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Karbala International Journal of Modern Science 2 (2016) 276e279
http://www.journals.elsevier.com/karbala-international-journal-of-modern-science/
Abstract
Scientists at universities across Iraq are actively working to report actual incidents and accidents occurring in their laboratories
in order to raise awareness and encourage openness, leading to widespread adoption of robust Chemical Safety and Security (CSS)
practices. In this study, we describe a serious event that resulted in a postgraduate student sustaining serious injuries when the
biological safety cabinet (BSC) she was using exploded. Of particular note, the paper highlights how a combination of failures and
deficiencies at many levels within an organization and its technical community (rather than a single piece of faulty equipment or the
careless behaviour of one person) can lead to a dangerous, potentially life-threatening incident. By openly sharing what happened
along with the lessons learnt from the accident, we hope to minimize the possibility of another researcher being injured in a similar
incident in the future.
© 2016 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of University of Kerbala. This is an open access article
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.kijoms.2016.11.001
2405-609X/© 2016 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of University of Kerbala. This is an open access article under
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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W.H. Al-Dahhan et al. / Karbala International Journal of Modern Science 2 (2016) 276e279 277
the student turned on the LPG and when she lit it.
While the High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) fil-
ters inside BSCs remove particulates and microorgan-
isms, they do not remove fumes from the air inside the
cabinet. Furthermore, BSCs are not designed for
Bunsen burners to be used inside them. Fortunately,
the injuries were not serious and the explosion was
contained within the BSC and the surrounding area
(Figs. 3e6).
The researcher was taken by ambulance to the
hospital, where she received stitches above her eyes
and other treatment for her injuries. She was released
and sent home the same day.
Fig. 1. Glass shards remain in the frame of the sash in this BSC after 3. CSS committee findings
an explosion in a university laboratory.
After the explosion, the university's CSS Committee
investigated, using guidelines published by the Amer-
incident. The CSS Committee's findings and associated
ican Chemical Society (ACS) and the Centre for
lessons learnt are summarized in this manuscript in
Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) [3e5]. They found
order to minimize the possibility of a similar incident
the following deficiencies within the department that
or accident occurring in the future.
contributed to the incident:
2. Incident description
The department leadership failed to exercise
effective oversight or to hold its staff and students
A postgraduate (M.Sc.) student researcher was
accountable for safety and security management.
using a Bunsen burner for hygiene purposes before
Lessons learnt from previous incidents, which
starting an experiment in a BSC involving Mesen-
might have encouraged measures to be adopted to
chymal Stem Cells (Fig. 2). When she ignited the
prevent this incident from occurring were not
Bunsen burner, it exploded, sending glass towards her
collected or communicated to department staff.
face and upper torso and starting a fire, which singed
the researcher's clothes.
Furthermore, the CSS Committee identified that at
The explosion was caused by a build-up of Liquid
the time of the accident, the university had not desig-
Petroleum Gas (LPG) that had accumulated in the BSC
nated an individual responsible for communicating
during a three-to-five-minute delay between the when
staff's and students' laboratory safety obligations, or of
Fig. 2. BSC with Bunsen burner inside. Fig. 3. Damage to the secondary roof and lighting system.
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278 W.H. Al-Dahhan et al. / Karbala International Journal of Modern Science 2 (2016) 276e279