Module 2

Utilitarianism

Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happi-

ness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.

J.S. Mill

A perennial concern of ethics is to search for

what is ultimately good. Utilitarianism is an
ethical theory that articulates and equates the ul-
Objectives
timate good to pleasure. For utilitarians, an ac- After working on this mod-
tion is good only if it will fulfill a person’s funda- ule, you should be able to:
mental need of happiness and satisfaction. What
follows is a discussion of what utilitarianism is 1. State the defining char-
all about and how utilitarians distinguish good acteristics of Utilitarian-
actions from bad ones. ism;
2. Identify and differentiate
the versions of Utilitari-
Inherent Versus Instrumental anism;
3. Enumerate the consider-
Value ations that figure in cal-
culating the rightness of
If we ask a student why he goes to the school an act; and,
library every afternoon he might say that he does 4. Gauge the rightness of
so because he wants to study well. If we ask why acts in an instance
he wants to study well his answer could be that where moral choice has
he wants to get good grades. Probing deeper, he to be made.
might say he wants to get good grades because
18 Philo 173 Ethics: Theory and Practice

he wants to qualify to medical school. Most likely, he wants to qualify to

medical school because he wants to become a doctor. He wants to become
a doctor because he wants to earn a lot of money. He wants to earn a lot
of money because he wants to buy a lot of things. And he wants to buy a
lot of things because those things will make him happy.

Based on the student’s answers, we can say that most of the things that
he values are instrumental. They are things that are valuable for him be-
cause they serve as instruments for other things that he considers desir-
able. Going to the school library is valuable because it enables him to study
well. Studying well is valuable because he gets good grades as a result.
Getting good grades has value in that it helps him qualify to medical school.
We can say the same of the other things that he wants.

If we ask the student why he wants to be happy, we are likely to get a

different kind of answer. How might he respond?

The student might say that he wants to be happy because he does not
want to be sad and you might echo the same sentiment if asked the same
question. He might further say he wants to be happy because he enjoys
being happy. At this point there is hardly anything different that the stu-
dent can say. He can only go around in circles because happiness is not
value as a means to another thing. It is something that people want for its
own sake. It has inherent value. Its value is
not merely instrumental.

For many people, only happiness has inher-

ent value. There is no other thing that some
people value for its own sake as happiness
is valued. The well-known British philoso-
pher John Stuart Mill points out that people
who seek money, value it only for the hap-
piness that it can bring. The same thing can
be said about a big house or a luxurious car.
A big house does not have value in itself.
Neither does a luxurious car. They only be-
come valuable to a person so long as they J.S. Mill
can give him happiness. If we extend the
process of reasoning, we could be led to
think that happiness is what people generally desire. It is the ultimate end
that human beings ordinarily seek with their actions.

If something has instrumental value, its value depends on what it serves

to achieve. For example, if I do a in order to achieve x, the value of a
depends on whether it brings about x or not. In general, actions performed
for a particular end derive their value from that end.

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To determine whether a is valuable or not, one has to examine its conse-

quences and see how well they promote that end. For this reason, utili-
tarianism is a consequentialist theory of morality. According to this theory,
the rightness of actions is determined by their outcomes.

Consequentialism
John Stuart Mill’s exposition of the foundations of utilitarianism clearly
shows its consequentialist character. Here is what Mill (1987) says about
the nature of actions:

All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it
seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and
color from the end to which they are subvervient. When we
engage in a pursuit, a clear and precise conception of what we
are pursuing would seem to be the first thing we need, instead
of the last we are to look forward to.

The view that “all action is for the sake of some end” can be contrasted
with the view that actions may sometimes be judged good or bad on the
basis of their being of one or another type. For instance, giving up one’s
life for a loved one may be considered right mainly because of its being of
a particular type of action. To illustrate clearly, the rightness of an act of
sacrifice comes from its characteristics as a sacrifice. The rightness of an
act in this instance does not result from its desirable consequences but for
being an act of sacrifice for the sake of another. From the perspective of
utilitarianism, one has to go by the tendency of an act to increase or decrease
happiness in order to determine its moral value. It is the presence of one
tendency or the other that constitutes the proof or disproof of the act’s value.

Pleasure Utilitarianism
If the moral worth of human actions is to be determined by examining
their consequences, there should be a criterion for judging such results.
To judge the value of an action on the basis of its tendency to promote a
certain kind of consequence, we have to know the results we are looking
for. This brand of utilitarianism is called by G.E. Moore s ideal utilitarian-
ism or preference utilitarianism. Moore’s brand of utilitarianism is differ-
ent from Mill’s in that Mill and his like-minded utilitarians, only have one
criterion in the determining the value of an action, that is: the ultimate
end of human actions is pleasure or happiness and this serves as the basis
for determining the moral worth of that action. Mill’s brand of utilitarian-
ism is called pleasure or hedonistic utilitarianism.

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20 Philo 173 Ethics: Theory and Practice

Moore agrees with Mill that the value of actions can be found in their
consequences; however, he rejects the idea that the anticipation of a happy
or pleasurable outcome is the only thing that could possibly drive men to
action. He points out that men value ends other than pleasure. His ex-
amples are personal affection and the appreciation of what is beautiful in
Art or Nature.

Preference utilitarianism seeks to maximize the satisfaction of preferences.

For this brand of utilitarianism, action is right only insofar as it leads to
the satisfaction of the greatest amount of preferences. Preference utilitari-
anism differs from pleasure utilitarianism by recognizing that not all hu-
man preferences can lead to pleasure or happiness. If an act leads to un-
pleasant consequences, it may still be considered right provided that it
leads to the satisfaction of preferences. An act that leads to pleasant con-
sequences is right only insofar as that result constitutes the satisfaction of
a preference. An act cannot be considered right based on the pleasant-
ness of the consequences.

Act Versus Rule Utilitarianism

Up to this point, our discussion of utilitarianism has emphasized on the
effects of particular actions in particular circumstances. We can call this
version act utilitarianism. In act utilitarianism, the rightness or wrong-
ness of a person doing a under circumstances c depends on the conse-
quences of one doing a under circumstances c.

In contrast to Act utilitarianism is rule utilitarianism. Rule utilitarianism

hold that to judge the rightness of doing act a, under circumstances c, one
would have to consider the consequences of everyone’s doing a as a rule
whenever circumstances of the c kind arise. In making moral judgments,
the rule utilitarian would ask “If it were a rule that act a ought to be done,
given circumstance c, what would the probable consequences be?”

Suppose a man finds himself in circumstances where he is alone in a gro-

cery pretty sure that no one is watching him. He knows for a fact that
there is no security camera installed and he is confident that he could get
away with shoplifting. An act utilitarian would perhaps wonder “If I
were to shoplift at this moment when nobody is watching, what would
the consequences be?” A rule utilitarian would, on the other hand, will
ask “If everyone would shoplift when nobody was watching and they
could get away without being discovered, what would be the likely con-
sequences?”

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To repeat, act utilitarianism weighs the consequences of doing something

in a given situation alone. In contrast, rule utilitarianism weighs the likely
consequences that will result from actions generally done by people when-
ever they find themselves in particular situations. To give a more concrete
example, an act utilitarian would consider the consequences of killing
another person in a given situation; a rule utilitarian, on the other hand,
would have to consider the consequences of killing being permissible in
general in similar situations.

Hedonistic Utilitarianism: Mill’s Proof

John Stuart Mill proves that validity of hedonistic utilitarianism by exam-
ining the ends that people actually desire. Insofar as “questions about
ends are…questions [about] what things are desirable,” Mill (1987) says
they “may be the subject of a direct appeal to the faculties which judge
fact.” This is how he explains his proof:

The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is

that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is au-
dible is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of expe-
rience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is pos-
sible to produce that anything is desirable, is that actually de-
sire it.

It is true that the proof that something

Think about this... is visible is that the object can actu-
ally be seen. Or to put it more explic-
itly, if I see something, then it must be
1. Does your ability to see
visible. Similarly, the proof that some-
something prove that it is
thing is audible rests in its being hear.
visible?
If I hear something, then it must be
2. Does your ability to hear
audible. However, we cannot use this
something prove that it is
type of analogy with desirability. The
audible?
proof that something is desirable lies
3. Is there a similar relationship
in more than one actually desiring a
between that which you de-
particular object. I might desire some-
sire and its desirability?
thing and yet be the first to admit that
4. Can you desire something
it is not worth desiring and therefore
that is not really desirable?
not desirable. If I desire to do some-
Give an example.
thing wrong, my having the desire to
do it does not necessarily mean that it
is desirable. Desirability means something more than the capability to be
desired.

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22 Philo 173 Ethics: Theory and Practice

Other Ultimate Ends

One of the primary objections to hedonistic utilitarianism lies in the obser-
vation that human beings have ultimate aims other than the promotion of
pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Here is how A.J. Ayer (1954) formu-
lates his objection:

Not all human action is purposive; and of those actions which

are purposive it is not true that they are always such as the
agent thinks will bring him the most happiness. For the most
part people aim at particular objects; they set out to accom-
plish certain tasks, to indulge their emotions, to satisfy their
physical needs, to fulfill their obligations, to outwit their neigh-
bors, to gratify their friends. These, and many others, are their
ends, and while they are engaged in pursuing them they do
not look beyond them. It may be that the achievement of these
ends will actually give them pleasure, but this does not imply
that they have had this pleasure in view all along. It is, indeed,
possible to pursue an object, say, that of gratifying a friend,
not even immediately for its own sake, but solely for the sake
of the pleasure that one expects oneself to derive from its at-
tainment; but this is a sophisticated attitude, which even in the
case of purely selfish action furnishes the exception rather than
the rule.

Think about this...

1. Think of the ends that you aim for when you go
about your daily activities. Can you identify
those ends?
2. Are you usually aware of what those ends are
as you do various things?

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Mill (1987) replies to Ayer’s objection by saying that things like money,
power, and fame only appear to be desired for their own sake. Pleasure is
already part of them:

What was once desired as an instrument for the attainment of

happiness, has come to be desired for its own sake. In being
desired for its own sake it is, however, desired as part of hap-
piness.... The desire of it is not a different thing from the desire
of happiness…. They are some of the elements of which the
desire of happiness is made up.

Think about this...

1. Do you agree with Mill? Do you associate all
the things that you desire with pleasure?
2. Can you name one desirable thing that does not
bring pleasure?

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24 Philo 173 Ethics: Theory and Practice

The contention, therefore, is that it is not true that there are ultimate ends
other than happiness. Those ends that seem to be different from happi-
ness were previously perceived as actually means to happiness and, by
some kind of process, have come to be part of it. Thus the desire for money,
power, and fame is not distinct from the desire for happiness.

In the end, the conflict boils down to an empirical-psychological dispute

that need not be resolved here. The point is merely to expose the difficulty
and to emphasize that our perceptions do vary and that their implica-
tions are crucial to the understanding of hedonistic utilitarianism.

SAQ 2-1
Answer the following, then read the next paragraph where you
will find the right answers.

Actions or moral rules are (1) ______________ when they bring

about the least amount of happiness; (2) ____________ when they
promote the greatest amount of discomfort; and (3) ____________
when they frustrate one’s preferences. Moral theories, such as utili-
tarianism, are (4) ___________ because the value of acts or moral
rules are determined by their consequences. Only (5)
_____________ is valued inherently by utilitarian. When Juliet
makes a judgment on the basis of the consequences of a particular
act she is an (6) _______________ utilitarian. And when Romeo
passes judgment on the basis of the consequences of rules he is a
(7) _________ utilitarian. How good or bad an act is depends on
its (8) _________. An act or moral rule to be most good must result
in (9) _________ consequences. Utilitarianism is said to be a
consequentialist moral theory because the value of actions or moral
rules lies on their (10) ___________.

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ASAQ 2-1
Let’s see how well you did. Check your answers against this an-
swer key and see whether you have remembered correctly the things
we have discussed thus far.

Actions or moral rules are (1) wrong or bad when they bring about
the least amount of happiness; (2) wrong or bad when they pro-
mote the greatest amount of discomfort; and (3) wrong or bad when
they frustrate one’s preferences. Moral theories, such as utilitari-
anism, are (4) consequentialist because the value of acts (or moral
rules) are determined by their consequences. Only (5) pleasure or
happiness is valued inherently by utilitarians. When Juliet makes a
judgment on the basis of consequences of a particular act she is an
(6) act utilitarian. And when Romeo passes judgment on the basis
of the consequences of rules he is a (7) rule utilitarian. How good or
bad an act is depends on its (8) consequences. An act or moral rule
to be most good must result in (9) pleasant consequences. Utilitari-
anism is said to be a consequentialist moral theory because the
value of actions or moral rules lies on their (10) consequences.

Calculating Happiness: A Problematic Exercise

Many questions have been raised in connection with the business of cal-
culating the amount of happiness. One criticism holds that the calcula-
tion of good that results from the consequences of a particular act is an
impossible task. The far-reaching consequences of our actions are too dif-
ficult to anticipate given our fallible and mistake-prone minds. If they are
foreseeable at all, relevant consequences can be too many, too far-reach-
ing, and too complicated.

We may recall those early twentieth century physicists who first split the
atom. Did it ever occur to them in their worst nightmare that, years later,
their feat would annihilate hundreds of thousands of people in Hiroshima
and Nagasaki? So if matters were to be that complicated, when and how
are we to determine the moral worth of what we do now? To what extent
should the calculations be carried out? What would be the limits? Utili-
tarianism advocates greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.
But the pursuit of maximizing pleasure is not consistent all the time with
the maximizing the number of its beneficiaries. Imagine a restaurant giv-
ing an extra piece of pie to a person who can consume four slices and four

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26 Philo 173 Ethics: Theory and Practice

people with money enough only

for four slices of pie. Suppose we Think about this...
rate eating one piece of pie equiva-
lent to ten units of pleasure. If the
1. How can one person tell that
maximum units of pleasure were
his suffering is greater than
to be pursued then, only one per-
another person’s suffering?
son should eat all pieces so one
2. How can you tell whether
more piece would be earned and
one person’s happiness is
the total units of pleasure would
greater than that of an-
add up to fifty. If maximum ben-
other?
eficiaries were to be pursued then,
only one person should eat all
pieces so one more piece would be earned and the total units of pleasure
would add up to fifty. If maximum beneficiaries were to be pursued then
all four persons should be given a piece each, but then they will not earn
an extra piece making the total units of pleasure add only up to forty. Is it
preferable to have the maximum total amount of pleasure with only a
few benefiting or is it better to have more beneficiaries but with a lesser
total amount of pleasure?

There are also difficulties involved in making basic comparisons of happi-

ness and suffering. It might be easy enough for an individual to compare
his own pleasures and say that one is greater than another. For instance,
he can determine that going to a concert gives more satisfaction than
being scratched on the back. But calculating the happiness of a number of
persons requires a refined system of measurement that can compare one’s
happiness with that of another. The pleasure that one gets from having a
particular experience is not always the same as the pleasure another per-
son gets when he or she has the same experience. Interpersonal evalua-
tions are extremely subjective and very difficult to make.

We have learned that for utilitarians the rightness of an act (or rule) de-
pends on the amount of happiness it can bring as opposed to unhappi-
ness. Happiness can come in the form of delightful bodily sensation, intel-
lectual satisfaction, emotional fulfillment, and the like.

To determine rightness, one may have to (1) note all probable consequences,
(2) delineate pleasant consequences from unpleasant ones, (3) determine
the degree of pleasantness and/or unpleasantness, (4) sum up the amount
of pleasure and/or displeasure, and (5) estimate the number of probable
beneficiaries. Since there is no single standard methodology for calculat-
ing happiness there can be variations in the calculations different people
can make.

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The following hypothetical case study illustrates how complicated the

calculation can be. Let us take the example of a devoutly Catholic mar-
ried couple: Romeo and Juliet.

Romeo and Juliet earn money enough to give them, their two children
and an elderly parent a rather modest lifestyle. They can hardly save money
after paying all their food, lodging, children’s education, and daily bills.
Thinking that they can not afford to support one more baby, they choose
to practice birth control. They narrow their choices to either condom and/
or diaphragm or the Church-approved rhythm method. A utilitarian way
of calculating the better choice may be as follows.

Grant that Romeo and Juliet have drawn a list of probable consequences
or PC , should they use, on one hand, condom and/or diaphragm, which
we will abbreviate as C/D or on the other, Rhythm Method or RM? Grant
further that the consequences they had listed could be categorized, for
the purpose of simplifying the list-into: (1) pregnancy prevention, (2) copu-
lation frequency, (3) cost, and (4) comfort. Please take note that the couple
could have more considerations other than our list because the illustrative
calculation we have drawn up is simplistic.

For every PC, there are assigned points for degree of happiness (DH) for
Condom/Diaphragm use and for the Rhythm Method. But could happi-
ness really be quantified? Let us try it. Anway, it is not so absurd to think
of differing degrees of happiness such as unhappy, quite happy, happy,
very happy, and superlatively happy. With this in mind, we can allow
the couple to arbitrarily assign points to these degrees of happiness: -3, 3,
5, 8, 10 respectively.

Romeo and Juliet want to prevent pregnancy yet still enjoy their sex life.
In terms of pregnancy prevention both C/D and RM could be effective,
making them both superlatively happy, so the degrees of happiness re-
sulting from the use of C/D (DH-CD) and from RM (DH-RM) would in
both cases be 10.

In pursuit of sexual enjoyment, Romeo and Juliet can copulate as often as

they wish without Juliet becoming pregnant if they use C/D. This would
make them superlatively happy, so the DH-C/D would be 10. But if they
use RM they would be forced to abstain from sex for a certain number of
days when Juliet is ovulating. This would presumably lessen the frequency
of their copulation. Interestingly, ovulation is the period when women’s,
or in this instance, Juliet’s libido is at its peak. With the rhythm method,
Juliet is not allowed to copulate during this period less she gets pregnant.
This would probably take away some degree of enjoyment from her be-
cause she will be suppressing her natural sexual urges. So the DH-RM

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would comparatively bring her less happiness, say 7, in our degree of

happiness scale.

In terms of cost, C/D probably will not be too much strain on their bud-
get, if at all. But since they still have to pay for these, that should deduct

Think about this...

1. Do we make inter-subjective calculations of happiness
or suffering in real life?
2. Are such calculations pertinent to the moral decisions
that we make?

some happiness from them but not too much. Thus the DH-CD on this
matter would be -2. On the other hand RM would cost them no money
but they would not save much either, so the DH-RM would be 2.

Since Rome and Juliet are Roman Catholics, the effects of birth control
methods on their conscience would have to be considered too. The Church
approves only the RM and disapproves of other methods such as C/D.
They would probably feel uncomfortable with C/D, but since they are
Jesuit-trained and detest the Opus Dei, they would probably be not su-
perlatively uncomfortable, so on this matter the DH-C/D would be -5.
Jesuits, by the way, are relatively more liberal with issues such as contra-
ception than the conservative Opus Dei. If Romeo and Juliet use the RM
they would not be uncomfortable but they would feel practicing it is not
that virtuous an act either. So perhaps the DH-RM for this would be 5.

Table 2-1. Condom/Diaphragm Versus Rhythm Method

PC DH-C/D DH-RM
Prevention of pregnancy 10 10
Copulation Frequency 10 7
Cost -2 2
Comfort -5 5
Total 13 24

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If they add up all their happiness points (see Table 2-1), they would get 13
points if they use C/D and 24 points if they use RM. It turns out they would
be happier with RM than with C/D. So RM is the right choice for them.

I hope you are not getting dizzy from this knotty calculations and I hope
it was not too difficult for you. This case study illustrates the complicated
nature of the calculations that may be required to maximize happiness in
some situations. For some people, this would be enough reason to reject
utilitarianism. However, there are those who think this is just one of the
things that we would have put up with if we want a practical basis for
determining moral worth.

ACTIVITY 2-1
Calculate the goodness of a decision from a utilitarian perspective
based on the story I outlined below. To make this activity more en-
gaging and significant, I suggest that you watch the movie Saving
Private Ryan so that you can get a better picture of the situation.

In the movie Saving Private Ryan, the Chief of Staff of the United
States Armed Forces, in an apparent act of compassion, orders that a
certain Private James Francis Ryan be pulled out from the battlefield.
Ryan’s mother had four sons who all served at the battlefronts in
World War I. All but one had fallen. The only surviving of the four-
James, the youngest-had just parachuted behind enemy lines some
three days before. The orders are handed down to the field com-
manders in Normandy, France who promptly sent a squad of eight
riflemen led by a captain on a mission to bring back Ryan safe and
sound. They did not know at that time where he was. But they knew
they would likely move across German-infested areas, and would
have to fight their way through. Casualties would probably be inevi-
table. All these to save one man. Calculate the goodness of the deci-
sion to send a platoon on an extremely dangerous mission to save a
single soldier who is just a lowly private at that.

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30 Philo 173 Ethics: Theory and Practice

COMMENTS ON ACTIVITY 2-1

To deal with this given issue you may have to follow the rule-of-
thumb mentioned above. When you analyze this, approach this
matter in foresight; that is, situate yourself at the moment the deci-
sion to send out a platoon to look for and save Ryan was made.
Also, look into the possible happiness-generating and sorrow-gen-
erating consequences of this action. Or, you (if you have seen the
movie) may approach it in hindsight; that is, after everything else
had happened-imagine the scene at the beginning and at the end
of the movie where Ryan is shown visiting half a century later the
grave of the captain who got killed saving him. List down the ben-
efits and the cost of saving Pvt. Ryan and decide whether it was,
from the utilitarian perspective, worth it.

Summary
Utilitariansm can be summed up thus: Actions or moral rules are right
when they bring about utmost utility. The term ‘utility’ refers to pleasure
or happiness, as Mill saw it to be and ideal satisfaction as Moore charac-
terized it. These two things are valued for their own sake. Furthermore,
utilitarianism is said to be a consequentialist theory of morality because
the value of actions or moral rules, as the case maybe, lies not in them-
selves but in their consequences. Under the consequentialist theory are
act and rule utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism is a version of utilitarianism
that subscribes to the idea that the value to be measured, hence the conse-
quences to be considered, should be those of particular actions. On the
other hand, rule utilitarianism has it that the value to be measured, hence
the consequences to be considered, should be those of general moral rules
underlying the actions in question and not particular actions themselves.

UP Open University
 Module 3
Duty and the Categorical
Imperative

It is impossible to conceive of anything anywhere in the world

or even anywhere out of it that can without qualification be called
good, except a Good Will…. Even an impartial sane witness can
never take pleasure in the uninterrupted well-being of a person
who shows no trace of a pure and good will. Consequently the
good will seems to be the indispensable condition even of being
worthy of happiness.
Immanuel Kant

I mmanuel Kant, a native of Konigsbë, Prussia (now Kaliningrad, Rus

sia), is considered one of the greatest philosophers of the western world.
Kant’s career as a philosopher can be described as productive and prolific
as Kant made valuable contributions to various areas in philosophy.
Among the areas he dealt with was ethics. In this module, we will explore
Kant’s contributions to the study of ethics by examining his thoughts on what
differentiates a good action from a bad one. We will also look into how Kant
saw the concept of good as inextricably linked with the concept of duty.
 32 Philo 173 Ethics: Theory and Practice

Kantian Versus Utilitarian Ethical Theory

The epigraph at the start of the module presents a
sharp contrast between Prussian philosopher
Immanuel Kant’s own ethical thinking and the
utilitarian ethical theory. If you will recall, for he-
donistic utilitarians, happiness or pleasure is the
only thing that is inherently good. In contrast,
Immanuel Kant thinks that only good will can
be considered good “without qualification.”

There is another basic difference between Kant’s

and the utilitarian’s theories. To determine
whether an act is right or wrong, utilitarians Immanuel Kant
would have us consider the consequences of our
actions. For Kant, what we have to examine is
the will with which the act is invested. Kant (1938) emphasizes the abso-
lute character of a goodwill as such:

The good will is good not because of what it

Objectives
After studying this module,
you should be able to:
1. Discuss what Kant con-
siders to be inherently
good or bad;
2. Differentiate acts done
out of duty from those
done in accord with
duty;
3. State the formulations of
the categorical impera-
tive;
4. Differentiate categorical
from hypothetical im-
perative, and perfect per-
fect from imperfect duty
and
5. Apply Kantian prin-
ciples instances where
moral choices have to be
made.
causes or accomplishes, not because of its use-
fulness in the attainment of some set purpose,
but alone because of the willing (emphasis
added), that is to say, of itself. Considered by
itself, without any comparison, it is to be val-
ued far more highly than all that might be ac-
complished through it in favor of some incli-
nation or of the sum of all inclinations.
According to Kant (1938), it is not morally impor-
tant that the will successfully bring about our de-
sired consequences:
Even though by some special disfavor of for-
tune or because of the meager provision of a
stepmotherly nature this will were entirely
lacking in ability to carry out its intentions; if
with the greatest of efforts nothing were to be
accomplished by it, and nothing were to re-
main except only the good will (not, to be sure,
as a pious wish but as an exertion of every
means in our power), it would still sparkle like
a jewel by itself, like something that has its full
value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitfulness can
neither add nor detract from its worth.

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 Unit I Module 3 33

Its goodness should not be measured in terms of the state of affairs that it
promotes or enhances nor should it be judged by the good or bad out-
comes it will bring. Instead, the goodness of an action should be judged
according to the act of willing or the intent of the action.

The Concept of Duty

What then is a good will? And how do we know that an act is invested
with a good will? The answers can be found in the concept of duty. We
can only understand the concept of good will when we compare and
contrast it with the concept of duty. Duty, it is said,

…includes the notion of a good will with certain subjective

restrictions and hindrances. However, far from hiding and
obscuring it, these rather serve to bring it out by contrast and
make it shine forth all the brighter.

The contrast that our quote is referring to arises as we examine different

types of subjective restrictions and hindrances accompanying the perfor-
mance of one’s duty. For Kant, a good will is manifested in acting out of
duty or from a sense of duty, which should be distinguished from acting
in accord with duty.

To do something in accord with duty is simply to do that which one has a

duty to do. Thus, one does not necessarily invest this action with good
will by acting in accord with duty, i.e., by doing that which one has a
duty to do. On the other hand, to do something out of duty, or from a
sense of duty, is to do that which one has a duty to do in a pertinently
qualified manner. Again, what do we mean by this? Simply put, this means
that to do something from a sense of duty entails investing the action with
good will.

More specifically then, when does not act out of duty? We begin to under-
stand what it means to act out of duty by identifying actions that cannot
be said to be done out of duty due to several subjective disqualifications,
namely, those that are recognized obviously as contrary to duty, and those
that conform to duty, but to which men have no direct inclination, being
impelled instead by some other inclination. In other words, it cannot be
said that something is done out of duty if it is done for the purpose of
achieving something other than itself or put more simply, if the person
does it in order to get something that he wants or he does it because he
was motivated by personal reasons.

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Kant explains the second disqualification above (1938) by making the fol-
lowing analogy:

It is indeed a matter of duty that a merchant should not take

advantage of an inexperienced customer and where business
is flourishing no merchant will do so, but he will rather main-
tain a fixed common price for all. One is therefore served hon-
estly. But that is not nearly reason enough to believe that the
merchant has been acting out of duty or principles of honesty.
It was to his advantage to act so.

Based on the previous example, we have seen what it takes for an act to
be done out of duty compared to an act that is only done in accord with
duty. Let us frame this more explicitly. For an act to be done out of duty it
must conform to duty; the agent must do it because it is a duty; and lastly,
the agent must do it only because it is a duty; he must not be driven by
fear or inclination.

These conditions are clarified by Kant’s own examples of “acting from a

sense of duty.” Kant (1938) sheds light on this by giving us an example
concerning suicide:

…when adversities and hopeless grief have wholly destroyed

the desire for living; when the unfortunate person, stout of
soul and angered by his fate rather than dejected or despon-
dent, nevertheless loves his life not because of inclination or
fear, but as a matter of duty, then his maxim has a moral con-
tent.

Kant yet gives another example, now done in the context of charitable
acts:

…let us assume…that the mind of…a philanthropist is be-

clouded by a private grief which destroys all his interest in the
fate of others; that he still has the ability to alleviate the suffer-
ing of others, but that the strange need does not move him
because he is sufficiently occupied with his own. If now, when
there is no inclination to urge him to it, he nevertheless rouses
himself from this deadly indifference and performs the act with-
out any inclination, solely out of duty, then the action for the
very first time has genuine moral value. Let us assume further
still that nature has allotted very little power of sympathy to a
certain person, he is cold by temperament and indifferent to
the suffering of others, perhaps because he himself possesses
the special gift of patience and their power of endurance in
respect to his own suffering and presupposes or even demands

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the same in others. While such a person, who certainly is not

its poorest product, has not been fashioned by nature into a
philanthropist, will he not still find within himself a source
which will afford him a far higher value than that of a friendly
temperament can be? Assuredly! This is the very point at which
that value of character begins to show which is moral and in-
comparably highest, namely, to do good, not from inclination,
but from duty.

The examples we have given clearly illustrate that what are said to be
cases of acting out of duty are cases of doing (1) what accords with duty,
(2) for the reason that it is a duty, and (3) only for the reason that it is a
duty. Kant also makes a distinction of two duties: perfect duty and imper-
fect duty. A perfect duty does not admit exception, such that when a
person has this kind of duty to do, he must always do it whenever the
opportunity arises. Imperfect duty on the other hand, admits some excep-
tion, such that when a person has this kind of duty to do an act, it may
sometimes be permissible for him to avoid doing it.

The Categorical Imperative:

A First Formulation
How do we know that one acts from duty rather than from inclination?
To lead us to the answer, let us contrast this with a consequentialist per-
spective. The moral worth of an action is not to be found in its conse-
quences:

Since…action fro duty must eliminate entirely the influence of

the inclinations and thus every object of the will, there is noth-
ing left to determine the will, except objectively the law and
subjectively pure respect for this practical law, that is to say,
the maxim to obey such a law, even at the expense of all my
inclinations.

Doing something out of duty means that the person is not acting out of his
inclinations; rather he is acting in accordance to what the law says. What
then is this law? How can we understand law aside from the results that it
ought to accomplish? These questions bring us to the concept of universal
lawfulness which Kant explains to us in the following manner:

Since I have deprived the will of every stimulus which it might

receive from the results of a law, so there is nothing left to
serve as principle for the will except the universal lawfulness
of actions in general.

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36 Philo 173 Ethics: Theory and Practice

This concept is further expressed in the first formulation of the Categori-

cal Imperative. “Act only on that maxim which will enable you at the
same time to will that it will be a universal law.”

To understand this more easily, we can break down this Categorical Im-
perative into two components. First, a moral agent must act on the basis
of a maxim. Maxim, for your enlightenment, is the principle adopted by
an individual as a subjective standard for action in accordance with his
faculty of desire. It is the principle by which the individual acts. Second,
the moral agent must be able to will that his maxim should become a
universal law. In other words, he must be able to will that it apply to all.

In order to explain the idea of willing one’s action to become a universal

law, Kant (1938) takes a look at the concept of making promises:

If I am sorely pressed, may I make a promise with the intention

not to keep it? … in order to take the shortest and yet surest
way toward an answer to this problem, whether or not a de-
ceitful promise is in accordance with duty, I ask myself: Would
I indeed be satisfied to have my maxim (to extricate myself
from an embarrassing situation by a false promise) considered
a universal law? Would I be able to say to myself: Everybody
has the right to make a false promise if he finds himself in a
difficulty from which he can escape in no other way? In that
manner I soon realize that I may will the lie, but never a uni-
versal law to lie. For according to such a law there really would
be no promise at all, because it would be vain to make a pre-
tense of my will in respect of my future actions to those who
have no faith in my pretensions or who, if they were rash
enough to do so, would repay me in my own coin. Therefore
my maxim would destroy itself as soon as it got to be a univer-
sal law.

Think about this...

1. Have you ever had to make a promise that you
did not intend to keep in order to save yourself
from a compromising situation?
2. Can you recall why you did that?
3. Did you consider it justified?
4. Do you think you can desire people to make a
false promise if it were the only way for them to
get out of a difficulty?

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 Unit I Module 3 37

Occasionally, we fine ourselves in com-

promising situations that we can only es- Think about this...
cape from if we make a promise that we
do not intend to keep. According to
1. What would happen if ev-
Kant, it is possible to conceive to make a
eryone thought they had a
false promise if there is no other way out
right to make false promises?
of a compromising situation. But this
2. Would people still be credible
maxim—that one should make a false
when they make promises?
promise if there is no other way to get
3. If a friend asks for P500 and
out from a compromising situation—can-
promises to pay you back,
not be seen as universal or is not
would you feel confident that
universalizable. In other words, it can-
he will do that if you knew
not be applied to all. For Kant, it is not
people had a right to make
conceivable that everyone should have
false promises under certain
the right to make a false promise if that
conditions.
were the only way to get out of a diffi-
cult predicament.

For Kant, the concept of promising is not logically compatible with the
maxim that says, everyone should have a right to make a false promise.
We cannot will that everyone should have a right to make promises that
they do not intend to keep because that would be contrary to the meaning
of a promise.

To promise is to give an assurance that what is being promised will be

done. If, for example, I promise to return to a certain place, I am giving an
assurance that I will return. If I do not actually intend to return despite
making the promise to return, then I am not really giving an assurance.
Thus, when I make that false promise, I am giving an assurance but I am
not actually giving an assurance because in effect, what I am giving is a
false assurance. Herein lies the contradiction.

Categorical Versus Hypothetical Imperatives

An imperative is a command of reason. A command of reason is an objec-
tive principle that is obligatory for the will. Imperatives can either be hy-
pothetical or categorical. An imperative that is hypothetical commands
an action that is meant to be a means to an end. In a hypothetical impera-
tive, the action commanded is good for some purpose. Thus, the com-
mand is conditional upon that purpose. A categorical imperative com-
mands an action that is good in itself. In a categorical imperative, the
action commanded is objectively necessary. It is commanded without re-
gard for any purpose or any end other than itself.

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38 Philo 173 Ethics: Theory and Practice

For Kant (1938), it is the categorical imperative that is the imperative of

morality. This is what he says:

There is an imperative which commands a certain conduct di-

rectly and which is not based on the condition of attaining any
other purpose by it. This imperative is CATEGORICAL. It has
nothing to do with the matter of the action or with that which
results from it, but with the form and the principle from which
itself proceeds; and its essential good consists of the state of
mind irrespective of what may result from it. This imperative
may be called the IMPERATIVE OF MORALITY.

The Categorical Imperative:

A Second Formulation
Kant (1938) says, “Act as if the maxim of your action by your will were to
become a UNIVERSAL LAW OF NATURE.” With this, we come face to
face with Kant’s second formulation of the Categorical Imperative. It dif-
fers from the first formulation in that it now speaks of a “universal law of
nature” instead of merely a universal law. To help us understand this, let
us read what Kant (1938) says about suicide:

A person who is wearied with life because of a series of misfor-

tunes that has reduced him to despair still possesses sufficient
reason to be able to ask himself, whether it may not be con-
trary to his duty to himself to take his life. Now he asks him-
self, whether the maxim of his action could possibly be a uni-
versal law of nature. But this maxim reads: Out of love of self I
make it my principle to shorten my life if its continuation threat-
ens more evil than it promises comfort. But he will still ask,
whether his principle of self-love is capable of being a univer-
sal law of nature. Then he will soon see that a nature, whose
law it would be to destroy life by the very feeling which is
meant to stimulate the promotion of life, would contradict it-
self and therefore not persist as nature. Accordingly the maxim
cannot possibly function as a universal law of nature, and it
consequently completely refutes the supreme principle of all duty.

Here, the proposed action is suicide, which is to be based on the following

premise: I ought to shorten my life if its continuation will bring about
more evil than comfort. To Kant, this premise cannot be conceived to be a
universal law of nature. There is a contradiction involved in this thought
because while the proposed action supposedly comes from love of self, it
actually gives rise to the destruction of that same self.

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Man as an End in Himself

One of the vital components of Kantian ethics is the conception of man as
an end in himself. The things that we desire, according to Kant, have
conditional value. Their value depends on whether or not we have the
desire, and whether there are felt needs relating to them. They are merely
instruments or means to support further ends. However, a person has to
be conceived differently. Because he is a rational being, he cannot or should
not be employed as a mere means. His existence is an end in itself. It does
not have to be justified in terms of another end. A person cannot serve as
a means only since ‘that would make it impossible to find anything of
absolute value anywhere” (Kant 1938). These ideas give rise to another
formulation of the categorical imperative: “Act so that in your own per-
son as well as in the person of every other you are treating mankind also
as an end, never merely as a means.”

Kant, again relates this formulation of the categorical imperative suicide.

He says that the person who is contemplating suicide should ask himself
if his act can co-exist with the idea of mankind as an end-in-itself: Kant
(1938) says,

If he destroys himself in order to escape from a burdensome

situation he uses a person merely as a means to maintain a
tolerable condition up to the end of his life. However, man is
not a thing and therefore not something that may be used as a
means only, but in all his actions he must always be consid-
ered as end-in-itself. Consequently I can make no disposition
of the man in my own person to mutilate, destroy, or kill him.

Likewise, Kant (1938) says that when a person makes a false promise or
what he calls lying promise to another person, he also uses that other
person merely as a means:

The person who intends to make a lying promise to others must

realize at once that he is about to use some other person as a
mere means, without the latter at the same time containing the
end in himself. For the person whom I am about to use for my
purposes by such a promise cannot possibly agree with my
conduct toward him, and thus himself contain the end of this
action.

The person to whom the lying promise is made is being used merely as a
means because he does not know the end of the action. If he does not
know what the end is, he cannot possibly agree with it. He is merely an
instrument or a means to achieve it. In other words, he does not play an
active role in what is going on.

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40 Philo 173 Ethics: Theory and Practice

SAQ 3-1
Fill in the blanks and then read the next paragraph for the an-
swers.

An act that conforms to duty out of sheer love of doing that act is
(1) _________. But performing an act because of a sense of duty
and the will to do it is (2) ________. The (3) ____________ is a
command of reason to perform an act for its own sake is; while (4)
_____________ is a command of reason to perform an act as a
means to some other good. A duty that admits to some exception
is (5) ___________; while a duty that may be set aside sometimes
is (6) _______. The governing principle behind an act committed
deliberately is called (7) __________. An act is deemed good if it is
(8) ___________ and done (9) ________. An act that sooner or
later undermines the very condition upon which it is committed is
(10) _____________.

ASAQ 3-1
See how many correct answers you got.

An act that conforms to duty out of sheer love of doing that act is
(1) in accord with duty. But performing an act because of a sense of
duty and the will to do it is (2) out of duty. The (3) Categorical Im-
perative is a command of reason to perform an act for its own sake;
while (4) hypothetical imperative is a command of reason to per-
form an act as a means to some other good. A duty that admits to
no exception is (5) prefer duty; while a duty that may be set aside
sometimes is (6) imperfect duty. The governing principle behind an
act committed deliberately is called (7) maxim. An act is deemed
good if it is (8) universalizable and done (9) out of duty. An act that
sooner or later undermines the very condition upon which it is
committed is (10) wrong or non-universalizable.

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Autonomy of the Will

Aside from having a practical significance, man’s being conceived as an
end in himself has important theoretical implications. For if the subject of
all ends is each rational being, then it follows, as Kant (1938) put it, that
the will of every rational being is a universally legislative will:” …the will
is not simply subjected to the law, but subjected in such way that it must
be looked upon also as giving itself the law, and for that reason really be
looked upon also as giving itself the law, and for that reason really subject
to the law [of which it can regard itself the author].” Moreover, “if there
is a categorical imperative (a law for the will over every rational being),
then it can only command that everything be done from the maxim of a
will that could also have itself as universal lawgiver as its object. For then
alone the practical principle and the imperative which it obeys are un-
conditional because they simply cannot be based on any interest.”

The conception of man as an end in himself further entails the autonomy

of the will. Ordinarily, the idea of man as subject to law suggests a coer-
cive relationship. This is because when a person is subject to law, he or
she is being obliged to act in a certain way by someone or something else.
Behind the subject who has to obey the law is an authority who gives
commands. Coercion prevails because the subject obeys what the author-
ity commands. The authority, interestingly, is understood to be different
from the subject.

But although it is true that man is bound by his duties to laws, the law
must be viewed as the person’s own commands because his will, in so far
as he is a rational being, is a universally legislative will. The response of
the rational being to law is not characterized by fear or inclination but
solely by respect for the law. The relationship, therefore is not coercive
since:

Man is subject only to his own and yet to universal legislation,

and…he is obligated to act only in accordance with his own
will which, however, in view of the end of nature is a univer-
sally legislating will.

Thus the pertinent principle of the will is this “to undertake no act ac-
cording to any other maxim than one can also count as universal law,
and therefore to act so that the will can consider itself at the same time as
legislating universally by means of its maxims” (Kant 1938).

The absence of a coercive relationship between the law and the rational
person also guarantees the notion of personal dignity. For since it is one’s
own will that legislates universally by its maxims, it is also the real object
of respect. And, according to Kant, “the dignity of mankind consists in

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42 Philo 173 Ethics: Theory and Practice

this very capacity of making universal laws, though with the condition
that it is itself subject to this same legislation.”

Autonomy, then, is that characteristic feature of the will by

which it legislates for its own self. In the end, Kant regards it
as the sole principle of morality since the principle of morality
must be a categorical imperative and the categorical impera-
tive commands nothing more nor less than this very autonomy.

Freedom
The will, according to Kant, is a way of relating causally to rational be-
ings. If so, then freedom would be the property enabling a causal relation-
ship to take place in a manner that is not determined by external causes.
In contrast, physical necessity is the property by which the causal rela-
tionships of all non-rational beings are determined by external causes.

By looking at the will as a kind of causality, Kant (1938) also accepts that
it is subject to laws “in accordance with which, because of something that
we call cause, something else, namely the result, must be posited.” How-
ever, the law that governs the will as causality is not a physical law. The
will cannot be governed by physical necessity since the latter involves a
determination of effects by foreign causes. But since the will can only be
beholden to itself it must also be a law to itself. Hence freedom of the will
cannot be anything but autonomy. Here, autonomy must be understood
as the property of the will to be a law to itself which, in turn, is an affir-
mation of the principle to act only in accordance with a maxim which
may be willed to become a universal law. In so far as we are referring to
rational beings, therefore, there is no distinction between a free will and a
will subject to moral laws.

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ACTIVITY 3-1
Calculate the goodness of an act from the Kantian perspective.

In the movie Gone With the Wind Scarlett O’Hara was a daughter
of a wealthy plantation owner whose estate was ruined as a result
of the civil war. For the first time in her life, she went through
starvation and depravation. When she was able to get back to their
plantation she saw nothing but devastation. While she knelt on
the soil that brought her family great fame, wealth and honor she
vowed: “As God is my witness, I shall never go hungry again!”
and she found a way not to go hungry again. There was a mer-
chant in town who was not so charming a gentleman but was not
lacking in material possessions. She befriended him, and one time
while they were seated on his wagon she said “Can I put my hands
in your pocket?” She eventually succeeded in marrying him. And
she shared his good. State the maxim of Scarlett’s act and deter-
mine whether or not such an act passes the Kantian standard of a
good act.

COMMENTS ON ACTIVITY 3-1

In the case of Scarlett O’Hara the maxim should make mention of
her poverty and hunger and her inducing—manipulating, if you
will—a relatively well-off person into marriage to pull herself out
of her misfortune. After you have formulated the maxim, you may
ask some questions such as: Is this maxim universalizable, or will
it be, sooner or later, self-defeating? If the maxim is carried out,
will it not use a person as a mere means to an end?

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44 Philo 173 Ethics: Theory and Practice

Summary
An act is good if it is invested with good will; its maxim is universalizable;
and in performing this act, mankind is treated as ends rather than means.
An act is invested with good will, if its done out of duty. An act is done
out of duty when it conforms to duty, that is, the person is dutifully bound
to do the act in question; it is done because it is a duty, that is, the person
does the act because it is his duty to do so; and it is done only because it is
a duty, that is, the person does the act to willfully fulfill his duty only, and
not because he loves to do the act or is coerced to do it. If a person does an
act he is dutifully bound to do, but performs it not willfully but only by
chance; or performs it out of maniacal fetish and not out of a sense of
duty; or performs it because a gun is pointed at his nape, the act is done
only accord with duty.

Kant distinguishes between two duties: perfect duty and imperfect duty.
A perfect duty is one which admits no exception, such that when a per-
son has this kind of duty, he must always do it whenever the opportunity
arises. Imperfect duty is one which admits some exception, such that when
a person has this kind of duty, it may sometimes be permissible for him to
avoid doing it.

Kant also gives two types of imperatives: hypothetical imperative and

categorical imperative. Hypothetical imperative involves a command of
reason to perform an act for the sake of some other—perhaps higher—
good. On the other hand, categorical imperative is a command of reason
to perform an act for its own sake as it is intrinsically good. Kant says in
his first formulation of the categorical imperative: “Act only on that maxim
which will enable you at the same time to will that it be a universal law.”
Every act is thought to have a corresponding maxim or a general policy.
For example, a person who wants to pass a test but does not know the
answers to the questions cheats. The maxim behind such act may be
framed as such: If only to pass a test one may cheat.

For an act to be right, its maxim must be universalizable or it can apply to

everyone. One test for universalizability of a maxim is that the act at-
tached to the maxim must never defeat its purpose, even in the long run.
The maxim in our previous example is non-universalizable because if ev-
eryone else acts according to that maxim, sooner or later, there will be a
backlash against the testing system. What kind of backlash can it create?
Well, the opportunity for cheating would be eliminated, or nobody would
have faith in the results of tests that the business of testing would be
scrapped altogether.

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Regarding the second formulation of the categorical imperative, Kant says:

“Act so that in your own person as well as in the person of every other,
you are treating mankind also as an end never merely as a means.” Man-
kind is composed of individuals who are rational. They are persons and
not things. They possess absolute worth and therefore, must not be merely
seen as objects to be used.

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