Logical analysis of the first 6 proofs in the Ethics1

Raymundo Morado

Some logicians have discussed the possibility of formalizing Spinoza's system. Such an
undertaking, however, is doomed to be unsuccessful given the complexity of his texts.
Arne Naess, p. 5.2
I. Purpose
In february 1678, Leibniz wrote to Henry Justel that Spinoza's Ethics had at last been
published. He considered the book to be dangerous.
Not only the book contained "paradoxes". It was also guilty of lack of clarity and of
faulty logic. The first accusation is repeated several times, from very discrete tones ("he does not
always sufficiently explain his opinions") to exasperated ones:
The demonstration [of proposition 29 of part I] is obscure and abrupt, being carried
through by means of the abrupt, obscure, and questionable propositions which have
preceded it.3
In more than one passage I have been tempted to agree with Leibniz. With several key
terms it is as if the clue to make the usage of that term fit in an harmonic pattern, were not
provided by Spinoza. As Wolfson once wrote, it feels as if in the Ethics Spinoza were talking,
not to us, but to himself. And Wolfson confesses that some of the utterances of Spinoza in that
book are elliptical, fragmentary, disjointed, and oftentimes, if we are to admit the truth to
ourselves, enigmatic and unintelligible.4
Of course, it is hard to tell what this phenomenon shows. Maybe we have been unable to
decipher messages that will appear crystal clear to better scholars... Perhaps. In any case, this
doubt will tend to reappear as we assess Leibniz's second criticism of Spinoza, the charge of
faulty logic.
In Leibniz' note to the proof of proposition 20, Leibniz comments that Spinoza needed
not mention the eternity of attributes. It was, he continues, "introduced as an empty pretentious
device to twist the whole into the form of a demonstration. Reasoning of this kind is very
common among men who do not know the true art of demonstration." The second accusation is
simply that Spinoza does not know how to prove things. Indeed, Leibniz was so dissatisfied with
what Spinoza offered as proofs, that in the letter to Justel mentioned supra he uses Spinoza as an

1
I thank the comments of Paul D. Eisenberg. This work is different and independent from
other attempts at fomalizing the Ethics in logic, e.g., the MSc Thesis (Afstudeerscriptie), A
formalization of Spinoza's Ethics, Part 1: Consequences for interpretation of Pablo Sierra
Márquez at the Universiteit van Amsterdam and defended April 21, 2017.
2 Arne Naess, Freedom, Emotion, and Self-subsistence: The Structure of a Central part of
Spinoza's "Ethics." Filosofiske Problemer, no. 42. Oslo-Bergen-Tromsr Universitetsforlaget,
1976.
3
G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, L. Loemker (ed.). Reidel (1976), p.
203.
4
H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes of His
Reasoning. Harvard U. P. (1962), p.6.

1
example of what happens when we depart from rigorous demonstrations.5 J. Bennett agrees with
this criticism and adds that Spinoza "was not skilled at constructing strictly valid arguments or at
criticizing invalid ones."6
There is only one way to assess this criticism: to go over the proofs and check if we can
give them some reasonable interpretation that will make them acceptable. I will confine myself
with respect to the first criticism to the analyses of the group of proofs that Wolfson identifies as
talking about the unity of substance, propositions 2 to 6 of the first part of the Ethics (I will also
add proposition 1). With respect to the second criticism I will examine the proof of 1p2.

II. Disconnected and circuitous steps

The more general complaint against a treatise intended to be more geometrico is its lack
of a good structure. We are used to the cumulative pattern of deductive inferences where every
new deduction not only increases our explicit knowledge but also points to the relational
structure of the truths in our system. If we are to use the geometrical method we can expect to
discover something about the objects of study just by discovering the way some propositions
come from others. But, according to Leibniz,
Our author's mind seems to have been most tortuous; he rarely proceeds by a clear and
natural route but always advances in disconnected and circuitous steps, and most of his
demonstrations surprise the mind instead of enlightening it .7
Is Leibniz's criticism correct? At least with respect to the first group of propositions in the
Ethics, no. The structure of this first block of propositions can be represented like this:

5
Leibniz, op. cit., p. 194.
6
J. Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics . Hackett (1984) p. 28.
7
Leibniz, op. cit., p. 204.

2
 The first thing to notice is that the structure of these first six proofs "culminates" in
proposition VI. It makes no explicit use of any definition but numbers 3, 4 and 5, and no axioms
but 1, 4, 5 and 6.
In order to get proposition VI the way Spinoza did, it is necessary to have, inter alia,
propositions II, III and V, but the order is not relevant. It is important, on the other hand, to have
propositions I and IV preceding proposition V.
So, the most natural way of presenting Spinoza's proofs seems to be to start by giving
definition 3 and getting proposition II; then adding definition 5 to get proposition I. Afterwards,
we only need to add definition 4 and axiom 1 to have proposition IV. One step ahead is to add
axiom 6 and we reach proposition V. Proposition III falls out of this cumulative pattern. It comes
out from axioms 4 and 5. And from all this we can now obtain proposition VI. This is:
D3
---
II D5
------------
I D4 A1
-----------------------
IV A6 A4 A5
---------------------- ---------
V III
-------------------------
VI
We have just interchanged propositions I and II for a more gradual introduction of the
definitions, and we have isolated the proof of proposition III which is, in fact, different from the
rest of the first five proofs. This is indeed a very slight change in structure. If Leibniz's criticism
were correct with respect to this block of proofs, we could have expected more drastic changes,
but, at least if we confine ourselves to these propositions, Spinoza's way of structuring his work
is almost perfect.
Let us now see the relevant Definitions, Axioms and Propositions:8
Definition 3. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other
words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.
Definition 4. By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of
substance.
Definition 5. By mode, I mean the modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and is
conceived through, something other than itself.
Axiom 1. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else.
Axiom 4. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause.
Axiom 5. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the
other; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.
Axiom 6. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.
Proposition I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.
Proposition II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in common.
Proposition III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other.

8
I follow here Elwes' translation. Nuances are noted below.

3
Proposition IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other, either by the
difference of the attributes of the substances, or by the difference of their modifications.
Proposition V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same
nature or attribute.
Proposition VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance.
In what follows, we shall use the following symbols:
S___ = ___ is a substance
___ A___ = ___ is an attribute of ___
___ M___ = ___ is a mode of ___
___ C___ = ___ is the cause of ___
__ CO__ __ = ___ has ___ in common with ___
CN___ = Someone has the conception of ___
___ P___ = ___ is prior in nature to ___
___ AT___ = ___ is apprehended through ___

III. THE PROOF OF PROPOSITION II.

Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in common. That is to say,
(y) (z) {<Sy & Sz & -(x)- (xAy  -xAz)>  (x)- (yCOxz)}.9
For Spinoza this is an evident consequence of definition 3, the definition of substance, as
that which exists in itself and is conceived through itself. But first, what is it "to exist in itself"?
Suppose that it means that a substance can exist without anything else. Then the formalization of
the definition of "x is a substance" (Sx) would include (y)(E!y y=x), i.e., it is possible that x
were everything that existed. The problem with this is the fact that according to proposition XVI,
the substance is necessarily accompanied by attributes, an infinity of them in fact. If we answer
that the substance is its attributes,10 we would have still to explain the presence of modes. We
cannot say that although they exist with the substance it could be otherwise, because nothing in
the universe is contingent (proposition XXIX). And substance must be different from its
modifications if it is going to be "prior in nature" to them (see 1p1). Since "priority in nature" is
an asymmetrical relation (and therefore irreflexive), substance and modes cannot be the same.
Perhaps this "in se" reduces to causal independence, as Bennett seems to think, or to
being a transcendent whole, as Wolfson wants it. In any case, Spinoza tries to go from this being
in itself and being conceived through itself to not having anything in common with any other
substance.

9
As you can notice, we make no assumptions with regard to whether Spinoza deals here
with substances which have only one attribute or not. At the end of the analysis of this
proposition it will be clear, I hope, why we do not have to make any.
10
Leibniz's own answer is that "an attribute is indeed in a substance but is conceived
through itself." Id., p. 197. Here we can remember that in prop. X Spinoza will say that
unumquodque unius substantiae attributum per se concipit debet . So, an attribute is partially
similar to and partially different from substance. (Although in a letter to Oldenburg Spinoza used
the word "attribute" in the sense in which he is now using "substance", it seems clear that he has
changed the meaning of "attribute" in the Ethics.)

4
 Of course, if we could just say that whatever is in itself is not in another, perhaps we
could find some sense in which, if a substance is not in another, then they have nothing in
common (at least ontologically).
But now the problem is that from being in itself there is no way either in Spinoza's
definitions or in his axioms to infer not being in another. Axiom 1 comes close to accomplishing
this task, saying that everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else.
Unfortunately, this "or" is a vel, which could be read as an inclusive disjunction, and not the
exclusive disjunction Spinoza needed (perhaps an aut ).
Parallel problems arise for "conceived through itself". Commenting on the definition of
attributes Leibniz writes that the concept of the attribute is necessary to form the concept of the
substance ."11
Trying to clarify what he meant by "that which is conceived through itself" Spinoza
added to the definition: "that of which a conception can be formed independently of the
conception of any other object." That would be
(A) (y)(CNy  y=x).
In the proof of proposition II, Spinoza offered a second paraphrase: "the conception of
one does not imply the conception of the other(s)." Are these two paraphrases really equivalent?
The second one would be:
(B) -(y=x)   -(CNx  CNy)
taking "imply" as "strictly imply."
(B) is not equivalent to (A). Suppose there is only one element in the domain of
discourse, present in all possible worlds, and that in no possible world CNz. Then (A) can be
false while (B) is true.
This difference is important because if we say that attributes are in some sense the ways
an intellect thinks of the substance, a possibility Leibniz himself considers in his notes to
proposition IV, then the conception of some attribute or other would be always necessary for an
intellect when it tries to conceive of the substance (that is the negation of (A) with CN relativized
to all possible intellects) but there would be no attribute such that precisely that one had to be
conceived by all possible intellects (that is, (B)). Of course, since our intellects do conceive of
Extension and Thought, and everything that happens is supposed to be necessary, then it is
necessary for us to conceive them. But for other possible intellects that might not be the case. My
conclusion is that if this kind of subjectivist interpretation of the attributes is right, then the (B)
formulation is enough to cope with Leibniz's objections.
Another problem is that Spinoza's classification is not exhaustive. There are sixteen
different possible combinations with "being in itself," "being conceived through itself," "being in
another," and "being conceived through another" and their negations. Even if we were able to say
that x is in itself iff it is not in another, and is conceived through itself iff it is not conceived
through another, there would be still four combinations remaining:
(1) In itself and conceived through itself (Substance)
(2) In another and conceived through another (Mode)
(3) In itself and conceived through another
(4) In another and conceived through itself.

11
Op. cit., p. 196.

5
 At the beginning of the Ethics, we have no way to rule out the last two possibilities. (And
among the other twelve, we have four cases in which something is both in itself and in another.)
So, the hypothesis that two different substances have nothing in common ontologically because
they are not in each other (this in turn because they are in themselves), is weakened. If this was
the way Spinoza thought, he has not given us enough basis at this point to follow him. This in
turn strengthens Leibniz's position when he accepts combination number 3 for substances
(number 4 corresponds to attributes according to him). He mentions that it seems true that some
things are in themselves, though they are not conceived through themselves, "and this is how
men commonly conceive of substances."12
To some degree, it is true that this was a common view. F. Burgersdijck, for instance,
wrote that
Substantia est Ens per se subsistens. Per se subsistens non excludit in hac definitione
dependentiam ab omnibus causis (nam hoc sensu nullum Ens dici potest per se subsistere
quam solo Deus) sed solummodo dependentiam a subjecto.13
Here a substance is not a mode of a subjecto, but it can have a cause other than itself through
which it is thought. Of course, the tension between Leibniz and Spinoza could be seen here as
the result of a notion of substance weak enough to accommodate Leibniz's monads, and the
strong notion of substance that some fourteen years before the Ethics Spinoza had already
sketched in the Korte Verhandeling . In the ninth section of the first Zamenspreeking (dialogue)
Reason tells Desire that there is only one substance in which all other attributes are:
Reede: klaarlyk zie ik dat'er maar een eenige is, de welke door zig zelve bestaat, en van
alle de andere eigenschappen een onderhouwder is.
Reason continues saying that the corporeal (lighaamelyke) and the intellectual (verstandige) are
but modes (wyzen) of this substance.
Whether the origin of the tension is Leibniz's desire to call the monads substances14, or
not, his criticism of the second proof need not prejudge us on these matters. Leibniz points out
that the phrase "diversa attributa habentes" is ambiguous. It can mean "having all their attributes
different," in which case it is easy to accept that the two substances have nothing in common.
But it can also mean "having some attributes different," and from the fact that x and y do not
have all their attributes the same it does not directly follow that they do not have some of them in
common. Bennett reads proposition II as "two substances which have no attributes in common
have nothing in common."15
Leibniz would readily accept that this reading saves the day for Spinoza. But he would
insist that if we substitute no for not all of their, then the proof fails if we want to talk of really
different attributes. Bennett offers an argument for not all of their which basically dwells on the
thesis that there would be no reason why, if two substances share one attribute, they do not share
12
Idem ., p. 196.
13
Quoted in Wolfson, op. cit., p. 64, n. 2. For the idea that concrete beings can be called
substances vid . Wolfson, op. cit., p. 80. To give a glimpse of the extent to which Spinoza's
notions diverged from common ones, consider the passage in the letter from Oldenburg to
Spinoza of September 27th 1661, where Oldenburg writes that two men are two substances with
the same attribute, inasmuch as both are rational.
14
Loemker seems to think so. See his note 1 on p. 205 of Leibniz, Philosophical ...
15
J. Bennett, op. cit ., pp. 69-70.

6
all of them. Bennett himself doubts the soundness of this explanatory rationalism and we shall
not follow this strategy.
Clearly, if there were only one attribute per substance, having some attributes different
would be equivalent to having all of them different. If we say that Spinoza is talking in this
passage only of one-attribute substances, his proof would go through. This is the tactic E. Curley,
inter al., adopts, assuming Spinoza is making at this stage of the Ethics the Cartesian assumption
that each substance has properly only one attribute.16
If Curley's thesis were true, it would relieve (at least in this group of propositions)
another major tension I think I detect between Spinoza and Leibniz. It centers around the thesis
that God can have more than one attribute expressing the same substance and conceived through
itself. The reason might be found in something Leibniz wrote one and a half years (November of
1676) before his notes on the Ethics. Leibniz remarks that to make the ontological argument go
through he needs to show that there is no contradiction in the notion of a being having all
perfections at once. This would be easy to show if all perfections were unanalyzable. The reason
seems to be, although Leibniz does not explicitly mention it, that a contradiction between
properties can arise only from the complexity of their structure. If that structure were simple,
"their nature would not enter into the reasoning."17
Now, "unanalyzable" for Leibniz seems to mean here "undefinable." And unanalyzability
can be secured if we can guarantee simplicity. So, he favors attributes that are primary essential
predicates, i. e., not further reducible, and he concludes that no two different attributes, in this
sense, can express the same substance. This is what I think is behind his remark that
I do not concede that there can be two attributes which are conceived through themselves
and yet can express the same substance. For whenever this happens, these two attributes
expressing the same thing in different ways can be further analyzed, or at least one of
them.18
According to Leibniz's testimony, he showed his argument to Spinoza in The Hague, and
Spinoza accepted it as sound. But this special tension with the notion of substance seems
avoidable in the first propositions of the Ethics thanks to Curley's thesis. I myself will try a
different tactic that might prove useful when dealing with the other propositions.
It is clear that for Spinoza there is a close relation between being in itself and being
conceived through itself, on the one hand, and having nothing in common with anything else, on
the other hand. So, we shall say that the relation of having nothing in common must equal both
not being one in the other and the conception of one not implying the conception of the other.
Therefore, the relation of being one in the other and the conception of the one implying the
conception of the other equals their having something in common. Let this be our definition of
substance: Sx = (y) {-(x = y)  (z) -xCOzy}.
Does proposition II, (y) (z) {<Sy & Sz & -(x)- (xAy -xAz)>  (x)-(yCOxz)}, now
follow logically?
It does, through Leibniz' Law for identity since (xAy -xAz) yields -(y = z).

16
E. Curley (ed. and trans.), The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. I. Princeton U. P.,
(1985) p. 410.
17
Leibniz, op. cit., p. 167.
18
Id. p. 198.

7
 Notice that I make no assumption with regard to whether Spinoza is dealing here with
substances which have only one attribute or not. Also, although proposition II mentions
attributes, it is not necessary to rely on definition IV (Spinoza does not use it here either). We did
not have to talk at all about what an attribute might be. So, if our reading is correct, Spinoza's
inference is impeccable here.
Notice also, we have not distinguished between having something in common
ontologically and having something in common epistemologically (or logically). It seems as if
Spinoza treated here both notions at the same time, and also that he considered them to exhaust
the ways two things could have something in common.

IV. THE PROOF OF PROPOSITION I

Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.
As Leibniz already noted, we have not explicitly the notion of "prior in nature" in our
axioms or our definitions. But, according again to Spinoza, this proposition should clearly follow
from the definitions of substance and mode. We have already definition 3. What should
definition 5 be?
Spinoza's words are "that which exists in, and is conceived through, something different".
That is, a mode has not the independence we had found in substance before.
Although, as we have seen, the possible combinations are not only these two, substance
and mode, perhaps Spinoza thought of one as just the complement of the other. The way
definitions 3 and 5 seem to mirror each other suggests this. If this is true, the definition of being
a mode of an x would be
yMx = -(z)-{-(z = y) & -(w)-( yCOwz)}
So, the priority seems to consist in the fact that substance, but not modes, can exist and be
conceived without recourse to anything else. And this in turn comes down to that ambiguous
phrase, "to have nothing in common with something else". So, we can try to give a rough
definition of priority in nature:
xPy = (z) {-(z = x)  (w) (-xCOwz)} & -(z)-{-(z = y) & -(w)-( yCOwz)}19
Since the first part of the definition is just good old definition 3, and the second conjunct is
definition 5, proposition I: (x) (y) {(Sx & My)  xPy} follows, and, as Spinoza wanted, it
follows clearly.
Now, it should be noted that any interpretation of "x is prior in nature to y" which implies
our present rendition of xPy, would be sufficient to validate the proof of proposition I.
Especially, if "x is prior in nature to y" is taken to be "from the substance x, y follows
necessarily" we would have:
(a) Since x is a substance, the first conjunct of our definition of xPy is satisfied.
(b) Since x is the "cause" of y, we might infer that y satisfies the second conjunct of our
definition of xPy.

V. THE PROOF OF PROPOSITION IV

19
Since "priority in nature" is an asymmetric relation (and therefore irreflexive),
substance and modes cannot be the same, as we announced in the analysis of proposition II.

8
Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of
the attributes of the substances, or by the difference of their modifications.
Definition 4 tells us that an attribute is what is perceived by the intellect as constituting
the essence of substance. Here we face at least two problems: the dependence of the definition on
a theory of intellectual perception and the undefined notion of essence. In these notes I shall deal
only with the problem of what is to constitute an essence; and even here I will be extremely
cautious. Whatever that relation may be, surely, by proposition II, to have the attribute of
substance x, and to be x, must be, if not the same thing, at least two things that must go together.
Without taking any more risks we shall equal the notion of constituting an essence with this
minimal, merely extensional, condition (ec): given that x, y are substances,
(ec) x=y  (z) (zAx  zAy).
Now we can try to reproduce Spinoza's own proof of proposition IV. Axiom 1 says that
everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else. And now Spinoza, without
any further argument, reduces this to combinations (1) and (2) of the four mentioned in the
analysis of proposition II. So, axiom 1 is transformed into
(x) (E!x  (Sx v Mx))
making, therefore, to exist in itself and to be conceived through itself extensionally equivalent.
This first step of the proof can be put as
(x) (E!x  <(y) {-(x = y)  (z) -xCOzy} v -(z)- {-(z = x) & -(w)- (xCOwz)}>).
Notice that, if we had built into our definitions the co-extensionality mentioned in (ec), this first
step would be, as Spinoza thought it was, a truth of logic (out of the definitions, just like in
geometry).
Now, proposition IV says that two things are distinguished one from the other, by the
difference either of attributes or of modes. That is
(x)(y){-(x=y)[-(z)-(zAx-zAy)v-(z)-(xAz-yAz)v-(z)-(zMx-zMy)v-(z)-(xMz-yMz)]},
that is, to get proposition IV we need to go from the fact that there is nothing but substances and
modes to the fact that, if two things are different, then either they have different attributes (or are
attributes of different things) or they have different modes (or are modes of different things).
But, since there are only substances and modes, any difference will be with respect to one
of them. By (ec), difference with respect to substances can be extensionally replaced by
difference with respect to attributes. This way, adding the possible differences with respect to
modes, we get the four cases Spinoza had to cover.

VI. THE PROOF OF PROPOSITION V

There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or
attribute.
As we saw earlier, proposition IV gives four alternatives in case of non-identity:
-(z)- (zAx  -zAy) v -(z)- (xAz  -yAz) v -(z)- (zMx  -zMy) v -(z)- (xMz  -yMz).
In the case of a substance, Spinoza reduces the four possibilities to the first and third
ones: either they have different attributes or different modes.
Now, to prove that different substances must have different attributes, let us assume the
hypothesis that -(x=y). We infer that either
(1) The attributes are not the same but the modes are.
(2) The modes are not the same but the attributes are.

9
 (3) Neither the modes nor the attributes are the same, i. e., -(z)-(zAx  -zAy) v
-(z)-(zMx  -zMy).
Spinoza begins with the first case of the trilemma: if (1), then, tautologically, the
substances do not have the same attributes. By the same token, although Spinoza does not
explicitly recognizes it, case (3) leads to the same conclusion (we only need to simplify the first
conjunct of (3)).
We are left with (2). But this case, Spinoza seems to argue, really does not matter. As we
saw in our analysis of "priority in nature", to conceive the substance we do not need anything
else; especially, we do not need any reference to the modes (which, in turn, lack that
independence).
So, we can disregard the modifications and try to conceive the substance in itself (here a
confussion between "in se" and "per se" might be present). But that is, by definition 3, the true
idea to have of a substance; and a true idea, says axiom 6, corresponds with its object. So, we can
say of the object (the substance) what we have found when we have left aside the irrelevant
consideration of the modes, case (2): -(z)-(zAx  -zAy). That is, x and y must not have the same
attributes.

VII. THE PROOF OF PROPOSITION III

Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other.
Axiom 4 says that if x causes y, then y must be apprehended through x. Needless to say,
this is a very strong notion of knowledge. We symbolize it as xCy  yATx. This, is transformed
into xCy  yATx and, therefore, into -xATx  -xCy.
Axiom 5 says that if two things have nothing in common, then it is not possible to
apprehend one through the other, that is (x) (y) {(z)-(xCOzy)  -(xATy)}.
The inference to proposition III: (y) (z) {(x)-(yCOxz)  -(yCz v zCy)} presents no
problems. (We can get the pair of disjuncts at the end because CO is symmetric.)

VIII. THE PROOF OF PROPOSITION VI

One substance cannot be produced by another substance.
The strategy now is very plain. Proposition V takes us from sameness of attributes to
identity of substances. By antilogism, from non-identity of substances to difference in attributes:
(x) (y) (z) {(Sx & Sy & -(x=y))  -(zAx & zAy)}
Then proposition II takes us from difference in attributes to having nothing in common,
and from this, proposition III takes us to non-causality. Putting everything together, we arrive at
(x) (y) {(Sx & Sy & -(x =y))  -(xCy v yCx)}, Q.E.D.

CONCLUSIONS
We have seen that Spinoza knew how to organize the first group of propositions;
furthermore, at least in Curley's interpretation and in my own, Spinoza can be reconstructed as a
man who knew "the true art of demonstration." At least in the small but important section we
have reconstructed.

10