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Philoponus, De Aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, 7.24-11.6 Rabe

And the reason (scil. of the fact that the cosmos cannot exist ab aeterno even if God

is eternally good and eternally demiurge) more properly cosmological than

we can adduce is the following. That in no way can there be an infinite

in place, Aristotle demonstrated this with many arguments both in the Physics and in De

caelo (here by "infinite" I mean what is found in greatness by extension

or the numerical one; indeed, the infinite in power is necessarily found only

in eternal realities by nature), and is unanimously accepted by all. Now, since it is

impossible to bring into being the actual nature of the infinite according to the magnitude o

according to number, it is absolutely necessary that the number of beings be finite.

This being the case, it is ridiculous to ask why (the Demiurge) has no place in

be a greater number of things: however many they may in fact be

the ones you imagine he created, since you couldn't anyway

to go beyond an infinite in act, the aporia would remain as it is. I know, it is

the number of beings must be finite. (…) If therefore the fact that they are not

been created more beings, or better beings, depends on the nature of things produced and in

in no way affects the power or goodness of the creator, it follows that we too,

when we say that the cosmos is not unborn, we are not calling into question either one

inability of the demiurge nor his unwillingness to always produce good things, but the

nature of generated things.

In fact, the fact that no more things have been produced, or infinite things, derives

from the fact that there cannot be an actual infinity, so I say that the cosmos also cannot

be coeternal with God, lest we find ourselves again having to admit that there is a

infinite in place, or having to make it traversable. If indeed the cosmos existed

from eternity, it would be necessary that the number of things that came into being in the cosmos from
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then until now—men, plants, or any of the other individual species—it was

infinity in place. Indeed, if it is placed that the number of men or of plants or of

any other individual is finite, since each of them had being

in a given time, all the time taken globally must also be

finite: that which consists of finite things is, in fact, finite. If therefore, in the hypothesis of a

unbegotten cosmos, even time that has come to be is infinite in existence, is

necessary that even the individual things that have come into being in infinite time

are infinite in actuality according to the number: thus one will have that there is an infinite in actuality, and that

he has given himself an ungenerated cosmos. But that in no way can one admit that

the infinite exists in actuality, neither having come into being all at once nor produced little

little by little, we will demonstrate it in greater depth elsewhere, if God wills (…).

In fact, the infinite is impervious by nature: otherwise it would not be infinite. self

therefore the infinite is impervious, but the succession of generations has come up to

we proceeding through infinite individuals, it follows that the infinite has become

traversable, which is impossible. And if, since the cosmos has no beginning, the number

of <men> up to Socrates was found to be infinite, and they added to that

number those ranging from Socrates to the present day, then there will be something more

greater than infinity, which is impossible.

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Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, 1177.38-1179.26 Diels = Fr. 132

Wildberg

Having said these things, he claims that he will prove that the world will not change

towards nothingness, but towards something different, greater and more divine. It is surprising

that on the one hand he claims that the destruction of the world is a change towards

something that exists and is more divine, while on the other hand says that his generation

it did not take place from something existing. He affirms that this world changes

in another world that is more divine, which he discusses in the later book, without

realize that this is not a destruction of the world, but his own

refinement. Concluding his arguments against the theses proving that the

movement is begotten and incorruptible, he says he has refuted them sufficiently with

this idle chatter; and as if he had really refuted them, he even dares

proves (so he claims) that motion cannot be engendered. To this

proof premise three axioms.

(the) if in order to be generated everything generated necessarily needs

of something pre-existing (for example, a timber ship), it does not

would be generated if this something hadn't been generated first

pre-existing.

(ii) It is impossible for an infinite number to actually exist and that someone

crosses infinity with an enumeration, as it is also impossible that

something is greater than infinity and that infinity is increased.

(iii) If for the generation of a thing it was necessary that a

infinite number of things generated from each other, it would be impossible that

this thing was generated.

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Aristotle himself, he claims, showed in De Generatione that it is impossible that

the elements of the bodies are numerically infinite, given that one is generated from the other:

for the infinite is impervious, and thus fire would not be generated if it could

be generated only after an infinite has been generated before it. We admit

these axioms — he says; now, if the specific movement of this given fire has a

beginning in being and an end, and whether in order for this movement to be generated there must have been

first generated another movement, as a precondition for the generation of the body

of fire, for example from the air that has undergone a change; and again, if there was

another movement before the movement of the air which has changed to fire, eg the

movement of water by which it changed into air, and if before that

there was another and so on ad infinitum, assuming that neither the cosmos nor change

of things in each other had a beginning, then it would need to pre-exist

an infinite number of movements for this particular fire to be generated.

Indeed, it would not have been generated if an infinite number had not existed first

of movements, by virtue of axiom (i) — this is what it says. Now (states) if it is

it is impossible for an infinite number of movements to have taken place, according to the axiom

(ii), then it will not be possible for the movement of this particular fire to exist, either

for this reason both for axiom (iii), according to which the one will not be generated

thing for whose generation an infinity must pre-exist. Therefore, if one determines the

generating this particular fire certainly hasn't previously existed a

infinite number of movements. (…) So, he says, if nature has crossed

finite movements to produce the movement of this particular fire, therefore exists

a first movement that was preceded by no other. The same goes for

any other particular movement, and this accords with physical reasoning, because
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perfect things precede imperfect ones, and what is in act precedes what is in

power: if we went back to infinity, perfect things would not precede them

imperfect and what is in actuality would not precede what is in potentiality; if instead i

movements are finite, then the first one, which clearly exists

simultaneously with the universe, it brought about a beginning from something

which is in place and perfect, from which all others begin. But - he says - if there is a beginning

of the individual movements and if it is not possible to think of one movement before the other

to infinity, then it is necessary that the circular motion of celestial objects have

also had a beginning and did not exist before, because it is impossible that the heavens

always move in this way and that, at the same time, things that can be generated and

corruptibles contained in them do not have their generable and corruptible being.

Adds a fourth point: if the movements that are generated increase the

number of those that had been generated when they were last added, e

if an infinite cannot increase, then the generations that have been generated before

certainly not infinite. (…)