You are on page 1of 19
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 91 and Eastern Enrope, The following readings explore the hurdles to creating regional human rights ‘ystems in the Asia-Pacific region. Do the authors agree in their assessments of the problems and prospects for the region? Ton Ginsburg, Eastphalia as the Perfection of Westphalia, 17 IN. J. Gonat Les. Stun, 27, 28, 30-38, 42-44 (2010) Universalism has driven the great development of the human rights movement and the establishment of an infrastructure of global institutions. Global ‘constitutfonalism has inspired increasingly numerous attempts to reach into policy realms previously considered within the domestic jurisdiction of a state and, in the European case, a shift to supermajority rather than unanimity as a basis of intergovernmental decision-making, But Asian countries have” not been leaders in either of these movements, Instead, they have reacted cautiously and have emphasized the traditional concerns of sovereignty and noninterference. There is little sign that this approach will change radically, even as economic and political power continues to shift to the proverbial East, ‘The greatest concepeual innovation of Asian states in international law in the past several decades has been a regressive one, namely the idea that “Asian values” offered an alternative to liberal universalism. In reaction to criticism from human rights advocates, Asian states launched a countervailing discourse, most notably in the Bangkok Declaration of 1993, Asians, we were told, value order over freedom, the group over the individual, and economic development over political liberties. Ic is difficult to evaluate the veracity ofthese claims, made as they typically were by representatives of illiberal governments, who evoked Orientalist imagery of complacent populations comfortable with hierarchy. Certainly there is room to acknowledge competing traditions of thinking about rights and their analogues in Asia. ‘Whether one believes thar the governments advancing Asian values are acting in good faith as representatives oftheir populations ie is clear that a corollary ofthe approach is to emphasize transnational dialogues and negotiations on rights, with implementation and enforcement left strictly to the domestic level. The debate provides clues as to what an international order dominated or heavily influenced by Asian governments would look like: oriented toward economic growth and development, socially conservative, and Politically tolerant of domestic repression of the individual in the name of the public good, Beyond this, Asian nations have resisted external attempts to internationalize treatment of their own populations. For example, China treats any criticism of its behavior in Tibet ot Xinjiang as international meddling, In the official Chinese view, human rights are well and good, bur they should not lead to external critique of macters within China’ domestic jurisdiction, As discussed below, the members of ASEAN have also been fairly consistent on their insistence on no external interference into matters reserved for domestic jurisdiction. In short, Asian countries do not seem to be major proponents of global governance that undermines national sovereignty, particularly not in spheres related to human rights. Instead, the emphasis is on sovereign prerogatives and noninterference. The Asian position makes sense given structural and historical dynamics in the region and reflects suspicion of the motives of Western critics of Asian practices. One can see in this emphasis a post-colonial sensibility. In an environment of decolonization, new states 9 REGIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS <"in Asia focused their attention on the prerogatives of state-building, The Asian position was decisively articulated by India, China, and Burma in 1954 under the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: (1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual nonaggtession, (3) mutual noninterference in internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence. ‘These principles were reiterated at the Bandung Summit on ‘Afto-Asian Solidarity in 1955, an important forerunner of the Non-Aligned Movement. In turn, these principles provided inspiration for the founding documents of the regional communities in South and Southeast Asia. But the principles are essentially Westphalian in character. Inshort, just as the Western powers turned toward global institutionsand integration, nascent Asian countries and powers were asserting their sovereigney and the importance of noninterference in domestic matters. ...As countries get richer, cheir citizens tend to demand more democratic governance and human rights. The experiences of the so-called Asian Tigers provide some evidence in this regatd, Taiwan, Korea, and Indonesia all democratized after extended periods of economic growth under an authoritarian regime. South Korea now has a vigorous human rights commission, and the nascent ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights might end up becoming an active body, despite low expectations. Some scholars have emphasized Asia's slow but steady shift toward global trends. The current President of the ICJ, Hisashi Owada, has argued that the Asian nations are moving slowly and steadily coward a universal vision of the rule of law in international affairs. Certainly Asia's participation in a variety of global fora and leadership in certain international institutions right suggest greater globalism. This globalist curn might in time affect the attieudes of Asian populgtions, which would then demand further internationalization by their leaders. Some visions of the international order emphasize how small steps can lead, and indeed do lead, coward greater cooperation, Early scholars of the EU, such as Emst Haas, focused on how cooperation in relatively uncontroversial areas led to “spillovers” that encouraged further and further integration over time, States create institutions that then change the preferences of the member states. In some approaches, this pattern follows a logic of path-dependency, so that the costs of further integration decline with each shift coward cooperation. This paradigm would predict greater institutionalization of ASEAN, and perhaps even a broader regional organization in the future. Whether one buys this teleological vision, itis at least a theoretical, possibility that would undermine the vision of Eastphalia described above. Another vision drawn from the human rights literature emphasizes the acculturation of states to norms associated with institutions. Institutions provide fora in which state elites can be persuaded of the mezits of alternative approaches. Elites can also become “acculturated” to the importance of human rights, leading to internalization at the state level, Either of these paradigms suggests that Eastphalia would look different from Westphalia and more similar to the universalist vision associated with global constitutionalism. The key factor here involves the shift in preferences among populations and their leaders toward a global convergence. In short, Eastphalia is hardly inevitable. Obstacles remain with regard to the continued trajectory of China, and, although in any projection Asia will remain a very important region; it is likely to be one among many, and unlikely as a matter of both inclination and power to REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS project its classical Westphalian vision onto other players in the international scene. Even if East Asia emerges as the single dominant region of the world, a convergence in preferences may also occur such that Eastphalia reflects current European trends toward global constitutionalism. Sou Chiam, Asia’ Experience in the Quest for a Regional Human Rights Mechanism, 40 Vicrorta U, WeLLincTo L. Rev, 127 (2009) Sifce the 1960s there havé been various initiatives by different groups to set up regional and sub-regional mechanisms in Asia. These initiatives have been driven mainly by human rights bodies of the United Nations, This article will give a brief history of UN initiatives to set up a regional human rights mechanism, discuss four main areas where positive progress is being made, four main factors that have hindered progress and conclude with what I see as the way ahead. A The 1960s and 1970s In the 1960s a study group was set up by the UN Commission on Human Rights (“the Commission”) to look into the establishment of regional human rights commissions in all patts of the world. In 1968 the Commission requested the UN Secretary General to organize regional seminars in those regions where there were no regional human rights commissions with a view to discussing their establishment. The UN General Assembly began to issue resolutions on regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights in the 1970s. One such resolution 32/127(1977) included this appeal: ‘ Appeals to states in areas where regional arrangements in the field of human rights do not yet exist to consider agreements with a view to the establishment within their respective regions of suitable regional machinery for the promotion and protection of human rights. D Jakarta Workshop 1993 ‘The second UN Workshop for the Asia Pacific Region on Human Rights Issues was held in Jakarta, Indonesia, It was attended by representatives of 28 states from the Asia Pacific region. The sessions on regional arrangements covered regional machinery and intra-regional co-operation, including bilateral exchange of information and practical assistance. The sessions tried to identify ways in which obstacles to the establishment of a regional human rights mechanism for the promotion and protection of human rights could be overcome. Key obstacles included: (1) Asia and the Pacific are not homogeneous areas. There were pleas to be realistic and that plans for the establishment ofa regional human rights mechanism should take into account the geographical complexity and vastness of the states that formed the regions; (2) The cultural diversity, different historical backgrounds and levels of political stability, economic prosperity and social development; (3) The lack of any unifying tradition; and (4) The absence of high levels of mutual understanding between governments. ‘The Chairman's concluding remarks noted progress made at the sub-regional level and called fora “step by step” strategy. A first step could be the setting up of sub-regional machinery for 3 94 REGIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS human rights information dissemination, to be followed by establishing an “Asia Forum” to enhance regional exchange of ideas aimed at promoting human rights. He suggested that the Forum might be used later to design machinery at the sub-regional or regional level for the promotion and protection of human rights. E World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna 1993 “This was the first global conference to review the subject of human rights in the contemporary world. It produced the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, which were adopted by 171 seates, Paragraph 37 states: Regional arrangements play a fundamental role in promoting and protecting human rights. They should reinforce universal human rights standards, as contained in international instruments and their protection... The World Conference reiterates the need to consider the possibility of establishing regional and sub regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights where they do not already exist. Paragraph 76 further states “[tJhe World Conference recommends that more resources be made available for the strengthening or the establishment of regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights...” F Seoul Workshop 1994 Representatives from 29 states from the Asia Pacific region participated in this workshop held in Seoul, South Korea. ‘The Chairman's concluding remarks summed up participants’ views as follows: (1) Regional co-operation should begin at sub regional initiatives; (2) There should be an annual UN Forum for the Asia and Pacific Region on Human Rights Issues as this will allow states in the region to benefit from initiatives taken atsubregional and national level; (3) The key to ehhancing the human tights environment in Asia and the Pacific lies in the strengthening of implementation at the national level; and (4) Development of aregional arrangement should be through a “building blocks” approach as this recognises that there are different “speeds” in the region, which required an evolutionary model. ‘The workshop noted the diverse cultural, historical and political backgrounds and the different levels of development in the region, It also noted that mutual respect among Asian and Pacificstates would be the foundation to provide the opportunity for regional co-operation in human tights. * [Annual workshopshave been held continuously since 1996. Eds] ~ POSITIVE PROGRESS IN FOUR MAIN AREAS A Sub-Regional Initiatives In Asia, sub-regional inter-governmental organisations such as ASEAN, SAARC and the Arab League were not specifically set up to promote and protect human rights but are now making progress in that direction. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS. B National Human Rights Institutions and the APF [Asia Pacific Forum] NHRysare human rights organizations that have been established by national governments to promote and protect human rights. The first NHRIs were established in the 1970s. In 1991, a meeting of the Human Rights Commission in Paris agreed on acomprehensive set of principles to guide the operations of NHRIs in order to be effective. The “Principles Relating to the Status and Functions of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights” (Paris Principles) set out the minimum standards required to be an effective NHRI. ‘The Paris Principles require that an effective NHRI has various characteristics, including: (1)A cleatly defined and broad based mandate, based on universal human rights standards; : (2) Independence guaranteed by legislation or the constitution; (3) Autonomy from government; (4) Pluralism, including membership that broadly reflects the society (5) Adequate powers of investigation into human rights breaches; and (6) Sufficient resources, . . ‘The Paris Principles form the basis for accreditation at the international level by the International Coordinating Committee (ICC). APF and its network of NHRIs is considered by Professor Vitit Muntarbhorn to be “the closest that the Asia-Pacific region has come to a regional arrangement or machinery for the promotion and protection of humén rights.” NHRis have a range of responsibilities. One of the most important is to receive compldints of unlawful discrimination or human rights abuses that breach national laws. NHRIs also raise community awareness and understanding of human rights, review national laws to ensurethat they are consistent with international human rights standards and recommend law changes. Ar the New Zealand Human Rights Commission, one of my duties was to write submissions to the Parliamentary Select Committees on proposed legislation to ensure that international human rights standards were met. APF was formed in 1996 and currently the full members include NHRIs from Afghanistan, Australia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Philippines, Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Timor Leste. The Fiji Human Rights Commission was a full member until it resigned in 2007. APF prévides technical assistance to strengthen existing NHR¢s; gives assistance to governments and NGOs to help with the establishment of NHRIs and helps to develop regional co-operation on human rights. ‘The Advisory Council of Jurists (ACJ) was set up by the APF in 1998 to advise the APF on the interpretation and application of international human rights law. The ACJ is made up of eminent jurists from member states who consider references made to it by the APE. The ACJ has now developed a substantial body of regional jurisprudence on a wide range of human rights issues that include torture, trafficking, terrorism and the right to education. I had the privilege of supporting the AC] in its inaugural session for the determination of the references on “Child Pornography and the Internet” and “The Death Penalty.” The ACJ can be regarded as a “stepping stone” body, working towards the formation of a[n] Asia Pacific Human Rights Court. APF and its NHRIs play a crucial role in human rights capacity building in the Asia Pacific region and are vital stakeholders to the formation of any mechanism for the region. 9s ol ee 96 REGIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS FACTORS THAT HAVE HINDERED PROGRESS “There have been many factors that have hindered progress in the quest for a hiantan rights mechanism in Asia. ‘These have included political issues such as the lack of political will and intergovernmental co-operation, cultural issues such as different value systems and languages, legal issues such as inadequtate ratification of human rights creaties and staté sovereignty and. ‘economic issues such as the vast economic disparity and development among Asian states. A Vastness and Diversity | “The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, in her opening speech at the 13th UN ‘Workshop in Beijing provided the following grim statistics for the creation of human rights framework to protect and promote human rights in the Asia Pacific region: ‘There are 52 countries in this vast region. Yet there are only fifteen national institutions or the like; only six national human rights action plans; the tight to development remains elusive as does the ability of people in the region to claim their most basic economic and social rights—to water, to health, to housing, and so on. Only three of the 52 have ratified all seven core human rights treaties. ... I mention these facts simply to highlight the enormity of the challenge before us. I fully appreciate the dificulties in reaching consensus with regard to the establishment of a human rights mechanism to cover 2 region whose vastness is only matched by its diversity. ‘As far back as the 1990 Manila Workshop, participants identified as a major obstacle the face that Asia and the Pacific is not a homogenous area and that plans to establish a regional human rights mechanism will have to take into account the geographical complexity, diversity and ‘vastness of the states in the region, as well as their different: historical and cultural backgrounds and levels of political stability, economic prosperity and social development. In spite of the vastness and diversity of Asia, states can work together to establish a regional human rights mechanism, The 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action states that: ‘While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, culeural and religiousbackgrounds mustbe bornein mind, itis the duty ofstates regardless __ of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. B Inadequate Ratification of Human Rights Treaties Many Asian states have not yet ratified the principal human rights treatiés such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination ‘Against Women, Corfiention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading ‘Treatment or Punishment or the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Due to the lack of ratification, Asian states’ commitment to protect and promote human rights to agteed international standards as set out in the UN Human Rights ereaties is questionable, The Chinese Government argues that the right to subsistence is che most important of all human rights. A number of Asian states have used the argument that civil REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS and political rights disrupe political stability and hinder economic development. It would be difficult to set up a regional human rights mechanism in Asia when states are not agreeable to common standard, 7 ‘There has been a consistent lack of political will on behalf of many of the political leaders in Asia to ratify UN human rights treaties. To set up a workable regional mechanism for human rights in Asia will require all states in the region to agree to abide by a set of common human rights standards. Those political leaders who are unwilling to tolerate human rights and are determined to continue to build oppressive regimes in Asia where basic human rights are subordinated to other goals of the state will hinder the quest for a human rights mechanism for Asia. ‘The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights urged states to incorporate the standards ‘contained in international human rights instruments into domestic legislation and to work towards the goal of universal ratification of international human rights treaties and protocols adopted within the framework of the UN system. C The “Asian Values” Debate ‘The various debates on “Asian values” and human rights have affected the quest to build human rights mechanism in Asia. Western notions of human rights are seen as excessively individualistic, as opposed to the emphasis on the family in Asian societies, and insufficiently supportive of religion and culture. Some Asian leaders such as Dr Mahathir‘Mohammed, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, regarded the West as “morally decadent because 6f the growth ofgay rights and relative success of the women's movement.” Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore asserted that civil and political rights could hinder economic growth and development. At the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, government officials from Singapore, China and other Asian countries entered into a tug of words with their American and European counterparts on the universality, inseparability and interdependence of civil and political tights and economic, social and cultural rights. Those states were critical of the international standards of human rights which they argued were Western standards. Lin Huaqui, the head ofthe Chinese delegation stated: ‘The concept of human rights is a product of historical development. Iris closely associated with specific social, political and economic conditions and the specific history, culture and values of a particular country. Different historical development stages have different human rights requirements. Countries at different development stages or with different historical traditions and cultural backgrounds also have different understanding and practice of human rights. Part ofthe “Asian values” debate is based on cultural relativism versus universalism, Advocates of “Asian values” argue that international human rights norms are deeply imbedded in ‘Western political tradition and therefore do not fit other cultures and societies. Some argue that che global human rights regime is largely commensurate with the Western cultural account, with its emphasis on such principles, policies and practices as individualism, liberal democracy and market capitalism and that non-Western states are “at a disadvantage in trying to promote and protect their distinctive cultural ideas by resisting the advance of ‘Western culture.” 97 REGIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS On the other hand, Kim Dae Jung, a former President of South Korea and the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate has stated that: : Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew has suggested that the “Western concepts” of democracy and human rights will not work in Asia. This is false: Asia has its own venerable traditions of democracy, the rule of law, and respect for the people. Asia destiny is to improve ‘Western concepts, not ignore them, . ‘A number of Asian human rights practitioners have argued that Asian governments which see international human rights standards as a Western construct and a form of Western. imperialism do so in order to justify their poor records in the protection of human rights, especially civil and political rights. ‘The Asian Human Rights Charter rejects “Asian values” and cultural relativism and affirms the universality and indivisibility of human rights. Ir states “[w]e believe that rights are universal, every person being entitled to them by virtue of being a human being.” Human rights standards as defined in various UN conventions are universal in character and since ‘uman sights derive from the dignicy and worth inherent in the human person, they apply to all people regardless of culcure or traditions. D State Sovereignty “The concept of state sovereignty is described as “supreme authority: to be sovereign is to be subject to no higher authority” Many Asian governments have insisted that human rights are within the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state. They insist that states can treat their citizens within their territory in any way they wish as a prerogative of state sovereignty. Any regional or international human rights mechanism to adjudicate or investigate human rights violations within a state may be viewed as a threat to state sovereignty. Using the traditional concept of state sovereignty, the Chinese Government ‘has maintained that human rights belong co its domestic jurisdiction as a sovereign state and it has a policy of noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states. Many Asian states use the sovereignty argument to reflect criticisms of their own poor human rights records. They use the principle of noninterference when they take no action against neighbouring Asian states which abuse Jhuman rights. Such states are therefore reluctant to support the establishment of any regional ‘human rights mechanism that could expose them to complaints of human tights violations filed by their citizens, NGOs, and other states in the region. Some states are not willing to be subjected to a higher authority like a regional human rights court. Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General, has argued that human rights should not be abridged in the name of state sovereignty. He stated: “There is no one set of European rights, and another of African rights, Human rights assert the dignity 6f each and every individual human being, and the inviolability of the individual’ rights. They belong inherently to each person, each individual and are not conferred by, or subject to, any governmental authority. There is no one law for one continent, and one for another. And there should be only one single standard—a universal standard—for judging human rights violations. THE WAY AHEAD “The quest for a regional human rights mechanism in Asia is a continuing one, The world is getting more interdependent due to the globalisation of the world economy. What happens REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 99 in one state affects other states due to the interdependence of the world in which we live in. ‘There is rapid progress in mass communication and internet technologies. State boundaries are no longer able to continue to keep out the flow of information and influence public opinion, Governments have become less the masters of what occurs even within their physical boundaries, even though they claim state sovereignty. International human rights treaties represent moral interdependence. Internationally recognised human rights standards are applicable irrespective of political, economic or cultural diversity. Human rights standards are comprehensive as they encompass economic, social and cultural rights and also civil and political rights. The efforts to promote and protect human rights will need regional and international co-operation because cooperative efforts are more efficient than separate ones in this increasingly interdependent world, For further reading, see AMARTYA SEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ASIAN VALUES (1997); DANIEL Bet, Bevonp Liberal Democracy 52-83 (2006); THE EasT ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR Human Riots 27-102 (Joanne Bauer & Daniel Bell eds., 1999); Elizabeth J. Perry, Chinese Conceptions of Rights: From Mencius to Mao—and Now, 6 Persp. ON Pot. 37 (2008); Sienho Yee, The Role of Law in the Formation of Regional Perspectives in Human Rights and Regional Systems in the Protection of Human Rights: The European and Asian Models as Itustrations, 8 StnG. YB. Inr't L. 157, 162-63 (2004); HipeTosHt HASHIMOTO, THE PROSPECTS FOR A REGIONAL Human RiGHTs MECHANISM IN East Asta (2004); HUMAN RIGHTS AND ASIAN VALUES: ConrEsTING NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS IN Asia (Michael Jacobsen & Ole Bruun eds, 2000); James TANG, HuMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE ASIA PActFIC (1995); PAUL CLose & Davip ASKEW, Asta PACIFIC AND Human RicHTs: A GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE (2004). 1.5.1 The League of Arab States “The League of Arab States, generally referred to as the Arab League, was formed in Cairo with the adoption of the Pact or Charter of the League on March 1945. There are six original members: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Yemen joined two months later. The Arab League currently has twenty-ewo members and four observers. According to its Charter, the main goal of the league is co “draw closer the relations between member States and co-ordinate col- laboration between them, to’safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.” The Charter does not mention human rights, but it should be noted thag the organization was formed and its founding agreement con- cluded before the UN Charter put promotion and protection of human rights on the international agenda. Over time, the League initiated and expanded its concérn with human sights. On September 12, 1966, the Council of the League of Arab States adopted its first resolution on human tights, calling for the establishment of a steering committee to elaborate a'program for the celebration of Human Rights Year in 1968. The Committee recommended the establishment of a permanent Arab Committee on Human Rights and the convening of an Arab Conference on Human Rights. The latter was held in December 1968 in Beirut. See Mohamed Noman Galal, The Arab Draft Charter for Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: EGYPT AND THE ARAB WORLD 37 (1994). In 1968, the Council of the League created the Arabic Commission of Human Rights. The main 100 REGIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS missions of the Commission are promoting and providing information about ‘human rights. It has no power to adopt resolutions against Arab states that violate human rights, A larger organization of all Islamic states, the Islamic Conference, endorsed human rights in its 1972. Charter, reaffirming the commitment of Islamic states to the UN Charter and to fundamen- tal human rights. On August 5, 1990, a meeting of foreign ministers of the Conference member states adopted the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. For an English translation of the Declaration, see World Conference on Human Rts., Contribution of the Organization of the Islamie Conference, UN. Doc. A/CONE157/PC/62/Add.18, at 2 (1993). For a critique of the Declaration, see Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal versus Islamic Human Rights: Clash of Cultures ora Clash with a Construct?, 15 Mrcn. J. Int’ L. 307 (1994). For background on the Islamic Conference, see Hassan Mornuppin, THE CHARTER OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND’ LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AMONG ITS MEMBER States (1987). For early background on the League and its human rights activities, see Stephen Marks, La commision permanente arabe des droits de Ubomme, 3 Rev. Drorr Dz LHomme 101 (1970). “The League of Arab States approved an Arab Charter on Human Rights on September 15, 1994, building on earlier texts adopted by regional nongovernmental and intergovernmental organiza- tions, The Charter required acceptance by seven states before entering into force. Many Arab and international NGOs criticized the 1994 Charter for falling below international standards for hhuman rights, and the treaty never entered into force. The Council of the ‘Arab League subse- quently adopted Resolutions 6184 of March 10, 2002, and 6243 of September 5, 2002, calling for the revision of the Arab Charter. On March 24, 2003, the Council of the Arab League, through Resolution 6032-129, encour- aged the Permanent Arab Commission on Human Rights to “modernize” the Arab Charter on Human Rights. Amr Musa, Secretary General of the League, explained that the term “modern- ization” should be understood as the process to bring Charter provisions into compliance with, international standards for human rights. In May 2004 the League adopted arevised version of the ‘Arab Charter on Human Rights, which entered into force on March 15, 2008, after its acceptance by seven states: Algeria, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Libya, Palestine, and Syria, Yemen and Qatar subsequently ratified the Charter. Mervat Rishmawi, The Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights: A Step Forwardi, 5 Hum. Rrs. L. Rev. 361 (2005) In 2003 the Council instructed the Arab Standing’ Committee on Human Rights to “modernize the Arab Charter on Human Rights...” The Committee produced an initial version that was largely inconsistent with international human rights standards. The Arab League, under pressure from NGOs and the [UN] Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) agreed to allow independent experts to prepare a new draft The OHCHR reached a bilateral agreement with the Arab League to assemble a group «of “independent Arab experts” as a Committee of Experts to carry out the task. All of the Committee's members, consisting of two women and three men from Algeria, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia, were drawn from the United Nations human rights treaty bodies. “The Committee... produced a draft in January 2004 for consideration by the Council. Ir was adopted by the Council without amendment and passed to the Summit of the League in May 2004 for consideration, which also adopted it without amendment. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS [T]he version which was finally adopted in May 2004 is a major step forward from the 1994 version, It also marks a movement forward in developing governmental discourse ‘on human rights in the region which will play a significant role in “bringing human rights home.” ...By borrowing considerably from language contained in various international human rights treaties, the Charter includes many provisions that are largely consistent with the standards found in them. The instrument also reflects, to a certain dégree, developments in international human rights jurisprudence. For example, it borrows from the expanded list of non-derogable rights developed in the Human Rights Committee's General Comment on Article 4 of the {International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)].... The lack of a complaints mechanism as established in each of the other regional systems is a major constraint on guaranteeing effective access to justice for victims, especially as most Arab countries have yet to sign up to the UN complaints systems, although a number of them are subject to the complaints mechanism of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, .+-Itshould be noted that the Islamic religion is the only faith specifically mentioned in the Charter, with other religions merely meriting a general reference... «++ The Charter attempts to create a new formula to address the historic and fundamental question of whether Islamic principles can be compatible with the universality of human fights. Inamajor step forward, the Charter does not refer to cultural, religious or other relativism, In its Preamble, it refers, on one hand, directly to international standards including those‘in the UN Chatter, the UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR and, on the other, to adocument that is seen as 2 major compromise on human rights: the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 1990, The Cairo Declaration, which is clearly grounded in Islam, stating in Article 20 that “Islam is the religion of grue unspoiled nature” has been widely criticized as a challenge to many aspects of human rights. For example, by permitting bodily harm to be inflicted for 4 Shari‘ah prescribed reason it opens the door to torture, and cruel, inhuman or degrading Punishment as well as che death penalty. Ir also includes provisioris which undermine the rights and autonomy of women... Regrettably, this conservatism of the Caico Declaration is aceually reflected in some of the substantive provisions of the revised Charter [see eg., Articles 8 and 26]. ‘This approach is even more perplexing when one notes that Arab States do nothaveauniform position on some of these issues, something which is reflected in the variance of ratification of international human rights treaties by these States.... It is disappointing that the Charter adopted the lowest common denominator rather than the most progressive interpretation. Ona positive note, some of the Charter’s language is directed towards universalism rather than relativism, The revised first Article declares that the aim of the Charter is “[tJo place human tights at the centre of the key national concerns of the Arab States” and that there is a need “[eJoentrench the principle that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated” Whilst to the outsider versed in human rights discourse these might seem obvious points this is not necessarily the case among Arab Sates who have traditionally and systematically sought to challenge the universality of human tights..... 102 REGIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS “The Charter retains some of the strong language related’ to Zionism from its previous 1994 incarnation. This insistence on equating Zionism co racism echoes General Assembly Resolution 3379 (XXX)...[hlowever, this determination was revoked by the General Assembly in 1991. ‘Whilst many provisions of the Charter are largely consistent with international standards, it suffers from two significant problems, Firstly; some of its key provisions are actually at variance with those standards. Secondly, there are many important rights and freedoms recognized in international human rights law that are missing from the Charter. This is despite the general provision in Article 43.... ‘Among the important standards that are missing from the Charter is the guarantee of an effective remedy for those whose rights and freedoms have been violated, as in Article 2(3) of the ICCPR..... There are many important tights of the child that are also missing... + Article 8(a) prohibits ‘physical or psychological torture’ and ‘cruel, inhuman, degrading or humiliating creatment} but not punishment. It also fails to include a definition of ‘torture: ... “Article 24 of the Arab Charter only grants the right to peaceful assembly and association to ‘citizens? thereby excluding non-nationals, and Article 41(b) guarantees free basic and primary ‘education only to ‘citizens’ These provisions are inconsistent with the universal protection afforded by [global human rights treaties]... 5. Conclusion “The revised Arab Charter on Human Rights is a significant step forward from its predecessor. ‘Arab States now havg a document that they can own and take some pride in as a reaffirmation of their commitment to human rights—evidenced by the encouraging recent two ratifications, and the reasonable prospect that there will be further ratificationsin the near fucure to bring the Charter into force. ... However, while the Charter is largely consistent with international law, it remains a missed opportunity to be totally up to date and to achieve the SG and Councils unconditional aim of “bringing Charter provisions into compliance with international standards for human rights.” Over time the fundamental defects of the Charter must be addressed through revision and the addition of optional protocols. Note on the League and the Arab Spring, The role of the League of Arab States during the political changes that swept many countries in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean during 2010 and 2011 has been inconsistent and often uncertain. In January 2011, the League failed to com- ment on events in Egypt, where its headquarters are located near Tahir Square. It also did not act with respect to Bahrain or Yemen. In contrast, in March 2011, it isolated the government of Libya and called for the United Nations to establish a no-fly zone. The subsequent actions of NATO and rebellion from within led to the end of the Khadafi regime. On November 16, 2011, the League of Arab States took its strongest action yet, condemning the human rights violations of Syria's government. The League gave Damascus three days to withdraw milicary forces from occupied cities, start talks beeween the government and opposition, and pave the way for an observer team of military peacekeepers and human rights experts. The government rejected the demand. Members REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 103 then voted to suspend the state from participating in the League and began to discuss sanctions, which were overwhelmingly approved on November 28, 2011. The sanctions included freezing the assets of senior officials in the Syrian government, banning visits by those officials co other Arab nations, and ending transactions with the Syrian central bank. It was the first such action by the organization. Does the Charter support action against a member state for human rights violations? Does there need to be an express provision to allow specific measures to be taken? 1.5.2 ASEAN: = ‘The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed on August 8, 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, the region's non-communist coun- tries, Some thirty years later the organization expanded with the successive entries of Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia. ASEAN was formed by its members as a forum for cooperation ‘on matters of peace, stability, progress, and prosperity in the region. More recently, the countries have engaged in common efforts to attain economic growth and political cooperation. : Over the years, the members of ASEAN agreed on some common values and principles,as et forth ina series of declarations. The Bangkok Declaration of August 1967 called for “respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region” The Declaration of ASEAN Concord of 1976 mentioned “reliance on peaceful processes in the settletyent of intra-regional differences” and “mutual assistance in case of natural disasters.” There were also “fundamental prin- ciples” enacted in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia of 1976, According to the treaty, its purpose is “to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation among their peoples which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship” ~ ‘To make further progress toward these aims, ASEAN member states formalized their associa- tion in a treaty, signed November 20, 2007. By the end of 2008, all ten member states—Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos (Lao PDR), Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, ‘Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam—had ratified the Charter. The new ASEAN Charter declares the organizational purposes to include strengthening democracy, promoting rule of law, and pro- tecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Charter further states that among the key - principles to govern the conduct of ASEAN and its member states are “respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights, and the promotion of social justice” and “adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and constitu- tional government” See Lin Chun Hung, ASEAN Charter: Deeper Regional Integration under International Law?, 9 CHINESE J. INT'L L, 821, 821-28 (2010). Whether the organization will develop a functioning human rights system remains a matter of discussion and debate. Simon S. C. Tay, The ASEAN Charter: Between National Sovereignty and the Region's Constitutional Moment, 12 SINGAPORE Y.B. INT'L L. 151 (2008) (footnotes omitted) “What are the motivating factors for the ten member states of ASEAN to go forward with an ASEAN Charter? What is the extent of political will that drives the Charter, in different areas and from the different member states? The first of these was the experience of the group from the financial crisis of 1997-98 and its expansion to include all ten member counties of the sub-region. This has led ASEAN to recognize both its weaknesses and its potential strength if its member countries can 104 REGIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS cooperate much more closely than chey have in the early years of the group. This recognition led to an ambition to “reinvent ASEAN.” This fuelled ASEAN’s shared ambition to create a + commuhity.... ‘A second factor is for ASEAN to-be more competitive as an economic unit. Since the 1997 ‘Asian crisis, the ASEAN member countries have witnessed the economic rise of China and, more recently, that of India. Whereas pre-1997 figures of foreign direct investment and other economic indicia favored ASEAN, the statistics a decade on clearly suggest that China and India are growing more rapidly than the smaller and medium sized countries of ASEAN. Against this background, ASEAN leaders have often cited competitiveness as a primary driving factor for them to move ahead with both ASEAN Community and Charter. A third factor behind the ASEAN Community and Charter is to maintain and indeed gain political influence in the wider region, Commentators have described ASEAN as one of the more successful regional ot sub-regional associations of states. Historically, this has been traced to the unity of purpose among ASEAN member states in response to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia in the context of the Cold War. This allowed ASEAN to play a role in the Paris peace process in Cambodia and then to bring Vietnam into the grouping, followed by Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. From this, we can see that ASEAN has often acted in unison to respond to issues in the region that have arisen from external factors and forces. This action moreover is as much in the political-security realm as in the economic. ‘The historical moment prevailing during the negotiation, signing and ratification of the Charter again saw the grouping seeking to respond to external changes in the political-security realm. This change was the ise of major powers—China, India and Japan—to seek greater weight and influence in political and security issues as Asia experienced a nascent regionalism in the years since the 1997 crisis, Given the historical tensions between these Asian powers arid the addigional and still dominant influence of the USA as a non-regional actor on the region, ASEAN has sought something of a role, despite its own limitations. This was not only directly in security issues, but in the free trade agreements within the region that were often not only economic in nature but also political signals. ‘Another newer cluster of purposes of ASEAN relate not to economic issues but to politics and security. The ASEAN Charter has included a number of references to democracy, human rights and good governance. "Asnoted above, article 1(4) sets out the long standing purpose to “to ensure that the peoples and Member States of ASEAN live in peace with the world at large.” Bur in the Charter it adds to this that this ambition to live in peace would be “in a just, democratic and harmonious environment” More directis article 1(7) of the Charter. This sets out the purpose “to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN” In conformity with these purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the ASEAN Charter sets out an institutional expression of this ambition in article 14, This promises that ASEAN. shall establish “an ASEAN human rights body” : REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS A lot may be said about these provisions of the Charter. They were hoped for by many advocates on these issues, including non-governmental organizations in the region like the Working Group for an ASEAN human tights mechanism. Yer their inclusion in the Charter, decided by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers in their 2007 meeting in Cebu, the Philippines, was unexpected. After all, ASEAN in the early 1990s had been part of the “Asian valies” discourse that doubted that human rights were universal values, Moreover, an ASEAN member country—Myanmar—has been the subject of international approbation for human 1s violations, and these mounted in the run up to the signing of thé Charter in 2007 when. the Myanmar regime put down protests by monks and civilians with lethal force... .«. While the aims for the ASEAN Community and the Charter are now in place, there is asyet no clear and agreed road map for bringing the ASEAN members together in a regional constitution. Nevertheless, the Charter goes beyond simply reflecting the status quo in ASEAN, ante- Charter, There are bases, surveyed in this article, for saying that the Charter constitutes some real and potentially far-reaching steps forward for the grouping. Despite its limitations, the Charter gives some optimism that post-Charter ASEAN will be able to move further down the road towards a regional order based on shared norms, agreed rules, and sufficient institutionalization that can constitute a new regional order and a constitutional moment for the region, ’ Questions and Comments 1. Given what you know of ASEAN’s member states and aims, why do you think the organization inserted human rights and the rule of law in the Charter? Does the Charter give the organization the power to respond to human rights violations in the region? Is it likely co do so? On the drafting of the ASEAN Charter, as recounted by the High Level Panel and other officials, see THE MAKING OF THE ASEAN CHARTER Tomy Koh, Rosario G. Manolo & Walter Woon eds,, 2009). . Do “Asian values” exist or are they a pretext for violating human sights? . Does ASEAN suggest that there are alternatives to the model of a human rights system consisting of binding rights and obligations, institutions, and monitoring procedures? See UN Comm'n on Human Rights, Effective Functioning of Human Rights Mechanisms: National Institutions and Regional Arrangements, UN. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/100/Add.1 (2005). 4, An ASEAN Declaration of Rights? ASEAN began drafting a declaration of human rights in June 2011. Ir created a Working Group of government-appointed experts who were to prepare a draft and present it to the ASEAN Intergovernment Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) for further discussion. Civil society was highly critical of the lack of transparency and engagement in the process, but some groups were able to meet with some of the members informally with respect to the draft, and national consultations were held in some member states. The process of negotiation continued throughout 2012 under the chairmanship of the representative of Cambodia. Central debates occurred over the issue of collective and individual rights, the relationship of rights and duties, and the “particularity” of ASEAN, The governments agreed on the desire to emphasize ey 105 106 REGIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS i promotion over protection and the subsidiarity of the regional mechanism to national y ones, Separately and also confidentially, the AICHR has been drafting internal rules and other texts concerning its mandate. : 5, To what extent do the Arab and ASEAN Charters incorporate and mirror universal i human rights standards? Where, ifat all, does each fall short and where does each go \ : farther? : 6. On November 17, 2011, ASEAN leaders decided to make Myanmar the ASEAN chair , in 2014, The decision was a controversial one, although it was supported by opposition Ae * “groups within the country who said it would boost political change in the state. The ' Indonesian Foreign Minister added that by giving Myanmar the chance to chair ASEAN, ‘ the grouping was trying to ensure that the momentum of democratization in Myanmar : was maintained, as it would put a bigger spotlight on the country, requiring it to be more open and transparent. Burmese officials released political opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and a number of other political prisoners, relaxed media controls, and pushed through some pro-democratic political reforms, United Nations Secretary General Ban ! Ki-moon expressed support for the decision of ASEAN, He also said he accepted an 7 invitation to visit Burma sometime in the future to see for himself the reforms being adopted. US. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Burma on a similar fact-finding | mission. Has the ASEAN policy of “constructive engagement” produced sufficient results we to justify rewarding Myanmar with the chairmanship? Is it likely to further democratize : the country? Is it consistent with the ASEAN Charter? 7. In relation to regional and subregional systems, what is the value added by national human rights institutions (NHRIs)? Do NHRIs have a special role in the Asia-Pacific region where regional systems are lacking or weak? See Chapter VII, section 2, , 8. For recent works on human rights in Asia and the possibilities of developing a regional 1 system or systems there, see DEALING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS: ASIAN AND WESTERN Views on THE VALUE oF HUMAN RiGHTs (Martha Meijer ed, 2001); THe East ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HuMAN RicHts (Joanne R, Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., ‘ 1999); Necorraring Currure AND Human Ricuts (Lynda S. Bell, Andrew : J. Nathan & Ilan Peleg eds., 2001); Karen Engle, Culture and Human Rights: The Aiian Values Debate in Context, 32 NY.U J. INT'L L. & Pot. 291 (2000); MARINA : SvENsSON, DEBATING HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, 1899-1999: A CONCEPTUAL p AnD Potrricat History (2002); STEPHEN ANGLE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE | Tuoucut: A Cross-CutTurat Inquiry (2002); Richard Klein, Cultural Relativism, 1 Economic Development and International Human Rights in the Asian Context, 9 TouRO Inr’L L. Rev. 1 (2001); Sienho Yee, The Role of Law in the Formation of Regional ! Perspectives in Human Rights and Regional Systems for the Protection of Human Rights: ‘The European and Asian Models as Iustrations, 8 SINGAPORE YB. INT'L L. 157 (2004). 1.5.3 Other Subregional and Interregional Organizations South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) SAARC was established in 1985 to promote regional cooperation among the member states, but local conflicts have limited its ability to act. The member states of SAARC are Bangladesh, Bhutan, REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 107 India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Its charter makes no mention of human rights and it currently does not have a human rights mechanism, but in 2002, the organization adopted two treaties linked with specific human rights issues: the SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution, and the SAARC Convention on Regional Arrangements for the Promotion of Child Welfare in South Asia, Subsequently, in 2004, SAARC adopted the SAARC Social Charter which impacts on many economic, social, and culcural rights, Finally, on February 8, 2011, SAARC adopted a Charter of Democracy which expresses, inter alia, a “shared commitment to the rule of law, liberty-and equal rights of all citi- zens” and “reaffirm{s] faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity of the human person as enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and as enshrined in the respective Constitutions of the SAARC Member States” This may mark a breakthrough in the organization and lead to further human rights initiatives. For a commentary written before adoption of che Charter of Democracy, see Surya Deuja, Establishing a Robust Regional Human Rights Mechanism in South Asia, 6 ASIAN HumAN RicHs Derenpr 4 (2010). Organization of Islamic Cooperation On June 29, 2011, member scates of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) created an Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission. The fifty-seven OIC member states come from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America (Suriname). The eightoen-member Commission was elected the same day. According to the preamble of the Commission's Starute, “{tJhe Independent Permanent Commission on Human Rights shall promote the civil, political, social and economic rights enshrined in the Organization's covenants and declarations and in uni- versally agreed human rights instruments, in conformity with Islamic values.” ‘The objectives of the Permanent Commission are set forth as follows: ARTICLE 8: “The Commission shall seek to advance human rights and serve the interests of the Islamic ‘Ummah in this domain, consolidate respect for the lamic cultures and noble values and promose inter-civlizational dialogue, consistent withthe principles and objectives of the OIC Charter. ARTICLE 9: _ The Commission shall support the Member States’ efforts co consolidate civil, political, economic, social and culeural rights, Arricte 10: ‘The Commission shall cooperate with the Member States to ensure consolidation of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights in the Member States in accordance with the OIC Charter, and to monitor observance of the human rights of Muslim communities and minorities, ARTICLE 11: ‘The Commission shall support the Member States’ efforts in terms of policies aimed at enhancing legislation and policies in favour of advancing the rights of women, the young and those with special needs, in the economic, social, political and cultural fields as well as eliminating all forms of violence and discrimination. 108 REGIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS See Res. 2/38 on the Establishment of the OIC Independent Permanent Independent Human Rights Commission, Resolutions on Legal Affairs, adopted by the 38th Session of the Council of Foreign “Ministers (Session of peace, cooperation and development), Astana, Republic of Kazakhstan, 26-28 Rajab 1432 h (28-30 Jane 2011), OIC/CFM-38/2011/LEG/RES/FINAL. Do any of the objectives raise concerns in respect to universality of human rights? Concluding Questions and Comments 1, Having examined the law, institutions, and procedures of existing regional systems, how would you explain to persons living in regions that lack such a system the differences between the global and regional protection of human rights? Is there any value added by the latter? Whar strategies might be utilized co encourage the formation of additional regional systems for Asia, if such a system is indeed a goal to be realized? 2. Isthere a common underlying and agreed conceptual framework or rationale for the protection of human rights in the regions? See Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen und ‘Automatenaufstellungs-GMBH v. Oberburgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 2004 E.C. R. I-9609 (reference for a preliminary ruling) in which the European Court of Justice upheld a ban on laser games simulating acts of homicide, despite the European Union's principle of freedom to provide services, on the basis that such games could be deemed to violate public policy because they offend human dignity. The Court agreed with the Advocate General that respect for human dignity is a general principle of law contained in the European Community legal order. The Advocate General had further comménts on human dignity—itself a right protected by the German Constitution—and respect for human rights: . 74. There is haslly any legal principle more dificult to fathom in law than that of human dignity.... ¢ 75. Human dignity is an expression of the respect and value to be attributed to each human being on account of his or her humanity Ie concems the protection of and respect for the essence or nature of the human being per se—that is to say, the ‘substance’ of mankind, Mankind itself is therefore reflected in the concept of human dignity; it is what distinguishes him from other creatures... 76. Human dignity, as a fundamental expression of an element of mankind founded simply on humanity, forms the underlying basis and starting point for alll] human rights distinguishable from its at the same time it is the point of convergence of individual human rights in the light of which they are to be understood and interpreted. Mention is therefore made by German theorists, for instance, of human dignity as the ‘fundamental principle’ of human rights. 77....lt reflects the idea that every individual human being is considered to be endowed with inherent and inalienable rights. 78. A variety of religious, philosophical and ideological reasoning could be given as the basis for this analysis, All in all, human dignity has its roots deep in the origins of aconception of mankind in European culture that regards man as an entity capable of REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 109 spontaneity and self-determination. Because of his ability co forge his own free will, he is a person (subject) and must not be downgraded co a thing or object. 79. That link becween the concept of dignity and those of the self-determination and freedom of mankind clearly shows why the idea of the dignity of man also often finds expression in other concepts and principles that have to be safeguarded, such as personality and identity. 80. Furthermore, the concept of the legal equality of all is also inherent in the idea of human rights in general and human dignity in particular, so that feference is also often made of the phrase “égale dignité” which embraces both concepts. 81, As an emanation and as specific expressions of human dignity, however, all (particular) human tights ultimately serve to achieve human dignity... Is this conception one of “European culture,” as the Advocate General states, or one that would resonate in the other regional systems as well? ‘This chapter aimed to illustrate the commonalities and differences in the role of human rights in the main regional organizations. Ir is clear that each region had a particular historical, political, and cultural context in which human rights became a matter of regional concern, and this context led the member states to give varying prominence to human rights within each of the regional orga- nizations, The chapter has also demonstrated the evolutionary character of thé regional organiza- tons; each of chem has undergone reform since its creation and has strengthened the human rights obligations of member states, Amendment or replacement of basic instruments has generally been accompanied by additional focus on human rights. This is not to say chat actual respect for human rights by member states has always kept pace with the regional standards; compliance remains an issue in all the systems. New member states and new issues have brought new challenges to each system, in some respects minimizing their historical differences and making them more alike. In response, the systems have increasingly converged by developing similar norms, institutions, and procedures to promote and protect human tights. The next chapter will examine the relationship between these norms and the domestic legal systems of the member states.

You might also like