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The Suez Crisis through Two Author’s Perspectives

Imperial strategy led the British and French into the Suez intervention of 1956,
an adventure successfully foiled by a United States impelled by a differing
view of the Egyptian regime and visceral anti-colonialism.
U.S.-UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century, page 186

In May of 1956, the leader of Egypt, President Abdul Gamal Nasser, nationalized the

Suez Canal – the vital shipping lane that connects much of the petroleum trading West with the

vast oil resources of the Middle East. The nationalization of this unique waterway transportation

route occurred immediately after British troops left the canal, which essentially ended a 70 year

occupation [1]. Soon after Nasser’s nationalization, the UK’s Prime Minister Anthony Eden

began planning to take back control of the Suez Canal, as it was considered a strategic military

and economic site for England. The plan eventually included the collaboration with France and

Israel; Israel would invade, take control of the canal, and France and England would move in to

secure the canal as “peacekeepers.” Although the plan worked, as England and France took brief

control of the canal, Nasser was not removed (as Israel and England had hoped) [2]; world

pressure ultimately caused Israel, France, and England to withdraw and they were replaced by

UN peacekeepers.

The Suez Crisis is covered in both Andrew’s [3] and Weiner’s [4] writings, though

somewhat briefly in both texts (especially in Weiner’s). Weiner’s focus on this historical event

was twofold. First, Eisenhower’s view on Egypt and Nasser differed greatly from England’s

view – Eisenhower wanted to work through covert operations and diplomacy to influence

Egyptian politics, while England was much less patient and wanted immediate action. Secondly,

Dulles disregarded obvious signs that Israel would invade Egypt and take the canal, because of

his strong belief in Israel’s shared intelligence pointing against an invasion. Ultimately, Weiner

concludes, Dulles fails to provide intelligence to Eisenhower predicting Israel, England, and
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France’s Egyptian invasion and Eisenhower’s views on dealing with Egypt fall on deaf British

and French ears.

Andrew presented a similar scenario, but he didn’t provide the same view that

Eisenhower was getting his intelligence strictly from Dulles. In fact, Andrew paints a portrait of

a highly aware president with many different intelligence tools in his hands to make decisions

with. Lieutenant Colonel Mark Bucknam, in his paper The Eisenhower Administration and the

Suez Crisis: Spying on Allies and Friends, comes to a similar conclusion, noting that Eisenhower

had learned the importance of intelligence from multiple sources during his tenure as supreme

commander of allied forces during World War II [5]. Bucknam’s paper specifically focuses on

three areas of intelligence: IMINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT. Bucknam also notes that

By one colorful account, HUMINT ultimately alerted the administration to the pending
Israeli attack, when the U.S. Military Attaché in Israel informed his Army superiors that
his driver—“a reservist with one arm and one leg missing, and blind in one eye”—had just
been called to duty. That degree of mobilization could only mean that Israel was going to
war. [6]

Both Bucknam and Andrew come to the conclusion on intelligence collecting during this

event – Israel, England, and France were all providing similar “stories” to support their

movements in preparation for the Suez hostilities, they were our allies, and we chose to believe

them based on our friendship, based on their deception, and based on believing their words over

our “eyes” and the actions happening on the ground. Unfortunately, it would appear that Weiner,

yet again, would rather portray the leader’s of the CIA as incompetent versus, our allies as

effectively deceptive.

Other narratives on the Suez Crisis share similar insights as Weiner and Andrew.

However, a notable overview of the Suez Crisis in the text U.S.-UK Relations at the Start of the

21st Century (edited by Dr. Jeffrey D. McCausland and Dr. Douglas T. Stuart and published by
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Strategic Studies Institute) concluded that the events of the Suez Crisis set back US-British-

French relationships nearly irreparably. This text theorizes that Eisenhower’s reluctance to

support our traditional allies came from “a disdain of empire” [7] and our relationship with

France has never been the same. The same publication concludes that even though our

relationship with England was hurt, it has not suffered as much as our relationship with France.

One can’t help but, to a certain extent, agree with this summary of post-Suez relations regarding

France as even former Secretary of Defesne Donald Rumsfeld perceives France to be a part of

“Old Europe.”

Additionally, both Weiner and Andrew seem to gloss over the behind-the-scenes support

that the United States was still providing Israel during the Suez Crisis. Peter Hahn’s book U. S.

Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961 provides us with a glimpse into Dulles and

Eisenhower’s relationship with Israel during tension over Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez

Canal. Hahn notes that:

To avoid provoking Nasser early in the canal crisis, Dulles delayed a planned release of
helicopters, half-tracks, and machine guns to Israel and discouraged Canada from
announcing its planned sale of F-86 jets. In August, however, he quietly released the U.S.
weapons, reasoning that such a move would balance Nasser’s acquisition of Soviet arms,
disprove Anglo-French accusations that Eisenhower favored Nasser, and please pro-Israel
voters on the eve of the 1956 election. [8]

Hahn showcases the lack of intelligence on Israel’s planned aggression with the UK and

England. And yet, arguably, the American-Israeli relationship was not as wounded as that with

the UK and France (long term). This notion is further strengthened in the text Britain, Israel,

and U. S., 1956-58, beyond Suez. During the end of the Suez Crisis, Dulles, Eisenhower, and

Ben-Gurion (the Israeli Prime Minister) are using back channels to communicate to preserve the

special relationship the US and Israel share, as well as to determine the potential outcomes of the

crisis. Israel’s primary concern was safe withdrawal from Egypt, UN protected international
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waters in the Gulf of Aqaba, and maintaining strong ties with the West and through their secret

negotiations they managed to receive it [9].

Ultimately, Weiner and Andrew provide excellent information on the events related to

the Suez Crisis. Unfortunately, Weiner’s limited information makes the US intelligence

community appear to be incompetent and led by an easily misled Dulles. Andrew closes that gap

with greater information and provides a better narrative showcasing strengths and weaknesses of

the IC leading up to the Suez Crisis. Other authors researched, provide a rich tapestry of

viewpoints showcasing Anglo-Israeli relationships both today and yesterday, as well as a

perspective on spying on your allies, as Eisenhower did during this time.

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End Notes

1. McCausland, Dr. Jeffrey D. and Dr. Douglas T. Stuart (editors). U.S.-UK Relations at the
Start of the 21st Century. Strategic Studies Institute. January 2006. Page 3
2. Ibid, page 5. The British and French ran psyops, but due to a wide range of challenges these
were not successful or did not occur as planned. The intention of the psyops campaign was
to cause an insurrection by the Egyptian people, removing or perhaps killing Nasser. The
“much-anticipated coup overthrowing Nasser failed to materialize.”
3. Andrew, Christopher. For the President's Eyes Only. New York: Harper Perennial, 1995.
Page 227-236.
4. Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes. New York: Doubleday, 2007 Pages 127-128.
5. Bucknam, Mark A., Lt. Col. The Eisenhower Administration and the Suez Crisis: Spying on
Allies and Friends [electronic resource]. National War College. November 200. Page 6.
6. Ibid, page 9.
7. McCausland, Dr. Jeffrey D. and Dr. Douglas T. Stuart (editors). U.S.-UK Relations at the
Start of the 21st Century. Strategic Studies Institute. January 2006. Page 148.
8. Hahn, Peter L. U. S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961 [electronic
resource]. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. Page 197.
9. Almog, Orna. Britain, Israel, and U. S., 1956-58, beyond Suez [electronic resource]. London,
Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003. Page 113.

Works Cited

Almog, Orna. Britain, Israel, and U. S., 1956-58, beyond Suez [electronic resource]. London,

Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003.

Andrew, Christopher. For the President's Eyes Only. New York: Harper Perennial, 1995.

Bucknam, Mark A., Lt. Col. The Eisenhower Administration and the Suez Crisis: Spying on

Allies and Friends [electronic resource]. National War College. November 200.

Hahn, Peter L. U. S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961 [electronic resource].

Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004.

McCausland, Dr. Jeffrey D. and Dr. Douglas T. Stuart (editors). U.S.-UK Relations at the Start

of the 21st Century. Strategic Studies Institute. January 2006.

Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes. New York: Doubleday, 2007.