Week 2 - Additional Reading 1

Episteme, 13, 3 (2016) 359–377 © Cambridge University Press
doi:10.1017/epi.2015.64
learning to listen: epistemic injustice

and the child
michael d. burroughs1 and deborah tollefsen
mdb32@psu.edu and dtollfsn@memphis.edu
abstract
In Epistemic Injustice Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic
type of injustice in which someone is wronged specically in his or her capacity as
a knower. Fricker’s examples of identity-prejudicial credibility decit primarily
involve gender, race, and class, in which individuals are given less credibility due
to prejudicial stereotypes. We argue that children, as a class, are also subject to tes-
timonial injustice and receive less epistemic credibility than they deserve. To illus-
trate the prevalence of testimonial injustice against children we document examples
of negative prejudicial treatment in forensic contexts where children frequently act
as testiers. These examples, along with research on the child’s competence and
reliability as a testier, reveal widespread epistemic prejudice against children.
Given that subjection to prejudice can have a detrimental impact on children we
discuss ways to ameliorate this form of testimonial injustice. We argue that,
both in formal and natural contexts, the child’s testimony should be evaluated
alongside the relationships that support (or fail to support) her development as
a testier. The adult can play a central role in creating successful testimonial inter-
actions with children by acting as a “responsible hearer.”
In Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing Miranda Fricker argues that
there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice in which someone is wronged specically
in his or her capacity as a knower (Fricker 2007: 20). One form of epistemic injustice –
identity-prejudicial credibility decit – occurs when someone receives a credibility decit
due to his/her social identity (Fricker 2007: 28). Fricker’s examples of identity-prejudicial
credibility decit primarily involve gender, race, and class, in which individuals are given
less credibility in testimonial interactions due to various prejudicial stereotypes (Fricker
2007: 9, 23, 28, 32). In this paper we argue that children, as a class, are also subject to
testimonial injustice. Although we acknowledge some developmental limitations to the
child’s2 ability to testify (especially in the case of young children), we argue that prejudicial
stereotypes of child irrationality, suggestibility, and unreliability result in the child receiv-
ing less epistemic credibility than she deserves.
1 Both authors contributed equally to the development of this article. Author listing is alphabetical.
2 The category “child” refers to a range of different types of people with different types of cognitive,
affective, and linguistic capacities, not to mention a wide range of different life experiences and social
locations. As a class, children – like adults – are a heterogeneous bunch. To simplify matters and to
focus on a specic population of children when we refer to children we are referring roughly to people
in early and middle childhood.
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Washington, on 23 Aug 2018 at 15:17:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.64 e p i s t e m e v o l u m e 13–3 359
michael d. burroughs and deborah tollefsen
Following an introductory discussion of the epistemology of testimony and epistemic

injustice we discuss the child’s subjection to prejudice (or “childism”) and, in turn, testimonial
injustice. To illustrate the prevalence of testimonial injustice against children we document
examples of negative prejudicial treatment in forensic contexts where – with increasing prose-
cutions of child abuse and domestic violence in the United States – children are frequently
called to act as testiers or, in instances where they are prevented from doing so, their testimony
is admitted as hearsay.3 Although the forensic context is just one area in which children are
subject to epistemic injustice,4 we contend that this context, along with recent research on
the child’s competence and reliability as a testier, reveals the presence of widespread epistemic
prejudice against children. Given that subjection to prejudice can have a detrimental impact on
children as developing epistemic agents we are also concerned with identifying ways to ameli-
orate testimonial injustice in adult-child testimonial interactions. To this end, we argue that,
both in formal and natural contexts, the child’s ability to offer reliable testimony should be
evaluated alongside the relationships that support (or fail to support) her development as a
testier. The child’s epistemic agency and, in turn, her ability to offer testimony is not developed
in isolation, but rather, in relation to her encounters with important adult gures in her life.
Thus, we argue that the adult plays a central role in creating successful testimonial interactions
with children. The child develops an identity as a reliable testier (or unreliable testier) in
virtue of her treatment by the adult as “responsible hearer” (Fricker 2007: 66, 76). In consider-
ing the child’s epistemic agency, then, we must pay greater attention to the role and responsi-
bilities of the adult. We need to develop a relational conception of child testimonial agency
that includes the adult and her ability to actively listen to the child.
1. the nature of testimony

Testimony is a specic type of speech act and it is often linked to a certain form of inten-
tional agency. Whether children are subject to epistemic injustice depends, in part, on
whether they are testiers. On many accounts of the nature of testimony, very young chil-
dren (roughly between the ages of 18 months to 6 years) do not count as testiers.
Consider, for instance, Coady’s analysis of (natural) testimony (1992).
S testies by making some statement that p if and only if:
N1. S’s stating that p is evidence that p and is offered as evidence that p.
N2. S has the relevant competence, authority or credentials to state truly that p.
N3. S’s statement that p is relevant to some disputed or unresolved questions (which may or
may not be whether p) and is directed to those who are in need of evidence on the matter.
3 Child testimony in the forensic context includes, but is not limited to, the child’s testimony on the court-
room witness stand. We also include in this category child testimony received outside of the courtroom
in pre-trial interviews conducted by social workers, forensic psychologists, or legal professionals.
Especially in the case of young children testifying on the witness stand – thereby potentially facing
an abuser in person and dealing with the additional stresses of the formal courtroom environment –
is deemed to be too anxiety provoking and, in turn, psychologically damaging. For these reasons
child testimony obtained in pre-trial interviews is sometimes allowed as evidence in the form of hearsay
(presented by a social worker or court appointed representative). In either case, child testimony can be
subject to negative prejudicial evaluation by jurors and legal professionals.
4 For examples of additional contexts in which children face epistemic injustice (namely, education and
health care contexts) see Murris (2013) and Carel and Kidd (2014).
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360 at ehttps://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
p i s t e m e v o l u m e 13–3 https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.64
learning to listen
If this is what is required for someone to testify then very young children cannot be tes-
tiers. To offer something as evidence one must understand the concept of evidence;
understand what it means to offer something as a reason for the acceptance of something
else. It seems implausible to think that very young children have such an understanding as
it would presuppose a fairly robust theory of mind. To understand how one’s utterance
can be a reason for someone else to believe something seems to require an understanding,
at the very least, that other people have beliefs and that their own beliefs can differ from
another’s. Although the empirical research on childhood cognition continues to evolve, it
is generally accepted that prior to the age of four, children do not have a robust under-
standing of belief. Although young children do intend to communicate it isn’t at all
clear that they can form intentions to give evidence or that they are aware of the epistemic
needs of others. Thus, if we adopt Coady’s theory of testimony we would not be able to
discuss the possibility of epistemic injustice in young children since on his account they
would not count as testiers at all.5
What view of testimony, then, will allow us to acknowledge that very young chil-
dren can be a source of knowledge but at the same time acknowledge that, epistemi-
cally, they may not be as developed as adults? We think the most compelling account
of testimony, and all the more compelling because it accommodates the child, is that
offered by Lackey (2006). Lackey distinguishes between hearer testimony and speaker
testimony and she denes each in terms of acts of communication rather than
statements.
Speaker S testies(t) that p by making an act of communication a if and only if

Testimony: S reasonably intends to convey the information that p (in part) in vir-
tue of a’s communicable content.
Speaker testimony captures the sense that on some occasions there is an intention to
convey information where there is an understanding of the role one plays as a commu-
nicator of such information. This can be distinguished from Coady’s view because
intending to convey information is different than intending to offer evidence.
Speaker testimony, then, captures the agential nature of many of our testimonial
exchanges.
In addition, Lackey’s conception of hearer testimony is as follows:
Hearer S testies(h) that p by making an act of communication a if and only

Testimony: if H, S’s hearer, reasonably takes a as conveying the information that
p (in part) in virtue of a’s communicable content.
5 There is an interesting parallel here between Coady’s theory of testimony and the requirements to be a
testier in a court of law. Many children under the age of 6 are deemed by courts to be incompetent to
offer formal testimony. In addition to a basic understanding of truth and its distinction from falsity,
competency standards also require an understanding of the obligation to tell the truth, and the meaning
of a legal oath. Under legal conceptions of testimony, very young children cannot count as formal tes-
tiers. Very young children’s informal or natural testimony has been allowed under hearsay exceptions,
however.
She thus proposes the following general account of testimony:
T: S testies that p by making an act of communication a if and only if (in part) in virtue
of a’s communicable content, (1) S reasonably intends to convey the information that
p, or (2) a is reasonably taken as conveying the information that p.
This disjunctive account of testimony is easily extended to young children. Young chil-
dren’s utterances or acts of communication can, on many occasions, reasonably be
taken as conveying information. This is so even when they do not themselves intend to
convey the information that p or are unaware that they are doing so. It also makes
sense of the fact that when there is a lack of intention to communicate there is also a
lack of responsibility attributed to the speaker.
When one reasonably takes an act of communication as conveying the information that
p, one views the utterance in a certain light and as having a certain import. One considers
the context of utterance and what one knows about the speaker. One treats the utterance
as if it was intended to convey information and assesses the reasonableness of such an
interpretation. When a child’s acts of communication move from hearer testimony to
speaker testimony is an empirical question (or from non-testimony to hearer testimony).
It is clearly something that happens gradually. But it happens precisely because, from
the very beginning, we are treating children as if they are capable of offering testimony.
It is worth emphasizing again that we are not claiming all children from birth have the
capacity to testify. We don’t deny that infants and pre-linguistic children may not meet
the conditions of testimony. Hearer testimony requires that acts of communication be
taken as conveying information. It is not clear when in the child’s development she
becomes capable of performing acts of communication and when those acts can be
taken as conveying information. Again, this is an empirical question. Our point here is
to identify a theory of the nature of testimony that does not, at the outset, exclude
some children (roughly children from the age of 18 months to 6 years of age) from the
class of testiers. Having identied the theory of testimony best suited to understand
the nature of child testimony, we turn to consider epistemic injustice and its impact on
children throughout their lives.
2. testimonial injustice and children

In Epistemic Injustice Fricker describes the central case of testimonial injustice as identity-
prejudicial credibility decit (Fricker 2007: 28). This form of injustice occurs when a per-
son is given less credibility in testimonial exchange due to his/her social identity.6 Fricker’s
examples of identity-prejudicial credibility decit primarily focus on gender and race (with
some examples centering on class). The woman, for instance, is given less credibility
because of various sexist stereotypes, the African-American given less credibility due to
6 Fricker notes that the central cases of testimonial injustice as identity-prejudicial credibility decit will
be “systematic” in nature and function as a “tracker prejudice” that negatively impacts a person
“through different dimensions of social activity – economic, educational, professional, sexual, legal, pol-
itical, religious, and so on” (2007: 27–9).
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learning to listen
racist stereotypes.7 In these examples “identity power” – power deployed through “shared
imaginative conceptions of social identity” (Fricker 2007: 14) – is exercised over a person
such that s/he is regarded as epistemically decient and discredited as a testier.
Although prejudice can harm the hearer and the epistemic community by preventing
them from acquiring knowledge, a primary harm is done to the speaker who is subject
to this form of epistemic injustice. Those who suffer identity-prejudicial credibility
decit are wronged in their capacity as knowers and, thus, made to feel less human. As
Fricker writes:
The capacity to give knowledge to others is one side of the many-sided capacity so signicant in
human beings: namely, the capacity for reason . . . When someone suffers a testimonial injustice
they are degraded qua knower, and they are symbolically degraded qua human. (2007: 44–5)
This primary harm of epistemic justice can lead to secondary practical and epistemic
harms (Fricker 2007: 46). For one, think of the potential practical consequences of testi-
monial injustice in a courtroom. Not being listened to in this context can have dire prac-
tical consequences, such as unjust imprisonment or even death. Further, testimonial
injustice against a speaker can have a “self-fullling power” (Fricker 2007: 55). If subjects
are systematically denied a voice they can lose condence in themselves and their own
beliefs such that they cease to be credible testiers and come to conrm prejudicial stereo-
types. To be subjected to systematic testimonial injustice is thus an epistemic harm that
cuts one to her very core, hindering the development of epistemic virtues and intellectual
self-condence that are central to one’s identity as a reliable testier.
There is much more to say about Fricker’s theory, the forms of epistemic injustice she
identies, and the negative affects of these forms of injustice on persons and we will return
to some of these points below. What we want to consider at this point is whether children,
as a class, are subject to prejudice and the kind of epistemic injustice that Fricker identies.
To motivate and make the issue of testimonial injustice against children more vivid, we
want to begin with a passage from A Circle of Quiet, the autobiography of Madeleine
L’Engle. In this passage L’Engle is describing an unfortunate event from her childhood:
I was about eight, certainly old enough to have forgotten what it was like to wet one’s pants. One
day in French class, I asked to be excused. The French teacher must have been having problems
with children wanting to leave the room for other reasons, and using the bathroom as an excuse,
because she forbade me to go. I asked her three times, and three times was told, No. When the bell
for the end of class rang I bolted from my desk and ran, but I couldn’t quite make it, and spent the
rest of the afternoon sodden and shamed. When my mother heard what happened, she demanded
to see the principal. I remember with awful clarity the scene in the Principal’s ofce, after the
French teacher had been summoned. She said, ‘But Madeleine never asked to go to the bathroom.
If she had only raised her hand, of course I would have excused her.’ She was believed . . . I was
reprimanded gently, told to ask next time, and not to lie about it afterwards . . . To have an adult
7 Not all credibility decits are a result of prejudice. For instance, one may give less credibility to an agent
simply due to a false belief about the competency of the speaker (Fricker 2007: 21–2). The hearer may
be guilty of an “innocent error” without being guilty of attributing an identity prejudicial credibility
decit to a speaker. The phenomenon Fricker is primarily interested in is one in which a subject is
given less credibility because of his/her social identity, an error that is both ethically and epistemically
culpable.
lie and to have another adult not know that it was a lie; to tell the truth myself and not be believed:
the earth shook on its foundations. (L’Engle 1972: 143)
We contend that L’ Engle’s account is representative of a widespread experience for chil-

dren; namely, adults frequently subject children to identity power and negative identity-
prejudicial treatment. In 1975 Chester Pierce and Gail Allen introduced the term childism
to capture the prejudicial nature of adult–child relations. Childism – or “the automatic
presumption of superiority of any adult over any child” (Pierce and Allen 1975: 15) –
is described as follows:
In childism, the child-victim is put on the defensive. He is expected to accommodate himself to the
adult aggressor, and is hardly ever permitted to initiate action or control a situation. The vehicle
for most adult action is micro-aggression; the child is not rendered a gross brutalization, but is
treated in such a way as to lower his self-esteem, dignity, and worthiness by means of subtle,
cumulative, and unceasing adult deprecation. As a result of this constant barrage of micro-
aggression, the child remains on the defensive, mobilizing constantly to conform and perform.
This incessant mobilization is not without cost, psychologically and probably physiologically.
(1975: 18)
Pierce and Allen provide a helpful entry point for understanding prejudice against children
but they underestimate the extent to which adults do, in fact, subject children to “gross
brutalization.” This is evident in the staggering rates of child maltreatment and adult
physical, emotional, sexual, and psychological abuse of children (Gilbert et al. 2009:
68–9). Given the continuing problems of child abuse and discrimination it is important
to acknowledge that children – like women, African-Americans, and other populations
subjected to prejudicial treatment – can be seen as a target group. That is, children, as
a class, are subject to prejudicial treatment based on “share[d] characteristics and condi-
tions that those prejudiced against them seize on and distort for their own purposes”
(Young-Bruehl 2012: 19). Children, too, have a social identity that can be accessed via
the “social imagination” (Fricker 2007: 38), an identity that crystallizes in common con-
ceptions of children as “decient,” “incapable,” or “incomplete” in relation to the adult
(Prout and James 1990: 10–11; Webb 2004: 806). Given the child’s lack of social power
and standing she is rarely in a position to challenge these conceptions and the decit
model of childhood that provides them with support. Thus, it is possible for prejudicial
stereotypes of children as overly emotive, irrational, and incompetent to color the credibil-
ity judgments that adults make when assessing their testimony. Recent empirical research
supports this possibility, documenting the presence of implicit negative attitudes in adults
towards children as “animalistic” and as lacking “uniquely human traits” (Loughnan and
Haslem 2007: 117).8
It is not difcult to imagine the potential impact of prejudicial stereotypes on the child’s
epistemic development and sense of self. Fricker contends that the recipient of testimonial
injustice – particularly in cases in which the injustice is persistent and systematic – “may
lose condence in her general intellectual abilities to such an extent that she is genuinely
8 Representations of children as animalistic and savage (and vice versa) have deep roots in the Western
world. For multiple examples see Jahoda (1999), in particular, Part III, “The Image of the Savage as
Child-like.”
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learning to listen
hindered in her educational or other intellectual development” (2007: 48). Prejudices that
inform acts of testimonial injustice may have a “self-fullling power” such that the victim
is constituted as a prejudicial stereotype depicts her and ultimately caused to resemble the
prejudicial stereotype (2007: 55). However, in Epistemic Injustice Fricker primarily
focuses on adult perpetrators and victims of testimonial injustice. She devotes little atten-
tion to the impact of testimonial injustice on children and, so, we gain little insight from
her on the signicance of adult expectations, projections, and prejudicial stereotypes for
the epistemic development of young children. But there is a substantial body of social psy-
chological literature that does just this, demonstrating that children are well aware of the
appraisals and expectations of others (parents, teachers, and peers) and, further, that these
appraisals and expectations inuence children’s self-perceptions in numerous domains of
competence (Cole 1991; Cole et al. 1997, 2001). In a series of studies with school chil-
dren, David Cole examined the degree to which signicant others’ evaluations correlate
with and predict changes in children’s self-perceived competence (Cole 1991; Cole et al.
2001). Cole’s studies demonstrate that “children construct views of their own compe-
tences out of others’ appraisals of their performances” (Cole et al. 2001: 391). Central
to developmental models of self-perceived competence, then, is that interpersonal feed-
back has a signicant impact on children’s self-perceived competence and, in general,
their negative or positive self-appraisals (as competent or incompetent) (Cole 1991:
682; Cole et al. 2001: 377).9
At this point one might raise an objection to our extension of Fricker’s theory to chil-
dren. Childhood, one might argue, is not a social identity. Rather, childhood is a biologic-
al stage of human development. Without doubt, there are basic biological elements of
childhood. Children are biologically immature persons who possess developmental traits
that are distinct from those classied as adults. Young children are pre-pubescent and
undergo forms of physical growth (height changes, for example) and forms of brain devel-
opment that cease in adulthood. But while biological immaturity is a fact of childhood the
signicance of these facts and the meaning attributed to them varies greatly across history
and culture. What it means to be a child is determined in diverse ways by cultural and his-
torical interpretations of the child’s biological immaturity. In this sense the concept of
“child” (and the concept of “adult”) is as much socially constructed as it is biological
and comprises a social identity. The social identity of the child marks out, among other
things, what forms of action are appropriate for those classied as children (e.g., partici-
pation in mandatory schooling as opposed to the adult world of work), appropriate areas
of knowledge for children (e.g., whether children should be included in discussions per-
taining to sex and death), and the conditions of a “good” childhood. None of these
aspects of childhood is a matter of biological determination; rather, they highlight cultural
and historical interpretations of what it means to be a child, interpretations which ultim-
ately reveal a multiplicity of childhoods in our world (Jenks 2005: 30; Prout 2005, 14).10
9 For related studies on interpersonal feedback and its impact on children’s self-perceived competence see
also Phillips (1984, 1987), Hymel and Franke (1985), and Boiven and Begin (1989).
10 The understanding of childhood as a historical and cultural production (as opposed to a biological
given) was introduced by Philippe Aries in his seminal study of the history of childhood (Aries
1962). Aries discusses the formation of the modern Western concept of childhood between the 15th
and 18th centuries and argues that this concept was formed within social institutions and practices,
3. children, testimony, and forensic contexts

Following our initial discussion of testimonial injustice and childism we will now turn to a
context in which adult prejudice toward children (and its detrimental impact on child tes-
tiers) is well documented. Prejudicial stereotypes of children as especially suggestible,
untrustworthy and incompetent are evident in legal discourse regarding the formal testi-
mony of the child.
Indeed, legal writers have tended to put the child in the same category as the mentally
deranged or drug addicted:
In determining the credibility of a witness and the weight to be accorded to it, regard may be had
to his age and his mental or physical condition, such as where the witness is a child, is intoxicated,
is a narcotics addict, or is insane, or of unsound or feeble mind. (Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing
Company 1976)
Here is a passage from the 1984 text Evidence: Cases and Materials:
Children are prone to live in a make-believe world so that they magnify incidents which happened
to them or invent them completely . . . they are very suggestible and can easily be inuenced by
adults . . . they may consent to sexual offences against themselves and then deny consent. They
may completely invent sexual offences. (Heydon 1984: 84)
Despite a growing body of empirical evidence that suggests that children (by the age of six)
are as accurate as adults in recalling events and no more suggestible than adults when
those memories are questioned in appropriate ways (Melton 1981: 76, 80, 82; Leippe
& Romanczyk 1989: 104; Pipe et al. 2004; Oates 2007: 844), legal discourse continues
to present the child as essentially irrational and unable to offer reliable testimony
(Brainerd and Reyna 2012: 227). Here we see clear examples of negative prejudicial
stereotypes informing conceptions of children as unreliable testiers. As Leippe and
Romancyzk note, “the evidence for a negative stereotype of young eyewitnesses seems
quite strong . . . people see children as somewhat untrustworthy (i.e., suggestible) and inex-
pert (i.e., poor at remembering specic details)” (Leippe and Romancyzk 1989: 111).
Numerous studies have shown that these prejudicial stereotypes inform adult perceptions
of child testiers. Goodman et al. (1984, 1987) conducted a study in which groups of adults
were provided with both written and lmed testimony of children (6 and 10 years of age) and
adults (30 years of age) regarding cases of vehicular homicide and murder. In each case the
eyewitness testimony was identical and all details of the trial were exactly the same with one
exception: the age of the eyewitness. The studies showed that adult potential jurors consist-
ently rated child testiers as less credible than adult testiers, especially so in the case of 6 year
olds. Commenting on their ndings, Goodman et al. write:
Regardless of the type of case (vehicular homicide versus murder), the population used (college
students versus a wider cross section of potential jurors), or the medium of presentation (written
trial summaries versus videotaped mock trial) . . . potential jurors view children, particularly those
psychological theories, economic and legal structures, which overlay biology and contribute to object-
ify children as a distinct social group.
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as young as 6 years, to be less credible bystander witnesses than adults. (Goodman et al.,
1987: 36)11
Yarmey and Jones (1983) found similar results in their studies of legal and cultural stereo-
types of child testiers. Several groups of people (including potential jurors, psychologists,
legal professionals, and college students) were asked to give their opinion of how an
8-year-old child would perform as a witness in a legal case. Less than 50% in any of
the groups felt that the child would respond accurately when questioned. 91% of the psy-
chologists and 69% of the potential jurors also felt that child witnesses would be overly
suggestible and, thus, unreliable witnesses (Yarmey and Jones 1983: 33, 35).
Numerous factors lead to the perception of children as decient testiers. For example,
in the courtroom environment (a highly stressful environment for many young children)
the child’s nonverbal behavior – dgeting, lack of condence, posture – can inuence per-
ceptions of her credibility (Goodman et al. 1984: 146–8, 153; Oates 2007: 844).
Attorneys’ tactics during direct- and cross-examination, such as the use of complex gram-
matical forms or aggressive questioning, can confuse and intimidate child witnesses
(Goodman et al. 1984: 146–8). But in addition to these factors researchers have concluded
that negative stereotypes of children as overly suggestible, incapable of distinguishing fan-
tasy from reality, and lacking memorial abilities play a signicant role in children’s general
lack of credibility as testiers (Leippe and Romanczyk 1989: 106–7; Newcombe and
Bransgrove 2007: 319). The harm of this child-centered prejudice is at least two-fold:
rst, in some cases (for example, child abuse and neglect) the child may be the only wit-
ness outside of the accused and, thus, the outcome will hinge in large part on her credibil-
ity and testimony. Discrediting the child testier for prejudicial reasons can lead to a
failure of justice and leave children even more vulnerable to acts of adult violence and
abuse. Second, following Fricker, we must be wary of the “self-fullling power” of stereo-
types. The child testier continually regarded as unreliable, overly suggestible, and incom-
petent, may come to resemble these negative stereotypes and cease to be a reliable testier.
At this point one might acknowledge that the child is subjected to prejudice and testi-
monial injustice but still insist that, at least in the epistemic realm, the child’s credibility
deciency is still warranted. While revealing prejudice against children, the argument
might go, we are at the same time crediting the child with too much epistemic power
and reliability as a testier. There are two factors to take into account when assessing
the reliability of a testier: competence and sincerity. We want to set aside the question
of whether children are sincere. We think the question is not a good one and is no
more easily answered than the question of whether adults are sincere. Like adults, some
children may have reasons to lie in some contexts and may have difculty telling the
truth in some contexts. But there is no empirical evidence that children, as a class, are
more deceptive than adults.
It is true that children (particularly very young children) will lack competency about a
range of things for which they have no knowledge or experience. But very young children
are also likely to have access to information that adults do not in a variety of domains (for
example, in cases of abuse) and their rst person accounts of their lives and their
11 Additional studies reveal similar conclusions: adult jurors consistently perceive children as lacking
credibility and competence as testiers. See Leippe et al. (1993), Leippe and Romanczyk (1989),
and Newcombe and Bransgrove (2007).
interactions with others are sometimes all we have to go on. The fact that we do not rely
on children to tell us about the stock market, for example, does not mean that we do not
rely on them for a variety of other information, or that we shouldn’t rely on them for a
variety of other knowledge. That is to say, acknowledging that children have particular
domains of competence as testiers does not commit us to crediting the child with too
much epistemic power. The important question is whether, given a relevant domain of
competence, children can be reliable testiers.
Research in the domain of formal testimony is once again instructive. Prior to the
1980s there was virtually no research on children’s competency to testify or their reliabil-
ity as witnesses. It was only after several high prole cases of child abuse in the late 1970s
and early 1980s that focus on a child’s ability to offer reliable testimony, particularly to
recount accurately traumatic events, was studied in any great detail (Ceci and Bruck
1993). These high prole cases involved credible allegations made by children of torture
and sexual abuse, as well as fabulous claims of cannibalism and murder. When one looks
at the details of these cases it becomes clear that, when inaccuracies did arise, the issue was
not with the basic competency of child testiers, but rather, with the interviewing methods
used to solicit the testimony. Adult investigators did not listen to child testiers very well
and instead created an “atmosphere of accusation” for children by consistently using
incriminating language to describe the adults under investigation (Ceci and Bruck 1993:
405). In a variety of ways, the suggestions and incriminating language of investigators
negatively impacted the ability of children to offer reliable testimony. Largely in response
to the controversies surrounding these cases, researchers have made considerable effort to
understand how to avoid compromising or contaminating a child’s testimony, leading to
recent protocols for forensic investigators to follow when interviewing children (discussed
below). There are several factors that can lead to limitations in the completeness and
accuracy of what children recall. These factors include difculties in organizing narrative
accounts; lack of long-term memory retrieval strategies; susceptibility to interviewer sug-
gestions; and lack of understanding of what information is important to recall (especially
in the forensic context children do not always understand what information is relevant to
police and legal investigations). Linguistic and conceptual limitations in early childhood
can also result in inaccurate testimony. However, despite these factors, children as
young as two years of age have been shown to accurately recall details of past events
(Ceci and Bruck 1994; Fivush and Schwarzmueller 1995) and recent work on aiding
young children’s retrieval and narrative strategies has proven effective in improving
young children’s recall (Saywitz and Snyder 1993; Nathanson and Saywitz 2003).
Interviewing tactics have been highlighted as particularly important factors in assisting
or hindering the reliability of a young child’s testimony. Current research suggests that
communication failures and suggestibility in children may actually reect the interviewing
techniques used by adults to elicit their testimony (Saywitz and Snyder 1993; Saywitz and
Camparo 1998) rather than a lack of developmental ability in children. In order to best
support the child testier interview questions need to be phrased in a language accessible
to young children, the length and extent of questioning needs to be limited, questioning
needs to occur within a relatively short time frame after the events being investigated,
and leading questions should be avoided (Ceci and Bruck 1994; Oates 2007). Young chil-
dren do possess the memory skills needed to describe events accurately, but these skills are
best utilized in response to simple open-ended questions in a supportive atmosphere.
Further, environmental factors contribute to the reliability of child testimony.
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learning to listen
Nathanson and Saywitz (2003), for example, found that children interviewed in an infor-
mal setting, as opposed to a courtroom, offered more accurate accounts of past events.
Children exhibited erratic heart rate patterns, indicative of a stress response, in the court-
room setting and were signicantly calmer in an informal setting (Nathanson and Saywitz
2003).
In sum, research from the forensic context shows that there are pervasive prejudicial
stereotypes at play that inuence whether a child is given credibility. The forensic context
offers a concrete example of a discursive space in which the child is subject to testimonial
injustice.12 Prejudicial stereotypes and related testimonial injustice against children can be
present in every aspect of the forensic context, including cross-examination in the court-
room as well as pre-trial and investigative interviews with police and social services. But
the research we point to shows that by a young age children are capable of offering reliable
testimony. Children can be competent testiers and have not been shown to be more sug-
gestible than adults in testimonial interactions. Perhaps more importantly, the research
also demonstrates that adults have a large role to play in helping the young child to be
a competent and reliable witness. Thus, when it comes to evaluating the competency
and reliability of child testiers we should also consider the epistemic responsibility of
the adult.
4. responsible hearing, active listening, and recognition

Thus far we have argued that children are subject to prejudicial stereotypes and, further,
that these stereotypes and related treatment by the adult have a signicant impact on the
child’s ability to offer reliable testimony. Although we primarily appeal to the forensic
context in developing our argument it is by no means the only context in which children
are subject to epistemic appraisal. Negative prejudicial stereotypes at play in the forensic
context can also be prevalent in the context of everyday adult-child exchanges. These
stereotypes and related forms of treatment wrong the child as a knower and provide
her with less epistemic credibility than she deserves. We will now turn to consider ways
in which adults can ameliorate testimonial injustice in their interactions with children.
As a response to epistemic injustice Fricker develops an account of “responsible” or
“virtuous” hearing (2007: 66, 76). Fricker argues that prejudicial stereotypes are embed-
ded in the fabric of the social imagination and, thus, hearers must exercise a “critical
awareness” regarding identity prejudices that can (or do) inform their credibility judg-
ments of speakers (2007: 89). The responsible hearer must “neutralize” or “correct
12 In the courtroom context the impact(s) of testimonial injustice and the child’s reliability as a testier
will need to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Adult jurors will need to evaluate child witness
testimony for reliability as they would with an adult witness. In this paper we are arguing that evalua-
tions of child witnesses can be inuenced by prejudice that negatively impacts child testiers. Thus, in
addition to evaluating the child witness (as with any other witness), adult jurors also need to be sen-
sitive to the ways in which prejudice can impact their credibility assessments of children. Although
most adult jurors will not be familiar with current empirical literature on child testimony, epistemic
injustice, and conditions that contribute to successful adult-child testimonial interactions, it is still
their responsibility qua jurors to (as far as is possible) be aware of their potential biases against wit-
nesses. This responsibility holds whether the witness is a child or an adult, a woman or a racial
minority.
for” the inuence of these prejudices as she perceives speakers and evaluates their compe-
tence and sincerity as testiers (2007: 89, 92). The responsible hearer must also take into
account his/her own social identity:
For a hearer to identify the impact of identity power in their credibility judgment they must be alert
to the impact not only of the speaker’s social identity but also the impact of their own social iden-
tity on their credibility judgment . . . [T]estimonial responsibility requires a distinctively reexive
critical social awareness. The hearer must factor into his net credibility judgment the likely impact
on his spontaneous perception – and if possible the impact on the speaker’s actual performance
too – of the relation of identity power that mediates between himself and the speaker. (2007: 91)
It is true that we are all gendered and raced in our testimonial exchanges and there are
distinct prejudices that target these social identities and negatively impact raced and gen-
dered individuals in testimonial exchange. But, in addition to being gendered and raced,
everyone also has an age and a social identity as an adult or child. In this paper we
have been attempting to show that this form of social identity is also a signicant factor
in epistemic credibility judgments. What is more, we have argued that those classied as
children are routinely subjected to the identity power of adults and, in turn, identity-
prejudicial credibility decit qua children.13 Given this state of affairs and the prevalence
of adult-child testimonial exchange we should devote more thought to avoiding testimo-
nial injustice in our interactions with children. We should think more about how to be
responsible hearers for children, just as Fricker contends we must do in the case of
other social groups that have been subjected to systematic discrimination.14
As gestured toward above, an important step in this direction includes paying greater
attention to the role and responsibilities of the adult in providing the child with the oppor-
tunity to be a testier. That is, we need to develop a relational conception of child testi-
monial agency that includes the adult and her ability to create conditions for the child
to be heard. We’ve already seen this exhibited in the forensic context in which interview-
ing tactics are a signicant factor in eliciting reliable child testimony. As a step toward
developing a broader account of relational testimony, let us turn our attention to the con-
cept and practice of active listening.
13 Although she does not discuss social identity related to age or children receiving credibility decit in
any detail Fricker does gesture toward the signicance of this social category in relation to identity
power: “There can be operations of power which are dependent upon agents having shared concep-
tions of social identity – conceptions alive in the collective social imagination that govern, for instance,
what it means to be a woman or a man, or what it is or means to be gay or straight, young or old, and
so on” (our emphasis) (2007: 14).
14 In making this claim we do not wish to conate important differences between the experiences of
women, blacks, and children in the face of epistemic injustice. There are distinct forms of identity
power relating to gender, race, and age as well as distinct forms of prejudice that impact the lives
of women (sexism), blacks (racism), and children (childism). We do not claim that these social groups
have undergone the same oppression, nor that the oppression can be rectied in the same manner.
Rather, individuals within each of these social groups have been and continue to be subjected to
forms of testimonial injustice that must be rectied. Children do form a special case of testimonial
injustice, however, as they are also gendered and raced and, thus, are subjected to multiple forms of
identity power and prejudice. For example, in a childist, racist, and sexist society the female, black
child will be confronted with identity power on numerous fronts and subjected to multiple layers of
negative identity-prejudicial credibility decit.
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learning to listen
The concept of active listening is already well established in educational contexts where
teachers strive to understand and communicate with young children (Cousins 1999;
Delfos 2001). In speaking of active listening, we are thinking of more than simply turning
an ear toward a speaker. Hearing is an inactive, involuntary process. By contrast, active
listening is a skill, an activity that must be learned and that can be performed well or
poorly. Active listening is fundamental to communication; it is a condition of possibility
for a speaker to be heard and, thus, as fundamental to communication as the act of speak-
ing (although it is the latter skill that receives the vast majority of attention both in theories
of testimonial exchange and communication more generally). When performed well active
listening is generative in nature – it contributes to the development of a potential speaker’s
voice and creates the conditions for a child to speak and be heard.
In order to advance and concretize our account of this skill, its impact on the child’s
ability to offer reliable testimony, and the signicance of adopting a relational account
of testimony more generally, we will now turn to a few examples of active listening. In
The Moral Life of Children (1986) and Children of Crisis (2003), the child psychiatrist
Robert Coles comments on common conceptions of children as decient persons, as lack-
ing agency and, with it, authentic moral, social, and epistemic concerns. But as he spent
time talking with and listening to children – over the course of decades of psychological
and sociological eldwork – Coles made an important methodological departure from
his tradition. Rather than attempt to measure children’s agency on the basis of adult-
centered interviews (asking children pre-set questions and evaluating the child’s develop-
mental status on the basis of her/his answers), Coles chose to develop communication with
children from the foundation of their own interests, concerns, and everyday experiences.
To access the young child’s world Coles developed an active listening technique – he asked
children to paint and draw pictures of their school, their family and friends, themselves,
and, in general, anything they wanted to draw. Coles writes:
Young children . . . are often uninterested in conversation. They want to be on the move, and they
are often bored at the prospect of hearing words and being expected to use them. It is not that they
don’t have ideas and feelings, or a need to express them to others. Indeed, their games and play,
their drawings and nger paintings are full of energetic symbolization and communication. It is
simply that – as one eight-year-old once told me – ‘Talking is okay, but I don’t like to do it all
the time the way grown-ups do.’ (2003: 15–16)
Through these and related exercises Coles was able to create a space for and listen to
young children’s interests and concerns. These young children were given an opportunity
to speak, to form a voice in relation to an actively listening adult. In this case, actively lis-
tening to the child involved moving away from adult-centered forms of communication; it
involved using creative and imaginative techniques (such as drawing, painting, playing
games, etc.) to meet the child on her own terms. In effect, the actively listening adult
(in this case, Coles) creates relational conditions for the child to exercise her testimonial
agency and, thus, to be a testier.
As a second example of active listening and relational testimony we can turn to Myra
Bluebond-Langner’s work with terminally ill children (18 months to 14 years of age). In
The Private Worlds of Dying Children (1978) Bluebond-Langner frames her work as an
attempt to communicate with leukemic children in a hospital setting and to discover how
“terminally ill children come to know that they are dying when no one tells them, and how
they conceal this knowledge from their parents and medical staff” (1978: ix). In the course
of her eldwork Bluebond-Langner notes that she was repeatedly struck by the failure of
adults to recognize children as knowers, as persons who already do know a great deal
about their condition:
I was struck by how totally unaware, or in what a state of denial, the staff was about the extent of
these children’s knowledge. The most striking example was in the oncology clinic. There, in front
of the children, some doctors and parents would exchange information about cancer cures, blood
tests, deaths of other children; then they would deny that the children knew anything about what
was happening. Many adults stated that there was no way for the children to know anything about
their diagnosis because they had not been told anything. (1978: 239)
Beyond traditional forms of epistemic prejudice against children, the adult’s lack of com-
munication with children in the hospital setting was based on canonical research that sup-
ported conceptions of children as passive, unknowing, and lacking the capacity for
understanding themselves and their world:
Since the children did not ask adults about their condition, researchers assumed that the children
either did not know, or were not interested in nding out, about their condition. Children would
indicate their awareness, felt the researchers, by discussing it with adults, as many older children
did. These investigators did not entertain the possibility that perhaps the children obtained infor-
mation from other sources; or that they were in fact expressing awareness, but in a symbolic way
that adults did not understand; or that by not talking about their condition, the children were
observing social taboos, and attempting to save others’ face . . . These alternatives do not occur
to one who fails to see children as willful, purposeful individuals capable of creating their own
world, as well as acting in the world others create for them. (Bluebond-Langner 1978: 6–7)
For our purposes it is important to note that Bluebond-Langner rejected these assumptions
about children, assumptions that she believes reveal a “failure to respect children and their
world” (1978: 5). Instead, in order to hear children and elicit their testimony she deployed
active listening techniques – playing games, drawing pictures, and, in general, letting the
child take a leading role in determining the activity and course of communication. These
practices acknowledged children as knowers and engaged children in a “context of aware-
ness” within which they could communicate their experiences, their hopes, fears, and the
reality of their prognosis (1978: 198). By using active listening techniques Bluebond-
Langner was able hear and, in turn, learn a great deal from these children about their
understanding of their condition, death, relationships, and many other things.
These examples of active listening to the voices of children are not exhaustive; rather,
they should be viewed as models for communicative practices that reconsider the epistemic
capabilities of children and help to mitigate testimonial injustice against children.15 At this
15 Earlier in this paper (p. 10) we discuss ways in which ofcers of the court can foster successful testi-
monial interactions with children. These interviewing methods – ranging from phrasing questions in
accessible language to conducting interviews in a supportive environment – can be understood as
active listening techniques (as described in section IV). But in courtroom contexts we are also con-
cerned with the manner in which adult jurors evaluate and interpret child testimony. Addressing
the adoption and practice of active listening techniques by jurors is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, numerous studies demonstrate that modications to the courtroom context through the
introduction of active listening methods can facilitate a better testimonial experience for the child,
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learning to listen
point it might be objected that active listening, though useful in adult-child testimonial
exchanges in informal or pre-trial contexts, is not adaptable for use in the formal court-
room setting.16 If so, the objection will go, active listening techniques cannot counter tes-
timonial injustice faced by children on the witness stand. Specically, it is not clear how
active listening and child-appropriate questioning can work in tandem with courtroom
practices such as cross-examination of the child witness.
In response, we point to numerous examples of active listening techniques already
implemented in many, but sadly not all, courtrooms for the specic purpose of hearing
and facilitating non-prejudicial evaluation of child testimony by jurors and legal profes-
sionals. These examples demonstrate that active listening techniques can make valuable
additions to adult-child communication in both informal and formal courtroom contexts
and, in turn, potentially reduce (though not eradicate) the impacts of epistemic injustice.
First, in the U.S. legal system trial judges have considerable autonomy in determining
the manner in which witness testimony and evidence is presented in court (Myers et al.
1996). In the case of young children trial judges commonly take extra measures to
avoid compounding the trauma children have experienced as abuse victims, namely, by
ensuring that child testiers are not subject to excessive anxiety and that they understand
the language and procedures of the court. Proactive measures taken by trial judges include
the limited use of closed-circuit television in courtrooms (so that children need not face an
abuser face to face while testifying), having children testify while sitting at a child-sized
table and chair with the judge, attorneys, and a support person present (a parent or
appointed guardian), and allowing the child to bring a “comfort item” with her to
court. In addition, judges can prescribe specic rules for attorneys to observe during
their cross-examination of child witnesses including the use of developmentally appropri-
ate language and terms, questioning from a single, neutral location at prescribed times (so
as not to interfere with a young child’s sleep patterns), and prohibiting attorneys from rais-
ing their voices or otherwise intimidating child witnesses on the stand. Because judges
have considerable autonomy, however, the extent to which these practices are implemen-
ted vary widely.
Second, in order to familiarize children with the roles of the judge, attorneys, and legal
process more generally, pre-trial programs such as “Kid’s Court” are used, involving a
mock trial and role playing in a supportive environment (Myers et al. 1996: 66). This
and related programs familiarize the child with the court process, its purposes, and poten-
tial outcomes, thereby reducing anxiety and increasing the ability of the child to offer cred-
ible testimony to jurors. None of these processes fully ensures that the child will not be
subject to testimonial injustice or negative prejudicial evaluations during trial. Indeed,
we have cited extensive research that reveals the depth of negative prejudicial attitudes
of laypeople and legal professionals alike toward children and their testimony.
However, when implemented, these courtroom methods do account for the special
needs of children in courtroom contexts, the importance of child-centered and active lis-
tening practices for allowing the child to offer credible testimony, and, further, the rela-
tional role of adult legal professionals in creating conditions for the child to be heard.
In doing so, they provide better opportunities for children to testify about their
and, in turn, for the juror as hearer and recipient of testimony. For example, see Saywitz and Snyder
(1993) and Nathanson and Saywitz (2003).
16 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection.
experiences in court as well as the increased possibility for fair evaluation of this testi-
mony. Finally, as previously noted, the forensic context extends well beyond the court-
room. Social workers, police ofcers, investigators, lawyers, and judges interact with
child victims and witnesses at various stages of the legal process prior to the child taking
the witness stand. The process of soliciting a child’s testimony begins with interviews with
police, forensic psychologists, and social services and it is particularly important for active
listening to occur in these pre-trial contexts. As noted above, the controversial day care
abuse cases of the 1980s involved investigators that did not listen to child testiers very
well, instead using leading questions and creating an “atmosphere of accusation” (Ceci
and Bruck 1993: 405). By the time these children got to the witness stand (or by the
time their testimony was offered as hearsay) signicant inuence over and damage to
their testimony was already done. Largely in response to the controversies surrounding
these cases and the continuing proliferation of child abuse prosecutions, researchers
have made considerable effort to understand how to avoid compromising or contaminat-
ing a child’s testimony, leading to child-centered and developmentally appropriate proto-
cols for forensic investigators to follow when interviewing children (Saywitz and Camparo
1998). Active listening techniques – ranging from phrasing questions in accessible lan-
guage and avoiding leading questions to creating an atmosphere that is comforting for
children and in which they can speak freely – are already integrated into these protocols
and can be fruitfully extended to the courtroom context as discussed above.17
It is common for philosophers (and adults more generally) to understand the develop-
ment of children’s abilities and competences (or lack thereof) in exclusively biological
terms. The child’s ability or lack of ability in a domain of activity is explained by reference
to capacities internal to the child. The child simply does or does not possess a given cap-
acity (and the related ability to actualize the capacity) due to her stage of development
(a biological understanding of capacities, akin to the development of puberty). But this
understanding of the capacities and related abilities of children overlooks the social
aspects of development and their relevance for child development. The ability to offer tes-
timony – and the capacities that ground this ability – does not develop in isolation. This
ability does not simply emerge within all children at a set age or stage of development, but
rather, develops to a greater or lesser degree in relation to children’s experiences of the
world and the felt appraisals of signicant others. Without doubt, the child’s biological
development is an important factor in her ability to exercise any form of agency, but
this is only part of the story. The child’s ability to be a testier and offer testimony to
others is equally dependent on the regard and related treatment and experiences she
receives from signicant others in her life (as, for example, current evidence from the
social sciences, forensic contexts and the work of Coles and Bluebond-Langner clearly
shows). For this reason we must pay greater attention to the relational aspects of child
development and look to the experiences and forms of regard that enhance or hinder it.
We contend that the development of testimonial agency and epistemic agency more
broadly is no different. This ability to testify – like other forms of action – is not developed
17 Our focus in this paper has been on the U.S. legal system, which is an adversarial system. In non-
adversarial legal systems (e.g., Germany), judges are responsible for determining the facts of a case
and also act as nders of law. In these instances even greater possibilities could exist for incorporating
active listening techniques tailored to the needs of children. We thank an anonymous reviewer for rais-
ing this point.
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learning to listen
in isolation or ex nihilo. Rather, the child’s epistemic agency and, in turn, her ability to
offer reliable speaker testimony is developed in relation to her encounters with others,
especially in her encounters with the important adult gures in her life. In large part,
the child develops an identity as a reliable (speaker) testier (or fails to do so) in virtue
of her treatment by the adult. When a child is offered recognition as a knower by the
adult and approached through active listening she is, in most cases, capable of telling
the adult a great deal and, further, she can develop forms of self-regard – self-condence,
self-esteem, self-respect – that are essential to agency.18 The child regarded as a testier by
others – and, in particular, by adults who have an important role in the child’s life – is
given the opportunity to regard herself as a testier, as a person who possesses a voice
worthy of the attention of others. Conversely, when the child is rejected as a testier out-
right due to prejudice or subjected to developmentally inappropriate forms of communi-
cation, the adult will hear nothing and the child will struggle to “speak.” The key here,
then, is to move away from an over-reliance on individualistic, capacities-based concep-
tions of agency, to pay greater heed to the relational aspects of agency and, in turn, to
take seriously the adult’s responsibilities and ability to listen along with the child’s ability
to speak. In large part, the child develops an identity as a reliable (speaker) testier
(or fails to do so) in virtue of her treatment by the adult.
5. conclusion
There is a great deal more to be said about epistemic injustice and the child and the means
by which the child is silenced in testimonial interactions. In particular, more needs to be
said about the ways in which this injustice is manifest in natural adult-child testimonial
exchanges. More could also be said about other forms of epistemic injustice that can
impact young testiers, such as hermeneutical injustice (Fricker 2007) and epistemic
oppression (Dotson 2012). Our work in this paper sets the foundation for continuing
investigation of forms of epistemic injustice perpetrated against children. Following this
work it is clear that we need to be aware not only of the ways in which our views regard-
ing race, gender, sexual orientation, and ethnic identity enter into our credibility judg-
ments of others, but also the way in which age enters into these judgments. Further, in
order to ameliorate testimonial injustice against children we must consider the adult’s epi-
stemic responsibilities alongside the child’s epistemic development. What current research
suggests is that epistemic responsibility should be divided equally amongst speaker and
hearer in testimonial exchanges. As adults, we have a responsibility to actively listen to
children and develop self-critical skills to correct for bias in our credibility judgments.
18 If one does not recognize oneself as capable or competent in a domain of activity, one is signicantly
hindered in the performance of that activity (if capable of performing the activity at all). In this sense,
forms of self-regard (self-condence, self-esteem, self-respect) are necessary conditions of the effective
exercise of agency. But these forms of self-regard are not developed in isolation; their development in
children depends on positive, supportive relationships with signicant others. That is, these forms of
self-regard are formed within relationships of positive recognition. This is a fundamental point for rec-
ognition theorists who argue that supportive relationships of recognition are pre-conditions for the
development of autonomy and forms of agency. See Taylor (1994) and Honneth (1995).
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MICHAEL D. BURROUGHS is Assistant Director of the Rock Ethics Institute and Senior
Lecturer of Philosophy at the Pennsylvania State University. His interests lie in the
philosophy of education, ethics education, social epistemology, and philosophy with/
for children.
DEBORAH TOLLEFSEN is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Memphis. Her

teaching and research interests include philosophy of mind, social and feminist
epistemology, and collective intentionality.

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Episteme, 13, 3 (2016) 359–377 © Cambridge University Press

learning to listen: epistemic injustice

Following an introductory discussion of the epistemology of testimony and epistemic

1. the nature of testimony

Speaker S testies(t) that p by making an act of communication a if and only if

Hearer S testies(h) that p by making an act of communication a if and only

She thus proposes the following general account of testimony:

2. testimonial injustice and children

We contend that L’ Engle’s account is representative of a widespread experience for chil-

3. children, testimony, and forensic contexts

4. responsible hearing, active listening, and recognition

———, Manion, A. P., and Romanczyk, A. 1993. ‘Discernibility or Discrimination? Understanding

DEBORAH TOLLEFSEN is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Memphis. Her

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