LMT (Done)

Basic Concepts

1. Declaration of principles and state policies (Art. II)

1. Principles
1. Sec. 1
1. Doctrine of Parens Patriae
1. The doctrine provides that the government may act as
guardian of the rights of the people who may be
disadvantaged or suffering from some disability or misfortune
(GRP v. Monte de Piedad).
2. Classification of Government
1. De Jure - government with rightful title but no power or
control
2. De Facto - government with power or control but without title
1. De facto proper - government that usurps, by force or by
the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government
and maintains itself against the will of the latter.
2. Paramount force - occupation of a territory of the enemy
in the course of war.
3. Independent - insurrection against the parent state. (Co
Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh).
3. Why do we classify governments?
1. For suspension of political law (sovereignty)
1. If de facto proper/independent - political law is not
suspended
2. If paramount force - it is suspended
1. Exception: The law on treason subsists.
2. For international obligations (PIL)
1. If de facto proper/independent/paramount force - the
doctrine of state continuity applies, i.e., the State
continues to be bound of its International obligations
notwithstanding a change in Government
2. If there is succession of State - not anymore, under
the clean slate theory.
2. Sec. 2
1. Doctrine of incorporation
1. It means international law form part of the municipal law,
without need of further legislative action.
2. Under Sec. 2, Art. II, “The Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
 2.

the land.”
2. “Generally accepted principles of international law”
1. The term includes international customs, and general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations. (Poe-
Llamanzares v COMELEC, 2016) 
1. There must be 1) state practice, and 2) opinio juris sive
necessitates.
3. Doctrine fo transformation
1. It means international law form part of the municipal law
provided there is a further legislative action.
2. Under Sec. 21, Art. VII, “No treaty or international agreement
shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”
3. This doctrine applies if the principle is NOT generally
accepted principle of international law.
4. In case of conflict between international law and the Constitution
or municipal laws
1. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to
give effect to both.
2. In the perspective of the local State - in case the conflict is
irreconcilable, jurisprudence dictates that the Constitution/
municipal law prevails.(Gonzales v Hechanova)
3. In the perspective of the international community - the
International law prevails. “A party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty.“(Art. 46, Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties)
5. In case of conflict between international law and the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court
1. In the perspective of the local State, the rule-making power of
the Supreme Court prevails over treaties entered into by the
Philippines. Otherwise, the doctrine of separation of powers
shall be violated. (In Re: Garcia)
3. Sec. 4
1. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
performed except through an army. To leave the organization of
an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of
the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who
volunteer to enlist therein. (People v Lagman, 1938)
4. Sec. 6
1. Discussed in Art. III - Bill of Rights.
2. State Policies
1. Sec. 12
 1. “Autonomous social institution” - Autonomy means freedom from
control. Hence, the State cannot enforce one-child policy.
2. “Equally protect” -  In a conflict situation between the life of the
mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always
to try to save both lives. If it is impossible, the resulting death to
one should not be deliberate/intended. The mother is never
pitted against the child because both their lives are equally
valuable. (Imbong v Ochoa, 2014)
1. It is implied that the doctor has the discretion who to save, as
long as the the resulting death to the other is not deliberate/
intended.
3. “From conception” - Conception happens when the sperm
fertilizes the egg, not when the zygote attaches to the uterus.
(Imbong v Ochoa, 2014)
1. Hence, contraceptives that prevent the sperm from fertilizing
the egg are legal, because there is still no conception.
2. However, contraceptives that a) induce abortion, b) induce
the destruction of the fetus inside the womb, or c) prevent the
fertilized ovum from reaching the uterus are abortifacients,
because there is conception already.
3. Hence, from the time of conception, the life of the fertilized
ovum must be protected already.
4. “Primary” - this means the parents’s right and duty to rear their
children is SUPERIOR to the right and duty of the State.
1. Hence, the State cannot take custody of the child, unless the
latter is already abandoned, neglected, or a foundling.
Further, the State cannot, without a compelling state interest,
take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a
minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage. (Imbong v Ochoa, 2014)
5. “Primary” - While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it
should be stressed that "when actions concerning the child have a
relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the
Sltate may act to promote these legitimate interests.” (SPARK v
QC, 2017) In short, it is true that the parents have PRIMARY right
to rear their children. However, this right is NOT EXCLUSIVE.
Hence, the parents can receive support from the Government,
such as the imposition of regulations/curfews for children (SPARK
v QC, 2017)
2. Sec. 15
1. A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to
health. This provision is self-executing. (Imbong v Ochoa, 2014)
3. Sec. 16
 1. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in
the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception
of humankind. Hence, these are self-executing.
2. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The
said right implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests. (Oposa v
Factoran)
4. Sec. 19
1. The term independent national economy does not rule out entry of
foreign investments, goods, and services. It contemplates neither
economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international
community. (Tañada v Angara, 1997)
5. Sec. 22
1. An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While
there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties
between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a
portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international
practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is
certainly not conducive to national unity. (Province of North
Cotabato v GRP Peace Panel, 2008)
6. Sec. 25
1. Autonomy simply means decentralization. It does not make local
governments sovereign within the State or an “imperium in
imperio.” (Basco v PAGCOR, 1991)
7. Sec. 26
1. This provision does not contain a judicially enforceable
constitutional right. It merely specifies a guideline for legislative
action. It is not intended to compel the State to enact measures
that woulda accommodate as many candidates as possible for
public office. Instead, this privilege may be subjected to ligations
scubas the provision on nuisance candidates. (Pamatong v
COMELEC, 2004)
8. Sec. 28
1. Discussed in Art. III - Bill of Rights.
9. X, an open and self-identified homosexual, filed pro se a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition to “declare Articles 1 and 2 of the Family
Code (FC) as unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Arts.
46(4) and 55(6) of the FC. X alleges that there is a violation of the
equal protection clause since there is no substantial distinction
between same-sex and opposite-sex couples. He argues that like
opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples are equally capable of
founding their own families and fulfilling essential marital obligations.
 Because there is allegedly no necessity to limit marriage as only
between a man and a woman, Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code are
supposedly unconstitutional. Does the Constitution prohibit same-
sex marriage? Explain with reasons, briefly.
1. No, the Constitution does not prohibit same-sex marriage. From
its plain text, the Constitution does not define or restrict marriage
on the basis of sex, gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity
or expression.
2. Article XV, Section 1 pertains to the family in general, identifying it
“as the foundation of the nation[,]” and articulates the State’s
overarching commitment to “strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development.” Article XV, Section 2 concerns
marriage, in particular, and articulates a broad commitment to
protecting its inviolability as a social institution.
3. Lacking a manifestly restrictive textual definition of marriage, the
Constitution is capable of accommodating a contemporaneous
understanding of sexual orientation, gender identity and
expression, and sex characteristics (SOGIESC). The plain text and
meaning of our constitutional provisions do not prohibit SOGIESC.
These constitutional provisions in particular, and the Constitution
in general, should be read through the lens of “a holistic approach
in legal interpretation” (Falcis, III v. The Civil Registrar General,
G.R. No. 217910, September 3, 2019, J. Leonen).
10. The City of Manila implemented a curfew ordinance entitled “An
Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00A.M. of the
Following Day as ‘Barangay Curfew Hours’ for Children and Youths
Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age.” XYZ Association, an association
of young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just
society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare of the
youth and minors, assails the constitutionality of said ordinance
because it deprives parents of their natural and primary right in
rearing the youth without substantive due process. Is XYZ correct?
Explain with reasons, briefly.
1. No. Under Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the
rearing of children for civic efficiency and the development of
their moral character are characterized not only as parental rights,
but also as parental duties. This means that parents are not only
given the privilege of exercising their authority over their children;
they are equally obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously.
The duty aspect of this provision is a reflection of the State’s
independent interest to ensure that the youth would eventually
grow into free, independent, and well-developed citizens of this
nation. The qualifier “primary” connotes the parents’ superior
 right over the State in the upbringing of their children. While
parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be
stressed that “when actions concerning the child have a
relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child,
the [S]tate may act to promote these legitimate interests.”
Thus, “[i]n cases in which harm to the physical or mental
health of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare
is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override
the parents’ qualified right to control the upbringing of their
children.” As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right
and duty to aid parents in the moral development of their
children, and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to
fulfill their parental obligations. The Curfew Ordinances are but
examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role
of promoting their children’s well-being [Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442,
August 8, 2017).
2. Sovereignty
1. Sovereignty is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in the
State by which the State is governed. (Laurel v Misa)
1. It includes supremacy of the State within the area of its jurisdiction,
and absolute independence of one State from another State.
2. Limitations of Sovereignty
1. Treaty stipulations/Doctrine of Auto-limitation - the State may, by
its consent, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. (Reagan v
CIR; Tañada v Angara)
2. Nature of membership in the family of nations.
1. In the domestic sphere, sovereignty is really absolute.
2. However, in the field of international relations, there may be
limitations imposed on sovereignty.
3. Can the Philippines enter into a treaty with China for the exploitation of
marine wealth in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone?
1. Yes. When the Philippines entered into treaties, it consented to
restrict its sovereign rights under the “concept of sovereignty as
auto-limitation.” In these treaties, the Philippines has effectively
agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers. The underlying
consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal
commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same
privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens.
The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under
WTO-GATT. The point is that, a portion of sovereignty may be waived
without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the
Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international
 law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of . . .
cooperation and amity with all nations” (Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No.
118295, May 2, 1997).
4. Can the Philippines enter into treaty with a USA Corporation for
exploitation of marine wealth in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone?
1. No. Art. XII, Sec. 2 provides that “the State shall reserve the use and
enjoyment of marine wealth in the EEZ to the use and enjoyment of
Filipino citizens.” The doctrine of auto-limitation shall NOT apply
because there is NO treaty agreed upon in the facts of the case.
5. Effect of change in sovereignty on the laws of the former sovereign?
1. Political laws - they are automatically abrogated, whether compatible
or not with those of the new sovereign. (Macariola v Asuncion, 1982)
2. Municipal laws - they regulate private rights, so they shall continue in
force. (Co Kim Cham v Tan Keh, 1945)
6. Effect of belligerent occupation on sovereignty and laws
1. There is no change of sovereignty. However, the exercise of the
rights of sovereignty are suspended.
1. Political laws are suspended, except the law on treason. Why?
Because citizens owe permanent and absolute allegiance to their
country.
2. Municipal laws remain in force since they regulate the relations of
private individuals. (Laurel v Misa)
7. Principle of Jus Postliminium
1. Political law
1. The principle provides that at the end of the occupation, when the
occupant is ousted from the territory, the political laws which had
been suspended during the occupation shall automatically
become effective again (Peralta v. Dir. Of Prisons.)
2. In the same vein, political laws of the belligerent occupants are
automatically abrogated. (Macariola v Asuncion)
2. Municipal laws
1. Municipal laws enacted by the belligerent occupant remain in
force because they regulate private rights.
2. If they are inconsistent with the municipal laws of the occupied
territory, a subsequent proclamation declaring them inoperative is
still required. (Macariola v Asuncion)
3. Judicial decisions
1. Judicial decisions rendered by the invader continue in force and
effect even after the cessation of invasion. Why? Because there
are vested rights which have been acquired by virtue of the
judgment. (Co Kim Cham v Tan Keh, 1945)
8. Effects of Revolutionary Government
1. A revolutionary government is bound by no constitution. However,
 1.
after installing itself as a de jure government, it could not escape
responsibility for the State‘s good faith compliance with its
TREATY OBLIGATIONS under international law. Hence, the
directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or
the Declaration (Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR. 104768, July 21,
2003).
3. State immunity
1. General Rule:
1. The State may not be sued without its consent. (Sec. 3, Art. XVI)
2. Immunity is also enjoyed by other States, consonant with the public
international law principle of par in parem non habet imperium
(Sovereign equality of States). The Head of State, who is deemed
the personification of the State, is inviolable, and thus, enjoys
immunity from suit. (Holy See v Rosario)
2. Exception; Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty:
1. However, it may be sued if it gives consent, whether express or
implied.
2. The consent is given by the legislature. It cannot be given by the
President, through the creation of a Commission. (Republic v
Sandoval) Neither can it emanate from an administrative officer
through a memorandum. (VMPSI v CA)
3. Forms of consent
1. Express consent (Act 3083(contract) + law)
1. Act No. 3083 and CA 327, as amended by PD 1445: “The
Government of the Philippine Islands hereby consents and
submits to be sued upon any MONEY CLAIMS arising from
CONTRACT, expressed or implied, which could serve as a
basis of civil action between private parties.” “A person
desiring to avail himself of this privilege must show that he
first presented his claim to the Insular Auditor and that the
latter did not decide the same within two months from the
date of its presentation.” (Act 3083) The COA must act upon
the claim within sixty (60) days. (CA 327) Rejection of the
claim authorizes the claimant to elevate the matter to the
Supreme Court on certiorari. (PD 1445, and Rule 64)
1. NOTE: It is the Commission on Audit which has primary
jurisdiction over money claims against government
agencies and instrumentalities, including local
governments units. Hence, COA and NOT the RTC has
primary jurisdiction to pass upon a money claim of
Builders Company against the City of Kaunlaran. (Province
of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development
Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 202623, November 27, 2013)
 1. Does this apply to GOCCs? No, since they are not
agencies/instrumentalities/LGUs.
2. Local Government Code, Sec. 22(a)(2): LGUs have the power
to sue and be sued.
3. Special charters of GOCC
2. Implied consent (LBP)
1. When the State commences litigation
2. When the State enters into a proprietary/business contract
(jure gestionis) (USA v Ruiz)
1. Example is entering into a contract for restaurant
services.
2. The opposite is when the State performs acts which are
sovereign/governmental in character (jure imperii).
3. Immunity cannot be used to perpetrate injustice. (Ministerio
v City of Cebu, among others)
1. Example is taking the real property of a person without
just compensation.
4. Waiver of immunity from suit does not mean concession/
ADMISSION of liability. The State can raise defenses in the suit.
(Philippine Rock Industries, Inc. vs. Board of Liquidators)
5. Waiver of immunity from suit does not include consent to the
EXECUTION of judgment
1. Such execution will require another waiver from the State,
because the power of the court ends when the judgment is
rendered. Hence, a corresponding appropriation law is required to
execute the judgment. (Republic v Villasor)
2. Basis: Sec. 29(1), Art. VI provides that “No money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.”
6. What are the suits against the State?
1. The Republic is sued by name;
2. The suit is against an unincorporated agency, and its principal
function is governmental; or
3. When the suit is on its face against A GOVERNMENT OFFICER,
but the case issue that ULTIMATE LIABILITY will belong not to
the officer, but to the GOVERNMENT.
7. Specific rules on suability and liability for LGUs
1. They are ALL suable, as provided under Sec. 22(a), LGC.
2. However, for liability and for execution of judgment, we have
different rules:
1. They are generally NOT LIABLE for torts committed by them in
the discharge of governmental functions and can be held
answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a
 1.

proprietary capacity. (San Fernando, La Union v Firme)

2. Assuming that the LGU is adjudged as liable, can the
judgment be EXECUTED already? No. Public funds are
EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION, unless there is a corresponding
appropriation in the form of an ORDINANCE. (San Miguel,
Bulacan v Fernandez)
3. If that is the case, what is the remedy of the injured party?The
claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to
compel the enactment and approval of the necessary
appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement
of municipal funds therefor. (Yuviengco v. Gonzales, 1960)
4. Why is mandamus not available against the Government?
Because of doctrine of separation of powers, and doctrine of
inter-departmental courtesy.
8. When will “ultimate liability” belong to the government?
1. State immunity extends its protective mantle also to complaints
filed against acts of state officials in the discharge and
performance of their duties, within the scope of their authority.
(DOH v Phi. Pharmawealth, 2013)
9. When the public official acts in bad faith, or BEYOND THE SCOPE
of his authority, he is personally liable. (VMPSI v CA)
1. In such case, the State is not suable, not because it did not give
its consent, but because it is not a party to the contract. Since the
public official acted in bad faith or in ultra vires, he is deemed to
have personally contracted with the injured party.
10. A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Billy, a
gravel and sand truck driven by Jose and a dump truck of the
Municipality of X and driven by Alfred. Several passengers of the
jeepney suffered varying degrees of physical injuries. A complaint for
damages against Municipality X and Alfred. Municipality X raised the
affirmative defense of non-suability of the State. The charter of
Municipality X grants the latter the power to sue and be sued. Is that
considered a waiver to the non-suability of Municipality X?
1. Yes, the power granted under the charter of Municipality X to sue
and be sued is a waiver of from its immunity from suit. The
doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in
Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, to wit: “the State may not be
sued without its consent.” Consent takes the form of express or
implied consent. Express consent may be embodied in a general
law or a special law. Municipal corporations, like provinces and
cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in
 the performance of such functions because their charter provided
that they can sue and be sued. Hence, Municipality X may be sued
because its charter says so (Municipality of San Fernando v.
Firme, G.R. No. 52179, April 8, 1991).
4. Separation of powers
1. The doctrine of separation of powers means that each branch of the
Government is separate, independent, and equal from the others.
(Angara v Electoral Commission, 1936)
2. When one branch encroaches into the powers of another branch, the
doctrine of separation of powers is violated. As a result, the Supreme
Court can nullify the same because it is unconstitutional.
3. The heads of each branch are co-equals, i.e., the President, the Congress,
and the Supreme Court. Hence, inter-departmental courtesy demands
that the highest levels of each department be EXEMPT FROM
COMPULSORY PROCESSES other departments on matters related to the
functions and duties of their office. (In Re: Production of Court Records
and Documents, 2012)
4. Is the PDAF not unconstitutional?
1. No, the Court ruled that the PDAF is unconstitutional. One reason is
that it violated the doctrine of separation of powers. Why? Once the
budget is enacted, the work of Congress ends. It cannot implement
the same law that was passed. In the implementation process, there is
merely oversight functions over the Department Heads of the
Executive Branch. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No.
208566, November 19, 2013)
5. Congress enacted law establishing the right to trial by jury of an accused
charged with a felony or offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. The law provides for the qualifications of prospective jury
members, the guidelines to be observed by the Judge and the lawyers in
jury selection including the grounds for challenging the selection of jury
members, and the methodology for jury deliberations. Is the law
constitutional? Explain fully. [2008, 2013 Bar]
1. The law is unconstitutional because the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts is vested only in the
Supreme Court. Congress cannot encroach to the prerogatives of the
Judiciary particularly those expressly given by the Constitution. The
interference of Congress of such power would be struck down
because it violates the separation of powers (Sec. 5(5), Article VIII,
1987 Constitution).
6. In RA 9262, there is no undue delegation of judicial power to barangay
officials.
1. The BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by
 1.
any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to
desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and
(2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such
function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature,
in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to
“enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the
barangay.
2. The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the
existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to
determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these
acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial
powers. Jesus C. Garcia v. The Hon. Ray Alan T. Drilon, G.R. No.
179267, June 25, 2013.
5. Checks and balances
1. The doctrine of checks and balances allows one department to resist
encroachments upon its prerogatives or to RECTIFY MISTAKES or
excesses committed by the other departments, i.e., veto power of the
President as check on improvident legislation, and nullification of an
invalid law/executive order through a judicial review by the Supreme Court.
2. The doctrine of checks and balances is a complement of separation of
powers.
1. It “checks and balances” the acts of the departments once it violates
the doctrine of separation of powers.
3. Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy; Judicial Review
1. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.
2. It does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does
not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation/duty assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy
the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This
is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy"
which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 1936)
4. Principle of Blending of Powers
1. This is a principle wherein when powers are not confined exclusively
within one department but are assigned to or shared by several
departments, i.e., enacting the national budget (President and
Congress), passing treaties (President and Senate), and granting
amnesties (President and Congress)
 5. Give examples of checks and balances in the government.
1. President
1. His approval is required in the law-making process of the
Congress. He may exercise veto power (CONST. Art, VI, Sec. 27).
2. He may nullify a conviction in a criminal case by pardoning the
offender (CONST. Art, VII, Sec. 19).
2. Congress
1. May override the veto power of the President by a vote of 2/3 of
all the members of each house (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 27).
2. Its consent through the Commission on Appointments is
necessary in the appointments of certain officers by the President
(CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 18).
3. Congress may refuse to give its concurrence to an amnesty
proclaimed by the President or the Senate refuse to concur to a
treaty the President has concluded (CONST. Art, VII, Secs. 19 &
21).
4. Sole power to impeach officers who may only be removed by
impeachment (CONST. Art. XI, Sec. 3).
5. May define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts but may not deprive the SC of its jurisdiction over
cases enumerated in Sec. 5 of Art. VIII (CONST. Art. VIII, Sec. 2).
3. Judiciary
1. In general, has the power to declare invalid an act done by the
Congress, the President and his subordinates, or the
Constitutional Commissions (CONST. Art, VIII, Sec. 4; Angara v.
Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L- 45081, July 15, 1936).
6. Delegation of powers
1. Principle of Non-Delegability of Powers
1. General Rule: The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated. Since the Constitution already delegated the lawmaking
powers to the Congress, the Congress cannot delegate it again to
another body.
2. Exceptions: (LPPPA)
1. Delegation to local government units
2. Delegation of its legislative power by allowing direct legislation by
the People in cases of initiative and referendum
3. Delegation of emergency powers to the President
1. When may Congress grant emergency powers to the
President? (WELLRPR)
1. War or other Emergency
2. Law
3. Limited period only
4. Subject to Restrictions as the Congress may prescribe
 5. Must carry out a national Policy declared by Congress.
(David v Arroyo; Sec. 23(2), Art. VII)
6. It must not be withdrawn by Resolution of the Congress
OR the Congressional session has not adjourned.
1. Emergency power must be granted by LAW. However,
it is withdrawn by mere RESOLUTION OR cease upon
the next adjournment of session.
1. The term “resolution” includes an approved bill by
Congress. (Rodriguez vs. Gella, 1953)
2. The term “session” includes regular and special
session (Cruz)
4. Delegation of tariff powers to the President
1. Sec. 28(2), Art. VI: The Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
5. Delegation to administrative bodies or the power of
“subordinate” legislation. Congress may delegate to another
branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law.
1. Completeness test - this test mandates that the law must be
COMPLETE IN ALL ITS TERMS and conditions when it leaves
the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the
ONLY THING he will have to do is to ENFORCE IT.
2. Sufficient Standard test - this test mandates that there
should be ADEQUATE STANDARDS or limitations in the law
to determine the BOUNDARIES of the delegate's authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot. (Kilusang Mayo
Uno v Hon. Aquino III, 2019, Leonen)
1. If the tests are not complied with, there is an invalid
delegation of power. Hence, the act of the administrative
body is void.
7. Fundamental powers of the State
1. Police power
1. Police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is the
most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of the
three fundamental powers of the State. (Southern Luzon Drug v
DSWD, 2017)
2. Requisites:
1. Lawful subject (Public interest requires interference)
 1. The INTEREST of the PUBLIC generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, REQUIRE the interference of
the State
2. Lawful means (Means reasonably necessary to accomplish
the public interest; NOT unduly oppressive)
1. The MEANS employed are REASONABLY NECESSARY for
the accomplishment of the purpose of the law, and
2. It is NOT UNDULY OPPRESSIVE upon individuals.
1. ILLUSTRATION: No vaccine, no access to public
transportation.
1. Lawful subject - Because the regulation is in the
interest of the public health/welfare. People who are
unvaccinated will likely spread the virus.
2. Lawful means - Because the regulation is reasonably
necessary to compel the people to get vaccinated.
Otherwise, they cannot ride public transportation.
This is not unduly oppressive because it applies to all
Filipinos.
2. Lawful subject
1. DepEd v San Diego
1. The dream to become a doctor can be regulated
in the exercise of police power.
2. The competence of doctors must be regulated
because it will affect public health/welfare.
3. Hence, those who failed NMAT 5 times shall be
barred from taking it for another time, since it is
reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose
of the law, which is to uphold the competence of
doctors. It is also not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
2. Del Rosario v Bengzon
1. Prescription of medicine.
2. Doctors are obligated to state generic medicines,
not only branded names. This affects public
health/welfare.
3. Imbong v Ochoa
1. Population control
2. If the population will not be controlled by the
State, the general welfare will be affected.
3. Lawful means
1. Lucena Grant Terminal v JAC, 2005
1. All the buses cannot go in the city proper of
Lucena.
 2. If they have terminals within the city proper, they
are deemed closed. Their terminal must only be
the central terminal.
3. There is lawful subject, because the decongestion
of traffic affects public welfare.
4. There is NO lawful means, because it is
oppressive. The buses of JAC do not actually
enter the city proper, since it has its terminal
outside the city proper. Hence, it is unduly
oppressive.
2. Dela Cruz v Paras, 1983
1. Overbreadth.
2. Not all night clubs/clubs/dance halls perform acts
contrary to public morals.
3. Lupangco v CA, 1988
1. PRC prohibited examinees from attending review
classes and receiving tips/handouts 3 days before
the date of examination.
2. There is NO lawful means because it is
unreasonable to achieve the purpose, which is to
maintain the integrity of the examination.
4. OSG v Ayala, 2009
1. Prohibition of collecting parking fees in mall
parking facilities.
2. This is unconstitutional, because it amounts to an
invalid exercise of police power. There was taking
without just compensation.
5. Fernando v St. Scholastica’s College, 2013
1. Ordinance requiring for a setback for parking
spaces and 80% see through requirements on
fences.
2. For setback for parking spaces, this is
unconstitutional, because it amounts to an invalid
exercise of police power. There was taking
without just compensation.
3. For 80% see through requirements on fences, it is
not a lawful means, because the ordinance failed
to establish reasonable connection between the
evil sought to be prevented and the measure.
Why? Crimes can still be committed within the
structure, which cannot also be seen despite
having see through fences.
6. Ferrer v Mayor Bautista, 2015 (GITO: Possible Bar
 6.
question)
1. Special assessment for the purpose of building
houses for informal settlers.
2. Is this a valid tax ordinance?
1. Yes.
2. Property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the
government in the exercise of police
power.
3. It is well-entrenched that taxation may be
made in the implement of police power.
4. Here, the special assessment is a form of tax,
used as an implement of police power,
because it is the declared policy of the State
to undertake a comprehensive and continuing
urban development and housing program that
shall, among others, uplift the conditions of
the underprivileged and homeless citizens in
urban areas and in resettlement areas.
7. SWS v COMELEC, 2015, Leonen (GITO: Possible Bar
question)
1. Survey firm is required to publish information as
to the name of the person paying for the survey.
To implement this Fair Election Act, COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 9764.
2. Can COMELEC regulate election surveys?
1. Yes. A survey is an election propaganda.
Since it is a form of election propaganda, it
may be regulated for the sake of state
compelling interest and the state
compelling interest is fair election, or
equal opportunities for public services.
(Sec. 26, Art. 2)
1. Why? Because those who rank high in the
election survey will publish the results of
the same, to affect the minds of the
voters.
2. It is not a mere descriptive aggregation of
data.
3. Limitations of police power
1. Due Process Clause
2. Equal Protection Clause
 1. If the requisites of police power are not complied with, the
due process and equal protection clause are violated.
4. Who exercises police power?
1. It is vested in the Legislature.
2. However, it may validly delegate this power to the President/
administrative bodies/LGUs.
1. Since the power is merely delegated to them, it cannot be
contrary to law, i.e., an activity prohibited by law cannot, in
the guise of regulation, be allowed; further, an activity allowed
by law may be regulated, but not prohibited.
5. LGUs exercise police power under the general welfare clause (LGC)
1. While police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature,
Congress may delegate this power to local government units.
2. Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers:
1. Expressly granted,
2. Necessarily implied therefrom,
3. As well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and
4. Those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare.
3. In order for an ordinance to be valid, the ordinance (PRODUC -
Public policy; Regulate trade; Oppressive; Discriminatory;
Unreasonable; Contravene Constitution)
1. must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
2. must not be unfair or oppressive;
3. must not be partial or discriminatory;
4. must not prohibit, but may regulate trade;
5. must be general and consistent with public policy; and
6. must not be unreasonable. City of Batangas v. Philippine
Shell Petroleum Corporation, G.R. No. 195003, June 7,
2017.
1. NOTE: This is the same as the requisites of substantive
due process (laws).
6. The power of eminent domain as an implement of police power
1. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) is an example of
the power of eminent domain being an implement of police power,
i.e., social justice.
7. The power of taxation as an implement of police power
1. As a rule, the purpose of taxation laws is to generate revenues for
the Government.
2. As exception, the purpose of taxation laws can be to regulate
liberty or property. In this case, taxation beomes an implement of
 2.

police power.
2. Eminent domain (Also read Rule 67 in Remedial Law)
1. Definition
1. It is the power to forcibly take private property for public use,
upon payment of just compensation.
2. Sec. 9, Art. III is not a conferment of power. Eminent domain is
inherent in every State. Instead, it is a limitation on the exercise of
the power of eminent domain.
2. Six (6) requisites of valid exercise of eminent domain: (PT-PP-JD)
(Private property; TAKING; public use; public necessity; just
compensation; due process)
1. Private Property
1. The property to be expropriated cannot be public. It must at
least be patrimonial property.
2. Taking - five (5) requisites (PMLJB - (Private; Momentary;
Legal; Just compensation; Beneficial enjoyment)
1. Enter a Private property,
2. Not for a Momentary period,
3. Warrant or color of Legal authority,
4. Public use, and
5. Oust the owner and deprive him of Beneficial enjoyment of
the property
1. This covers, not only the property traversed by the right-
of-way, but also the property adjacent to it. (NPC v
Gutierrez; NPC v Spouses Asoque, 2016, Leonen)
2. Building a tunnel underneath the property is also
“taking.” (NPC v Heirs of Sangkay)
3. Enacting an ordinance prohibiting a building which would
impair the view of the plaza is considered taking. (People
v Fajardo)
3. Public Use
1. “Public use” is one which confers some benefit, utility, or
advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by
public. (Manosca vs CA).
2. If there is NO public use, what is the remedy of the property
owner?
1. When the taking of private property is NO longer for a
public purpose, the expropriation complaint should be
dismissed by the trial court. Hence, it must RETURN the
property to the private owner, subject to whatever
damages were incurred in the course of the taking. (NPC
v Posada, 2015, Leonen)
4. Public Necessity
 1. When exercised by Congress through a law - this is a political
question.
2. When exercised by a delegate (LGU; Departments) through a
specific delegation of authority - it is also a political
question.
3. When exercised by a delegate (LGU; Departments) through a
general delegation of authority - it is a justiciable question.
(City of Manila v Chinese Community of Manila)
1. THE LGU/DEPARTMENT WAS GIVEN/DELEGATED
GENERAL POWER OF EXPROPRIATION.
OR THERE IS A SPECIFIC PROJECT WHERE THE
POWER IS DELEGATED?
2. Is there a difference between public necessity and public
use?
1. Yes. Public use simply means the public can gain
some benefit, advantage, or utility from the
expropriation. On the other hand, public necessity
determines whether the public needs the
expropriation.
2. As example, expropriating a Chinese cemetery to
build a road provides some benefit to the public.
However, the expropriation is invalid because it is not
necessary.
5. Just Compensation
1. Just compensation means the full, fair, and PROMPT payment
of the equivalent of the property taken.
2. What is the remedy of the property owner if the State failed to
pay just compensation?
1. In case of a taking without the proper expropriation action
filed, the property owner may file its own action to
question the propriety of the taking or to compel the
payment of just compensation. Among these inverse
condemnation actions is a complaint for payment of just
compensation and damages. (NPC v Spouses Asoque,
2016, Leonen)
3. In the inverse expropriation case, is there a need for three (3)
commissioners to determine just compensation?
1. No. If no such complaint is filed, the expropriator is
considered to have VIOLATED procedural requirements
and, hence, WAIVED the usual procedure prescribed in
Rule 67. This includes the appointment of commissioners
to ascertain just compensation. (NPC v Spouses Asoque,
2016, Leonen)
 4. If there is no payment of just compensation, can the property
owner recover the land expropriated?
1. No. It is neither convenient nor feasible if the land is
ALREADY USED FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE, so the only
relief available is to pay just compensation. (Amigable v
Cuenca)
5. When can the property owner recover the land?
1. If the property is NO LONGER USED FOR PUBLIC
PURPOSE, the Government must RETURN the property
to the private owner. (NPC v Posada, 2015, Leonen)
6. Land Bank v Sps. Esteban 2017
1. The LBP correctly argued that consideration of the
valuation factors under Section 17 of RA 6657 and the
implementing formula under DAR A.O. No. 05-98 is
mandatory in ascertaining just compensation for
purposes of agrarian reform cases. In short, it is a valid
formula.
2. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Gonzalez, we held
that although the determination of just compensation
is fundamentally a JUDICIAL FUNCTION vested in the
RTC, the judge must still exercise his discretion
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
3. He ought to take into full consideration the factors
specifically identified in RA 6657 and its implementing
rules, as contained under the pertinent Administrative
Orders of the DAR, such as DAR A.O. No. 05-98, which
contains the basic formula of the factors enumerated
under said law. He may not disregard the procedure laid
down therein because unless an administrative order is
declared invalid courts have no option but to apply it.
6. Due Process
1. It requires that the property owner must be given an
opportunity to be heard in the determination of the fair market
value of the property. The procedure is provided under Rule
67.
3. How do we determine if the governmental act is an exercise of
eminent domain or police power?
1. General Rule: In police power, there must be no “taking.” Hence,
if there is “taking,” it is eminent domain. If there is merely
“regulation,” it is police power.
2. Exception: If the purpose of the taking is to destroy the harmful or
obnoxious property to the public, it is an exercise of police power.
1. It is important to distinguish them because of just
 1.
compensation.
4. Power of eminent domain exercised by the LGUs through a valid
delegation (LGC)
1. Ordinance;
2. Public use;
3. Just compensation; and
4. Valid and definite offer has been previously made.(Municipality of
Paranaque vs VM Realty)
5. For immediate possession, the LGU may immediately take
possession of the property, provided it 1) files the expropriation
case, and 2) it deposits 15% of the FMV of the property, based on
the current tax declaration. (Sec. 19, LGC)
5. RA 8975 - Prohibiting Lower Courts from Issuing Restraining Orders,
Preliminary Injunctions or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions on
Government Infrastructure Projects
1. No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any TRO/PI/PMI
against the government to restrain, prohibit or compel the
following acts:
1. Bidding or awarding of contract/ project of the national
government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
2. Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way
and/or site or location of any national government project;
3. Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation,
operation of any such contract or project;
4. Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
5. The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity
necessary for such contract/project.
2. Exceptions:
1. Supreme Court
2. When the matter is of a) extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, and b) grave injustice and irreparable
injury will arise, TRO may be issued, upon the filing of the
bond.
6. The Republic commenced a suit against respondent PL Telecoms
praying for the right to demand interconnection between the
Government Telephone System and that of PL Telecoms, so that the
Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and
facilities of the respondent. Respondent contends that it cannot be
compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had
between them. Resolve.
1. While it is true that respondent cannot be compelled to enter into
a contract with the Government, there is, however, no cogent
reason why the power of eminent domain may not be availed of to
 1.

impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property,

without loss of title and possession. If, under Sec. 6, Art. XIII, of
the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national
welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of
just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not
require a public utility to RENDER SERVICES in the general
interest, provided JUST COMPENSATION is paid therefore.
Hence, while the Republic may not compel respondent to
celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of
the power of EMINENT DOMAIN, require the telephone company
to permit interconnection of the government telephone system
and that of the respondent, as the needs of the government
service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation
to be determined by the court (Republic vs. Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Co., G.R. No. L-18841, January 27, 1969).
1. Such interconnection is a “Private property” that can be
expropriated. Use the requisite of the exercise of eminent
domain.
7. Spouses H and W were the registered owners of parcels of agricultural
land. They offered the parcels of land for sale to the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the Voluntary Offer to Sell of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in 1995. During the
summary proceedings before the DAR, the parcels of land were valued
at ₱714,713.78. The Spouses did not agree with the initial valuation.
Upon a Petition for Review, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB)
raised the amount to ₱739,461.43, which the Spouses then withdrew
from the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). Still dissatisfied with the
amount, the Spouses on August 3, 2000 filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), sitting as the Special Agrarian Court (SAC), a Complaint
for the determination of just compensation. The SAC fixed the just
compensation in the amount of ₱1,024,115.49. In determining just
compensation the SAC took the average between LBP’s valuation and
the market value of the properties based on its respective tax
declarations. Thus, expanding the basic general formula under
Administrative Order No. 5 [LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)].
Is the SAC correct?
1. No, the SAC is not correct. The final determination of just
compensation is vested in courts. The Court has ruled that
courts MAY DEVIATE from the basic formula provided by
administrative agencies if it finds, in its discretion, that other
factors must be taken into account in the determination of just
compensation. Deviation, however, must be grounded on a
REASONED EXPLANATION based on the evidence on record.
 Absent this, the deviation will be considered as GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION. Here, by averaging the price of the land, as
computed based on the Department guidelines, and the land’s
market value as appearing in the tax declaration, the SAC did a
“double take up” of the market value per tax declaration of the
property. Such double take up, this Court held, destroyed the
affordability of the land to the farmer-beneficiaries. This method
of valuation has already been considered in Palmares as a
departure from the mandate of law and basic administrative
guidelines (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Franco, G.R. No.
203242, March 12, 2019, J. Leonen).
1. Even though determination of just compensation is a
judicial function, the courts must still exercise it within
the bounds of the law. (LBP v Esteban, 2017, Leonen)
8. QUESTION: Is the senior citizen/PWD discount police power or
eminent domain?
1. In Southern Luzon Drug v DSWD, is the 20% discount for senior
citizens and PWDs an exercise of eminent domain or is it an
exercise of police power? It is an exercise of police power. It is
NOT an exercise of eminent domain.
2. Take note of the five (5) requisites of the eminent domain.
1. The first requirement speaks of entry into a private property
which clearly does not obtain in this case. There is no private
property invaded or appropriated by the State. As it is, the
petitioner precipitately deemed future profits as private
property and then proceeded to argue that the State took it
away without full compensation. This seemed preposterous
considering that the subject of what the petitioner supposed
as taking was not even earned profits but merely an
expectation of profits, which may not even occur. For obvious
reasons, there cannot be taking of a contingency or of a mere
possibility because it lacks physical existence that is
necessary before there could be any taking. Further, it is
impossible to quantify the compensation for the loss of
supposed profits before it is earned. In short, future profits
shall not be considered as private property, since they do
not even exist.
2. The supposed taking also lacked the characteristics of
permanence and consistency. The reason is that the impact
on the establishments varies depending on their response to
the changes brought about by the subject provisions. To be
clear, establishments, are not prevented from adjusting their
prices to accommodate the effects of the granting of the
 discount and retain their profitability while being fully
compliant to the laws. It follows that losses are not inevitable
because establishments are free to take business measures to
accommodate the contingency.
3. There is also no ousting of the owner or deprivation of
ownership. Establishments are neither divested of
ownership of any of their properties nor is anything forcibly
taken from them. They remain the owner of their goods and
their profit or loss still depends on the performance of
their sales.
4. As a supporting basis, covered establishments are also
provided with a mechanism to recoup the amount of discounts
they grant the senior citizens and PWDs. It is provided in
Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442
that establishments may claim the discounts as "tax
deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services
rendered."
5. As another supporting basis, right to profits does not give the
petitioner the cause of action to ask for just compensation,
because it is merely expectant, and is still not existing.
Further, it is only an inchoate right which cannot be claimed
as one's own property. Certainly, the petitioner cannot claim
confiscation or taking of something that has yet to exist or
something it does not own. It cannot claim deprivation of
profit before the consummation of a sale and the purchase by
a senior citizen or PWD.
3. Instead, the Congress exercised police power. Why? (Use lawful
subject (public interest requiring interest); lawful means (means
reasonably necessary; not oppressive)
1. Because R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442 are regulatory laws. Similar
examples are the minimum wage law, zoning ordinances, price
control laws, laws regulating the operation of motels and
hotels, laws limiting the working hours to eight.
2. For instance, private establishments cannot protest that the
imposition of the minimum wage law is confiscatory since it
eats up a considerable chunk of its profits or that the
mandated remuneration is not commensurate for the work
done. The compulsory nature of the provision for minimum
wages underlies the effort of the State to favor labor and
social justice.
3. Further, the imposition of price control on staple goods in R.A.
No. 7581 is likewise a valid exercise of police power and
affected establishments cannot argue that the law was
 3.

depriving them of supposed gains. The law seeks to ensure

the availability of basic necessities and prime commodities at
reasonable prices at all times without denying legitimate
business a fair return on investment.
4. More relevantly, in Manila Memorial Park, Inc., it was ruled that
it is within the bounds of the police power of the state to
impose burden on private entities, even if it may affect their
profits, such as in the imposition of price control measures.
3. Taxation
1. Definition
1. The power by which the sovereign, through its law -making body,
raises revenue to defray the necessary expenses of government.
2. Can the power to tax include the power to destroy?
1. Yes. The power to tax includes the power to destroy if it is used
validly as an implement of the police power in discouraging and in
effect, ultimately prohibiting certain things or enterprises inimical
to the public welfare. (Justice Cruz)
3. Who exercises the power of taxation
1. As a rule, it is the Congress.
2. Exceptions:
1. However, the tariff powers may be validly delegated to
President. (Sec. 28, Ar. VI) Further, it can be delegated to the
President as an incident of emergency powers. (Sec. 23, Art.
VI)
2. Also, the Constitution, under Sec. 5, Art. X, provides that
LGUs have the power to tax. However, it can be limited by
Congress.
4. Uniform; Equitable; Progressive
1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress
shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. (Art. VI, Sec. 28)
2. Difference of Equitable and Uniformity
1. In other words, equitability in taxation simply means that the
tax shall be strictly proportional to the relative value of the
property (Cooley)
2. In contrast, uniformity in taxation means that persons or
things belonging to the same class shall be taxed at the same
rate (Dimaampao, Tax Principles and Remedies).
3. Regressive taxes
1. The Constitutional provision should be construed to mean
simply that ―direct taxes are to be preferred and indirect
taxes, as much as possible, should be minimized. Indeed, the
mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve a
progressive tax system. This is a mere directive upon
 Congress, not a justiciable right or a legally enforceable one.
We cannot avoid regressive taxes but only minimize them.
(Tolentino vs Sec. of Finance)
5. Limitations on the Exercise of the Power of Taxation
1. Due process of law: Tax should not be confiscatory.
2. Equal protection clause: Taxes should be uniform and equitable
(Sec28. (1), Art. VI)
3. It must be for a PUBLIC PURPOSE. It is considered for public
purpose if the proceeds thereof are used for the support of the
government, or for some organized object of government, or for
the welfare of the community.
4. If the taxation was made for a special purpose [Sec. 29(3), Art.
VI] – it must be treated as a special fund and paid out for such
purpose only; when purpose is fulfilled, the balance, if any, shall
be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
6. Double taxation
1. Prohibited Sense; Direct double taxation (SPK-AJP) six (6)
requisites
1. Imposition of two taxes on the same Subject matter, (nature of
tax - privilege business/transfer)
2. for the same Purpose, (for revenue or regulation purposes)
3. Of the same Kind or character (tax on sales/receipts/income/
estate)
4. by the same taxing Authority, (national/local)
5. within the same Jurisdiction (domestic/international)
6. during the same taxing Period (City of Manila v Coca-Cola
Bottlers, 2009)
1. Section 14. – Tax on Manufacturers, Assemblers and
Other Processors. – There is hereby imposed a graduated
tax on manufacturers, assemblers, repackers, processors,
brewers, distillers, rectifiers, and compounders of liquors,
distilled spirits, and wines or manufacturers of any article
of commerce of whatever kind or nature, in accordance
with any of the following schedule: x x x x over
₱6,500,000.00 up to ₱25,000,000.00 - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - --₱36,000.00 plus 50% of 1% in excess of
₱6,500,000.00
2. Section 21. – Tax on Businesses Subject to the Excise,
Value-Added or Percentage Taxes under the NIRC. – On
any of the following businesses and articles of commerce
subject to excise, value-added or percentage taxes under
the National Internal Revenue Code hereinafter referred to
as NIRC, as amended, a tax of FIFTY PERCENT (50%) of
 ONE PERCENT (1%) per annum on the gross sales or
receipts of the preceding calendar year is hereby
imposed: (A) On persons who sell goods and services in
the course of trade or business; and those who import
goods whether for business or otherwise; as provided for
in Sections 100 to 103 of the NIRC as administered and
determined by the Bureau of Internal Revenue pursuant to
the pertinent provisions of the said Code. x x x x (D)
Excisable goods subject to VAT (1) Distilled spirits; (2)
Wines x x x x (8) Coal and coke (9) Fermented liquor,
brewers’ wholesale price, excluding the ad valorem tax x x
xx
7. Tax exemptions
1. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed, without the
concurrence of a MAJORITY of ALL the members of the Congress
(Art. VI, Sec. 25, par. 4)
8. Entities and Matters Exempt from Some Kind of Taxes by the
Constitution
1. ART. VI, SECTION 28. (3) Charitable institutions, churches and
parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
1. Under Sec. 28, Art. VI, we are talking about the ASSET AND
HOW IT IS BEING USED. We will not factor in who is using,
and who is the registered owner.
1. Therefore, San Miguel Corporation can be exempted from
RPT if the property they own is being used as a chapel of
Roman Catholics.
2. We are limited to REAL PROPERTIES.
3. The provision in Article XIV states “assets.” Hence, this covers
all kinds of properties.
4. In Article VI, it only covers “lands, buildings, and
improvements.”
1. As example, “improvements” do not cover machines, but
“assets” cover machines.
2. Hence, a non-stock non-profit educational institution is
exempt from real property tax because the exemption
under Article XIV Sec. 4(3) applies. On the other hand, a
machine ADE used for religious purposes is not exempt
from real property tax because it is not an “improvement."
2. ART. XIV, SECTION 4. (3) All revenues and assets of non-stock,
non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and
 2.

exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes

and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate
existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in
the manner provided by law.
1. Under Sec. 4, Art. XIV, we are talking about the INCOME, or
the ASSET, HOW THEY WERE USED, and THE PERSON
USING IT.
2. It covers both REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTIES. Why?
The provision states “assets.”
3. DIMAAMPAO: This does not extend to facilities which are
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the main purposes, i.e., canteens and
bookstores. The previous case of Herrera v QC is
ABANDONED. Hence, these facilities are now taxable.
4. CONTRA IN DLSU v CIR, 2016: In concrete terms, the lease
of a portion of a school building for commercial purposes,
removes such asset from the property tax exemption granted
under the Constitution. There is no exemption because the
asset is not used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes. The commercial use of the property is
also not incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the main purpose of a university, which is
to educate its students.
1. Hence, in DLSU v CIR, use of property that is “incidental”
or “reasonably necessary” to accomplish the main
purpose of the educational institution is still exempt from
RPT.
3. ART. XIV, SECTION 4. (4) Subject to conditions prescribed by law,
all grants, endowments, donations, or contributions used actually,
directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt
from tax.
9. The Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) charged by the Quezon City
Government is a tax which is within its power to impose. Its
imposition is constitutional.
1. The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise
revenue; it is levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is
primarily in the exercise of the police power for the general
welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public
interest.
1. Tax as an implement of police power.
2. It must then comply with the 2 requisites of police power -
Lawful subject (Public interest requires interference;
Lawful means (reasonably necessary and not oppressive)
 2. For the purpose of undertaking a comprehensive and continuing
urban development and housing program, the disparities between
a real property owner and an informal settler as two distinct
classes are too obvious and need not be discussed at length. The
differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and
equity and is not discriminatory within the meaning of the
Constitution. (Ferrer v Mayor Herbert Bautista, 2015)
10. On the other hand, Garbage Fee is not a tax. It is a license. Its
imposition is unconstitutional because it violates the equal
protection clause.
1. For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no
substantial distinction between an occupant of a lot, on one hand,
and an occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing
project or apartment, on the other hand. Most likely, garbage
output produced by these types of occupants is uniform and does
not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both
just and equitable.
1. Two possible questions: 1) is it a license or a tax, 2) was the
equal protection clause violated?
11. A law was enacted in 1953 containing a provision for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement
of Pasig feeder road terminals within Antonio Subdivision owned
by Senator JCZ. JCZ “donated” said parcels of land to the
Government 5 months after the enactment of the law, on the
condition that if the Government violates such condition the
lands would revert to JCZ. The provincial governor of Rizal, WP,
questioned the validity of the donation and the Constitutionality
of the particular provision, it being an appropriation not for a
public purpose. Is the appropriation valid?
1. No, the appropriation is invalid. The appropriation of an amount
for the construction on a land owned by a private individual is an
invalid imposition since it results in the promotion of private
enterprise, and it only benefits the property of a particular
individual. The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is
correlative with its right to tax, and, under constitutional
provisions against taxation except for public purposes and
prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the
devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state
funds can be made for other than a public purpose. Incidental
advantage to the public or to the state, which results from the
promotion of private interests and the prosperity of private
enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by use of public
money (Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, G.R. No. L-10405,
 December 29, 1960).
12. XYZ Corporation leased its building to the INC Church. The latter
used it for their weekly religious worship. The Local Government,
however, assessed XYZ Corporation for RPT. Is the property
exempt from RPT? Yes, because the property is ADE used for
religious purposes.
1. The INC Church leased its vacant building to XYZ Mining Co.
The latter used the same as office of its employees. The Local
Government assessed the INC Church for RPT. Is the property
exempt from RPT? No, because the property is NOT ADE used
for religious purposes. It was used for commercial purposes.
2. The INC Church leased its vacant building to AAA University, a
nonstock nonprofit institution. The latter used the same as
classrooms for its K-12 Program. The Local Government
assessed the INC Church for RPT. Further, the BIR assessed
the INC Church for lease income. Lastly, the BIR assessed
AAA University for its income from the K-12 Program. The
income from the k-12 program was used to invest in treasury
bonds.
1. Is the INC Church exempt from RPT? Yes, because the
property is ADE used for educational purposes.
2. Is the INC Church exempt from income tax? No. Under
Section 30, nonstock nonprofit corporations organized
exclusively for religious purposes, where no part of its
income inure to its members, shall not be taxed for
income received as such nonstock nonprofit corporation.
However, under the last paragraph of Section 30, income
derived by it from activity conducted for profit is taxable
regardless of the disposition of the same. Here, the INC
Church conducted an activity for profit, which is the
leasing of its property to AAA University. Hence, it shall be
subject to income tax.
3. Is the AAA University liable for RPT? No, because RPT is
paid by the owner, and not the lessee of the real property.
4. Is the AAA University exempt from income tax? Yes,
because Article XIV provides that all revenues and assets
of nonstock nonprofit educational institutions ADE used
for educational purposes are exempt from income tax.

Taxation Police Power Eminent Domain

Purpose Raising revenue Promote public Facilitate the
welfare through taking of private
regulations property for
public use
Effect The money There is restraint There is transfer
exacted from the on the injurious of property to the
 Taxation Police Power Eminent Domain
Purpose Raising revenue Promote public Facilitate the
welfare through taking of private
regulations property for
public use
Effect The money There is restraint There is transfer
exacted from the on the injurious of property to the
taxpayer becomes use of property State.
part of the public
funds
Non-impairment Contracts are not Contracts may Contracts may
of contracts impaired by be impaired be impaired
taxation
(Philippine
American Life
Insurance v.
Auditor General,
1968)
Delegability the Generally, the Can be expressly Can be expressly
power power to make tax delegated to the delegated to the
laws cannot be local government local government
delegated unit by the unit by the
legislature legislature
Persons affected It affects the It affects the It affects only the
community or community or class individual who
class of of individuals owns the
individuals particular
property
Limit of Amount No limit, as long Limited to the Just
as not cost of compensation is
confiscatory and regulation determined by
excessive the court
Benefit No direct benefit No direct benefit A direct benefit is
is received by the is received received when the
taxpayer just compensation
is paid
Taking There is taking. As a rule, there There is taking.
The property must be no The property
taken is taking. As taken is
wholesome exception, There wholesome.
may be taking of
noxious and
harmful
properties, i.e.,
nuisance per se,
rabid dog, GRO
 Benefit No direct benefit No direct benefit A direct benefit is
is received by the is received received when the
taxpayer just compensation
is paid
Taking There is taking. As a rule, there There is taking.
The property must be no The property
taken is taking. As taken is
wholesome exception, There wholesome.
may be taking of
noxious and
harmful
properties, i.e.,
nuisance per se,
rabid dog, GRO
clubs, drugs,
illegally
possessed
firearms
Compensation The tax exacted Altruistic feeling The just
of helping the compensation
State

I. Expropriation (also check Political law on eminent domain)

1. Concept and nature of expropriation
1. Requisites:
1. Private property
1. All private property capable of ownership may be expropriated,
such as public utilities and services. (Republic v PLDT)
2. Patrimonial properties of the LGU can be expropriated. (Republic v
Cortez, 2014)
2. Taking
1. Five (5) sub-requisites of “taking”
1. Enter a private property
2. Not only for a momentary period
3. Warrant or color of legal authority
4. Public use
5. Oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment
(Republic v Vda. De Castellvi)
1. Expropriation is not limited to acquisition of title. It covers
restriction or limitation on property rights over the land,
such as when it is traversed by transmission lines.
3. Public use or purpose
1. “Public use” is one which confers some benefit, utility, or
advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public.
(Manosca vs CA).
2. It is essential that the element of public use of the property to be
maintained throughout the proceedings for expropriation.
 3. When the purpose is terminated or peremptorily abandoned, the
former owner may file a reversion suit to recover the land, subject
to reimbursement of the payment of just compensation. (Vda. De
Ouano v Republic; Republic v Posada, 2015, Leonen)
4. Public necessity
5. Just compensation
1. It means the full, fair, and prompt payment of the equivalent of the
property taken.
2. Can the owner recover the property if the State failed to pay just
compensation?
1. No. In Amigable v Cuenca, the Court ruled that since
restoration is neither convenient nor feasible, because it is
now used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the
government to make just compensation which it could and
should have done years ago.
2. It can only be recovered if the property is no longer used for
public purpose. (Republic v Posada, 2015, Leonen)
3. What then should the owner do in case of failure to pay just
compensation?
1. Among these inverse condemnation actions is a complaint
for payment of just compensation and damages. (National
Power Corporation v Spouses Asoque, 2016, Leonen)
4. In the inverse expropriation case, is there a need for three (3)
commissioners to determine just compensation?
1. No. If no such complaint for expropriation is filed, the
expropriator violated procedural requirements. Hence, it
waived the usual procedure, such as the appointment of
commissioners. (National Power Corporation v Spouses
Asoque, 2016, Leonen)
6. Due process of law
1. The State must adhere with Rule 67.
2. Expropriation Case is Not Automatically Dismissed When
Property Ceases to be for Public Use; State must first file the
appropriate MOTION TO WITHDRAW
1. Expropriation proceedings must be dismissed when it is
determined that it is not for a public purpose, except when:
first, the trial court’s order already became final and
executory; second, the government already took possession
of the property; and lastly, the expropriation case already
caused prejudice to the landowner. The expropriation case is
not automatically dismissed when the property ceases to be
for public use. The state must first file the appropriate Motion
to Withdraw before the trial court having jurisdiction over the
 proceedings. The grant or denial of any Motion to Withdraw in
an expropriation proceeding is always subject to judicial
discretion. NAPOCOR vs. Posada, G.R. No. 191945, March
11, 2015, J. Leonen
1. In the context of FORUM SHOPPING.
2. Matters to allege in complaint for expropriation
1. The verified complaint SHALL state with certainty:
1. Right and purpose of expropriation;
2. Real or personal property sought to be expropriated; and
3. Join as defendants ALL persons owning or claiming to own, or
occupying, the property or interest therein. (Sec. 1, Rule 67)
1. They are indispensable parties to the action. Failure to implead
them so would render the judgment void.
2. This includes lessees because they occupy the property.
3. Two stages in every action for expropriation
1. The first stage determines the propriety of the action
1. The authority to expropriate the property and the existence of public
purpose are determined herein.
2. This stage ends with an order of dismissal or an order of expropriation
declaring that:
1. The plaintiff has a lawful right to expropriate the property,
2. For the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
3. Upon the payment of just compensation to be determined from
the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever
came first. (Sec. 4, Rule 67)
3. The order of dismissal shall be final and appealable because it finally
disposes of the whole suit.
4. For the order of expropriation, “a final order sustaining the right of
expropriate may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
However, such appeal shall not prevent the court from determining the
just compensation to be paid. (Sec. 4, Rule 67)
2. The second stage determines the just compensation to be paid to the
landowner.
1. The order fixing the just compensation would be final and appealable.
It finally disposes of the second stage of the suit. (National Power
Corporation v Posada, 2015, Leonen)
4. When plaintiff can immediately enter into possession of the real
property (Rule 67)
1. Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter
2. After due notice to the defendant
3. Amount of deposit
1. For real property, the plaintiff deposits with the authorized
government depositary an amount equivalent to the ASSESSED VALUE
 1.

of the property for purposes of taxation.

2. For personal property, the value shall be provisionally ascertained and
the amount to be deposited shall be promptly FIXED BY THE COURT.
(Sec. 2, Rule 67)
5. New system of immediate payment of initial just compensation
1. RA 10752 - national government infrastructure projects (amending RA
8974)
1. Requisites:
1. Upon the filing of complaint or at any time thereafter
2. After due notice to the defendant
3. Amount of deposit
1. Real property (100% zonal value) - 100% of the value of the
land based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR
issued not more than three (3) years prior to the filing of the
expropriation complaint;
2. Improvements - The replacement cost at current market
value of the improvements and structures; and
3. Crops and trees - The current market value of crops and
trees located within the property. (Sec. 6, RA 10752)
2. Thus, if expropriation is NOT for national infrastructure projects, Rule
67 applies. If it is for national infrastructure projects, R.A. 10752
applies.
3. RA 8974 Requires Immediate Payment of Zonal Value Before
Government Can Take Possession
1. Republic Act No. 8974 provides for a procedure eminently more
favorable to the property owner than Rule 67 since it requires the
immediate payment of the zonal value and the value of the
improvements on the land to the property owner before the trial
court can allow the government to take possession. In contrast,
Rule 67 only requires the government to deposit the assessed
value of the property for it to enter and take possession.
NAPOCOR vs. Posada, G.R. No. 191945, March 11, 2015, J.
Leonen
4. For the Republic to be able to take possession of the property, the
law mandates that it must first pay to the landowner one hundred
percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current
relevant zonal valuation of the property by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR).
1. The payment of less than the amount required by law cannot be
considered substantial compliance. (Republic v Heirs of
Fernandez, 2015, Leonen)
5. The statutory requirement to pay a provisional amount equivalent
to the full Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) zonal valuation does
 5.

NOT SUBSTITUTE for the judicial determination of just

compensation.
1. The payment to the property owner of a preliminary amount is one
way to ensure that property will not be condemned arbitrarily. It
allows frontloading the costs of the exercise so that it is the
government instrumentality that bears the burden and not the
owner whose property is taken.
2. Such deposit also serves a dual purpose:
1. Advance payment in the event the expropriation prospers
2. Indemnity for damages if it is dismissed
3. This advance payment, a prerequisite for the issuance of a writ of
possession, should not be confused with payment of just
compensation for the taking of property even if it could be a
factor in eventually determining just compensation. If the
proceedings fail, the money could be used to indemnify the owner
for damages. National Power Corporation vs. Posada, 752
SCRA 550, G.R. No. 191945 March 11, 2015, Leonen
6. Once the amount of just compensation has been determined, it
stands to reason that this is the amount that must be paid to the
landowner as compensation for his or her property.
1. In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, taking of private
property necessarily includes its possession. Government, then,
must pay the proper amount of just compensation, instead of the
provisional value in order to enter and take the private property.
National Power Corporation vs. Posada, 752 SCRA 550, G.R.
No. 191945 March 11, 2015, Leonen
2. RA 8975 - Prohibiting Lower Courts from Issuing Restraining Orders,
Preliminary Injunctions or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions on
Government Infrastructure Projects
1. No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any TRO/PI/PMI
against the government to restrain, prohibit or compel the following
acts:
1. Bidding or awarding of contract/ project of the national
government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
2. Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/
or site or location of any national government project;
3. Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation,
operation of any such contract or project;
4. Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
5. The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity
necessary for such contract/project.
2. Exceptions:
1. Supreme Court
 2. When the matter is of a) extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, and b) grave injustice and irreparable injury
will arise, TRO may be issued, upon the filing of the bond.
3. Republic v Heirs of Fernandez (2015), Leonen
1. All courts, except the SC, are prohibited from issuing a TRO to
enjoin the government from acquiring the site of any national
government project.
2. Rtc malolos cannot issue a TRO.
3. Local Government Code (Sec. 19, RA 7160)
1. Requisites:
1. Ordinance (mere resolution is insufficient)
2. Public use
3. Payment of just compensation
4. Valid and definite offer
5. Offer was not accepted by the owner.
2. How may the LGU immediately take possession of the property
1. Upon the filing of expropriation proceedings; and
2. Upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least 15% of
the FMV of the property based on the CURRENT TAX
DECLARATION of the property. (Assessed value)
3. The amount to be paid shall be based on the FMV at the time of the
taking of property.
1. Filing of a complaint - implied taking
2. Entrance - actual taking
1. Whichever comes first will be the reckoning point to
determine the FMV.
6. Defenses and objections
1. No objection
1. Defendant shall file a notice of appearance and a manifestation, within
the time stated in the summons.
2. He shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.
2. With objection
1. He shall answer within the time stated in the summons.
2. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged
or allowed in the answer or any subsequent pleading.
3. Waiver of defense and objection
1. A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged
2. However, at the trial of the issue of just compensation whether or not
a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may present
evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his
property, and he may share in the distribution of the award. (Sec. 3,
Rule 67)
1. Hence, the defendant cannot be declared in default.
 7. Order of expropriation
1. Previously discussed.
8. Ascertainment of just compensation
1. The court SHALL appoint not more than 3 competent and disinterested
persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation. (Sec. 5, Rule 67)
9. Appointment of commissioners; commissioner's report; court action
upon commissioner's report
1. In NO case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the
consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual
value of his property so taken. (Sec. 6, Rule 67)
2. Upon the filing of the report, the clerk of court shall serve copies on all
interested parties, with notice that they are allowed 10 days within which
to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire. (Sec. 7,
Rule 67)
3. The court may, after hearing:
1. Accept - the report and render judgment in accordance therewith
2. Recommit - the same to the commissioners for further report
3. Set aside - the report and appoint new commissioners
4. In part - accept the report in part, and reject in part
10. Rights of plaintiff upon judgment and payment
1. The plaintiff shall have the right to:
1. Enter upon the property expropriated and to appropriate it for the
public use or purpose defined in the judgment, or
2. Retain it should he have taken immediate possession thereof under
the provisions of Sec. 2, Rule 67. [Sec. 10, Rule 67]
11. Effect of recording of judgment; When title is vested
1. Personal property - upon payment of just compensation. (Sec. 10, Rule
67)
2. Real property - Upon:
1. Payment of just compensation; and
2. Recording of the judgment in the registry of deeds where the property
is situated. (Sec. 13, Rule 67)