath of the
assassination, and in this process the military forces came to the fore within the
power bloc.
Within the military authorities, however, trouble arose between the moderates
and the hardliners over the reorganization of the Yushin system, and this was
concluded with the hardliners’ victory through an armed conflict known as the
“12.12 (December 12) Incident.” The hardliners’ new military forces, which had
supported the monopoly capitalists even more faithfully, thus held real power
inside both the military authorities and the government. The new military
authorities now needed an opportunity to eliminate political leaders who had been
subjected to suppression under the Yushin system, activists outside the govern-
ment who had been leading anti-dictatorship movements, and political leaders of
the conservative opposition parties, who held off popular support.
The political forces of the conservative opposition parties stood for privileges
for the smaller capitalists, who had been excluded from capital accumulation since
the 1960s, rather than for advantages for the people as a whole. They could,
however, count on political support from the people, because they belonged to the
anti-dictatorship camp. Due to the relative inactivity of the labor movement and
the immature political consciousness of the general public, Korean citizens were
not able to recognize the difference between the conservative opposition parties
in terms of their class interests. It is thus possible to say that they were under the
hegemony of the non-monopolistic bourgeoisie, or the petite bourgeoisie.12
It was left to ordinary Korean citizens to hinder the new military authorities’
plan for a reactionary reorganization of the ruling system, to end the monopoly
capitalists’ reorganization of the accumulation structure, and to propel the
democratization of the country. The common task imposed upon the student
movement, the labor movement, the peasant movement, and other social
movements of the time was clearing out the remains of the Yushin system and
designating a correct path for the future.

(Footnote continued)
the May 16 military coup d’état can be described as such. Academic Groups Association,
Korean Society and its Ruling Structure in the 1980s (Seoul: Poolbit, 1989).
12
Kim Jun, “The Political Development and Confronting Composition in 1980,”
Gwangju People’s Uprising, Sagyejeol, 1990, p. 135; Kim Jin-gyun, Jeong Geun-sik, ibid., 1990,
p. 85.
170 Ahn Jean

This popular demand from the grassroots exploded on the political scene
after the assassination of Bak. By that time, labor movements had outgrown their
limitations as mere spontaneous economic struggles for basic human rights and
assumed the aspects of an organized solidarity struggle.13 At the same time, the
peasant movement demanded that the government revise existing agricultural
laws.
After Bak’s assassination, the student movement, which had been supporting
the lower classes’ demands for basic rights and democratization, became con-
cerned about matters of democratization on the campuses (campus liberaliza-
tion), including the revival of a students’ union. When Jeon Doo-hwan took
power14 on April 14, 1980, universities from all parts of the country at once
announced declarations concerning the situation, and soon came to the fore of
the political struggle to end the martial law and forcibly retire the remnants of
the Yushin system.15 The general public, however, didn’t understand the true
meaning of the student movement, and the students were not able to establish
a leadership or a code of conduct, as their movements developed too quickly
into street demonstrations. As the students’ street demonstrations grew larger,
politicians inside the system also began to call for a lifting of martial law. At this
juncture, when demands for the retirement of the new military authorities and
for the remnants of the Yushin system were coming from all parts of the nation,
the new military authorities carried out a coup d’état and proclaimed an
emergency expanded martial law on May 17. With this new law, the new
military authorities arrested their strongest political opponents on charges of
conspiracy to revolt and on charges of accumulation of illicit wealth. The
Authorities also took other measures including closing universities, censoring
the national press, prohibiting labor slowdowns or strikes, and prohibiting the
circulation of false reports or profaning the head of the nation.

The Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Gwangju–Jeonnam Area: Why

Gwangju?
In this section, we shall examine the element of regional discrimination as part
of the background for the Gwangju People’s Uprising, on the basis of the
development process of social confrontations discussed above.
As mentioned above, in the spring of 1980 before May 18, the ruling group
was trying to reorganize of the ruling system in order to rearrange the capital-
accumulation system of the monopoly capitalists, who were facing a crisis after

13
Democratization struggles of this period assumed a violent form of localized
occupations or fights with the police, as shown in the Sabuk Incident, which was brought
about by the mine workers’ resistance against the company union, and by the strikes of
Dongguk Steel and Incheon Iron. There were 1011 labor disputes in four months beginning
in January 1980.
14
Jeon Doo-hwan, the army security commander, gained control over the Central
Intelligence Agency, which was the strongest means of suppression of the Yushin system,
on April 14, 1980. He then declared, through press conferences and commanders’ meetings
of the whole army at the end of April, that he would “take a decisive measure” against what
he defined as “a state of disorder.”
15
The students’ demonstration at the Gwanghwamun area on May 13 and the large-scale
demonstration in the Seoul Station Square on May 15, 1980, were the largest demonstrations
of their size since the April 19 Revolution in 1960.
 Socio-Economic Background of the Gwangju Uprising 171

Bak was assassinated. At the same time, the average citizens’ class consciousness
was being expressed in stronger tones.
In other words, the spring of 1980 was a turning point for both groups in
their confrontation with each other. The monopoly capitalists and hardline
military dictatorship forces were beginning to clash with the people’s forces who
were allied with the working class and farmers. The former had to reorganize
their fascist ruling system to maintain the existing ruling group’s control over
the country, while the latter had to accomplish a social reform through their own
democratization struggle.
In order to fully understand the Gwangju People’s Uprising, we need to
consider not only of the general contradictory structure of Korean society, but
also the reasons why this confrontation between the classes took the form of an
armed clash between the hardline military authorities and the Gwangju people,
and the reason why the specific region of Gwangju and Jeonnam became the
scene of such an intensive struggle. Why did the new military authorities choose
Gwangju as their scapegoat to justify the May 17 coup d’état and what caused
the Gwangju people to resist to the bitter end against the military’s massacre and
ruthless suppression?

The Socio-Economic Situation of the Gwangju–Jeonnam Area

In order to understand the social potential that made it possible to transform a
mere student demonstration into an overall people’s armed uprising, the special
characteristics of the Gwangju and Jeonnam area need to be examined. As it
progresses, the development of capitalism has a tendency to deepen regional
and industrial inequalities, whether on a global or a national level. In Korean
society, this uneven development had existed ever since the country entered into
the global capitalist system after the opening of one of its ports to foreign
commerce.
The development of capitalism in Korea caused the economic collapse of the
agriculture-oriented Honam area due to uneven development between industry
and agriculture, and this influenced the formation of the working classes in the
process of industrialization since the 1960s.16 Because of its natural circum-
stances as an agricultural plain, the Honam area was subjected to intense
exploitation under the feudal system, and continued to be the major area for
imperialistic plundering during the Japanese colonial era and the United States
military government era.17 This was because the Honam area contained the
conditions necessary to develop nationalistic, anti-imperialist, and democratic
16
The population in this area is characterized by advanced age and the small number
of people transferred from other regions. In 1980, 95.7% of the Jeonnam population was from
the area. It was because of limited employment opportunities that there were so few people
from other regions, which was also a factor that limited class differentiation inside the
region, compared to other regions, and that made it easy to keep the traditional community
solidarity of the residents.
17
Under the rule of both the Japanese Empire and the US military government, the
Honam area was the main victim of imperialist plundering, as well as the place where
liberation movements arose. During the Japanese colonial period, the portion of the land
of the big landowners in the area was higher than the national average 12.8%, with 21% in
Jeonnam and 30.9% in Jeonbuk. Japanese squires owned 59% of the land in Jeonbuk and 51%
in Jeonnam. In the Honam area, the most active tenancy disputes in the country were
172 Ahn Jean

movements as it was a region where class contradictions and national contra-

dictions were more serious than in any other region.
With the introduction of surplus agricultural products from the United
States, Korean agricultural industry collapsed. This had a serious influence on
the Honam farmers. The land reform of the early 1950s influenced the local
ruling class, i.e., the landowners of the region. As the rise of the Korean
monopoly capitalists in the 1950s was promoted by the government through the
privatization of government enterprises or the distribution of foreign aid,
capitalists from North Korea and the Yeongnam area received more opportuni-
ties to accumulate wealth, while most of the landowners of the Honam area did
not have the chance to become industrial capitalists.
Since the 1960s the industrialization based on low wages and low grain
prices was attained through intensive investments in the Geyoungin and eastern
coastline region, and led to the low rate of development in agriculture-oriented
regions. Due to the collapse of agriculture, the surplus workforce in the rural
communities of the Honam area drained out of the region. This was how the
confrontation between the monopoly capitalists and the lower classes, working
class, and the farmers assumed locality.18 In other words, the regional problem
was another expression of class contradictions.
Korean society experienced rapid growth in its working class and a decrease
in those employed in farming and fishing because of the industrialization since
the 1960s. In the Jeonnam area, however, the growth in the number of industrial
workers was relatively low, despite the rural exodus. At that time, the Jeonnam
area had almost no large-scale factories, except for the Yeocheon Industrial
Complex, a petrochemical industry. Accordingly, the percentage of workers
employed in large factories with more than 500 employees was extremely low.19
In other words, there were plenty of workers from the Jeonnam region, but very
few of them resided in the area. Moreover, when examining the composition of
the workers of the area, it can be observed that the proportion of temporary or
day laborers was quite high.
The economic development plan of the government since the 1960s was
based on the union between foreign monopolistic capital, mainly from the
United States and Japan, and the domestic monopolistic jaebols. The political
power that had led this economic development offered preferential treatment to
specific regions that had given them political support. In the process of industri-
alization, the national rate of those employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishery
decreased from 76.7% in 1962, to 50.7% in 1970, to 28.1% in 1986. In the Jeonnam
region, however, it decreased from 86.5% in 1962, to 72.2% in 1970, to 55.2% in
1986, showing the relatively low rate of industrialization.
The Jeonnam area was discriminated against in terms of economic opportu-
nities compared to other regions in the country: there was hardly any growth of

(Footnote continued)
developed in the 1920s. After the liberation, under the US military government, Jeonnam
had the highest rate of the reverted farmland which was managed by the Shinhan
Cooperation, as well as being a locus of intense resistance against the US military
government.
18
Kim Jin-gyun, Jeong Geun-sik, ibid., 1990, p. 90.
19
In 1980, there were 604 businesses with more than 500 employees in the country; out
of these only 15 were located in the Jeonnam area.
 Socio-Economic Background of the Gwangju Uprising 173

monopolistic capital, or growth in small and medium-sized enterprises, a group

that generally backed the conservative opposition parties. Across the nation, at
that time, the number of small and medium-sized enterprises increased by
27.8%. In the Jeonnam region, however, it decreased by 21.6%.
This adverse socio-economic situation in the Jeonnam area increased the
residents’ tendency to criticize the government, and, at the same time, helped
form a feeling of solidarity or “citizens’ consciousness” among the members of
the local community, due to the relative delay in class differentiation.
Gwangju was the political center of the Honam area and also suffered the
above-mentioned conditions. In 1980 the population of Gwangju was around
730,000 (of which only 43.6% were employed). With a meager distribution of
large capitalistic enterprises and industries, the population employed by these
enterprises and industries was very low, while the number of people employed
in tertiary industries, in states of unstable employment, and in the industrial
reserve force from rural communities, was high.
The gross product of the Gwangju area in 1980 consisted of 2.41% in the
primary industries, 31.32% in the secondary industries, and 66.27% in the
tertiary industries. The number of the tertiary industries, which were mainly
distribution industries, or various service businesses and other small-scale
businesses, exceeded the national average rate of 45% by more than 20%.20 Even
though Gwangju was the most developed city in the Jeonnam area, the annual
income per capita of Gwangju citizens was much lower than the national
average.21
The situation for workers was even more serious. The larger industries in the
Gwangju region included the Ilshin Textile, Jeonnam Textile, and Mudeung Socks
industries representing the category of the manufacturing, and Asia Motors and
Hwancheon Machines representing the machine industry, as well as Samyang Tires
and Honam Electricity. As for service and distribution, Geumho existed as a
large-scale industry. In the Gwangcheon Factory Complex there were 63 small and
medium-sized enterprises (of these, only three businesses had more than 100
employees), and most of them were small-scale businesses that supplied Asia
Motors with parts. The productivity of these businesses was very low, and the
working conditions were also extremely poor, much lower than the average
national level.22
As for labor movements, workers from small and medium-sized enterprises,
especially those in the textile industry, which employed mainly female laborers,
started to organize democratic labor unions with the support of religious groups
such as the JOC,23 from the late 1970s. Against the political background of the
“1980s Spring,” labor disputes began to arise in Gwangju, as in other regions.

20
Kim Dong-uk, “The Contradictory Structure of Korean Capitalism, and the Subject of
the Uprising,” Gwangju People’s Uprising (Sagyejeol, 1990).
21
Jeong Sang-yong, et al., Gwangju People’s Uprising (Dolbegae, 1990), p. 152.
22
Deulbul Yahak (Wild Fire Night School), A Fact-Finding Survey on the Gwangju Factory
Complex, 1979; Jeong Sang-yong, et al., ibid., 1990, p. 152.
23
The major activities of the JOC were organizing field laborers and the small-group
education of manufacturing workers. Besides the JOC, the City Industry Mission can be
mentioned as an example of a religious group that supported labor movements in the 1970s.
Its activity, however, was slow in the Gwangju area because of suppression by the
government.
174 Ahn Jean

The local workers, whose working conditions were extremely poor and
whose movement had become somewhat more active, around 1980, played an
important role in the Gwangju Uprising. The workers who joined the Uprising
were from diverse backgrounds and included the traffic service workers of the
vehicle demonstration, whose role was very important during the Uprising,
female workers in the textile industry, such as the Ilshin and Jeonnam Textile
companies, workers from Asia Motors, day laborers, temporary employees, and
semi-proletarians from slums in the city. Their participation, however, was not
organized, but spontaneous.
Another characteristic of Gwangju City was that it was not only the center of
administrative affairs and an economic center for the Honam area, but also the
center for education. A large number of students from rural communities and
neighboring small and medium cities were concentrated in Gwangju. In 1980,
about 110,000 students from outside Gwangju were attending higher educational
institutions; their number was more than 1/7 of the entire population of the
city.24 This was the background of the middle and high school students who
participated in the Uprising in its early stages, along with the university
students. The majority of the students were former petite bourgeoisie who left
rural communities because of the collapse of agriculture, or were simply from
rural communities in the Jeonnam area. These, however, had the potential to join
a political struggle, given the opportunity.
Gwangju was also a strategic point for traffic in the area. It was the center for
transportation connecting each part of the Honam area, as well as connecting the
Honam region to Seoul via a number of roads. This was why the Uprising could
spread easily to neighboring cities and rural communities such as Mokpo, Naju,
Hampyeong, Hwasun, Haenam, Gangjin, and Yeongam. This also explains why
the Martial Law Army killed many citizens on the outskirts of the city; the army
had to cut off any contact between Gwangju and outlying areas.

The Political Situation of the Gwangju–Jeonnam Area and the May 18 Uprising
As noted above, the socio-economic situation of the people in the Gwangju and
Jeonnam area, which was due to the uneven development of Korean capitalism,
amplified the potential for resistance against the existing ruling group or the
central government. Moreover, the local small and medium-sized entrepreneurs
grew into a political force, antagonistic toward the existing forces in power, as
they were discriminated against in both economic and political terms, even
though they were a faction of the ruling classes.
The uneven development between regions and the composition of the central
government’s power bloc were closely related. Medium and petite bourgeoisie
from the Honam area were excluded from participation in the power bloc, which
consisted of the monopoly capitalists, the military authorities, and high-ranking
state officials. From the viewpoint of the ruling group, the weakening of the
inner party of the ruling bloc would be lessened if they used the Honam region
as a type of sacrificial victim.
In the political reality of 1980, it was not the classes of workers and farmers
who grasped political hegemony, but the non-monopolistic bourgeoisie and

24
Jeong Sang-yong, et al., Ibid.., 1990, p. 150.
 Socio-Economic Background of the Gwangju Uprising 175

petite bourgeoisie, i.e., the conservative opposition parties. In the Honam area,
their hegemony was overwhelming as it seemed relatively progressive set
against the reality of uneven regional development.
This can be demonstrated by the rise of Kim Dae-jung, who had become the
symbol of the democratization struggle, especially when the citizens’ demands
for an end to the dictatorship and for democratization were expressed. As direct
presidential elections became a central issue in the democratization struggle in
the spring of 1980, the Honam people enthusiastically supported Kim Dae-jung.
This can be explained as an expression of the people’s demands being voiced
against the inequalities in regional development. The people’s ardent support for
Kim Dae-jung seemed to have been an alternative that they could concretely
choose, judging from the current political topography in 1980.
For this reason, the Gwangju area became an appropriate target for the new
military authorities in their pursuit of power. The direct cause of the Uprising
lay more in the new military authorities’ decision than in the Gwangju citizens’
voluntary choice. The ruling group chose Gwangju in order to resolve the
overall crisis that they themselves were facing, not only because it could reduce
their own losses to a minimum, but also because they could alienate and
suppress a region which had a weak organization of industrial workers, who
generally form the core of reform movements in capitalist societies. Thus, the
new military authorities hoped to reorganize the ruling system without reveal-
ing the true nature of the ruling classes by making it seem a local problem. In
the situation of the time, to crush the Jeonnam people’s demands for social and
historical change seemed the most efficient method for the military authorities to
suppress popular resistance and pave the way for a new military dictatorship:25
The military forces wishing to continue the Bak Jeong-hee system had to flaunt
their power in order to stem the growing power of the people and to establish a
new system of suppression. In the political situation of that time, the Military
Authorities chose Gwangju as the perfect place to display their power, a place
where the Kim Dae-jung faction, which did not hold an entirely dominant
position in the political struggles between the different conservative forces, was to
be found, and also a place which would be guaranteed to resist against the
Military Authorities.

In short, the Gwangju People’s Uprising was an explosion of political

grievances in the region, grievances which had accumulated in the process of the
development of Korean capitalism and which were condensed in a specific way
in the political structure of 1980 with the new military authorities’ intentional
choice of the region. Gwangju was the political center of the Honam area, which
had been subjected to plundering and oppression and had a long history of
resistance and frustration, and had suffered from an uneven development
process during the industrialization of Korea after its liberation from the
Japanese. Furthermore, Kim Dae-jung, the political opponent of Bak Jeong-hee
and the military authorities, symbolized the political hope of the opposition
forces and the people of the Honam area. With the combination of the military
authorities’ decision to move into Gwangju, the fact that it was Kim Dae-jung’s
power base, and because of the Gwangju people’s own inherent character,
25
Bak Hyeon-chae, “The Significance and Roles of the May 18 Gwangju People’s
Uprising in the 1980s’ National and Democratic Movements,” History and Sites 1, 1990, p. 51.
176 Ahn Jean

Gwangju became the scene where the new military authorities and the people’s
forces clashed.26

Conclusion
The Gwangju Uprising was a people’s demand for democratization. It expressed
their resistance against the oppression of a ruling group which intended to
reorganize a system of government that faced a crisis in the confrontation
between neocolonial fascist ruling forces, a contradictory structure formed in the
development process of Korean capitalism, and the people they ruled.
Now that the new military personnel have been charged and tried in court,
and now that the military authorities have disappeared from the political arena,
the majority of Koreans see the Gwangju Uprising as a victory for democracy
and believe that every matter is settled. The political forces are still in existence,
however, which originally designated the May 18 Uprising as an uprising of
only the Gwangju citizens, and which played down the problems raised by the
Uprising as being merely “Gwangju’s problems.” Furthermore, attempts are still
being made to impede an understanding of the Uprising as an expression of the
structural contradictions in the entire Korean society. Because of these attempts,
the Uprising cannot be said to be over, nor can it be said that the problems of
Gwangju and its region have been completely overcome. As long as the
unopened educational videotapes concerning the Gwangju Uprising remain
stacked in a storeroom of the Daegu-Gyeongbuk Provincial Office of Education, and
as long as the conservative press, which designated those responsible for the
massacre in Gwangju as nation-saving heroes, continues to hold such power and
influence, the Gwangju Uprising cannot be said to be over. Even today, in some
parts of the Daegu and Gyeongbuk region, there are still some people who
believe that the Gwangju Uprising was a localized uprising, initiated by Kim
Dae-jung and his followers. This kind of misunderstanding seems to continue to
spread through the political propaganda of Korea’s present-day conservative
opposition forces, influenced by regional antagonisms since Kim Dae-jung came
to power with the overwhelming political support of the Honam people.

26
Ahn Jong-cheol, “The Background of Gwangju People’s Uprising and its Progress,”
in Na Kahn-chae (ed.), Gwangju People’s Uprising and May Movement (Gwangju: May 18
Institute, Chonnam National University, 1997)