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Civitas Sibi Faciat Civem: Bartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine on the Making of a Citizen

Author(s): Julius Kirshner


Source: Speculum , Oct., 1973, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Oct., 1973), pp. 694-713
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Medieval Academy of
America

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2856224

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CIVITAS SIBI FACIAT CIVEM: BARTOLUS OF
SASSOFERRATO'S DOCTRINE ON THE
MAKING OF A CITIZEN*
BY JULIUS KIRSHNER

ARCHIVES in Italy are replete with municipal statutes enacted during the late
Middle Ages and Renaissance, which granted citizenship (civilitas, cittadinanza)
to thousands of individuals, their families and their male descendants. Investiga-
tions on citizenship-legislation in Siena, Perugia and Florence have demonstrated
how the legal definition of citizenship differed from city to city, how different
forms of citizenship could exist side by side in a single city, and how these forms
were undergoing a gradual amalgamation in the trecento.1 These complexities,
combined with the fact that the state of research on this subject is still in its
infancy, prevent us from reducing the historical development of citizenship in
Italian cities to a few exact models.2 Nonetheless a general pattern of what one
may call the making of a citizen has begun to emerge.
For the most part, the origins of new citizens can be traced back to the contado,
castellanies, and communities subject to the imperium of the city. Sometimes

* I am indebted to Professor Domenico Maffei of the University of Siena and to my colleague


Hanna Gray for their critical reading of this paper. I also wish to thank the American Philosophical
Society for a travel grant which enabled me to spend the summer of 1970 in the libraries of Rome
and Florence. All references to the Digest, hereafter cited as D., to the Code, hereafter cited as C.,
and to the Institutes, hereafter cited as I., are found in Corpus iuris civilis, edd. T. H. Mommsen,
W. Kroll, P. Krueger, and R. Schoell (3 vols. Berlin, 1928-1929).
1 This theme has been treated by A. Pertile, Storia del diritto italiano (Torino, 1894), ii, pp. 1
D. Bizzari, "Ricerche sul diritto di cittadinanza nella costituzione comunale," Studi senesi, XXXII
(1916), 19-136, reprinted in her collected studies, Studi di storia del diritto italiano, edd. F. Patetta
and M. Chiaudano (Turin, 1937), pp. 61-158; W. M. Bowsky, "Medieval Citizenship: The Indi-
vidual and the State in the Commune of Siena, 1287-1355," Studies in Medieval and Renaissance
History, iv (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1967), 193-238; P. Riesenberg, "Civism and Roman Law in Four-
teenth-Century Italian Society," Explorations in Economic History, vii (Fall-Winter, 1969-70), 237-
54; J. Kirshner, "Paolo di Castro on Cives Ex Privilegio: A Controversy over the Legal Qualifica-
tions for Public Office in Early Fifteenth-Century Florence," in Renaissance Studies in Honor of
Hans Baron, edd. A. Molho and John A. Tedeschi (Florence, 1971), pp. 227-64. P. Molmenti,
Venice (6 vols., Chicago, 1906), i, 169-77; F. C. Lane, "The Enlargement of the Great Council of
Venice," Florilegium Historiale; Essays Presented to Wallace K. Ferguson, edd. J. G. Rowe and W. H.
Stockdale (Toronto, 1971), 258-60. For a controversial analysis of different conceptions of citizenship
held by medieval philosophers, jurists, and publicists, see W. Ullmann, Principles of Government and
Politics in the Middle Ages (London, 1961), passim; idem., A History of Political Thought: The Middle
Ages (Baltimore, 1965), passim; "The Rebirth of the Citizen on the Eve of the 'Renaissanice' Period,"
in Aspects of the Renaissance, ed. A. R. Lewis (Austin, 1967), 5-25. Ullmann's interpretation has
been attacked by G. Post in SPECULUM, XLIII (1968), 389-90; and by P. Grendler in Renaissance
Quarterly, xxi (1968), 442.
2 Bowsky's methodological statement on the study of citizenship underscores the pitfalls con-
fronting the scholar who approaches this topic "solely from the vantage point of political theory
and Rechtsgeschichte." As he emphasizes (and I am in complete agreement with him): "Research must
account for actual practice and must relate a study of citizenship to immigration and naturalization,
socio-economic conditions, and the structure and aims of government." "Medieval Citizenship," 238.

694

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Bartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine 695

newcomers hailed from other Italian cities, and even other parts of the Mediter-
ranean and Europe. Customarily, immigrants were required to fulfill tax, prop-
erty, and residency requirements before they could apply for citizenship. Quali-
fied candidates were then awarded many legal privileges and benefits claimed by
native-born citizens (cives originarii), and in the words of a typical measure, they
were henceforward considered veri et originarii cives civitatis.3 The rights, responsi-
bilities and immunities of new citizens were detailed in the statutes, with special
attention accorded to the taxes which they were obligated to pay, the public
offices which they were eligible to hold, the treatment which they could expect
before the bar of communal justice, and the requirements for guild matriculation
which they had to meet. There are cases where immigrants were first granted
citizenship and then asked to express a tangible commitment to their new patria,
by purchasing property and erecting a house within the confines of the city and its
boroughs and by residing there for a continuous number of months or years.
Such bounden duties were often waived when the newcomer was a member of a
socially and politically prominent family, a scholar with a luminous reputation, or
a craftsman with valuable and needed skills.4
The rights of these citizens, although normally granted in perpetuum, often
proved to be ephemeral. Their rights were challenged, abridged and even melted
away in times of rampant nativism and social conflict, as happened in fourteenth-

3 Three examples culled from the archives of Florence, Siena, and Venice are offered here: Archivio
di Stato, Florence, Registri delle Provvisioni, 40, fol. 86v (13 March 1353, modern style): "Quod ipse
dominus Tomassus (a jurist whose native town was Gubbio) ... intelligatur esse et sit civis floren-
tinus et tanquam verus et originarius civis civitatis Florentie habeatur, censeatur, et sit, et gaudeat
et potiatur et gaudere et potiri possit et debeat omnibus benefitiis, privilegiis, muneribus et honoribus
communis Florentie tanquam quilibet verus et originarius civis civitatis eiusdem"; Archivio di Stato,
Siena, Consiglio Generale, Deliberazioni, 143, fols. 16V-17 (19 Sept. 1348): "Quod ipsi Matteus et
Priore (two gentlemen from Cortona) et uterque ipsorum pro se eorumque filiis et descendentibus
recipiantur et admictantur in cives dicte civitatis Senarum, et sic recepti, gaudeant, utantur et per-
fruantur omnibus privilegiis, favoribus, gratiis, beneficiis, muneribus, honoribus quibus alii orrigin[arii]
cives civitatis Senarum gaudent, utuntur et perfruuntur"; Archivio di Stato, Venice, Senato-Privilegi,
i, fol. 99v (31 Dec. 1391): "Nicolaum Bartholomei, spetiarium a pavone, quem fuit de Alemanea,
nunc habitatorem Venetiarum in contracta Sancti Salvatoris ... in nostrum civem et venetum
originarium recepimus atque recipimus, et venetum et civem nostrum originarium fecimus et facimus,
et pro veneto et cive nostro originario in Venetiis et alibi deinceps haberi et procurari omni effectu et
plentitudine volumus et tractari ipsum sincere benivolentie brachiis amplexantes et firmiter statuentes
quod singulis libertatibus, beneficiis, immunitatibus et honoribus quibuscunque, quibus alii cives
et veneti nostri originarii gaudent et perfrui dignoscuntur, prefatus Nicolaus in Venetiis et extra
ubique locorum perpetuo gaudeat et utatur."
4Examples of this practice are found in the works listed above in note 1, and in my "Papa Eugenio
IV e il monte comune," Archivio storico italiano, cxxvii (1969), 339-82; see also B. Cecchetti,
"La medicina in Venezia nel 1300," Archivio veneto, xxvi (1883), 77-111, 251-70. Always in need of
outstanding legal talent, towns often extended the privileges of citizenship to famous jurists in order
to influence their decision to accept an invitation to teach in the local university or a post in the
administration of government. In this manner, Bartolus was granted Perugian citizenship in 1348
and Baldus degli Ulbaldi became a citizen of Florence in 1359; and Bartolomeo da Saliceto and Pietro
d'Ancharano were awarded Venetian citizenship, respectively in 1393 and 1396. See A. Rossi, "Docu-
menti per la storia dell' UniversitA di Perugia," Giornale di erudizione artistica, v (1876), 184-89

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696 Bartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine

century Florence.5 New citizens could be denaturalized, if, in the judgment of


the government, they did not comply with the terms of the statute which granted
them citizenship. Confusion about the validity of acquired citizenship occurred
when statutes dealing with the legal status of new citizens were ambiguously
worded, utterly equivocal, or in conflict with one another. The legal problems
engendered by these events overwhelmed laymen, who constantly turned to
jurists for professional counsel. There are a number of recorded cases where
judicial officials summoned lawyers to submit formal opinions (consilia sapientis)
on behalf of individuals whose recently earned civil rights (iura civilia) were
threatened and on behalf of governments desiring to clothe their actions in the
garb of Roman legal science. The attempt of jurists to unravel the skein of legal
technicalities presented by these cases ushered in a new phase in the development
of the substantive law of citizenship.
In their evaluation of the qualities of acquired citizenship, the legists directed
their energies to answering a two-pronged question: did the city-state (civitas)
possess the authority to create citizens by statute, and did the naturalized immi-
grants stand on the same legal plateau as native-born citizens? Bartolus of Sasso-
ferrato (d. 1357) was one of the first jurists to address himself to this question,
and his authoritative examination of acquired citizenship, which provided later
jurists with an arsenal of ideas, is the present and central concern of this paper.6
His contribution would have been diminished, if not impossible, without the
labors of earlier juristconsults from which he harvested so many opinions
the nuclei of his own commentary. The legal literature on citizenship extended
back to the Corpus iuris civilis of Justinian and ran through the glosses and com-
mentaries of Azo (d. ca. 1230), Accursius (d. ca. 1260), Odofredo (d. 1265), and
Dino del Mugello (d. 1303?) .He came into contact with this tradition through

(secolo XIV [N. 66, 67, 68]); E. Cuturi, "Baldo degli Ubaldi in Firenze," in L'opera di Baldo per cura
dell' Universita di Perugia nel V centenario della morte del grande giureconsulto (Perugia, 1901), pp.
369ff.; Archivio di Stato, Venice, Senato-Privilegi, i, fol. 109, (23 Nov. 1393); fol. 124 (4 Feb. 1396).
5 G. A. Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society 1343-1378 (Princeton, 1962), pp. 116 ff.; M. Becker,
Florence in Transition (2 vols; Baltimore, 1967-1968), ii, pp. 93-149; Kirshner, "Paolo di Castro,"
228ff.
6 Bartolus dealt with the subject of citizenship in his lectures on D. 50, 1, Ad municipalem et de
incolis, Opera omnia (Venice, 1596), Vol. VI, fols. 217b-221vb; on C. 10, 39 (38), De municibus et
originariis and C. 10, 40 (39), De incolis..... ibid., Vol. VIII, fols. 21av-vb. He also penned several
consilia on this theme; for example, ibid., Vol. X, cons. LIX, fols. 16b-16vb; cons. LXI, fol. 17. Unless
otherwise indicated, all citations to Bartolus' teachings will refer to the Venetian edition of 1596.
According to W. Ullmann, the Bartolist doctrine regarding naturalization was only implicit in
Bartolus' political thought and was actually worked out by his pupils, most notably Baldus. See
"De Bartoli Sententia: concilium repraesentat mentem populi," Bartolus da Sassoferrato, studi e
documenti per il VI centenario, ed. D. Segolini (2 vols.; Milan, 1962), ii, pp. 725-26; A History of
Political Thought: The Middle Ages, pp. 917-18; Principles of Government, pp. 285-86. His interpreta-
tion has been accepted by L. Martines, Lawyers and Statecraft in Renaissance Florence (Princeton,
1968), p. 416, n. 33. Although Ullmann is correct in stressing the constitutional importance of late
fourteenth-century jurisprudence on the concept of naturalization, he is mistaken, as my paper will
demonstrate, when he attributes its original elaboration to Bartolus' students.
7 D.50, 1; C. 10, 40 (39); C. 10, 39 (88); Azo, to C. 10, 89 (38) and C. 109 40 (39), Ad singulas leges
XII librorum codiCi8 (Lyons, 1596), cols. 1097-99; see also his discussion of C. 8, 47 (48), 7, In adop-
tionemn, col. 984; Accursius, to D. 50, 1, Glossa ordinaria (Venice, 1591), Vol. III, fols. 1176a-1191V;

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Bartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine 697

the lectures of his mentors, Oldrado da Ponte (d. 1335), Cino da Pistoia (d.
1336/37), and Jacopo Bottrigari (d. 1347).8 Bartolus' theoretical views were
strengthened by insights gained from practical experience while serving as an
assessor at Todi in 1336 and Pisa in 1339.9 Very important, too, is the fact that
the city of Perugia bestowed the rights and privileges of citizenship upon Bar-
tolus in 1348, giving him an intimate acquaintance with the mechanics of acquir-
ing citizenship.10
Bartolus' response to the question raised above was charged by two currents
of thought which flowed through the works of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century
jurisprudence. In the first place, there was the widely accepted Roman legal idea
that a civitas could grant citizenship to outsiders (adlectio inter cives).11 Among
his predecessors, this idea was routinely mentioned; it was rarely developed and
related to contemporary institutions.12 The second current centered on the idea
that a civitas has the authority to make laws and statutes (potestas condere legem,
potestas statuendi), an idea to which whole treatises were devoted.13 Bartolus
himself declared that the populus liber of a civitas can make laws and statutes at
its pleasure on matters of public utility. The authority of the civitas on affairs
conducted within its own realm of jurisdiction is parallel to that of an emperor.
In Bartolus' celebrated phrase, the civitas is its own emperor (civitas sibi princeps),

idem, to C. 10, 39 (38) and C. 10, 40 (89), (Venice, 1569), fols. 51a-54a; Odofredo, to C. 10, 40 (89),
Lectura pertulis necnon excellentissima super tribus libris codicis (Lyons, 1517), fols. 35v-36. I have
examined Dino's gloss on C. 10, 40 (89) in a fourteenth-century MS housed in the Biblioteca Vaticana
(Borgh., 374, fols. 232b-232vb), and I have also examined his gloss on D. 50, 1 in a MS (saec. XIII-XIV)
located in Bologna, the library of the Collegio di Spagna (Cod., 283, fols. 233vb-235ra).
8 See Cino da Pistoia, to C., 3, 18, 2, Iuris ordinem, ... in Codicem et aliquot titulos primi Pan-
dectorum tomi. . . commentaria ... (Frankfurt am Main, 1578), fol. 146b-a. Cino's contribution to
the law of citizenship has been discussed by W. M. Bowsky, "A New Consilium of Cino of Pistoia
(1824): Citizenship, Residence, and Taxation," SPECULUM, XLII (July, 1967), 481-441. For references
to Oldrado da Ponte and lacopo Bottrigari, see below, notes 25, 48, 49 and 52.
9 On Bartolus' professional training, see J. L. J. van de Kamp, Bartolus de Saxoferrato, 1313-1357,
Leven-Werken-Invloed-Beteekenis (Amsterdam, 1936); A. Sheedy, Bartolus on Social Conditions in the
Fourteenth Century (New York, 1942), pp. 11-49; Francesco Calasso, "Bartolo da Sassoferrato,"
Dizionario biografico degli Italiani, vi (1964), 640-669. The chief source for Bartolus' education and
career is the sixteenth-century biography of Tomasso Diplovatacci, Liber de claris juris consultis
edd. F. Schulz, H. Kantorowicz and G. Rabotti, Studia Gratiana, x (1968), 274-9287.
10 For the reference to the enactment of 1348, see above, note 4.
11 C. 10, 40 (89), 7, Cives. On the Roman law see, A. Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law.
Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. XLIII, Part 2 (Philadelphia, 1953), p. 613;
H. F. Jolowicz, Roman Foundations of Modern Law (Oxford, 1957), pp. 39-43.
12 Accursius, to C, 10. 40 (39), 7, fol. 53b; Odofredo, to C. 10. 40 (39), 6, Privilegio, fol. 36a; Dino del
Mugello, to C. 10. 40 (39), 6, MS Borgh., 274, fol. 232vb; Aberico da Rosciate (d. 1360), to D. 50, 1,
Super digesto novo (Lyons, 1545), ii, fol. 225va.
18 See A. Solmi, "Alberto da Gandino e il diritto statutario nella giurisprudenza del secolo XIII,"
Contributi alla storia del diritto comune (Rome, 1937), pp. 339-413; F. Calasso, Introduzione al
diritto comune (Milan, 1951), pp. 59 ff; L. Prosdocimi, "Alberico da 1tosciate e la giurisprudenza
italiana del sec. XIV," Rivista di storiadel diritto italiano, XXIX (1956), 67 ff; N. Horn, "Die juristische
Literatur der Kommentatorenzeit," lus Commune, ed., H. Coing (Frankfurt am Main, 1968), II,
112-113; M. Bellomo, "Due 'Libri Magni Quaestonum Disputatarum' e le 'Quaestiones' di Riccardo
da Saliceto," Studi senesi, LXXXI (1969), 256 ff.

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698 Bartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine

and like the emperor, it does not recognize a superior.14 Certainly, the funda-
mental act of selecting new members of the civitas through legislation enacted by
council or an assembly, a jealously guarded prerogative of the citizenry, fell with-
in the boundaries of public utility and the state's jurisdiction. For this jurist,
there was no doubt that civitates -he had in mind cities such as Perugia,
Florence, Padua, and Milan - have the legislative sovereignty to invest someone
with the privileges and benefits of citizenship.
This opinion was propounded in different parts of his opera, and reiterated
with unshakable regularity during the span of his career. As early as 1339, when
he was twenty-six years old, Bartolus touched upon the motif of civilitas acquisita
in a repetitio on the lex Si is qui pro emptore (D. 41, 3, 15), given at the University
of Pisa. Here, Bartolus posited "that civitates themselves can effect statutes by
which means they who are not citizens are made citizens."15 He employed a
variety of juristic formulae to express the same view. In the repetitio mentioned
above, he spoke of newcomers who received their citizenship de voluntate maioris
consilii. Later, in 1341-42, while lecturing to his students on D. 50, 1, 1, Muni-
cipem, he asserted - in a phrase unmistakably Bartolean - "Civitas sibi faciat
civem."16 And, he added, to become a citizen de electione, as in the Roman law,
should be interpreted to mean that one has acquired citizenship via the legisla-
tion of a civitas.17 Needless to say, with these statements, Bartolus was validat-

14 On these ideas, see C. N. S. Woolf, Bartolus of Sassoferrato (Cambridge, 1913), pp. 144 if; F.
Ercole, Da Bartolus all' Althusio (Florence, 1932), pp. 70-183. In Bartolus' theory, as Ercole has
shown (p. 290), the Roman emperor was still considered a de iure overlord. F. Calasso, I Glossatori
e la teoria della sovranita (3rd. ed. rev.; Milan, 1957); W. Ullmann, "De Bartoli sententia: concilium
repraesentat mentem populi," pp. 707-733 and in the same volume, D. Segolini, "Bartolo da Sasso-
ferrato e la civitas Perusina," pp. 667-668, who argues against the idea that Bartolus construed the
civitas sibi princeps as a miniature empire and a sovereign state vis a vis the jurisdiction of the em-
peror; L. Martines, Lawyers and Statecraft in Renaissance Florence, pp. 412 if. Approaching this prob-
lem from the discipline of political science rather than history, and employing the techniques of
structural linguistics is the recent work of P. Costa, Iurisdictio, semantica del potere politico nella
pubblicista medievale (1000-1433) (Milan, 1969), pp. 238-260.
15 "Modo non examino, sed posito, quod sit verum, praemitto aliud, scilicet quod civitates possunt
sibi facere statuta per quem modum illi, qui non sunt cives, efficiuntur cives, ut infra de ver. sig.,
1. Aedificia [D. 50, 16,139] . . . " (Vol. vi fol. 95b). For the date of the repetitio, see Calasso, "Bartolo
da Sassoferrato," p. 642. To D. 50, 16, 139, Bartolus wrote: "Ista lex cum gl[ossa] facit, quod civitas
statutum facere potest quod quis sit civis" (Vol. VI, fol. 233vb). In a fifteenth-century MS of his
lectura (Biblioteca Vaticana, Vat. lat., 2287, fol. 378va), the redactor has substituted qui for quis. The
text of the law reads: "Aedificia 'Romae' fieri etiam ea videntur, quae in continentibus Romae aedi-
ficiis fiant." The Glossa ordinaria interprets this to mean: "Statuerunt Romani, quod qui aedificium
habebat Romae, Romanus sit . . . " (Vol. III, 1266b). When we compare Bartolus' statement to the
law itself and its explication in the Glossa ordinaria, it becomes quite evident that Bartolus was up-
dating both sources in the light of early fourteenth-century legal theory and practice.
16 Vol. vi, fol. 217vb.
17 To C, 10, 40(39), 7, Cives: "Hoc modo intellige d. 1., cives, C. de incol. lib. X. [=C. 10, 40 (39), 7],
ubi dicitur, quod cives facit origo, manumissio, adoptio et electio. Nam ibi recitatur ista lex. In eo
vero, quod ibi dicitur de electione, intelligo conventione vel constitutione civitatis facta cum aliquo,
licet glo. ibi aliter intelligat, licet etiam intellectus glo. ibi positus sit verus in se (Vol. viii fol. 210b).
As Ullmann points out, "the Roman law description of customary law as a conventio civium is used by
Bartolus to designate a statute: like customary law statute law too is 'quaeda1n conventio civium'

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Bartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine 699

ing a common practice, and his perceptions were easily accepted by his students.
More vexing was the endeavor to equate the rights of newly created citizens with
those of native citizens.
Bartolus tackled this problem in a consilium which is edited below.18 Previous
editions and five manuscript copies of the consilium offer no testimony on the
date and place of its composition or the circumstances surrounding its execution.
The abstract nature of the opinion suggests that some magistrate or fellow jurist
may have requested Bartolus to write a formal opinion in order to clarify a point
of law. In this case, the point of law in question was whether an individual who
has acquired citizenship by statute is actually a true citizen. To this query,
Bartolus answered:
Regarding the above question, it ought to be known that someone cannot be considered
a citizen by an act of nature, but by the civil law, which is obvious. First, from the nam
of citizen itself, inasmuch as civis is derived from civitas. Secondly, because the civi
was not created by natural law, and one does not become a citizen by being born. It is,
therefore, the rule of civil law which makes someone a citizen, either because of place
of birth, rank'9 or adoption.... Wherefore it must not be said that some men are
citizens under natural law, some under civil law. On the contrary, all men are citizens
by virtue of the civil law.

Compressed into his reply were the strands of several legal traditions. Etymo-
logically, the ius civile referred to the laws of a civitas, and in Roman law it
designated the law proper to the citizens of Rome (ius civile proprie Roma-
norum).20 In the late Middle Ages and Renaissance the ius civile was often used
by jurists to denote the laws and statutes of individual cities (ius proprium) .21

("De Bartoli sententia," p. 714). Bartolus' interpretation of the term, electio, became the standard
one. For example, Johannes de Platea (ft. 1388), to C. 10, 40 (39), 7, states: "Sed Barto. in 1, i, f
municipales, dicit quod licet hic intellectus et expositio glo. sit vera, tamen potest intelligi adlectione,
id est, ex receptione, conventione vel contractu civitatis facta cum aliquo ut veniat ad habitandum et
subeundum honores et munera efficitur qui civis, sicut tota die videmus fieri quod aliquis forensis
veniens ad habitandum recipitur in civem et efficitur verus civis . . . ," Super tribus ultimus libris
codicis (Venice, 1598), fol. 46vb.
18 See below, p. 713.
19 The latin term is dignitas. Bartolus was thinking of the doctor legens, who enjoyed special priv-
ileges of citizenship while he was teaching at a university. See his commentary on C. 12, 15, 1 (Vol.
viii, fol. 50ra); D. 50, 1, 23, Municeps ? Mues (Vol. vI, fol. 219vb). This theme has been discussed
by A. Sheedy, Bartolus on Social Conditions, pp. 151-52. He also had in mind the Podesta and the
Capitano del popolo; to C. 10, 40 (39), 7: "Potestas vel capitaneus efficitur civis et ponit glo. exemplum
de quodam potestate civitatis Bononie nomine Rufino Guasco" (Vol. viii, fol. 21vab). Cf. Glossa
ordinaria, to C. 10, 40 (39), 7 (fol. 53b).
20 A. Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law, p. 527.
21 Glossa ordinaria, to I, 1, 2, Ius naturale vv. Ius civile (ed. Venice, 1569, fol. lOa). In a Quaes
disputata, Guglielmno Accursio (ft. 1274), the son of Francesco, stated: "ius civile, id est, statutum
municipale" (Biblioteca Vaticana, Arch. S. Pietro, A. 29, fol. 124a); Petrus de Bellapertica (d. 1308),
to I, 1, 2, Jus naturale: "Quaelibet eius civitas statutum sibi facere potest municipale quod est ius
civile," In libros Institutionum commentaria (Lyons, 1536); Alberto da Gandino, Quaestiones statu-
torum, in Bibliotheca iuridica medii aevi, ed. A. Solmi (Bologna, 1901), Vol. iii, p. 3. no. I; Bartolus,
to I. 1, 2, Ius naturale (Vol. iX, fol. 59b); to D. 48, 19, 43, Imperator (Vol. vi, fol. l9ovb); Baldus, to
D. 8, 2, 8, Genero inquit: "Statutum populi est ius civile," In primam digesti veteris partem (Venice,
1586), i, fol. 168va; W. Ullmann, "The Development of the Medieval Idea of Sovereignty," English

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00 PBartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine

The emphasis placed by Bartolus on the civil law as a formative element in the
creation of the civitas echoed the perception of an earlier jurist, Iacopo d'Arena
(d. ca. 1296), who had written: "For assuredly, the civitas is established by the
[civil] law and not only by walls."22 More to the point, the consilium recalled a
Ciceronian vision, modified and preserved in the juridical literature of the Middle
Ages, wherein the civitas constitutes an assemblage of men united together to
live under the law.23 To Bartolus, the genesis of the civitas was not rooted in
nature, but in the collective will of men expressed through the civil law. The
same holds true for the very inception of citizenship. The primary source of all
citizenship was and continued to be the civil law. While natural law plays a sig-
nificant part in the creation of original citizenship, its role remains purely cir-
cumstantial and thus secondary. Hence, the mere fact of birth in the civitas does
not automatically convey the precious rights and benefits of citizenship. With-
out the imprimatur of civil law, that is, the positive sanction of the civitas,

Historical Review, LXIV (1949), 33; see also A. Solmi, "Alberto da Gandino," 339 if; F. Calasso,
Medio evo del diritto (Milan, 1954), I, pp. 409 f; N. Horn, Aequitas in den Lehren des Baldus (Cologne,
1968), pp. 76 f. On the various usages of the ius civile, especially its rapport with the ius commune
and the ius naturale, see E. Cortese, La norma giurdica (2 vols. Rome, 1964), i, 61, 63-71, 93, 96.
22 To D. 12, 21, Facturus: "Nam non solum muris, sed iure fundatur civitas" (Commentarii in uni-
versum ius civile, Lyons, 1541, fol. 63va). It is clear from the context that lacopo was referrhig to the
civil law. On the various usages of the term, civitas, in Italy durinig the Middle Ages, see C. Battisti,
"La terminologia urbana nel latino dell' alto medioevo con particulare riguardo all' Italia," La citta'
nell' alto medioveo (Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di studi sull' alto medioevo), vi (Spoleto,
1959), pp. 647 f; E. Sestan, Italia medievale (Naples, 1966), pp. 103 f; G. Dilcher, Die Entstehung
der lombardischen Stadtkommune (Untersuchungen zur deutschen Staats-und Rechtsgeschichte), vii
(Aalen, 1966), pp. 158 ff.
23 Cicero, De republica, I, 25, 39; R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, A History of Medieval Political Theory in
the West (6 vols; Edinburgh and London, 1903-1936), i, pp. 4 f; Ercole, Da Bartolo all' Althusio, pp.
14 f; H. Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine (New York, 1963), pp. 118-123. The
Ciceronian ideal was given juridical life in this twelfth-century expression: "Civitas est hominum
multitudo seu collectio ad iure vivendum." It is found in Azo's Summa in Pandectas (Venice, 1581),
col. 1142. Savigny attributed the authorship of this part of the Summa to Ugolino dei Presbiteri
(d. 1233); see Geschichte des romischen Rechts im Mittelalter (7 vols; 1834-1850), v, p. 59 f. However,
after a careful investigation of both MSS and editions, H. Kantorowicz has convincingly argued that
this particular section of the Summa was probably written by Giovanni Bassiano (d. 1197); see Studies
in the Glossators of the Roman Law (Cambridge, 1938), p. 39 and note 12. In the thirteenth and four-
teenth centuries, the definition of civitas cited above was also attributed to Azo and Accursius; see
two quaestiones of lacopo de Belviso (d. 1335) published in Alberico da Rosciate's De statutis,
quaestio 177, pars 2a, in Tractatus universi iuris (Venice, 1584), ii, fols. 48v-49r. A MS copy of these
quaestiones is housed in the Biblioteca Vaticana, Arch. S. Pietro, A 29, fol. 224vb-225va. In the MIS,
Pietro de' Cernito (d. 1338), a Bolognese jurist, who was one of Bartolus' sponsors for the doctorate,
appears to have been credited with authorship of the quaestio. On this theme, see also Carlyle, ii, p.
77 and note 2; W. Ullmann, The Medieval Idea of Law as represented by Lucas de Penna (London,
1946), p. 168; A. Gewirth, Marsilius of Padua (2 vols; 1951, New York), i, p. 182; F. Calasso, Gli
ordinamenti giuridici del rinascimento medievale (2nd ed.; Milan, 1965), pp. 93 ff; idem., I glossatori,
p. 92 ff; D. M. Bueno de Mesquita, "The Place of Despotism in Italian Politics," Europe in the Late
Middle Ages, edd. J. Hale, R. Highfield and B. Smalley (Evanston, Ill., 1965), p. 328 and note 2.
The Ciceronian definition of civitas reappeared in Leonardo Bruni's conception of a political commu-
nity as a multitudo hoininum iure sociata: see C. C. Bayley, War and Society in Renaissance Florence
(Toronto, 1961), pp. 342, 371.

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Bartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine 701

original citizenship and the rights accompanying it would neithe


flourish.
Yet Bartolus admitted elsewhere that a marked difference did e
original citizens, those whose parents are citizens as well as those
civitas, and individuals upon whom the civitas confers citizenship
action.24 In theory, both groups initially formed two separate species
This division reflected an early fourteenth-century legal doctrine in
one was viewed as a native of the civitas if either he, his father, or g
been born there.25 According to the Romanists, moreover, an ado
assumes the ius originarius of his pater adoptivus and a manumit
of his patron.26 Bartolus observed that persons who became citize
and manumission have, like other non-original citizens, acquired
ship.27 He included in this category the foreign-born wives of citizen
matic depiction of the citizenry did not end here. Indeed, his fir
citizenry welded by the civil law into a unified entity would not
leave the civitas divided into separate camps of citizens. The two
Bartolus explained, simply subdivisions of a larger class or genus
cives civitatis or cives de civitate.29 Members of this genus are only c

24 To C. 10, 40, (39), 7: "Ita dico, quod civis subdividitur in duas alias species, quia
. alius non originarius" (Vol. viii, fol. 21va).
25 In Roman law a legitimate son inherited the ius originarius of his father; an
became a citizen in his mother's origo. See D. 50, 1, 6, Adsumptio; D. 50, 1, 9, E
(38), 3, Filios. Accursius, to D. 50, 1, 1, Municipem ? Nativitas, declared that an in
citizen of the locality in which he was born as well as in his father's origo (Vol.
matter both lacopo d'Arena and Oldrado da Ponte moved beyond Accursius, as t
grandson could claim citizenship in the origo of his grandfather. Their remarks are
lus: "quod quis sequitur originem patris et avi, non autem aliorum parentium antiqu
d'Arena] dicit hic et ita etiam tenebat hic D. 01[dradus], sed C. de iurisd. om. iud. 1.
dicit aliter, videlicet: aut nepos nascitur vivo avo et sequitur originem avi.... Au
et tunc secus...." See Bartolus, to D. 50, 1, 6 Adsumptio ? Filius (Vol. vi, fol. 218r
self accepted the opinion of Oldrado, but added this stipulation: "Si enim nascitur
eius potestate, merito eius originem sequitur, sicut dicimus de filio adoptato vel leg
218va). See the commentary of Alberico da Rosciate, who also reported the opinions
and Oldrado: to D. 50, 1, (super rubrica), Super Digesto Novo, ii, fol. 225va. The first
by Bartolus to Oldrado can be found in a gloss to D. 50, 1, 6 Adsumptio ? Patri
Collegio di Spagna, Cod. 283, fol. 234rb). Here the author argues that one's claim
ship "non liceat avum transcendere, Od." In my opinion, the initials "Od," indicatin
author of the gloss, was a scribal error. Odofredo's position was clearly the same as
Accursius. See Odofredo's comments to C. 10, 40 (39), 6, Privilegio (Lectura .. ., fo
26 C. 10, 40 (39), 7; Azo, to C. 10, 39 (38), supra rubrica, col. 1097; Glossa ordin
(39), 7; Dino del Mugello, to C. 10, 40 (39), 7, MS Borgh., 374, fol. 232vb); Alber
D. 50, 1, (supra rubrica), fol. 224a; Bartolus, to D. 50, 1, 1, fol. 217va; D. 50, 1, 6, Ad
fol. 218va; to C. 10, 40 (39), 7, fol. 21va-b; Quaestio disputata, MS Arch. S. Pietro,
"Item cives facit manumissio, adoptio et electio, ut d. 1. cives, C. de incol."
27 To D. 50, 1, 6, Adsumptio ? Filius (Vol. vi, fol. 218va).
28 To D. 50, 1, 38, Imperatores ? Item rescripserunt mulierem (ibid., fol. 221va).
29 To D. 50, 1,1, (Vol. vi, fol. 217b-va). See also notes 38 and 53 below. The d
through which Bartolus arrived at the juridical reification, "citizens of the city," h
by V. Pian Mortari, "Dialettica e giurisprudenza. Studio sui trattati di dialet
XVI," in Annali di storia del diritto, i (1957), 314 ff; idem, "Il problema dell' inte

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702 Bartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine

the state recognizes their status as cives. Consequently, all citizens, Bartolus
insisted, "sunt cives civiliter." With this juristic construct, he surmounted the
theoretical barrier dividing original from non-original citizens.30 It enabled him
to reject outright opinions which cast doubt upon the validity of non-original
citizenship. As Bartolus maintained in his consilium, the legislators of a civitas
can grant citizenship to an individual who has satisfied a property requirement;
for example, by possessing a house. They can induct anyone into the citizenry,
who desires to serve the state; for example, by contributing taxes. In each
instance, Bartolus determined, the person who has been granted citizenship ough
to be respected as a true citizen.31 Even where statutes were vaguely worded,
where they did not specifically confer citizenship but merely announced that
certain individuals would henceforth be treated and regarded as citizens (habeatur
pro cive), these statutes, Bartolus argued, ought to be broadly interpreted and
these individuals were to be given a place under the canopy of true citizenship.32
This doctrine was particularly relevant to the comitatenses - those who
flocked to the city from nearby rural localities and from the castellanies and
communities which had been incorporated into the legal structure of the contado
at the time they submitted to the overlordship of the civitas. It is clear from the

commentatori," in Annali di storia del diritto, ii (1958), pp. 69 ff, 80 ff; M. Sbriccoli, L'interpretazione
dello statuto (Milan, 1969), pp. 349 f, 430 ff.
30 Following the sententia Bartoli, fourteenth-cenitury jurists would uphold the validity of citizen-
ship acquired by statute. They did not, however, embrace his position on the causal relationship
between the civil law and original citizenship and tightly clung to the dichotomy between civilitas
originalis stemming from natural law and civilitas acquisita stemming from positive law. Pertinent
is an opinion written around 1379-80 by Baldus degli Ubaldi, which dealt with the certification of
Florentine citizenship granted to a certain notary, named Ser Orlando. The jurist declared: "Et primo
quod dictus ser Orlandus fuerit verus civis effectus a principio non venit in dubium. Nam vera civili-
tas, licet extraordinaria, conferri potest per cives forensibus, ut not. D. in l. edificia, ff. de ver. signi. et
C. de incolis, l. cives, lib. x, et per Bar. ff. de usuca., l. si is qui pro emptore." Yet, "est verus civis,
non natura sed arte, quia civilitas est quid factible, et non solum nascitur sed causatur, ut dicta l.
cives (MS Vat. lat. 14094, fols. 391r-393r)." A critical edition of this consilium is presented in my
paper, "Ars Imitatur Naturam: A Consilium of Baldus on Naturalization in Florence," Viator, Iv
(1974). In another opinion, probably written by Baldus' son Francesco, the author opined: "Considero
quod civilitas quaedam est quae non potest induci nisi per naturam, ut civilitas originalis .. . quae-
dam est civilitas quae potest induci per constitutionem humanum et est vere inducitur per statutum
... secundum Bart., ut in l. si si qui pro emptore." This opinion is found among Baldus' edited Con-
silia (5 vols., Frankfurt, 1589), v, cons. 64, fol. 15ra. Following Walter Ullmann (see "Paolo di
Castro," p. 253, note 81), I had attributed this opinion, which is signed "Francesco," to Francesco
Albergotti, but there is no evidence to sustain such an attribution. The consilium centered on a case
involving Perugian citizenship, and there is no evidence which would indicate that Albergotti prac-
ticed law in Perugia, On Albergotti's career see my "Messer Francesco di Bici degli Albergotti
d'Arezzo, Citizen of Florence," Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law, ii (1972), 84-90. On the other hand,
volume V of Baldus' Consilia contains many opinions penned by Francesco di Baldo degli Ubaldi,
which, in my opinion, suggests that he authored this consilium.
31 See below, p. 713.
32 To D. 41, 3, 15 (Vol. vi, fol. 95v); to D. 48, 5, 16 (15), Si Maritus (ibid., fol. 158a). In his Tracta-
tus repraesaliarum, Bartolus argued that the words debent tractari ut cives ". . . nullam potestatem
dant, sed solum modificant quod tractentur ut cives.... Dico tamen quod possent esse verba ita late
concepta, et posset esse tanta confoederatio duarum, quod essent quasi ut unum corpus ...
(Lyons, 1547, fol. 120a). The tract was written in 1354.

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Bartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine 703

evidence unearthed by modern scholarship that a sizeable number of these new-


comers were men of standing in their own local communities and had arrived in
the city with considerable wealth. Many of them were professionals trained in the
art of the notary, law, and medicine. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the
civitas actively encouraged these men to apply for citizenship.33 However, there
were humble peasants and laborers existing on the fringes of poverty who quit
the countryside to eke out a living in the capital city. Frequently, these comita-
tenses along with their families established permanent residency in the city. At
the same time, there were peasants who constantly migrated between the
countryside and the city in search of seasonal employment. According to Barto-
lus, certain jurists had taken the position that a son of a comitatensis may be
elevated to the rank of civis if he could furnish proof that he was born in the
city.3 Bartolus rejected their proposition for this fundamental reason: to allow
birth to be the sole criterion of citizenship would place an unwarranted restric-
tion upon the authority of the state to define the membership of its own citizenry.
Unless these rustics are formally accepted as cives by the state, he contended,
they retain their status as comitatenses.35 Even marriage to a citizen cannot trans-
form the legal status of the rustic partner into that of a civis civitatis.36
Another thorny problem regarding the comitatenses had been posed by the
Glossa ordinaria. Commenting on D. 50, 1, 30, Qui ex vico, Accursius had stated
that a rustic born in the territory of a civitas is called a "civis huius terrae."37

33 See the works cited above in note 1 and also J. Plesner, L'Emigration de la compagne a la ville
libre de Florence aux XIIIe siecle (Copenhagen, 1934); D. Herlihy, "Santa Maria Impruneta: A Rural
Commune in the Late Middle Ages," Florentine Studies, ed. N. Rubinstein (London, 1968), p. 268;
and idem, "The Tuscan Town in the Quattrocento: A Demographic Profile," Medievalia et Human-
istica, New Series, I (1970), 81-109. For an incisive survey of the whole question of the relationship
between city and countryside, see the review-article of E. Cristiani, "Citth e campagne nell'eta comun-
ale in alcune pubblicazione dell' ultimo decennio," Rivista storica italiana, xxv (1963), 829-45.
34 To D. 50, 1, 1, (Vol. vi, fol. 217b); cons. CLXXII (Vol. x, fols. 41-41v); A MS copy (saec. xv) of
this consilium is found in the Biblioteca Vaticana, Vat. lat. 8069, fols. 42v-44v.
3 To D. 50, 1, 1 (Vol. vi, fol. 217b217va). Literally, Bartolus' teaching applied to all the comita-
tenses, the powerful as well as the humble. And when analytically and logically necessary, later
jurists would interpret Bartolus' doctrine ad litteran, treating the comitatenses as an unstratified
group of juridical personae, a pure legal fiction. But it seems clear that the dominant focus of Bartolus'
doctrine was the peasant element of rural society. See the passages cited in notes 36-39.
36 To D. 50, 1, 38, Imperatores ? Item rescripserunt mulierem: "Quaero, quid de comitatensi nupta
civi, an efficietur civis? Videte, ista quaestio est utilis. Finaliter, ut dixi vobis supra eo 1.1 [D. 50, 1, 1]
ista qualitas comitatensis, est quaedam adiectio, per quam denotatur nexus ad maiora onera, non
autem est significativa domicilii, vel incolatus, cum omnes cives et comitatenses unam habeant
domicilium . .. et ideo puto quod comitatensis non efficiatur civis et quod civis nupta comnitatensi
non efficiatur comitatensis .. . " (Vol. vi, fol. 221va).
37 Vol. III, 1187b. Accursius was offering jurisprudential confirmation of a contemporary practice.
Late twelfth- and early thirteenth-century documents reveal that men of the contado were in fact
sometimes called cives. See D. Waley, The Italian City-Republics (New York, 1969), p. 112. Early
fourteenth-century argeemrents between Florence and towns which had come under her jurisdictio
demonstrate that the new subjects were, in specific instances, given the designation cives comitatens
See Kirshner, Paolo di Castro, p. 2936 The extension of certain rights of citizenship was a political
maneuver to facilitate the incorporation of conquered localities into the structure of the contado.
At the same time, the rustic status of these citizens was a constant reminder of their subjugation,

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704 Bartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine

While Bartolus agreed with this opinion, he maintained that rustic citizens,
cives comitatenses, must not be confused with urban cit*izens, cives civitatis. As he
declared, "among citizens there is a certain diversity, because some are citizens
of the city, some of the contado."38 This piece of hair-splitting logic was reinforced
by the prejudice which the fourteenth-century urban dweller harbored against
the peasant element of rural society. Regardless of place of birth, Bartolus
asserted, the comitatensis is weighted down by the servile legal condition which
he inherited from his parents (including his grandfather). And his menial posi-
tion is seen in the fact that he customarily has been required to shoulder greater
public burdens than the civis civitatis. In order to lend authority to an argument
grounded on social fact, Bartolus cited appropriate passages from the Corpus
iuris civilis which decreed that a poll tax (capitatio) was to be exacted from
rustics, but not from citizens of Roman municipalities.39 Although Bartolus
acknowledged the existence of the cives comitatenses as a distinct legal class, he
demanded that their inferior status must be sharply distinguished from that of
the cives civitatis.40

That politicians were aware of the different legal consequences radiating from the technical ascrip-
tions civis and civis comitatensis and that this awareness informed policy decisions is clearly illus-
trated at the time of Florence's conquest of San Gimignano in 1353. The future status of the San
Gimignanesi was discussed in the executive council of Florence. What follows is a transcription of a
proposal made by Ubertino degli Albizzi: "Quod terra et curia et homines Sancti Geminiani fiant
comitatini et comitatini civitatis Florentie et deinceps gaudeant civilitatem civitatis Florentie.
Sed ... ad evitandam omnem infamiam qua commune Florentie posset impingi, quod ordinetur
quod per Sanctos Geminenses in terra Sancti Geminiani fiat lex submissionis et ipsimet faciant se
comitatini Florentie." (Archivio di Stato, Florence, Consulte e Pratiche, i, fols. 35-35v, July 31, 1353).
For the outcome of these discussions, see Paolo di Castro, 234-35.
38 Sed inter cives est quaedam differentia, quia quidam sunt cives de civitate, quidam sunt cives
comitatenses." (cons. CLXXII, Vol. x, fol. 41; MS Vat. lat. 8069, fol. 43v).
39 To D. 50, 1, 1: "Ad declarationem istius quaestio, oportet te alia scire, utrum de iure commtn
aliqua sit differentia inter civem et comitatensem? Respond. sic, quia comitatensis tenetur ad maiora
onera, potest enim imponi collecta pro ea parte, quae vocatur capitatio, quae civibus non potest
imponi, ut C. de capi. civi. cen. exi. Li, lib. xi [ = C. 11, 49 (48), 1] et ibi not. et C. ne rusti. ad ullum
obsequi. devo., l.i eo li. [=C. 11, 55 (54), 1]. Hoc faciunt statuta civitatum, ut vides. Nunc ad pro-
positum debetis scire, quod tam civis quam comitatensis dicitur civis, sed persona comitatensis est
obnoxia quodam nexu, scilicet quodam munere, ut maiora munera subeat, ut vidistis, sed in istis sic
obnoxiis non inspicitur locus in quo nascitur, sed personae ex quibus oriuntur" (Vol. vi, fol. 217b-
217va). This passage in MS Vat. lat. 2287, fol. 364vab, in several places, differs verbally from the edi-
tion, but in all respects the meaning has not been altered. On the whole, Bartolus' interpretation of
the code was judicious. Cf. A. Berliri, L'ordinamento tributario della prima meta del secolo XIV nell'
opera di Bartolo di Sassoferrato (Milan, 1952), p. 64. For the administration of the capitatio in the
later Roman Empire, see A. H. M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire (2 vols. Norman, Oklahoma),
Vol. i, pp. 63 ff; Vol. ii, pp. 453 ff and 464.
40 To D. 50 16, 2, Urbis: "Breviter dicimus, quod appelatione civium continentur comitatenses, licet
appellatione comitatensium non continentur cives." (Vol. vi, fol. 231va); to D. 50, 1, 1: "Item natus
ex comitatensi, ubicumque nascatur, erit civis comitatensis; natus vero ex non comitatensi, ubicumque
nascatur, erit civis non comitatensis . .. ." (ibid. fol. 217va); "Sed appelatione civium bene continentur
comitatenses, nisi civis poneretur ad differentiam comitatensis: quia tunc ponerentur ut seperatae
species . . . " (cone. 196, ed. Lyons, 1530, fol. 50). Bartolus argued in the same vein with respect to the
difference between provincials and citizens. To C. 39 (38), 2 Si ut proponis: " . . . dictio, civis,
proprie respicit civitatem, verbum autem per quod significatur provincia est, ut dum dicitur, IL

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Bartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine 705

Similarly, Bartolus continued, the son of a civis civitatis inherits his father's
legal status, wherever he is born.41 The juridicial ramifications of this doctrine
with respect to taxation, law suits, and office-holding were immense: for the chil-
dren of citizens whose public and private business demanded their absence from
the civitas over a long period of time and also for the children of exiles, ubiquitous
figures in the late-medieval and Renaissance landscape.42 This aspect of Bartolus'
thought leads us into the problem of jurisdiction and into the area of private
international law, subjects which have been amply discussed by modern jurists
and historians.43 What has not been noticed is that Bartolus was also concerned
with the problem of jurisdiction within the civitas and its connection with citizen-
ship. He introduced the problem with this question: can a person claim that he is
an original citizen of the neighborhood or ward of the city in which he was born
(porta, parochia, and capella), and not of the whole civitaas?44
At first glance, the question appears artificial, merely raised for a didactical
purpose. But a real issue was at stake here. In Italian towns direct taxes were
usually levied according to assessments made on both real and movable property
located in the section where the citizen resided.45 Likewise, the apportionment of
public offices mirrored the sectional composition of the civitas. The fact that a
citizen was born in one section of a civitas, resided in another, and listed in the
tax registers of both sections was a constant source of confusion among officials.46
There were citizens who claimed that their civil rights and responsibilities flowed
from their natal parochia. And they petitioned the government to exempt from

bardus, Tuscus, et similes non congruunt huic dictioni, civi, sed dicitur, quaedam conditio personae,
ut hie, dum dicitur eius conditionis, et cetera. Sed sicut a civitate dicitur quis civis, ita provincia
dicitur quis provincialis [Ed: provinciales], ut lex provinciales, ff. de verb. signifi. [=D. 50, 16, 190]"
(Vol. viii, fol. 21a). Bartolus did state, however, that provincials and cives shared the provincia as a
common patria (to D. 50, 1, 1, Vol. vi, fol. 217va). For Bartolus, the civitas superiorem non recognoscens
was the capital city of the province, a point brilliantly illustrated and thoroughly documented by F.
Ercole, Dal Bartolo all' Althusio, pp. 80 ff. In his Tractatus de insula, composed at Perugia ca. 1355,
Bartolus also stated: "Civitas enim honorabilior dicitur caput provinciae" (ed. Lyons, 1530, fol.
113, no. 6).
41 To D. 50, 1, 1; " .. . et sic natus ex cive, ubicumque nascatur, erit civis" (Vol. vi, fol. 217va).
42 See the interesting comments on political exiles (fuoriusciti) offered by L. Martines, "Political
Conflict in the Italian City States," Government and Opposition, 3 (Winter, 1968): 88-91.
43 For the bibliography on this subject, see B. Breschi, "Alcune osservazioni sul contributo recato
da Bartolo alla teoria degli statuti" and A. Checchini, "Presuppositi giuridici dell'evoluzione storica
della 'bartoliana' teoria degli statuti al moderno diritto internazionale privato" in Bartolo da Sasso-
ferrato, ii, pp. 51-59 and 63-104. K. Neumeyer's Die gemeinrechtliche Entwicklung des internationalen
Privat- und Strafrechts bis Bartolus (2 vols. Munich, 1901-1916), remains an essential contribution to
this subject.
" To D. 50, 1, 1: "Quaero, civitas ista distinguitur per portas et per parochias, utrum natus in
aliqua porta, vel parochia debeat dici de illa porta, vel parochia, ratione originis? (Vol. vi, fol. 217va).
46 See E. Fiumi, "L'imposta diretta nei comuni medioevali della toscana," Studi in onore di Armando
Sapori (Milan, 1957), pp. 329-353; D. Herlihy, "Direct and Indirect Taxation in Tuscan Urban
Finance, ca. 1200-1400," Finances et comptabilite urbaines du XIIIe au XVIe siecle (Brussels, 1964),
pp. 385-405; W. M. Bowsky, The Finance of the Commune of Siena 1287-1355 (Oxford, 1970), pp.
74 ff.
41 The case upon which lacopo Bottrigari rendered his opinion (cited in the following notes) offers
an example of this problem.

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706 Bartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine

taxation the property they possessed in other parts of the civi


the tax exemption, city magistrates would, in effect, be denyin
the state (ius civitatis) was applicable to all citizens, wherever t
and wherever they resided. They would also be admitting that
more than a cluster of miniature states, each with its own citizenr
These deductions were repugnant, indeed preposterous, to Ba
fellow jurists, whose vision of a unitary state pervaded their doctr
ship. Citing an earlier opinion of Jacopo Bottrigari, Bartolus e
rationale behind the formal divisions within the civitas is a matter
tive convenience, since they facilitate the collection of taxes an
offices.47 Both he and Bottrigari sternly rejected all claims of sect
within the civitas. Every citizen, they concurred, is subject to
upon property in the porta or parochia in which they reside.48 No
one is born in the civitas, Bottrigari ruled, he is a native of the whole civitas.49
What distinguished one citizen from another is his patria, not his neighborhood
(locus).50 In this context, the citizen's patria signifies his civitas,5' to which he

47 To D. 50, 1, 1: " ... distinctio vero portarum et capellarum fit gratia maioris notitiae, et gratia
facilioris divisionis de honoribus et muneribus faciendis . . . " (Vol. vi, fol. 217va). Any section or
quarter of the city could produce statutes for the sake of expediency, Bartolus commented, but such
legislation must be approved by the populus of the whole civitas. To D. 1, 1, 9, Omnes poputi: "Tertio
quaero, nunquid pars aliqua civitatis, puta unum quarterium, possit facere statuta? Videtur quod sic,
quasi sit collegium approbatum.... Sed cum iurisdictio non resideat in certa parte civ itatis, sed in tot
populo vel consilio quod populum representat . . . in hoc dico, quod statuta ad causarum decisiones
non possunt facere sine confirmatione totius populi, sed statuta pertinentia ad modum expediendi ea,
quae incumbunt ipsi parti, seu quarterio possunt facere . . . " (Vol. i, fol. 9va). On the relationship be-
tween civitas and collegium, see Costa, lurisdictio, pp. 234-38.
48 To D. 50, 1, 1: "Et ideo nativitas in aliqua capella vel porta non facit eum illius portae vel capel-
lae, sed ista distinctio fiet, ut in qua capella munera subit, illius capellae dicatur, ar. extra., de paroch.
c. fi., vel dicatur illius capellae in qua ipse habitat, ubi magis conversatur, . . . et ita de facto consuluit
lac. But., licet non per istas leges" (Vol. vi, fol. 217va). For the allegation to the Lzber Extra, see
Decretals of Gregory IX, iII, tit. XXIX, c. 5, Significavit (ed. E. Friedberg, iI, 1879, col. 555). I have not
been able to consult an edition of Bottrigari's Quaestiones et consilia published at Bologna in 1557. A
MS (saec. XV) of the consilium which Bartolus cited is found ia Biblioteca Vaticana Vat. lat. 8069,
fols. 306-306v. The passage to which he referred reads as follows: "Statuto cavetur quod quilibet
faciat se extimari in ea capella de qua est et cumu hominibus ilMius capelle mnunera subeat. Contingit
quod quidam habebat originem proprianm et paternam in una capella, in alia habebat habitationem et
extimum. Quero, in qua debeat facere se scribi, vel in utraque vel nulla? Et obmissus allegationibus,
Xristi nomine invocato, videtur quod describi debeat in capella in qua extimum et habitationem
habet, nec debeat inspici originis capella" (fol. 306).
49 Loc. cit.: "Nam orrigo unius capelle communis est ad totam civitatem et omnes capellas; ... quod
orrigo disponit effectum suum in quacunque sit parte civitatis quoad totum et omnes partes totius."
50 Loc. cit.: "Cives autem distinguunt [MS: distinguit] patriam a patria, non locum a loco, ut 1.
Qui ex vico [D. 50, 1, 30]."
51 The equation between civitas and patria was commonplace among fourteenth-century jurists:
Alberico da Rosciate, to D. 50, 16, 2, Urbi: " . . . patria et civitas idem videntur"; Bartolus, to C.
10, 40 (39), 5, Si in patria: "Haec lex est clare et no. quod verbum patria et verbum civitas idem
importat" (Vol. viii, fol. 21va); idem., to D. 50, 4, 3, Et qui originem (Vol. vi, fol. 185b); Angelo degli
Ubaldi, to C. 10, 40 (39), 7: "Verbum, civitas, idem importat quod patria" (in the Commentaria ...
codicis of his brother Baldus; 6 vols., Venice, 1577, v, fol. 287).

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Bartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine 707

owes his complete loyalty.52 Complementing his teacher's opinion, Bartolus


postulated: "The [rights of] citizens of the civitas are identical, and citizenship,
which is occasioned by birth, is uniform throughout the whole civitas.Y1
The accent placed by Bartolus on the uniformity of legal rights shared by the
cives civitatis was stressed again in his examination of contractual citizenship. The
act of contracting citizenship was illuminated by him in an analysis of what was,
in the light of fourteenth-century practice, an almost identical situation. A
statute provided that persons who come to settle in the civitas may receive a per-
petual immunity, presumably against public charges. Drawn by this attractive
invitation, men arrived in the civitas only to learn that the government was intent
on repealing the statute. Bartolus acknowledged the authority of the civitas to
cancel its offer insofar as it affected future arrivals. At the same time, he denied
the civitas the right to abrogate the statute, alleging that this action would be
prejudicial to those who have already come. His reasoning is clear: after the indi-
vidual arrived in the city, the statute awarding him the immunity is transformed
into a contract (statutum transivit in contractum), which is binding upon both
parties.54 Paradoxically, for all his awe-inspiring pronouncements on the positive
law of the civitas, Bartolus fully realized that it was necessary to prevent the
state from acting capriciously by making it a party to a contract, whose binding
force derived from natural law as well as civil law.
When the new citizen has performed the services demanded of him by the
enactment granting him citizenship, his relationship with the civitas also takes
the form of a contract. Bartolus described this pact as civilitas contracta and
employed the technical terms of civis ex pacto and civis ex conventione to desig-
nate the newcomer's status. The marriage between contract and citizenship
represents his most novel and fruitful contribution to the principles underpinning

52 lacopo Bottrigari, to D. 1, 1, 2, Veluti: "Dico quod debet potius parere imi patriae quam patri,"
In primam et secundam veteri digesti partem (Rome, 1617), i, fol. 3a; Dino del Mugello, to D. 50, 1, 17,
Libertus, ? In honoribus: "Si intelligeres quod fuisset in illa patria ad quam modo vocatur civis
ratione originis proprie vel paterne, compelleretur tunc [subire munera], non obstante quod alibi
domiciliuim constituisset" (Collegio di Spagna, Cod. 283, fol. 234rb).
13 To D. 50, 1, 1: "Videte, cives civitatis sunt uniformes et civilitas, quae per originem contrahitur,
est uniformis toti civitate . . . " (Vol. vi, fol. 217va); " . . . omnia loca quae sunt in civitate vel extra
[vel extra Om. Ed.) se habent uniformiter quantum ad ius civilitatis [Ed. civitatis] acquirendum
nativitate, sive quis nascitur in civitate, sive extra ex quacumque parte territorii" (cons. 172, Vol. x,
fol. 41; MS Vat. lat., 8069, fol. 43v).
14 To D. 1, 1, 9. Omnes populi (Vol. i, fol. Ha). This passage has been transcribed in my article
"Paolo di Castro," 257, n. 101. Bartolus' commentary on the lex Omnes populi was delivered as a
repetitio. Although many of the passages in his lectures on the Digestum vetus have now been re-
attributed to his mentor, Cino da Pistoia, there is a consensus among legal historians that Bartolus
was indeed the author of the repetitio on D. 1, 1, 9. See D. Maffei, La "Lectura 8upe7 digesto veteri"
di Cino da Pistoia (Milan, 1968), pp. 7-8, 15-16; F. Calasso, "Bartolo da Sassoferrato," p. 645.
Finally, it ought to be noted that Bartolus specifically referred to this repetitio in his discussion of
contractual citizenship. To D. 50, 1, 1: "Hic no. quod secundum etymologiam vocabuli municeps
dicitur quasi munerum particeps et sic vides, quod propria significatio assumitur ex etymologia
vocabuli, de quo plene dixi in repetitione 1. Omnes populi in tracta. statutorum, supra de iust. et
iu . . . (Vol. vi, fol. 217vb).

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708 Bartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine

the law of acquired citizenship. Bartolus was keenly aware that this union was
not authorized by juristic precedent. While discussing contractual citizenship in
his magisterial lecture on the lex municipem (D. 50, 19 1), he candidly admitted
that Ulpian's words, "recepti in civitate ut munera nobiscum facerent" could be
construed as citizenship resulting from birth, manumission, and adoption rather
than ex contractu.55 Juridicially speaking, what then justified civilitas contracta?
Consciously moving beyond a literal and mechanical interpretation of the law,
Bartolus informed his audience that civilitas contracta was sanctioned by custom:
tamen prior lectura magis placet, ut receptione propria ex contractu habito cum aliquo
civitas sibi faciat civem. Hoc videmus servari de consuetudine.A6

For Bartolus the fundamental rights and responsibilities of the cives ex pacto
were commensurate and coextensive with those enjoyed by original citizens.
Unlike other contracts, civilitas contracta was inheritable, devolving upon one's
male descendants.57 It was permanent, as the new citizens could -not willingly
renounce the contract, nor could the state arbitrarily revoke it.58 When the
property or persons of the cives ex pacto suffered injuries inflicted by the citizens
of another civitas, they could lawfully petition their own state for the right of
reprisal - the act of using force, short of war, against another state to procure
redress of grievances.59 For immigrants, civilitas contracta served as a legal buffer
against the winds of political and social change, which might prod a government
into enacting regressive legislation limiting or stripping them of their rights.
Following Bartolus' lead, jurists of the late trecento and quattrocento were forever
reminding city magistrates of their responsibility to uphold statutory agreements

15 To D. 50, 1, 1: "Secundo no. quod aliqui possunt recipi in civitate ut munera nobiscum faciant, et
sic receptione contrahitur civilitas, ut hic in textu, dum dicit, recepti in civitate, etc., posset etiam hic
tex. intelligi aliter, ut dicantur recepti in civitate, scilicet ipso facto, per eos modos [nativitatem,
manumissionem et adoptionem] qui ponuntur in principio legis . . . " (ibid.). The text which Bartolus
was explicating is as follows: "Municipem aut nativitas facit aut manumissio aut adoptio. Et proprie
quidem municipes appellantur muneris participes, recepti in civitatem ut munera nobiscum facerent."
56 To D. 50, 1, 1. Bartolus was, of course, historically correct. The practice of granting citizenship
by statute had become customary by the 1340's. It is true that Bartolus cited the lex Aedificia in
support of his claims about contractual citizenship. But, as we have already seen above (note 15),
Bartolus' interpretation of that law reflected early fourteenth-century legal theory and legislative
procedure. Indeed, the relationship between civilitas acquisita and custom was already being dis-
cussed in the late thirteenth century. In a gloss to D. 50, 1, 6, Adsumptio, Umberto da Cremona voiced
the opinion that "Accidens [i.e., positive law] non tollit naturam, ut hic, sed convertit naturam ad
quandam consuetudinem . ." (Collegio di Spagna, cod. 283, fol. 234ra). On the theme of contrac-
tual citizenship, see Bizzari, Studi di storia del diritto italiano, pp. 74 if; F. Calasso, La legislazione
statutaria dell' Italia meridionale (Bologna, 1929), pp. 103 ff.
57 To D. 50, 1, 6, Adsumptio ? Filius: " . . . quia civilitas acquisita per adoptionem vel manumis-
sionem transit ad filios .. . civilitas quaesita per conventionem praedictis aequiparatur, quia utrum-
que fit per conventionem, ergo, et cetera;" to D. 50, 1, 17, Libertus ? Patris domicilium: " . . . quod
civilitas contracta ex conventione transeat ad filios, quia quis est obligatus civitati, nec potest libera
voluntate recedere . .. (Vol. VI, fol. 219a).
58 To D. 50, 1, 6: "Sed civilitas contracta vel nativitate vel aliis modis, ... non potest mutari
libera voluntate . .. " (Ibid., fol. 218b).
h Tractatus repraesaliarurm, fols. 11 9vb-1R0.

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Bartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine 709

forged between the civitas and her new citizens.60 In their turn, as we have seen,
town officials could legitimately compel new citizens to serve the civitas as
soldiers, taxpayers, office-holders, and so forth. The civitas stood ready to admon-
ish and punish citizens who tried to circumvent or refused to fulfill their part of
the contract.
Thus far Bartolus had delineated the rights of cives ex pacto in relation to the
rights of other citizens within the jurisdiction of the civitas. There remained the
perplexing problem of dual citizenship, posed by new citizens who retained their
status as cives originarii of another civitas. The problem was compounded when
new citizens were also awarded the rights of original citizenship. Given conflict-
ing commands by one's acquired patria and original patria, which one must the
citizen obey? Did the legal validity of acquired original citizenship correspond
to that of ordinary original citizenship? For the savant jurists, Lucas de Penna
(fl. 1343-1382), Baldus degli Ubaldi (1327-1400), and Lodovico Pontano (d.
1439), the commands of the civitas originis carried more legal weight.61 Another
distinguished jurist, Paolo di Castro (d. 1441) opined that although it was
within the authority of the civitas to grant an individual the rights and benefits
of original citizenship, acquired original citizenship was still contrary to natural
law and could only be interpreted as a legal fiction.62 Bartolus does not appear to
have grappled with these specific problems. In his Tractatus repraesaliarum, how-
ever, he did consider the case of the civis ex conventione who appealed to his
acquired civitas for the right to undertake reprisals against his civitas originis,
and conversely, the civis originarius who entreated his native civitas for the right
of reprisal against his acquired civitas. Bartolus approached these cases with
utmost caution. He reminded his readers that the act of reprisal was an extraordi-
nary remedy in law, which could only be carried out when real and unrequited
injury was suffered and when other legitimate forms of redress were exhausted.

80 See Riesenberg, "Civism," 0243 ff; Kirshner, "Paolo di Castro," 227 ff; and see the consilia cited
above in note 30.
81 Baldus to C. 40 (39), 4. Cum te: "Quid si concurrant in inducendo munera locus originis naturali
et locus originis civilis? . . . sed credo originem naturalem praeferri civili . . . " Commentaria ad
libros codicis .. . (Venice, 1615), fol. 262vb; Lucas de Penna, to C. 10, 40 (39), 7, Commentaria in tres
libros codicis (Lyons, 1586, fol. 80vb); Lodovico Pontano, to D. 45, 1, 2, Stipulationum: " . . . civilitas
originaria potentior est accidentali; unde si vocatur a municipio originario et accidentaliter acquisito,
originario potius parere tenetur.... In primam atque secundam digesti novi partem commentaria
(2 vols.; Venice, 1580), Vol. ii, fol. 119v). Adhering to tradition, Bartolus did state that the claims of
one's natal civitas were to be preferred over those of the civitas where the individual was merely a
resident (incola). To C. 10, 39 (38), 1; C. 10, 40 (39), 7. There were some lawyers, however, who re-
jected the idea that original citizenship could be acquired. For instance, Alberico da Rosciate, to D.
50, 92 (supra rubrica) argued: "Cives quidam sunt origine propria, quidam paterna, propria est in loco
in quo quis natus est, licet alibi conceptus fuerit ... et ita istam non potest quis mutare per accidens
et ille qui non habet eam non potest per accidens acquirere, ut d.l. assumptio [D. 50, 1, 6] in principio,
ubi de hoc videas, et ratio, quia inest a natura, ut ibidem probatur et ideo per accidens mutari non
potest." (Super digesto novo, Vol. ii, fol. 933va). Let it be noted, however, that Alberico agreed with his
contemporaries that the acquisition of non-original citizenship was legal: "Quidam factus est civis ali-
cuius civitatis ... est actus-legitimus.... De statutis, quaestio 119, fol. 17rb,
62 Kirshner, "Paolo di Castro," pp. 252 ff.

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710 Bartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine

After weighing the arguments for and against conceding the right, Bartolus
decided that it is incumbent upon any civitas to provide for the welfare of its
citizenry.63 In both cases, he instructed, the citizens may.clearly request the rigbht
of reprisal and the state is bound to favor that request.64 At one point, Bartcius
revealed his reservations about permitting citizens to take retaliatory measures
against their native civitates. With regard to the cives originarii, he admitted, the
authority of the civitas originis is greater than that of the acquired patria.65 Yet,
he ultimately concluded, the obligation of the state to defend its cives ex conven-
tione overrides the ius potentius of the native civitas.66
As one wades through Bartolus' writings, one encounters a petrified wilderness
of legal jargon, abstruse logic, and partially explained allusions to authority and
tradition. What was once self-evident to the master's disciples often mystifies the
modern student. Taken together, his formulations on citizenship resemble an
intricate montage rather than a neat blueprint yielding precise definitions.
Nevertheless, after a critical investigation of his teachings, the meaning Bartolus
imputed to the term verus civis becomes apparent. The true citizen waE the civis
ex pacto as well as the civis originarius, both of whom were entitled to equal treat-
ment and protection before the law of the civitas. The Bartolist notion of civic
equality, as we have seen, drew inspiration from an ancient and cherished politico-
legal ideal: "Civitas est hominum multitudo seu collectio ad iure vivendum."67
Its specific configuration was, however, fashioned under the lights and shadows
cast by a fresh historical perspective. Not prepared to mortgage the juridicial
needs of his own generation to preconceived, hackneyed formulae, Bartolus pro-
duced a construct which would encompass and symbolize the dynamic amalga-
mation of different forms of urban citizenship taking place during his own life-
time. Yet cognizant that the urban amalgam could be torn apart by conflicts
erupting between the native and the newcomer, he introduced the concept of
civilitas contracta to safeguard the latter's civil rights, and thereby prevent a
bifurcation of the citizenry. Above all, Bartolus' doctrine on the making of a
citizen was consistent with and an inevitable extension of his portrait of the
"sovereign" city-state. Only a unified citizen-body, with each member possessing
full legal rights, was worthy of bearing the title of cives civitatis. And it was in the

63 " . . . quando sunt duo qui habent unum subditum, quilibet potest defendere eum contra iniuri-
aym, quae ei infertur ab alia.... Et si civitas procederet contra eum filium, pater admitteretur pro suo
interesse ad defensionem filii . . . ita in proposito una civitas contra aliam ad defensionem sui Civis
poteret concedere repraesalias" (fol. ll9vb).
64 loc. cit.
65 Loc. cit.
6B Loc. att.: "Quando sunt plures qui habent ius in re licet unum ius sit potentius altero, tamen etiam
ille qui habet ius debelius poteret agere contra illum qui habet ius potentius, si rem illam damnificat
. . . ita etiam in proposito, civitas, quae habet illum civem ex conventione, licet habet illud ius debelius
quam civitate [Ed: civitas] originis, tamen pro eius defensione poterit sibi concedere repraesalias."
The same point was expressed by Bartolus in his Tractatus super constitutione 'qui sint rebelles' (Lyons,
1555), fol. 128". Bartolus argued that when both citizens and residents (incolae) have fulfilled their
municipal obligations, the eivitas is then bound by contract to come to their defense.
67 For the juridicial literature carrying this idea, see above, p. 700, note 2$c

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Bartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine 711

interest of the civitas sibi princeps to preserve and nurture this legal fiction, to
insist that all citizens be equally unequal in confrontation with its own superior
authority.

In conclusion, I should like to make clear that I am not applauding Bartolus as


the originator of the theory of naturalization in the fourteenth century, but
arguing that he was the author of an innovative and coherent theory, with mul-
tiple sources, about the making of a citizen: a theory which would bear his name
from the mid-fourteenth century on. Indeed, throughout this paper I have
deliberately side-stepped the question of Bartolus' originality, because it is
peripheral to the subject at hand and asked by historians more intent on grading
rather than understanding and explaining Bartolus' theoretical contributions;
and because it misdirects our attention from the significant question of the mean-
ing of naturalization in the Italian city-states of the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries. In a more profound sense, the origins of Bartolus' theory, or for that
matter any legal theory, cannot be solely ascribed to the genius of an individual;
rather, it is the result of a collective enterprise, conscious as well as unconscious,
of society at large, legislators and professional jurists. The formulation of a jurid-
ical concept, moreover, may undergo a period of gestation lasting generations
before it crystalizes in the work of a particular jurist. Until we have a more
detailed picture of the chain of glosses and commentaries linking the Glossa
ordinaria to the commentaries of Bartolus, our understanding of how Bartolus
forged his theory will remain partially clouded. Whatever the case may be, much
more important than juristic originality was the jurist's auctoritas, and it cannot
be denied that the sententia Bartoli was enormously influential among his intel-
lectual heirs. Auctoritas does not imply Pavlovian obedience. In many cases
Bartolus' opinions on citizenship would be modified and rejected as well as
enthusiastically received. But his authorative opinions could not be ignored, and
they would weigh heavily upon the future jurisprudence of citizenship.68 The
dissemination of his thought, however, is properly the subject for other papers
and monographs.

NOTE PREFATORY TO THE TEXT

Anyone who attempts to attribute the paternity of a particular opinion or work to


Bartolus of Sassoferrato, let alone undertake the task of editing one of his pieces, treads
upon a quagmire. The problems inherent in such an undertaking were underlined long ago
by jurists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. More recently, D. Maffei and others
have heightened our awareness of the fact that the massive legal literature bearing the
name of Bartolus is heavily larded with the opinions and complete works of other four-
teenth-century jurists.69 With these caveats in mind, I have nonetheless thought it de-
sirable to offer an edition of Bartolus' consilium which deals with the validity of acquired

68 See my paper "Ars Imitatur Naturam," cited above in note 30.


69 D. Maffei, La "Lectura super digesto veteri" di Cino da Pistoia; idem., "I1 'tractatus percussionum'
pseudo-Bartoliano e la sua dipendenza da Odofredo," Studi Senesi, xv (1966), 7-18; A. Campitelli,
"I1 'tractatus de cicatricibus' di Francesco Albergotti attribuito a Bartolo da Sassoferrato," Annali di
storia del diritto, ViII (1964), 269-288; J. Kirshner, "A 'Quaestio de usuris' Falsely Attributed to Bar-
tolus of Sassoferrato," Renaissance Quarterly, xxii (Autumn, 1969), 256-261.

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712 Bartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine

citizenship andwhich has been discussed above, pp.699-703. In preparing the text I have used
ten previous editions, published in the sixteenth-century volumes of Bartolus' Consilia,
quaestiones et tractatus.70 I have also utilized five MSS copies of the consilium, all of which
were penned in the fifteenth century. As I have already pointed out, these editions and
MSS give no indication of when, where and for what specific purpose the consilium was
written. This void in our knowledge is extremely unfortunate, for until we can date
Bartolus' opinion with precision, we are left with a static vision of his thought. The opening
of the punctus, with the impersonal "Quidam . . . ", however, suggests to me that the
author was dealing with a hypothetical case. Consilia of this genre were common in the
fourteenth century, and it may well be that the opinion was delivered to an audience com-
posed of students and colleagues, intended to clarify the law on civilitas acquisita, or even
to clarify or reaffirm Bartolus' own doctrine on this subject. Doubtless, there are many
more copies of the consilium buried in European MS collections, but the current inade-
quacies of inventories limit their accessibility. Given this state of affairs, the text presented
below is not intended to be a definitive critical edition. Hopefully, future discoveries of
manuscripts and incisive textual criticism will provde the solid foundation which is neces-
sary for an historical examination of Bartolus' teachings.
The text is based on a collation of the ten editions and the five MSS listed below. Since
there are no significant, and only a few minor, variants among the editions, I have treated
all ten as a single edition. In preparing the text, I have disregarded all the explanatory
prefaces inserted above the consilium by the editors for the benefit of readers. I have also
disregarded the classical orthography of the editions, for not only is it absent from the
MSS, but it also gives a false impression of Bartolus' style. Furthermore, there has been
no attempt to reproduce the orthography of the MSS. Instead, I have introduced uni-
formity in the transcription. With the exception of errors due to a mere slip of the pen,
all variants have been duly placed in the apparatus.

Editions

Edd =1. Venice, 1506, cons. 62, fol. 17ra-b. 2. Lyons, 1535, cons. 62, fols. 18vb-l9ra. 3.
Lyons, 1537, cons. 62, fol. 31vab. 4. Lyons, 1547, cons. 62, fols. 19vb-20ra. 5. Lyons,
1555, cons. 62, fol. 21Va. 6. Venice, 1567, cons. 62, fol. lgrb. 7. Venice, 1575, cons. 62,
fol. 17ra-b. 8. Turin, 1577, cons. 62, fol. 17vb. 9. Venice, 1581, cons. 62, fol. 17ra-b.
10. Venice, 1590, cons. 62, fol. 17ra-b.

Manuscripts
B =Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Barb. lat. 1396, fol. 53r (s. XV)
L=Leipzig, Universitatsbibliothek, Cod. 1054, fol. 270r(s. XV)71.
U= Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Urb. lat. 1132, fol. 70v(s. XV)72.
Va =Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2290, fols. 92V-93r (s. XV)73.
Vb =Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 10726, fol. 316r(S. XV)74.

70 Although ten editions were available to me, there are at least fifty-five editions of Bartolu
opera according to Van de Kamp, Bartolus de Saxoferrato, pp. 109-119.
71 This MS has been described by R. Helssig, Katalog der Handschriften der Universitatsbibliothek zu
Leipzig (Leipzig, 1905), Vol. iii, p. 178; E. Casamassima, "Note sui manoscritti di Bartolo nelle
biblioteche tedesche," Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fur RechtsgeschichIe, R. A., LXXIX (1962), 222;
idem, Codices operum Bartoli a Saxoferrato recensiti, I: Iter Germanicum (Istituto per la storia dei
postglossatori e commentatori) (Florence, 1971), p. 87. I would like to express my gratitude to Dr.
Emanuele Casamassima for providing me with a microfilm copy of the Leipzig text.
72 This MS has been described by C. Stornajolo, Codices urbinates latini (Vatican City, 1921), iII,
pp. 165-169.
73 B. Nogara's unpublished description of this MS is found in Vat. lat. 13474, pp. 115-128.
74 This MS has been described by J. B. Borino, Codices vaticani latini 10707-10875 (Vatican City,
1947), pp. 114-148.

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Bartolus of Sassoferrato's Doctrine 713

Text

1. Punctus talis est: Quidam est effectus civis alicuius civitatis per statutum
2. vel reformationem. Queritur, an dicatur vere civis, an improprie? In questione
3. predicta sciendum est quod aliquem esse civem non est actus naturalis, sed iuris
4. civilis, quod apparet. Primo, ex ipso nomine, quia civis dicatur a civitate.
5. Secundo, quia de iure naturali non erat civitas et nascendo quis non
6. efficiebatur civis. Est ergo constitutio iuris civilis que facit aliquem
7. civem propter originem vel propter dignitatem vel propter adoptionem, ut C.,
8. de incolis. 1. Cives.1 Unde non est dicendum quod quidam sunt cives naturaliter,
9. quidam civiliter. Immo est dicendum quod omnes sunt cives civiliter: aliqui
10. tamen propter naturalem originem, aliqui propter aliam causam. Unde si civitas
11. facit statutum quod quicunque habet ibi domum sit civis, vere erit civis, ut ff.,
12. de verbo sig., 1. Edificia2 et ibi not. et eo. tit. 1. Provinciales3 et de statu ho.,
13. 1. In urbe4; et vere et proprie civis est, quicunque recipitur, ut munera subeat.
14. Sed iste est sic receptus, ergo vere et proprie civis est, ut if., ad muni.,
15. 1. i. ibi "proprie quidem,"5 et cetera. Unde debet tractari ut civis illius
16. civitatis que eum civem facit. Et ita consulo ego, Bar. de Saxoferrato.

Apparatus criticus

1. Punctus-est] om. LUVaVb talis] questionis add. B est2] post effectus tr. L; rep. Va
alicuius civitatis om. L
2. vel (seu EddUVa) reformationem om. B Queritur om. LVb improprie] in parte B; et
proprie Va et praem. in Va In questione predicta om. U questione] conclusione L
3. sciendum] dicendum LVb quod om. LVa; praem. sciendum rep. U aliquem om. U iuris
om. Edd
4. Primo post nomine tr. LVb dicatur a civitate] om. BEddUVa
5. Secundo quia] sed LVb erat] civis nec add. Vb quis om. BEddL; post efficiebatur tr. Vb
6. efficiebatur] nascebatur Edd Est] om. Edd; et U ergo om. U que facit aliquem civem]
civem facit aliquem Edd
7. propter2 om. Va
8. Unde rep. Va non] est dubium add. Va sunt cives] sit civis UVa; sint cives Vb
9. et praem. quidam Edd quidam post civiliterl cancell. Va Immo - civiliter2 om. Va est
dicendum quod] om. BEdd; dicendum est quod L sunt] sint L originem naturalem tr. Va
lo. aliqui] alii BUVa propter2] per B aliam] aliquam Edd
11. ubi praem. habet Va habet post domum tr. L ibi] ea add. B; om. L vere erit civis] om.
B; vere civis esset L; vere civis erit UVb; erit Va
13. urbe] verbo Va civis - 14 civis om. B, suppl. Bl marg. quicunque - 14 est2 om. U re-
cipitur] accipitur Edd; reperitur Va; reperitur alias recipitur Vb ut] et B subeat] subire
B; recipiat V
14. Sed] se Vb iste]hic L vere - 15 ibi om. Vb civis] illius civitatis add. B est post vere
tr. B
15. proprie] improprie BEddLUVa illius] eius L
16. facit] fecit LUVb Et - Saxoferrato] Ego Bar., ita consulo Edd; Et hoc est consilium
domini Bar. de Saxoferrato L; Bar. de Saxoferrato UVb; Bartholus Va

1 C. 10, 40 (39), 7.
2 D. 50, 16, 139.
3 D. 50, 16, 190.
4D. 1, 5, 17.
6 D. 50, 1, 1: "Et proprie quidem municipes appellantur muneris participes, recepti in civitatem
ut munera nobiscum facerent ...."

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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