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Special Sciences and Ceteris Paribus Laws

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 Φ Philosophical Writings
No. 27 Autumn 2004

SPECIAL SCIENCES AND CETERIS

PARIBUS LAWS
Mehmet Elgin — Muğla Üniversitesi (Turkey)

Abstract
Some philosophers argue that the legitimacy of special sciences depends on
their containing laws and that only laws these sciences can have are ceteris
paribus laws. I argue that there is a minimal condition for ceteris paribus
laws and this minimal condition states that if “ceteris paribus A’s are B’s”
express a lawful relation, then “ceteris paribus A’s are B’s” and “ceteris
paribus A’s are not B’s” should not both be true. I argue that if there are
genuine ceteris paribus laws, then ‘ceteris paribus’ should be a proper part
of a law statement in which it occurs. However, if we interpret ‘ceteris
paribus’ in this way, the containing sentence cannot be a law because it does
not satisfy a minimal condition for ceteris paribus laws. Consequently, I
argue that even if there are ceteris paribus sentences, it is unlikely that there
are ceteris paribus laws.

Introduction
With few exceptions, philosophers think that general propositions
in the special sciences and general propositions in physics and chemistry
have important differences. While at least some of the generalizations in
physics and chemistry satisfy the universality condition that laws require,
it is thought that generalizations in the special sciences don’t satisfy this
condition—i.e., for any special science generalization there is always
some defeater. If it is true that laws don’t have exceptions, then it looks
as if the special sciences don’t have laws. For some philosophers
(Stephen Schiffer (1991), James Woodward (2000, 2001, 2002), Earman
& Roberts (1999), Earman, Roberts & Smith (2002)), this conclusion is
correct (never mind the argument), but others find it quite difficult to
accept. For they think that the following argument (or something like it)
is correct:
1. At least sometimes the special sciences (Biology, Economics,
Psychology, Sociology, etc.) provide good explanations.
2. Providing good explanations requires citing laws.
3. Therefore, there are laws in the special sciences.
4 Special Sciences and Ceteris Paribus Laws

Philosophers who accept this argument think that the task is to

explain how at least some generalizations in the special sciences can be
called laws of nature even though they don’t seem to satisfy the
traditional standards for lawhood. Most philosophers who defend the
view that there are laws in the special sciences think that these laws
include explicit or implicit ceteris paribus (cp) clauses. For, they think
that without cp clauses most special science generalizations that are
candidates for lawhood are false. However, if these generalizations are
interpreted as including additional conditions in their antecedents, then
they don’t come out as plain falsehoods. On the other hand, it is not clear
what the truth conditions of such laws would be.
Schiffer (1991) argues that there are two main philosophical
problems associated with cp laws:
1. Do statements that include cp clauses express definite
propositions?
2. If they do express propositions, can those propositions be laws?
It is important to note that the problem of cp laws is the problem of
whether cp can occur as a proper part of any law statement. Thus, the
issue is not whether we can replace cp clauses with some specific
conditions and get a law statement but the issue is whether we can have a
law where cp is a proper part of the law statement.
The opponents of cp laws reason as follows: sentences that include
cp clauses either express definite propositions or they don’t. If these
sentences express any proposition at all, these propositions are mere
tautologies. In such cases, ‘ceteris paribus if A then B’ means ‘if A then
B unless not.” They think that laws are empirical; therefore, tautologies
aren’t even candidates for laws. On the other hand, if ‘ceteris paribus’ is
interpreted in a way that ‘ceteris paribus if A then B’ doesn’t come out as
a mere tautology, then the sentence does not express any definite
proposition at all—i.e., ‘unless C, D, E, etc., if A then B’ does not express
a definite proposition due to the vagueness of “etc”. Hence, “ceteris
paribus if A, then B” can’t be a law. Therefore, whether the sentences
that include cp clauses express definite propositions or not, such
sentences can’t express laws.
The trick for the friends of cp laws is to come up with an account
that will show that these statements express definite propositions and that
the propositions they express are not mere tautologies.

© Φ Philosophical Writings
 Mehmet Elgin 5

A Minimal Requirement for Ceteris Paribus Laws

There is at least one minimal constraint on the truth conditions of
ceteris paribus laws and it is this: if “ceteris paribus if A then B” is a law
then “ceteris paribus if A then B” and “ceteris paribus if A then not B”
should not both be true. Why should this condition be necessary for cp
laws?
It is commonly agreed that laws support counterfactuals. If the
statement “cp if A then B” does not satisfy the minimal condition, then it
does not support counterfactuals. Thus, if “cp if A then B” does not
satisfy the minimal condition it cannot express a law statement. Suppose
“cp if A then B” fails to satisfy the minimal condition. Then, “cp if A
were the case then B would be the case” would not be true. For, if “cp if
A then B” does not satisfy the minimal condition then it is possible to
make “cp if A then B” and “cp if A then not B” both true. This means that
it is not the case that “cp if A were the case then B would be the case”.
Hence, if “cp if A then B” fails to satisfy the minimal condition, it also
fails to support counterfactuals.
Suppose that the minimal condition is not necessary for cp laws.
Then, it is possible that “cp if the match is scratched it will light” and “cp
if the match is scratched then it will not light” can both be true. For
example, this would be the case if the cp means there is a condition C
such that C and the antecedent of the conditional are sufficient for the
consequent of that conditional. For, in each case one can find such a
condition. For example, “if the match has been soaked in water over
night and the match is scratched, then it will not light” and “if the match
is dry, there is enough oxygen in the air, and the match is scratched, it
will light” can both be true. Suppose I want to explain why this particular
match lights when it is scratched. I then construct the following
explanation: 1. cp if the match is scratched it will light. 2. cp the match is
scratched. 3. Therefore, the match lighted. Initially, this explanation
looks okay. However, one can construct a similar kind of explanation
along the same way to reach a completely opposite conclusion—i.e., cp if
the match is scratched it will not light. 1. cp if the match is scratched it
will light. 2. cp the match is scratched. 3. Therefore, it will not light. If
one takes the cp clause as a proper part of these sentences, then the
usefulness of these sentences in explanation and prediction can be
questioned.
It may be argued that what counterfactuals laws support will
depend on what else is held fixed. So for example, if Newton’s laws are
© Φ Philosophical Writings
6 Special Sciences and Ceteris Paribus Laws

not held fixed, then the counterfactual “if there was an extra planet in the
solar system, it would describe an ellipse” would come out false. Then,
the point is that if what is held fixed varies from context to context then
even strict laws may violate the minimal condition, so the minimal
condition may not be necessary for cp laws after all (I owe this point to a
anonymous referee). The point, indeed, explains why cp laws that fail to
satisfy the minimal condition also fail to support counterfactuals. I think
the anonymous referee want to argue that since even strict laws would
violate the minimal condition, it should not be necessary for cp laws
either. However, strict laws would not fail to support counterfactuals.
The reason is this: when we formulate strict laws, say law of inertia, their
antecedent conditions don’t vary from context to context. For example,
we can formulate law of inertia and law of gravitation as follows: “if
there are no forces acting on the object, then…” and “if the gravitational
force is the only force acting on the system then…”. In these examples,
it is clearly specified which possible world we live in, but in the case of
cp laws this is not the case, and this is why they fail to support the
minimal condition. My point is this: there is a way of formulating strict
laws in a way that specifies exactly which possible world we live in and
this formulation would safe them from failing to support the minimal
condition, but it is impossible to do the same with cp laws.
Hausman (1992, 134-135) argues that the cp clause picks out
different things in different contexts. However, the minimal condition
entails that such sentences cannot be laws. For, if the cp clause picks out
different things in different contexts like “I”, then the minimal condition
should not be introduced as a necessary condition. I have offered
independent reasons why the minimal condition should be accepted as
being a necessary condition for any law (so in particular for ceteris
paribus laws). In any case, if the cp clause is like “I”, then there is a
question about whether indexical terms can appear in laws. It may be said
that “it” in “if there are no forces acting on the object, then it will
continue its motion with uniform velocity if it is in motion and if it is at
rest then it will remain at rest” is also an indexical term but this does not
prevent it from appearing in this law. However, when we symbolize this
sentence in quantifier logic, we symbolize ‘it’ in the consequent as ‘x’
that ranges over all objects, so ‘x’ that represents ‘it’ in the consequent of
this conditional occurs as a bound variable. Therefore, ‘it’ in the above
sentence does not really behave like an indexical term. Now consider the
following sentence: “if everyone attends, I will be surprised”. In this
example, the main connective is the conditional and ‘I’ in the consequent

© Φ Philosophical Writings
 Mehmet Elgin 7

is a constant not a variable. If the cp clause is like the latter kind, then its
appearance in law statements will be problematic since laws are
supposed to hold invariantly. The other problem is that referents of
indexical terms are determined, in part, by what the speaker intends to
refer to in using these terms, but this should not be the case with laws.

The Completion Account

An account of cp laws proposed by Fodor (1991); Hausman (1992,
133-151); and Pietroski and Rey (1995) is known as the completion
account. Many philosophers who write about cp laws (including some of
the proponents of cp laws) believe that the completion account fails. The
main criticism against this account is that it provides the truth conditions
for cp laws at the expense of vacuity (see for example Earman and
Roberts 1999; Schurz 2001; Woodward 2000; Earman, Roberts and
Smith 2002; Schurz 2002; Woodward 2002). The completion account in
its most general form can be stated as follows: If “ceteris paribus if A
then B” is a cp law then there is a condition C such that when C if A then
B. Schiffer (1991); Earman and Roberts (1999,); and Woodward (2002)
are quick to observe that if the system is deterministic then there will
always be some condition C such that C is by itself sufficient for B even
though C may have nothing to do with A. They also observe that if the
system is indeterministic then there is no reason to suppose that there is
such a condition C. However, the completion account does not stop at
this. Advocates have made specific proposals that they think would avoid
this problem.
Fodor (1991) requires that neither C nor A is by itself sufficient for
B. Pietroski and Rey (1995) require that there has to be some condition
C` such that C` explains why some A’s that are also C’s are not B’s and
C` explains some other independent facts as well. However, Earman,
Roberts and Smith (2002); Schurz (2001); and Woodward (2002) argue
that these modifications don’t save the completion account from
rendering cp laws almost vacuous. Let’s first formulate the completion
account:

“Ceteris Paribus if A then B” is a true law if and only if 1. there is a

condition C such that all A’s that are C’s are also B’s 2. Neither A nor C
is by itself sufficient for B 3. When A’s are not B’s then there is some
condition C` such that C` explains why A’s are not B’s and in addition
C` explains some other independent facts.

© Φ Philosophical Writings
8 Special Sciences and Ceteris Paribus Laws

Woodward (2002) argues that “all people living in Western Europe

speak Indo-European languages” satisfies conditions 1-3. The idea is that
neither being human nor living in Western Europe is by itself sufficient
to speak Indo-European languages but together they are. Clearly, though
there are exceptions to this. For example, Turkish people who live in
Germany don’t speak Indo-European languages. However, this can be
explained by saying that these people are immigrants from Turkey where
people speak Turkish that belongs to the Ural-Altaic language family and
this condition also explains many other independent facts. Similar
counter examples are also discussed in Earman and Roberts (1999, 453).
They claim that “ceteris paribus all spherical bodies conduct electricity”
satisfy the conditions the completion account requires. The point is that
the completion account doesn’t provide sufficient conditions for cp laws.
Earman and Roberts (1999); Earman, Roberts and Smith (2002);
Woodward (2000, 2002); and Schurz (2001, 2002) point out that the
completion account entails that cp laws are deterministic. Let’s now see
if this should be a reason to think that the completion account does not
provide necessary conditions for cp laws either. If we look at the
conditions 1-3 above, we see that either there is a condition C whose
presence together with A always leads to B or there is a C` whose
presence is sufficient for ~B. These results are proven in Schurz (2001).
However, it seems that there are genuinely probabilistic cp sentences. For
example, “ceteris paribus the house wins at blackjack in the course of an
evening” can’t be a strict universal statement even though we could agree
that there is no problem about cp sentences. For, even if other things are
equal it is still not determined that the house wins at blackjack. Thus, the
idea is that there is no completer C for this sentence such that adding it
would make it the case (strictly) that the house wins at blackjack in the
course of an evening. This criticism is not a decisive one since friends of
cp laws can say that cp laws are deterministic but this does not mean
there are no probabilistic laws in special sciences that are not cp laws.

Ceteris Paribus As A Disposition or Capacity

A dispositional or capacity account of ceteris paribus laws is the
view that most laws are about capacities and dispositions. Two most
famous proponents of this view are Peter Lipton and Nancy Cartwright.
Here is Lipton’s proposal as to how cp clauses should be analyzed:

What does it mean to say that a cp law attributes a stable disposition? It

means, for example, that to say that glass breaks when dropped, cp, is to

© Φ Philosophical Writings
 Mehmet Elgin 9

say that glass is fragile and that this feature is not readily lost. To say
that iron filings will arrange themselves around a bar magnet in a
specified pattern, cp, is to say that magnets exert a certain sort of force
on iron filings, a disposition magnets do not loose while remaining
magnets (Lipton 1999, 164).

At first this proposal looks promising. However, I argue that this

account fails to solve the real philosophical problem.
1. “Ceteris paribus if a glass is dropped it breaks” means “Glass is
fragile”.
2. “A glass is fragile” is understood to assert the following
conditional “if a glass were dropped, it would break.”
3. However, there are many counterexamples to “if it were dropped,
the glass would break”. This is the whole reason the proponents of
cp laws argue that such generalizations have to include cp clauses.
Otherwise, the given conditional cannot be a law.
4. Thus, in order for “if a glass were dropped, it would break” to
qualify as a law, this conditional should be rewritten as “ceteris
paribus if a glass were dropped it would break.”
This looks circular and Lipton is aware of this. However, he thinks that
the apparent circularity points to a very important fact. According to
Lipton, it shows that the problem of how to understand cp laws does not
apply only to the cases where it is not clear what we talk about but to
every dispositional attribution we make. According to Lipton, since we
use dispositional terms all the time, the problem about dispositional
attributes must be solved and that the dispositional approach is a move in
the right direction:

The extension of the complete antecedent is thus unfixed and often

empty, and when not empty a hodge-podge, not a natural kind, and so
not something the externalist mechanism of reference could determine.
The disposition, by contrast, present as it is even when the terms of the
imaginary antecedent are not met, does have non empty extension and,
in the case of dispositions that underlie cp laws, that extension will pick
out a natural kind. Here again, what is crucial is the difference between
the ‘binary’ occurent properties and the ‘tripartite’ dispositions which
may be present without displaying (Lipton 1999, 168).

There is no clearly worked out account of dispositions so it does

not help to solve the problem about cp laws. Furthermore, Lipton claims
that in the case of cp laws, underlying dispositions will pick out natural
kinds but this is a controversial thesis. Mondadori and Morton argue that
© Φ Philosophical Writings
10 Special Sciences and Ceteris Paribus Laws

modal claims can be objectively true even if there are no modal

properties:

Second, the objectivity of modal predications does not on our view

depend on the existence of modal properties. For each particular modal
predication is true and objective by virtue of the presence of certain
properties, facts, or processes. The modal properties were luxury that
we introduced in order to have something which stands to a modal
predicate as nonmodal property does to a nonmodal predicate. But they
do not have any ultimate explanatory power; it is not they but the
physical facts that underlie the particular true predications, that are the
ultimate parameters of modal, as of nonmodal, truth (Mondadori and
Morton 1976, 20).

Mondadori and Morton argue that to be objectivist about modal

properties we don’t have to postulate the existence of modal properties
since we can consistently say that propositions that include modal terms
are either true or false and that there are no modal properties. According
to Mondadori and Morton, what makes such propositions true or false is
not the existence of modal properties, but the actual physical facts that
these so-called modal properties supervene on, so to speak. The same
point applies to the dispositional properties. Hence, for dispositions to be
scientifically legitimate they don’t have to be natural kinds.
There is, however, even deeper problem with this approach. “A has
a disposition to bring about B” implies that “A can cause B”, but “cp if A
then B” does not imply that A can cause B. For example, “cp if the
barometer is low, it will rain” does not entail “the barometer can cause
the rain”. If we follow the suggestion above “cp if the barometer is low,
it will rain” should be understood as “the barometer has a disposition to
bring about rain”, which implies “the barometer can cause rain”.
Cartwright argues that what is essential to her account is that laws
describe capacities and for this reason their antecedents should include
qualifying conditions under which the lawful relation in question holds.
Cartwright writes:

Those of us raised in the joint shadow of the Vienna Circle and British
Empiricism were taught that these kinds of concepts [power or capacity
concepts] must not appear in science. I was puzzled about this from
early on since it seemed to me that many of the most important concepts
I learned in physics are power or capacity concepts, force being the
first, simple example (Cartwright 2002).

© Φ Philosophical Writings
 Mehmet Elgin 11

As I stated before, my complaint is not that dispositions or capacity

concepts have no place in science. Rather I argue that the real problems
concerning cp laws don’t magically go away once we replace cp clauses
with dispositions or capacity concepts.
We can ask the following question about Cartwright’s claim that
ideal laws describe capacities: what exactly does ‘capacity’ mean in “A
has a capacity C to bring about B”? One possible response is to say that
‘capacity’ is a primitive concept, so I should not ask for a further
analysis. However, this response is not satisfactory. To see this let’s look
at the following example: “Objects have capacities to induce
accelerations toward each other that is equal to the products of their
masses divided by the square of the distance between them” is not
exactly the same thing as “if there are no forces other than gravity, then
the total force between two objects is equal to the product of their masses
divided by the square of the distance between them.” In the latter, we
have specified under what conditions the capacity that is mentioned in
the previous one is exercised. It is the latter that we want, so ‘capacity’
cannot be interpreted as a primitive concept.
There are two other possible interpretations: The first one is to say
“A has a capacity C to bring about B” means "C increases the probability
of B in all causally homogeneous background conditions". If there is a
component force (f1) pointing East, can we say that the presence of the
force raises the probability that the object will move East in all
background contexts? No. For suppose that there is a set up with
following property: If (f1) is present there will be another force (f2) also
present pointed West. But if (f1) is absent there will be two other forces
present (f3) and (f4) pointed Northwest and Southwest. The second one is
to say “A has a capacity C to bring about B” means “given that an object
is A, Pr(B | C) = x” where x is invariant cross contextually. There are
two difficulties with this suggestion: 1. It is difficult to interpret
deterministic laws this way and 2. If one accepts the traditional
conception of multiple realization thesis, then one should not interpret “A
has a capacity C to bring about B” as meaning “Pr(B | C) = x” where x is
invariant cross contextually.
The nature of idealized laws, as Cartwright (1983) observes, is
such that many of the idealizations stated in the antecedents of these laws
are never true. For example, “if the gravity is the only force at work,
then…” or “if the population size is infinite, then…” states an ideal
condition that is never true. Hence, when the conditional is interpreted as
expressing a conditional probability, the probability of the proposition
© Φ Philosophical Writings
12 Special Sciences and Ceteris Paribus Laws

that we conditionalize on will be zero. However, this means that

probability of the conditional cannot be defined when the conditional
probability is analyzed as Pr(A & B)/Pr(A). I conclude that the usual
(Kolmogorov) understanding of probability can’t be used in this case.
However, there are reasons to think that the standard understanding of
conditional probability has to be revised (See Hajek 2001). Hajek’s
solution to the problem about conditional probabilities is to take
conditional probabilities as primitive and unconditional probabilities as
derivatives. However, this solution does not seem to be adequate for the
problem at hand. We started out by saying that “cp if A then B” means
“Pr(B | A) = x where x is cross contextually invariant.” However, given
the problem about zero probabilities, we are forced to say that “Pr(B | A)
= x” is primitive.
It may be said that while I claim that “An object A has a capacity C
to bring about B” means “given that an object A, Pr(B/C), in the case of
strict laws I am conditionalizing on A not on C. This is correct but there
is a reason why the latter cannot be done. To have a capacity to achieve
certain things never means it is guaranteed that the thing in question will
exercise the capacity in question. To say that all glasses are breakable is
not to say that all glasses are guaranteed to do so. What this means is that
in the case of strict laws when we conditionalize on C, x value will not be
equal to 1, which is to say that we turned a strict law into a probabilistic
law. Let’s look at the law of gravitation. What we want to do is that we
formulate this law in such a way that the law will be strict, i.e.,
probability value x will be 1. “Objects have capacities to induce
accelerations toward each other that is equal to the products of their
masses divided by the square of the distance between them”. We have to
say that given objects’ capacities to induce accelerations toward each
other, probability that the value of induced acceleration toward each
other is equal to the products of their masses divided by the square of the
distance between them is 1. However, this is not correct at all. For if
there are different forces acting on the system the value of the
acceleration that objects induce toward each other may not be equal to
the products of their masses divided by the square of the distance
between them. Hence, again I conclude that strict laws cannot be
interpreted in the framework suggested above.
Let’s now turn to the second problem. Suppose Pr(B | M) = x,
where M is a mental state and B is a behavior and x is a probability value.
If Pr(B | M) = x is a law then x must be time translationally invariant.
However, the fact that mental states are multiply realized (understood in

© Φ Philosophical Writings
 Mehmet Elgin 13

the traditional sense) makes it the case that x will not be time
translationally invariant (Sober 1999). Let’s suppose that there are two
physical states that realize M (this is just to keep things simple, the same
argument will apply to the cases where M is realized by more than two
states); then, Pr(B | M) = Pr(B | M&P1)Pr(P1 | M) + Pr(B | M&P2)Pr(P2
| M). If Pr(B | M& Pi) Pr(B | Pi) (which Sober says captures the idea
that physics is causally complete), then Pr(B | M) = Pr(B | P1)Pr(P1 | M)
+ Pr(B | P2)Pr(P2 | M). It isn’t plausible to think that Pr(P1 | M) or Pr(P2
| M) will be the same at all times since individuals with M at one time
might mostly have P1 while at other times they might mostly have
P2. Given that these probabilities change values through time, there are
only two ways that Pr(B | M) will be time translationally invariant. One
is that Pr(B | P1) = Pr(B | P2). However, it isn’t plausible to think that
this exact equality obtains. For example, let B = S will go to the movies
tonight and let M = S believes this afternoon that a movie is playing and
wants to go. If P1 and P2 are two physical realizations of that
belief/desire pair, then Pr(B | P1) won’t be the same as Pr(B | P2) since
P1 might be a physical state that would make the behavior quite unlikely
(because it also makes a heart attack probable) while P2 might be some
other physical state that would make the behavior likely. On the other
hand, if Pr(B | P1) and Pr(B | P2) differ in value, then for Pr(B | M) to be
invariant, they must change in value in such a way that their changes and
those of Pr(P1 | M) and Pr(P2 | M) are all “coordinated” so that Pr(B | M)
remains constant through time. This is even more implausible. Thus,
given these probability relations and the traditional understanding of the
multiple realization thesis, Pr(B | M) will not be time translationally
invariant.

A Case Against Cp Laws

Given the minimum condition I have introduced before, the
trivialization result found in Earman and Roberts 1999; Schurz 2001;
Woodward 2000; Earman, Roberts and Smith 2002; Schurz 2002;
Woodward 2002 is unavoidable.
If there are cp laws distinct from other kind of laws, then there is a
category of laws that is called ceteris paribus. Any law that falls under
this category does so in virtue of the fact that it shares something in
common with all the other laws that also fall under this category. This
means that ceteris paribus picks out a unique property and ceteris
paribus laws are so-called because they have that property. However, it is

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14 Special Sciences and Ceteris Paribus Laws

highly dubious that there is a unique property that ceteris paribus in all
cp claims picks out. It should be clear that the ceteris paribus clause
refers to different things when the contents of two statements that employ
the cp clause are different. Consider, for example, “ceteris paribus
smoking causes lung cancer” and “ceteris paribus human behaviors are
goal oriented”. Cp refers to different things in these two examples. It is
difficult to reconcile the minimality condition and the fact that the cp
refers to different things in different contexts. The former requires more
constraints on the cp clause while the latter requires less.
Lipton, and Cartwright try to find a unique property that governs
the concept of ceteris paribus in all contexts. They suggest that ceteris
paribus in “cp if A then B” refers to the ideal conditions under which the
lawful relation between A and B holds. However, there are no uniquely
defined conditions that are ideal. Since ideal conditions will vary in
different sciences, ‘ideal conditions’ will pick out different properties in
different sciences. This means we are back to the problem discussed in
the previous paragraph.
Either the accounts of cp laws satisfy the minimum condition or
they don’t. When they satisfy this condition the trivialization result
follows. When they don’t satisfy this condition, it is dubious that such
statements be laws (for reasons discussed in section 2). Consequently,
given the minimum condition and the nature of cp statements, it is highly
dubious that we will ever find cp laws.
I can imagine certain people protesting by saying that one has to
start somewhere. Unlike physics, other special sciences are still in the
process of development. So, it may be that physicists have a pretty good
idea how to state ideal circumstances but scientists in other special
sciences are still trying to figure out how to state ideal circumstances and
laws that apply in such circumstances. And, so-called cp laws are perhaps
the predecessors of real laws in these sciences. Earman, Roberts and
Smith (2002) discuss this possibility. Doesn’t it make sense to use cp as a
placeholder in those generalizations even though we are not sure how to
describe the ideal circumstances in which they apply? This may be
methodological advice. However, the problem with cp laws is not
whether cp is useful in discovering real laws, but whether there are cp
laws. Thus, even if it turns out that it is a good strategy to use cp as a
placeholder in generalizations that may turn out to be laws, this does not
answer the question of whether there are cp laws. This may be an
argument why one needs it for epistemic reasons, but it does not say

© Φ Philosophical Writings
 Mehmet Elgin 15

anything about whether there are laws where cp is itself a part of the law
statements.1

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1
I thank Elliott Sober for reading earlier drafts of this paper. I also thank Ellery Eells,
Berent Enç and Dan Hausman for reading the very early draft of this paper.
© Φ Philosophical Writings
 16 Special Sciences and Ceteris Paribus Laws

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Mehmet Elgin
Muğla Üniversitesi
Felsefe Bölümü
Kötekli/Muğla
Turkey
melgin@mu.edu.tr

© Φ Philosophical Writings

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