Land Use Policy 121 (2022) 106305

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Land Use Policy

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/landusepol

Gender norms, landholdership, and rural land use fee and agricultural
income tax in Ethiopia☆
Hitomi Komatsu a, *, Alemayehu A. Ambel b, Gayatri Koolwal b, Manex Bule Yonis c
a
Development Data Group, World Bank, 1818H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433, USA
b
Development Data Group, World Bank, Washington, DC, USA
c
Development Data Group, World Bank, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

JEL Classification: Area-based land taxes – a form of property tax – exist where rural land markets do not exist or do not function
H71 well. Understanding how these taxes affect different groups of landholders, including by men and women, is
Q15 important since a tax based on the land size is likely to have an outsized effect on smaller landholders. However,
J16
survey data allowing for an individual- and household-disaggregated analysis has been scarce. Using newly
Keywords: available data on tax payments and self-reported individual land ownership from the Ethiopian Socioeconomic
Agriculture
Survey 2018/2019, this paper assessed the gender implications of an area-based rural land use fee and agri­
Land ownership
Taxation
cultural income tax in Ethiopia. We found that female adult-only households were more likely than dual adult
Gender households to be smallholders with less than 0.5 hectare of land, and these smallholders faced the largest per-
Ethiopia hectare tax rates. Female-headed- and female adult-only households faced a tax incidence that was 37 %
higher than it was for male-headed and dual-adult households. The gender land ownership patterns, norms
limiting women’s role in agriculture, household structures, and gender agricultural productivity gaps are likely
to result in lower consumption, and consequently, a higher tax burden for women. Finally, we simulated the
effect of a hypothetical tax schedule with progressive per-hectare tax rates and exemptions for smallholders, and
found that while this would reduce women’s tax burdens, the tax remained to be regressive because of the
prevalence of landholdership among poor households. Our study highlights the difficulty of area-based land taxes
to be progressive.

1. Introduction correlated with property values, productivity, or agricultural income

An area-based tax on land - a type of property tax - is common in low-
and middle-income countries (such as Burundi, Czech Republic, Dem­
ocratic Republic of Congo, Slovakia, and Sudan) where rural land
markets do not exist or do not function well and value-based taxes are
difficult to administer (Franzsen and McCluskey, 2017; Sah and Stiglitz,
1985; Skinner, 1991). Understanding how these taxes affect different
groups of landholders, including by men and women, is important since
property taxes are increasingly gaining attention as a means to raise
local government revenue (Franzsen and McCluskey, 2017). Taxes based
on land size, however, can be regressive since they are not always
(Bird and Slack, 2005; Khan, 2001; Norregaard, 2013; Skinner, 1991;
Sah and Stiglitz, 1985).
We examine the gender implications of an area-based tax on land
using nationally representative survey data from Ethiopia – where the
responsibilities of holders of rural land rights include payment of an
area-based land use fee and agricultural income tax (Hill et al., 2017).
Ethiopia is an important country context to examine such gender dif­
ferences; since the late 1990 s, Ethiopia’s rural land registration and
certification process strengthened tenure security by formally recog­
nizing rights that both women and men have to rural land and issuing
land certificates (Deininger et al. 2008, Deininger et al. 2011; Holden

☆
The study is part of the Ethiopia Technical Assistance to Support Data Collection and Policy Guidance on Taxation and Gender project, which is funded by the
World Bank Global Tax Program. We thank Daniel Ayalew Ali and Stephen Younger for valuable comments and discussions on earlier drafts. Any error or omission is
our responsibility alone.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: hkomatsu@worldbank.org (H. Komatsu), aambel@worldbank.org (A.A. Ambel), gkoolwal@worldbank.org (G. Koolwal), myonis@worldbank.
org (M.B. Yonis).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2022.106305
Received 16 February 2022; Received in revised form 7 July 2022; Accepted 2 August 2022
Available online 16 August 2022
0264-8377/© 2022 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND IGO license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
nd/3.0/igo/).
H. Komatsu et al.
and Tilahun, 2020). As a result, many women were named on land
certificates (Holden et al., 2011).
In light of expanded recognition of land rights and the regressivity of
area-based tax on land in Ethiopia (Hill et al., 2017), this paper uses
newly available survey data on household tax payments and
self-reported individual-level data on land ownership in the Fourth
Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey (ESS4) 2018/2019. The data allows us
to examine gender-differentiated implications of the rural land use fee
and agricultural income tax on women landholders, as well as associated
gender norms that can affect landholding patterns and relative tax
burdens. We disaggregate landholding size by male and female owners
and by gendered household typologies, and calculate household- and
individual-level tax incidence, where individual tax incidence is
imputed in proportion to the amount of the household land a person
owns. We also provide new evidence on how a tax on land could reduce
women’s tax burdens through a tax policy simulation.
Our findings underscore key inequalities in landholdings across men
and women in Ethiopia, as well as higher tax burdens for women
landholders. First, there are considerable variations by household de­
mographic profiles. Female-only households (with no male adults) are
more likely than dual adult households (with both male and female
adults present) to be smallholders with less than 0.5 hectare of land, and
these smallholders face the largest per-hectare tax rates. Specifically, 65
% of female-only and 58 % of female-headed households are small­
holders with less than 0.5 hectare of land, compared to about 40 % of
their male counterparts. Second, the tax burden – as a proportion of
household consumption – for female-headed and female-only house­
holds is 37 % higher than for male-headed and dual adult households,
violating the horizontal equity principle – whether the tax treats in­
dividuals in the same circumstances equally. There is also a gender
difference in individual tax incidence, but the magnitude is smaller
given the narrower gender gap in individual landholdings. Gender
norms limiting women’s role in agriculture, household structures, and
gender productivity gap are likely to result in women’s disproportion­
ately higher tax burden. Even though tax liabilities for similar-sized land
are the same, lower productivity and consumption result in a higher tax
burden for women.
Because of the regressivity of tax schedules, we conduct a policy
simulation by analyzing the tax incidence of a hypothetical tax schedule
with progressive per-hectare rates and exemptions for smallholders. We
find that this is likely to decrease the tax burden of female-headed- and
female-only households, but the tax incidence remains to be regressive
because land rights are prevalent among poor rural households. This
demonstrates how difficult it is for an area-based tax on land to be
vertically equitable.
The paper contributes to the empirical literature on the tax burdens
of agricultural land taxes in low-income countries. The empirical evi­
dence of area-based land taxes has been found to be regressive in
Rwanda (Ali et al., 2020; Kalkuhl et al., 2018), in Indonesia, Peru, and
Nicaragua (Kalkuhl et al., 2018), and in Ethiopia (Hill et al., 2017;
Mesfin and Gao, 2020). These studies, however, do not analyze tax from
a gender perspective. Building on this evidence, we examine the hori­
zontal equity from a gender perspective. Our findings on vertical and
horizontal equity are relevant for countries where land taxation is
area-based.
This paper also contributes more broadly to the growing literature on
the gender dimensions of taxation in low- and middle-income countries.
Much of this literature focuses on personal income tax and payroll taxes
(see Elson, 2006; Grown and Valodia, 2010; Joshi et al., 2020; Lahey,
2018; Stotsky, 1997). Grown and Valodia (2010) also examine gender
issues in indirect taxes using expenditure data for Argentina, Ghana,
India, Mexico, Morocco, South Africa, Uganda, and the United Kingdom.
Informal taxes have a gender dimension in Nigeria (Akpan and Sempere,
2019) and Zambia (Ligomeka, 2019). There is less evidence in low- and
middle-income country contexts, however, on the gender implications of
land taxation – mainly due to a lack of nationally-representative data
2
Land Use Policy 121 (2022) 106305
that disaggregates ownership at the individual level and asks questions
on taxation. The ESS4 addresses these data gaps, and allows us to pro­
vide new empirical evidence on the gender dimensions of a tax on land.
In what follows, Section 2 provides an overview of gender and land
rights in Ethiopia, and the rural land use fee and agricultural income tax.
Section 3 describes the data and methodology for understanding the tax
incidence. Section 4 provides descriptive statistics on agricultural
landholdings by gender. Section 5 presents the tax incidence by gender
disaggregated household categories and by sex of the landholder. We
also provide results of a policy simulation of a hypothetical tax schedule
with progressive tax rates and smallholder exemptions. Section 6 draws
conclusions.
2. Gender, land, and taxation: The Ethiopian context
2.1. Gender and land rights, Ethiopian context
The Ethiopian government has taken considerable steps to formalize
land rights for women and men. Land certificates were issued in the
names of both women and men but there were variations by region in
implementing joint titling (Deininger et al., 2008; Kumar and Qui­
sumbing, 2015). Subsequently, the Tigray region carried out the Second
Stage Land Registration in 2014 to register the names of all parcel
holders, with Amhara, Oromia, and SNNP regions following suit (Bezu
and Holden, 2014a; Holden and Tilahun, 2020). According to the
Constitution, the state owns the land but every Ethiopian wishing to
engage in agriculture can receive use rights for free (Deininger et al.,
2008). Thus, individuals or households receive usufruct rights to land,
not ownership, and are prohibited from selling or mortgaging land
(Deininger et al., 2008). There is no rural land sale market, and the land
rental market is restricted except for Amhara (Deininger et al., 2008,
2011).
The 2000 Revised Family Code gives women and men equal rights to
property in inheritance and during marriage, and equal division of assets
in divorce (Kumar and Quisumbing, 2015).1 Despite these laws,
different norms across locations and across ethnic and religious groups
affect how land is allocated (Kumar and Quisumbing, 2015). The pri­
mary way to gain access to land is by inheritance from parents, with
older sons given preferential treatment (Bezu and Holden, 2014b; Kosec
et al., 2018). Women access land by marrying men with land (Bezu and
Holden, 2014b) or living with an adult son who inherited the land rights.
Over the last decade, population growth has resulted in landlessness
and farms becoming subdivided and smaller (Bezu and Holden, 2014b;
Holden and Tilahun, 2020). Even when landholders have obtained
perpetual use rights, their continuance is generally contingent on
physical presence in the village, although there are variations by region
(Bezu and Holden, 2014b). While the land certification program
increased tenure security (Bezabih et al., 2016), there is evidence that
landholders continue to feel insecure about their tenure because of the
threat of expropriation for land redistribution (Ali et al., 2011; Deininger
et al., 2011; Bezu and Holden 2014). The banning of land sales, limited
access to land, the requirement for local residence to retain land rights,
and tenure insecurity make it clear that in Ethiopia (1) there are no land
markets; (2) there is a limited supply of rural land; and (3) landholders
are not mobile. These conditions have important implications for guid­
ing the assumptions used in the tax incidence analysis.
The gender productivity gap (Aguilar et al., 2015; Bezabih et al.,
2016; Ghebru and Holden, 2015) and gender inequities in agriculture
and consumption (Teklu, 2005) have implications for the burden of an
area-based tax on land. In Ethiopia, it is considered inappropriate for
women to engage in agricultural work, particularly plowing with oxen
1
The Family Law stipulates that all property is considered common property
even if it is only registered in the name of one spouse (Holden and Tiluhan
2020).
H. Komatsu et al.
(Ghebru and Holden, 2015; Holden et al., 2011; Teklu, 2005). When
male-labor is not accessible, households without male adults rent out
their land through sharecropping arrangements, often with male rela­
tives (Bezabih et al., 2016; Ghebru and Holden, 2015; Teklu, 2005).
However, women prefer to hire male laborers because sharecropping
agreements can cost half of the crop (Teklu, 2005). Sharecropper pro­
ductivity is also lower on female-owned than on male-owned land
(Ghebru and Holden, 2015). Women farmers, the majority of whom are
either divorced or widowed, have less access to land, agricultural inputs,
and agricultural extension services, and their productivity is lower
(Aguilar et al., 2015).
2.2. The rural land use fee and agricultural income tax
The Rural Land Use Fee and Agricultural Income Tax constitute less
than 0.5 % of total tax revenue in Ethiopia (Mesfin and Gao, 2020). The
ten regional governments of Ethiopia have a constitutional mandate to
set and collect the annual rural land use fee and agricultural income tax
(Mengistu et al., 2017). The tax liabilities vary by region and are lump
sum amounts, which are assessed on the total landholding area used for
agriculture (Hill et al., 2017). Land area is therefore a proxy for agri­
cultural income.2
The average per hectare tax rates calculated from the tax schedules
are generally regressive; they decline with the size of the total land­
holding until 1.5 ha of land and then remain proportional thereafter
(Fig. 1). Farmers with less than 0.5 hectare pay more tax per hectare
than farmers with more land. In Fig. 3, we show that 65 % of female-only
and 58 % of female-headed households hold less than 0.5 hectare of land
compared to only 38% of male-headed and dual adult households, and
therefore face the largest per hectare tax rate.
The Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development provides farmers’
names and area of rural landholdings in the land registry to the Revenue
Bureau (ORS 2005). The Revenue Bureau or the chairman of the kebele
(ward) peasant association delegated by the Revenue Bureau collects the
taxes from the farmers, who have until April 30 E.C. to make the pay­
ment (ORS 2005). Farmers are required to notify any changes in the
landholders or the area of landholdings to the Revenue Bureau (ORS
2005).
3. Data and methodology
3.1. The Ethiopia socioeconomic survey (ESS4)
Our analysis draws on the nationally representative ESS4 2018/19,
part of the Living Standards and Measurement Study (LSMS) program,
which collects a range of information on household demographics, ex­
penditures, agricultural activities, and tax payments, including the land
use fees and agricultural income taxes. The survey used a two-stage
stratified probability method to draw its sample, where the rural
enumeration areas (EAs) were drawn from the Central Statistical
Agency’s Annual Agricultural Sample Survey and the urban EAs were
selected from each region using probability proportional to size (Central
Statistical Agency, 2020). The ESS4 also interviewed adults aged 18 and
older in private on their ownership of different assets – including
ownership and rights over residential land and non-residential (pri­
marily agricultural) land.3 In particular, the ESS4 asked respondents
about land ownership through different lenses. This included their
overall (reported) ownership, whether respondents had a certificate or
title to the land (documented ownership), as well as ownership patterns,
such as whether ownership was exclusive or joint with other members
2
There is a livestock tax assessed on the number of livestock owned, but we
do not include this in our analysis because the paper deals with land taxation.
3
The response rates of eligible respondents on rural residential and non-
residential land were over 93 % (Hasanbasri et al., 2021).
3
Land Use Policy 121 (2022) 106305
within/outside the household. The ESS4 makes an important contribu­
tion in filling substantial individual- and household-disaggregated data
gaps on key economic outcomes in nationally-representative surveys.
The survey teams made multiple visits to households from September
2018 to August 2019, each time covering different modules of the
questionnaire (Central Statistical Agency, 2020). The final sample used
in the analysis consists of 2942 rural households; 3122 male and 3350
female respondents aged 18 or over were interviewed about their rights
to and ownership of land. Appendix 1 provides additional information
on the number of households and respondents per region.
3.2. Methodology
3.2.1. Calculating tax incidence
The tax incidence of the rural land use fee and agricultural income
tax is measured at two different levels – household and individual levels.
First, we calculate tax incidence as the household payments of land use
fee and agricultural income tax as a proportion of annual nominal total
household expenditure, and conduct the analysis across gendered
household typologies by (1) sex of the household head; and (2) house­
hold composition discussed below.4 Second, we impute individual taxes
by assigning household tax payments to the individual in proportion to
the individual’s share of household land.5 Individual tax incidence is
derived by dividing the individual’s imputed tax payments by per capita
expenditure.
We assume that landholders bear the full burden and behavioral
responses are not expected. This is because while property taxes assessed
on the value of land and buildings could affect the property investment
decisions of owners (Bird and Slack, 2005), the tax on land in Ethiopia is
area-based, not value-based. The Ethiopian policy contexts – a tax on
land area, fixed supply of land, no land market, and immobile land­
holders – are consistent with the assumptions that predict that the tax
burden falls entirely on landholders, who cannot relocate because of the
risk of losing their land rights. Further, in low-income countries, prop­
erty taxes are not expected to affect property owner decisions to move to
a lower tax jurisdiction because they do not receive adequate local
public services (Bird and Slack, 2005; Kalkuhl et al., 2018). They are also
unlikely to adjust the area of land in response to changes in tax rates.
To discuss the tax incidence of the rural land use fee and agricultural
income tax with a gender perspective, we develop categories of land­
holders and household typologies, by gender and across the household
expenditure distribution.
3.2.2. Definition of agricultural landholders
Looking first at categories of landholders, we define agricultural land
as any plot used for agriculture in the prior 12 months. Because the state
owns the land, to which households and individuals have usufruct
rights, we define different categories of landholders as outlined in
Table 1. Given our focus on the tax incidence on rural agricultural land,
our analysis is restricted to rural landholding individuals and
households.
4
Some studies have used household income in the denominator, instead of
expenditures, as a welfare measure in the tax incidence analysis. However,
expenditures are considered to be a better welfare measure than household
income in low-income countries because farmers’ incomes fluctuate between
seasons and over years, and there are practical difficulties in measuring rural
incomes (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002, Martinez-Vazquez, 2001).
5
We calculate the proportion of land held by the respondent by (1) dividing
the area of the parcel by the number of co-holders (as reported by the
respondent); (2) summing up the total area of land held by the individual across
all parcels to obtain total area of the individual’s landholdings; and (3) dividing
the individual’s land area by the household’s total land size.
H. Komatsu et al.
Fig. 2. Area of landholdings by household type, Percent. Note: This figure shows the size of landholdings (in hectare) among landholding households.
Source: Authors’ calculations using ESS 2018/2019
3.2.3. Gendered household typologies and individuals
We classify households and individuals by demographic composition
to examine the gender differences in tax burdens among landholders:
1) First, we disaggregate the analysis of the household by sex of the
household head. However, the assignment of headship is often
arbitrary, making it problematic to compare households (Grown,
2010). This method has also been criticized for ignoring the heter­
ogenous needs and constraints of female-headed households, and for
masking the poverty and inequality that exist within male-headed
households (Grown, 2010).
2) Second, we disaggregate households into three groups by the
following household composition: (1) dual male and female adult
households; (2) female-only households with no male adults; and (3)
male-only households with no female adults.6 This method of clas­
sifying households is useful because women living in a household
with no male adults are likely to face different challenges than fe­
male household heads living with their adult sons. In Ethiopia,
gender norms limit women’s role in agriculture and the presence of
an adult son has implications for access to land (Bezu and Holden,
2014b; Kosec et al., 2018).
3) Using the individual-level data in the ESS4, we also disaggregate the
analysis by sex of the respondent. This is valuable because it reveals
6
The Instructional Guide on the Abbreviated Women’s Empowerment in
Agriculture Index (A-WEAI) (Malapit et al., 2015) uses this classification.
4
Land Use Policy 121 (2022) 106305
Fig. 1. Average per hectare tax rates, rural land use fee
and agricultural income tax. Note: The average birr per
hectare tax rate is calculated by dividing the total tax by
the mid-point of the landholding classes; this is similar to
the method used in Hill et al. (2017).
Source: Amhara Regional State, Proclamation (No.161/
(2001), Proclamation to Amend Rural Land Use Payment
and Agricultural Income Tax of Oromia Regional State’s
Proclamation (No.99/ (2005), Southern Nations et al.
(2008), A Revised Proclamation to provide for rural land
use fee and agricultural activities income tax (No.
122/2008).
the ownership status of women in male-headed households, who are
otherwise hidden in the household-level analysis.
3.2.4. Ranking of individuals and households across the expenditure
distribution
Our approach is grounded in a central question in assessing vertical
and horizontal equity, namely how to rank households and individuals
by their ability to pay – a proxy measure for the “same” circumstances.
Household expenditures should be adjusted by some measure of the
household size, such as per capita or adult equivalence scales, because
poverty could be underestimated if poorer households are larger than
wealthier households (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002; Lustig, 2018). However,
the per capita approach has been criticized for assuming the consump­
tion needs of adults and children are the same, which overestimates the
incidence of poverty when there are many young children in large
households (Lustig, 2018).
We therefore order households by spatially-adjusted adult equivalent
consumption into four quartiles to take into account household size and
the demographic composition of household members. Households are
ranked according to their positions in the expenditure distribution of all
rural and urban households and individuals by their positions in the
expenditure distribution of all individuals. The annual household
expenditure consumption is the sum of the annual value of food
H. Komatsu et al.
Fig. 3. Tax Incidence.
Source: Authors’ calculations using ESS 2018/2019. Notes: The figures are a graphic representation of Table 5.
Table 1
Agricultural Landholders’ Definitions.
Variable
Agricultural land
Landholding household
Documented landholding
household
Individual landholder (self-
reported)
Individual documented
landholder (self-reported)
Definition
Agricultural land is defined as plots that were used
for agriculture in the previous 12 months.
Households are landholders if at least one plot was
granted to the household by leaders, was
inherited, or was purchased.
Households are documented landholders if they
have a title deed, certificate of ownership or
customary ownership, certificate of occupancy,
certificate of hereditary acquisition listed in the
registry, or purchase agreement for at least one
plot.
Individuals are landholders when they have the
right to use at least one plot, and the plot was
granted to the household by leaders or was
inherited or purchased. An individual who rents or
sharecrops a plot is not the landholder.
Documented landholders are named on the title
deed, certificate of ownership or customary
ownership, certificate of occupancy, certificate of
hereditary acquisition listed in the registry, or
purchase agreement for at least one plot.
5
Land Use Policy 121 (2022) 106305
consumption and expenditures on nonfood items,7 education, meals out,
and utilities.
3.2.5. Discussion of methodological approach
Our approach is similar to Kalkuhl et al. (2018), which uses a na­
tionally representative household survey in Indonesia, Nicaragua, and
Rwanda to calculate tax incidence of land tax as proportion of household
expenditure. We extend this approach by disaggregating tax incidence
by gendered household typologies and by sex of the landholder to assess
the horizontal equity, in other words, whether the tax treats individuals
or households in the same circumstances equally from a gender
perspective. Another approach, which examines the effects of the taxes,
transfers and expenditures on the overall income distribution,
inequality, and poverty, includes Hill et al. (2017) and Mesfin and Gao
(2020) using the Household Consumption Expenditure Survey data in
Ethiopia. These studies find the rural land use fee and agricultural in­
come tax to be regressive and poverty increasing by calculating the
Kakwani index and poverty headcount ratio, which measure the impact
of the fiscal system on the overall income distribution but they do not
measure the horizontal equity of the tax across different types of
households. The major contribution of our paper is that we provide new
evidence on the horizontal equity and gender dimensions of a tax on
land by using the ESS4, a nationally-representative data with dis­
aggregated land ownership information at the individual level and
questions on tax payments, both of which are missing in other surveys.
7
Nonfood items include personal care products, clothing, tobacco, transport,
household fuel, costs for domestic and household services, spending on housing,
and contributions to informal social security and community development.
H. Komatsu et al. Land Use Policy 121 (2022) 106305

Our empirical approach has the following limitations. First, the Table 3
analysis is a first-order approximation of tax incidence and does not Prevalence of agricultural landholdings by household type and sex of
consider behavioral responses – although, as noted, an area-based tax on respondent.
land is unlikely to cause such responses. Second, although we assume A. Among all households
that the self-reported tax payments recorded in the survey are accurate, Panel 1: Sex of Panel 2: Household Sex
there could in fact be a recall or reporting error on the part of re­ household head Composition
spondents. For this reason, we conduct a sensitivity analysis by esti­
Male- Female- Dual Female Male
mating the tax incidence using tax liabilities estimated from land area headed headed adult adult only adult
and the regional tax schedules in Section 5.2. Lastly, we examine self- only
reported individual landholdings and the associated tax burdens, but = 1 if landholding 93.8 % 84.7 % 93.5 82.0 % 83.3%
our analysis does not investigate intra-household gender relations. household %
= 1 if documented 83.0 % 74.4 % 83.5 70.0 % 56.3%
4. Descriptive statistics: Gender inequities in agriculture landholding %
household
Number of 2157 785 2402 436 104
Table 2 shows demographic characteristics and agriculture households
production-related information of all rural households by household B. Among All Respondents
type. (See Appendix 2 for characteristics of individual male and female Panel 3: Sex of
respondents.) Statistically significant differences (p < 0.05) are re­ respondent
Men Women
flected in bold (1) between male- and female-headed households, and = 1 if landholder 73.2 % 70.0 %
(2) between female-only and dual-adult households. Female-only = 1 if documented 54.6 % 47.7 %
households are a subset of the female-headed households: just over landholder
half of female-headed households (57 %) have no male adult present. An No. of respondents 3122 3350
adult son lives in 30 % of female-headed households. Far more female Notes: Tests of equality of means were conducted between (1) male- and female-
respondents in general are married (71 %) than female household heads headed households, (2) female-only and dual adult households, and (3) male and
(28 %). female respondents. Significant differences at p < 0.05 are shown in bold.
Because gender norms limit women’s engagement in agricultural Source: Authors’ calculations using ESS 2018/2019.
work, a higher share of female-only households (21 %) sharecrop or rent
out land than dual-adult households (11 %). Female-only households are Table 3 also shows that over 90 % of all households and over 70 % of
also more vulnerable economically; of those who sharecrop out land, all respondents are landholders, but women and female-only households
they receive only 43 % of agricultural yield, and their annual household fare worse than men and dual-adult households, particularly in docu­
expenditure is lower than that of their male counterparts. Female-only mented land rights. Only 70 % of female-only households have docu­
households are also more likely to be subsistence farmers (30 %) than mented land rights compared to 84 % of dual adult households.
male-headed and dual adult households (24 %). Further, female-headed Individual male respondents (73 %) are slightly more likely than females
crop-farming households experience lower agricultural productivity (70 %) to be landholders and documented landholders (55 % for men, 48
than male-headed households. These differences in household compo­ % for women).
sition are important in highlighting gender inequities. Male-headed households tend to have substantially larger

Table 2
Rural household characteristics and agricultural production by household type.
Head of household Household sex composition

Male Female Dual adult Female-only Male only

Household characteristics
Age of household head 44.5 46.9 44.9 46.1 42.5
Head is married 94.9 % 27.7 %a 90.2 % 22.3 %b 28.0 %c
Household size 5.3 3.6 5.3 3.0 2.3
Adult son of the head lives in household 23.6 % 29.7 % 29.0 % 0.0 % 15.3 %
Household receives cash or in-kind transfers from family or friends 8.7 % 19.0 % 9.3 % 20.9 % 16.6 %
Total annual household expenditure (Birr) 49,091.9 37,096.8 49,233.9 30,171.3 34,104.2
Percentage of households engaged in subsistence farming 23.6 % 29.4 % 24.0 % 30.3 % 29.2 %
Number of households 2157 785 2402 436 104
Rent/sharecrop out agricultural landd
= 1 if rent out or sharecrop out land 10.4 % 17.7 % 10.6 % 21.1 % 12.3 %
Number of households 2041 754 2265 428 102
Share of yield received from sharecropping out land 47.7 % 45.3 % 48.20 % 43.3 % na
Number of households 105 81 126 52 8
Productivity (value of harvest in Birr/land size)
Productivity 479,083.6 194,947.0 457,450.7 211,772.5 78,995.3
Number of crop farming households 1368 373 1506 188 47

Notes: Equality of means tests were conducted between (1) male- and female-headed households, and (2) female-only and dual adult households. Significant differences
at p < 0.05 are in bold.
a
The assignment of headship is self-reported and is often arbitrary, which is why headship is often not recommended for gender analysis (Grown, 2010). In 6 % of
female-headed households, the female heads’ husbands live with them. For other female-headed households, their husbands live elsewhere.
b
In female-adult households, 22.3 % of female heads are married, but their husbands do not live with them.
c
In 14% of male-adult only households, the underage wives (<18 years) live with them, but they are not counted as female adults. For others, their wives live
elsewhere.
d
This indicator is missing for some households, including the Somali region, where the post-planting module was not administered due to security concerns.
Households with no landholdings are classified as not able to rent out land.
Source: Authors’ calculations using ESS 2018/2019.

6
H. Komatsu et al. Land Use Policy 121 (2022) 106305

landholdings (Fig. 2; also see Appendix 3), and these differences in land Table 5
area persist across the expenditure distribution (see Appendix 4). Total Tax Incidence.
landholding size is less than 0.5 hectare for 58 % of female-headed Panel 1 Panel 2a
households and 65 % of female-only households, compared to only
Household tax incidence Household tax incidence
about 40 % of male-headed and dual-adult households. This is con­
cerning as a farm smaller than 0.5 ha is not large enough to support a Exp. Quartile Male- Female- Dual- Female-adult
headed headed headed only
sustainable livelihood (Holden and Tilahun, 2020), and the per-hectare
average tax rate is highest for this land size class (see Fig. 1). Thus, not Poorest 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.76b
2 0.37 0.74 0.4 0.83b
only are female-headed and female-only households disadvantaged
3 0.31 0.52 0.33 0.43b
because their farms are so small, but they also have to pay a higher Richest 0.2 0.36 0.21 0.42b
per-hectare rate in taxes. Total tax 0.46 0.62 0.47 0.65
In spite of these gender inequalities over land ownership, close to incidence
80% of landholding households and 84 % of documented landholding Number of 1755 553 1935 303
households
households nevertheless pay a rural land use fee and agricultural income Panel 3
tax (Table 4). This suggests that farmers regard paying these taxes as a Imputed individual tax
proxy for having title to the land. It is possible that in Ethiopia, house­ incidence
holds make tax payments a priority to ensure continuance of their land Exp. Quartile Male Female
owners owners
rights given the tenure insecurity, population growth, and land
Poorest 1.96 2.03
shortages.8 2 1.01 1.16
3 0.72 0.81
5. Results Richest 0.38 0.46
Total tax 1.07 1.19
incidence
5.1. Tax incidence using self-reported tax payments Number of 1726 1731
respondents
Table 5 shows the tax incidence for landholding households in panels
Notes: The sample is restricted to landholding households and respondents. For
1 and 2 and for landholding individuals in panel 3. Fig. 3 is a graphic
in panels 1, and 2, household tax incidence is calculated by dividing self-
representation of Table 5. Tax incidence is highest in the poorest quartile reported tax payments by household expenditure. In panel 3, individual tax
and lowest in the richest, confirming a regressive pattern, and consistent incidence is calculated by dividing imputed tax payments (apportioned ac­
with other studies in Ethiopia (Hill et al., 2017; Mesfin and Gao, 2020). cording to individual landholdings) by per capita expenditure. The imputation
The regressive pattern can be explained by the high prevalence of rural of individual incidence requires the land area, but because there are households
households with land rights and the uniform land area average across for which that is missing, the sample size of male respondents is less than that of
the expenditure distribution and therefore there are poor households male-headed households.
with large holdings (see Appendix 4). The poorest female-only and Tests of equality of means were conducted between (1) male- and female-headed
dual-adult households (panel 2) bear a tax incidence of 0.8 % and 0.7 %, households, (2) female-only and dual adult households, and (3) male and female
respondents. Significant differences at p < 0.05 are shown in bold.
a
Male-adult-only households are excluded in this panel because of small
Table 4 sample size. b The sample size is less than 100 observations.
Households that paid a rural land use fee and agricultural income tax, percent. Source: Authors’ calculations using ESS 2018/2019.
All Landholding Documented
households households landholding
a small tax payment could increase poverty.
households
Looking at horizontal equity, the tax incidence for female-only and
Percent of 74.3 79.3 84.2 female-headed households is 37 % higher than for dual-adult and male-
households who
paid tax
headed households. The gender difference in tax burdens generally
Number of households 2942 2343 1900 persists across the expenditure distribution. For individual landholders,
the gender difference in tax incidence exists but is smaller (panel 3).10
Source: Authors’ calculations using ESS 2018/2019.
The tax incidence of female landholders is 11 % higher than that of male
landholders. The difference is smaller than at the household-level
respectively, and the poorest respondents are subject to an individual because the gender gap in individual land size is small. Our results
tax incidence of 2 % (panel 3).9 Our data (see Table 2) showed that 30% suggest that gender differences in tax burdens depend on whether the
of female-only and female-headed households and 24 % of dual-adult analysis is conducted at the level of the household or the individual –
and male-headed households are subsistence farmers, for whom even which points to the importance of data on individual ownership to
reveal such differences and to ensure that policies are effectively
targeted.
8
While tax liabilities for equal-sized farms are the same, an area-based
As a comparison, about 60–70 % of property owners in Lima, Peru, paid
tax on land results in a heavier tax burden on households with lower
property taxes, with the compliance rate (percentage of owners paying taxes)
productivity and consumption. This is confirmed when tax incidence is
ranging from 25 % to 90 % depending on the district (Del Carpio, 2014). In
Mexico City, the compliance rate is about 60 % (Brockmeyer et al., 2021). At
disaggregated by land area classes (see Appendix 6), where the tax
the other extreme, in the city of Kananga, Democratic Republic of Congo, only burden on female-only households with less than 0.5 hectare of land is
8.8 % of property owners pay property taxes (Bergeron et al., 2021). 47 % higher than for dual-adult households. Because of taboos against
9
There is very little data with which to compare the tax burdens of property
taxes, but Norregaard (2013) estimates that among property owners in
Denmark, tax incidence of individuals in the poorest decile is 1.8 % of per
10
capita income, similar to our estimates. Property tax in Denmark is also Appendix 3 also shows that the adult-equivalent land areas do not differ
regressive (Norregaard, 2013). For other examples, in Mexico City the poorest much across gender-disaggregated households or at the individual-level. There
owners bear a property tax of about 1 % of household income (Brockmeyer is an almost equitable distribution of farm areas held by women and men
et al., 2021), and in Rwanda the rural property tax for the poorest households is because women and men in male-headed households are joint holders and
approximately 0.5 % (Kalkuhl et al., 2018). women in female-headed households are exclusive holders (see Appendix 5).

7
H. Komatsu et al. Land Use Policy 121 (2022) 106305

women engaging in agricultural work, women in households with no
male adults have to sharecrop their land (Bezabih et al., 2016), and
receive a lower percentage of the yield, as we saw in Table 2. There is
also evidence that sharecroppers’ yields on women-owned farms are
lower than on men-owned farms (Ghebru and Holden, 2015). Even
when women manage farms themselves, researchers find a gender
productivity gap (Aguilar et al., 201511; Ghebru and Holden, 2015).
These factors reduce consumption and contribute to higher tax burdens
for female-only- and female-headed households. Taxes on land seem to
reinforce existing gender inequities because they place a heavier burden
on female-headed- and female-only households, who already face
several areas of disadvantage in agriculture and consumption.
ments and imputed tax liabilities, in this section, we calculate tax inci­
dence using imputed tax liabilities with land size and the tax schedules.
The assumption is that there is full tax compliance. Our results in Table 6
show that tax incidence using imputed tax liabilities with land size and
tax schedules is about a third of the incidence using self-reported taxes.
Some patterns of the tax burden still hold, however. On vertical equity,
taxes are regressive. As for horizontal equity, female-headed and female-
only households still bear a larger burden than male-oriented house­
holds. Tax incidence of female-only households is 42 % larger than that
of dual-adult households – similar to the difference using self-reported
taxes. For individuals, the gender difference in tax incidence is no
longer significant (see panel 3).

5.3. Policy simulation: Hypothetical tax incidence

5.2. Imputed tax incidence using the tax schedules

Since the tax incidence is greater for female-only households than

Because there are large differences between self-reported tax pay­
dual households, we carry out a policy simulation to calculate the tax
incidence of a hypothetical tax schedule that reduces per-hectare tax
Table 6
rates for farmers with less than 0.5 hectare of land and progressively
Imputed tax incidence.
increases the tax liabilities for larger landholders to assess how it affects
Panel 1 Panel 2 vertical and horizontal equity.
Imputed household Imputed individual We start with the tax schedule of Amhara region for kebeles (or
tax incidence tax incidence wards) that are not in the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP)
Exp Quartile Male- Female- Exp Quartile Male Female because the average per-hectare tax rate is the most progressive for land
headed headed holders holders that is larger than one hectare, and we then increase the tax liabilities for
Poorest 0.22 0.25a Poorest 0.59 0.60 larger landholdings. We set the agricultural income tax liability for
2 0.13 0.21a 2 0.32 0.32 smallholder farmers (<0.5 ha) at zero. The hypothetical tax schedule
3 0.09 0.13a 3 0.22 0.22 outlined in Table 7 results in an average per-hectare tax rate that in­
Richest 0.06 0.08a Richest 0.11 0.12
creases with land area (column 4).
Total tax 0.14 0.18 Total tax 0.32 0.33
incidence incidence Using the total tax liabilities in column 3, and household and
Number of 979 284 Number of 1075 1110 respondent landholding size, we calculate the hypothetical tax incidence
households respondents (in Table 8). We assume full tax compliance and no behavioral responses
Panel 3b to the changes. The results show that there is no longer a gender dif­
Imputed household
ference in tax incidence because the tax liabilities for total landholdings
tax incidence
Position in exp Dual Female- of less than 0.5 ha are lower. Female-only households continue to bear a
distribution adult only larger tax burden than dual-adult households in the second quartile but
Bottom 40% 0.19 0.26a the magnitude of the difference is smaller than when self-reported taxes
Top 60% 0.09 0.15a
are used. However, the taxes continue to be regressive because the
Total tax 0.14 0.20
incidence average landholding size does not vary across the expenditure distri­
Number of 1058 172 bution. This illustrates how difficult it is for area-based taxes on land to
households be vertically equitable, particularly where land rights are prevalent
Notes: Tax liabilities are imputed by using the area of household landholdings among poor rural households.
and the tax schedules. For panels 1 and 3, household tax incidence is calculated There has been an increasing focus on the potential of property taxes
by dividing imputed tax payments by household expenditure. In panel 2, indi­ to raise local government revenue and reduce the need for inter-
vidual tax incidence is calculated by dividing imputed tax payments (appor­ governmental fiscal transfers (Franzsen and McCluskey, 2017; Jun­
tioned according to individual landholdings) by per capita expenditure. The quera-Varela et al., 2017). An area-based tax on land – a form of prop­
sample is restricted to landholding households and respondents in the three erty taxes - are economically more efficient, easier to administer, and
regions. Tests of equality of means were conducted between (1) male- and
female-headed households, (2) male and female landholders, and (3) dual adult
Table 7
and female-only households. Significant differences at p < 0.05 are reflected in
Hypothetical tax schedule, Birr.
bold.
a (1) (2) (3) (4)
The sample size is less than 100 observations.
b
Male-adult- only households are excluded in this panel because of small Land area Rural land Agricultural Total tax Average per
sample size. (hectare) use fee income tax liabilities hectare tax rate
Source: Authors’ calculations using ESS 2018/2019 and Amhara Regional State, < 0.5 15 0 15 60.0
Proclamation (No.161/ (2001), Proclamation to Amend Rural Land Use Pay­ 0.5–1 20 30 50 66.
ment and Agricultural Income Tax of Oromia Regional State’s Proclamation 1–1.5 30 55 85 68.0
(No.99/ (2005), Southern Nations et al. (2008), A Revised Proclamation to 1.5–2 40 80 120 68.6
2–2.5 50 105 155 68.9
provide for rural land use fee and agricultural activities income tax (No. 122/
2.5–3 60 130 190 69.1
2008).
3–3.5 70 155 225 69.2
3.5–4 85 180 265 70.7
4–4.5 100 205 305 71.8
4.5–5 115 230 345 72.6

11
Although the analysis of Aguilar et al. (2015) focuses on female farm
managers, not female-headed households, 95% of female managers are in fact
heads of households.
Notes: Columns 1–3 provide a hypothetical tax schedule that exempts the agri­
cultural income tax for smallholders with less than 0.5 ha and increases the
progressivity of the tax schedule. The average per hectare tax rate in column 4 is
calculated by dividing the total tax by the midpoint of the landholding classes.

8
H. Komatsu et al. Land Use Policy 121 (2022) 106305

Table 8 insecurity.
Hypothetical Tax Incidence. We find that these taxes are regressive, violating the vertical equity
Panel 1 Panel 2a principle. Further, female-headed- and female-only households face a
larger tax burden than their male counterparts, which violates the
Household tax incidence Household tax incidence
horizontal equity principle. These gender differences persist when we
Exp Quartile Male-headed Female-headed Dual Female adult impute tax incidence with total land area and regional tax schedules. An
adults only
area-based tax on land reinforces existing gender inequities because
Poorest 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.26b norms about women’s roles in agriculture, the structure of households,
2 0.16 0.21 0.15 0.25b
and the gender agricultural productivity gap result in higher tax burdens
3 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.14b
Richest 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07b for women than for men. While a more progressive per-hectare tax
Total tax 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.2 schedule with exemptions for smallholders would reduce the tax bur­
incidence dens for women, it would continue to be regressive. Increasing the tax
Number of 1740 556 1923 303 liabilities for large landholders could adversely poor households who
households
Panel 3
hold rights to large areas of land. Our results show that it is difficult for
Imputed individual tax incidence this type of tax to be progressive where land rights are prevalent among
Exp Quartile Male Female poor rural households.
landholders landholders We also provide evidence that gender differences in tax burdens
Poorest 0.77 0.75
depend on whether the analysis is conducted at the level of the house­
2 0.4 0.38
3 0.28 0.27 hold or the individual. The gendered landholding patterns within
Richest 0.16 0.16 households, through exclusive or joint ownership, result in a smaller
Total tax 0.42 0.41 difference in tax burdens between male and female landholders than
incidence between female-only and dual households. This points to the importance
Number of 1763 1754
respondents
of data on individual ownership in survey data to reveal such differences
and to ensure that policies are effectively targeted.
Notes: The sample is restricted to landholding households and respondents. Tax
incidence is calculated by dividing by household expenditures the imputed tax
Data availability
liabilities using land area and the hypothetical tax schedule in Table 7. Tests of
equality of means were conducted between (1) male- and female-headed
households, (2) dual-adult and female-only households, and (3) male and fe­
Data will be made available on request.
male landholders. Significant differences at p < 0.05 are reflected in bold.
a
Male-adult-only households are excluded in this panel because of small Appendix A. Supporting information
sample size. b The sample size is less than 100 observations.
Source: Authors’ calculations using ESS 2018/2019. Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the
online version at doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2022.106305.
cost less than value-based property taxes (Slack and Bird, 2014),
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