2018 Lonneker Christian Magical - Thinking.grounded - Theory

Christian Lönneker
Magical Thinking
in Severe Grief
Reactions
Theoretical Foundations
and New Insights from
a Grounded Theory Expert Study
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Christian Lönneker
Magical Thinking in
Severe Grief Reactions
Theoretical Foundations and New
Insights from a Grounded Theory
Expert Study
With a preface by Prof. Dr. Dr. Andreas Maercker
Christian Lönneker
Department of Psychology
Psychopathology and Clinical Intervention
University of Zurich
Zurich, Switzerland
ISSN 2625-3577 ISSN 2625-3615 (electronic)

BestMasters
ISBN 978-3-658-25001-0 ISBN 978-3-658-25002-7 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25002-7
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For Aysu
Acknowledgements
The present master thesis was written at the Chair of Psychopathology
and Clinical Intervention at the University of Zurich. I am deeply grateful
to my supervisor, Dr. Iara Meili, who with her invaluable advice support-
ed this qualitative research journey wherever it took us. She taught me
much about academic writing and encouraged me in my efforts far be-
yond the present work. I would also like to thank all participants in the
expert study for their support and for very interesting conversations. Be-
yond their rich expertise, they were a source of motivation and inspira-
tion. Last but not least, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Dr. Andreas
Maercker for enabling this innovative project and providing a stimulating
framework. The initial idea for this investigation originated with him.
Preface
Grief and mourning are moments of existential confrontation. One is
confronted with mortality, finiteness and very often with one’s own dark-
ened soul. In June 2018 the World Health Organization (WHO) decided
to officially recognize a new category of disorder that covers the cases of
people who are unable to overcome their personal grief and who thus
develop Prolonged Grief Disorder, which requires professional help. Up
until now, people in this state of suffering would have been most fre-
quently diagnosed with a depressive disorder. The scientific community
and many clinicians around the world consider this development as long
overdue.
Making a contribution in this regard is Christian Lönneker’s book Magi-

cal Thinking in Severe Grief Reactions. This work opens up new portals
to the topic—at least from a scientific standpoint. In 2005 the American
author Joan Didion published a memoir on the double bereavement she
suffered after death of her husband and daughter. Christian Lönneker’s
work examines in a most thoughtful and far-reaching manner the psycho-
logical concepts of magical thinking as well as common beliefs relating
to superstition along with its anthropological underpinnings.
Lönneker focuses on the Delphi-method study as performed by experts

on bereavement and grief. The author interviewed them regarding their
views on the occurrence and particularities of magical thinking in relation
to clients who were in the midst of bereavement and grieving. He uncov-
ers many non-trivial aspects and agglomerates them to create a very co-
herent overall picture. The reader will surely gain many interesting in-
sights. Christian Lönneker’s final discussion of grief-related magical
thinking as “uncompleted rites of passage” will have far-reaching conse-
quences for further psychopathological as well as psychotherapeutic work
in the field.
X Preface
From my personal standpoint, the current investigation is very fruitful for

two additional reasons. First, the topic of magical thinking covers non-
rational views and behaviors that are often neglected in psychological
science. Second, these terms may be better able to nonjudgmentally cover
rites and customs from non-Western parts of the world.
We as psychotherapists have to learn that not all non-rational views and

behavior must be changed as quickly as possible to rational ones. For the
last decades we have been trained to label such interpretations and coping
styles as “irrational” and to replace them with “functional” views. We
may discover that not everything in the realm of non-rational mental ac-
tivities is bad and needs to be extinguished. For instance experienced
therapists in the area of Prolonged Grief Disorder encourage their clients
to have literal conversations with their deceased loved ones. There are
numerous advantages to maintaining your bond with a person who has
been of such crucial and lifelong importance. Non-rational views and
behavior have thus begun to slowly to factor into the practice of thera-
pists.
It is from the still relatively new psychological subdiscipline of cultural

psychology that we have been able to learn that the Western style of
thinking remains a singular instance among many other styles—for ex-
ample the mothers who mourn the loss of those children who became
refugees and died in frightful ways en route to their countries of exile.
These mothers are often deprived of the opportunity to express their grief
in a heartfelt manner. Much of what they report may sound peculiar to
listeners and even to mental health experts. A deep religiosity or spiritual-
ity which comes packaged in certain cultural mores may overwhelm the
rational Western therapist with their seeming strangeness. The concept of
magical thinking surely provides a road to better understanding the broad
range of phenomena which are apparently new to us in the Western hemi-
sphere.
Preface XI
There is much left to study in the field of severe grief reactions or Pro-
longed Grief Disorder—from a practioner’s viewpoint as well as from
that of more basic research. Christian Lönneker’s work on magical think-
ing in grief is an important building block in this endeavor.
Berlin, September 2018
Andreas Maercker, PhD MD

Professor of Psychology
Contents
1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 1
1.1 Reactions to Bereavement .............................................................. 1
1.1.1 Seriousness of grief reactions............................................... 1
1.1.2 Current efforts to establish a grief-specific diagnosis.......... 2
1.2 Death and Beliefs ........................................................................... 4
1.2.1 Common narratives and beliefs ............................................ 4
1.2.2 Religious, superstitious, paranormal, magical, or …? ........ 5
1.3 Research Questions and Aims ........................................................ 7
2 Theoretical Background.................................................................... 11
2.1 Bereavement and Psychopathology .............................................. 11
2.1.1 Bereavement, grief, and mourning .................................... 11
2.1.2 Theories of grief ................................................................. 19
2.1.3 Psychopathology of grief .................................................... 27
2.2 Perspectives on Magical Thinking ................................................ 30
2.2.1 Anthropological notions of magical thinking .................... 30
2.2.2 Developmental psychology ................................................. 32
2.2.3 Superstitions in daily life .................................................... 33
2.2.4 Clinical psychology and psychopathology.......................... 37
2.2.5 Magical thinking and (the origins of) religion .................. 40
2.3 Magical Thinking in Severe Grief Reactions ................................ 42
2.3.1 Plausibility .......................................................................... 42
2.3.2 Detailed research questions and aims ................................ 47
XIV Contents
3 Methods .............................................................................................. 49
3.1 Methodological Framework .......................................................... 49
3.1.1 Overarching strategy .......................................................... 49
3.1.2 Specific approach ............................................................... 50
3.1.3 Qualitative methodology in bereavement research ............ 51
3.2 Expert Study ................................................................................. 53
3.2.1 Rationale for expert interviews ........................................... 53
3.2.2 Proceedings in recruitment ................................................ 55
3.2.3 Conducting the interviews .................................................. 58
3.2.4 Techniques in analysis ....................................................... 61
3.2.5 Saturation ........................................................................... 62
3.3 Narrative Reviews and Additional Materials ................................ 62
3.3.1 Narrative review: Magical Thinking .................................. 63
3.3.2 Narrative review: prehistoric origins ................................. 64
3.3.3 Further materials................................................................ 64
3.4 Analysis and integration of results ................................................ 65
4 Results ................................................................................................ 67
4.1 Echoes from Practitioners ............................................................. 67
4.2 Theoretical Cornerstones .............................................................. 68
4.2.1 What Magical Thinking is and what it is not ..................... 69
4.2.2 Magical Thinking at the origins of human burial ............. 79
4.3 Descriptions of Magical Thinking in Grief and Bereavement ....... 81
Contents XV
4.3.1 Themes of bereavement-related magical thinking ............. 82

4.3.2 Characteristics of bereavement-related magical thinking . 93
4.3.3 Formulating a bereavement-specific definition of
magical thinking................................................................. 95
4.4 The Role of Magical Thinking in Severe Grief ............................. 96
4.4.1 Magical thinking and the symptomatology of
disordered grief ................................................................... 96
4.4.2 Processual and performative perspectives .......................... 97
4.4.3 Continuing Bonds and Magical Thinking ......................... 98
4.4.4 Towards theory: explicatory complement ........................ 102
5 Discussion ......................................................................................... 105

5.1 Summary of Results.................................................................... 105
5.2 Relevance of Findings ................................................................ 108
5.2.1 For further theory constructions ...................................... 108
5.2.2 For clinical practice.......................................................... 109
5.2.3 For funeral industries and public dealings with death .... 111
5.3 Strengths and Limitations ........................................................... 112
5.3.1 Strengths ........................................................................... 112
5.3.2 Limitations ........................................................................ 113
5.4 Perspectives for Future Research ................................................ 115
5.5 Conclusion .................................................................................. 117
XVI Contents
Appendices .......................................................................................... 119

Appendix A. Invitation to Study for Pretest...................................... 119
Appendix B. Invitation to Study for Formal Phase ........................... 125
Appendix C. Question Catalogue (discarded) ................................... 131
Appendix D. Leading Questions (Interviews 19 th Feb. – 15th Mar.).. 135
References ........................................................................................... 141

Lists of abbreviations/tables/figures
List of abbreviations
APA American Psychological Association

BP Before Present
CG Complicated Grief
DSM-5 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
5th Edition
GAD Generalized Anxiety Disorder
ICD-10 International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision
ICD-11 International Classification of Diseases, 11th Revision
OCD Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
PGD Prolonged Grief Disorder
PSMS Paranormal, Superstitious, Magical, Supernatural
TAF Thought-Action Fusion
WHO World Health Organization
List of tables
Table 1: Overview of Study Participants ................................................ 58

Table 2: Themes of Bereavement-Specific Magical Thinking ................ 83
List of figures
Figure 1: The Anatomy of the Study ...................................................... 52

Abstract
Attempts by grieving children to reverse death and bring back loved ones
have been identified as instances of magical thinking. Yet this phenome-
non, broadly defined as the belief that certain thoughts, words, or actions
can alter reality in a non-ordinary manner, is not restricted to childhood.
In her best-selling book The Year of Magical Thinking (2005), for in-
stance, Joan Didion explores similar ideas in examining the intrusive
thoughts she experienced grieving for her husband after his unexpected
death. Though, on a theoretical level, there are plausible arguments for
this association of grief and magical thinking, it has yet to be systemati-
cally investigated. From a clinical perspective, its role in severe condi-
tions (such as Complicated Grief or Prolonged Grief Disorder) would be
especially interesting. The present thesis therefore dealt with two research
questions: (a) Is magical thinking a recurrent component in severe grief
reactions? and (b) Are there different forms (themes) of bereavement-
specific magical thinking? Methodologically, a grounded theory approach
was deployed: a review of interdisciplinary literature compiled defini-
tional elements of magical thinking, while in a clinical expert study ex-
amples of magical thinking in severe grief reactions were collected and
assessed regarding their practical relevance. Eight categories (themes) of
grief-related magical thinking were identified, including attempts to ward
off the harmful influences of the dead and to preserve the possibility of a
return of the deceased by retaining personal belongings. Although the
experts were comparatively rarely confronted with expressions of magi-
cal thinking by their patients, they reported an association between magi-
cal thinking and maladjustment to bereavement and rated research in this
field as relevant. A comprehensive definition of bereavement-specific
magical thinking is provided demarcating it from superstitions, paranor-
mal beliefs, religious concepts as well as hallucinatory experiences and
after-death communications. Findings are discussed regarding its role in
transforming the internal representation and the continuing of bonds with
XX Abstract
a deceased loved one. Future studies may build upon these preliminary
findings.
1 Introduction
1.1 Reactions to Bereavement
“[…] but I needed that first night to be alone. I needed to be
alone so that he could come back” (Didion, 2005, p. 33). With these
words, American best-selling author and National Book Award winner
Joan Didion described her thinking shortly after her husband suddenly
and unexpectedly died the evening before. Her autobiographical book
The Year of Magical Thinking in which these words appeared comprises
an authentic account of her intensive grief after the sudden loss. Although
most people at some time in their life experience bereavement-grief (Wil-
son et al., 2017), forms of grief-related magical thinking like in the quota-
tion above have not yet been subject to systematic research. Are they
wide-spread in bereaved individuals or was it merely an idiosyncratic
experience of the authoress? An unexpected death like she was confront-
ed with is known to be a risk factor for complications in grief (Wagner &
Maercker, 2010), particularly as, in her case, she simultaneously strug-
gled with the severe illness of her daughter. Is magical thinking then a
component of complicated grief? Is thinking about what needs to be done
in order to bring back the deceased a risk factor for more severe trajecto-
ries of grief or maybe a sign of regaining a sense of power? Two funda-
mental issues precede these questions: What is meant by complications in
grief, and what exactly is magical thinking?
1.1.1 Seriousness of grief reactions

Grief reactions naturally include affective (e.g. yearning, despair,
anger, loneliness), cognitive (e.g. intrusive ruminations, denial, helpless-
ness, concentration difficulties), behavioral (e.g. agitation, weeping,

C. Lönneker, Magical Thinking in Severe Grief Reactions, BestMasters,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25002-7_1
2 1 Introduction
searching, social withdrawal), and physiological (e.g. loss of appetite,

sleep disturbances, somatic complaints) symptoms that lead to suffering
and functional impairments (Stroebe, Schut & Stroebe, 2007). Compared
with other stressful live events, the death of a loved one is rated as the
most adverse event a person could possibly experience in live (Holmes &
Rahe, 1967). Among those elderly who actually experienced the loss of a
spouse or a child during their lifetime – in the before mentioned study
this was no sine qua non –, 70 % declared it as one of the three most im-
portant negative experiences in their life (Bratt, Stenström & Rennemark,
2018). These findings may also be reflected in mortality rates: Increased
mortality rates among bereaved individuals – commonly referred to as
dying from a broken heart – are well documented (for reviews see Stroe-
be & Stroebe, 1993, and Stroebe, Schut & Stroebe, 2007; but see Johnson
et al., 2000, and Stroebe, Schut & Stroebe, 2007, for potential confound-
ers). While most former studies (e.g. Young, Benjamin & Wallis, 1963)
stressed a higher risk of mortality for the first months, more recent longi-
tudinal studies indicated a more endurable risk of mortality (Li, Morten-
sen & Olsen, 2003; Prior et al., 2017). Much of this increased mortality
rates may be ascribed to psychological distress and detrimental effects of
associated immunological and endocrine changes (Prior et al., 2017;
Stroebe, Schut & Stroebe, 2007) leading for example to increased vulner-
ability for acute cardiovascular events (Carey et al., 2014). There may be,
however, underlying behavioral (e.g. increased risk-taking behavior and
decreased self-care associated with accidental and violent deaths; Mar-
tikainen & Valkonen, 1996; Parkes & Prigerson, 2010) and cognitive
factors (e.g. in increased suicide rates after bereavement due to a suicide;
Agerbo, 2005; Linde et al., 2017) that account for higher mortality rates
in bereaved people.
1.1.2 Current efforts to establish a grief-specific diagnosis

Grief reactions, however, may become further complicated. In the
aftermath of bereavement, studies have suggested an increased risk for
1.1 Reactions to Bereavement 3
developing psychiatric disorders like major depressive disorder, panic

disorder, generalized anxiety disorder (Onrust & Cuijpers, 2006), and
post-traumatic stress disorder (Parkes & Prigerson, 2010). Furthermore,
acute grief can lead to a condition commonly referred to as complicated
grief (CG). This condition must be understood as distinct from the above-
mentioned mental disorders (Wagner & Maercker, 2010), but it has in
common with many other mental disorders that it elevates the risk for
serious (physical) health outcomes (Prigerson et al., 2009). Up to today,
there is no approved diagnosis in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-5; APA, 2013) or in the International Classifica-
tion of Diseases (ICD-10; WHO, 1992) that describes that condition.
There are, however, several concepts in research whose different labels
each emphasize its different aspects (Rosner, 2015).
Considerable efforts have been done to develop valid diagnostic
criteria by introducing the terms complicated grief, traumatic grief, and
prolonged grief (Horowitz et al., 1997; Shear, Zuckoff & Frank, 2001;
Prigerson, Vanderwerker & Maciejewski, 2007). Moreover, the appendix
for “conditions for further study” in the DSM-5 introduces the Persistent
Complex Bereavement Disorder. Labels are, however, not exchangeable
since they partly stand for different diagnostic entities that would include
varying individuals and yield diverging prevalences (Maciejewski et al.,
2016; Maciejewski & Prigerson, 2017). After a long gestation period,
ICD-11 (announced for 2018) finally will give birth to Prolonged Grief
Disorder (PGD; Maercker et al., 2013) with a suggested prevalence of
9.8 % in the adult bereaved population (Lundorff et al., 2017).
The commonalty in concepts such as CG or PGD is the identifi-
cation of severe grief reactions in which debilitating symptoms are char-
acterized by an intensity, quality or duration that deviate from the social,
cultural or religious norms of the individual’s context (ICD-11: PGD,
beta-draft). For a better understanding of maladaptation, it is therefore
indispensable to focus on the individual’s (deviations of) internalization
4 1 Introduction
of those norms. One aspect often neglected in clinical research is the on-
going relationship with the deceased (Wagner & Maercker, 2010).
1.2 Death and Beliefs

The two-track model of bereavement (Rubin, 1981; Rubin, Mal-
kinson & Witztum, 2012) conceptualizes grief reactions as characterized
by two main multidimensional tracks: the first focuses on the biopsycho-
social functioning of bereaved individuals which would be disturbed in
maladjusted responses as described above. The second considers the on-
going relationship with the deceased and the individual meaning made of
death. Much recent and contemporary research in bereavement deals with
those so-called ‘continuing bonds’ between the living and the dead
(Klass, Silverman & Nickman, 1996; Klass & Steffen, 2017), but there
are few clinical studies that examine the role of continued bonds in mal-
adjusted grief reactions (for an exception see: Yu et al., 2016). In the
context of the present study it can be asked whether magical thinking is a
form of such continued bonds.
In general, the continuing of bonds is not a homogenous phenom-
enon but embedded in individual and cultural (including religious) con-
texts (Neimeyer, Klass & Dennis, 2014). It may be intermingled with
beliefs in an afterlife or other forms of continued existence (Benore &
Park, 2004) that, in turn, might interact with magical thinking.
1.2.1 Common narratives and beliefs

Beliefs in an afterlife are central in most religions, “whether it be
a bodily resurrection, placement in Heaven, reincarnation, or some other
form of continuing existence” (Benore & Park, 2004, p. 6). Many of them
include the concept of a soul (Bering, 2006) or another immortal part of
the human nature (Lifton & Olson, 2018). One explanation for the in-
creased salience of those beliefs is provided by terror management theo-
ry, which states that they mitigate levels of death-related anxiety (Green-
berg, Pyszczynski & Solomon, 1986) being an issue in bereavement as
1.2 Death and Beliefs 5
well (Shear & Skritskaya, 2012). Encounters with death therefore may
shatter assumptions about the benevolence of life (Parkes & Prigerson,
2010; Reisman, 2001) and increase belief in afterlife, supernatural agen-
cy, human ascension from nature, and spiritual distinctions between mind
and body (Vail et al., 2010). On the other hand, the belief in an afterlife
has been found to be associated with positive coping strategies in be-
reaved samples and better adjustment (Benore & Park, 2004).
Data from the European Value Study (Haraldsson, 2006) show
that 52.8 % of persons in the Nordic countries (Denmark, Iceland, Fin-
land, Norway, Sweden), 58.87 % of Western Europeans, and 47.6 % in
Eastern Europe belief in life after death. On average, 25 % of people
across Europe belief in reincarnation. Moreover, in Western Europe, eve-
ry fourth person claimed to “having felt as though they were really in
touch with someone who had died” (ibid., p. 179). In a random telephone
survey in the United States, 55.4 % reported to have at least one time
sensed the presence of a deceased loved one (Klugman, 2006). Post-
bereavement hallucinatory experiences, defined as abnormal sensory
experiences in bereaved individuals that are associated with the deceased,
are reported by 30-60 % (Castelnovo et al., 2015). In a 2001 Gallup poll,
38 % indicated the belief in ghosts and 42 % believed in haunted houses
(Newport & Strausberg, 2001) – beliefs that have a long history in Eu-
rope (Finucane, 1996). The prevalence of death-related superstitions, like
opening a window after death for the soul to be able to leave, however,
remains unclear. This might be due to the fact that superstition is an ill-
defined concept and demarcation lines are often unclear – which extends
to magical thinking as well.
1.2.2 Religious, superstitious, paranormal, magical, or …?

Lindeman and Svedholm (2012) reviewed the literature on para-
normal, superstitious, magical and supernatural beliefs that contains a
definition of any of the terms. They provided examples for authors and
6 1 Introduction
papers that (i) used all four concepts as synonyms without making differ-
ences between them, (ii) connected three of the four concepts together
(e.g. paranormal, superstitions, and supernatural; superstitions, magical,
and supernatural), or (iii) suggested parallels between two of the four
concepts (e.g. supernatural and magical beliefs; magical and paranormal
beliefs). They found that there was no consensus regarding the relation-
ship between those terms in literature so that some researchers argued
that superstitions are rooted in or derivatives of magical thinking, others
that belief in magic is a consequence of superstition, and still others that
paranormal beliefs include superstitions and magical thinking (Lindeman
& Svedholm, 2012). The maybe most contentious question relates to the
position of religious beliefs within this cluster of constructs. The problem
becomes obvious by considering the role of just one single religious sys-
tem: whereas medieval Christianity coined the term superstition in refer-
ence to pagans and non-Christians (Kieckhefer, 1989), its key tenets like
believing in God are itself labeled superstitious or paranormal today
(Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Irwin, 2009). Another example would be the
ambivalence in Christian theology regarding the role of magical events
within certain religious beliefs: while so-called witches were persecuted,
God is believed to do magic-like miracles (Assmann, 2010). With only
that said, the reader may be reminded of the enormous diversity of reli-
gious beliefs worldwide and the problem of defining ‘religion’ in itself
(Oman, 2015; Boyer, 2001).
The inconsistency in using those constructs led to different labels
for beliefs common in bereavement. The belief in an afterlife, for in-
stance, was denoted as religious belief (Benore & Park, 2004), paranor-
mal belief (Irwin, 2009), and superstition (Tykocinski, 2008). On the
other hand, phenomena in bereavement that resemble beliefs in children,
where they are termed as magical (Rosengren, Johnson & Harris, 2000),
are not labeled as such: what, for instance, is the difference between
thinking that there is a monster under the bed and sensing the presence of
the deceased in bereavement? What is the difference between talking
1.3 Research Questions and Aims 7
with imaginative friends and talking with the departed loved one? How
does caring for dolls and caring for the corpse differentiate? What distin-
guishes childish imagination, fantasy, and play from beliefs in afterlife or
reincarnation?
A reason for these inconsistencies may be that in developmental
psychology, in which a large proportion of literature on magical thinking
originated, the phenomenon is inconsistently defined too (Rosengren &
French, 2013). ‘Classical’ accounts in the field put more emphasis on
cause-effect relations that are suspected to be confused by the child to the
benefit of its power: The child may belief that its thoughts could alter
reality, or its actions could have special effects (Piaget, 1929; 1930). Sim-
ilarly, in clinical psychology it is known that in some forms of obsessive-
compulsive disorder there is the basic attitude that certain thoughts do
increase the likelihood of catastrophic events (Berle & Starcevic, 2005).
Further problems of definitions and usage of terms relate to (i)
the lack of required differentiation between exceptional experiences like
seeing the deceased and the belief in the possibility to see dead people
per se (Landoldt et al., 2014; Vaitl, 2012), (ii) a sophisticated view on
characteristics of beliefs including varying degrees of conviction as well
as explicit versus implicit beliefs (Irwin, 2009), (iii) the lack of acknowl-
edgment of double-tracked thinking, that is holding a belief and non-
belief at the same time (Risen, 2016), (iv) thinking versus acting on it,
and (v) the pejorative connotation of many definitions (Rosengren &
French, 2013). Investigating magical thinking in severe grief reactions
therefore requires the disambiguation of terms and development of a via-
ble working definition.
1.3 Research Questions and Aims

Bereavement-grief is a multi-faceted phenomenon that may lead
to serious health issues and enduring psychological suffering. Complica-
tions in grief can to date be described with research concepts such as
8 1 Introduction
complicated grief (CG) and will be covered by the diagnosis of prolonged

grief disorder (PGD) in ICD-11. The present study does not, however,
draw on strict criteria such as proposed for these conditions in defining its
objective. Instead, ‘severe grief’ is pragmatically defined as any grief-
related condition that prompts the bereaved individual to make use of
professional help (e.g. as provided by psychiatrists or psychotherapists).
Magical thinking on the other hand is an ill-defined psychological
construct that is yet to be clearly demarcated from nearby concepts such
as superstitious, paranormal or religious beliefs. In any case, beliefs from
these categories – like for example the belief in an afterlife or ghostly
existence – might form a framework for magical thinking in bereavement.
As there is no systematic research on magical thinking in bereavement-
grief up to today, it is unclear whether it is related to the continuing of
bonds with the deceased or hallucinatory experiences in bereaved indi-
viduals.
This thesis raises two basic research questions: (a) Is magical
thinking a recurrent component in severe grief reactions? and (b) Are
there different forms (themes) of bereavement-specific magical thinking
(e.g. related to the continuation versus severance of the bond with the
loved one)? Due to its exploratory character, this study proceeds by first
collecting theoretical arguments why there might be an association of
grief and magical thinking. Looking at the wide-spread custom of burying
the dead and death ritual, magical thinking might have contributed to its
evolutionary emergence. Therefore, a brief excursus on the prehistoric
origins of human burial is provided and evolutionary aspects in defini-
tions of magical thinking are stressed.
In addressing the research questions, this study methodologically
follows a qualitative, grounded theory approach. Given the lack of a gen-
erally accepted definition of magical thinking, definitional elements are
compiled on the basis of a comprehensive literature review. To create a
working definition that fits the context of bereavement, however, results
from this review are steadily compared with results from an expert study
1.3 Research Questions and Aims 9
that is conducted. In this expert study it is aimed to collect examples for

magical thinking in severe grief and to assess their clinical relevance.
Results from the expert study and the literature review together inform
the definition of bereavement-specific magical thinking this study works
towards.
2 Theoretical Background
The theoretical and empirical intersection of the two constructs
grief and magical thinking has not systematically been explored yet. This
chapter provides an overview of the status quo in research and practice of
both constructs. In the light of central theories, arguments for the plausi-
bility of magical thinking being a recurrent component in severe grief are
summarized at the end of this chapter.
2.1 Bereavement and Psychopathology

A death and all that follows in its aftermath are embedded in a
context: bereavement is a situation with certain social consequences, grief
reactions are idiosyncratic experiences following the loss, mourning en-
compasses public reactions to death and loss, dealings with the corpse
mirror individual and collective beliefs, and so do rituals that play a role
for both, the bereaved and the community (Stroebe et al., 2008; Parkes &
Prigerson, 2010; Pettitt, 2011a; Van Gennep, 1909/2018). In the first part
of this paragraph, more universal aspects will be emphasized (disambigu-
ation of terms, origins of human burial, structural analogies in funeral
rites). The second part, then, deals with Western theories of grief pro-
cesses and more recent conceptualizations of pathological grief reactions.
2.1.1 Bereavement, grief, and mourning

Bereavement is defined as the circumstance a person finds him or
herself after the loss of a loved one (Stroebe et al., 2008), be it a partner,
parent, child, sibling, friend or other significant person. The most com-
mon reaction to bereavement is grief. For spousal bereavement, data from
the Yale Bereavement Study (Ott et al., 2007) showed three prototypes of

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25002-7_2
12 2 Theoretical Background
grief: common grief (49 % with high initial grief and depressive symp-
toms and widely remission after nine respective 18 months), resilient
grief (34 % with constant low scores), and chronic grief (17 % with per-
sistent high scores). Nevertheless, grief is a highly variable and individual
experience with idiosyncratic symptom profiles and different durations
(Bui, 2018). There are several reasons that may account for such diver-
gences. On the one hand, contrary to common understanding, a grief re-
action usually also includes positive feelings, such as joy, peace, and
gratitude (Maercker & Lalor, 2012). On the other hand, very often there
are secondary stressors in the aftermath of bereavement, like changes in
circumstances of life (e.g. financial situation, residence), stigmatization,
and loneliness (Parkes & Prigerson, 2010). Since a close relationship
encompasses many aspects, it is not always clear on the first sight, what
is grieved for. Besides, grief can be the response to many forms of losses
that sometimes are not acknowledged by cultural norms to be a reason for
grief at all (e.g. loss of possessions or institutionalization of a loved one;
Doka, 2008). The reactions that come along with grief, that is, ways of
mourning also relate to cultural norms of grief (e.g. weeping, funeral
rites; Stroebe et al., 2008).
2.1.1.1 Cultural differences

Attitudes towards death are subject to time (Ariès, 1974) and
space (Robben, 2018), and so do dealings with the dead (Doughty, 2017),
the socio-cultural reality that is constructed after a loss (Neimeyer, Klass
& Dennis, 2014), as well as the individual reactions to bereavement
(Parkes, Laungani & Young, 2015; Rosenblatt, 2017). There are, howev-
er, ambiguities whether the nature of grief itself, the private emotional
reaction, is cultural-dependent or not (Stroebe & Schut, 1998; Rosenblatt,
2008). According to Rosenblatt (2001), cultural differences lie especially
in “understandings of what has been lost with a death, death rituals, cul-
tural constructions of a survivor’s ongoing and future relationship with
the deceased, and the cultural construction of culturally deviant grieving”
2.1 Bereavement and Psychopathology 13
(p. 286). One factor, for instance, is the type of social structure that de-
termines how much of the everyday reality of the deceased is known to
the bereaved and thus what is grieved for (Walter, 1994; Klass & Walter,
2001). Taking the cultural peculiarities and individual differences in be-
reavement reactions together into account, the definition of ‘normal’ grief
becomes very difficult (Maercker, 2007).
When regarding magical thinking in bereavement, differences
across cultures may be expected too – and may it merely be the social
support versus rejection of its expression. As with grief, however, it
seems likely that some components of the phenomenon have a certain
cross-cultural stability (e.g. cognitive foundations) while others vary with
a higher degree (e.g. purposes of magic). Yet, by being aware of cultural
aspects, such considerations go beyond the scope of the present study and
it will be focused more on the potential commonalities across time and
space instead. An evolutionary approach may help to understand how
grief and magical thinking interrelate and why it should be expected in
bereaved individuals. Therefore, the present study not only questions
whether magical thinking is a component in grief but argues that dealings
with the dead (funerary rituals, formal burial, etc.) per se may be rooted
in magical thinking. In other words, there may be emotions in grief reac-
tions that may trigger magical thinking once evolution provides for the
respective cognitive ability. Magical thinking, then, may have played a
role in the ‘invention’ of burial. Here, a brief excursion is offered regard-
ing the prehistoric origins of human burial. Later, a reinterpretation of
respective archaeological findings in terms of magical thinking is sug-
gested.
2.1.1.2 Grief and the prehistoric origins of burial

Evolutionary psychology, among other disciplines like neurobi-
ology or comparative psychology, focuses on grief components that show
a certain cross-cultural stability. White and Fessler (2018), for example,
made the case for that increased vigilance after separation was evolution-
ary adaptive in cases of an absent but living partner. In bereavement-
grief, however, a hyper-vigilant susceptibility for cues of the deceased
may result in preoccupation and searching behavior (White & Fessler,
2018; see Parkes & Prigerson, 2010). One may also consider research
from paleoanthropology and prehistoric archaeology. In such disciplines,
the focus on the innate, physiology-driven and universal character of
emotion “appear[s] to be more prevalent the more remote the time period
under consideration” (Tarlow, 2012, p. 173). In elaborating on the origins
of human burial and referring to an archaeology of grief (Cannon &
Cook, 2015), particular meanings of emotions that are socially construct-
ed must be excluded (Tarlow, 2012; Neimeyer, Dennis & Klass, 2014).
Let alone, one must bear in mind that emotions do not have to be located
within the individuals but in a thereby “enchanted” world (sensu Weber,
1917). Furthermore, grief may not be the only decisive factor for burial,
as mortuary practices can also be an expression of anxiety and a strategy
of risk reduction (Tarlow, 2012; besides, of course, pragmatic and social
reasons).
An argument for the universality of certain reactions to bereave-
ment stems from primatology. Chimpanzees are often regarded as reflect-
ing some behaviors of earlier hominids and perhaps even of a common
ancestor (Goodall, 1990). Bereaved chimpanzees show a whole range of
physiological and behavioral changes that resemble ‘grief’, ‘mourning’,
or ‘clinical depression’ (Pettitt, 2011a). Some individuals were observed
carrying the mummified remains of their dead infants over long times
(Biro, 2011). Moreover, there are frequent reports of what Pettitt (2011a)
called ‘morbidity’: “An enquiring concern with the injured, diseased or
dead body, whether or not this derives from a desire to understand the
nature or cause of death of an individual” (p. 8). In chimpanzees this en-
compasses the dragging of the corpse, smelling and investing the corpse,
grooming, and removing insects’ eggs while at the same time omitting
behaviors that would be directed at the living (e.g. licking wounds; Pet-
titt, 2011a). Besides, there are forms of what Pettitt (2011a) termed ‘core
mortuary activity’, including communicative acts like unusual calls, gath-
ering, or sitting in silence, and ‘social theatre’ with privileged access to
the corpse. The author made the case that these elements can be extended
to all hominids, forming a broad repertoire of practices related to the
treatment of the dead (see also Hovers & Belfer-Cohen, 2013).
Based on abstractions and interpretations of archaeological find-
ings, Pettitt (2011a) proposed ‘abandonment’, ‘structured abandonment’,
and ‘funerary caching’ as antecedents of burial among early hominids.
Abandonment would mean “[t]he simple act of leaving a helpless indi-
vidual to die. […] Also, the abandonment in situ of a corpse” (p. 9, italics
in original). Structured abandonment, on the other hand, would indicate
“[t]he deliberate placement of a corpse at a certain point in the landscape,
for reasons amounting to no more than simple concerns such as protec-
tion from scavengers” (Pettitt, 2011a, p. 9). Funerary caching, finally, is
defined as “[t]he structured deposition of a corpse, or parts of a corpse in
a chosen place, without modification of that place, such as at the back of
caves, in natural fissures, etc. Also, the use of pits originally created for
purposes other than burial. Unlike structured abandonment, however, the
place is given meaning beyond prosaic concerns such as corpse protec-
tion. Concepts such as ‘places of the dead’ may arise from funerary cach-
ing” (ibid.). A further important concept in the context of early treatments
of the dead is that of ‘Cronos compulsions’: “A physical extension of
morbidity: the urge – for whatever reason – to dismember, injure or con-
sume parts of the bodies of one’s conspecifics. Named after Cronos (Ro-
man Saturn), who consumed his children. This concept links nutritional
and ritual cannibalism, processing of the body such as scalping and dis-
memberment, and any other example whereby physical changes are
brought about to the corpses of the dead […]” (Pettitt, 2011a, p. 9).
Maybe the oldest archaeological site that was interpreted in the
light of structured abandonment or even funerary caching is a locality
dated to ~3.2myr BP (before present) at Hadar, situated in Ethiopia’s

western Afar depression (Pettitt, 2011a). Hominid fossils of at least 13
individuals assigned to Australopithecus afarensis were found in one
place that lack any other animal remains and must be regarded as unique
given the large number of individuals represented here. Interpretations
encompassed single catastrophic events or localized bogging. Pettitt
(2011a), however, argued strongly against such interpretations, leaving
intentional deposition as an explanation. According to him, the bodies
were ‘hidden’ in tall grass, which would fulfill the definition of structured
abandonment or perhaps even funerary caching.
A more convincing example for early funerary caching, however,
stems from the Sima de los Huesos site at Atapuerca. Here, at least 28
individuals assigned to Homo heidelbergensis were found in a constella-
tion that arguably depicts an “anthropogenic accumulation of hominin
remains” 500.000 years ago (Hovers & Belfer-Cohen, 2013, p. 634). If
this interpretation is accepted, the peculiarities of the location here would
allow the label ‘place of the dead’ (Pettitt, 2011a).
Early post-mortem manipulations or ‘Cronos compulsions’ are
consensually associated with the Bodo cranium found in the Awash river
valley in Ethiopia. It dates to around 600.000 BP and shows linear cut
marks that are signs for intentional defleshing (removal of tissue and
exposure of bones) respective “non-utilitarian mortuary practices” (Hov-
ers & Belfer-Cohen, 2013). Similar processing of bones like on a part of a
skull from Sterkfontein or on several hominin remains from the Gran
Doline, Atapuerca, that were associated with mortuary practices (Pettitt,
2011a) pre-date the Bodo cranium and are more likely to represent nutri-
tional cannibalism (Hovers & Belfer-Cohen, 2013; Pickering, White &
Toth, 2000; Bermúdez de Castro et al., 2004).
The first mortuary practices of Homo sapiens occurred around
170.000 ago in Africa and contain cranial modifications that resemble
them on the Bodo cranium (Hovers & Belfer-Cohen, 2013). Pettitt
(2011a) summarized evidences from the period between 150-60kyr BP in
Africa as “[m]ortuary defleshing and curation of crania among African

early Homo sapiens populations, possibly as a continuation of a Middle
Pleistocene tradition” (p. 76). These practices contrast with Eurasian de-
velopments where funerary activities took the form of formal burials,
defined as “[t]he creation of an artificial place for the purposes of con-
taining a corpse [in an] at least three-stage process involving 1) the exca-
vation of an artificial pit or trench intended to serve as a grave; 2) the
interment of a body within the grave; and 3) the covering of the body
with the extracted sediment” (Pettitt, 2011a, p. 9). There may be addi-
tional burial paraphernalia like humanly made grave goods. The oldest
archaeological sites that contain such formal burial are the sites of Skhūl
and Qafzeh, dating to 90.000-120.000 BP (Hovers & Belfer-Cohen,
2013). Pettitt (2011a, p. 76) resumed: “Funerary caching and formal buri-
al of children and adults, males and females, in shallow features that ap-
pear to respect the positioning of each other, possibly assisted by grave
markers. […] Occasional deliberate inclusion of objects (well-made lith-
ics, faunal remains, ochre fragments) into formal graves. […] Possible
association of rituals using ochre and/or fire with interment of the dead.”
An important differentiation in formal burials is that of primary
and secondary burials (Eggert, 2008) indicating that the treatment of the
dead often comprises a multiphasic process with the last and ultimate
burial being the secondary one (Veit, 2008). The dead body can, for ex-
ample, be deposited at a ‘special’ place and finally, say, after its complete
decomposition, be interred at another place. The practice of an initial
primary and later secondary burial is often associated with different ritu-
als that together constitute the rites of passage.
2.1.1.3 Rites of passage

The ethnographer Arnold van Gennep postulated at the turn of
the century, that when an individual leaves one group and enters another
this is an indication for certain rites that vary in their formal complexity
but are stable in their internal structure: he termed them rites de passage
(Van Gennep, 1909/2018). Rites of passage include three stages: (rites of)
separation from a previous world, rites of transition (liminality), and
(rites of) incorporation into the new world. To emphasize the importance
of the transitional phase, an alternative notation reads: preliminal rites,
threshold rites, and postliminal rites (Van Gennep, 1909/2018; Thomas-
sen, 2009). The death of an individual thereby is a paragon for an incident
that requires rites of passage (Metcalf & Huntington, 1991). In this con-
text, according to van Gennep, rites of separation encompass “the various
procedures by which the corpse is transported outside; burning the tools,
the house, the jewels, the deceased’s possessions; putting to death the
deceased’s wives, slaves, or favorite animals; washings, anointings, and
rites of purification in general […]” (Van Gennep 1909/2018, p. 40). He
further lists the closing of the coffin or the tomb, rites to expel souls, and
the destruction of the corpse itself (by cremation, committal, etc.). Im-
portantly, van Gennep claimed parallels between the run of events for the
bereaved and the deceased: with rites of separation the bereaved enters
the phase of mourning in which (s)he is suspended from social life and is
situated in a transitional period as the defunct. Sometimes, the transitional
periods of the bereaved and the deceased are counterparts and equal in
duration. In some cases, the transitional period is subdivided into sections
that correspond with the stages of the otherworld journey of the soul of
the deceased. With regard to the corpse, the liminal phase often parallels
the decomposition or defleshing of the dead body and/or the time be-
tween primary and secondary burial. The end of the liminal phase is
clearly marked by rites of reintegration of the mourner into society re-
spectively rites of incorporation that are necessary for the dead being able
to enter the world of the dead (Van Gennep 1909/2018). A recent exam-
ple for such a postliminal rite of reintegration in Western culture(s) would
be the funeral meal.
2.1.2 Theories of grief

In thanatology and neighboring disciplines dealing with be-
reavement and grief, different models or paradigms came up to substitute
this more figurative account of conveying the dead and the living from
one world or state into another, guided research in the field, and were
replaced or merged with another. Each one of the models and paradigms
originate in its historical context, although many explicitly stressed the
timelessness of their postulates by drawing on evolutionary aspects like
mentioned above or more recent historic accounts. Theories of grief,
therefore, often stand out due to their interdisciplinarity.
2.1.2.1 Grief work

In the 20th century, the idea was advocated that grief is a series of
conditions that must be worked through. According to Freud (1917), suc-
cessful mourning may lead to “withdrawal of libidinous energy from the
lost object (decathexis) and eventual reinvestment of that energy in other
objects and relationships” (Russac, Steighner & Canto, 2002, p. 464). The
term ‘grief work’, he used to describe the efforts of the mourner, was
especially reinforced by Eric Lindemann who defined it as the “emanci-
pation from the bondage of the deceased, readjustment to the environ-
ment […] and the formation of new relationships” (1944, p. 143; cited in
Middleton et al., 1999). Failures in relinquishing attachment and severing
bonds would inevitably lead to melancholia (Freud, 1917), or unresolved
(Bowlby, 1980) or pathological grief (Volkan, 1970), respectively. In the
history of mankind, such a radical postulation to discontinue relationships
with the dead is quite uncommon as even after ‘postliminal rites’ the dead
are not forgotten (cf. Klass & Walter, 2001). Either way, from this per-
spective, magical thinking would be a complicating factor in grief work
as it involves engagement with the deceased.
2.1.2.2 Process models

Although, to the best of my knowledge, magical thinking was
never explicitly mentioned in any model of grief, some authors reported
of feelings and thoughts that involve an extraordinary causality-concept,
which may be read as allusions to magical thinking. Bowlby and Parkes
(Bowlby, 1961, 1969), for example, proposed a four-stage model of reac-
tions to bereavement where the second stage centers around yearning and
searching for the deceased. This act of searching may manifest itself in
various behaviors like driving to the deceased’s favorite spots or scanning
faces in the mall. According to Parkes and Prigerson (2010), searching
behavior in bereavement is not aimless but aims to find and physically
reunite with the deceased. It only appears to be an aimless activation, as
bereaved individuals that show such behavior may be aware of its irra-
tional nature and therefore do not talk about it. Knowing the person is
dead but searching for him or her resembles magical thinking in that a
cause (searching behavior) would bring an impossible effect (finding a
dead person alive). What do bereaved people that are in this hypothetical
stage actually think about their action? Do they believe that the loved one
is forever lost only when they stop searching?
Kübler-Ross (1969) proposed five stages of grief, three of which
encompass denial, anger, and bargaining. First, denial and disbelief hin-
der the bereaved from realizing the death. If the fact is denied, there may
be acting as if the person was still alive (Kübler-Ross (1969), which,
again, resembles magical thinking. Being shocked and numb often leads
to simply execute daily routines (Kübler-Ross (1969). Do bereaved peo-
ple believe the loved one will come back if only they act as usual? Would
that be magical thinking? Second, descriptions of anger and guilt in be-
reavement include cases of blaming others and self for being guilty of the
death (Kübler-Ross (1969). Was the permission for the child to bicycle to
school actually the cause for its accident? Third and similarly, can God,
asked for in prayers, reverse the death? Will becoming a better person
bring back the deceased? These examples that would be ascribed to
Kübler-Ross’s stage of bargaining seem to perfectly fit common defini-

tions of magical thinking.
Whereas stages (and task) models are widely based on the idea of
grief work, the dual-process model of coping with bereavement (Stroebe
& Schut, 1999, 2010) emancipates from this presupposition and owes
much to cognitive stress theory (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Folkman,
2001). It describes two types of stressors in bereavement: loss-oriented
and restoration-oriented stressors. The former encompasses the loss and
grief experience itself, the latter deals with secondary stressors such as
changed circumstances of life, shattered world-views and plans, and so
on. Coping with these stressors can be described along two different di-
mensions (Stroebe & Schut, 1999, 2010). First, there can be emotion-
focused coping versus problem-focused coping. Although in coping with
loss-oriented stressors, emotion-focused strategies may be more efficient,
and in coping with restoration-oriented stressors, problem-focused strate-
gies may be more adaptive, neither form of coping is restricted to a type
of stressor (Stroebe & Schut, 1999, 2010). Second, coping can vary on
the dimension of confrontation versus avoidance. As expression of this
emotion regulation, the bereaved individual may oscillate between loss-
orientation and restoration-oscillation as well as between positive and
negative affect (Stroebe & Schut, 1999, 2010). Whereas this oscillation is
seen as necessary for adaptive coping, excessive avoidance is associated
with maladjustment. Boelen, van den Hout and van den Bout (2006) de-
scribed two types of avoidance: anxious avoidance and depressive avoid-
ance (Boelen & Eisma, 2015) that can be linked with avoidance of con-
frontation with loss-oriented stressors and avoidance of engagement in
activities that foster restoration (Stroebe & Schut, 2010).
A related hypothesis draws on the differentiation of primary and
secondary control, which is derived from the life-span theory of control
(Heckhausen & Schultz, 1995; Boerner & Heckhausen, 2003; Stroebe,
Schut & Boerner, 2010). Regarding the transformation of the mental rep-
resentation of the deceased, which is a loss-oriented stressor in the dual-

process model, this hypothesis states an advantage of secondary control
strategies that are inwards-directed and focus on emotion regulation.
There are, however, interindividual differences, for example in the dispo-
sition to strive for primary control that is to change external conditions
(Stroebe, Schut & Boerner, 2010).
These models will be referred to in assessing the role of magical
thinking in bereavement. One may question, for example, whether magi-
cal thinking relates more to loss-oriented or to restoration-oriented stress-
ors. Further, if magical thinking aims to bring the deceased back to life, it
would be an indicator of primary control striving.
2.1.2.3 Attachment perspective

The attachment system is conceptualized as an “inborn motiva-
tional system aimed at maintaining proximity to supportive others at
times of need” (Field & Filanosky, 2010, p. 3) that is activated, among
others, by separation from an attachment figure. From this perspective,
grief is associated with separation anxiety (Bowlby, 1969, 1973) and the
emotional turmoil resulting from repeated frustrated attempts (e.g. search
efforts: Parkes & Prigerson, 2010) at reunification. It can be theorized
that magical thinking promotes such attempts and, by doing so, leads to
further frustrations.
Finally, however, it has been suggested that those frustrations
may lead to “relinquishing the goal to re-establish physical proximity” in
successful mourning (Field & Filanosky, 2010, p. 4; Bowlby, 1980).
Field and Filanosky (2010, p. 4) stressed, that this is “not equivalent to
detachment” as the striving for physical proximity is replaced by the psy-
chological proximity of an internalized secure base. From that perspec-
tive, persisting magical thinking in severe grief would cause enduring
emotional distress without promoting mental reorganizations. However,
individual differences in attachment styles (Stroebe, Schut & Boerner,
2010) are beyond the scope of the present study.
2.1.2.4 Continuing Bonds

With the path-breaking work from Klass, Silverman and Nick-
man (1996) the insight that a relationship with a loved one must not ter-
minate after death came into focus. “The presence of an ongoing inner
relationship with the deceased person” is referred to as a continued bond
(Stroebe & Schut, 2005, p. 477) that is as characterized by interdepend-
ence (Silverman & Klass, 1996) and intersubjectivity (Klass & Steffen,
2017), comparable to the relationship between living individuals. Similar-
ly, continuing bonds encompass a wide variety of behaviors (cf. Root &
Exline, 2014) that continue, albeit in a changed way, the idiosyncratic
dyadic relationship before death (Klass & Steffen, 2017). Continued
bonds differ from former theoretic concepts like hypercathexis (intensifi-
cation of the bond as a prelude to sever it) or searching behavior (that will
prove unsuccessful and eventually be extinguished) particularly in that
they can last for decades (Klass & Steffen, 2017; Russac, Steighner &
Canto, 2002). Proponents of this ‘new’ paradigm highlight that, over
history, the continued interaction with the deceased was far more com-
mon than the severance of bonds (Klass & Walter, 2001; Klass & Goss,
1999; Walter, 2017).
In the first place, continuing bonds with the deceased, according
to this paradigm, is a normal process (Klass & Steffen, 2017). In their
pioneering work, the authors wrote they were “open to both the positive
and negative consequences of this activity” (Klass, Silverman & Nick-
man, 1996, p. 72). Nevertheless, there were many preconceptions about
their adaptive functions and role in adjustment to the loss (summarized by
Root & Exline, 2014). However, dichotomizing may be too simplistic
(Klass, 2006). A more differentiated view has to investigate different
behaviors and experiences (among other factors) that are expression of a
continued bond.
One of such experiences is described as sensing the presence of
the deceased. Rees (1971) found about half of the interviewed widows
and widowers reporting to have sensed the presence of their dead spouse
over years. For the majority of all bereaved such experiences were com-
forting but usually not initiated by the living (Klass & Walter, 2001;
Sanger, 2009).
Whereas a sense of presence is rather diffuse and amorphous,
there are more concrete post-bereavement hallucinatory experiences
(Castelnovo et al., 2015) that include seeing, hearing or feeling touched
by the departed (Rees, 1971), or noticing a smell associated with the de-
ceased (Klugman, 2006). Such abnormal sensory experiences are with
30-60 % rather frequent in bereavement (Castelnovo et al., 2015).
Related experiences and expressions of continued bonds are en-
counters with the deceased in dreams (Germain et al., 2013; Epstein,
Kalus & Berger, 2006; Chan et al., 2005) and keeping possessions that
once belonged to the deceased and sometimes convey a sense of the be-
loved (Gibson, 2008). The same is true for looking at photographs or
engaging in memorial photography, respectively (Foster et al., 2011;
Aytemiz, 2013).
A further form of continued bonds is talking with the dead (Klass
& Walter, 2001) or after-death-communication (Guggenheim & Guggen-
heim, 1996). In their famous field study, Francis, Kellaher and Lee
(1997) interviewed cemetery visitors and asked about their activities at
the graveside. They found people telling their dead spouses about family
events, recalling joint memories, and engaging in open conversation –
sometimes as intensive as it never was in lifetime. There were gender
differences, in that men were particularly likely to sense the presence
and/or to communicate with the deceased at the grave, whereas women
are more likely to have these experiences within the family home.
Bereaved people, however, often not only talk to the dead but ob-
tain answers from them. Those can be changes in electrical devices, lights
that are switched on or off, windows that are opened or closed, objects
that are moved (Klugman, 2006), or “meaningfully timed appearances of
animals, rainbows, and other symbolic natural phenomena” (Kwilecki,
2011, p. 220), among others. Sometimes, psychic mediums are visited to

establish a contact with the deceased via them (Beischel, Mosher &
Boccuzzi, 2015) – an idea that originated in end of 19th century spiritual-
ism (Klass & Walter, 2001).
In recent times, new media and social networks have become “a
new ritualized and public space” for maintaining continued bonds (Irwin,
2015, p. 190). Under the heading “paranormal copresence” in the Inter-
net, Irwin (2015) extracted three posting categories on Facebook memo-
rial pages where site members can comment on the deceased’s online
pages: “guidance from beyond and reunion with the deceased”, “messag-
es and visitations from the deceased”, and “conversations with the de-
ceased”. The latter was the most frequent theme and included the sub-
themes “references related to the bereaved wishing that they and the de-
ceased could experience something together” and “combined references
to everyday activities or memories that the bereaved wanted to share with
the deceased and explanations regarding what the bereaved missed or
loved about him or her” (Irwin, 2015, p. 133).
In continuing bonds, the dead are often regarded as moral guides
(Klass & Walter, 2001). The deceased can function as a role model in that
a global identification takes place (Marwit & Klass, 1995) and character-
istics of the personality are adopted (impersonation; Gibson, 2008; Rus-
sac, Steighner & Canto, 2002). This usually includes the internalization
of values and beliefs espoused by the deceased (Klass & Walter, 2001).
On the other hand, the deceased can be asked for and provide situation-
specific guidance in problematic situations (Irwin, 2015). More indirect,
bereaved people can be engaged in activities to honor the deceased like
altruistic acts, doing what he or she would have liked (Foster et al., 2011)
or creating a (online) memorial (De Vries & Rutherford, 2004; “We do it
to keep him alive”: Bell, Bailey & Kennedy, 2015). Ethical concerns
regarding harming the dead would fall into this category as well (Fisher,
2001).
Finally, a bond with the deceased can be continued simply by

talking about him or her as “a valued part of the survivor’s biography”
(Walter, 1996, p. 12; Silverman & Nickman, 1996). Sometimes, this ad-
ditionally purposes to complete the deceased’s identity or to construct his
or her biography by conversation, for example in the form of eulogies
that became part of many modern funeral rituals (Klass & Walter, 2001).
Similarly, just holding on to the memory and reminiscing about the de-
ceased continues the bond with him or her (Marwit & Klass, 1996). There
may be, however, many more idiosyncratic forms (Root & Exline, 2014).
Root and Exline (2014) recited the advantages of sort all these
heterogeneous forms of continued bonds along a few dimensions. They
propose to arrange them according to the specificity of the bond (e.g.
amorphous sense of presence vs. seeing the deceased standing in the
kitchen corner), the proximity (e.g. feeling guided vs. feeling a connec-
tion intermediated by certain objects), the past versus the presence (e.g.
clinging to memories vs. assuming a continued existence in some form),
the locus of bond (e.g. internally localized dialogues vs. hallucinatory
experiences), and the initiating agent (e.g. controlled contacts vs. contacts
initiated by the deceased).
Along similar lines as the discussion about the adaptiveness of
continuing bonds reads the question of the assessment of the bond by the
bereaved. Continuing bonds with the dead can be unwelcome, frightening
or experienced as intrusive, especially when they elicit negative affects
regarding the loss, the person, or the pre-death relationship, when they
lead the bereaved to question their sanity or ability to cope successfully,
and when they are not culturally supported (Root & Exline, 2014). Ac-
cording to Klass “[t]he criteria for the health of an interpersonal bond are
the same whether the bond is between living people or between living
people and dead people” (Klass, 2006, p. 845). Regarding the objective of
the present study, it is thus left open whether magical thinking may en-
hance or worse the situation in bereavement.
In sum, continuing bonds include the “reorganization of the cog-

nitive-affective mental representation of the deceased” (Germain et al.,
2013, p. 279; Rubin, Malkinson & Witztum, 2003; Horowitz, 1990,
1991). The bond becomes internalized in an active process (Silverman &
Klass, 1996; Root & Exline, 2014) that needs, however, a certain degree
of social validation (Klass & Walter, 2001). “The purpose of grief is […]
the construction of a durable biography that enables the living to integrate
the memory of the dead into their ongoing lives” (Walter, 1996, p. 7).
2.1.3 Psychopathology of grief

Unlike most mental disorders, abnormal grief has a distinct and
known etiological factor: bereavement. Therefore, although not all deaths
are traumatic for the survivors from a present-day perspective (Wagner &
Maercker, 2010), the study of severe grief reactions is historically em-
bedded in psychotraumatology, where it constitutes a recent branch of a
steadily differentiating field (Maercker & Augsburger, 2017). The term
“disorders specifically associated with stress” that captions PGD in the
upcoming ICD-11 (Maercker et al., 2013) builds not only on statistical
evaluation (Langner & Maercker, 2005) and latest neuroendocrine find-
ings (Saavedra Pérez et al., 2017) but points to the roots of modern grief
concepts in stress response theory (Horowitz, 2011; Horowitz et al.,
1984).
2.1.3.1 History of pathological grief

Before the initiation of a systematic empirical research to estab-
lish reliable and valid diagnostic criteria, many different names and con-
cepts were rather loosely employed to describe “not normal” grief reac-
tions. Sigmund Freud dedicated one of his in-depth works to Mourning
and Melancholia (1917) and regarded it as pathological when the latter
replaces the former (Middleton et al., 1999). Lindemann (1944) placed
special emphasis on psychosomatic aspects of morbid grief that in his

view resulted from aborted grief work.
Horowitz and colleagues (1993) at first used the term pathologi-
cal grief in reference to their conceptualization of a diagnostic entity.
Later, they called it complicated grief and based it on stress response
theory, in which bereavement is construed as a stressful life event (Hor-
owitz et al., 1997; Wagner & Maercker, 2010). Following the clinical
phenomenology of psychiatric disorders in the aftermath of exposure to
trauma or extreme stress, they suggest as core symptoms of complicated
grief intrusive-preoccupation, denial-avoidance, and failure-to-adapt.
Whereas intrusions may occur as recurrent realizations of the absence of
the loved one, preoccupation relates to unbidden memories and willfully
indulging in positive memories and images of the deceased to the extent
that it disturbs the process of restoration in the present (Wagner &
Maercker, 2010). Avoidance relates to places, people, situations or talk-
ing about the deceased. Failure-to-adapt phenomena are observed in
physiological (e.g. unusual levels of sleep disturbance), behavioral (e.g.
keeping possessions of the deceased), and affective variables (e.g. endur-
ing feelings of loneliness) (Wagner & Maercker, 2010).
Prigerson et al. (1995) conceptualized complicated grief and
found it to be distinct from depression and anxiety. Between 1997 and
2002, however, the research team reported about their findings under the
term traumatic grief. After a period of reusing the label complicated
grief, in 2007 they finally coined the term prolonged grief to better de-
scribe one important – but not the main (Prigerson, Vanderwerker &
Maciejewski, 2007) – characteristic of the condition (Wagner & Maerck-
er, 2010). Their criteria were clustered in two categories: symptoms of
separation distress versus symptoms of traumatic distress (Prigerson et
al., 1997). Symptoms of separation distress are for example preoccupa-
tion with thoughts of the deceased, longing and searching, and feelings of
loneliness. Traumatic distress manifests itself for example as disbelief
about the death, avoiding reminders, feeling that life is empty, and a
fragmented sense of trust, security and control (Prigerson & Jacobs,

2001).
In 2009, the working groups around Horowitz and Prigerson
joined to develop consensus criteria for Prolonged Grief Disorder. Subse-
quently, the criteria were proposed for DSM-5 (Prigerson et al., 2009)
and ICD-11 (Maercker et al., 2013).
2.1.3.2 Status of diagnostics

Currently, there still is no clinical diagnosis for grief-related syn-
dromes in neither DSM-5 nor ICD-10. In DSM-5 (APA, 2013), however,
the bereavement-exclusion criterium was removed from the list for major
depression allowing practitioners to diagnose a depressive disorder from
two weeks after the bereavement onwards (Pies, 2014). In addition,
DSM-5 lists the Persistent Complex Bereavement Disorder in its appen-
dix for conditions that require further research (Jordan & Litz, 2014). The
criteria by Prigerson et al. (2009) pro-posed for Prolonged Grief Disorder
were rejected to be included as new diagnostic category.
ICD-10 (WHO, 1992) offers a Z- code (Z63.4) Disappearance
and death of a family member as a “factor influencing health status and
contact with health services”. In ICD-11 (announced for 2018), there will
be for the first time a separate diagnosis for Prolonged Grief Disorder
(Maercker et al., 2013).
2.1.3.3 Symptomatology of Prolonged Grief Disorder

According to these proposed ICD-11 criteria, a central character-
istic of Prolonged Grief Disorder is yearning for the deceased daily or to
a disabling degree. In addition, there have to be five or more of the fol-
lowing symptoms: confusion about one’s role in life or diminished sense
of self; difficulty accepting the loss; avoidance of reminders of the reality
of the loss; inability to trust others since the loss; bitterness or anger re-
lated to the loss; difficulty moving on with life (e.g. making new friends,
pursuing interests); emotional numbness since the loss; feeling that life is
unfulfilling, empty or meaningless since the loss; feeling stunned, dazed,
or shocked by the loss. To diagnose PGD, at least 6 months must have
passed since the death (Prigerson et al., 2009; Maercker et al., 2013; Jor-
dan & Litz, 2014).
While these criteria were shown to distinguish reliably and valid-
ly between normal and dysfunctional grief and other mental disorders,
there is most likely a continuum between those categories (Wagner,
2014). To the best of my knowledge, there is only one single account that
mentions magical thinking as a cognitive symptom in complicated grief
(Znoj, 2016). Its role for example in relocating an individual on that con-
tinuum towards more severe form of grief, however, remains unclear.
2.2 Perspectives on Magical Thinking

There are many different perspectives on magical thinking that
arose from different contexts and mostly include certain appraisals: false
beliefs, deficient thinking, pathological features, etc. In this paragraph,
the literature on magical thinking is reviewed, stressing the emerging
tendency – as opposed to former theories – to regard magical thinking as
an everyday-phenomenon and proximal to religious thinking.
2.2.1 Anthropological notions of magical thinking

Descriptions of thought processes related to the practice of magic
were first provided in cultural anthropology. Here, different approaches
to the subject emerged, that were classified as rationalist, symbolic,
pragmatic, and emotionalist approaches (Sørensen, 2007). In the follow-
ing, these approaches will briefly be presented in a roughly chronological
order.
In his pioneering work Primitive Cultures, Sir Edward Tylor de-
scribed what he called ‘associative thinking’ as the unfounded and perni-
cious ideas of members in certain non-European cultures that events or
2.2 Perspectives on Magical Thinking 31
entities are in a causal relationship simply because of their semblance

(Tylor, 1871; Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012).
Sir James G. Frazer, in his 1890 The Golden Bough: A Study in
Magic and Religion, differentiated the phenomenon that he called ‘sym-
pathetic magic’ in ‘contagious magic’ and ‘homeopathic magic’. Alleged
regularities behind them he termed ‘the law of similarity’ (like produces
like or an effect resembles its cause) and ‘the law of contagion’ (once in
contact, always in contact). In addition, he differentiated magic on the
basis of opposing motivations: positive magic – or sorcery – aims to
bring about desirable effects, negative magic – or taboo – aims to avoid
unwanted ends (Vyse, 2014). According to Frazer, religion replaces mag-
ic as society develops – a mindset, which is known as Social Darwinism.
Magical thinking, thus, was restricted to ‘primitive’ and ‘savage’ men as
reflected in the Paleolithic cave paintings (Breuil, 1949). A commensura-
bly linear trajectory was later proposed by Ernst Cassirer, who, in his
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1923-1929), sought magic between myth
and logos (Gloy & Bachmann, 2000).
On the other hand, Bronisław Malinowski in Magic Science and
Religion (1948) described his observations of magical thinking occurring
parallel to scientific and religious thoughts. According to his fieldwork
data from the Trobriand Isles, the circumstances of the situation are im-
portant in determining which thinking is likely to occur. He made the
case that dangerous and risky situations with high degrees of uncertainty
(like fishing on the open sea) foster magical thinking; as opposed to situa-
tions with lower levels of anxiety (like fishing in a sheltered lagoon). At
the same time, Malinowski stressed the performative aspect of magic that
is primary expressed through language and functions as a ‘substitute ac-
tivity’ where technology and practical knowledge are stretched to its lim-
its (Sørensen, 2007).
Instead of regarding magic as an instrumental activity and its rea-
soning as primitive and defective, Stanley J. Tambiah (1990) proposed
that magic is based on a mode of thought deployed on performativity and

therefore on “conventional intersubjective understanding” and the “per-
formative efficacy of communicative acts” (Tambiah, 1990, p. 190;
Sørensen, 2007). Despite of some problems with this conceptualization
for a theory of magic and ritual (Sørensen, 2007), the double-tracked
nature of cognition is central to more recent theories of magical thinking
in psychology (Risen, 2016).
2.2.2 Developmental psychology

In the psychology of childhood, the term magical thinking is
sometimes restricted to thoughts in imagination, fantasy, and dreams
(Sully, 1897) and distinguished from actual beliefs in a magical reality
(Subbotsky, 2010). However, this distinction is not universal: Werner
(1927), for example, regarded magical thinking as beliefs of ‘primitive
men’, children, and adolescents, but not of civilized adults (Watzlawik &
Valsiner, 2012). Whereas the latter cannot be sustained, today there is
broad agreement that magical thinking is a normative occurrence in
childhood (Rosengren & French, 2013). As opposed to modern research
that searches its peak at younger children at about age 5 or 6 (Bolton et
al., 2002), earlier accounts – with Piaget’s view leading the way – con-
sidered the whole childhood until reaching the concrete operations period
at age 11 or 12 (Piaget, 1929). Rather than understanding magical think-
ing as temporary phenomena, those accounts regarded it as the dominat-
ing way of thinking in children (Rosengren & French, 2013). Piaget de-
scribed the erroneous grasp of causality by means of the “law of partici-
pation” which, according to him, consists of magic by participation be-
tween thoughts and things (i.e. the belief that thoughts can alter reality),
magic by participation between actions and things (i.e. the belief that
words, gestures, or acts can alter reality), magic by participation between
objects (i.e. the belief that objects without physical relationship influence
each other), and magic by participation of purpose (i.e. the belief that
there is mind and intention in the inanimate world; Piaget, 1929, 1930).
He subsumed this form of thinking by egocentrism and emphasized the

role of wishes respective the desire to control in order to fulfill one’s
wishes that stands behind magical thinking (Watzlawik & Valsiner, 2012;
Bolton et al., 2002).
A further exponent in the research on magical thinking in child-
hood is the psychologist Eugene Subbotsky. Importantly, in a series of
experiments, he provided solid evidence that magical thinking is not re-
placed by logic at the end of childhood. Instead, he argued that it is rele-
gated to subconscious level by social and cultural pressures (Subbotsky,
2010; Rosengren & French, 2013). He demonstrated, that under certain
conditions, adults are prone to think similar as children. Taken together,
in (developmental) psychology, then, the theoretical progress resembled
that in anthropology: No longer is magical thinking regarded as a stage in
a linear process of development, but it is acknowledged that magical and
logical thinking may coexist – be it in children or adults.
2.2.3 Superstitions in daily life

“The superstition in which we grew up, though we may recognize
it, does not lose its power over us. Not all are free who make mock of
their chains.” These words by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1779) are in-
deed topical in that they summarize very well the current state in research
on superstition and magical thinking. Both are part of a broader spectrum
of irrational and illogical thoughts and behaviors people show in every-
day life (Kahneman, 2011) even in the face of high levels of education
and scientific training (Rosengren & French, 2013; Risen, 2016). People,
then, are engaged in superstitious behaviors before competitive events
like in sports or gambling (Vyse, 2014), they wear certain clothes or use
lucky pens on exams day (Albas & Albas, 1989; Rosengren & French,
2013), or carry a rabbit’s foot to bring luck (Risen, 2016). Today’s super-
stitions are highly idiosyncratic (Vyse, 2014) and are sometimes found to
indeed increase performance in tasks or games (Damisch, Stoberock &
Mussweiler, 2010). In the same manner, people avoid walking under

ladders (Jahoda, 1969), knock on wood in response to hearing a stressful
question (Keinan, 2002), or refuse to eat chocolate in the shape of dog
feces (Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000). In general, they avoid substances that
just resemble disgusting or dangerous ones, as well as contaminated sub-
stances that were sterilized in front of their eyes (Rozin, Millman &
Nemeroff, 1986). Similarly, people avoid tempting fate as they believe
that negative outcomes are especially likely after commenting on a series
of success (Risen, 2016) or when not protected by an insurance (Tykocin-
ski, 2008). Many of these and related beliefs are culturally supported or at
least not suppressed (Rosengren & French, 2013).
Superstitions and magical thinking share central definitional ele-
ments (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007) and those who act superstitiously have
been said to become ‘small magicians’ for the moment (Zusne & Jones,
1989). Yet, there are “slight trends” in the usage of the concepts with
superstitions being specifically associated with luck related rituals (Lin-
deman & Svedholm, 2012, p. 247). Any distinctive characteristics be-
tween both concepts will be derivable from the working definition of
magical thinking of the present study, which will be suggested later along
this thesis.
Whereas Freud (1913) regarded magical thinking in adults as re-
gression to an infantile stage in states of extreme anxiety and fear, today,
it is acknowledged as a general feature in adults (Vyse, 2014; Nemeroff
& Rozin, 2000; Bolton et al., 2002). Often, however, adults act on magi-
cal or superstitious thinking although they do not really believe in it (Ris-
en, 2016) or are not aware that they hold it after all (Subbotsky, 2010).
Recent research, then, focused on underlying cognitive mechanisms that
would explain its pervasiveness and phenomenology.
2.2.3.1 Sympathetic magic and essentialism

Many theories of everyday magical thinking and superstition
draw on the anthropological concept of sympathetic magic (Rosengren &
French, 2013). With its categories ‘law of similarity’ and ‘law of conta-
gion’, it is “considered the basis for universal primitive human thought
[…] The law of similarity specifies that objects that resemble one another
share certain fundamental properties that are sufficient to link the objects
causally” (Rosengren & French, 2013, p. 46). The law of contagion can
be summarized as ‘once in contact – always in contact’, that is, it pre-
sumes a “transfer of physical, moral, or behavioral properties from source
to recipient through some form of contact” (ibid.). The effects of negative
contagion, however, are incomparably stronger than those of positive
contagion (Rozin, Millman & Nemeroff, 1986). Similarly, when differen-
tiating between physical sources of contagion and interpersonal-moral
sources, the latter were more persistent (Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000;
Rosengren & French, 2013).
The laws of sympathetic magic have in common, that they appear
to have deep ancient roots and seem to be of evolutionary value for sur-
vival: the law of similarity, for example, leads to an avoidance of plants
that resemble the poisonous one. The law of contagion appears to be the
prototype of germ theory (Rosengren & French, 2013). Another com-
monality is that both presume imperceptible forces or essences, which
was conceptualized as a core definitional element of magical thinking
(Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000). Medin and Ortony (1989) coined the term
psychological essentialism for people behaving as if there was a soul,
essence, or core nature. Similarly, Rosengren and French (2013) wrote of
a “basic tendency to essentialize” (p. 50) and Gelman (2003) regarded
essentialism as “a universal habit of the mind” (p. 15).
2.2.3.2 Further underlying mechanisms

Besides the laws of sympathetic magic and psychological essen-
tialism, further cognitive mechanisms are debated to underlie various
forms of magical thinking and superstition. The avoidance of tempting
fate, for example, was theorized to be built on the availability heuristic.
This heuristic describes the general “tendency to infer the likelihood or

frequency from how easily things come to mind” (Risen, 2016, p. 186)
appending that “emotionally laden events are [especially] easily imag-
ined” (ibid.). Many forms of magical thinking and superstition were ex-
plained by attribution theory: people tend to jump to conclusions and
offer explanations based on causal inferences in cases where random
variation would provide a better explanation (Risen, 2016). In the context
of operant conditioning people gain an illusion of control (Vyse, 2014).
However, especially in children, there may also be distinct concepts of
causality that are based on perception and lack a moderating theory. This
is what Subbotsky called ‘phenomenalistic causality’ (Subbotsky, 1997,
2000; Bolton et al., 2002).
Once a belief came into being, it is defended by confirmation bias
in the sense that people tend to “search for and favor evidence that sup-
ports [their] current beliefs and ignore or dismiss evidence that does not”
(Risen, 2016, p. 188). At the same time, the endorsement of a belief is
moderated by the ability to be rational, which may be low in people with
intellectual deficits (as formulated in the cognitive deficits hypothesis:
Alcock, 1981; Irwin, 2009), but also when doing simultaneous tasks or
being forced to respond quickly (Risen, 2016). Furthermore, there are
differences in the motivation to be rational (e.g. due to instructions or
incentives) as well as individual differences. Vyse (2014) predicts super-
stitious behavior to be more likely in individuals with an external locus of
control, lower self-efficacy, higher hypnotic suggestibility, higher neurot-
icism, overprotective fathers, or female gender, among others (see also
Irwin, 2009). He emphasized, however, that there is no ‘superstitious
personality’ and context and mood play an important role as well (Vyse,
2014). The latter supports the argument for magical thinking being likely
to increasingly occur in the context of bereavement.
2.2.4 Clinical psychology and psychopathology

Magical thinking per se is neither abnormal nor pathological.
Vyse (2014) provides an “assessment of the abnormality of typical super-
stitious behavior” using Rosenhan and Seligman’s (1989) criteria (p.
212). He concludes that only three of those seven can – and to a limited
extent – be applied to superstitions: “irrationality and incomprehensibil-
ity”, “maladaptiveness”, and “vividness and unconventionality”. None-
theless, certain psychopathological syndromes comprise magical thinking
and it may well play a role in psychological suffering. Concluding that it
therefore is a risk factor for mental disorders would be, however, a circu-
lar argument, since in some cases magical thinking is a component of the
diagnostic criteria. Moreover, the denotative meanings of the term differ
between the descriptions of respective disorders (Rosengren & French,
2013).
2.2.4.1 Magical Thinking in primary psychotic disorders

In DSM-5, a diagnostic criterion for schizotypal personality dis-
order reads “Odd beliefs or magical thinking that influences behavior and
is inconsistent with subcultural norms” (APA, 2013, p. 655) including
superstitiousness or belief in clairvoyance (Vyse, 2014). Clinical studies
earlier found magical thinking to be one of three factors constituting
schizotypy – the others being paranoid ideation and unusual perceptual
experiences (Claridge & Broks, 1984; Joseph & Peters, 1995), or magical
ideation set up one factor along with unusual perceptual experiences in
the face of ideas of reference/social anxiety and suspiousness being the
other two factors (Wolfradt & Straube, 1998). Since schizotypy is con-
ceptualized as dimensional variable that indexes proneness to schizo-
phrenia (Claridge, 1997), Eckblad and Chapman (1983) constructed their
Magical Ideation Scale for identifying individuals at risk. As psychologi-
cal construct, magical thinking here encompasses a very broad range of
phenomena from superstitions (e.g. item 3: “I have sometimes been fear-
ful of stepping on sidewalk cracks”; see Vyse, 2014), over paranormal

beliefs (e.g. item 4: “I think I could learn to read other’s minds if I want-
ed to”), to ideas of reference (e.g. item 21: “I have sometimes had the
passing thought that strangers are in love with me”) and suspicious or
paranoid thinking (e.g. item 19: “I have sometimes sensed an evil pres-
ence around me, although I could not see it”). Consequently, there are
various problems with resulting correlations of magical ideation with
schizotypal traits or even schizophrenia, like small effect sizes, confound-
ing variables and potential moderators like reality testing (Irwin, 2009).
2.2.4.2 Magical Thinking and obsessive-compulsive disorders

Thought-Action-Fusion (TAF) is a construct that is regarded by
many authors as a specific type of magical thinking (Lindeman &
Svedholm, 2012), and that was early on associated with obsessive-
compulsive behavior and disorder (OCD; Rachman, 1993). Individuals
who score high in TAF interpret unwanted intrusive thoughts as having a
special significance in two ways: that they are reprehensible immoral
(TAF moral) or that they increase the likelihood of catastrophic events
(TAF likelihood) (Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996). The latter can
further be differentiated in likelihood-for-others (having bad thoughts
about others increases the likelihood that something bad happens to them)
and likelihood-for-self (having bad thoughts about oneself may make
them true) (Subbotsky, 2010). Whereas in control groups only TAF like-
lihood-for-self showed higher scores, which can be explained by belief in
self-fulfilling prophecies (Subbotsky, 2010), in patients with OCD both
types were elevated (Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996). Over time,
significant correlations between TAF and obsessive-compulsive symp-
toms measured with varied instruments has been consistently found
(Berle & Starcevic, 2005). Newer research indicates that this relationship
is culturally invariant (Halgadottir, Menzies & Einstein, 2012) and also
true for non-Western cultures (Yorulmaz, Inozu, Gültepe, 2011). Fur-
thermore, not only magical beliefs (as indicated by the Magical Ideation
Scale) play a significant role in elevated TAF and obsessive-compulsive

scores (Einstein & Menzies, 2004), but also religious beliefs (Protestant
Christian) in that they are associated with increased TAF moral and TAF
likelihood scores (Berman et al., 2010). On a more superficial level,
compulsive behaviors too may appear as superstitious-like (Vyse, 2014).
2.2.4.3 Magical Thinking in other mental disorders

The case for magical thinking was made for some further clinical
disorders with anxiety disorders leading the way (Berle & Starcevic,
2005). West and Willner (2011) and similar Agorastos et al. (2012) found
no significant difference between scores of magical thinking (as meas-
ured with the Magical Ideation Scale; Eckblad & Chapman, 1983) in
OCD and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) respective anxiety disor-
ders. For GAD, a reinforcement of superstitious positive beliefs over time
was discussed (as feared events rarely happen their nonappearance may
be attributed to past superstitious behavior), as well as idiosyncratic tries
to regain a sense of control when faced with the sense of uncontrollability
of worries in GAD (West & Willner, 2011). Pathological worry was also
found to be predictive not only by the constructs intolerance of uncertain-
ty and perfectionism but also by magical thinking as measured with the
Illusory Beliefs Inventory (Shihata, Egan & Rees, 2014). The latter, how-
ever, accounted for less than 1 % of variance in worry, indicating that its
role in pathological worry or the differences in measuring instruments
demand further investigation.
Magical thinking measured with the respective subscale of the
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire was furthermore found to be more
frequent in patients with somatoform disorders. This finding can be dis-
cussed in the light of “a general tendency to mistake correlation for casu-
alization” and not just in an illness-related context (Hausteiner-Wiehle &
Sokollu, 2011, p. 287; italics in original).
2.2.5 Magical thinking and (the origins of) religion

The relationship between magic(al thinking) and religion was as-
sessed from both, outside observers and religious believers. Whereas the
group of the former, which includes many early anthropologists, ethnog-
raphers, and recent researchers, progressed in their emphasis of distinct
(early) and common (later) features, the assessment of religious believers
depends on which religious system they belong.
According to Frazer (1890), religion implies a persuasion of su-
pernatural forces whereas magic aims to manipulate them. Thus, magic is
a direct way of achieving one’s goals whereas in religion a deity interme-
diates the effect of, say, a prayer. The sociologist Èmile Durkheim
(1912), in contrast, stressed the different functions, magic and religion
fulfill in societies as he observed that not all cultures maintain a distinc-
tion between the natural and supernatural. He proposed that religion
serves purposes for the community, whereas magic is a means for the
individual to reach its idiosyncratic goals. Malinowski (1948), in turn,
regarded magic as directed at future events whereas religion shall help the
community to surmount a recent crisis.
Today, in anthropology and related disciplines, a hierarchical re-
lationship or a common ancestor of both concepts are postulated. Magic,
then, is often considered to be a part of religion (Stein & Stein, 2011) as it
is, for example, involved in most religious rituals (Sørensen, 2007). A
related notice is that religious objects at times are alienated and become a
source of magical thinking (e.g. the key to the church, coins from the
offertory, holy water, that have special powers according to folk supersti-
tions; Thomas, 1971). In the emerging field of Cognitive Science of Reli-
gion and psychology, the idea of magical and religious thinking being
essentially the same prevails (Boyer & Walker, 2000; Subbotsky, 2010).
One distinct feature often mentioned is the institutionalization of beliefs:
“Of course the most sophisticated, historically developed, and powerful
example of magical reality is religion” (Subbotsky, 2010, p. 4). Similarly
argue Boyer and Walker (2000) when they state that magical and reli-
gious thinking are two forms of thinking that start out as one and the
same and separate themselves in the course of ontogenetic development
(Rosengren & French, 2013).
Phylogenetically, the term religious ideology is usually not used
before the Upper Paleolithic (Mithen, 1996). For this period, the case for
explicit (apotropaic) magical practices was made too (Floss, 2016). It
may be hypothesized, however, that there were precursors in antecedent
periods, which can probably be identified in earlier burial practices when
a strong definition of magical thinking is applied. Within belief systems,
however, there was most probably no distinction between religious and
magical thinking as it is still absent in some forms of tribal religions and
even major religions like Hinduism today (Subbotsky, 2010).
A sharp separation of both concepts was propagated within the
emerging abrahamic religions (e.g. Judaism, Christianity). In their self-
conception, they incorporate the opposite of what they call idolatry, pa-
ganism, and magic. Therefore, it is part of their theological dogma to
exterminate all magic in form of divination, necromance, and sorcery
(Assmann, 2010). At the same time, their god is believed to be able to
affect physical, biological, and psychological events and to cause mira-
cles (Barrett, 2001). Likewise, their god practices what would be called
magic through privileged individuals called prophets (Assmann, 2010).
For becoming acknowledged by the Vatican as a saint, one must have
done at least one miraculous cure (Vyse, 2014). Similarly, contacting the
spirits of the dead was a monopoly of clergymen whereas magical prac-
tices for that purpose were prohibited and persecuted over a long time
(Klass & Walter, 2001). Thus, the dichotomy of (evil) magic and (divine)
religion mostly arose within monotheistic religions. It thus can be argued,
that many existing definitions of magical thinking in psychology and
related disciplines only compile and try to make sense out of the ‘theo-
logical garbage’ (concepts refused by Church).
It is kind of an anecdote, however, that recently some psycholo-

gists and other scientists used the term magical thinking in a pejorative
sense and included religious beliefs under its heading (Rosengren &
French, 2013).
2.3 Magical Thinking in Severe Grief Reactions

To the best of my knowledge, there is no research about magical
thinking in severe grief reactions – or in bereavement at all – up to today.
An inquiry in the MEDLINE, PSYNDEX and PsycINFO databases with
the searching terms [grief OR bereavement] AND [magical thinking OR
magical beliefs OR magical ideation] yielded 31 results from the time
between 1973 to 2014 (update: 07th April 2018). 10 of those did not cover
our research area (instead, they were concerned with topics like alcohol-
ism or illusory correlations), 10 entries referred to grieving children, 7
papers were about Joan Didion’s The Year of Magical Thinking, and 4
articles contained grief and magical thinking but in very particular con-
texts (e.g. in trichotillomania; Hamiel, Yoffe & Roe, 1999). Before out-
lining the detailed research questions and the aims of the present study,
some of those issues will be elaborated on, because they may provide a
rationale for the present study.
2.3.1 Plausibility
One of the quality criteria in qualitative research is the logic and
soundness of an argument or theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). In the
following, the – in my view – most important points are presented why
magical thinking should be expected in severe grief reactions, as they
summarize the status quo of joint mentions of magical thinking and grief
and therefore are significant for the present research.
2.3.1.1 Magical thinking in grieving children

Magical thinking in grieving children is repeatedly discussed un-
der the aspects of inflated responsibility and guilt, and death concepts in
2.3 Magical Thinking in Severe Grief Reactions 43
that death is regarded as temporary and reversible (Fogarty, 2000; Ruffin

& Zimmerman, 2010). Especially critical may be the age between 2 and 6
years (Bogyi, 2006). In adolescents, magical thinking is associated with
suicidal ideation in the light of reunion with the deceased (Fogarty,
2000). Regarding its function in grieving children, magical thinking is
seen as a factor that impede a decisive processing of the loss (Biank &
Werner-Lin, 2011) or that even complicates grief: “Magical thought is
children’s inaccurate conclusion(s) regarding a loss experience resulting
in children believing that they are responsible for the loss experience and
need to fix the loss experience. Magical thought may lead children to
believe that they have developed a method of mourning, but they have
actually developed an unhealthy and complicated process of mourning”
(Fogarty, 2000; p. 1).
For the present study, it is interesting, that (a) magical thinking
and grief do not simply coexist in bereaved children but magical thoughts
interact with grief-related feelings of guilt and control experiments, and
(b) today there is evidence that magical thinking does not end with entry
into adulthood but persists in many forms (Subbotsky, 2010; Vyse, 2014;
see above).
2.3.1.2 Joan Didion: The Year of Magical Thinking

Today, there is a substantial amount of literary grief accounts, in
which bereaved individuals write about their “struggles to accept, under-
stand, assimilate, overcome, manage, or cope with grief [and] the percep-
tions, messages, strategies, and activities used toward these purposes”
(Dennis, 2008; p. 802). An outstanding and awarded autobiographic nar-
rative is Joan Didion’s The Year of Magical Thinking (2005) in which the
author writes about the twelve months after her husband John Gregory
Dunne suddenly died at dinner, the illness of her daughter Quintana, her
turning towards personal accounts of grief and professional literature, and
her manifold experiences of intense grief (Brennan & Dash, 2008). One
aspect of that experience was that she noticed herself thinking magically.
She writes: “I was incapable of thinking rationally. I was thinking as
small children think, as if my thoughts or wishes had the power to reverse
the narrative, change the outcome” (Didion, 2005; p. 35). She acknowl-
edges: “‘Bringing him back’ had been through these months my hidden
focus, a magic trick. By late summer I was beginning to see this clearly.
‘Seeing it clearly’ did not yet allow me to give away the clothes he would
need” (p. 44).
The Year of Magical Thinking became an international bestseller
and award winner. It was referred to in marketing management in view of
how objects are treated in bereavement (O’Donohoe & Turley, 2012) as
well as in law where its contents were compared to thinking in victims of
fraud (Barnard, 2013). Up to today, however, it prompted no foundational
research in the psychology of grief and bereavement.
2.3.1.3 Stress theory of magical thinking

While the mere encounter with death is potentially a major
stressor (Vail et al., 2010), the death of a loved one is rated as one of the
most important negative life events (Bratt, Strenström & Rennemark,
2018). Bereavement is regarded as a stressful life event (Horowitz et al.,
1997), which is especially true when death was experienced as traumatic
(Wagner & Maercker, 2010). The death of a close one ruptures a yawning
gap in the texture of everyday life and not alone grief is experienced as
distressing and aversive, although normal, there often are many second-
ary stressors like changing circumstances of life, stigmatization, loneli-
ness, negative health outcomes, and so forth (Parkes & Prigerson, 2010).
On the other hand, it is a well replicated finding that magical think-
ing occurs more likely in stressful situations (Keinan, 2002), in situations
with high uncertainty (Subbotsky, 2010), and when levels of perceived
control are low (Whitson & Gallinsky, 2008). Malinowski (1948), for
example, observed more magical thinking in Trobriand fishers who put
out to open sea than in those who fished in sheltered lagoons. Very simi-
lar event-related magical thinking was found in cosmonauts (Weibel &

Swanson, 2006) and sportsmen (Vyse, 2014). Another field-study stems
from Keinan (1994) who compared Israeli citizens that, during the Gulf
War, resided in areas exposed to missile attacks (high-stress condition)
versus those residing in areas that were not exposed to such attacks (low-
stress condition). Again, it was shown that psychological stress promotes
magical thinking (although moderated by personal tolerance of ambigui-
ty; Keinan, 1994). From an evolutionary perspective, the occurrence of
magical thinking in situations in that individuals are confronted with a
lack of control, was described as adaptive as it modifies levels of anxiety
(Markle, 2010). From that perspective, it seems reasonable to assume a
higher occurrence of magical thinking in bereaved versus non-bereaved
individuals.
2.3.1.4 Experiences and narratives

There are several experiences that are usually specific for be-
reavement, like facing a corpse, and confrontation with funeral services,
customs, and rituals. Chan et al. (2005) noted that bereaved Chinese tend
to interpret the facial expression of the deceased at the moment of death.
For example, if the mouth stands open, a frequent interpretation is that
the deceased has words unsaid, or if the eyes are not completely closed
the person was unwilling to leave the world. Those interpretations may
give rise to feelings of guilt or fear of a restless dead (Chan et al., 2005).
Although in Western culture morticians do their best to make the de-
ceased look as if asleep, it seems plausible that the attribution of emotions
to the corpse has an effect on certain aspects of grief (Eyetsemitan &
Eggleston, 2002). Likewise, it seems plausible that funerary rituals (e.g.
committal rites) that contain a variety of symbols (Hoy, 2013) are taken
for real in some individuals, that is, to have magical effects.
Further bereavement-specific experiences encompass the sensa-
tion of the deceased’s presence (Parkes & Prigerson, 2010; Rees, 2001),
encounters with the deceased in dreams and nightmares, and post-

bereavement hallucinatory experiences (Castelnovo et al., 2015; Rees,
1971). It is unclear whether these experiences activate broader semantic
networks of folkloric narratives of restless dead, ghosts, and revenants
(Lecouteux, 2001). In any case, in a 2001 Gallup poll, 38 % indicated the
belief in ghosts and 42 % believed in haunted houses (Newport &
Strausberg, 2001). Since in general, the belief in manifestations of the
dead is thus quite common, it can be hypothesized that they are common
in those bereaved that experience appearances as mentioned above too.
Again, the occurrence of magical thinking to influence those events
seems reasonable.
2.3.1.5 Elusion from an ontological dilemma

The psychologist Martin Lunghi provided one of the most com-
prehensive rationales for magical thinking in bereaved individuals. In his
paper Ontology and magic: A conceptual exploration of denial following
bereavement (Lunghi, 2006) he described the transition from existence to
non-existence as an ontological dilemma. According to him, there are
cognitive and linguistic structures that make this transition so challeng-
ing. Cognitive factors include expectancies, learned rules of object per-
manence, assumptive worlds, and the problem of a cognitive representa-
tion of nothing or nonexistence – they all are based on the principle of
continuity that, according to Lunghi, is defended by resort to magical
thinking. Linguistic factors operate to the extent that concepts like ‘iden-
tity’ or ‘person’ suggest persistence after death, which again is tried to
uphold by magical thinking. However, the author provides no definition
of magical thinking in grieving individuals and offers very few concrete
examples. A supplied rating scale includes items like “Have you some-
times imagined that you see the lost person, perhaps in a crowd or out of
the corner of your eye?” or “How often has the lost person appeared in
your dreams?”. It is, however, claimed that the scale measures ontologi-
cal uncertainty instead of magical thinking. A clear definition of magical

thinking in (severe) grief is therefore still lacking.
2.3.2 Detailed research questions and aims

Grief is a natural reaction to bereavement that can exacerbate into
a condition of pathological significance. There were many efforts to dis-
sect the phenomenology of severe grief symptoms to create reliable and
valid diagnostic criteria, but a comprehensive understanding of grief pro-
cesses is pending. The current study focuses on one specific cognitive
aspect in maladjusted grief reactions: magical thinking, its occurrence,
and its role in adjustment.
Apart from isolated references to the occurrence of magical
thinking in bereaved individuals in scientific literature, there is no con-
siderable research about that issue. The current study is innovative in that
it asks two crucial questions: (1) First, is magical thinking a recurrent
component in severe grief? To set the stage, logical arguments were pro-
vided why it should be associated with grief (particularly, the stress theo-
ry of magical thinking, the elusion from an ontological dilemma, and
magical thoughts in grieving children). To strengthen that argument, it
will be questioned which role magical thinking could have played in the
emergence of burial practices in the Paleolithic period. At the same time,
the construct of magical thinking needs to be specified in a psychological
definition that clearly demarcates it from nearby concepts like paranor-
mal, superstitious, or religious beliefs.
Second, the question must be raised whether magical thinking in
severe grief can further be differentiated: (2) Are there themes (categories
of manifest variables) in magical thinking related to the deceased? Joan
Didion, for instance, offers in her autobiographic grief account The Year
of Magical Thinking (2005) several examples for her magical thinking
that can be clustered according to contents and intentions. In order to
provide a tentative understanding of the role of (different themes of) mag-
ical thinking in severe grief processes, a link of magical thought content

with the ideations of the anthropological concept of rites of passage will
be suggested. The exemplary re-interpretation of records in the archaeol-
ogy of death and burial in the light of a theory of magical thinking shall
further prove its plausibility.
The present study is preliminary in that it aims to prepare future
clinical studies in pathological grief conditions. It therefore draws on
early feedback from longstanding clinical practitioners including their
first associations and appraisal of relevance regarding the present objec-
tives. In narrative reports, experts will be asked how they would integrate
the subject under study in existing theories of grief processes. So, the
elaborated theory will be enriched with tentative explanatory elements.
“A theory states relationships between abstract concepts and may aim for
either explanation or understanding” (Thornberg & Charmaz, 2012, p.
41). In that sense, in the end, this study provides a bereavement specific
theory of magical thinking designed in the context of interdisciplinary
considerations and grounded in clinical practice.
In the current study, severe grief is an umbrella term for all forms
of grief that are relevant in health system. Thus, it is pragmatically de-
fined as the condition in every grieving individual that is met by a profes-
sional with profound training in psychology or psychotherapy (see be-
low).
3 Methods
This chapter reports on the way the study was conducted. It starts
with describing the general methodological framework and subsequently
details the used proceedings in data acquisition and analysis in the expert
study and the narrative reviews and additional materials. The use of these
methods is described in terms of triangulation of results.
3.1 Methodological Framework

First, an overview of the study’s qualitative research approach
will be provided. As multiple methods in a complex progress were em-
ployed, their composition and interplay in the present study will be out-
lined.
3.1.1 Overarching strategy

Grounded Theory Methodology is used as an overarching strate-
gy as with the research questions a new field of inquiry is entered and a
theoretical framework is required to enable future, more systematic re-
search (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Mey & Mruck, 2010). The four most
important features of Grounded Theory are (a) working towards a theory
based on/ grounded in data; (b) simultaneous data acquisition and analy-
sis and conceptual work; (c) constant comparison work based on theoreti-
cal sampling; and (d) memo-writing to develop new ideas and to protocol
the journey of the research process (Charmaz, 2014; Corbin & Strauss,
2008).

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25002-7_3
50 3 Methods
3.1.2 Specific approach

Qualitative research and especially grounded theory are often de-
scribed as a journey (Bansal & Corley, 2012; Charmaz, 2014) and the
same is true for the present study. At the beginning, a terra incognita lay
in front and the scope of research was not clearly defined yet. When initi-
ating the project, it was clear that the concept of magical thinking has so
far been ill-defined and poorly demarcated from other concepts like su-
perstition, paranormal beliefs, exceptional experiences, or supernatural
and religious beliefs. Therefore, a review of literature on magical think-
ing from different perspectives (including developmental psychology,
cognitive sciences, parapsychology, etc.) was conducted. Methodically,
this approach follows Thornberg’s (2012) Informed Grounded Theory,
which is based on Constructivist Grounded Theory approaches (e.g.
Charmaz, 2014) and recognizes “the advantage of using pre-existing the-
ories and research findings in the substantive field in a sensitive, creative
and flexible way instead of seeing them as obstacles and threats [as in
classic Grounded Theory]” (Thornberg, 2012, p. 249).
At the same time, it was started to interview clinical professionals
in an expert study. Objectives in this early phase were: (a) Is magical
thinking a recurrent component in severe grief reactions (first research
question); basically, is there magical thinking in severe grief after all? (b)
Which understanding of magical thinking can be premised in ordinary
clinical practice? What are the first thoughts and reactions to our objec-
tive? What do experts think about theoretical links, structures and mecha-
nisms regarding severe grief and magical thinking? and (c) Meta-skills:
Gaining experiences in intensive interview and interviewing experts and
professionals.
Technically, the primary study design contained a written ques-
tion-catalogue to complete in an electronic format. This proceeding, how-
ever, was discarded in a very early phase following negative feedback
regarding the form and amount of work for participants. After revision,
3.1 Methodological Framework 51
unstructured interviews were conducted in a face-to-face setting. Ques-

tions from the catalogue were employed in these interviews.
It was not before the first interviews, however, that a working
definition of magical thinking was created that was supplied with data
from literature review and data from the expert study after constantly
analyzing and comparing both. Retrospectively, these indicatory inter-
views are referred to as pretest phase. Proceedings in recruitment and
conducting the interviews are described in more detail below.
For theoretical reasoning, a focus was laid on evolutionary ori-
gins of grief and magical thinking, respectively. Methodically, a literature
review on the origins of mortuary practice and burial customs in prehisto-
ry and early history was conducted, constantly comparing the findings
with data from the review on magical thinking and data from the expert
study. By that, archaeological records were re-interpreted in the light of
magical thinking (see below) and themes of presumed magical thinking
were distilled.
Meanwhile, the questions in the ongoing expert interviews (for-
mal phase) were differentiated, and the focus was laid on the second re-
search question: Are there different facets (categories of manifest varia-
bles) in bereavement-related magical thinking? In addition, it was intend-
ed to confirm or adapt (rephrase) emerging categories, to add new or
reject existing categories (working towards categories with theoretical
centrality and adequacy: Charmaz, 2014), to collect and catalogue exam-
ples for each category (saturation of categories), and to gain additional
knowledge regarding general contexts and specific conditions (theoretical
coding; Glaser, 1998). Figure 1 summarizes the anatomy of the study.
3.1.3 Qualitative methodology in bereavement research

The use of qualitative methods is quite common in bereavement
research and methodological pluralism is supported (Silverman & Klass,
52
Expert Interviews
Narrative review I: Magical Thinking
trained psychologists, psychiatrists,
psychotherapists with clinical experi-
ences and specialization
Pratictioners in grief counseling or rel- Narrative review II: The long-term
evant neighboring disciplines perspective of magical thinking and
consultation on their understanding of
Categorization (or cataloging) of magical thought con-

tent and behavior in (severe) grief
Creating an interdisciplinary and bereavement-specific definition of magical thinking in severe grief
Figure 1: The Anatomy of the Study

3 Methods
3.2 Expert Study 53
1996; Neimeyer & Hogan, 2001). There is broad agreement that grief and
severe forms of it are idiosyncratic experiences (e.g. Rando, 2013) and a
phenomenon that is at least partly a social construct (e.g. Neimeyer, Klass
& Dennis, 2014). The latter is mirrored in a variety of qualitative, cross-
cultural studies (e.g. Parkes, Laungani & Young, 2015) and historical
comparisons (e.g. Rosenblatt, 1983). Landmark works in the field and
neighboring disciplines like Kübler- Ross’ (1969) On Death and Dying
follow qualitative methodology. In fact, Grounded Theory Methodology
itself evolved in the field of thanatology (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
3.2 Expert Study

To distinguish different phases in the continuous grounded theory
progress may be an attempt to square the circle. Nevertheless, the pro-
gress in the expert study is here reported by means of a pretest and a for-
mal phase. Both phases varied in their main objectives, starting points,
modes of interview, and sampling strategies. Before going into these
phases in detail, the rationale for conducting an expert study and our gen-
eral proceedings are described.
3.2.1 Rationale for expert interviews

There are several reasons why an expert study would fit specific
content aspects and the state of research in this area. First, experts can be
regarded as multiplicators or focal points (Bogner & Menz, 2005) in their
respective area of expertise. Searching for a construct definition and its
facets requires relevant examples and case studies on which it is based or
in which it is grounded. In interviewing clinical experts, there lies the
opportunity ‘to speak with many persons at a time’. While asking one
person with magical thinking might ‘ideally’ yield diverse examples from
one subject and one context, asking a practitioner might yield one exam-
ple from diverse subjects and contexts, showing the diversification of the
phenomenon. Second, there are many advantages of a theory grounded in
54 3 Methods
practice (including early feedback about clinical relevance of theory):

The usefulness and applicability of a new theory (or at least a new con-
struct definition) is an important desirable outcome of a grounded theory
research. Thus, on the one hand, the present study asks if magical think-
ing is a recurrent component in severe grief and aims toward designing its
definition with the aid of concrete examples from clinical practice rather
than logically deduced hypotheses. On the other hand clinical relevance
of the research will be investigated. It might be possible, that magical
thinking is a frequent companion of grief (statistical significance) but has
no implications for its course, prognosis or therapy (clinical relevance).
Third, two major limitations of self-reports must be recalled: (a) There
may be explicit and implicit magical thinking, that is, those affected may
sometimes not be aware of it but nevertheless show magical behavior that
can be recognized by trained professionals. Also, magical thinking is an
ill-defined construct that’s extensional definition may be broader than
lay-persons are aware of. (b) Due to the conceptional closeness of the
construct Magical Thinking to concepts like superstitious behavior or
religious faith (previous knowledge/sensitizing concept), it was assumed
that information about one’s magical thinking must be regarded as sensi-
ble data. An existing therapeutic relationship may help affected people to
disclose the questioned information. Our participants later confirmed this
assumption. Fourth and last, there are practical reasons to enter a new
area of research by consulting experts (Bogner & Menz, 2005). As i)
outcomes are unclear, ii) expansive groundwork due to the confusing
existing literature must be accomplished, and iii) the present study is
realized as a master thesis, the efforts associated with interviewing pa-
tients seem disproportionate. Instead, this thesis can be understood as
preliminary work that emphasizes the necessity to conduct further re-
search in the field.
3.2 Expert Study 55
3.2.2 Proceedings in recruitment

Potential participants were recruited between September 2017
and April 2018. In the following, it will be outlined how and according to
which rationales participants were recruited and selected.
3.2.2.1 Inclusion criteria

According to the present working definition, severe grief is de-
fined as an aversive condition with bereavement-related suffering that
leads affected individuals to search for professional help. According to
three self-defined criteria, providers of such help were considered as eli-
gible experts for study participation if they have training in psychology,
psychotherapy or psychiatry and clinical experience (Criterion A). They
should specify their treatment focus in grief and bereavement or in an
ICD-10 F3 or F4 diagnosis or must work in a section that does so (Crite-
rion B). And finally, professionals working according to the German
Non-Medical Practitioners Act (German: Heilpraktikergesetz) and per-
sons occupationally engaged in grief counseling (e.g. grief counselors,
social workers, undertakers) could be included in study (Criterion C) but
answers from this population were later discussed in the light of uncertain
grief severity. Participants must be German-speaking.
3.2.2.2 Search for potential participants

There were four ways potential participants were found: (a) Gen-
eral internet search: About half of the potential participants were ‘discov-
ered’ online and taken into consideration according to the theoretical
sampling of the respective phase (see below). Search engines (Google,
Bing) were employed with German search terms like 1) [psychologe OR
psychotherapeut OR psychiater] AND [trauer OR verlust], 2) [psychologe
OR psychotheurapeut OR psychiater] AND [trauerbegleitung], 3) trauer
AND therapie. In addition, register of professional associations (e.g.
Föderation der Schweizer Psychologinnen und Psychologen, FSP;
56 3 Methods
Berufsverband Trauerbegleitung e.V.) were screened for associates meet-

ing our inclusion criteria. In a second step, homepages of potential partic-
ipants were consulted to assess the candidates experience with grief-
related themes. (b) Namable exponents in the field: Many potential par-
ticipants were ‘discovered’ through their published books or (online)
articles designating them as experts either in research or practice or both.
The same applies to founders and members of relevant organizations,
public institutions, associations, etc. (c) Personal contact: One person was
recruited from personal environment, providing important feedback in an
early phase of the study. (d) References and snowball sampling: Some
contacted experts commended further potential participants for our study
that subsequently were considered.
3.2.2.3 Theoretical sampling

Theoretical sampling aims to fill out emerging and intriguing cat-
egories while still being open for new aspects or major revisions (Char-
maz, 2014). Therefore, to ascertain the emerging categories, experts in
relevant specialties (e.g. after-death-communication, or grief therapy) or
representatives from other disciplines (e.g. theology) were sought to cov-
er interdisciplinary aspects (e.g. magical thinking and religiosity). In the
beginning, theoretical sampling manifested itself as searching for ‘repre-
sentative’, non-specialized practitioners from whom we gained an under-
standing of foreknowledge of magical thinking among clinical profes-
sionals. The inclusion of a trained philosopher and psychiatrist, however,
was especially valuable to understand the premises we tacitly assumed
when approaching the subject.
3.2.2.4 Establishing and maintaining contact to study participants

Potential participants were contacted via email and requested to
partake the study. Along with the email, they received the personalized
(filled-in name) study invitation and an attached information sheet. In
pretest, it was tried to formulate all information as vaguely as possible to
3.2 Expert Study 57
prevent biasing the results in any direction (see appendix A). Later, in
formal phase, parts of this invitation were revised. Modifications related
to concrete aims of the interviews (i.e. less discussion about understand-
ing and global definition of magical thinking, more focus on systematiza-
tion and examples in severe grief), and to realization of the consultation
(preparation, long-distance interview by phone or Skype) (see document
B in appendix). Eventual questions and/or initial skepticisms were clari-
fied in subsequent mail correspondence.
To arrange the interviews, participants were asked to propose a
time. For the pretest interviews, a face-to-face meeting was envisaged, in
formal phase a phone conversation was appointed. From our side, inter-
views were non-expiring, but 60 minutes were set as a tacit guideline to
not run off the track too often.
After completing the interviews, the contacts to study participants
were seldom and mostly restricted on expressions of thank. After the first
interviews, however, it was necessary to seek demographic information
retrospectively.
3.2.2.5 Overview of participants

A total of seven experts contributed to the present study. At the
time of interview, they had on average 27 years of professional experi-
ence. Two experts fulfilled the inclusion criteria A and B in that they are
trained psychologists, psychiatrists or psychotherapists and specify their
specialization as being the treatment of grief. Three experts fulfilled the
criterion A, one of them being additionally a philosopher, another was
also trained as an undertaker. The last two experts were included due to
the criterion C as they stem from other occupational backgrounds and are
highly engaged in grief-related topics. Apart from the fulfillment of in-
clusion criteria, all participants were selected for theoretical reasons (see
above: theoretical sampling). All participants are practicing in Switzer-
58 3 Methods
land or Germany. Table 1 shows further characteristics of experts in the

study in order of their participation.
3.2.3 Conducting the interviews

Every interview was individually prepared in advance. Most ex-
perts contacted for the study are renowned specialists for a distinct issue-
Table 1
Overview of Study Participants
Sex Occupation Approbation/ Professional Native Practicing

Specialization experience language in
m psychiatrist, Psychoanalytical 32 years Swiss Switzerland
philosopher therapy German
m psychiatrist Psychoanalytical 38 years Swiss Switzerland

therapy German
f psychotherapist Psychoanalytical 10 years German Switzerland

therapy
f psychotherapist Cognitive behav- 37 years German Germany

ioral therapy
m theologist Grief counseling, 30 years German Germany

funeral ceremo-
nies, natural burial
f non-medical Cognitive behav- 25 years German Germany

practitioner ioral therapy
(psychotherapy)
f psychologist Palliative care 20 years German Germany

(earlier: under-
taker)
3.2 Expert Study 59
area, founded organizations, published books or (online) articles, are

known from their public presence, etc. Most of them maintain their own
homepage. Before every interview, as many accessible resources as pos-
sible were consulted to gain an understanding of the main themes partici-
pants are engaged in, and to learn their background and ‘language’.
In many cases there was no time pressure during the interview
and the amount of time was regarded as sufficient by both sides. Partici-
pation was in every case fully deliberate and there were no material or
financial incentives. All interviews were recorded for subsequent tran-
scription.
3.2.3.1 Questions for qualitative interviews

The initial plan, to conduct a paper-and-pencil interview yielded
a catalogue of nine questions (see document C in appendix). Participants
could fill in their responses in that file and found respective instructions
in the document. Due to negative feedback, this proceeding and with it
the original question catalogue was discarded (see above).
After pretest, a first set of leading questions was derived from the
emerging tentative theoretical categories yielding ten questions and five
additions (see document D in appendix). Exemplary questions included:
“Do you have examples for bereaved individuals with the thought of be-
ing able to bring the deceased person back to life?” (question I), or “In
which manner did your bereaved patients attempt to influence the de-
ceased person after death?” (question IV). Each question encompassed
several further questions that were intended to specify and to facilitate
recollection. In case of question I, for example, they asked: “What has to
be done (in order to bring the deceased person back to life)?”, “Whom
can be approached to this end?”, and “What has to be omitted in order to
bring the deceased back?”. Those questions were collected in a docu-
ment that also provided a working definition of magical thinking. Partici-
60 3 Methods
pants received the document after scheduling the interview and for view-
ing and preparation purposes only.
3.2.3.2 Pretest
In pretest phase, interviews were realized as face-to-face meet-
ings in the facilities of the participants. Most questions were derived
from/based on the initial and discarded question-catalogue but were de-
ployed uncommittedly regarding sequence and wording. Sometimes,
instead of direct questions, theoretical inputs were contributed by the
interviewer to confront participants with past considerations (cross-
validation). Intensive interviewing delivers very rich and dense data
(Charmaz, 2014).
3.2.3.3 Formal phase

Later, in formal phase, the interviews were conducted as long-
distance consultations via phone or skype. According to Media Richness
Theory, face-to-face communication, videoconference, and telephone are
the most efficient forms of communication and eligible for complex tasks
(Reichwald et al., 1998). From personal experience, tele-interviewing
was even more suitable for our purpose, since we were not interested in
emotional or non-verbal aspects of communication, self-display, or envi-
ronmental variables, these factors would only distract from our complex
research questions. On the contrary, notes were easier to take, and memos
were easier to look up allowing constant comparisons already during the
interview.
Interviews in formal phase were aimed to advance and differenti-
ate inputs from pretest phase while being open for new aspects. Since all
experts confirmed us in considering magical thinking to be likely in se-
vere grief and encouraged us to move on, there was a justification for our
further inquiry.
Because, in general, a tendency towards over-generalization of
the term magical thinking and a poor demarcation of nearby concepts
3.2 Expert Study 61
became obvious in pretest interviews, we provided a working definition

in subsequent interviews. That working definition was the product of
contents of the pretest interviews, a comprehensive review of literature,
and theoretical considerations. It was presented, however, in a simplified
form.
With that working definition in mind, all data were re-analyzed,
and a set of tentative categories was derived. These categories emerged
from different contents of deceased-related magical thinking (themes of
magical thinking) and do not include other components of nascent theory
in this stage (e.g. structural mechanisms, functions, or links between cat-
egories).
At the same time, questions about those tentative categories were
formulated (leading questions; see paragraph 3.2.3.1 and document D in
appendix). Invited experts that declared their interest to participate re-
ceived the leading questions in advance for optional preparation. In the
interviews, the questions served as a loose structure, which resulted,
however, in more structured discussions with more directive questions
than it was true for pretest interviews. Except from the first question, they
were in a random order.
3.2.4 Techniques in analysis

Interviews were conducted in German and subsequently translat-
ed into English for transcription. To avoid later misconceptions and mis-
translations and to convey and preserve the linguistic and non-verbal
context of a relevant phrase, the transcription was done immediately after
the interview. Although no linguistic analysis was necessary for the pur-
poses and not all passages were translated verbatim or were taken over at
all, this proceeding can be viewed as a form of initial word-by-word cod-
ing (Charmaz, 2014).
Apart from translation, initial coding was conducted according to
the incident-with-incident technique entitling larger units of data (Corbin
62 3 Methods
& Strauss, 2008). Subsequent focused coding raised recurrent or relevant

initial codes on a higher level of abstraction and showed the theoretical
direction. Notes were made to compare statements from within an inter-
view and between interviews, as well as interview data with data from the
literature reviews. They served to emphasize especially important passag-
es and to preserve spontaneous ideas and questions. Case examples men-
tioned by the experts were treated as theoretical codes, since they specify
and support emergent categories (conceptual elements of theory).
Beyond initial coding, comparing data with data (see above), and
focused coding, writing of extensive memos (informal analytic notes),
constant theoretical sorting, diagramming and integrating of emerging
categories was carried out.
3.2.5 Saturation
The general aim of saturation in grounded theory is to saturate
categories, not data (Charmaz, 2014). In the present study, this goal was
followed by adapting the interview questions and theoretical sampling to
former results. According to Charmaz (2014), categories are saturated
when established properties account for patterns in data, no new proper-
ties are found, the relationship between categories is investigated, and the
range of variation within and between categories is clear (p. 213). It is
debatable, however, if this goal ever can be reached with Grounded Theo-
ry as inquiries can branch on and on along with new data (Charmaz,
2014). Instead, we contend with Dey (1999) when he replaces the term
saturation with theoretical sufficiency and the phrase categories saturated
by data with the notion of categories suggested by data. This language
use leaves open when research ends and focuses on the cogency of theory
as a product of the current research project.
3.3 Narrative Reviews and Additional Materials

A narrative literature review provides “in a relatively unstruc-
tured manner […] a narrative analysis of important developments on a
3.3 Narrative Reviews and Additional Materials 63
specific topic, and highlights important points […]. It aims at organizing

a topic and at pinpointing the state of the art” (Kühberger et al., 2016, p.
145). For the present study, one narrative review for magical thinking and
one for the prehistoric origins of burial practices was conducted respec-
tively. Here, it is reported at first how pertinent literature was selected
and ordered, before its analysis, interpretation, and integration into the
data from the clinical expert study is described. In practice, however,
these tasks were conducted simultaneously according to the grounded
theory methodology.
Apart from the expert study, further materials were examined for
expressions of magical thinking in grieving individuals. With that, it was
aimed to enrich the emerging themes of bereavement-related magical
thinking and to accumulate examples to saturate categories (Charmaz,
2014). In analysis, however, those findings were treated separately as
described below.
3.3.1 Narrative review: Magical Thinking

The literature review on magical thinking was started by consid-
ering classical papers from developmental psychology and psychopatho-
logical descriptions of mental disorders in that magical thinking is com-
monly found, like schizotypal personality disorder. Soon, it became obvi-
ous that definitions of magical thinking are inconsistent and show over-
laps with nearby concepts like superstitions, paranormal beliefs, and su-
pernatural and religious concepts. We therefore extended our objective
and used respective searching terms. Constant comparisons between find-
ings in the literature review, data from the expert interviews, and previous
knowledge of the author led to an emphasis on cognitive factors of magi-
cal thinking (e.g. belief vs. half-belief; intrusive thoughts) rather than on
specific contents. Over time, we increasingly considered novel approach-
es to the understanding of religious and PSMS beliefs (paranormal, su-
perstitious, magical, and supernatural; Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012) that
64 3 Methods
define them as category errors confusing core knowledge from different

cognitive domains. With that approach, we were able to link findings
from the literature review on magical thinking with those from the review
on evolutionary aspects of magical thinking and human burial.
3.3.2 Narrative review: prehistoric origins

A second literature review was conducted on the question about
the origins of human burial and the eventual role of magical thinking in
that process. There were, however, no references to magical thinking in
pertinent literature. Since we were interested in the global scheme of
evolving burial practices rather than in detailed remarks on specific ar-
chaeological sites, we searched literature that integrates records and fo-
cuses on overall concepts. We compared those outlines with state-of-the-
art papers from the evolutionary psychology of religion that focus on
cognitive aspects. For further analytic and interpretative work we drew on
selected examples of early mortuary practices and explicatory theories
from anthropology previously known to the author.
All results from both narrative reviews are summarized in the
chapter on theoretical background in the present study. Interpreted find-
ings are integrated into theory in the results section.
3.3.3 Further materials

In our search for expressions of magical thinking in grieving in-
dividuals we followed Glaser’s (1998) dictum “all is data”, meaning that
everything relevant that is happening in reference to the research subject
is considered – independent from what source. Nevertheless, it is possible
to define two types of sources we drew additional material from. This
approach further supports the triangulation of data, which is a quality
criterion in qualitative research (Flick, 2017).
3.4 Analysis and integration of results 65
3.3.3.1 Online material

For bereaved people, the internet offers new opportunities to deal
with grief. Irwin (2015) spoke from ‘Mourning 2.0’. Grieving individuals
can write about their grief in personal blogs, can receive informational
support on platforms (Sofka, Cupit & Gilbert, 2012), can gain emotional
validation from specialized communities (Hartig & Viola, 2016), or can
create web memorials for their loved ones (Bell, Bailey & Kennedy,
2015). In addition, people use open communities like Facebook to com-
municate with the deceased (Irwin, 2015). We unsystematically searched
for statements in such sources that met our emerging working definition
of magical thinking. While there is no certainty about the nature of such
statements, they support our goal to collect possible examples in order to
formulate more targeted questions.
3.3.3.2 Literary accounts

Magical thinking is a recurrent term in Joan Didion’s (2005)
bestselling book The Year of Magical Thinking that deals with her reac-
tions to the sudden death of her husband and the contemporary severe
illness of their daughter. In that book, Didion offers several examples of
magical thinking related to the deceased that she herself discerns as such.
Such examples were collected and used for analysis. There are further
grief accounts forming a ‘bereavement genre’ in literature (Dennis, 2008)
that were, however, not examined for the present study.
3.4 Analysis and integration of results

In reviewing the literature on magical thinking and related con-
cepts, we constantly worked towards a generic definition of magical
thinking. Methodically, an emphasis was laid on the demarcation from
other constructs like paranormal beliefs or religious concepts. The neces-
sity to do so was apparent after the first interviews in which we did not
provide a working definition and noticed a very broad use of the term
66 3 Methods
‘magical’ (extensional definitions). At the same time, we paid attention to

include notions of definitional criteria of magical thinking (intensional
definitions) that were mentioned in the first interviews by the partici-
pants. The emerging working definition was steadily applied to descrip-
tions that seemed to resemble magical thinking and constantly optimized.
It is an important core element in our conclusive theory of magical think-
ing in severe grief.
The interpretation of archaeological records like prehistoric buri-
als can be compared to reading a text in that every interpretation relies on
the subjective background and experiences of the reader (Hodder & Hut-
son, 2003). It can therefore be used to assess the plausibility of the theory
that underlies interpretation rather than claiming to fully explain a past
reality. We did that by interpreting the paleolithic origins of burial in the
light of cognitive evolution of humans and magical thinking.
In ascertaining recurrent themes of magical thinking in bereaved
individuals, we relied primary on data from the expert interviews. Addi-
tionally, gathered data (e.g. from online materials) further influenced our
emerging categories. However, there were methodical problems since we
have no information of severity of grief (or recourse to professional help)
and we are often not able to distinguish magical thinking from phenome-
nological similar thoughts like symbolic thinking. We nevertheless in-
cluded them, since a) today there is no reason why some facets should
occur only in ‘normal’ grief and others not, and b) even if this would be
case, it seems reasonable to rather include them as items in future interro-
gations than to miss an important phenomenon that affects some people
with severe grief after all.
It is, however, not legitimate to include examples from data other
than from expert study in theoretical considerations about the role of
magical thinking in severe grief. For this reason, all statements with ex-
planatory character are derived from expert interviews only.
4 Results
This chapter starts reporting the study results by summarizing
overall feedback from participants in the expert study. It then clarifies the
framework conditions of magical thinking by providing a working defini-
tion that is embedded in interdisciplinary considerations. Substantial be-
reavement-specific themes of magical thinking are listed afterwards,
comprising many concrete examples mentioned by (clinical) experts or
found in written accounts of bereaved individuals. With a focus on its
role in severe grief, a novel theory of bereavement-specific magical
thinking is presented in the concluding paragraph.
4.1 Echoes from Practitioners

As the present study aimed to ground theory in clinical practice,
reactions to its innovative questioning may tell about its relevance as well
as any difficulties. The overall response rate to study invitation was 82 %,
that is nine out of 11 contacted experts responded per email (update 19th
Mar. 2018). Two potential participants dropped out after registered inter-
est, given consent and/or received leading questions. Reasons for this
drop out are not known. Seven of the contacted experts completed the
interview.
Nearly all responders expressed explicitly their interest in the re-
search questions or regarded the topic as “very exciting”. Many stated
that they felt inspired by the study documents to reflect the issue more in-
depth. During written contact, some wrote rather expansive mails with
their early thoughts. Moreover, interest was reflected in additional efforts
like conducting the interview in the evenings, discussing (or formulating

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25002-7_4
68 4 Results
the intention to do so) the topic with colleagues, and commending further
potential participants from one’s address list. Many expressed their wish
to prepare the interview, which is a common feature of expert interviews
(Charmaz, 2014).
Several contacted experts, however, expressed their doubts
whether to be the appropriate person of reference. This was not only the
case in pretest when specialization in grief-related areas was no necessary
condition in theoretical sampling but even in the light of being a special-
ist for grief therapy. This could be interpreted as that either inappropriate
candidates were selected or that the phenomenon of magical thinking in
grief reactions is rarely seen by therapists. From a theoretical perspective,
there is much evidence for the latter.
When it comes to previous knowledge, most experts appeared to
be widely unaware of magical thinking in (severe) grief before this study
made them realize it. There were two exceptions: One associated magical
thinking in grieving children, the other mentioned Joan Didion’s The
Year of Magical Thinking. From the beginning, participants in the expert
study gave our research a raison d’être and encouraged us to move on
with our research questions
4.2 Theoretical Cornerstones

In this paragraph, the results after conducting the literature re-
views are described. A working definition of magical thinking in general
is provided and those definitional elements that seem to be most central
when the phenomenon of magical thinking occurs in bereavement are
stressed. A novel interpretation of the paleolithic development of human
burial in the light of the so-defined construct is presented, arguing that
magical thinking was a mediator between the emerging cognitive ability
to think of the corpse as carrier of life and more elaborated funerary prac-
tices as a result of magical thinking. Although it is quite impossible to
reconstruct past thought content, this argumentation might be a starting
4.2 Theoretical Cornerstones 69
point for reflecting on possible themes of prehistorical and early historic

(presumed) magical thinking.
4.2.1 What Magical Thinking is and what it is not

The following global definition of magical thinking incorporates
all conceptual elements found to be crucial when applying existing defi-
nitions in the context of bereavement. This does not imply, however, that
this working definition defines magical thinking in general sufficiently.
Its specificity and sensitivity in other contexts would have to be deter-
mined. In addition, the definition contains elements that are not observa-
ble, which means, that its application to describe phenomena in non-
Western societies may be limited.
Starting point for the working definition the present thesis relies
on was the definition of “active magical thinking” in Markle (2010, p. 19)
who referred to Lindeman and Aarnio (2007) and applied that definition
in an evolutionary framework. In line with the results from a comprehen-
sive literature review (which are presented afterwards), however, this
definition was modified and supplemented for the present study. It now
reads as follows: Magical Thinking is the cognitive- emotional precursor
for the belief or half-belief that the power of one’s thoughts, words, or
actions will produce an outcome perceptible by the senses, which defies
the otherwise known laws of cause and effect within a specific domain of
knowledge. In the way we use the term magical thinking, it refers to a
mode of cognitive processing rather than being a pejorative label for cog-
nitive shortcomings (see Rosengren & French, 2013).
Compared to other definitions in literature, this definition con-
ceives the construct rather narrowly in that it demarcates magical think-
ing from magical beliefs (structural dimension), mere ontological as-
sumptions (performative dimension), everyday-reasoning and symbolical
thinking (affective dimension), a lack of knowledge and delusions (epis-
temological dimension), and irrational thinking as well as from commu-
70 4 Results
nication with the deceased (contentual dimension). Therefore the histori-

cal rationalist, symbolic, pragmatic, and emotionalist approaches to mag-
ical thinking (Sørensen, 2007) are taken into account and integrated.
4.2.1.1 Structural dimension

From a structural perspective, it is fundamental to keep psycho-
logical phenomena like magical thinking and magical beliefs separate
from each other. Here it is argued that much of the problems with exist-
ing definitions result from a lack of linguistic and conceptual poignancy
regarding the intrapsychic structures of magical thinking. Magical think-
ing and beliefs cannot be the same as thinking is a mode of cognitive
processing that generates thoughts (noesis in Husserl’s phenomenology),
but evidently not every thought is a belief (noema; Husserl, 1913). Be-
sides, more recent definitions of beliefs entail not only a cognitive but
also an affective and potential behavioral component.
To clarify the cognitive structures of magical thinking versus be-
liefs, one can draw on the revised corrective dual-process model proposed
by Risen (2016). In general, dual-process models postulate the existence
of two information processing systems: System 1 that generates rapid,
associative and automatic inferences, and System 2 that performs in a
deliberate and effortful manner (Gilbert, 1999; Evans & Stanovich,
2013). There are different theories about how both systems work togeth-
er, one of them being the ‘corrective’ or ‘default-interventionist’ model,
which suggests System 1 to be the default generator of inferences “which
may or may not be corrected by System 2” (Risen, 2016, p. 185; Gilbert,
1999; Kahneman, 2011). Risen (2016) applied and enhanced that per-
spective for a better understanding of magical thinking. As she points out,
System 1 relies on heuristics and attribute substitution, causal intuitions,
and confirmation bias (concepts that were described in the second chap-
ter) and generates what she terms “magical intuitions”. Depending on the
ability and motivation to be rational as well as contextual cues, System 2
may engage and override respective correct the magical intuition or it
may not engage which results in endorsement of the magical intuition.

Risen (2016) points, however, to a third possibility that is especially rele-
vant in the context of magical intuitions: System 2 may engage – that is,
detect the error of System 1 magical intuitions – but may fail to correct.
Risen (2016) terms this ‘superstitious acquiescence’ and describes it as a
“partial belief – a belief that is supported by System 1, but not necessari-
ly endorsed by System 2” as opposed to quasi-beliefs “in which people
act superstitiously without holding the belief” (Risen, 2016, p. 193; italics
in original).
With regard to bereavement, the application of the concept ‘su-
perstitious acquiescence’ seems highly important. If System 1 generates
an inference that suggests a way to gain the deceased back and System 2
detects the erroneous reasoning, it seems plausible that a correction
would have higher psychological costs (e.g. distress through realization
of the irretrievability of the loss) than not correcting it.
In reference to this revised corrective dual-process model, termi-
nology can now be clarified and some supplements be made. First, the
point here is to restrict the term magical thinking on System 1 processing
in that model, implying that magical thinking is a process and not an out-
come that can be measured with questionnaires. In line with Sperber
(1990), however, it should be maintained, that magical thinking can also
be a reflective process, that is the deliberate reasoning about magical
efficacy. In both cases – the automatic generation of inferences and the
deliberate reasoning – magical thinking is a precursor for beliefs (System
2 endorses the intuition or conclusion generated by magical thinking by
not detecting an error), and superstitious acquiescence (System 2 detects
an error but does not correct it).
Second, further points can be made relating to these outcomes of
magical thinking. Beliefs, on the one hand, can be explicit (conscious to
the individual who holds them and measurable with self-reports) or im-
plicit (measurable with indirect tests). Additionally, they are hold with
72 4 Results
varying degrees of conviction warranting the term ‘half-belief’ for lower

degrees. According to the spatio-temporal cultural context, they may be
classified as religious, magical, folk beliefs or other. More recent theories
conceptualize a belief as comprising a cognitive, affective and potential
behavior component (Irwin, 2009). The latter two are addressed by our
performative and affective criteria (dimensions). Superstitious acquies-
cence, on the other hand, was described as a “partial belief” (Risen,
2016). Here, the term spontaneous ideation is proposed instead, because it
better captures the phenomenological character of such thoughts that is of
interest in the present study. Spontaneous ideation that results from magi-
cal thinking, then, has characteristics of intrusive thoughts that are com-
mon in general population (Allsopp & Williams, 1996; Clark & Rhyno,
2005). Since individuals often reject them, they may be described as ego-
dystonic.
Finally, the structural criterion can help demarcating nearby con-
cepts. It can be argued that the correction of System 1 intuitions by Sys-
tem 2 leads either to strict rejection (metacognitions that may repress
respective thoughts), labeling as imagination, or labeling as symbolic.
Regarding something as symbolic, then, would be the result of System 1
intuitions that are recognized and classified by System 2 as standing for a
referent.
4.2.1.2 Performative dimension

Ontological beliefs determine whether the existence of an entity
is regarded as true. Some authors declare the belief in deities, ghosts, or
demons as magical thinking (e.g. Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). The same
holds true for the belief in psychokinesis or telepathy, as well as the be-
lief in astrology – among others. Apart from the fatal equalization of
magical thinking and beliefs, it seems questionable, to merge ontological
beliefs with beliefs in special abilities and extremely complex and diverse
assumptions about how the world works. From a differential perspective,
it is questionable why speaking about PSMS (paranormal, superstitious,
magical, and supernatural; Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012) believers in-

stead of investigating the differences of, for instance, believers in astrolo-
gy versus believers in haunted houses to gain a more sophisticated under-
standing. Regarding the objectives of the present study, the result from
applying such a broad definition most likely would be a list of afterlife-
beliefs, reports about ghost encounters, and retrospective belief in premo-
nitions – nothing that is not already known.
Other authors include behavioral aspects in their definitions of
magic(al thinking) and superstitions. They emphasize the ritualistic
(Mauss, 1902/1972; Womack, 1992; Sørensen, 2007) and repetitive char-
acter (Jahoda, 1969; Vyse, 2014), the practical conditioning of respective
behavior (Skinner, 1948), and the teleological nature (Malinowski, 1948)
of performed magical acts. For the present context, there are two prob-
lems with such definitions. First, stereotype behavior and rituals can be
grounded on various reasons, including neuropsychological factors and
symbolic actions. Definitions based on behavioral aspects say little about
the demarcation from those phenomena. Second, according to the struc-
tural criterion detailed above, magical thinking does not have to result in
behavior but can occur as spontaneous ideation or (half) belief that is
hold but not executed.
Further definitions stress the causal element of magical thinking.
They can be classified as ‘active’ or ‘performative’ definitions in that
they postulate that – in magical thinking – there is an action, a certain
behavior, or happening (cause) that leads (magically) to an effect. Simi-
larly, Risen (2016) exemplified that she does not refer to “a general belief
in the existence of witches or angels” but to “the belief that a witch’s
curse can cause illness” (p. 183). Apart from ontological assumptions,
those definitions also demarcate fortuitous forms of divination (e.g.
omens, oneiromancy, apantomancy) from magical thinking (Stein &
Stein, 2011). Whereas those transformative and manipulative (Sørensen,
2007) definitions come closest to our understanding of magical thinking,
74 4 Results
they miss an important point that we explicitly refer to with our per-
formative criterion: the psychological function.
Many authors stress that magical thinking is most likely in situa-
tions in that individuals feel high levels of uncertainty and uncontrollabil-
ity (Malinowski, 1948; Vyse, 2014). Magical thinking, then, is discussed
to reduce levels of anxiety (Markle, 2010) and provide an “appearance of
control in the absence of real control” (Bolton et al., 2002). It is postulat-
ed here that a sense of control and power is central to the phenomenon of
magical thinking, which is especially true in the context of bereavement.
In the present general working definition, this aspect is captured in the
phrase “the power of one’s thoughts, words, or actions”. I argue, that the
sense of control and power provided by this mode of thinking, is the basis
for subsequent behavior and part of the emotional component. There are,
however, further affective phenomena in magical thinking.
4.2.1.3 Affective dimension

Magical thinking is no isolated cognition but accompanied by
emotional states. It is proposed here that there are affective states that
trigger magical thinking and those that are triggered by the specific con-
tent of the contemporary magical thinking. Here, however, it is not dealt
with affects resulting from magical thinking (e.g. frustration about failed
attempts or astonishment about successful practice). Whereas affects that
immediately trigger magical thinking may be more context-dependent,
there may be an affective situation specific to magical thinking in gen-
eral. Regarding this aspect, it is concentrated here on the situation in be-
reavement.
Boelen (2010, 2017) described a ‘sense of unrealness’ in individ-
uals that suffer from prolonged grief as “a subjective sense of uncertainty
or ambivalence about the irreversibility of the separation despite the
mourner knowing that the lost person is really dead and gone” (Boelen,
2010, p. 234). It seems plausible, that such an uncertainty or ambivalence
about the irreversibility may give rise to thinking about how to reverse
the death.
In severe grief, extreme desiring, wishing, wanting, pining,
yearning, and craving for the lost beloved are characteristic. In reference
to magical thinking, experts participating in our study repeatedly stressed
the association with wishful thinking (e.g. experts #2 & #3). Regardless
of the intent of the magical thought (e.g. to bring about or ward off some-
thing), magical thinking seems to incorporate a strong volitional factor.
This is in line with early 20th century occultism and esotericism, that
placed an emphasis on willpower in definitions of magic: “Magick is the
Science and Art of causing Change to occur in conformity with Will.”
(Crowley, 1913).
Therefore, in the presence of magical thinking, a sense of indi-
vidual control and personal power is crucial, as stated in the performative
criterion. By that, magical thinking endorses a feeling whose absence is
associated with anxiety and helplessness and giving up of action (Ban-
dura, 1977; Bolton & Hill, 1996; Seligman, 1975).
Although at present speculative, it can be assumed that in the
very instance of magical thinking there are more characteristic phenome-
na that affect awareness and mood. In some cases, for example, a con-
strained reality control (a not engaging System 2 in Dual Process termi-
nology) might lead to a higher absorption (reduced density of associa-
tions; Bronkhorst, 2017) respective shift towards the ‘autistic’ end of the
consciousness-spectrum proposed by Lewis-Williams (2010). Assuming
a psychoticism-spectrum in general population, it seems plausible that
magical thinking carries a feeling of the extraordinary that may have sim-
ilar (but moderated) qualities as delusional mood. Yung et al. (2006) clas-
sified magical thinking as a subtype of psychotic-like experiences and
found them common in general population. Interestingly, magical think-
ing was repeatedly found to be associated with hyperacusis respective
auditory hallucinations (Dubal & Viaud-Delmon, 2008; Garcia-Montes et
76 4 Results
al., 2006; Garcia-Montes et al., 2014). However, in each case, magical

thinking was problematically operationalized with the Magical Ideation
Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983).
A practical implication resulting from an affect criterion relates to
the theoretical differentiation of magic from science. Clarke’s law ‘Any
sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic’
(Clarke, 1962) is an example for formulations of the hypothesis that sci-
ence one day will fully explain magical efficacy like it already explained
some variations of the law of contagion by germ theory and alternative
healing by placebo. For Subbotsky (2010), quantum effects belong to “a
special realm that is a bridge between scientific and magical realities” (p.
9). It is postulated here, that in such definitory gray areas, the affective
state of the individual is crucial whether the thought is magical or scien-
tific for the person. A lack of scientific knowledge, on the other hand, is
not automatically magical thinking, as I would like to stress with refer-
ence to an epistemological dimension.
4.2.1.4 Epistemological dimension

What is here declared as epistemological dimension of the defini-
tion of magical thinking is based on the concern of some development
psychologists that a lack of knowledge or experience in children will be
prematurely classified as magical thinking. The same is true for different
types of knowledge or experience. Rosengren and French (2013) show
the example of two drops of water that yield one slightly larger drop
when added. The equation 1 + 1 = 1 would therefore be true for children
who observed this natural phenomenon. In order to provide an example in
accordance with the detailed ‘performative criterion’, it is referred to
superstitious behaviors that are learned by operant conditioning (Vyse,
2014). To exclude such different experiences, the definition of magical
thinking demands that the person “must realize that under normal situa-
tions the world works in a particular way” and, at the same time, holds
the belief (half-belief, or spontaneous ideation) “that in some situations
the world can be ‘altered’ so the normal causal relations are in some way
circumvented by some other, ‘special’ process or processes that lead to an
‘alternative’ outcome that varies from the norm” (Rosengren & French,
2013, p. 44). This is in line with Malinowski (1948) who observed that
everyday work (i.e. science) exists parallel to magical work. Again, this
‘out of the ordinary’ experiencing may be reflected in an affective quality
that elevates magical thinking and rituals to a particular level of experi-
encing.
An addendum can be made for the above quoted statement: There
might be different degrees of realizing the ‘normal situation’ but it seems
necessary that in the end there must be the provable ability to discrimi-
nate the profane from the sacred as Durkheim (1912) put it. Otherwise,
magical beliefs (as well as religious faith) would no longer be distinct
from delusions. But what characterizes this sacredness, peculiarity, and
oddity that are so central in magical thinking from a psychological and
contentual perspective?
4.2.1.5 Contentual dimension

There is no generic psychological mechanism, neuroanatomical
module nor an evolutionary preset which generates magical (or supernat-
ural) thinking (Sørensen, 2007; Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012). Instead, it
was argued that religious (including magical) thinking is a by-product of
essential functional systems of the human mind (Kirkpatrick, 2015). A
close relationship with a deity, for example, can be seen as a by-product
of the general attachment system (Kirkpatrick, 2005). Various domains of
interaction with the world are processed by several cognitive systems
(Sørensen, 2007). This is known as the domain-specificity hypothesis:
“[…] the human mind contains fully or partly independent [innate or
early-acquired: Sørensen, 2007] modules specialized to process evolu-
tionary significant information” (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012, p. 244).
Inputs are, in other words, categorized and, for example, ascribed to one
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type of ontological domains: is it something animated? Is it an object?

There is no consensus about the number of ontological domains (Søren-
sen, 2007) nor the labeling (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012). Frequent is a
distinction of at least a physical, a biological and a mental domain. Evi-
dence for the domain-specificity hypothesis stems from developmental
psychology since it addresses the here well-known problem of induction
and explains how the child distinguishes relevant from irrelevant infor-
mation (Karmiloff-Smith, 1995; Sørensen, 2007). It was therefore argued
that this basic-level categorization is invariant across cultures (Barrett,
2000; Boyer & Ramble, 2001).
As by-product of this cognitive architecture, it can come to onto-
logical confusions. An entity of one ontological domain, then, is associat-
ed with a property that it should not have. Alternatively, one property that
it should have according to its domain is denied (Atran & Norenzayan,
2004). For example, according to their belongingness to the mental do-
main, it is a distinct property of minds that they are dependent on the
living body. If, however, core knowledge from another (the biological)
domain is borrowed – independent existence, living – and attached to the
entity (minds), the cognitive foundation for gods, angels, demons, ghost,
etc. is established (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012). The case was made
that such ontological confusions form the basis of religious beliefs (Boy-
er, 2001), paranormal, magical, and superstitious beliefs (Lindeman &
Aarnio, 2007), and magical thinking (Wellman & Gelman, 1998). In fact,
early accounts like Piaget’s nominal realism, artificialism, and participa-
tion can be explained by confusion of the mental and physical, lifeless
and living (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012). The term ‘counterintuitive
beliefs’ was coined for these beliefs (Boyer, 1994; Upal, 2010) and asso-
ciated with improved retention and a feeling of the ‘extraordinary’
(Atran, 2002; for a critical discussion of the term see Lindeman &
Svedholm, 2012).
With regard to magical thinking in bereavement, the theory of on-
tological confusions is adopted as a definitional element in this thesis. It
is specified, however, that magical thinking implies a confusion of laws

of causality within the respective domains (cf. Markle, 2010). For in-
stance, for the manipulation of a physical object (effect), a bodily action
is necessary (cause; both, cause and effect lie within the physical do-
main). The belief that a thought can transform the object, however, is
grounded in magical thinking since the cause lies within a mental do-
main, the effect by contrast in the physical domain.
4.2.2 Magical Thinking at the origins of human burial

Evolutionarily, the capacity to confuse properties from different
domains and to transcend borders of domain-specific knowledge – re-
ferred to as ‘cognitive fluidity’ (Sørensen, 2007) – is no a priori but came
into being. This points to the question of when religious thinking first
appeared and by whom. From a cognitive science perspective this devel-
opment would have been simultaneous to that of the ability to symbolize,
with the capacity of forming metarepresentations being the key variable
(Barrett, 2011). In the discussions about Homo symbolicus or Homo re-
ligiosus, however, there is one phenomenon missing: magical thinking.
As summarized above, arguments that sharply distinguish magical think-
ing from religious thinking (cases made by early anthropologists in pejo-
rative social Darwinian scenarios and certain religious systems to legiti-
mize their exclusive claim of truth) cannot be maintained in the light of
modern research. Admittedly, the term magical thinking puts a focus on
individual efficacy and phenomenological causality. It can be stated, that
this dimension is missed in current theories about the origins of human
burial. When magical thinking is indeed strongly connected with the ex-
periences of death and grief, it would provide (besides more so-
cial/religious reasons) a strong motive to engage in otherwise absolute
uneconomic behaviors like putting the most valuable objects into the
grave, destroying all possessions of the deceased or erecting monumental
tombs. Engaging in mortuary practices, therefore, would provide a sense
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of control in a highly stressful situation (Malinowski, 1948; Keinan,

1992; Bolton et al., 2002), reduce levels of uncertainty and anxiety
(Whitson & Gallinsky, 2008; Markle, 2010; Tarlow, 2012), and be in line
with terror management theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski & Solomon,
1986; Vail et al., 2010).
Since mortuary practices were no sudden discovery but devel-
oped gradually or fragmentarily (Pettitt, 2011b), the question remains
what differentiates those that are based on or include magico-religious or
symbolic thinking and those that do not. To make this differentiation, I
draw on the heuristics proposed by Pettitt (2011a) outlined in chapter 2.
Species-specific theories of the emergence of religious ideation
postulate that its preconditions are restricted to anatomical modern hu-
mans, Homo sapiens. Mithen (1996), for example, proposed a modular
design of intelligence including modules for the social, technical, natural
history, and linguistic domain, as well as a general factor. Differentiated
cultural accomplishments would require interconnection between those
initially distinct modules with modern language being an important factor
that establishes such links. Mithen (1996) vindicated that only Homo
sapiens would have that form of intelligence. Similarly, Lewis-Williams
(2002, 2010) postulated fundamental distinctions between Homo sapiens
and Homo neanderthalensis and earlier species. Opposed to Mithen
(1996), however, he did not focus on intelligence but on the ability to
altered states of consciousness. More precisely, he contended that only
Homo sapiens would be able to memorize, manipulate, and share mental
imageries from introverted states of consciousness like reverie, hypgna-
gogia, sleep or trance. According to those theories, formal burial (as first
represented in the sites of Skūl and Qafzeh) could be interpreted in the
light of religious thinking.
Other researchers do not draw the line between the species. Pettitt
(2011b), for example, allowed for symbolic thinking in archaic Homo and
regarded ‘funerary caching’ as evidence. Places, then, were regarded as
‘special’ by the survivors and associated with a world of the dead. If one
4.3 Descriptions of Magical Thinking in Grief and Bereavement 81
follows that argumentation, one must assume magico-religious thinking

in those individuals who deposited at least 28 corpses at the Sima de los
Huesos site, 500.000 years ago. Moreover, one must consider that ‘Cro-
nos compulsions’ can base on magical thinking too. The removal of soft
body parts and subsequently consuming might, for example, serve the
purpose “to obtain the strength/nature of the consumed” (see Pettitt,
2011a, p. 46). This intention would fit our working definition of magical
thinking, substantiating the notion of achieving a goal by magical means.
In a mortuary context like in the case of the Bodo cranium, 600.000 years
ago, ‘Cronos compulsions’ might also be part of some form of detach-
ment ritual (Pettitt, 2011a).
Whenever the prerequisites for magical thinking entered the
stage, it is suggested here that it may have played an important role in
individual and interpersonal bereavement and in the elaboration and dif-
ferentiation of mortuary practices. Why would a dead body be deposited
in special places? To guarantee a certain afterlife? To ward off their per-
nicious influence? Recently, archaeological findings were interpreted in
the light of the continuing bonds paradigm (e.g. Croucher, 2017; Mac-
Dougal, 2017). It is postulated here, that the archaeological record of
early mortuary practices should be reinterpreted in the light of potential
magical thinking underlying the reconstructed behaviors too – also to
conversely test the sufficiency of this nascent theory (cf. Hodder & Hut-
son, 2003).
4.3 Descriptions of Magical Thinking in Grief and Bereavement

How does magical thinking present itself in contemporary be-
reaved individuals? How can clinicians recognize when their patients
think magically? How to ask those affected? Here, recurrent themes of
magical thinking in grieving individuals and characteristics of that think-
ing especially in severe forms of grief are presented. Afterwards, those
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insights are combined with the definitional elements of magical thinking

discussed before to specify the definition for the context of bereavement.
4.3.1 Themes of bereavement-related Magical Thinking

There were several recurrent themes of magical thinking found in
grieving individuals (see Table 2). Eight categories were built according
to theoretical considerations. Depending on the criterion, there is more or
less overlap between categories (for example when asking what is aimed
by the bereaved). The number of eventual categories differentiates the
phenomenon for subsequent inquiries but is not too large. Of course are
there other ways possible to arrange themes.
The themes here are derived from various sources (including
online material and literary accounts) and not only from the expert study.
It therefore is not legitimate to associate these categories exclusively with
severe grief. Except from two categories, (III: ongoing care for the dead;
V: the person still is physically alive), it was, however, possible to collect
at least one example per category from individuals suffering from severe
grief according to the above-mentioned pragmatic definition. Sources are
tagged respectively.
4.3.1.1 Bringing the deceased back to life (I)

As quoted at the outset, Joan Didion wrote about the first night after her
husband suddenly died: “[…] but I needed that first night to be alone. I
needed to be alone so that he could come back” (Didion, 2005, p. 33).
This quote fits our definition of magical thinking very well in that a cause
(an action: being alone) is thought to have the effect to bring a person
back from the dead. Similarly, Madeline Sharples in her eponymous book
wrote about ‘leaving the hall lights on’ for her deceased son to find the
way back home (Sharples, 2011).
Other examples found for this category are less explicit but center
Table 2
Themes of Bereavement-Specific Magical Thinking
Theme Description Example

Bringing the deceased back Attempts and thoughts Asking a priest what is
to life (I) related to reversing the necessary to sacrifice in
death order to bring the loss back
Objects are a key to the Treating personal belong- Preserving objects to main-
loved one (II) ings of the deceased as tain the possibility of the
special return of the deceased
Ongoing care for the dead Providing magical assis- Ensuring a ‘good’ afterlife
(III) tance for the afterlife for the deceased by per-
forming religious rituals
Forcing the deceased to Attempts to induce or Contacting a psychic medi-

communicate or to appear reiterate experiences of um; engaging in spiritistic
(IV) ‘real’ post-death contacts practices
The person still is physical- Thoughts about the possi- Reluctance to organ dona-
ly alive (V) bility of reviving the corpse tion
Places are a key to the Treating places as special Visiting a special place to
loved one (VI) be able to communicate
with the deceased
I didn’t prevent death (VII) Blaming oneself or others Blaming daily hassles to
to have (magically) caused have caused the death of a
death; preventing future loved one
deaths on that premise
The dead still have power Warding off the negative Not talking ill about the
in this world (VIII) influence of the deceased deceased
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around the unuttered question: What can I do to bring the deceased back
to life? One expert (#4) observed something one could call the forcing by
means of willpower: ‘If only I badly want it enough, (s)he will come
back’.
Another expert (#5) reported of a bereaved young woman that
came to him – as a priest – begging and asking for what would be neces-
sary to sacrifice in order to bring back the deceased. Here, the theme re-
ceives a variation: the person admits that she cannot do anything but be-
lieves in a power that can (c.f. Watzlawik & Valsiner, 2012). Markle
(2010) termed those thoughts ‘Passive Magical Thinking’. Prima facie,
this form of magical thinking is not in line with our working definition in
that it seems to lack the thought and feeling of individual power and con-
trol (performative & affective dimension). It must be stressed, however,
that the individual seems to assume, that it can prompt (or even force; in
the example above through begging) that mighty other (be that a priest,
shaman, or a deity) to bring back the deceased and that it can hereby ini-
tiate the magical action. I thus would like to devote the term ‘Passive
Magical Thinking’ for those cases which clearly separates us from Mar-
kle for whom the term refers to magical events that “happen without the
need of the believer’s action” (Markle, 2010, p. 19).
In bereavement, the psychotherapist may appear as a mighty oth-
er as well. It may become a tacit therapy expectation in some grieving
patients that the therapist will undo the loss (expert #1).
4.3.1.2 Objects are a key to the loved one (II)

Deceased individuals often bequeath a great deal of personal be-
longings: objects that become symbolic (e.g. they stand for certain attrib-
utes of the beloved), memorabilia (or ‘melancholy objects’: Gibson,
2004), or semiophores (carriers of meaning) for the bereaved. In mourn-
ing, they might become what transitional objects are for children accord-
ing to psychoanalytical theories (Winnicott, 1971; Gibson, 2004; expert
#2). However, not all objects are equally meaningful (Gibson, 2008). A
study from Niemyjska (2015) showed that objects preferred by separated

romantic partners are such that equal the partner (e.g. photographs, date
of birth) or were in contact with him (e.g. a pillow), that is, which meet
the laws of sympathetic magic. From an evolutionary point of view, new
media like photographs or voice mails promote ‘false recognitions’ that is
misattributions of external stimuli to the deceased by the bereaved (White
& Fessler, 2013). Transferred to the structural model of magical thinking,
those objects seem suited to prompt magical thinking or to be employed
by it.
Such magical thinking can involve the reluctance to discard per-
sonal belongings like Joan Didion (2005) described. Keeping possessions
and preserving everything the deceased touched – Gorer (1965) used the
term ‘mummification’ – may be an expression of the assumption of a
continued existence and eventual return of the beloved (Field, 2006).
Likewise, in magical thinking, an intensive preoccupation can lead to this
end, for example, making the bed of the deceased child every day (expert
#5).
In practice, it may be important to differentiate magical thinking
from symbolic thinking or keeping objects for memorizing. One expert
(#4) stated, that bereaved individuals with severe, clinically relevant grief
are not able to symbolize at all, when death is not accepted. Another ex-
pert (#7) stated that the mere number of objects may be a differentiator:
to symbolize or recall, often one object of a sort is sufficient. But the
preservation of, say, twenty identical shirts may be a hint for magical
thinking.
4.3.1.3 Ongoing care for the dead (III)

All tries to influence the afterlife of the deceased would fall into
this category. Although in many cases this would contradict our definito-
ry element that magical thinking focuses on an outcome “perceptible by
the senses”, this category is maintained, since it seems to be very relevant
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in bereavement. Many superstitions that center around death and funeral

rites would fall into this category. Examples are: opening a window im-
mediately after death for the soul to leave (c.f. the archaic ‘Seelenloch’);
putting the corpse headfirst into the hearse; knocking thrice on the coffin
is to knock on the door of Heaven; and so on. There are, however, two
theoretical problems with those superstitions: First, since they are tradi-
tional, they do not necessarily meet the definitory element of individual
feelings of control what justifies their label as superstitious. Second, all
similar beliefs that appeared in this study, were closely related to the time
of death or the funeral services. Thus, their occurrence in clinically rele-
vant grief is by definition not possible.
Magical thinking can be directed on one’s reunion with the de-
ceased. The spectrum here can reach from the leaving of fingerprints on
the urn or coffin for other than symbolic purposes (expert #5) to suicidal
ideation that would fit our working definition in that an action (suicide) is
thought to attain a real (perceptible by the senses) reunion with the de-
ceased love one. From our other categories, this aspect deviates in that in
this form of magical thinking an alteration of the state of the bereaved is
desired. For our bereavement-specific definition of magical thinking,
however, it seemed appropriate to focus on the aim to alter the deceased’s
state. On the other hand, from theoretical considerations, there are few
reasons to annex suicidal ideation to the emerging construct of bereave-
ment-related magical thinking since it already is a well-defined construct.
Religious death and farewell rituals (here: Roman Catholic) serve
psychological purposes and are a means to confirm and articulate the
individual’s faith. As a theologian (expert #5) explained with regard on
our study, only God knows what is good and men should trust in His
plans leading to a good end – even when a loved one had to die. In magi-
cal thinking, however, individuals assume to know what is good and seek
to fulfill their individual will. They may therefore misconceive religious
elements like blessings and prayers and take them literally (for example
feel the urge to care for the deceased by praying regularly). They may
also mistake religious rituals as means to magically achieve the desired

outcome (for instance to bring death to an end, or to assure a good after-
life for the beloved). Clergymen then may be confronted with grievers
who insist that every detail must ‘correctly’ be done, and everything must
be perfect at ceremony (expert #5). The same meticulous arrangement of
rituals and eventual despair is, again, reflected in Joan Didion’s words:
“But I did the ritual. I did it all. I did St. John the Divine, I did the chant
in Latin, I did the Catholic priest and the Episcopal priest, I did ‘For a
thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday when it is past’ and I did
‘In paradisum deducant angeli’. And it still didn’t bring him back” (Didi-
on, 2005, p. 43; italics in original).
The same idea of religious traditions being magical rituals may
stand behind the phenomenon of imitation and misuse of religious rituals
and customs by non-religious folk in the absence of external reasons (e.g.
social pressure) (expert #5). An alternative explanation, however, refers
to Pascals Wager, that is, the rational thought of causing more harm when
omitting the rituals and God does exist compared to the efforts of con-
ducting the ritual in the absence of an afterlife. However, we suppose that
in many non-Christian belief systems funerary rites indeed serve(d) mag-
ical purposes.
4.3.1.4 Forcing the deceased to communicate or to appear (IV)

Communication sequences between the living and the dead can
be initiated by the bereaved or by the deceased (Chan et al., 2005). The
latter was described as ‘post-death-contacts’, defined as the feeling of a
living individual “that a person who is deceased is reaching out to con-
nect with the living” (Klugman, 2006, p. 250) or ‘after-death-
communication’, defined as “spontaneous communications from the dead
[which] introduce the possibility of constant, ongoing contact outside of
ritual settings” (Kwilecki, 2011, p. 241), among others (e.g. ‘vécu subjec-
tif de contact avec un défunt’: Elsaesser, 2017). Although those phenom-
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ena are common in bereavement, they were described as exceptional ex-

periences (LaGrand, 2005; Landoldt et al., 2014; Vaitl, 2012). Be that as
it may, their definition in any case contradicts our working definition of
magical thinking: Seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling the deceased, en-
counters with him or her in dreams, holding him or her responsible for
any happening, etc. therefore are not magical thinking according to our
definition.
Experts, however, repeatedly reported from patients that tried to
reiterate those experiences in that they tried to restore the situation in
which it came to the encounter. Examples reached from leaving the bed-
room door open at night (expert #4), over ‘meeting’ the deceased loved
one every evening for watching news on TV (expert #6), to abundant
showering since it came to a hallucinatory experience in the shower cabi-
net (expert #4). Magical thinking, here, relates to one’s ability to force the
deceased to appear. Though, patients failed in their tries to establish a
volitional contact (experts #4 & #7).
In turn, communication (here restricted on talking, writing or
speaking with thoughts) can be initiated by the bereaved. In fact, talking
to the deceased while sitting in front of his or her photograph or on a visit
on the cemetery is regarded as a form of continuing bonds (Francis, Kel-
laher & Lee, 1997; Klass & Walter, 2001; Chan et al., 2005). Irwin
(2015) points out that social media on the internet are used by bereaved
people to send messages to the deceased that contain conversations about
daily activities, sharing of memories, asking for guidance, good wishes,
and other. None of these forms of spontaneous or unplanned communica-
tion, however, comply with our working definition of magical thinking.
There are, however, also forms of arranged contacts initiated by
the bereaved. They can include spiritistic elements like seances (Irwin,
2009), a psychomanteum (Hastings et al., 2002), or be mediated by a
psychic medium (Beischel, Mosher & Boccuzzi, 2015). In my view, since
they meet the criteria of our working definition, these are forms of (pas-
sive) magical thinking which is supported by the fact that Spiritualism
verges on necromancy (Kieckhefer, 1989). Whereas other themes of mag-

ical thinking in bereavement mostly seem to do not involve strong be-
liefs, experts reported that patients with severe grief that visit a medium
or shaman to channel the deceased’s voice often really believe in it (ex-
perts #4 & #6). The very concrete nature of those offers is more appeal-
ing for bereaved individuals than offers from clergymen or psychothera-
pists (expert #5).
4.3.1.5 The person still is physically alive (V)

The present study found several indications for magical thinking
with regard on the dead body in grieving individuals, although it was
seldom conclusively articulated. An early incident in bereavement that
may give raise to magical thinking is the question of autopsy or organ
donation. Joan Didion expressed ambivalent thinking on this point: On
the one hand “autopsy could show that what had gone wrong was some-
thing simple [and] they might still be able to fix it” (Didion, 2005, p. 37).
At the same time, she wondered: “How could he come back if they took
his organs […]?” (p. 41). Therefore, magical thinking in bereaved people
that must decide about organ donation can lead to reluctance to do so:
Experts ascribed this to the aversion of ideas of the deceased ‘residing’ in
the organ receiver (which would relate to sympathetic magic) or of dis-
turbing his integrity that he would need in afterlife (experts #5, #6 & #7).
Since in Western culture(s) decisions about the corpse usually are made
shortly after death, this form of magical thinking is, however, unlikely to
appear in clinical relevant grief.
A related phenomenon is what a former undertaker in our study
called ‘empathy for the corpse’, the latter being – in that thinking – sensi-
tive (expert #7). This does not only influence the treatment of the dead
body (fitting coffin or casket, headfirst in the hearse, etc.; expert #7), but
may also prompt feelings of guilt (e.g. if the facial expression induces
related thoughts; Chan et al., 2005; Eyetsemitan & Eggleston, 2002) or
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the sudden urge to protect the deceased from being exposed to weather
and elements (unknown online source). In addition, experts (#5 & #6)
drew our attention on what resembles tries to animate the mortal remains
through putting them next to something living (e.g. the urn with ashes
next to a bundle of flowers; the cremated remains under a living tree in
natural burial). It was, though, not possible to investigate these phenome-
na more in-depth or to clearly demarcate them from symbolic actions or
aesthetic enjoyment. They can thus be recommended as objective for
further research.
4.3.1.6 Places are a key to the deceased (VI)

There are places associated with the dead that are treated as spe-
cial by the bereaved and often the whole society (Roymans, 1995, Ar-
nold, 2008). Those places may be burial places (e.g. cemeteries, church-
yards), places of death (e.g. a crash site), the bedroom or chair of the
deceased, or memorial sites (e.g. favorite spots). Grieving individuals
sometimes visit those places in order to communicate with the deceased
(expert #6), which would be termed magical thinking. Although in the
present study it was found not that explicit, it can be postulated that such
places evoke feelings of the extraordinary that may set the emotional
arena for magical thinking. Similar, Rugg (2000) proposed ‘sacredness’
as a definitional feature of cemeteries (cf. Härke, 2001). I would like to
call places that give rise to bereavement-related magical thinking ‘liminal
places’ because people are more likely to sense the presence of their de-
ceased loved one which in turn may prompt magical behavior.
4.3.1.7 I didn’t prevent death (VII)

Guilt is regarded as an emotional component in grief, as well as a
potential risk factor for complications in grief reactions (Li et al., 2014).
In bereavement, guilt is associated with ruminating about proximal and
distal causes of death (Parkes & Prigerson, 2010) and counterfactual
thinking (Eisma et al., 2015). There can be self-reproaches not having
prevented the death or even to have caused the death with one’s own
deeds (Parkes & Prigerson, 2010; Chan et al., 2005). In the present study,
experts regarded guilt as either including magical thinking (expert #7) or
a mediator between grief and magical thinking (expert #1).
According to Li et al., (2014), guilt has a cognitive and an affec-
tive dimension. It is suggested here that only the cognitive component
can be linked with magical thinking, since the affective component in
guilt partly contradicts the affective criterion of our working definition
(whereas a sense of responsibility seems to link both constructs, painful
remorse is restricted on guilt). I propose the term ‘backwards oriented
magical thinking’ for ruminating about how one’s words, thoughts, or
actions magically led to the death or the thought one would have been
able to magically prevent the death. Often, they include retrospective
assumptions of precognition or premonition (experts #1, #4 & #5) defined
as the “conscious cognitive awareness” (precognition) and “affective
apprehension” of a future event “that could not otherwise be anticipated
through any known inferential process” (Bem, 2011, p. 407; see also
Mossbridge & Radin, 2018). Joan Didion ruminated about premonitions
her husband could have had (“Did he know he would not write the book?
Did he have some apprehension, a shadow?” p. 23), but the bereaved may
remember any form of vision they had before their loved ones died as
well (expert #4). The connection of such phenomena with any kind of
magical thinking (or guilt in general) should be investigated more in-
depth in further studies.
In the mediator model, expert #1 (psychoanalytically trained)
suggested, the association of grief with magical thinking would be medi-
ated by guilt or resentments. In case of guilt, magical thinking may mani-
fest itself in obsessive-compulsive neurosis (or disorder, OCD). In a clin-
ical case example, expert #1 reported, that his patient developed OCD
after multiple losses (other than bereavement) with compulsions that
should prevent further losses. Similarly, expert #4 reported a case in
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which the patient experienced a vicarious death (no close relationship) at

a very young age and developed compulsions since then that intended to
prevent the death of any family member. As one member died, the com-
pulsions persisted but were now interpreted as means to protect the de-
ceased in afterlife. In both cases, the magical thinking substantiates our
working definition but is not bereavement-specific but death-related. The
same is true for mothers that become extremely overprotective after one
of their children died (expert #7) or superstitions like veiling all mirrors
after a death to prevent future deaths.
As mentioned, expert #1 regarded resentments or blaming as fur-
ther mediators. In fact, guilt can be seen as self-blame (Parkes & Priger-
son, 2010). Blaming others or generally adverse circumstances (resent-
ment) can be classified as negative-passive magical thinking if all criteria
of our working definition are fulfilled. There may be implicit expecta-
tions involved (e.g. perfectionism: there is no natural death) that may be
supported by claims of modern medical system, especially preventive
health care (expert #7; c.f. Didion, 2005, p. 206: “I realize how open we
are to the persistent message that we can avert death. And to its punitive
correlative, the message that if death catches us we have only ourselves to
blame”).
4.3.1.8 The dead still have power in this world (VIII)

There are many myths and legends about revenants and restless
dead that persist in folklore (cultural assumptions) in rural areas up to
today (Lecouteux, 2001, 2008, 2009). Paranormal activities like haunted
houses and poltergeists belong into this category (Irwin, 2009). The be-
lief or spontaneous ideation that the dead still have power in this world,
however, is not magical thinking according to our working definition.
Instead, it comes to magical thinking, when thoughts, words, or actions
are believed to influence that haunting or to ward off the deceased’s ac-
tivities. Some evidence was found that magical thinking of this kind may
occur in (severe) grief, though in the examples referred to here it is very
implicit and in some there would be many alternative explanations for the
shown behavior.
The most obvious case was described by expert #4 who reported
on a bereaved person who actually believed that certain incidents in her
house were caused by the restless defunct. Subsequently, the patient
wrote a letter to the deceased, after which the alleged haunting stopped.
Again, according to our working definition, the belief in a paranormal
genesis of certain happenings is not magical thinking, but the belief to be
able to have a demonstrable effect on the causative entity is.
In other cases reported by expert #5, the bereaved persons by
their actions intended to keep a given a promise (making the garden de-
spite physical illness) or to apologize (by keeping an object loved by the
deceased). It is, however, unclear if the bereaved feared negative conse-
quences caused by the deceased unless they did so. Either way, as expert
#2 remarked, there can be indeed the fear of a curse in grieving individu-
als – especially when there were unresolved conflicts and ambivalences
in the pre-death relationship (see also Root & Exline, 2014).
There are cultural-specific superstitions that resemble magical
thinking and belong into this category: In China, for instance, certain
family members must be present at the death moment to ward off
longstanding bad luck (Chan et al., 2005). In Germany, talking ill about
the recently deceased is said to get punishment. Finally, the saying that
certain deeds of the living cause the deceased to turn over in his grave
(sich im Grabe umdrehen) seem to originate from magical thinking.
4.3.2 Characteristics of bereavement-related Magical Thinking

There are four general characteristics of bereavement-related
magical thinking that were mentioned consonantly and frequently by the
grief-experts. First, (clinical) practitioners are confronted very rarely with
what we call magical thinking. On average, experts that participated in
the present study had more than 25 years of professional experience. Sel-
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dom, however, they could report more than two case examples that clear-
ly met our definitional criteria. In most cases, potential magical thinking
had to be reconstructed by them from behavioral data. Second, and that
may be an explanation for the above-mentioned finding that was support-
ed by experts, affected individuals feel ashamed about their magical
thinking. In many cases this may be associated with their acting without
believing (acquiescence: Risen, 2016), that is bereavement-related magi-
cal thinking often appears to be of ego-dystonic nature. Additionally,
Western culture(s) tend to suppress related ideations, in that it is more
acknowledged that the deceased initiates contact (e.g. by showing itself in
dreams) than the bereaved acting in behalf of the deceased (expert #4).
On the other hand, practitioners in health system (unconsciously) may
promote certain contents of magical thinking, for example in that they
over-emphasize the possibilities of medical treatments or psychotherapy.
Third, for outsiders acting on bereavement-related magical thinking ap-
pears to be rigid, repetitive and ritualistic. In that, it has to be differentiat-
ed from habits. Fourth and last, bereavement-related magical thinking is
multidimensional: evidence was found for both, evocative (calling forth
the deceased) and apotropaic (turning away harm and evil influences)
magical thinking. This would comply with Frazer’s (1890) dichotomy of
sorcery versus taboo.
Moreover, it was asked for every theme, if there is an enhanced
conscious engagement with related contents in grieving persons. There
are, for example, many narratives about theme I (Bringing the deceased
back to life) that are more or less universally accessible in Western cul-
ture(s): Orpheus’ descent into Hades and try to bring back his Eurydice,
the reawakening of Lazarus in the gospel of John, or Julia’s apparent
death in Shakespeare’s Romeo and Julia. In fact, expert #5 reported of a
bereaved young woman who mentioned the tale of Snow White while
articulating her longing for the deceased (poisoned Snow White was rea-
waken by the kiss of a prince). Overall, however, no evidence was found
for significantly enhanced conscious engagement with narratives that
support the respective magical thinking of individuals. Bereaved persons

may be, however, more susceptible to such narratives and related offers
for example from psychic mediums.
4.3.3 Formulating a bereavement-specific definition of magical

thinking
With regard on its phenomenology, the general working defini-
tion can be specified and a bereavement-specific definition of magical
thinking can be postulated: Bereavement-related Magical Thinking is the
cognitive-emotional precursor for the belief, half-belief, or spontaneous
ideation that with the power of one’s thoughts, words, or actions one is
able or needed to intervene in (to stop, to reverse, to accelerate, to retard,
to facilitate, …) the transformation of the deceased from psycho-physical
existence to non-physical existence.
As obvious, this definition does not entail every theme referred
above: guilt-related magical thinking, for example, may not be bereave-
ment-specific. In my further argumentation it will become clear why this
form (that I called backwards oriented magical thinking) is not in line
with magical thinking that intends to bring back the deceased or to ward
off its negative influences.
In this bereavement-specific definition of magical thinking, the
structural, performative, affective, and epistemological criteria that were
set forth above are carried on. The contentual dimension, however, needs
a specification: Death is unique in that it alters the affiliation to a domain
of knowledge. Whereas magical thinking about one’s thoughts making an
accident likely to happen confuses known cause-effect relations for men-
tal phenomena in the psychological domain, bereavement-related magical
thinking collides with the transition of a psycho-physical being into a
non-physical being that no longer is subordinated to cause-effect relations
of living agents (but of mental phenomena?).
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4.4 The Role of Magical Thinking in Severe Grief

Remarks in this paragraph explicitly focus on severe grief, that is,
trajectories of grief that became clinically relevant and potential cases for
grief-specific diagnoses like prolonged grief disorder. Statements of ex-
perts are reported regarding the role of magical thinking related to the
symptomatology and disturbances in model assumptions of adaptive grief
reactions. Intending to create a theoretical framework, a model of be-
reavement-specific magical thinking is proposed within a continuing-
bonds perspective.
4.4.1 Magical Thinking and the symptomatology of disordered grief

Although experts were rarely confronted with the phenomenon,
they regarded the investigation of magical thinking in severe grief as
highly relevant (experts #4, #6 & #7). During most of the interviews an
implicit or explicit tendency in experts to assess it as pathological or
pathogenic could be observed. It was frequently mentioned that (a) magi-
cal thinking mirrors or maintains enduring difficulties in accepting the
reality of the loss, (b) it is an expression or fortifies avoidance of remind-
ers of the reality of the loss, (c) it is related to bitterness or anger (resent-
ments), and (d) it is a component of intensive yearning. These were the
plainest descriptions of the association of bereavement-specific magical
thinking with symptoms of the consensus criteria for prolonged grief
disorder (Prigerson et al., 2009; Maercker et al., 2013). Experts, however,
also affirmed that magical thinking may inhibit positive emotions in grief
(Maercker & Lalor, 2012) and double-tracked thinking may mirror cogni-
tive struggles and disbelief (Lunghi, 2006). Aside from expert opinions,
the above-mentioned structural dimension suggests an intrusive character
of some forms of magical thinking. Phenomenologically, this might re-
semble intrusive realizations and preoccupying memories and thoughts of
the deceased as suggested for the conceptualization of complicated grief
(Horowitz et al., 1997).
4.4 The Role of Magical Thinking in Severe Grief 97
4.4.2 Processual and performative perspectives

Within the framework of the dual-process model of coping with
bereavement (Stroebe & Schut, 1999, 2010), magical thinking would be
classified as loss-oriented. In all subjective themes of bereavement-
specific magical thinking, the loss and the deceased person play a pivotal
role. There was no report of magical thinking related to, say, gaining a
higher workload to enhance the new financial situation (restoration-
orientation). However, this finding may result from higher depressive
avoidance in complicated grief conditions (Boelen & Eisma, 2015). An
exception may be category VIII, which is oriented to a life without the
pernicious influence of the deceased.
Experts (#3, #4) admitted that magical thinking may be a coping
strategy in some cases, although this terminology can be problematic
(expert #1). At the moment, there is not enough information about magi-
cal thinking in grieving individuals to decide whether it is a stressor im-
manent to the grief reaction or a coping strategy or a defense mechanism.
Forced into the dichotomy of emotion-focused versus problem-focused
coping (Stroebe & Schut, 1999, 2010), however, it would fit the latter.
Problem-focused coping is defined as “directed at managing and chang-
ing the problem causing the distress” (Stroebe & Schut, 2010, p. 277),
which is exactly what bereavement-specific magical thinking aims by
reversing the death or by searching for shortcuts in the grief process (ex-
pert #3). But again, there may be specific aspects for different categories:
Blaming oneself or others to have caused the death (category VII) seems
not to belong to problem-focused coping, nor does magically caring for a
good afterlife. On the contrary, the latter seems to be an adaptive form of
emotion-focused coping. Tellingly, however, this theme was found at
best shortly after death and not in severe grief.
As detailed above, the need for control and a sense of power are
core inciters behind magical thinking. In the dichotomy of primary and
secondary control (Boerner & Heckhausen, 2003), magical thinking is an
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expression of primary control striving since it aims by definition to bring

about concrete changes in the environment. In grief, however, primary
control striving is maladaptive as its main goal (reunion with the beloved)
cannot be achieved (Boerner & Heckhausen, 2003; Stroebe, Schut &
Boerner, 2010). These findings can be interpreted as an indicator for
magical thinking being a risk respective complicating factor in bereave-
ment.
4.4.3 Continuing Bonds and Magical Thinking

Looking at bereavement-specific magical thinking from a contin-
uing bonds perspective allows us to integrate our interdisciplinary find-
ings in a comprehensive model. It could be argued that magical thinking
is related to continued bonds with the deceased in that it in many cases
intends to shape the ongoing relationship. Even in the case the magical
thinking manifests itself in attempts to ward off the pernicious influence
of the dead (category VIII), the relationship, although a conflictual one,
continues. As with other forms of continuing bonds, the ongoing relation-
ship can be arranged along the five dimensions proposed by Root and
Exline (2014). For most examples of bereavement-specific magical think-
ing its expression would be specific (e.g. centered around materializa-
tion), distal (e.g. objects are a key to the deceased), present (e.g. (s)he
comes back every moment), external (e.g. forcing to appear), and often
initiated by the bereaved. Postulating that magical thinking can be a form
of continuing bonds does not, however, contradict our findings of its mal-
adaptiveness. Not all forms of ongoing relationships with the dead are
associated with positive consequences for the survivor: “As we began our
thinking [about continuing bonds] we were aware of the histories in many
cultures of the dead returning as hungry ghosts, wandering spirits, and
other sorts of dangerous beings to haunt or harm the living” (Klass, 2006,
p. 844). In evaluating the role of magical thinking in adjustment to be-
reavement, of course the individual context and processes must be con-
sidered. It might be, for instance, that the sense of control provided by
magical thinking may in the short-term be alleviating (a fictional example

would be the thought that if only I visit all his or her relatives, (s)he will
come back: to carry out the magical act would take a while in that severe
symptoms of grief may be repressed). The model presented here, there-
fore, focuses on the long-term perspective of repeated magical thinking of
most themes (except categories V and VII).
4.4.3.1 Uncompleted rites of passage

A model concept is suggested, which parallels intrapsychic pro-
cesses of continuing bonds with the concept of rites of passage and lo-
cates the role of magical thinking within those processes. Starting point is
the anthropological notion that, in many societies, the phases which are
separated by rites of passage run parallel to the beginning and ending of
the mourning period (Van Gennep, 1909/2018): the rites of separation
open the gates for mourning and related customs which persist during the
transitional period. Finally, rites of incorporation reintegrate the mourners
into the community. At the same time, preliminal rites of separation aim
to detach the deceased individuals from the world of the living and enable
them to set forth the afterlife journey. During the liminal phase, the dead
are on a threshold and often have to pass challenges. At the time of post-
liminal rites, they reached their place of destination as the bereaved ones
found their new place with new roles and functions in society.
Likewise, the continuing of a bond was described as a process in
which the relationship undergoes changes. It starts as a relationship be-
tween the living and transforms into a bond between a living and a dead
person (Klass & Steffen, 2017). The death of the loved one, in other
words, at first shattered the way of the world and is then, after a transi-
tional period with manifested symptoms of grief, incorporated in one’s
ongoing life (cf. Root & Exline, 2014). Conveying the concept of rites of
passage on the individual level, this would be the ‘point’ in time, when
postliminal rites would be practiced. In Western culture(s), however,
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those rites are widely unknown (Hunter, 2008). Importantly, postliminal

rites do not indicate the severance of the bond (Irwin, 2015) but what is
traditionally celebrated as the completion of mourning, meaning the re-
covery of social functionality (Thomassen, 2009).
From the perspective of the bereaved, the deceased loved ones
can no longer be located in the world of living. The process of accepting
the death as reality in the bereaved gradually separates them from this
world and incorporates them in the world of the dead. Many symptoms
and experiences in grief, however, that may be an evolutionary by-
product of the attachment system (White & Fessler, 2013, 2018), work
against that acceptance. How can the persons be dead, when I saw them
this morning in the crowd? How can they be dead, when it feels as if they
would return as it always felt before they came home? Knowing of the
factuality of death, but at the same time sensing the person alive: neither
is the loved one alive nor dead: it appears as if bereaved individuals with
these words describe the liminal phase that is manifold reflected in re-
spective narratives (see below).
In severe cases of grief reactions that become clinically relevant,
symptoms persist for abnormal long periods of time, which is a central
criterion to bereavement-specific diagnoses like Prolonged Grief Disorder
(Prigerson et al., 2009). In these cases, one might speak of an extended
phase of liminality. At the same time, magical thinking in many manifes-
tations appears to keep the loved one ‘undead’. Whereas attempts to bring
the deceased back to life (category I) explicitly aim to reverse the tenor of
events, other themes of bereavement-specific magical thinking seem to
intend to retain the status of liminality (e.g. forcing the deceased to com-
municate or to appear – category IV – or being preoccupied with magical
objects; category II). Other forms of magical thinking appear to aim to
force the transition of the deceased (e.g. category III) respective to end a
menacing phase of liminality, while at the same time potentially prolong
it paradoxically (e.g. category VIII).
Given the importance of the concept of a liminal period in this

theoretical model of magical thinking, in the following some (very selec-
tive) background information are provided about how the interaction with
the deceased in this period was conceived across human history.
4.4.3.2 A model of liminality

The concept of liminality was seized on and broadened by Victor
Turner including his essay Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in
Rites of Passage (1967). It was soon applied in a broader context to the
experiences of individuals, groups, and whole societies in various tem-
poral and spatial frames (Thomassen, 2009). In many belief systems, the
liminal period for the deceased lay between death (whatever defined;
Kellehear, 2007) respective rites of separation or primary burial and de-
composition or intentional removal of the flesh (Van Gennep 1909/2018).
It is a time the deceased is on the journey to the other world (be it an Isle
of the Dead or situated on top of a mountain) and meets challenges before
entry (e.g. crossing a river like Styx; Van Gennep 1909/2018). It is, how-
ever, also a time for approaching unfinished businesses for both sides: In
Europe, since ancient times there is the recurrent belief that the soul re-
mains in the vicinity of the corpse for a while and thus can be contacted
there (Finucane, 1996). Similarly, shamans by the Ostyak of Salekhard
ask the dead why they had died at this time (Van Gennep, 1909/2018).
Vice versa, the dead can meet their desire for vengeance, making it likely
for ghosts and revenants to appear in the months after death or after the
scheduled funeral rites have been missed (Lecouteux, 2009). For some,
the liminal period can thus be lengthened in that they vegetate eternally in
a threshold stage (Van Gennep, 1909/2018). Until recent times, for Cath-
olics, for example, children who died without baptism remain in the lim-
bo (Van Gennep, 1909/2018). Likewise, in the conception of the mid- to
late medieval purgatory, the final destination was not (yet) settled result-
ing in an easy access of the dead to the world of the living (Klass & Wal-
102 4 Results
ter, 2001). In the liminal phase, thus, the deceased is disembodied but
socially alive (Hallam, Hockey & Howarth, 1999). From a psychological
and phenomenological perspective, as it was argued above, magical
thinking may hold the dead in the phase of liminality.
4.4.4 Towards theory: explicatory complement

In the following definition of bereavement-specific magical
thinking, that model of liminality, the working definition of global magi-
cal thinking (implying that the five dimensions still lie underneath), and
the themes of magical thinking in severely grieving individuals (except
guilt-related magical thinking: I propose that category VII must be con-
sidered separately) are integrated. It reads: Bereavement- related Magical
Thinking is the cognitive- emotional precursor for the belief, half-belief,
or spontaneous ideation that with the power of one’s thoughts, words, or
actions one is able or needed to intervene in (to stop, to reverse, to accel-
erate, to retard, to facilitate, …) the transformation of the deceased from
psycho- physical existence to non-physical existence.
So far, the definition is descriptive and phenomenological. In
psychological terms, it can be argued, this intervention relates to the cog-
nitive-emotional reorganization of the internal representation of the loved
one (Rubin, Malkinson & Witztum, 2003). That is, grief-related magical
thinking interferes with recategorizing the person (cf. White, Marin &
Fessler, 2017) and with the transformation of its mental representation
(Boerner & Heckhausen, 2003). As a consequence of bereavement-
specific magical thinking it can be assumed what Field and Filanosky
(2010) called the coexistence of “incompatible working models of the
deceased as alive and dead” (p. 4). The integration of the deceased as a
past but still cherished chapter in one’s biography (Walter, 1996) may be
blocked by magical thinking: instead the deceased remains in a liminal
sphere, “betwixt and between” (Turner, 1967).
The acting of bereaved individuals as if their beloved is still alive
and receptive, was described as a central phenomenon in other concepts
too. Reisman (2001), for example, proposed a differentiation between

ongoing higher order bonds and lower order bonds. He conceptualized
higher order bonds as symbolic bonds that are in line with abstract sche-
mas or generalized theories about the self, the world, and the future and
associated with well-being and adjustment. Lower order bonds, in con-
trast, are concrete bonds that relate to representations about personal abil-
ities, traits, behaviors and interaction schemes (Reisman, 2001). Individ-
uals who continue the bond with the deceased on a lower order level act
as if the person is still alive by keeping possessions, not dating others,
and so on. Interestingly, the author linked these different forms of contin-
uing bonds with illusory basic assumptions that are defined as inaccurate
and self-serving beliefs like perceptions of invulnerability, beliefs in a
benevolent and meaningful world and a worthy self. ‘Normal’ illusory
basic assumptions also carry an optimistic sense of control and mastering
(Reisman, 2001). All these illusions may be shattered post-loss (see also
Parkes & Prigerson, 2010). However, Reisman (2001) points out that they
are restored in symbolic higher order bonds, which are therefore adaptive
in bereavement. Lower order bonds are associated with a lack of buffer-
ing illusions and may be maladaptive according to Reisman (2001). In
magical thinking, however, there appears to be a pendulum swung in the
other extreme of an exaggerated sense of control and mastery. So, alt-
hough magical thinking seems to be related to lower order bonds, it is
unclear whether it represents a pre-phase of regaining illusory basic as-
sumptions or strengthens the concrete bond. As magical thinking often
appears as intrusive thoughts and spontaneous ideation, it is also unclear
whether it doesn’t occur in individuals that maintain higher order bonds
with their deceased. Whereas pressing the variety of expressions of ongo-
ing relationships in one single dichotomy instead of arranging it on sever-
al dimensions (Root & Exline, 2014) seems rather unrefined, the distinc-
tion between abstract and concrete interaction may be fruitful for differ-
entiating between magical and symbolical thinking and behaving.
104 4 Results
A further concept that includes acting as if the deceased was not

dead stems from Field and Filanosky (2010). These researchers empha-
size the distinction between internalized and externalized continuing
bonds. In cases of the former, the deceased provides an “internalized
secure base” (p. 4) in that mentally evoked images of him or her are per-
ceived as a “comforting presence” (p. 4) and the imagination of his view-
point on practical matters is used as a guide in making decisions. Exter-
nalized continuing bond expressions, in contrast, imply an unresolved
loss and represent a type of “re-experiencing” (p. 3) the relationship in
illusions and hallucinations (Field & Filansoky, 2010). Further respective
items are “I briefly acted as though the deceased were not dead – such as
calling out loud his or her name or preparing the table for two” or “I im-
agined that the deceased might suddenly appear as though still alive”
(Field & Filanosky, 2010, p. 11). How does magical thinking fit in that
concept? Again, first, not all forms of magical thinking aim towards ma-
terialization of the deceased, some aim to ward off his or her influence or
improve his or her post-death whereabouts. Second, items like “preparing
the table for two” (Field & Filanosky, 2010, p. 11) fall too short for de-
tecting magical thinking: was it out of a habit or really practiced as a
magical act? Was it planned or out of a spontaneous idea? Third, anoma-
lous experiences are not automatically beliefs (Landoldt et al., 2014) but
may give rise to beliefs or half-beliefs. In that sense, externalized con-
tinuing bonds may trigger magical thinking.
In sum, magical thinking related to the deceased is to such a de-
gree an expression of a continuing bond as magical thinking related to a
living person (e.g. love spells) is an expression of the relationship be-
tween the two who live.
5 Discussion
The present study is the first one that investigated magical think-
ing in severe grief. It summarized the theoretical plausibility from a va-
riety of perspectives and specified the construct definition by limiting its
extension and clarifying its intension. In a Grounded Theory expert study,
the practicability of our working definition was further approved by ap-
plying it to the context of severe (clinically relevant) grief reactions.
Based on different forms (themes) of magical thinking that emerged from
the analysis of case examples provided by practicing experts in the field,
a bereavement-specific definition of magical thinking was formulated.
Working towards a tentative theory and in line with preliminary, profes-
sional estimates, that definition was linked with pathogenetic models of
severe grief and an interdisciplinary approach was proposed to gain a
comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon.
5.1 Summary of Results

In this thesis, contextless magical thinking was defined as the
cognitive-emotional precursor for the belief or half-belief that the power
of one’s thoughts, words, or actions will produce an outcome perceptible
by the senses, which defies the otherwise known laws of cause and effect
within a specific domain of knowledge. It was emphasized that magical
thinking does not equate with the belief in the efficacy of magic. Instead,
it can appear as spontaneous ideation on that people act without ‘really’
believing in it – a phenomenon that seems to be common in general popu-
lation (e.g. Risen, 2016). Importantly, however, magical thinking pro-
vides a sense of control and mastery even if no respective behavior fol-
lows (e.g. Bolton et al., 2002). It transports a feeling of extraordinariness

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25002-7_5
106 5 Discussion
that may rise to brief psychotic-like experiencing (Yung et al, 2006). The
individual is, however, potentially able to tell that the contents of magical
thinking are different from ordinary reality (Rosengren & French, 2013).
From a cognitive science perspective, magical thinking connects objects
of one category of knowledge with the laws of causality of another (e.g.
Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012). This confusion of core knowledge may be
especially likely when one object of a category needs to be recategorized,
like after its cessation of belonging to the ontological domain of the liv-
ing. Together with the observation that an organism that experiences dis-
tress is prone to such confusions (Markle, 2010), it is plausible that magi-
cal thinking increasingly occurs in bereavement. Moreover, it may have
played an important role in the emergence of intentional dealing with the
dead and the origins of human burial.
As magical thinking in Western culture(s) is not supported but
even condemned by Christian religion and some forms of it are ego-
dystonic, bereaved individuals mostly may feel ashamed and do not initi-
ate conversation about it. For professionals it is therefore important to
know, what magical thinking in grief is about. Based on the statements of
(mainly) clinical experts from various academic backgrounds, eight re-
current themes of bereavement-specific magical thinking were formulated
(yet, the categories are tentative). Many forms deal with evoking the be-
loved, bringing him or her back to life (I). Sometimes, mighty others like
priests, shamans, or psychotherapists are ‘believed’ to be able to reverse
death after being contacted by the bereaved (a form it was referred to as
Passive Magical Thinking). Objects like personal belongings are em-
ployed not only to feel the deceased near but to bring him or her near (II).
Religious rituals in bereavement are prone to be conceived magically and
there are attempts to influence the afterlife of the loved one (III). Com-
mitting suicide to be reunited with the deceased loved one would be the
most fatal consequence of magical thinking in grief if minor definitional
problems are condoned. Experiencing post-death contacts with the be-
loved falls not under magical thinking, volitionally inducing concrete
5.1 Summary of Results 107
encounters, however, does (IV). Special treatments of the corpse and its
immediate environment sometimes are associated with magical thinking.
All examples found, however, were only from the first weeks after death
(V). As with objects, magical thinking can center around places in which
a resurgence of the loved one is thought to be more likely than in other
places (VI). Bereavement-specific magical thinking can also be retrograde
or backwards oriented and confuse the causality that led to the death.
Actions of others (blame) or oneself (guilt), then, are thought to have
caused the loss (VII). Finally, some bereaved believe or show the ideation
that the dead still have power in this world. Their magical thinking then
relates to warding off their influence (VIII). In general, magical thinking
and behaving seems to occur spontaneously and to be embedded in over-
all world-view only in a small subgroup. Possibly, ‘unbiased’ individuals
with severe grief are more susceptible to narratives and offers associated
with magic than general population.
Abstracted from those themes, a definition was formulated that
specifies bereavement-related magical thinking as the cognitive- emo-
tional precursor for the belief, half-belief, or spontaneous ideation that
with the power of one’s thoughts, words, or actions one is able or needed
to intervene in (to stop, to reverse, to accelerate, to retard, to facilitate,
…) the transformation of the deceased from psycho-physical existence to
non-physical existence. In other words, individuals that present magical
thinking appear to be willing to intervene in the post-loss cognitive-
emotional reorganization of the internal representation of the loved one
(Rubin, Malkinson & Witztum, 2003). Although in some cases the goal
of magical thinking seems to comply with therapeutic aims (e.g. ac-
ceptance of the loved one being in the ‘world of the dead’), paradoxically
all forms of magical thinking keep the beloved ‘undead’, ‘betwixt and
between’ – that is in a liminal sphere.
This interpretation of the present study’s findings is in line with
tentative assessments of participants in the expert study about the role of
108 5 Discussion
magical thinking in severe grief. There was an overall tendency toward

regarding bereavement-specific magical thinking as pathological and
associated with symptoms of clinically relevant grief like a lack of ac-
ceptance of the reality of the loss or avoidance behavior. Even so is mag-
ical thinking very seldom met by professionals and grief experts.
5.2 Relevance of Findings

The present study for the first time systematically described a
phenomenon in individuals with severe grief that up to today was in the
focus neither of bereavement research nor – as far we can say from our
investigations in the field – of clinical practitioners, for reasons that lie in
conceptual problems and the private nature of the phenomenon itself.
That alone bears a huge relevance simply because of the potential role the
new construct could play in models of disturbed grief and regarding prac-
tical implications. As this study did preliminary research and aimed to-
wards theory construction, statements about the potential relevance can-
not be far exceeded. In the following, a tentative assessment of the rele-
vance of the presented results for further enhancement of theory, for clin-
ical practice, and for the general dealings with death in Western societies
is proposed.
5.2.1 For further theory constructions

To the best of my knowledge, with its integration of definitional
elements and empirical findings from a thorough literature review, the
present study presented one of the most detailed psychological definitions
of magical thinking available today. Particularly, its demarcation from
nearby concepts on various levels (e.g. cognitive structure, affective con-
comitants, epistemological character of contents) was emphasized, advo-
cating its role as a distinct psychological construct. By drawing on the
criteria that were proposed, future research can ask more specific ques-
tions and may profit from the differentiation of concepts (e.g. individual
agency versus ontological presupposition) or psychological phenomena
5.2 Relevance of Findings 109
(e.g. spontaneous ideation versus belief). Importantly, there is no reason

to stigmatize magical thinking as it results from regarding it as a residual
category for exotic beliefs. Including the long-term perspective, that is,
regarding its evolutionary adaptiveness, might be a means to this end and
should be applied more often. In this regard, the present study may con-
tribute to an understanding of the origins and original meanings of human
burial too and may be an example for an interdisciplinary and long-term-
perspective approach to grief and bereavement.
5.2.2 For clinical practice

As mentioned, the following remarks cannot be regarded as rec-
ommendations for clinical practice due to the preliminary character of the
present work. There are, however, certain observations that might be
relevant in the clinical setting.
First and foremost, magical thinking appears to be a very private
experience that might have direct negative consequences for the individu-
al (apart from its suspected negative influence on grief easing). Frustra-
tion, new recurrences of painful grief-symptoms or social isolation might
be such immediate consequences. Magical thinking can be perceived as
intrusive, double-tracked, and ego-dystonic. Apotropaic forms of magical
thinking might in the midterm foster the development of an obsessive-
compulsive disorder. It might be comforting for bereaved individuals to
talk about such experiences and learn that they do not go ‘crazy’ or blas-
phemous.
Second, a finding of this study was that grieving individuals can
be susceptible for magical realities and respective belief systems. Thera-
pists should recognize when a patient is prone to become a victim of
trickery and charlatanry. On the other hand, behavioral reactions to magi-
cal thinking might become dangerous as well. Although no respective
examples could be found, in theory, magical thinking might refer to every
cause. It is imaginable that a person donates all of his or her money to
110 5 Discussion
bring the deceased back to life, as well as to burn the house to this end
(such extreme consequences, however, might be very rare since, as for-
mulated in the epistemological criterion, the individual remains able to
monitor its behavior in magical thinking). Committing suicide to reunite
with the deceased can sometimes draw on beliefs that are based on magi-
cal thinking (despite minor problems concerning its definition). One
should question whether deeds by bereaved done “in sheer desperation”
sometimes were rather done “because of magical thinking”.
Patients with severe grief might come to psychotherapy because
of an implicit expectation the therapist would magically undo the loss.
Therefore, it seems important to clarify what can be achieved with psy-
chotherapy in cases of severe grief in the first session to avoid drop out or
non-adherence. Therapies that contain ‘encounters with the deceased’
(e.g. experiences of communication) might be sabotaged by undetected
magical thinking.
Hypothetically, the proposed model of liminality suggests the
practice of (therapeutic) rites of incorporation to end the transitional state
that is associated with magical thinking. This is in accordance with fare-
well rituals in grief (Schmid, 2014) and elements of complicated (or pro-
longed) grief therapy like writing a farewell letter and identifying unfin-
ished businesses (Brodbeck, Berger & Znoj, 2017) or social sharing
(Wagner, Knaevelsrud & Maercker, 2005, 2006). However, it would be
worthwhile to consider emphasizing the ritualistic character of such ther-
apeutic elements and using frames and metaphors in line with the model
of liminality. It can be hypothesized that therapeutic rites of incorporation
should be logically based on magical thinking, the difference being it is
no longer private and individual but interpersonally acknowledged. This
is in line with the importance of social validation Klass and Walter
(2001) wrote about and would explain why individual magical thinking
does not ‘work’ but funerary rituals all over the past and present world
do.
5.2 Relevance of Findings 111
5.2.3 For funeral industries and public dealings with death

The last thought is relevant for ‘regular’ funeral ritual too. Walter
(1990) noted that “even within formal funeral ritual, we find a trend to-
ward reducing the religious rite of passage in favor of telling the story of
the deceased” (Klass & Walter, 2001, p. 440). The disappearances of
ritual and public dealings with death is manifold mourned (Michaels,
2005; Hunter, 2008; Doughty, 2017). Regarding the postulated parallels
between the mourning process and the becoming of the deceased, it
should be a warning that across many cultures “persons for whom funeral
rites are not performed are condemned to a pitiable existence since they
are never able to enter the world of the dead or to become incorporated in
the society established there” (Van Gennep, 1909/2018, p. 39). It can be
hypothesized that ‘classic’ funerary rites performed after an appropriate
time (the “transitional period”) could decrease the occurrence of magical
thinking in bereaved people. Likewise, as extended exposure to the
corpse was shown to reduce vigilance toward detecting the deceased in
grief (White, Fessler & Gomez, 2016; White, Marin & Fessler, 2017),
removing taboos from the dead body hypothetically might decrease dis-
belief and magical thinking.
It was pointed out above that magical thinking is a psychological
phenomenon that may be promoted by many factors in bereavement.
Therefore, institutionalized religions should not stigmatize those who
show it. Magical thinking may contradict some theological concepts but
bereaved individuals who think magically do not need (further) inner
conflicts or fears of being expelled by the Church community.
Finally, this research has implications for medical systems. Re-
luctance to donate organs or allowing autopsy, for example, may be based
on magical thinking. Medical professionals should address this question.
On the other hand, they may be confronted with magical thinking in form
of blaming. There might be those people who have distorted conceptions
of medical issues who might withdraw their accusations after being ex-
112 5 Discussion
tensively informed. Those who show magical thinking, in contrast, may

insist on their idea of what caused the death. Future studies have to show
how to deal with that group professionally.
5.3 Strengths and Limitations

The present study worked toward a tentative theory by probing a
terra incognita. The methodological approach with that this goal was
pursued, however, has its advantages and disadvantages. In general, they
can be looked up for example in El Hussein and colleagues (2014) and
Charmaz (2014). Here, the strengths and limitations are resumed of how
the methods were designed and composed in this study, the techniques
that were applied, and the caveats of findings.
5.3.1 Strengths
The broadness of our approach is a main accomplishment of the
present study. It is reflected in a plethora of methods (two narrative re-
views, expert interviews, analysis of additional data), many sources of
data (interview data, academic literature, literary accounts, online materi-
al) and a constant adaptation of techniques (written question-catalogue,
face-to-face interviews, tele-interviewing). Moreover, various areas of
knowledge informed the results (different disciplines of psychology, psy-
choanalysis, anthropology, theology, among others). This proceeding
ensured the triangulation of results which is a quality criterion in qualita-
tive research. In terms of content, this research stands out due to its inter-
disciplinary considerations and its oscillating between a scientific and a
phenomenological perspective. The former mirrors in the selection of
participants that span from a former undertaker and current psychologist,
to therapists with different backgrounds (psychoanalysis, cognitive-
behavioral therapy), to a philosopher and a theologian engaged in alterna-
tive burials and grief counseling.
5.3 Strengths and Limitations 113
5.3.2 Limitations
Of course, the presented results need to be regarded against the
background of some inherent limitations. First, especially in the formal
phase, participants were selected in terms of theoretical sampling. There-
fore, it had to be drawn on career information published online. Thus,
experts and clinicians familiar with the subject might be missed (I wel-
come them hereby to contact me). Nevertheless, to the best of my
knowledge, one participant of our study is without internet presence.
Second, all participants in the pretest phase lived and worked in
Switzerland at the time of interview, those in the formal phase in Germa-
ny. As their native language differ and they were most likely confronted
mainly with patients from their respective regions, cultural factors might
have influenced the respective expressions of magical thinking they came
to know about. On the other hand, some experts had international careers
(but, as far as I know, restricted on Western nations) and their current
expertise must be regarded as resulted from their cumulated experiences.
Moreover, it is unclear whether cultural differences between German-
speaking Switzerland and Germany have an impact on magical thinking,
or whether there are even differences between different parts of Germany.
The differences between rural and urban areas might be expected to be
more important in this regard. It may be a further limitation that it was
not controlled for this variable.
Thirdly, ‘severe grief’ was defined pragmatically as every case,
in which a bereaved person suffers from its grief to such a degree that
(s)he calls on professional help (here: from trained psychologists, psychi-
atrists or psychotherapists). Examples from other cases were tagged in
our statements. This terminology, however, may be misleading in that it
a) is not congruent with criteria for grief-specific diagnoses or clinical
concepts like Complicated Grief or Prolonged Grief Disorder, and b) does
not include equivalent cases in that individuals do not have access to such
help or have other reasons to not contact a specialist. However, regarding
114 5 Discussion
magical thinking, there are no a priori reasons to except major differences

between these groups. From a theoretical perspective, it can be speculated
that those with exposure to more traumatic deaths and those with less
depressive symptoms are most likely to have magical thinking. A related
issue is that we have very limited background information about the pa-
tients of whom experts reported examples for magical thinking. Interest-
ing factors would have been comorbidities, cultural backgrounds, any
psychotic symptoms, etc. to see whether bereavement-specific magical
thinking would be more associated with these variables than with grief
per se.
Fourthly, experts had to recall examples from their longstanding
experiences so there may be memory and interpretation biases on side of
the interviewees. In formal phase, we tried to meet this problem by
providing a possibility to prepare by sending our leading questions in
advance. It is unclear, however, to which degree that possibility was used.
Fifthly, Gesch-Karamanlidis (2015) summarized losing track,
steering, and a lack of clarity as frequent failures in interviewing. Char-
maz (2014) additionally noted suggestion and preconceptions in intensive
interviews. As a novice, the present author confesses guilty of nearly all
these ‘don’ts’ but performed better and better in the course of the study.
A further issue may be misunderstandings due to specialist languages (the
downside of interdisciplinarity). It was tried to limit them by intensive
preparation before each interview (consulting books or (online) articles
by the participating experts, as well as their own or related homepages to
gain an understanding of the main themes participants are engaged).
Finally, it may be criticized that the resulting categories are not
enough saturated (as the ‘themes of magical thinking’ are sparsely filled
with examples), the sufficiency may be deficient (were professionals not
the ideal persons of reference?), or that the study was closed prematurely
(cf. El Hussein et al., 2014). Again, our research marks the begin of a
journey (Bansal & Corley, 2012) that has still got a long way to go.
5.4 Perspectives for Future Research 115
5.4 Perspectives for Future Research

The present study did preliminary work. It approached a research
gap and explored systematically the terrain in that it clarified the theoreti-
cal plausibility of magical thinking being a recurrent component in severe
grief. A comprehensive review of definitional elements of the construct
was provided and it was showed that magical thinking related to the de-
ceased indeed occurs in bereaved individuals. Professionals for grief,
grief counseling and therapy from heterogenous disciplines were asked
for their assessment of clinical relevance and the potential role in individ-
ual bereavement. The study concluded with a bereavement-specific defi-
nition of magical thinking that covers qualitatively derived categories of
concrete thought content as well as a comprehensive model for a deeper
understanding of its role in the normative and disturbed grief process. As
a preliminary study, however, the present work leaves many questions
and desiderata behind.
First and foremost, I see the necessity to work towards a higher
theoretical sufficiency (Dey, 1999). This goal can be pursued by inter-
viewing those affected: people who score above-average on various grief-
scales and maybe fulfill the criteria of a bereavement-specific diagnosis
like Prolonged Grief Disorder. The present study may provide the tools
regarding a guideline for interviews, the framing of questions, and the
anticipation of reactions to be assumed. It seems indicated to conduct that
research as a (informed) grounded theory journey as well and to proceed
exactly where the current study stopped. It is possible that there come up
new, idiosyncratic examples that may give reason to revise our categories
(themes) of bereavement-specific magical thinking. This conclusion is
derived from the fact that experts in the study reported a restricted access
due to the implicit, private, and shame associated nature of the phenome-
non. At the same time, our tentative findings indicate a huge relevance of
addressing this kind of thinking when it occurs in severe grief reactions.
116 5 Discussion
From a theoretical perspective, there is no reason to assume mag-

ical thinking showing different characteristics and thematic contents
shortly after death or in (otherwise) well-adjusted bereaved. Neverthe-
less, it seems recommendable to qualitatively investigate and subsequent-
ly compare these groups to validate this a priori assumption. Still, such
research should focus on the level of construct definition to strengthen the
theory. Later, intergroup comparisons will become important again when
empirically testing the role of magical thinking in pathomechanisms of
grief reactions. In addition, comparisons regarding other types of losses
would be interesting for theoretical purposes. Zarlock (1961), for exam-
ple, described magical thinking as reaction to acquired blindness.
The role of culture and metaphors was beyond the scope of the
present work. However, as alluded, magical thinking might be a meta-
phorical system for processes otherwise described by psychologists in
intrapsychic terms. As indicated in the definitional element of core cate-
gory confusions (contentual dimension), however, a different epistemo-
logical perspective underlies magical thinking. The intention to alter an
intrapsychic processing of the deceased – as common in psychotherapy –
would not be labeled as magical thinking as no core categories are con-
fused (mental causes have mental effects). Thus, magical thinking em-
ploys not only another language but another (phenomenological) percep-
tion of reality. Culture and religion might not so much play a role regard-
ing the existence of magical thinking (here, evolutionary and cognitive
variables might be more crucial), but regarding the dealings with such
individual ideation. Social support maybe increases its occurrence in
severe grief like it does in children, whereas suppression like the exclu-
sion from a religious community might stigmatize the phenomenon. In
any case, these are first thoughts that must be elaborated on a thorough
theoretical basis.
It would be valuable to operationalize bereavement-specific mag-
ical thinking by developing an inventory for systematic quantitative re-
search. Items could be based on the examples that were collected for each
5.5 Conclusion 117
category (theme) of magical thinking and questions should be framed in

line with the definitory elements of the construct we provided. A poten-
tial example would be: “In the last month, did you ever have the sponta-
neous idea or the belief that any of your actions would actually bring
back your lost loved one?” The measured construct ‘proneness to be-
reavement-specific magical thinking’ subsequently can be supplied to
correlational studies to shed light on possible associations of so defined
magical thinking with demographic and cultural variables, personality
traits, types of bereavement, interpersonal factors, and so forth.
5.5 Conclusion
In respect of our research questions, it is to conclude that there
are beliefs, half-beliefs, and spontaneous ideations in bereaved individu-
als that base on magical thinking and are interwoven in the symptomatol-
ogy of severe grief. From a theoretical perspective, this should not sur-
prise, since past research has shown that magical thinking does not end
with childhood but persists in adulthood and is especially activated in
stressful situations. In addition, there are isolated references and descrip-
tions of bereavement-related magical thinking in literature accounts and
scientific works. To the best of my knowledge, however, this study was
the first to systematically explore the phenomenon. One reason might be
that previous attempts stumbled over contradictory and vague definitions
of the construct magical thinking. It is one accomplishment of the present
study, therefore, to have reviewed the existing literature on that issue and,
in an iterative Grounded Theory approach, to have designed a working
definition of magical thinking that would fit to be applied to the context
of bereavement. Another reason for the former research gap might be the
private and shameful nature of the phenomenon. In the present study,
longstanding experts of grief and grief therapy from a variety of academic
backgrounds were interviewed that were able to establish a therapeutic
relationship with their grieving clients and have wide experiences. These,
118 5 Discussion
then, were a main source of our catalogue of examples for bereavement-

specific magical thinking from which eight categories were derived by
qualitative analysis. In looking at those themes, it became apparent that
with magical thinking, bereaved people keep their deceased ‘undead’ as
the spontaneous ideations or beliefs inhibit the acceptance that a concrete
interaction is no longer possible. In anthropological terms, the deceased
lingers in liminality. It was postulated, that this state is a phenomenologi-
cal metaphor for an incomplete cognitive-affective reorganization of the
internal representation (Rubin, Malkinson & Witztum, 2003) of the loved
one. Thus, bereavement-specific magical thinking was formulated as a
separate construct that might interact with further grief variables. It is
important that practitioners are aware of the potential existence of that
phenomenon in their grieving clients as it might have negative individual
and interpersonal consequences like prolongation of grief symptoms or
becoming a victim of charlatanry. It might also affect therapy like in
magical therapy expectations and indications of certain therapeutic ele-
ments. With regard on practical implications, however, it must be kept in
mind that the present study was intended to be preliminary and leaves the
desideratum of directly speaking with those affected.
Appendices
Appendix A. Invitation to Study for Pretest
UNIVERSITÄT ZÜRICH
PSYCHOLOGISCHES INSTITUT
PSYCHOPATHOLOGIE UND KLINISCHE INTERVENTION
Expertenstudie: Schwere Trauer und Magisches Denken
Sehr geehrte/r Frau/Herr
Im geplanten ICD-11 wird die 'Prolongierte Trauerstörung' als neue Di-

agnose für die anhaltende schwere Trauer vorgeschlagen. Auch mit Blick
auf diese neue Diagnose setzt sich der Lehrstuhl für Psychopathologie
und Klinische Intervention der Universität Zürich mit den Veränderungen
im Denken und Erleben als Reaktion auf einen schwerwiegenden Verlust
auseinander. Es ist ein neuer Ansatz, dabei auf das Magische Denken der
Betroffenen zu fokussieren.
Bisherige Forschung konnte zeigen, dass Magisches Denken im Erwach-

senenalter besonders unter dem Einfluss von Stress auftritt. Der Tod eines
geliebten Menschen stellt nicht nur ein kritisches Lebensereignis dar,
sondern vielmehr sehen sich die nächsten Hinterbliebenen in der Folge-
zeit mit einer Vielzahl an Stressoren konfrontiert, die Magisches Denken
demnach begünstigen dürften. Basierend darauf, nimmt es sich die aktu-
elle Studie zum Ziel, eine kontextspezifische Definition Magischen Den-
kens zu erarbeiten. Ein Schwerpunkt liegt dabei auf der Frage nach Magi

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25002-7
120 Appendices
schem Denken und Verhalten im Alltag bei Trauernden, denen ihr Ver-
lust besonders schwer zusetzt.
Wir haben uns entschieden, hierzu in einem ersten Schritt Experten nach
ihren Erfahrungen im Umgang mit Patienten, die Magisches Denken
äusserten, zu fragen. Da einige Inhalte für die Betroffenen schambesetzt
sein könnten ('Aberglaube') oder sensible (etwa religiöse) Überzeugungen
tangieren könnten, die einem Aussenstehenden eher zurückhaltend offen-
bart werden, wird bewusst darauf verzichtet, direkt mit Betroffenen zu
sprechen. Zudem können Praktiker mit langjähriger klinischer Expertise
oft auf einen reichen Fundus an Erfahrungen und Beispielen zurückgrei-
fen.
Auf der letzten Seite dieses Dokuments finden Sie ausführlichere Infor-
mationen zu den Hintergründen unserer Studie.
Wenn wir Sie in den Forschungsprozess involvieren dürfen, genügt eine

kurze Mail an den Absender zur Vereinbarung eines persönlichen Tref-
fens; gerne bei Ihnen vor Ort. Der Zeitrahmen ist individuell anpassbar,
vorgesehen sind 60 bis 90 Minuten. Im Gespräch (Interview mit Ton-
band- Aufzeichnung) interessieren uns Ihre Überlegungen zu dem Zu-
sammenhang zwischen Magischem Denken und schwerer Trauer sowie
Ihre klinischen Erfahrungen und Fallbeispiele. Es müssen keine Namen
von PatientInnen genannt werden. Auf Wunsch können Sie unsere Fragen
alternativ auch schriftlich erhalten und beantworten.
Der übliche Datenschutz ist in jedem Fall selbstredend gewährleistet.
Ihr Beitrag hilft uns, wichtige Grundlagenforschung zu leisten und die

wissenschaftliche Theoriebildung von Beginn an in konkreten Beispielen
aus der klinischen Praxis zu begründen. Dies in einem Forschungsbe
Appendix A. Invitation to Study for Pretest 121
reich, der dank den Bemühungen, erstmals eine trauerspezifische Diagno-

se im neuen ICD- 11 zu verankern, in den letzten Jahren zunehmend Be-
achtung gefunden hat.
Wir hoffen auf Ihre Unterstützung und danken Ihnen schon jetzt für Ihr
Interesse! Für Rückfragen stehen wir gerne zur Verfügung.
Mit freundlichen Grüssen

Christian Lönneker
PS: Sie tun uns einen grossen Gefallen, wenn Sie dieses Mail auch an
interessierte KollegInnen weiterleiten.
Durchführung und Wissenschaftliche Gesamtleitung:

Kontakt: Betreuung:
Christian Lönneker MSc Iara Meili Prof. Dr. Dr. Andreas Maercker
Psychopathologie und Psychopathologie und Psychopathologie und
Klinische Intervention Klinische Intervention Klinische Intervention
Binzmühlestrasse 14/17 Binzmühlestrasse 14/17 Binzmühlestrasse 14/17
CH- 8050 Zürich CH- 8050 Zürich CH- 8050 Zürich
christian.loenneker@uzh.ch xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
122 Appendices
Das gesamte Projekt in der Übersicht

Das Projekt, für das Sie zur Teilnahme eingeladen wurden, trägt Erkennt-
nisse aus der rezenten Trauerforschung (etwa zu den Continuing Bonds
oder zur Symptomatologie der komplizierten oder prolongierten Trauer)
zusammen und betrachtet sie unter dem Aspekt des Magischen Denkens.
Im Fokus der theoretischen Arbeit steht die offensichtliche Verbrüderung
dieser Art der Weltauffassung mit der erschütternden Erfahrung von Tod
und Trauer.
Bereits in prähistorischen Bestattungsformen und Totenkulten sowie den
Jenseitsvorstellungen vergangener Kulturen spiegelt sich der Versuch der
Hinterbliebenen, Einfluss auf die Verstorbenen auszuüben, oder umge-
kehrt das Gefühl, unter ihrem Einfluss zu stehen. Wir sammeln entspre-
chende Beispiele und glauben daran, dass solche Befunde eine Bereiche-
rung für die kulturvergleichende Psychologie darstellen und allgemein
zugunsten einer kulturellen Sensibilität fungieren können. Von Beginn an
ist damit eine transkulturelle, interdisziplinäre und kontextspezifische
Definition Magischen Denkens angestrebt, die das gesamte Spektrum an
Phänomenen abdeckt: von der Kontaktaufnahme mit dem Verstorbenen,
über die Sorge für ein gutes jenseitiges Leben, bis hin zur Abwehr schäd-
licher Totengeister. Ob und wann Magisches Denken im Verlauf der in-
dividuellen Trauer adaptiv oder dysfunktional ist, gilt es empirisch zu
ermitteln.
Um das Ausmass und die Ausprägungsformen Magischen Denkens bei
Trauernden im rezenten deutschsprachigen Raum abschätzen zu können,
haben wir uns entschieden, parallel zur Literaturarbeit zunächst eine Ex-
pertenstudie durchzuführen. Die Ergebnisse sollen helfen, in einer späte-
ren Datenerhebung im Feld (siehe unten) die richtigen Fragen zu stellen,
denn wir gehen davon aus, dass manche Gedanken oder Verhaltenswei-
sen schambesetzt sind (Aberglaube) oder mit religiösen oder sonstigen
privaten Überzeugungen verbunden sein können. Die therapeutische Be-
ziehung, die Experten oftmals bereits aufbauen konnten, ist daher für eine
Appendix A. Invitation to Study for Pretest 123
explorative Studie eine wichtige Grundlage. Weitere Vorteile einer Ex-

pertenbefragung sind die Möglichkeit, Informationen über eine grössere
Zahl an individuellen Fällen zu erhalten, das Training der Experten das
gefragte Konstrukt hinter einer Vielzahl von manifesten Variablen zu
erkennen, und die Chance, die wissenschaftliche Theorie bereits in dieser
frühen Phase auf ihre praktische Relevanz zu testen. Umgesetzt wird die
Befragung in circa ein- bis anderthalbstündigen, semi- strukturierten In-
terviews mit Tonband- Aufzeichnung. Bei individueller Vorliebe wird
alternativ die Möglichkeit zur elektronischen Studienteilnahme angebo-
ten.
Forschungspraktisch folgen wir bei diesem Schritt der Grounded- Theo-
ry- Methodologie, die den Rahmen für eine qualitativ- kodierende In-
haltsanalyse der Antworten vorgibt. Gleichzeitig ist damit die Möglich-
keit verbunden, die Datenerhebung und -auswertung parallel zu gestalten
und die Interviewfragen an den laufenden Ergebnisstand anzupassen. In
der Folge werden nicht allen Teilnehmern die gleichen Fragen gestellt
und individuelle Schwerpunkte sind möglich.
In einem angedachten dritten Schritt (nach der Literaturarbeit und der
Expertenstudie) sollen, weiterhin zum Zweck der Theoriebildung, Be-
troffene selbst interviewt werden. Wie schon bei der Expertenstudie inte-
ressieren uns dabei insbesondere die Fälle, in denen ein aussergewöhnlich
starker Leidensdruck zur Inanspruchnahme professioneller Hilfe führt
(potentielle Kandidaten für eine Trauerstörung- Diagnose) oder Sympto-
me einer depressiven Episode oder Traumafolgestörung die Situation
erschweren.
Das Projekt wird in Gestalt einer Masterarbeit am Lehrstuhl für Psycho-
pathologie und Klinische Intervention der Universität Zürich (Prof. Dr.
Dr. A. Maercker) realisiert. Gleichzeitig war von Beginn an eine Publika-
tion von Teilen oder der gesamten Arbeit in englischer Sprache inten-
diert.
Appendix B. Invitation to Study for Formal Phase
Sehr geehrte/r Frau/Herr
Im geplanten ICD-11 wird die Prolongierte Trauerstörung als neue Di-

agnose für die anhaltende schwere Trauer vorgeschlagen. Auch mit Blick
auf diese neue Diagnose setzt sich die Fachrichtung für Psychopathologie
und Klinische Intervention der Universität Zürich mit den Veränderungen
im Denken und Erleben als Reaktion auf einen schwerwiegenden Verlust
auseinander. Es ist ein neuer Ansatz, dabei auf das Magische Denken der
Betroffenen zu fokussieren.
Bisherige Forschung konnte zeigen, dass Magisches Denken im Erwach-

senenalter besonders unter dem Einfluss von Stress auftritt. Der Tod eines
geliebten Menschen stellt ein kritisches Lebensereignis dar und wird in
der Folgezeit oftmals von einer Vielzahl an Stressoren begleitet. Ziel der
aktuellen Studie ist es, zu sondieren, ob Magisches Denken nach einem
Trauerfall somit tatsächlich eine relevante Rolle für den Trauerprozess
spielt und wie es sich zukünftig systematisch erschliessen lässt. Ein
Schwerpunkt liegt auf der Frage nach Magischem Denken im Alltag bei
Trauernden, denen ihr Verlust besonders schwer zusetzt.
126 Appendices
Wir haben uns entschieden, hierzu in einem ersten Schritt ExpertInnen

nach ihren Erfahrungen im Umgang mit PatientInnen/KlientInnen, die
Magisches Denken äusserten, zu fragen. Da einige Inhalte für die Be-
troffenen schambesetzt sein könnten (Aberglaube) oder sensible (etwa
religiöse) Überzeugungen tangieren könnten, die einem Aussenstehenden
eher zurückhaltend offenbart werden, wird bewusst darauf verzichtet,
direkt mit Betroffenen zu sprechen. Zudem können PraktikerInnen mit
langjähriger klinischer Expertise oft auf einen reichen Fundus an Erfah-
rungen und Beispielen zurückgreifen.
Wenn wir Sie in den Forschungsprozess involvieren dürfen, genügt eine

kurze Mail an den Absender zur Vereinbarung eines Termins. Das Inter-
view findet per Telefon oder Skype statt und wird von unserer Seite für
eine spätere Auswertung aufgezeichnet. Der Zeitrahmen ist individuell
anpassbar, vorgesehen sind circa 60 Minuten. Im Gespräch interessieren
uns Ihre Überlegungen zu dem Zusammenhang zwischen Magischem
Denken und schwerer Trauer sowie Ihre Erfahrungen und Fallbeispiele.
Es müssen keine Namen von PatientInnen genannt werden. Unsere Fra-
gen erhalten Sie zur optimalen Vorbereitung bereits vorab per Mail zuge-
sandt.
Der übliche Datenschutz ist in jedem Fall gewährleistet. Auf der letzten
Seite dieses Dokuments finden Sie ausführlichere Informationen zu den
Hintergründen unserer Studie.
Ihr Beitrag hilft uns, wichtige Grundlagenforschung zu leisten und die

wissenschaftliche Theoriebildung von Beginn an in konkreten Beispielen
aus der Praxis zu begründen. Dies in einem Forschungsbereich, der auch
dank den Bemühungen, erstmals eine trauerspezifische Diagnose im neu-
en ICD- 11 zu verankern, in den letzten Jahren zunehmend Beachtung
gefunden hat.
Appendix B. Invitation to Study for Formal Phase 127
Wir hoffen auf Ihre Unterstützung und danken Ihnen schon jetzt für Ihr
Interesse! Für Rückfragen stehen wir gerne zur Verfügung.
Mit freundlichen Grüssen

Christian Lönneker
PS: Sie tun uns einen grossen Gefallen, wenn Sie dieses Mail auch an
interessierte KollegInnen weiterleiten.

Kontakt: Betreuung:
BSc Christian Lönneker MSc Iara Meili Prof. Dr. Dr. Andreas Maercker
128 Appendices
Das gesamte Projekt in der Übersicht

Das Projekt, für das Sie zur Teilnahme eingeladen wurden, trägt Erkennt-
nisse aus der rezenten Trauerforschung (etwa zu fortdauernden Bindun-
gen (Continuing Bonds) oder zur Symptomatologie der komplizierten
oder prolongierten Trauer) zusammen und betrachtet sie unter dem As-
pekt des Magischen Denkens. Im Fokus einer vorbereitenden theoreti-
schen Arbeit stand dabei die Frage, wodurch sich Magisches Denken aus
psychologischer Sicht auszeichnet und warum es in der Folge von Tod
und Trauer zu erwarten sei.
Bereits in prähistorischen Bestattungsformen und Totenkulten sowie den
Jenseitsvorstellungen vergangener Kulturen spiegelt sich der Versuch der
Hinterbliebenen, Einfluss auf die Verstorbenen auszuüben, oder umge-
kehrt das Gefühl, unter ihrem Einfluss zu stehen. Wir beziehen entspre-
chende Beispiele ein und argumentieren, dass solche Befunde eine Berei-
cherung für die kulturvergleichende Psychologie darstellen können. Von
Beginn an ist damit eine transkulturelle, interdisziplinäre und kontextspe-
zifische Definition Magischen Denkens angestrebt, die das gesamte
Spektrum an Phänomenen abdeckt: von der Kontaktaufnahme mit dem
Verstorbenen, über die Sorge für ein gutes jenseitiges Leben, bis hin zur
Abwehr schädlicher Totengeister. Ob und wann Magisches Denken im
Verlauf der individuellen Trauer adaptiv oder dysfunktional ist und ob es
mit anhaltendem Leidensdruck nach einem Todesfall in Verbindung
steht, gilt es empirisch zu ermitteln.
Um das Ausmass und die Ausprägungsformen Magischen Denkens bei
Trauernden im rezenten deutschsprachigen Raum abschätzen zu können,
haben wir uns entschieden, zunächst eine Expertenstudie durchzuführen.
Die Ergebnisse sollen helfen, in einer späteren Datenerhebung im Feld
(siehe unten) die richtigen Fragen zu stellen, denn wir gehen davon aus,
dass manche Gedanken oder Verhaltensweisen schambesetzt sind (Aber-
glaube) oder mit religiösen oder sonstigen privaten Überzeugungen ver-
bunden sein können. Die therapeutische Beziehung, die Experten oftmals
Appendix B. Invitation to Study for Formal Phase 129
bereits aufbauen konnten, ist daher für eine explorative Studie eine wich-
tige Grundlage. Weitere Vorteile einer Expertenbefragung sind die Mög-
lichkeit, Informationen über eine grössere Zahl an individuellen Fällen zu
erhalten, das Training der Experten das gefragte Konstrukt hinter einer
Vielzahl von manifesten Variablen zu erkennen, und die Chance, die
wissenschaftliche Theorie bereits in dieser frühen Phase auf ihre prakti-
sche Relevanz zu testen. Umgesetzt wird die Befragung in circa ein- bis
anderthalbstündigen, (semi-)strukturierten Interviews per Telefon/Skype.
Die Gespräche werden für eine spätere Auswertung von unserer Seite
aufgezeichnet.
Forschungspraktisch folgen wir bei diesem Schritt der Grounded- Theo-
ry- Methodologie, die den Rahmen für eine qualitativ- kodierende In-
haltsanalyse der Antworten vorgibt. Gleichzeitig ist damit die Möglich-
keit verbunden, die Datenerhebung und -auswertung parallel zu gestalten
und die Interviewfragen an den laufenden Ergebnisstand anzupassen. In
der Folge werden nicht allen Teilnehmern die gleichen Fragen gestellt
und individuelle Schwerpunkte sind möglich.
In einem angedachten dritten Schritt (nach der Literaturarbeit und der
Expertenstudie) sollen, weiterhin zum Zweck der Theoriebildung, Be-
troffene selbst interviewt werden. Wie schon bei der Expertenstudie inte-
ressieren uns dabei insbesondere die Fälle, in denen ein aussergewöhnlich
starker Leidensdruck zur Inanspruchnahme professioneller Hilfe führt
(potentielle Kandidaten für eine Trauerstörung- Diagnose) oder Sympto-
me einer depressiven Episode oder Traumafolgestörung die Situation
erschweren.
Das Projekt wird derzeit in Gestalt einer Masterarbeit am Lehrstuhl für
Psychopathologie und Klinische Intervention der Universität Zürich
(Prof. Dr. Dr. A. Maercker) realisiert. Gleichzeitig war von Beginn an
eine Publikation von Teilen oder der gesamten Arbeit in englischer Spra-
che intendiert.
Appendix C. Question Catalogue (discarded)
Universität Zürich
Psychologisches Institut
Psychopathologie und Klinische Intervention

Fragenkatalog
Wir bedanken uns schon jetzt bei Ihnen, dass wir Sie für unsere For-
schung konsultieren dürfen. Mit der vorliegenden Studie möchten wir das
Fundament für einen neuen Ansatz zum Verständnis klinisch relevanter
Trauer legen.
• Die folgenden neun offenen Fragen können direkt hier im Word-
Dokument (.docx) oder in einer separaten Datei (dann bitte zusätz-
lich als PDF abspeichern) beantwortet und retourniert werden.
• Alle Fragen können beliebig ausführlich beantwortet werden. Das
Auslassen einzelner Fragen ist selbstverständlich möglich (für eine
Begründung wären wir sehr dankbar!).
• Aufgrund unseres methodischen Vorgehens (parallele Datenerhe-
bung und -auswertung) erhält nicht jede/r Teilnehmer/in die gleichen
Fragen.
• Inhaltliche Rückfragen von unserer Seite würden wir gerne auf weni-
ge Ausnahmen beschränken. Der Austausch weiterführender Überle-
gungen per Mail oder persönlich ist auf Wunsch möglich.
• Unsere Fragen zielen auf Erfahrungen und professionelle Meinun-
gen. Auch wenn Ihnen in Ihrer praktischen Tätigkeit ein erfragtes
Phänomen nie begegnet ist, ist dies eine wichtige Erkenntnis für uns.
132 Appendices
Magisches Denken als theoretisches Konstrukt
Magisches Denken ist im klinischen Setting kein geläufiger Begriff. Uns

interessiert, welches Verständnis Sie allgemein in Bezug auf dieses Kon-
strukt mitbringen (losgelöst von seiner Erscheinung bei Trauer o.ä.). Es
gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten.
I. Obwohl es in der Anthropologie, Psychologie und verwandten

Disziplinen vielfältige Versuche gegeben hat, bleibt es schwierig,
alle Formen magischen Denkens in einer Definition zu beschrei-
ben. Was verstehen Sie unter Magischem Denken und womit as-
soziieren Sie den Begriff am ehesten?
Ihre Antwort:
II. In welcher Beziehung stehen irrationales Denken, Aberglaube,

religiöse Überzeugungen, paranormale Vorstellungen oder Inhal-
te des Volksglaubens (kulturell geprägte Annahmen) zu Magi-
schem Denken?
Ihre Antwort:
Magisches Denken bei schwerer Trauer
In der vorliegenden Studie wird es vermieden, Kriterien festzulegen ab

wann Trauer als schwer oder krankheitswertig zu klassifizieren sei. Bitte
denken Sie bei den folgenden Fragen an PatientInnen aus Ihrer prakti-
schen Tätigkeit, die aufgrund eines Leidensdrucks, der sich aus ihrer
Trauer ergab, zu Ihnen kamen, oder bei denen der Umgang mit einem
schwerwiegenden Verlust im Rahmen der Therapiesitzungen thematisiert
werden musste.
Appendix C. Question Catalogue (discarded) 133
III. Welche Gedankengänge und Aussagen haben Sie bei Trauernden

beobachtet, hinter denen Ihrer Meinung nach Magisches Denken
steht? (Möglichst viele und konkrete Beispiele)
Ihre Antwort:
IV. Von welchen Verhaltensweisen haben Sie erfahren, die im Zu-

sammenhang mit einem zurückliegenden Verlust standen und die
Sie auf Magisches Denken zurückführen würden? (Möglichst vie-
le und konkrete Beispiele)
Ihre Antwort:
V. Wie bewerten die Betroffenen selbst solche Gedanken und Ver-

haltensweisen?
Ihre Antwort:
VI. Lassen sich Parallelen zu anderen (sub-) klinischen Störungsbil-

dern ziehen?
Ihre Antwort:
Klinische Relevanz
VII. Bei welcher Gruppe von Trauernden (Rolle des Verstorbenen/

des Verlusts oder Art und Weise des Todesfalls) ist das Magische
Denken Ihres Ermessens nach besonders ausgeprägt?
Ihre Antwort:
134 Appendices
VIII. Welchen Stellenwert nimmt das Magische Denken im Rahmen

von Trauer Ihrer Ansicht nach ein? (Z.B. Coping-Mechanismus,
Leitsymptom, aggravierender Faktor, zufällige Erscheinung, …?)
Ihre Antwort:
IX. Welche Bedeutung messen Sie der offenen Thematisierung Ma-

gischen Denkens bei Trauernden im klinischen Alltag bei? (Z.B.
in Patienten- oder Angehörigengesprächen, Rapporten, im Rah-
men der Behandlungsstrategie, …?)
Ihre Antwort:
Abschliessend wären wir für einige Angaben zu Ihrer Person dankbar:
Muttersprache:
Beruf/ Abschlüsse:
Spezialisierung auf folgende(s) Störungsbild(er)/ Diagnose(n):
Jahre Berufspraxis:
Vielen Dank!
Kontaktperson:
Christian Lönneker, BSc
Universität Zürich, Psychologisches Institut
Psychopathologie und Klinische Intervention
Binzmühlestr. 14/17
CH- 8050 Zürich
christian.loenneker@uzh.ch
Appendix D. Leading Questions (Interviews 19 th Feb. – 15th Mar.)
Expertenstudie: Anhaltende schwere Trauer und Magisches

Denken
Leitfragen
Wir bedanken uns schon jetzt, dass wir Sie für unsere Forschung konsul-
tieren dürfen. Mit der aktuellen Studie möchten wir einen bislang wenig
beachteten Aspekt der klinisch relevanten Trauer erschliessen und Er-
kenntnisse für eine zukünftige systematische Erfassung gewinnen.
Magisches Denken wird in der psychologischen Literatur uneinheitlich

definiert, allerdings verweisen etliche Befunde darauf, dass es im Er-
wachsenenalter häufiger auftritt als vielleicht vermutet. Psychisch stark
belastende Situationen scheinen sein Auftreten generell zu begünstigen.
Auch wenn das Erarbeiten einer (trauerspezifischen) Definition Magi-

schen Denkens ein Ziel unserer Studie ist, möchten wir in unserem Ge-
spräch von folgender Grundlage ausgehen: Magisches Denken ist der
Glauben, dass eine Ursache (eine Handlung, ein Gedanke) zu einer
Wirkung führt, die fernab einer wissenschaftlichen Erklärung liegt.
Die Person muss dabei nicht (aber kann) der festen Überzeugung sein,
dass es sich dabei um ein wirkliches Geschehen handelt – im Gegenteil
136 Appendices
scheint sich Magisches Denken häufig als spontaner Gedanke aufzudrän-

gen, dem dann aber doch eine gewisse Relevanz beigemessen wird.
Bitte sehen die folgenden Fragen als Strukturierungshilfe bei der Überle-
gung, ob Ihnen solche Phänomene bei Betroffenen mit schwerer Trauer
begegnet sind. Sie brauchen die Fragen selbstverständlich nicht schrift-
lich zu beantworten, sie sollen im Gespräch lediglich einen Leitfaden
bieten.
I.
Haben Sie Beispiele für trauernde Menschen mit dem Gedanken, ihren
Verlust ins Leben zurückbringen zu können?
➢ Was müsse dafür getan werden?
➢ An wen könne man sich wenden?
➢ Was müsse dafür unterlassen werden?
II.
Welche Objekte/Gegenstände sind für die Trauernden besonders stark
mit dem Verstorbenen verbunden?
➢ Wie wird diese Verbindung begründet?
➢ Wie werden solche Objekte/Gegenstände behandelt?
III.
Beschäftigen sich Menschen mit schwerer Trauer überdurchschnittlich
viel mit paranormalen Themen (z.B. Séancen, Spiritismus) oder volks-
tümlicher Mythologie (z.B. Teilnahme des Verstorbenen an der Wilden
Jagd)?
Appendix D. Leading Questions (Interviews 19th Feb. – 15th Mar.) 137
IV.
Können Sie Beispiele dafür nennen, auf welche Weise Trauernde Ein-
fluss auf den Verstorbenen zu nehmen versuchen?
➢ Was wird unternommen?
➢ Zu welchem Zweck/mit welchem Ziel?
V.
Haben Sie von Menschen mit schwerer Trauer von Magischem Denken
mit direktem Bezug auf den toten Körper/Leichnam gehört?
➢ Wo befand sich der Leichnam zu diesem Zeitpunkt?
VI.
Können Sie konkrete Beispiele für Magisches Denken in Verbindung mit
Gedanken zur Todesursache nennen?
➢ Welche Rolle spielt Magisches Denken in den Fragen nach Schuld
und Beschuldigung?
➢ Ziehen Betroffene Konsequenzen aus dem "Lauf der Din-
ge"/"Schicksal", die Sie auf Magisches Denken zurückführen wür-
den?
VII.
Können Sie Beispiele dafür nennen, auf welche Weise die Verstorbenen
Einfluss auf das alltägliche Leben der Trauernden nehmen?
➢ Was wird unterlassen/ müsse unterlassen werden?
➢ Wozu "bringen" die Verstorbenen die Hinterbliebenen?
138 Appendices
➢ Was wird im Falle von Zuwiderhandlungen befürchtet?

➢ Kennen Sie Fälle, in denen sich die Trauernden in ihrem Sein von
dem Verstorbenen beeinflusst wähnen?
VIII.
Welche Orte sind für die Trauernden besonders stark mit dem Verstorbe-
nen verbunden?
➢ Wie wird diese Verbindung begründet?
➢ Werden die Orte eher aufgesucht oder gemieden? Warum?
➢ Was tun die Trauernden an solchen Orten?
IX.
Auf welche Weise kommunizierten die Trauernden, die zu Ihnen kamen,
mit den Verstorbenen?
➢ Alltagskommunikation?
➢ Ritualisierte Kontaktaufnahme?
X.
Für uns besonders wichtig: Gibt es weitere Aspekte Magischen Denkens
bei Schwerer Trauer, die wir mit unseren Fragen nicht abgedeckt haben?
Grundsätzlich: Haben Sie weitere (Alltags-) Verhaltensweisen bei Men-

schen mit Schwerer Trauer beobachtet, die Ihnen durchweg irrational
oder unerklärlich erschienen?
Appendix D. Leading Questions (Interviews 19th Feb. – 15th Mar.) 139
Zusatzfragen
i.
Wie bewerten die Betroffenen selbst solche Gedanken und Verhaltens-
weisen?
➢ Ist Magisches Denken bei Schwerer Trauer schambesetzt?
➢ Wird es als störend oder erleichternd wahrgenommen?
ii.
Ereignet sich das Magische Denken in einer bestimmten situationalen
Affektlage?
➢ Gefühle des Besonderen, Nicht- Alltäglichen?
iii.
Bei welcher Gruppe von Trauernden ist das Magische Denken Ihres
Ermessens nach besonders ausgeprägt?
➢ Rolle des Verstorbenen/ des Verlusts
➢ Art und Weise des Todesfalls
iv.
Welchen Stellenwert nimmt das Magische Denken im Rahmen von Trau-
er Ihrer Ansicht nach ein?
➢ Z.B. Coping-Mechanismus, Leitsymptom, aggravierender Faktor,
zufällige Erscheinung, …
140 Appendices
v.
Welche Bedeutung messen Sie der offenen Thematisierung Magischen
Denkens bei Trauernden im klinischen Alltag bei?
➢ Z.B. in Patienten- oder Angehörigengesprächen, Rapporten, im Rah-
men der Behandlungsstrategie, …

Kontakt: Betreuung:
BSc Christian Lönneker MSc Iara Meili Prof. Dr. Dr. Andreas Maercker
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Christian Lönneker

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/13198

ISSN 2625-3577 ISSN 2625-3615 (electronic)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018965930

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2018

Making a contribution in this regard is Christian Lönneker’s book Magi-

Lönneker focuses on the Delphi-method study as performed by experts

From my personal standpoint, the current investigation is very fruitful for

We as psychotherapists have to learn that not all non-rational views and

It is from the still relatively new psychological subdiscipline of cultural

Berlin, September 2018

Andreas Maercker, PhD MD

4.3.1 Themes of bereavement-related magical thinking ............. 82

5 Discussion ......................................................................................... 105

Appendices .......................................................................................... 119

References ........................................................................................... 141

APA American Psychological Association

Table 1: Overview of Study Participants ................................................ 58

Figure 1: The Anatomy of the Study ...................................................... 52

1.1.1 Seriousness of grief reactions

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2018

searching, social withdrawal), and physiological (e.g. loss of appetite,

1.1.2 Current efforts to establish a grief-specific diagnosis

developing psychiatric disorders like major depressive disorder, panic

1.2 Death and Beliefs

1.2.1 Common narratives and beliefs

1.2.2 Religious, superstitious, paranormal, magical, or …?

1.3 Research Questions and Aims

complicated grief (CG) and will be covered by the diagnosis of prolonged

that is conducted. In this expert study it is aimed to collect examples for

2.1 Bereavement and Psychopathology

2.1.1 Bereavement, grief, and mourning

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2018

2.1.1.1 Cultural differences

2.1.1.2 Grief and the prehistoric origins of burial

dated to ~3.2myr BP (before present) at Hadar, situated in Ethiopia’s

Africa as “[m]ortuary defleshing and curation of crania among African

2.1.1.3 Rites of passage

2.1.2 Theories of grief

2.1.2.1 Grief work

2.1.2.2 Process models

Kübler-Ross’s stage of bargaining seem to perfectly fit common defini-

resentation of the deceased, which is a loss-oriented stressor in the dual-

2.1.2.3 Attachment perspective

2.1.2.4 Continuing Bonds

2011, p. 220), among others. Sometimes, psychic mediums are visited to

Finally, a bond with the deceased can be continued simply by

In sum, continuing bonds include the “reorganization of the cog-

2.1.3 Psychopathology of grief

2.1.3.1 History of pathological grief

special emphasis on psychosomatic aspects of morbid grief that in his

fragmented sense of trust, security and control (Prigerson & Jacobs,

2.1.3.2 Status of diagnostics

2.1.3.3 Symptomatology of Prolonged Grief Disorder

2.2 Perspectives on Magical Thinking

2.2.1 Anthropological notions of magical thinking

entities are in a causal relationship simply because of their semblance

that magic is based on a mode of thought deployed on performativity and

2.2.2 Developmental psychology

He subsumed this form of thinking by egocentrism and emphasized the

2.2.3 Superstitions in daily life

Mussweiler, 2010). In the same manner, people avoid walking under

2.2.3.1 Sympathetic magic and essentialism