JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS denying Enrile’s  

Motion to Fix Bail,

SANDIGANBAYAN August 18, 2015 where it held:
The Facts: XXX [I]t is
            On June 5, 2014, the only after
Office of the Ombudsman charged the
Enrile and several others with plunder in prosecutio
the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their n shall
purported involvement in the diversion have
and misuse of appropriations under the presented
Priority Development Assistance Fund its
(PDAF). In accordance with the Plunder evidence
Law, no bail was recommended for his and the
provisional liberty. Court shall
have
            Thereafter, Enrile filed his
made a
Motion for Detention at the PNP General
determinat
Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail, both
ion that
dated July 7, 2014, which where heard
the
by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.
evidence
In support of the motions Enrile argued
of guilt is
that he should be allowed to post bail
not strong
because: (a) the Prosecution had not
against
yet established that the evidence of his
accused
guilt was strong; (b) although he was
Enrile can
charged with plunder, the penalty as to
he
him would only be reclusion temporal,
demand
not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was
bail as a
not a flight risk, and his (d) age and
matter of
physical condition must further be
right.
seriously considered.
Then and
            Senator Enrile next argues only then
that the Court should grant him bail will the
because while he is charged with Court be
plunder, “the maximum penalty may be duty-
possible imposed on him is reclusion bound to
temporal, not reclusion perpetua.”  He fix the
anchors his claim on Section 2 of R.A. amount of
No. 7080, as amended, and on the his bail.
allegation that he is over seventy (70)
years old and that he voluntarily To be
surrendered.  “Accordingly, it may be sure. No
said that the crime charged against such
Enrile is not punishable by reclusion determinat
perpetua, and thus bailable.” ion has
            On July 14, 2014, the been
Sandiganbayan issued its resolution made by
the Court.
 In fact, OPP
accused ORT
Enrile has UNIT
not filed an Y TO
application PRE
for bail. SEN
Necessaril T
y, no bail EVID
hearing ENC
can even E TO
commence SHO
.  It is thus W
exceedingl THAT
y THE
premature EVID
for ENC
accused E OF
Enrile to GUIL
ask the T IS
Court to fix STR
bail. ONG
?
ISSUE:
HELD:
MAY
THE             Yes, in the present case of
COU Senator Juan Ponce Enrile.
RT             Bail protects the right of
GRA the accused to due process and to be
NT presumed innocent.
BAIL In all criminal prosecutions, the
IN A accused shall be presumed innocent
NON- until the contrary is proved.  The
BAIL presumption of innocence is rooted in
ABLE the guarantee of due process, and is
OFF safeguarded by the constitutional right
ENS to be released on bail, and further binds
E the court to wait until after trial to impose
WITH any punishment of the accused.
OUT It is worthy to note that bail is not
THE granted to prevent the accused from
PRO committing additional crimes.  The
SEC purpose of bail is to guarantee the
UTIO appearance of the accused at the trial,
N or whenever so required by the trial
GIVE court.  The amount of bail should be
N high enough to assure the presence of
THE
the accused when so required, but it
should be no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose.  Thus,
bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accused’s
interest in his provisional liberty before
or during the trial, and the society’s
interest in assuring the accused’s
presence at trial.
The general rule is, therefore,
that any person, before being convicted
of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged with the
capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, and the evidence of
guilt is strong.  Hence, from the moment
he is placed under arrest, or is detained
or restrained by the officers of the law,
he can claim the guarantee of his
provisional liberty under the Bill of
Rights, and he retains his right to bail
unless he is charged with a capital
offense, or with an offense punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of guilt
is strong, no right to bail shall be
recognized.
On the other hand, the granting
of bail is discretionary: (1) upon
conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC
has imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six years, provided none of
the circumstances enumerated under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his
admission to bail.
Enrile has averred in Motion to
Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating
circumstances that should be
appreciated in his favor, namely: that he
was already over 70 years at the time of
the alleged commission of the offense,
and that he voluntarily surrendered.
Enrile’s averment has been mainly
uncontested by the Prosecution.
In our view, his social and
political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charge in
court indicate that the risk of his flight or
escape from this jurisdiction is highly
unlikely.  His personal disposition from
the onset of his indictment for plunder,
formal or otherwise, has demonstrated
his utter respect for the legal processes
of this country.  We also do not ignore
that at an earlier time many years ago
when he had been charged with
rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, he already evinced a
similar personal disposition of respect
for the legal processes, and was
granted bail during the pendency of his
trial because he was not seen as a flight
risk.  With this solid reputation in both
his public and private lives, his long
years of public service, and history’s
judgment of him being at stake, he
should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of
Enrile’s health presents another
compelling justification for his admission
to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did
not recognize.
In his testimony in the
Sandiganbayan, Dr. Jose C. Gonzales,
the Director of the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a
geriatric patient who was found during
the medical examinations conducted at
the UP-PGH to be suffering from the
different medical conditions. Dr.
Gonzales attested the medical
conditions, singly or collectively, could
pose significant risks to the life of Enrile.
Based on the foregoing, there is
no question at all that Enrile’s advanced
age and ill health required special
medical attention.
Bail for the provisional liberty of
the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the
charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his
life.  Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperiling his health and life would not
serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.
The Supreme Court therefore
granted bail to Senator Enrile in the
amount of P1,000,000.00.
ATTY. ADALIM-WHITE VS JUDGE
BAGTAS
Facts:
Judge Bugtas ordered the Release on
Recognizance of Bagaporo, a convict of
frustrated murder before terminating
service of the minimum penalty, and
pending the approval of the prisoner’s
application for parole. Manuel
Bagaporo, Jr. was convicted of
frustrated murder and was sentenced
four years and two months to eight
years and one day of imprisonment. He
started serving his sentence and
subsequently, he filed an application for
release on recognizance. In support of
his application, the Provincial Jail
Warden issued a certification that
Bagaporo has been confined at the
Provincial Jail since February 9, 1996
and is already entitled to parole. Another
certification was issued by the
Supervising Parole and Probation
Officer showing that Bagaporo applied
for parole in lieu of the DOJ’s Maagang
Paglaya Program. By virtue of the above
certifications, respondent judge ordered
the release of Bagaporo upon
recognizance of the Provincial Jail
Warden of Eastern Samar. He likewise
justified the same based on the rule that
“bail is discretionary upon conviction by
the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment”.
Issue:
W/N Judge Bugtas, in exercising his
discretionary powers, was correct in
ordering the release of Bagaporo on
recognizance [NO]
Held:
            Respondent Judge is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
ordering the release of Bagaporo
pending the approval of his application
for parole and before the completion of
the minimum period of the sentence
imposed upon him. It must be noted that
Bagaporo was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from
four years and two months to eight
years and one day. It is not disputed
that he began to serve sentence on
February 9, 1996 Counting four years
and two months from said date the
minimum period of Bagaporos sentence
should have been completed on April 9,
2000.
            It is patently erroneous to
release a convict on recognizance.
Section 24, Rule 114 provides that there
shall no bail for a convict after final
judgment. The only exception is when
the convict applies for Probation before
he commences to serve his sentence
and that the offense and the penalty for
the offense  is within the purview of the
Probation Law. Sections 5 and 16 of
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court (on the
different kinds of bail) APPLIES ONLY
TO AN ACCUSED UNDERGOING
PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT
DURING TRIAL OR ON APPEAL.
THEY DO NOT APPLY TO A PERSON
CONVICTED BY FINAL JUSGMENT
AND ALREADY SERVING SENTENCE.
            Judge Bugtas was
therefore fined P40,000.00 for gross
ignorance of the law and sternly warned
that a repetition of the same or similar
act shall be dealt with more severely.
***The judge is correct in granting bail to
an accused charged of Murder if after
the prosecution presented its evidence,
only the crime of Homicide was proven.
There is no need for the accused to file
a petition for bail or for the court to
conduct a separate hearing for the
Petition for Bail filed by the accused.
RICARDO DE LA CAMARA vs HON.
MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE
An order of respondent Judge Manuel
Lopez Enage, fixing the bail of
petitioner, Ricardo de la Camara, in the
sum of P1, 195,200.00 is assailed in this
petition for certiorari as repugnant to the
constitutional mandate prohibiting
excessive bail. Nonetheless, relief
sought setting aside the above order by
reducing the amount of bail to
P40,000.00 cannot be granted, as in the
meanwhile, petitioner had escaped from
the provincial jail, thus rendering this
case moot and academic. It is deemed
advisable, however, for the guidance of
lower court judges, to set forth anew the
controlling and authoritative doctrines
that should be observed in fixing the
amount of the bail sought in order that
full respect is accorded to such a
constitutional right.
Fact:
That on or about November 7, 1968
Ricardo de la Camara, Municipal Mayor
of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental was
arrested and charged with multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder
for the incident happen on august 21,
1968 for the killing of some laborers of
the Tirador logging corporation in
Agusan del sur.
He filed then an application to bail base
from his assertion that there’s no
evidence that warrant his involvement or
linking him on the incident happen in the
killing of several laborers. The judge
granted his application on august 10,
1970 affirming that there’s a weak
support to prove the allegation of the
prosecution, and thus the judge fixed a
bail for the petitioner in the following:
1.   P840,000.00 multiple murder
2.   P355, 200.00   multiple frustrated
murder
Total   P1, 195, 200.00  
The secretary of justice then informed
the judge of imposing an excessive
amount of bail and recommended that
P40, 000.00 would be reasonable.
Furthermore, the judge likewise denied
the motion for reconsideration to reduce
the amount, hence, this petition was
filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Judge discretion on
fixing and granting the bail amount is
excessive and therefore violate the right
of the petitioner to bail granted by the
constitution.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that right to
bail is afforded under Sec. 13, Art III of
the 1987 Constitution and Sec. 7, Rule
114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
to wit: “No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall
be admitted to bail when evidence of
guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.”
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than
that the challenged order of August 10,
1970 fixing the amount of
P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be
posted by petitioner, the sum of
P840,000.00 for the information
charging multiple murder, there being
fourteen victim, and the sum of
P355,200 for the other offense of
multiple frustrated murder, there being
twelve victims, manifest a clear violation
of the constitutional provision. Under the
circumstances, there being only two
offenses charged, the amount required
as bail could not possibly exceed
P50,000.00 for the information for
murder and P25,000.00 for the other
information for frustrated murder. Nor
should it be ignored in this case that the
Department of Justice did recommend
the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two
offenses.
There is an attempt on the part of
respondent Judge to justify what, on its
face, appears to be indefensible by the
alleged reliance on Villaseñor v. Abano.
The guidelines in the fixing of bail was
there summarized, in the opinion of
Justice Sanchez, as follows:
(1) ability of the accused to give bail;
(2) nature of the offense;
(3) penalty for the offense charged;
(4) character and reputation of the
accused;
(5) health of the accused;
(6) character and strength of the
evidence;
(7) probability of the accused appearing
in trial;
(8) forfeiture of other bonds;
(9) whether the accused was a fugitive
from justice when arrested; and
(10) if the accused is under bond for
appearance at trial in other cases.
Respondent Judge, however, did ignore
this decisive consideration appearing at
the end of the above opinion:
"Discretion, indeed, is with the court
called upon to rule on the question of
bail. We must stress, however, that
where conditions imposed upon a
defendant seeking bail would amount to
a refusal thereof and render nugatory
the constitutional right to bail, we will not
hesitate to exercise our supervisory
powers to provide the required remedy."
Because there is reason to believe that
any person in the position of petitioner
would under the circumstances be not
able to resists thoughts of escaping from
confinement, reduced as he must have
been to a state of desperation. In the
same breath that he was told he could
be bailed out, the excessive amount
required could only mean that
provisional liberty would be beyond his
reach. It would have been more
forthright if he were informed
categorically that such a right could not
be availed of. There would have been
no disappointment of expectations then.
It is no wonder that the resulting
frustration left resentment and bitterness
in its wake. Petitioner’s subsequent
escape cannot be condoned. That is
why he is not entitled to the relief prayed
for. What respondent Judge did,
however, does call for repudiation from
this Court.
MANOTOC vs CA
Facts: Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc,
Jr., is one of the two principal
stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management, Inc. and the Manotoc
Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage
house. Having transferred the
management of the latter into the hands
of professional men, he holds no officer-
position in said business, but acts as
president of the former corporation.
Following the "run" on stock brokerages
caused by stock broker Santamaria's
flight from this jurisdiction, petitioner,
who was then in the United States,
came home, and together with his co-
stockholders, filed a petition with the
Securities and Exchange Commission
for the appointment of a management
committee, not only for Manotoc
Securities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-
Insular Management, Inc. The petition
relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc.,
docketed as SEC Case No. 001826,
entitled, "In the Matter of the
Appointment of a Management
Committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc.,
Teodoro Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc,
Jr., Petitioners", was granted and a
management committee was organized
and appointed.
When a Torrens title submitted to and
accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc.
was suspected to be a fake, six of its
clients filed six separate criminal
complaints against petitioner and one
Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and
vice-president, respectively, of Manotoc
Securities, Inc. In due course,
corresponding criminal charges for
estafa were filed by the investigating
fiscal before the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400, assigned
to respondent Judge Camilon, and
Criminal Cases Nos. 45542 to 45545,
raffled off to Judge Pronove. In all
cases, petitioner has been admitted to
bail in the total amount of P105,000.00,
with FGU Instance Corporation as
surety.
On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before
each of the trial courts a motion entitled,
"motion for permission to leave the
country," stating as ground therefor his
desire to go to the United States,
"relative to his business transactions
and opportunities."  The prosecution opposed
said motion and after due hearing, both trial
judges denied the same.
Issue: Does a person facing a criminal
indictment and provisionally released on
bail have an unrestricted right to travel?
Ruling: A court has the power to prohibit a
person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of
the nature and function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
defines bail as the security required and given
for the release of a person who is in the custody
of the law, that he will appear before any court in
which his appearance may be required as
stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
It’s object is to relieve the accused of
imprisonment and the state of the burden of
keeping him, pending the trial, and at the
same time, to put the accused as much
under the power of the court as if he were in
custody of the proper officer, and to secure
the appearance of the accused so as to
answer the call of the court and do what the
law may require of him.
If the accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he
may be placed beyond the reach of the
courts.
The effect of a recognizance or bail bond,
when fully executed or filed of record, and
the prisoner released thereunder, is to
transfer the custody of the accused from the
public officials who have him in their charge
to keepers of his own selection. Such
custody has been regarded merely as a
continuation of the original imprisonment.
The sureties become invested with full
authority over the person of the principal
and have the right to prevent the principal
from leaving the state.
Petitioner has not specified the duration of the
proposed travel or shown that his surety has
agreed to it. Petitioner merely alleges that his
surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted
cash indemnities. The court cannot allow the
accused to leave the country without the assent
of the surety because in accepting a bail bond or
recognizance, the government impliedly agrees
"that it will not take any proceedings with the
principal that will increase the risks of the
sureties or affect their remedies against him.
Under this rule, the surety on a bail bond or
recognizance may be discharged by a
stipulation inconsistent with the conditions
thereof, which is made without his assent. This
result has been reached as to a stipulation or
agreement to postpone the trial until after the
final disposition of other cases, or to permit the
principal to leave the state or country."
The constitutional right to travel being
invoked by petitioner is not an absolute
right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of travel shall
not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court, or when necessary in
the interest of national security, public
safety or public health.
To our mind, the order of the trial court
releasing petitioner on bail constitutes
such lawful order as contemplated by
the above-quoted constitutional
provision.
Finding the decision of the appellate
court to be in accordance with law and
jurisprudence, the Court finds that no
gainful purpose will be served in
discussing the other issues raised by
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is
hereby dismissed, with costs against
petitioner.
People vs Lopez    (G.R. No. L-41974
November 29, 1976)
Facts: According to complainant,
Salvacion Pablo, on the morning of
January 14, 1972, while seated on a
bed alone in a bedroom of her house,
busy sewing her shorts, clad only in her
panties and a blouse, the accused, who
must have noticed through a mirror in
the sala that she was alone, approached
her. He then sat near her. She did not
ask him to leave. She saw nothing
unusual in his presence under
circumstances where perhaps
insistence on respect for one's privacy
was indicated. Almost immediately after,
so she testified, she was flat on the bed;
he pushed her down, touching her
breasts in the process. Nor did it take
long for him to remove his trousers, at
the same time divesting her of her
panties. Then he placed himself on top
of her, with one of his hands being
pressed against her throat, thus
rendering ineffectual her resistance to
his efforts to have sexual intercourse.
The act of coition then took place. From
her own account, it was not over and
done with in a hurry. It took time. On
cross-examination, in what could have
been an unguarded moment, there was
an admission by her that the urgencies
of the flesh on the part of both of them
did find release and satisfaction. After it
was over, the conduct of both
participants was even more revealing. It
was as if nothing out of the ordinary
occurred. Calmly, he put on his clothes
and left. She was, from her own
account, equally serene, no tears shed,
not even a word of recrimination. That
silence she kept and maintained, her
father being kept completely in the dark
all the while. It was not until the last
week of May, 1972, with the evidence of
a prior sexual intercourse quite visible
that she had to reveal what happened
on that fateful day. Her pregnancy could
no longer be hidden. So another of the
witnesses of the prosecution, Leoncia A.
Carreon, a grandaunt, testified. It was at
first thought that a marriage would be
the Ideal solution. Surprisingly, the
opposition came from the mother of the
accused. Nor could the marriage have
taken place even if there were
willingness on both sides, as they were
first cousins. In due time, a child was
born. Fortunately for complainant, the
cross she had to bear was thereafter
lifted with her marriage to another man.
Ernesto Lopez raises the issue that his
right to due process was violated since
his guilt was not established beyond
reasonable doubt. His position was
supported by Acting Solicitor General
Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in a brief. To
quote from such manifestation: "[For all
the foregoing considerations], we
respectfully submit that appellant's guilt
has not been established beyond
reasonable doubt, since with the
premises unraveled above, one cannot
set his mind at rest to his culpability."
Issue: Is Lopez’s position tenable?
Ruling: On the above facts, there clearly
was no basis for a judgment of
conviction for the crime of rape. As
noted at the outset, the lower court's
decision finding him guilty thereof and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua
must be reversed.
Regard for the implications of the
constitutional presumption of innocence
cannot justify a finding of guilt. The
explanation for the lower court decision
could very well be that it was moved by
the sad plight of complainant, a young
girl of fifteen, who in a moment of
weakness lost her innocence and
yielded what even in these times is still
looked upon as a young maiden's most
precious possession, especially so in
rural areas. She is thus entitled to all the
sympathy there is. What was done by
the accused was morally reprehensible.
It could not, however, be adjudged as
rape. Moreover, the lower court must
have been influenced likewise by what
clearly appeared to be the fabricated
defense of alibi interposed by the
accused. The verdict was one of guilt.
Hence this appeal. As could be
expected, the brief filed on his behalf
concentrated on the weakness of the
case for the prosecution.
In the light of the credible and
competent facts of record, this Court
cannot view the matter in the same way
the lower court did. The state of moral
certainty as to the guilt of the accused
was not reached. It does not signify, to
repeat, that no reproach could be hurled
at the manner he conducted himself. It
is only that the quantum of proof
required in cases of rape was not
satisfied. It bears repeating likewise that
in reversing the appealed decision and
acquitting the accused, this Court is not
insensible to the misfortune that befell
the hapless complainant. As in the lower
court, so here, there is all the sympathy
for her. She is more to be pitied than
censured. As a young girl of fifteen,
subject to the biological changes that
adolescence brings, she was unable to
resist what has been referred to, in
Faulkner's phraseology, as the glandular
promptings of the moment. Moreover,
what must have contributed to such an
occurrence was the fact that she was
not put on her guard, the accused being
a first cousin. To be realistic about the
matter with the cult of the machismo still
prevalent, it should cause no surprise
when he exploited to the hilt the
potentialities of the occasion and
injected the element of sex in what
otherwise could be a humdrum situation.
Certainly though, that was not enough to
warrant a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower
court of October 9, 1975, convicting the
accused Ernesto Lopez of the crime of
rape is reversed, without prejudice to
the appropriate action for support of the
child that was the result of the sexual
act committed on January 14, 1972. No
costs.
People vs. San Diego
26 SCRA 522 (1968)
FACTS: The accused were charged for
murder. The prosecution and the
defense agreed that the motions for bail
of the defendants would be considered
in the course of the regular trial instead
of in a summary proceeding. In the
course of the regular trial, after the
prosecution had presented eight
witnesses, the trial court resolved the
motions for bail granting the same
despite the objection of the prosecution
on the ground that it still had material
witnesses to present. Bail was granted
on the ground that the evidence of guilt
was not strong.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution was
deprived of procedural due process
when trial court granted bail without
allowing the prosecution to present their
other witnesses?
HELD: YES. Whether the motion for bail
of a defendant who is in custody for a
capital offense be resolved in a
summary proceeding or in the course of
a regular trial, the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all the evidence that it
may desire to introduce before the court
should resolve the motion for bail. If, as
in the criminal case involved in the
instant special civil action, the
prosecution should be denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of
procedural due process, and the order
of the court granting bail should be
considered void on that ground. The
orders complained of dated October 7, 9
and 12, 1968, having been issued in
violation of procedural due process,
must be considered null and void.
The court’s discretion to grant bail in
capital offenses must be exercised in
the light of a summary of the evidence
presented by the prosecution;
otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and
might be capricious or whimsical.
Hence, the court’s order granting or
refusing bail must contain a summary of
the evidence for the prosecution
followed by its conclusion whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong. The
orders of October 7, 9 and 12, 1968,
granting bail to the five defendants are
defective in form and substance
because they do not contain a summary
of the evidence presented by the
prosecution. They only contain the
court’s conclusion that the evidence of
guilt is not strong. Being thus defective
in form and substance, the orders
complained of cannot, also on this
ground, be allowed to stand.
People vs Saturno
The case is an appeal interposed by
accused Servando Saturno, Abraham
Rodriguez and Benigno Andres from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 39, San Jose City, Nueva Ecija,
finding them guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of multiple murder and ordering
them to indemnify the heirs of the
victims, and to pay cost.
Facts:
That on or about June 23, 1989 at
around 5:30 in the afternoon of that
date, when the tragic incident was
happened at the house of Mr. and Mrs.
Lucila Valdez. When Lucila heard a
tricycle stop in front of their residence
and she noticed Benigno alighted from
the tricycle. The wife of Rodrigo thought
that may be Benigno will deliver the
pinapaitan she ordered to him, so she
went to meet him but when she was on
her way out, she met one assailant on
the stairs at their house asking about
her husband and went inside directly to
where Rodrigo is sleeping and fired a
gun to her husband and later other
victims. Her husband was shot in their
bedroom while sleeping, together also
with other victims who were shot inside
their house. The incident happens after
a whole day morning drinking session at
the residence of spouses Valdez.
The accused Servando Saturno et. al
were arrested and brought for
questioning and Lucila was asked to
identify the perpetrator but she was
force to point them as the assailant even
if she could not identify them as the
killer. All the accused denied any
involvement of the killings but every time
they denied their involvement, they were
subject for maltreatment, coercion by
pouring water on their nose and mouth,
undressed and made them to lie down
and one accused where they lighted
cigarette on his butt and on his private
part until they were force to admit the
act and sign the documents.
Later they were brought to a certain atty.
Evangelista and were told to answer yes
to all the questions being asked and not
allowed to read their affidavits they
signed.
The trial court found the accused –
appellants guilty of multiple murder and
acquitted one accused Delfin Gregorio
for insufficiency of evidence. Hence, the
case appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and observe presumption of
innocence.
Held:
It is a basic rule that the guilt of an
accused must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Before he is
convicted, there must be moral certainty
of guilt- a certainty that convinces and
satisfies the reason and conscience of
those who are to act upon it that he is
guilty of the crime charged. The court
must consider whether it entertains a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
The task of the prosecution is two-fold:
first, to prove that a crime has been
committed, and
second, that the accused is the person
responsible therefore. Thus, the
prosecution must be able to overcome
the constitutional presumption of
innocence with evidence beyond
reasonable doubt to justify the
conviction of the accused.
In the case at bar, the prosecution was
able to establish the fact of the killing;
however, it failed to prove that
appellants perpetrated the crime. Where
the prosecution has failed to discharge
the onus probandi for a pronouncement
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the
constitutional presumption of innocence
in favor of the accused will result in
acquittal.
The court a quo gave weight to the
affidavits executed by the accused
wherein they admitted their participation
in the killing. However, they were able to
prove that their affidavits were solely
prepared by the police investigators,
that they were not apprised of their
constitutional rights, and that they were
forced to sign the affidavits lest they be
maltreated again.
True, the settled rule is that alibi is a
weak defense. It has been held that
courts will not at once look with disfavor
on the defense of alibi. Alibi may be
considered in light of all the evidence for
it may be sufficient to acquit the
accused.
Appellants alibi and denial gain
considerable strength in view of the
unreliable identification of the
perpetrators of the crime.
Thus, where the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or
more explanations one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with
his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support a
conviction. The equipoise rule provides
that where the evidence in a criminal
case is evenly balanced, the
constitutional presumption of innocence
tilts the scales in favor of the accused.
People vs. Jose
Conditional Pardon – How it works after a
change of sovereign
FACTS: Jose was charged for violating
Act 65 in 1944. Act 65 was an act of the
Nat’l Assembly of RP while the Japanese
were still occupying the country. After
serving 6 months or in April 1944, Jose
was granted a conditional pardon – the
simple condition was for him not to violate
any other Penal Laws of RP. Later he
committed a crime of qualified theft. The
Fiscal then went on to file an additional
charge against Jose for violating the
conditions of the pardon granted him.
Jose argued that he did not violate the
pardon conditions at all because there is
no pardon at all. The pardon granted him
is inoperative because the law he violated
before was a political law which was
abrogated when the US army took over
the country as proclaimed by MacArthur in
Oct 1944.
ISSUE: Whether the defendant can now
be prosecuted for having allegedly
violated the conditional pardon granted by
the President of the so-called Republic of
the Philippines.
HELD: The SC held that Jose cannot be
prosecuted criminally for a violation of the
conditional pardon granted by the
President of the so-called RP (during the
Jap Occupation), for the following
reasons: Because, without necessity of
discussing and determining the intrinsic
validity of the conditional pardon, as an
act done by the President of the so-called
RP, after the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government, no
elaborate argument is required to show
that the effectivity of a conditional pardon
depends on that of the sentence which
inflicts upon a defendant the punishment
inflicted by the sentence ceases to be of
any effect in so far as the individual upon
whom it is bestowed is concerned, for the
latter cannot be required to serve a void
sentence of penalty imposed on him, even
without such pardon.
DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
1. People vs Angus, August
3, 2010 (ACQUITTED)
Facts:
 Porferio R. Angus was charged
for the crime of parricide in the
killing of his wife, Betty Angus,
committed in the morning of
January 10, 2002 particularly in
Lanisi Base in the Municipality of
Claveria, Province of Misamis
Oriental.
The version of the prosecution
are as follow:
The victim, Betty D. Angus,
arrived at the Lanisi Patrol Base
at around 7:00 p.m. on January
9, 2002. Appellant fetched her at
the gate and they proceeded to
his bunker. Later, CAFGU
members Malaran and Carpio
heard the two (2) arguing about
appellant’s relationship with
another woman. Appellant was
also seen go out of his bunker
around midnight to get some rice,
beef and vegetables for dinner.
The following day, January 10,
2002, at around 7:00 a.m.,
appellant had breakfast at the
mess hall with Jintapa, Malaran
and Carpio. As appellant was not
with his wife, Jintapa reminded
appellant to call her. When
appellant returned, he told them
that he would just leave some
food for his wife because she
was still sleeping.
After eating, Malaran and Jintapa
asked for permission to fetch
water near the barangay
elementary school about a
kilometer away. While they were
gone, Carpio went to the outpost
and started cleaning his firearm.
Appellant went to the comfort
room then decided to join Carpio
at the outpost. On his way to the
outpost, appellant passed by his
bunker and peeped through the
door which was open by about 1
inches. Carpio was able to see
the door because it was facing
the outpost. A few minutes later,
Malaran and Jintapa returned
and joined appellant and Carpio
at the outpost. The four (4)
shared funny stories and joked
for a while, after which Carpio
went to the mess hall while
Jintapa went to his bunker.
Malaran and appellant decided to
continue their conversation at the
mess hall
On their way to the mess hall,
appellant passed by his bunker
but was not able to open the door
at once because something was
blocking it from the inside. When
appellant pushed the door,
Malaran saw the back of the
victim in a slanting position and
leaning at the door. Appellant
went inside and almost
immediately shouted for help.
Malaran and Carpio saw
appellant embracing his wife.
They helped appellant carry
Bettys body to the bed. Malaran
observed that her skin below the
jaw was reddish and her knees
were covered with mud. There
was food on the table and a
multi-colored tubao was hanging
on the purlins of the roof about a
meter away from the victim. The
lower tip of the tubao was in a
circular form and was hanging
about four (4) feet from the
ground.
Dr. Uy, who conducted an
autopsy on the body of the victim
stated that Betty may have died
two (2) hours after taking her last
meal due to the presence of
partially digested food inside the
stomach. He believed that the
cause of her death was asphyxia
by strangulation and not by
hanging, as the victim did not
sustain a fractured bone on her
neck or hyoid bone and there
was no hemorrhage above the
trachea and larynx. He explained
that the sudden gravitational
force would usually cause a
fractured bone. Dr. Uy clarified
that the absence of a fractured
bone would only happen if the
person hangs herself very slowly
without a sudden force or if she
was in a kneeling position.
The testimonies for the
defense are as follow:
Cheryl Ann A. Siarez is the only
daughter of Betty and appellant.
In the afternoon of January 9,
2002, at around 1:30 p.m., Betty
went inside Cheryl Anns bedroom
and told her to be serious in her
studies. Betty also intimated to
Cheryl Ann that she wanted to go
to a far place where there would
be no more rumors, no
backbiting, and nobody would
recognize her. At 4:00 p.m., they
boarded a bus bound for
Cagayan de Oro City. Betty
disembarked at Villanueva,
Misamis Oriental to transfer to a
passenger jeepney going to
Claveria.
From Villanueva to Claveria,
Betty sat beside Angeles
Ociones, an old friend, in the
front seat of the jeepney. She
confided to Ociones about her
jealousy towards her husband.
She also mentioned that she was
angry that she was not able to
catch him and his mistress.
Ociones advised Betty to confront
her husband regarding the
rumors she had heard, as it was
common to hear such rumors
every time a soldier is assigned
to a place away from home. Betty
revealed that she planned to
commit suicide because of the
many stories she had heard
about her husband. This was the
third time she shared thoughts of
suicide. Betty further said she
wanted to go to a far place where
nobody would recognize her. At
around 7:00 p.m., Betty arrived at
Lanisi Patrol Base.
Appellant was convicted for the
crime of parricide and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua with its
accessory penalties which were
later affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, hence this petition for
review now before the Supreme
Court.
The ruling of the Supreme
Court:
Appellant argues that nobody really
saw who killed the victim or when
and how she was killed. He asserts
that the prosecution witnesses
merely testified to have last seen
Betty alive on the night of January 9,
2002. Thereafter, they heard the
couple arguing about a woman. The
 following morning Betty was found
dead. Although there was more than
one (1) circumstance, appellant
contends that the prosecution failed
to prove that the combination thereof
leads to the inevitable conclusion
that he killed his wife.
We find merit in appellant’s
contentions.
We may well emphasize that direct
evidence of the commission of a
crime is not the only basis on which
a court draws its finding of guilt.
Established facts that form a chain
of circumstances can lead the mind
intuitively or impel a conscious
process of reasoning towards a
conviction. Verily, resort to
circumstantial evidence is
sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 133 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence.
While no general rule can be laid
down as to the quantity of
circumstantial evidence which will
suffice in a given case, all the
circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and
with every other rational hypothesis
except that of guilt. The
circumstances proved should
constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to only one (1) fair
and reasonable conclusion that
the accused, to the exclusion of
all others, is the guilty person.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean the degree of proof
excluding the possibility of error and
producing absolute certainty. Only
moral certainty or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind is required.
The following are the requisites
for circumstantial evidence to be
sufficient to support conviction:
(a) there is more than one (1)
circumstance,
(b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been
proven, and
(c) the combination of all the
circumstances results in a moral
certainty that the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, is the one (1)
who has committed the crime.
Thus, to justify a conviction
based on circumstantial evidence,
the combination of circumstances
must be interwoven in such a way
as to leave no reasonable doubt
as to the guilt of the accused.
The Court is not satisfied that the
circumstantial evidence in this
case constitutes an unbroken
chain which leads to the
conclusion that appellant, to the
exclusion of all others, is guilty of
killing his wife. The trial court relied
on the testimonies of Malaran and
Carpio who heard the appellant and
his wife arguing about the latter’s
illicit relationship with another
woman, which supposedly proves
motive for him to commit the crime.
However, granting that appellant and
Betty had an argument on the night
before her death, it would be too
much to presume that such an
argument would drive appellant to
kill his wife. Clearly, the motive is not
convincing. If at all, the testimonies
of Malaran and Carpio merely show
a suspicion of appellant’s
responsibility for the crime.Needless
to state, however, suspicion no
matter how strong can not sway
judgment. In the absence of any
other evidence reasonably linking
appellant to the crime, evidence of
motive is not sufficient to convict
him.
Likewise, Dr. Uy explained that if a
person hangs herself, most of the
time there will be a fracture on the
bone of the neck because of the
pressure caused by gravity that pulls
the rope. However, he also testified
that if the person hangs herself
slowly, there will be no fracture on
her neck or hyoid bone. Thus, the
fact that Betty did not sustain a
fractured bone on her neck or hyoid
bone, as the doctor observed, does
not automatically lead to the
conclusion that appellant
strangled the victim. Given the
evidence that the victim had
intimated her wish to commit suicide
a day before the incident, it is not
farfetched to conclude that she
indeed chose to take her life.
An acquittal based on reasonable
doubt will prosper even though the
accused’s innocence may be
doubted, for a criminal conviction
rests on the strength of the evidence
of the prosecution and not on the
weakness of the defense.  And, if
the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two (2)
or more explanations, one (1) of
which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, then
the evidence does not fulfill the
TEST OF MORAL CERTAINTY and
is not sufficient to support a
conviction. That which is favorable to
the accused should be considered.
Appellant is ACQUITTED.
7. MALILLIN VS PEOPLE
Facts:
Junie Malillin assails the Decision of
the Court of Appeals as well as its
Resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration. The challenged decision
has affirmed the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon City which
found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of shabu.
Police officers raided the residence
of Junie Malillin y Lopez (petitioner). The
search allegedly yielded two (2) plastic
sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic
sachets containing residual morsels of the
said substance. Petitioner was charged with
violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA No. 9165
(The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002).
Petitioner entered a negative plea.
At the ensuing trial, the prosecution
presented P/Insp Bolanos, Arroyo (forensic
chemist) and PO3 Esternon as witnesses.
The evidence for the defense
focused on the irregularity of the search and
seizure conducted by the police operatives.
Petitioner testified that PO3 Esternon began
the search of the bedroom with Licup and
petitioner himself inside. Petitioner was then
asked by a police officer to buy cigarettes at
a nearby store.
Petitioner asserted that on his return
from the errand, he was summoned by
Esternon to the bedroom and once inside,
the officer closed the door and asked him to
lift the mattress on the bed. And as he was
doing as told, Esternon stopped him and
ordered him to lift the portion of the
headboard. In that instant, Esternon showed
him "sachet of shabu" which according to
him came from a pillow on the bed.
Petitioner's account in its entirety was
corroborated in its material respects by
Norma (petitioner's mother), barangay
kagawad Licup and Sheila (petitioner’s wife)
in their testimonies. Norma and Sheila
positively declared that petitioner was not in
the house for the entire duration of the
search because at one point he was sent by
Esternon to the store to buy cigarettes while
Sheila was being searched by the lady
officer. Licup for his part testified on the
circumstances surrounding the discovery of
the plastic sachets. He recounted that after
the five empty sachets were found, he went
out of the bedroom and into the living room
and after about three minutes, Esternon,
who was left inside the bedroom, exclaimed
that he had just found two filled sachets.
The trial court declared petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged. The trial court reasoned
that the fact that shabu was found in the
house of petitioner was prima facie
evidence of petitioner's animus possidendi
sufficient to convict him of the charge
inasmuch as things which a person
possesses or over which he exercises acts
of ownership are presumptively owned by
him. It also noted petitioner's failure to
ascribe ill motives to the police officers to
fabricate charges against him.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal
with the CA, calling the attention of the court
to certain irregularities in the manner by
which the search of his house was
conducted. The OSG advanced that on the
contrary, the prosecution evidence sufficed
for petitioner's conviction and that the
defense never advanced any proof to show
that the members of the raiding team was
improperly motivated to hurl false charges
against him and hence the presumption that
they had regularly performed their duties
should prevail. The CA affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.
Issue: Whether petitioner's bare
denial cannot defeat the positive assertions
of the prosecution and that the same does
not suffice to overcome the prima facie
existence of animus possidendi.
Held:
Held: Yes, petitioner may defeat the
positive assertions through proving the
failure to follow the chain of custody rule.
The dangerous drug itself
constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
offense and the fact of its existence is vital
to a judgment of conviction.  As a method of
authenticating evidence, the chain of
custody rule requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter
in question is what the proponent claims it
to be. An unbroken chain of custody
becomes indispensable and essential when
the item of real evidence is not distinctive
and is not readily identifiable, or when its
condition at the time of testing or trial is
critical, or when a witness has failed to
observe its uniqueness. A unique
characteristic of narcotic substances is that
they are not readily identifiable as in fact
they are subject to scientific analysis to
determine their composition and nature.
A mere fleeting glance at the records
readily raises significant doubts as to the
identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly
seized from petitioner. Of the people who
came into direct contact with the seized
objects, only Esternon and Arroyo testified
for the specific purpose of establishing the
identity of the evidence.
Any reasonable mind might then ask
the question: Are the sachets of shabu
allegedly seized from petitioner the very
same objects laboratory tested and offered
in court as evidence? The prosecution's
evidence is incomplete to provide an
affirmative answer. The prosecution was
thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden
of establishing the identity of the seized
items because it failed to offer not only the
testimony of Gallinera and Garcia but also
any sufficient explanation for such failure.
Also the records disclose a series of
irregularities committed by the police
officers from the commencement of the
search of petitioner's house until the
submission of the seized items to the
laboratory for analysis.
Moreover, Section 21 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of
R.A. No. 9165 clearly outlines the post-
seizure procedure in taking custody of
seized drugs. It mandates that the officer
acquiring initial custody of drugs under a
search warrant must conduct the
photographing and the physical inventory of
the item at the place where the warrant has
been served. Esternon deviated from this
procedure. It was elicited from him that at
the close of the search of petitioner's house,
he brought the seized items immediately to Drugs Act of 2002 which was later affirmed
the police station for the alleged purpose of by the Court of Appeals, hence this petition
making a "true inventory" thereof, but there for review before the Supreme Court.
appears to be no reason why a true
inventory could not be made in petitioner's
house when in fact the apprehending team
was able to record and mark the seized
items and there and then prepare a seizure
receipt therefor. Lest it be forgotten, the
raiding team has had enough opportunity to
cause the issuance of the warrant which
means that it has had as much time to
prepare for its implementation.
Given the foregoing deviations of
police officer Esternon from the standard
and normal procedure in the implementation
of the warrant and in taking post-seizure
custody of the evidence, the blind reliance
by the trial court and the Court of Appeals
on the presumption of regularity in the
conduct of police duty is manifestly
misplaced.  The presumption of regularity is
merely just that—a mere presumption
disputable by contrary proof and which
when challenged by the evidence cannot be
regarded as binding truth.
Suffice it to say that this presumption
cannot preponderate over the presumption
of innocence that prevails if not overthrown
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the
present case the lack of conclusive
identification of the illegal drugs allegedly
seized from petitioner, coupled with the
irregularity in the manner by which the same
were placed under police custody before
offered in court, strongly militates a finding
of guilt.

People vs Nasara G.R. No.

188328, August 25, 2010

Facts:

Appellant, Joselito Jojo Nasara was

convicted by the Regional Trial Court in
Quezon City for the violation of Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165 or the Dangerous