Construction Management and Economics

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A strategic analysis of contract termination in

public–private partnerships: implications from
cases in sub-Saharan Africa

Anthony T. Odoemena & Masahide Horita

To cite this article: Anthony T. Odoemena & Masahide Horita (2017): A strategic analysis of
contract termination in public–private partnerships: implications from cases in sub-Saharan Africa,
Construction Management and Economics, DOI: 10.1080/01446193.2017.1361039

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2017.1361039

Published online: 08 Aug 2017.

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 Construction Management and Economics, 2017
https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2017.1361039

A strategic analysis of contract termination in public–private partnerships:

implications from cases in sub-Saharan Africa
Anthony T. Odoemena  and Masahide Horita
Department of International Studies, Institute of Environmental Studies, Graduate School of Frontier Sciences, University of Tokyo, Kashiwanoha,
Japan

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

The paper examines empirically what contributes to the problem of contract termination in Received 3 October 2016
public–private partnerships (PPPs) from the perspectives of theories on contracts, transaction Accepted 23 July 2017
costs and industrial organizations. Based on a theoretical exploration of a model of the holdup and
KEYWORDS
underinvestment problems, we identified the profit-sharing mechanism as the contract type that Holdup; underinvestment;
most predisposes a PPP to the inefficiencies that lead to contract termination. We then conducted
Downloaded by [Pepperdine University] at 17:48 08 August 2017

public–private partnerships;
an empirical examination of a data-set of PPP contracts in sub-Saharan Africa. Using rough sets contract termination; rough
theory and the logic of explanatory power, we found that contract type outweighs other factors, sets; explanatory power
such as sector and nationality, in the explanation of contract termination.

Introduction Globally, the percentage of PPP projects that have been

terminated currently stands at 3.7% of aggregate levels
A public–private partnership (PPP) can be defined as a
(World Bank/PPIAF 2016). However, the rate of termina-
contractual arrangement through which a government
tion varies significantly by certain factors, such as sectors
or public authority confers on a private firm the rights to
and geographical regions. For example, those regions with
design, finance, build, rehabilitate, operate and maintain
infrastructure poverty – and thus, greater reliance on pri-
a public infrastructure asset for an agreed period. Some
vate financing – are known to be more vulnerable to ter-
of the practical reasons that are commonly used to justify
mination than other developing regions, with sub-Saharan
the increased use of the PPP approach to mobilize private
Africa as a notable exemplar (Harris and Kumar 2009). Still,
finance and expertise in the provision of public infrastruc-
there seems to be no sufficient theoretical explanation of
ture services centre on the socio-economic importance
the mechanism that makes the PPP contracts in sub-Sa-
of infrastructure services and the contention that due to
haran Africa more susceptible to termination.
budget constraints, the public sector alone cannot meet the
The objective of this study, which focuses on several
growing demand for the development and maintenance of
representative cases, is to identify the drivers of the dif-
new infrastructure assets. These have helped make the use
ferences in PPP contracts’ vulnerability to termination. In
of PPPs a top priority in the development plans of many
addition to the findings of existing studies that PPP con-
governments in both developed and developing countries.
tracts in sub-Saharan Africa have higher rates of termina-
Despite the positive roles that PPPs play in the context
tion in comparison with those in other regions, the authors
of infrastructure service delivery, they also face the risk of
elected to focus on cases from sub-Saharan Africa for prac-
premature termination – the exit of the private firm from
tical reasons related to their knowledge of the region and
the project before the fulfilment of the contractual terms
their ability to navigate some of the limitations associated
(Harris et al. 2003). The termination of a PPP is associated
with the disclosure of confidential information.
with some serious problems that often include contrac-
The general problem of contract termination has been
tual disputes, court injunctions, delayed construction, a
analysed in several studies (Harris et al. 2003, Harris and
project’s outright abandonment and the socio-economic
Kumar 2009). Leading examples include Harris and Kumar
costs associated with the deterioration of an uncompleted
(2009), who used econometric models to examine the
project. In addition, it is argued that contract termination
effect of macroeconomic variables on the rate of contract
could undermine a host country’s credibility as a reliable
termination, and the recent study by Darwin and Schuyler
partner (World Bank/PPIAF 2016).

CONTACT  Anthony T. Odoemena  odoemena@hotmail.com

© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
 2   A. T. ODOEMENA AND M. HORITA
(2016) on the link between multilateral support and con-
tract termination in long-term infrastructure PPPs.
There are cases, however, whose contractual failure
cannot solely be attributed to exogenous factors, but also
seemingly to strategic interactions of stakeholders’ behav-
iours. Among the most notable examples is a PPP contract
that was established in 2007, between the Tanzanian gov-
ernment and a private concessionaire, for the rehabilitation
and operation of the Tanzanian Railways Limited (RAHCO
2011, World Bank 2010, SUMATRA 2011). In this case, the
inefficiencies associated with underinvestment, the diver-
gence of the firm’s self-interest from the government’s best
interest, and the problems of policing and enforcement
were paramount in the termination of the PPP contract.
Specifically, the concession suffered from underinvest-
ment or the “underfunding of track and asset rehabilita-
tion” (World Bank 2010, p. 8). In view of the railway’s state
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of disrepair, the consensus among the stakeholders was
that there was no evidence that the private firm made any
investment. This partly led to the government’s decision to
give the private firm only one US dollar as compensation
upon the termination of the contract, with the explanation
that the private partner underinvested in the partnership
and was therefore, undeserving of greater compensation.
The explanations given by the government for this deci-
sion also seem to corroborate the theoretical assumption
on how unverifiability – the existence of imperfect knowl-
edge on hidden actions (e.g. in terms of the effort that a
partner exerts or the partner’s actual investments in the
quality of the procured asset) – undermines the implemen-
tation and enforcement of a contract.
In view of the additional issues (such as underinvest-
ment and enforceability) raised by some stakeholders
to explain why some real-life contracts break down, it
becomes obvious that an exclusive focus on macroe-
conomic variables is not sufficient. Hence, we turned to
theories on contracts, transaction costs and industrial
organization to examine how such problems of contract
termination in a PPP could be tackled. The explanatory
relevance of a theoretical perspective is because, aside
from the occurrence of exogenous events (such as mac-
roeconomic and socio-political issues) that are reasonably
beyond the partners’ control, there are identifiable system-
atic patterns in stakeholders’ behaviours that can increase
the likelihood of a contract’s termination.
Specifically, using some of the recently published
advances in contract theory, we examined an economic
model of PPP that highlights the causes and negative
effects of the holdup and underinvestment problems.
We then used the main features of the model to identify
some contract types that theoretically predispose a PPP
to inefficiencies and a sub-optimal outcome. The data
used to test the study’s hypothesis were taken mainly
from publicly available databases developed by the World
Bank’s Public–Private Partnership Group and the Public–
Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) on private
sector participation in infrastructure projects in developing
countries. Given the study’s focus, the empirical analysis
involved a total of 444 PPP projects that reached financial
closure in sub-Saharan Africa in the period between 1990
and 2012.
Our general objective was to determine, how these
problems of contract termination in PPPs could be bet-
ter understood using theories on contracts, transaction
costs and industrial organization. We assumed that the
contract types that fail to make up for the holdup and
underinvestment problems would be more susceptible to
termination. Therefore, we focused on two contract types
that are derivable from theoretical models of the holdup
and underinvestment problems. The two contract types
are the profit-sharing mechanism (PSM) and the specific
performance mechanism (SPM). In section three, we show
theoretically how the PSM model fails to provide sufficient
incentive to prevent underinvestment and conflicting
interests. We also show how the configuration of payoffs
under the SPM model provides sufficient incentive for an
optimal level of investment.
Our goal in investigating the empirical validity of the
deductive consequences of contract theory, and holdup
literature in particular, is similar to those of Chang and
Qian (2015), Galetovic et al. (2015), Iwaki (2015), and
Schwiebacher (2012). The main differences that separate
this paper from the existing literature lie in the approach
and scope. For example, using the holdup model and the
Nash bargaining scheme, Chang and Qian (2015) explored
the connection between quasi-rent differences, excess
profit margin and ex post renegotiation, and change
orders in 62 construction projects. Galetovic et al. (2015)
focused on the effect of the holdup problem in indus-
tries that rely on patents and innovation. Iwaki (2015)
focused on holdup and the problem of debt financing in
Japanese firms, whereas Schwiebacher (2012) examined
the effect that holdup had on investments in innovation.
Distinctively, this paper focuses on how contract types that
are inherently vulnerable to the risk of underinvestment –
which often arises as a direct consequence of the holdup
problem – are more likely to end in termination. We then
tested our prediction on the effects of contract type using
rough sets theory (Pawlak 1982, 2002, Bal 2013) and the
logic of explanatory power (Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010,
Schupbach and Sprenger 2011).
The use of rough sets theory is justified by its suitability
for classificatory data analysis and this study’s goal of using
the available information (on contract type, sector and
investors’ nationality) to identify the attributes associated
with terminated PPP contracts. Since each decision rule is

defined in terms of if…then… logical implications, the logic
of explanation shows how informative a variable (a property
of a PPP project) implied in a decision rule’s precedent is in
the explanation of the consequent of the decision (i.e. the
status of the PPP project: terminated or operational). In this
way, this study has provided an objective basis for ascertain-
ing the extent to which a given feature of a PPP provides a
positive or negative explanation for contract termination.
Furthermore, based on the notion of context sensitivity, we
have also evaluated the susceptibility of the explanatory
power of each attribute to background changes or local
causal interference (Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review
the current state of knowledge and literature in section
two. The existing studies are organized into two groups,
depending on their methodological orientation. Hence,
while the earlier part of section two focuses mainly on
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empirical studies, the latter part summarizes the recent
advancements in contract theory. The apparent disconnec-
tion between the two sides of the literature (the empiri-
cal and the theoretical) and this study’s aim of helping to
bridge that gap are also highlighted in the review. We then
present the hypothesis development process in section
three, starting with a specification of the main foundations
of the predictions advanced in this paper, with particular
reference to the literature on the role of contract types and
some of the strategic inefficiencies that undermine the
successful implementation of an economic transaction. In
the earlier part of section three, we outline the study’s main
hypothesis regarding the mechanisms through which the
partners’ behaviours and investments affect the social sur-
plus of a PPP and the ways in which the social optimality
or sub-optimality of such behaviours and investments
emanate from the specificities that characterize the con-
figuration of the partners’ payoffs and entitlements in
the PPP contract. In section four, we present the research
methodology and design, and the rationale behind the
mathematical tools used for the empirical analysis (namely,
rough sets and the logic of explanatory power). In section
five, we present the results of the empirical analysis. We
then conclude the paper with a recap of the main findings,
limitations and recommendations in section six.
Review of the literature
The current state of knowledge pertaining to the problem
of contract termination, and contractual failure in general,
appears to consist of two sides (i.e. empirical and theoreti-
cal) that arguably need some points of intersection.
On the one hand, some of the existing empirical stud-
ies have sought to make sense of the observed data.
With particular reference to contract termination in PPPs,
researchers have found satisfactory explanations, to some
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS   3
degree, in the role of macroeconomic shocks and finan-
cial crises. Some examples in this regard include Renato’s
(2009) study of the determinants of stress and risks in PPP,
the Hammami et al. (2006) work on the determinants of
PPP termination, and the Burger et al. (2009) study on the
effects of the global financial crisis on PPPs. There is some
contentiousness in the literature in this regard. On the one
hand, some have argued that economic shocks stifle the
finances that are necessary for the successful implementa-
tion of a PPP project. At the same time, others have argued
that a good macroeconomy can lead to the initiation of
ambitious projects, optimism bias or the underestimation
of fiscal risks, which could in turn increase the likelihood of
project failures. In other words, unlike a healthy macroeco-
nomy, a poor macroeconomy can provide good incentives
for cautious investments, risk analysis and realistic financial
projections.
In addition to the issues associated with exogenous
economic factors, issues related to strategic behaviour
have received equal mention in the literature. For exam-
ple, Russell et al. (2006) argued that some of the factors
that can affect the implementation of a PPP project may
reside in issues associated with the project’s type (in terms
of scale, scope and complexity), the nature and the compo-
sition of the project’s team (in terms of their expertise and
motivation), the problems associated with the assignment
of risks and penalties. In relation to the risks of strategic
behaviour, Renato (2009) further argued that moral hazard
and adverse selection can create some potentially serious
incentive problems that can undermine the successful
implementation of a PPP project. Unlike the role of mac-
roeconomic variables, however, the mechanism through
which strategic behaviour affects the rate of contract ter-
mination has yet to receive empirical scrutiny.
Generally, in the study of contract termination in PPPs,
questions of differential vulnerability are tied to the
assumption that the termination of a partnership would
depend on its exposure to several factors, including those
related to the prevailing macroeconomy and the socio-po-
litical context. Nevertheless, one argument in the literature
in this regard is that the difficulties associated with direct
measurement and comparison of each project’s specifics
on a large-scale has made empirical explanations challeng-
ing (Renato 2009). This challenge has helped limit the focus
of the existing studies to easily identifiable categories
such as the project’s type or primary sector. For example,
in relation to the effects on contract termination of the
macroeconomic shocks and currency risks that occurred
in Brazil (in 1999), Argentina (in 2002) and the Dominican
Republic (in 2003), Renato (2009) observed that many of
the terminated contracts were energy projects.
Further, Harris and Kumar (2009) noted that, unlike port
and natural gas-related PPP contracts, projects in the water
 4   A. T. ODOEMENA AND M. HORITA
and sewerage sector were observed to have a significantly
higher rate of termination. This led to the contention by
Harris and Kumar (2009) that something in the water sector
itself might be responsible for their higher probability of
termination. Based on the aforementioned examples, one
main conclusion is that, irrespective of the prevailing mac-
roeconomy, the sector could be an important factor in the
explanation of contract termination. However, there seems
to be no explanation of the mechanism through which a
given sector complicates the implementation of a PPP.
From a regional perspective, it is also argued that PPP
projects implemented in sub-Saharan Africa are more vul-
nerable (by almost 9% points) to termination in compari-
son with those implemented in other developing regions.
However, the explanations for the greater vulnerability of
PPP projects in sub-Saharan countries were found to be
insufficient. As an example, the role of macroeconomic
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shock (as exemplified in the effect of the Asian financial cri-
sis in 1997, on the trend of PPP investments in the region)
did not seem to apply readily to the implementation of
PPPs in sub-Saharan Africa, given the absence of a simi-
larly major macroeconomic shock or financial crisis in the
region during the period covered in the previous studies.
Similarly, despite its plausibility as an explanatory factor,
no significant relationship has been found between a
country’s institutional quality (in terms of good govern-
ance indicators) and the probability of contract termina-
tion (Harris and Kumar 2009, Renato 2009).
A main consensus in the literature is that other factors
are undoubtedly at work (Harris and Kumar 2009). This
conclusion suggests that the tolerance of a PPP contract
may vary from category to category because of some uni-
dentified connections and conditions. This highlights the
need to expand the scope of the explanatory variables,
to provide some explanation for the dependence mecha-
nisms so as to minimize the omission of important attrib-
utes and connections, and for an analytical tool that can
facilitate the discovery of some patterns liable to improve
the usefulness of the empirical studies in decision-making.
There are two questions that still need to be addressed in
this regard. Why are some PPP projects more vulnerable to
termination than others? What are the lessons and impli-
cations for theory and practice, particularly in relation to
the choice of implementation models?
The other side of the literature involves the use of the-
ory to explain the conditions under which a contractual
failure might occur. From this perspective, it is argued
by Williamson (1985) that a microanalytic methodology
can reveal how the specificities of a transaction’s contract
shape the parties’ incentives and opportunities to the
transaction in question. Thus, Williamson (1985) could be
considered one of the earliest studies on the importance
of incorporating the role of contract type in the study of
economic transactions. Some of the seminal studies that
have helped to advance this methodological perspec-
tive include Demski and Sappington (1984) on how to
design optimal incentive contracts, Fudenberg and Tirole
(1990) on how to deal with moral hazard and renegotia-
tion in agency contracts, and Laffont and Tirole (1993) on
the nature of incentives in procurement and regulatory
contracts. We also use the reference Iossa and Martimort
(2015) on the microeconomic analysis of agency costs and
main incentive issues in PPPs and the shape of optimal
contracts in those contexts.
With particular reference to PPP, Iossa and Martimort
(2015) focused on the contract theoretic models of infra-
structure procurement and on how to provide adequate
incentives for private firms and contractors in a multi-task
environment in which a risk-averse firm or contractor
chooses non-contractible efforts in cost reduction and
quality improvement. Iossa and Martimort (2015) empha-
size the advantages of private ownership of the infrastruc-
ture projects in relation to social welfare. They also argue
that in relation to the dynamics of the incentives for invest-
ment in long-term contracts, the risks of regulatory oppor-
tunism and the use of bundling, the benefits of private
ownership outweigh other forms of ownership. Although
Iossa and Martimort (2015) do not examine contract ter-
mination, their paper and ours both focus on the under-
investment problem and the incentive power of private
ownership and profit-sharing contracts, also known as the
PSM contract, in this study.
In general, the mechanism that links underinvest-
ment and the incentive power of private ownership
with profit-sharing rules is a common topic in the study
of the holdup problem in contract theory. The assump-
tion, in this regard, is that an underinvestment problem
arises if the partners are not able to capture the full ben-
efits associated with their individual investments (Bolton
and Dewatripont 2005, Martimort 2008). As with classic
implementation problems, there is some debate on the
possibility of using a simple contract to induce efficient
investment. The desired solution would entail designing
a contract that induces both partners to invest optimally,
even if the investments are unverifiable. However, such
a theoretical possibility is bound up with the constraints
imposed by uncertainty, non-verifiability and contractual
incompleteness (Marschak and Radner 1972, Williams and
Radner 1988, Legros and Matsushima 1991). Hence, a larger
share of the focus in the literature has been on remedies
such as vertical and lateral integration as well as the allo-
cation of ownership and control rights (Klein et al. 1978,
Williamson 1985, Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore
1988, Bolton 1990, Bolton and Whinston 1993, Tirole 1998).
Despite the understandable reservations in relation
to the practicality of the contractual remedy, recent

developments in contract theory have indicated that it is
possible to use a simple contract to solve the holdup prob-
lem and induce efficient investment. For example, with
particular reference to the verifiability constraint, some
studies have focused on the feasibility of implementing the
first-best (optimal) investment using a renegotiation-proof
contract (Chung 1991, Cheng 2000, Neeman and Pavlov
2013). The main focus of the exploration of the renegotia-
tion-proofness principle has been on how to deal with the
inefficiency that may arise if the parties in a contracting
relationship bargain with asymmetric information (given
that non-verifiability may foster the strategic revelation of
private information). This has given rise to calls for using
contracts that would involve an appeal to the revelation
principle, and the definition of a contractual solution as
a mechanism that induces an enduring equilibrium, irre-
spective of the possibility that in a dynamic setting the
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continuation of a hitherto optimal contract may become
sub-optimal after a time.
Despite these constraints, some authors have argued
that it is possible to induce efficient investment and out-
comes using a simple contract – the specific performance
mechanism (SPM) (Chung 1991, Bolton and Dewatripont
2005) or the sellout contract (Martimort 2008). Our study
is based on this position, namely the hypothesis that the
SPM is more resilient to the risk of underinvestment than is
the PSM model. Specifically, we hypothesize that contract
type could affect the outcome of a PPP. The mathematical
model behind this hypothesis (i.e. a model of the holdup
and underinvestment problems and the desirability of a
contract type that makes up for them) as implied in the
literature, is expanded on in the upcoming section. In sum-
mary, based on the contention that the study of strategic
behaviour in contracts has tended to lean towards theoret-
ical research, one of the most significant gaps addressed
by this paper is the lack of empirical verification of the
implications of theory. Additionally, the results of the study
will help demonstrate that contractual failure in PPPs can-
not solely be attributed to exogenous factors.
Hypothesis development
Based on the existing state of knowledge, we organize the
factors that lead to contract termination into three broad
categories that consist of the issues inherent in a project’s
type (Russell et al. 2006, Harris and Kumar 2009, Renato
2009), the suitability of the prevailing political economy
(Hammami et al. 2006, Burger et al. 2009, Harris and Kumar
2009, Renato 2009) and the strategic risks inherent in the
contract type (Chung 1991, Bolton and Dewatripont 2005,
Martimort 2008, Renato 2009, Iossa and Martimort 2015).
Figure 1 summarizes the main factors cited in the expla-
nations of contract termination in PPPs.
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS   5
Figure 1 includes many factors and concepts. This section
will provide a simple rationale for the links between the fac-
tors in the framework, as advanced in the existing literature.
Moreover, in view of our main objectives, we first elucidate
the role of contract type as the primary factor in contract
termination. Next, we provide the theoretical implications
derived from modelling two contrasting contract types.
Finally, we provide some background information about
the other explanatory variables and their expected effects.
The role of contract type
According to the literature on the role of contract type
in economic transactions (with particular reference to the
holdup problem), it is possible to distinguish two types of
contracts. The contract types can be defined using a simple
principal-agent model, where the principal and the agent
correspond to the host government and the private firm,
respectively.
We started by assuming that the partnership yields
a profit x that depends on the private firm’s capital
investment k, and that the profit could be high or low.
Formally, x ∈ {x− , x̄ }, with x− < x̄ , the prob(̄x ) = p and the
prob(x− ) = 1 − p. We considered the case where the prob-
ability p depends on the private firm’s capital investment
k. An important remark, in this regard, is that investment k
was sunk and was specific to the objectives of the partner-
ship. We assumed that p = p(k) is twice differentiable and
concave in k. In addition, if k = 0, then p(0) = 0. Accordingly,
the expected value of x with respect to probability p
becomes p(k)̄x + (1 − p(k))x−. We define the ensuing social
profit as 𝜋s = p(k)̄x + (1 − p(k))x− .
First, if a private firm’s investments were fully observable
and verifiable, the host government would simply force
the( investors
)( )to invest k̂ , the amount that results when
p k x̄ − x− = 1. To provide sufficient incentive for the
� ̂
investment of k̂ , a common solution involves linking or
tying the private firm’s payoff and compensation to the
realized profit of the PPP. In such a case, the contract could
take the form of a profit-sharing mechanism (PSM) – a
contract that splits the realized profit between the part-
ners. In the foregoing illustration, letting 𝛽I ∈ (0, 1) denote
the fraction of the realized profit x that the private firm
appropriates, and βG = 1 − βI the fraction that host govern-
ment
( receives, the firm’s ) payoff under the PSM becomes:
𝛽I p(k)̄x + (1 − p(k))x− − k. Based on this payoff config-
uration, we can show that the private firm underinvests.
Specifically,
( )(the firm’s
) optimal
/ investment would result
1
when p k x̄ − x− = 𝛽 . It is therefore, straightforward
� ̃
I
to verify that k̂ > k̃ , based on the increasing and concave
properties of p(k).
On the other hand, under the SPM or the sellout contract
(Chung 1991, Bolton and Dewatripont 2005, Martimort
 6   A. T. ODOEMENA AND M. HORITA

Contract-Type

Unenforceability
Underinvestment Controlling Interests
Problem Problem

Poor Performance
(act of bad faith)

Contract Termination

Project failure Degree of

Complexity
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Fiscal Risks of Regulatory

Sector Scope Scale
Risks Expropriation Risks

Political & Economic Environment Project Type

Figure 1. A schematic representation of the determinants of contract termination in PPPs.

2008), the private firm pays the host government a fixed
concession fee c ∈ ℝ+ for the right to completely own and
operate the public asset or facility (for an agreed period of
time). In such a case, the host government receives a fixed
concession fee c instead of a fixed fraction of the profit.
The private firm’s payoff in such a case then corresponds
to the following: p(k)̄x + (1 − p(k))x− − k − c. The interest-
ing result, in this regard, is that if the partners agree on a
concession fee c that meets the firm’s participation con-
straints,(the )(optimal
) investment becomes self-enforcing.
With p� k̃ x̄ − x− = 1, it is therefore, easy to verify that
k̂ = k̃ > k̃ . Using the sellout mechanism, thus, eliminates
the need for the government to fully police, verify and
enforce the optimal investment k̂ .
The foregoing concludes the simple illustration of the
unique problems that can arise under a PSM. Specifically,
the PSM leads to underinvestment. In addition to the
underinvestment problem, the main disadvantages of a
PSM are as follows. To begin with, the divergence of the
firm’s self-interest (to underinvest under a PSM) from the
government’s best interest creates a conflict that partially
centres on how to force the firm to invest in a manner that
corresponds to the government’s desires. Another prob-
lematic aspect of the PSM that makes it less suitable (in
comparison with the SPM) lies in the role played in a PPP by
the notion of default or non-performance and the logical
association between underinvestment, poor performance
and contractual clauses on contract termination.
Using these two contract types (i.e. the PSM and the
SPM), we grouped PPP models based on some shared char-
acteristics. In one group, we classified those partnerships
where the private firm and the public firm split the profit
according to an agreed fraction or percentage of share or
equity under the PSM. This included partial divestitures,
management contracts, and jointly managed concession
projects. Based on the above-mentioned issues and disad-
vantages (i.e. the problem of underinvestment, the diver-
gence of the firm’s self-interest from the government’s best
interest, and the problems of policing and controlling inter-
ests), we expected these PPP models to have a higher rate
of termination. In the other group, we classified those part-
nerships wherein the private firm pays a concession fee for
the right to build, own and operate a facility at their own risk
for an agreed upon period under the SPM. This included full
divestitures, merchant contracts, lease and rental contracts,
build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects, build-lease-transfer
(BLT) projects, build-rehabilitate-operate-transfer (BROT)
projects and the concession projects that are entirely run
by the private firm. In contrast to the PSM, the SPM (or
sellout contract) allocates the full consequences of under-
investment to the firm and aligns the self-interest of the
private investors with the social incentives of the project.
Given the self-enforcing nature of the optimal investment
in such contracts, we expected the implementation of SPM
to be less vulnerable to underinvestment, the problem of
policing, controlling interests and contract termination.
 CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS   7

The role of project sector investor. As such, some have argued that, ex post, host
governments that initially lacked the technology and
In relation to the effect of project type on contract termi-
resources to execute a PPP project may have an incentive
nation, our main focus was on the project’s sector (due to
to renege on the generous concessions they previously
practical constraints in terms of measurability and data
considered necessary and justifiable for attracting the pri-
availability). Aside from being the least subjective indi-
vate investor. In such a case, the lucrative bargain that the
cation of project type, including the PPP project’s sector
investor struck with the host government upon entering
in our analysis was based on the notion that the type of
the country could become obsolete (Jenkins 1986), cul-
service the PPP project provides to the public may give
minating in expropriation or contract termination. In gen-
rise to some differential vulnerability. For example, Harris
eral, there is also the contention that foreign-sponsored
and Kumar (2009) observed that, despite the considerable
projects may be more vulnerable to politically motivated
variation in the rate of project termination, projects in the
decisions in response to the risks associated with a macro-
water and sewerage sector are most vulnerable to cancel-
economic crisis, currency devaluation, changes in invest-
lation because of the problem of pricing and the low level
ment laws and foreign exchange.
of cost recovery in comparison with other sectors that are
highly commercialized. Also, Markard (2011, p. 107) argued
that, “in some respects, infrastructure sectors are quite Research methodology
different from other sectors and that these particulari-
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The outline of the research process is summarized in

ties matter, especially if there is an interest to initiate and
Figure 2.
govern transformation processes toward a specific end”.
As illustrated in Figure 2, first, we embarked on
The goal, in this regard, was to see whether infrastructure
hypothesis development, as explained in the preceding
sectors possess certain disruptive particularities that play
section. Next, given the nature of the research objective,
a role in their differential vulnerability.
a cross-sectional research design was adopted for the
study’s data collection process. The research involved the
The effect of investor’s nationality collection and organization of information on the individ-
ual characteristics (in terms of the sector, the contract type
Although the focus of the existing empirical studies in
and the sponsor’s nationality) and outcome (in terms of
relation to the prevailing political economy has been on
being operational or terminated) of a given PPP project.
macroeconomic variables, particularly the effects of finan-
The use of this research approach facilitated the inclusion
cial crises as exemplified in Renato (2009), our focus in this
of the entire set of projects that were either operational or
study is primarily on the effect of the nationality of the
terminated in sub-Saharan Africa in the period between
PPP project’s sponsors. The availability of data and the
1990 and 2012. Notably, the first entry in the reference
suitability of this classification for the study’s method of
database was in 1990. The researchers had no access to
analysis helped to motivate this decision. Besides, given
earlier data on PPPs in the region. Also, the latest entry or
the availability of existing studies on the effect of macroe-
update on the status of the PPP projects in the data-set
conomic variables on PPP trends, we did not see the need
during the study, was in 2012, hence the study’s focus on
to reexamine this factor. Hence, we examined the effect
the period between 1990 and 2012. This helped to elimi-
of the PPP sponsor’s nationality in our analysis, in view
nate the need for sampling and the problems of sampling
of some arguments advanced in the context of the obso-
bias and representativeness, while enhancing the incorpo-
lescing bargaining literature and the risks of expropriation
ration and examination of multiple attributes.
(Jenkins 1986, Ramamurti 2001, 2003).
In all, 444 PPP projects that reached financial closure
A main argument in this regard was that the passage
in sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2012, were
of time degrades and alters the balance in the bargaining
used for the analysis. The authors used the World Bank’s
relationship between host government and the private

Hypothesis PPP Information Decision Rule Synthesis Analysis of

Data Collection
Development System & Evaluation Explanaory Power

Using the existing Using a table to organize To determine how

Using the World Bank logical link between contract
literature on PPP and the individual attributes informative and sensitive
Dataset on PPP termination & PPP attributes
contract theory of a PPP an explanation is

Figure 2. An outline of the research process.

 8   A. T. ODOEMENA AND M. HORITA
Public–Private Partnership Group and the Public–Private
Infrastructure Advisory Facility’s (World Bank/PPIAF 2013)
database on private participation in infrastructure (PPI) as
the basis for information gathering. This database contains
easily classifiable information on the project’s sector, the
implementation model, the nationality of the investors
and the operational status of the PPP project. In addition,
the use of this data-set was based on the fact that it is
the most comprehensive source of information on global
PPP projects. The data were supplemented with publicly
available data on the implementation and circumstances
surrounding the termination of PPP contracts. We used
the operational definitions of the PPP models in this data-
base to guide the identification of common properties
that determined whether a PPP belonged to either PSM
or SPM. The collected information was then used to create
a cross-sectional table that comprises PPP projects and
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their individual characteristics.
The subsequent steps in the empirical analysis involved
the use of rough sets theory, a rule-based mathematical
approach to intelligent data analysis, data mining, pattern
recognition and knowledge discovery (Pawlak 1982, 2002,
Bal 2013). There are many advantages associated with
the chosen method of analysis. Besides being a suitable
method for the analysis of a data table that comprises var-
ious attributes, some of the advantages of the rough sets
theory lie in its ability to facilitate the discovery of partial
or total dependencies from the PPP cross-sectional table. It
also facilitates the elimination of redundant attributes and
the development of decision rules that are less dependent
on external parameters. In addition to the ease of inter-
pretation, rough sets theory provides the mathematical
foundation for the analysis of the explanatory power of
independent variables (Schupbach and Sprenger 2011)
and the analysis of the context sensitivity of any set of
rival explanatory variables. The overall analysis involved
the following sub-steps.
Construction of a PPP cross-sectional table
First, we used the raw data to create a cross-sectional
table. Formally, the PPP cross-sectional table 𝕋 is a triple,
𝕋 = ⟨U, A, V ⟩, where U is a non-empty finite set of PPPs and
A is a non-empty finite set of attributes that described each
PPP in U. Hence, if xi denotes a given PPP contract, then
U = {x1, x2 … xn}, where n = |U|. The four attributes used, in
Table 1. Summary of the attributes used in the study.
Description Attribute The value set
Contract type a1 V1 = {SPM, PSM}
Project’s sector a2 V2 = {Energy, telecom, transport,
water}
Investor’s nationality a3 V3 = {Domestic, foreign, mixed}
PPP Status a4 V4 = {Terminated, not-terminated}
this study, were: the contract type, the project sector, the
nationality of the private investors and the PPP’s status (i.e.
A = {a1, a2, a3, a4}). Each attribute aj ∊ A is associated with a
value set Vj. Table 1 summarizes the information regarding
the attributes and their corresponding value sets.
Notably, Table 1 consists of conditional attributes or
simply the conditions (i.e. {a1, a2, a3}) and the outcome
attribute (i.e. {a4}). One can thus, define 𝕋 as a decision
system and a quadruple, 𝕋 = ⟨U, C, D, V ⟩, where C = {a1, a2,
a3} denotes the set of conditions and D = {a4} denotes the
outcome variable. As with the initial definition, V denotes
the value set associated with each attribute in C and D. The
next step in the rough sets analysis involved the construc-
tion of elementary sets and used the notion of indiscerni-
bility. Formally, we let B denote a non-empty subset of the
set A of all attributes. The indiscernibility relation IND(B) is
a relation on U defined for xi, xk ∊ U by (xi, xk) ∊ IND(B) if and
only if, for both xi and xk, the values for all the attributes
from B are identical. The construction of elementary sets
is based on the principle that PPPs characterized by the
same information are indiscernible in view of the available
information about them (Skowron et al. 2015).
Decision rule synthesis and evaluation
A decision rule explains an outcome (contract termination)
in terms of certain conditions and is a formal language of
approximations that takes the form of if…then… logical
implications. Each rule rl is comprised of a premise ϕl and
the conclusion θl. Accordingly, we let 𝜙l and 𝜃l denote the
set of PPPs that meet the conditions of the criteria implied
in a rule’s premise 𝜙l and conclusion 𝜃l, respectively.
To evaluate the decision rules, we let 𝜙l ∧ 𝜃l denote the
set of PPPs that met the properties specified in both ϕl and
θl. For each decision rule, we then associated a number
( )
supp rl = ||𝜙l ∧ 𝜃l || that denotes the number of PPPs that
met the properties specified in a rule’s premise and conse-
quent. Also, for any decision rule, we associated a certainty
factor cer (rl) ∊ [0,1]. The certainty factor is also known as
the confidence coefficient, and it measures the truth of a
decision rule in view of the available data (Pawlak 2002,
Bazan et al. 2004). We define the formula for the certainty
factor as follows:
( ) ( ) |𝜙 ∧ 𝜃l ||
cer rl = prob 𝜃l |𝜙l = | l . (1)
|𝜙 |
| l|
The certainty factor (for contract termination) equals one
if all the cases that satisfy a rule’s premise also satisfy the
property specified in a rule’s conclusion. Also, for any deci-
sion rule, we associated a coverage coefficient (belonging
to [0,1]) that measures the frequency of terminated con-
tracts in the set of contracts that possessed the condition

in a rule’s premise. We define the formula for the coverage
coefficient as follows:
( ) ( ) |𝜙 ∧ 𝜃l ||
cov rl = prob 𝜙l |𝜃l = | l . (2)
|𝜃 |
| l|
Both the certainty factors and the coverage coefficient
reveal some conditional probability that expresses the
approximate knowledge of the factors that influence the
outcome of a PPP.
The analysis of explanatory power
Explanatory power is a notion that is used in contexts in
which two or more alternative explanations are compared
(Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010). The calculation of explan-
atory power was based on recent developments in the
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philosophy of science literature (Ylikoski 2007, Ylikoski and
Kuorikoski 2010, Schupbach and Sprenger 2011). As with a
decision rule, the logic of the explanatory power analysis
was comprised of two main components – the explicans
and the explicandum. The explicans refers to the explana-
tion given for an observation, whereas the explicandum
denotes the event or fact to be explained. Accordingly, one
can think of a rule’s consequent θ as an explicandum and
a rule’s premise ϕl as the explicans – the explanation for
contract termination θ. Using these definitions, we then
examined the extent to which the conditions in a rule’s
premise provided a strong or weak explanation for con-
tract termination.
Formally, an explanatory power εl is a measurable func-
tion that maps the two propositions in a decision rule (ϕl
and θ) to a real number in [−1, 1]. The function εl (ϕl, θ) is
defined as a function of Pr(θ), Pr(ϕl|θ) and the Pr(ϕl|¬θ). The
contention that the incorporation of a contrastive expli-
candum makes the explanatory power analysis explicit and
forces one to articulate a decision rule’s implications and
truth-values necessitates the inclusion of ¬θ (i.e. non-ter-
minated contracts, the exclusive alternative value of a
PPP’s status). We state the formula for a rule’s explanatory
power as follows:
( ) ( )
( ) Pr 𝜙l |𝜃 − Pr 𝜙l |¬𝜃
l 𝜃, 𝜙l = ( ) ( ) (3)
Pr 𝜙l |𝜃 + Pr 𝜙l |¬𝜃
Regarding the connection between rough set theory
and the logic of explanatory power analysis, recall that
( ) ( )
Pr 𝜙l |𝜃 = cov rl , the coverage
( )
coefficient associated
( )
with rl. We, therefore, let Pr 𝜙l |¬𝜃 = cov ¬rl denote the
frequency of non-terminated contracts in the set of PPPs
that possessed the properties specified in ϕl. To compute
( )
cov ¬rl , one simply divides the number of cases in a rule’s
premise ϕl that fail to meet the property specified in the
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS   9
rule’s consequent by the number of non-terminated con-
tracts as follows:
( ) ( ) |𝜙 ∧ ¬𝜃 ||
Pr 𝜙l |¬𝜃 = cov ¬rl = | l . (4)
|¬𝜃|
Putting these together, we restate the measure of explan-
atory power as follows:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) Pr 𝜙l |𝜃 − Pr 𝜙l |¬𝜃 cov rl − cov ¬rl
l 𝜃, 𝜙l = ( ) ( )= ( ) ( ) (5)
Pr 𝜙l |𝜃 + Pr 𝜙l |¬𝜃 cov rl + cov ¬rl
Besides facilitating the resolution of explanation-related
controversies, l induced a normalized measure that pre-
vented the allocation of explanatory powers based on a
condition’s relative frequency. It also facilitated the inter-
pretation of a range of inferences and counterfactual
implications derivable from the truth-values of a decision
rule (Schupbach and Sprenger 2011).
Results
Table 2 shows the main results of the analysis.
In rough sets theoretic terms, the information in Table 2
shows the values of the logical decision rules built from the
attribute values in the PPP cross-sectional table. Reasoning
from the results in Table 2, it is possible to extract some
approximate implications. As an example, for each deci-
sion rule, we can identify the certainty factor, cert(ri), which
can be interpreted as the conditional probability that a PPP
contract is terminated, given that it belongs to the set of
contracts that possess the attribute value specified in the
premise of the decision rule. Hence, from this perspective,
one can say that the conditional probability that a PPP
contract is terminated, given that it is implemented under
a PSM contract type, is 0.261. Likewise, one can say that the
conditional probability that a PPP contract is terminated,
given that it is implemented under an SPM contract type,
is 0.084. The conditional probability that a PPP contract is
terminated, given that a domestic firm implemented it, is
0.069, making this the least certain decision rule. Similarly,
as the conditional probability that a PPP contract is termi-
nated given that it is implemented under a PSM contract
type is the highest probability observed, this is the most
certain decision rule. The results also show that the condi-
tional probability that a PPP contract is terminated given
that it is an energy project is higher than those of the other
sectors (i.e. telecom, transport and water).
No decision rule in Table 2 has an explanatory power
or certainty coefficient that equals one. Nevertheless, the
information in Table 2 provides some evidence of differ-
ential relevance to the explanation of contract termina-
tion. For example, it shows that a PSM contract type had
 10   A. T. ODOEMENA AND M. HORITA

Table 2. Measures associated with each attribute.

Premise → Consequent Supp(rl) Cov(rl) Cert(rl) εl (rl)
ϕ → θ |Φ ∧ Θ| Pr(ϕ|θ) Pr(θ|ϕ) ε1(θ, ϕ)
r1 (Contract = PSM) → (Outcome = Terminated) 23 0.434 0.261 0.446
r2 (Contract = SPM) → (Outcome = Terminated) 30 0.566 0.084 −0.191
r3 (Sector = Energy) → (Outcome = Terminated) 17 0.321 0.142 0.098
r4 (Sector = Telecom) → (Outcome = Terminated) 24 0.453 0.119 −0.003
r5 (Sector = Transport) → (Outcome = Terminated) 9 0.170 0.093 −0.140
r6 (Sector = Water) → (Outcome = Terminated) 3 0.057 0.120 0.003
r7 (Sponsor = Foreign) → (Outcome = Terminated) 39 0.736 0.134 0.064
r8 (Sponsor = Mixed) → (Outcome = Terminated) 8 0.151 0.157 0.157
r9 (Sponsor = Domestic) → (Outcome = Terminated) 4 0.075 0.069 −0.395

the greatest expected incidence of contract termination.
In other words, with ε1  =  0.446, it can be said that the
attribute PSM provided the best explanation for con-
tract termination. Conversely, domestic sponsorship pro-
vided the least explanation for contract termination, with
ε9 = −0.395. Domestic sponsorship seems to have provided
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The explanatory relevance of the four sectors with
respect to contract termination appears to be highly sen-
sitive to background factors. For example, whereas the
attribute energy  ∧  PSM increased the degree to which
one would expect contract termination, the attribute
energy  ∧  domestic eliminated the expectation of con-

a negative explanation for contract termination.
The sensitivity of each attribute’s explanatory
relevance
Using the notion of context sensitivity, we evaluated how
the explanatory power associated with each attribute varied
when it was combined with another attribute to identify the
susceptibility of their explanatory relevance to local causal
interference (Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010). The decision
rule for the sensitivity analysis took the following form: if
Contract_type = x and sector = y, then PPP = terminated. The
presentation of the results of the analysis thus, places some
emphasis on the potential use of these implications in deci-
sion-making and recommendations. Table 3 shows the con-
text sensitivity of the explanatory powers of all the attributes.
Table 3 shows how the explanatory power of each
attribute in the horizontal axis changes in the context of
the attribute in the vertical axis, and vice versa. Each entry
xij in the table thus, corresponds to the explanatory power
of a conjunction of attributes i and j in the vertical and
horizontal axes (respectively) in the explanation of contract
termination. The interpretation of each entry is therefore,
straightforward. For example, the explanatory power of
SPM alone is −0.191, whereas the explanatory power falls
to −0.448 when the premise of the decision rule involved
an SPM with domestic sponsorship. The first prominent
observation in Table 3 centred on the fact that the signs
of the explanatory power of PSM and SPM contracts with
respect to contract termination continue to hold under a
larger set of interventions. The use of SPM contracts seems
to minimize contract termination across a range of circum-
stances, unlike the PSM contracts. Therefore, based on this
result, it would be reasonable to avoid PSM contracts in
telecom and foreign-sponsored PPPs.
tract termination. A similar observation applied to the
distance between the explanatory power of the attribute
water ∧ mixed and the attribute water ∧ domestic.
In relation to the corresponding certainty coefficients, if
a PPP was an energy project, and the sponsor was domes-
tic, the probability that the contract would be terminated
was zero. This explains the strong negative relevance of
the attribute energy  ∧  domestic. A similar explanation
applies to the relevance of the attribute water ∧ domes-
tic. Furthermore, one can also see that there seem to be
some circumstances where the telecom and water sectors
increase or decrease the expectation of contract termi-
nation. However, there does not appear to be an easily
generalizable logic for the context sensitivity of the sector
attributes.
It is also easy to see from Table 3 that, unlike for mixed
sponsorship, the negative relevance of domestic spon-
sorship with respect to contract termination seems rel-
atively stable. One can also observe the contexts where
the risk of foreign sponsorship seem most sensitive, par-
ticularly the significant difference between the sensitivity
of a foreign-sponsored project and a domestic-sponsored
project.
Figure 3 summarizes the variance associated with the
context sensitivity for all of the explanatory attributes.
As with the conventional interpretation of variance,
smaller and larger values correspond to lower and higher
sensitivities, respectively. Additionally, an increase in sen-
sitivity makes the explanatory relationship more fragile
and less robust (Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010). The infor-
mation in Figure 3, thus, indicates that the explanatory
power associated with contract type tends to be less con-
text sensitive and therefore, more reliable than the expla-
nations for contract termination derived from the sector
and nationality attributes.
 CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS   11

Table 3. Sensitivity of the attributes’ explanatory power.

PSM SPM Domestic Foreign Mixed Energy Telecom Transport Water
PSM 0.446 – −0.151 0.565 0.192 0.320 0.613 0.336 0.146
SPM – −0.191 −0.448 −0.225 0.152 0.026 −0.446 −0.270 −0.239
Domestic −0.151 −0.448 −0.395 – – −1.000 −0.040 −0.594 −1.000
Foreign 0.565 −0.225 – 0.064 – 0.212 0.059 −0.121 −0.395
Mixed 0.192 0.152 – – 0.157 −0.099 −0.126 0.336 0.573
Energy 0.320 0.026 −1.000 0.212 −0.099 0.098 – –
Telecom 0.613 −0.446 0.040 0.059 −0.126 – −0.003 – –
Transport 0.336 −0.270 −0.594 −0.121 0.336 – – −0.140 –
Water 0.146 −0.239 −1.000 −0.395 0.537 – – – 0.003

0.2500 associated with the PSM, particularly the problems of

enforceability and conflict interests, are relevant in the
0.2000 explanation of contract termination. It also corroborates the
argument of some stakeholders in actual cases of contract
0.1500 termination that the inefficiencies associated with under-
Variance

funding play pervasive roles. This explains why underin-

0.1000 vestment is considered an act of bad faith, an antecedent
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that can undermine a PPP project’s successful implemen-

0.0500
tation, viability and profitability. The general implication
of this result is that one needs to be careful in choosing a
0.0000
contract type for long-term infrastructure projects.
M

rt

tic
M

gn
r

om

ed
gy

According to the literature, one of the problems that

po
at
PS

SP

er

es

ix
ei
ec
W

ns

M
En

om

Fo
l
Te

a
Tr

Contract-Type Project’s Sector Sponsor’s Nationality
Figure 3. The variance of a PPP attribute’s explanatory powers.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have examined empirically the factors
that contribute to the problem of contract termination
in PPP, based on insights from theoretical advancement
in contract theory, transaction costs economics and the
theory of industrial organizations. Using these theoretical
perspectives, we examined an economic model of PPP that
highlights the negative effects of a contract type that is
vulnerable to the holdup and underinvestment problems.
Consequently, we focused our empirical examinations
primarily on the profit-sharing mechanism (PSM) and the
specific performance mechanism (SPM) – the two contract
types that are theoretically expected to have the most dif-
ferent effects on contract termination. In view of some of
the major issues raised in the existing literature, to facilitate
the comparison of rival and competing explanations we
also expanded the scope of the explanatory variables to
include the project’s sector and the investor’s nationality.
Based on the evidence presented, in this study, we can
conclude that contract type is a significant factor in con-
tract termination in PPPs. Aside from having higher cer-
tainty coefficients, the explanations derived from contract
type are less sensitive to contextual factors, as compared
to the explanations derived from a project’s sector or the
sponsors’ nationality. The result justifies the relevance of the
study’s underlying assumption that unique inefficiencies
undermines the suitability of the PSM – and indeed. any
contract that is vulnerable to the holdup and underinvest-
ment problems – is the verifiability constraint with the
resulting moral hazard. This makes PSM contracts more
vulnerable to classic implementation problems. The main
idea is that, although verifiability facilitates a contract’s
enforceability, the benefits associated with verifiability
may become trivial if the contract is designed in a man-
ner that makes optimal investment self-enforcing. In other
words, one can expect a contract type that is not self-en-
forcing to be less easy to implement in comparison with
a contract type that is self-enforcing.
Our findings indicate that it is possible to use the impli-
cations of theoretical models to expand the scope of the
explanatory variables used in the study of contract termi-
nation. Thus, further theoretical and empirical studies are
highly recommended. Due to the complexity of real-life
PPP projects, future research could consider other factors
that can be deduced from contract theory to improve
upon the understanding of the mechanisms through
which a contract type undermines the viability of a part-
nership. Some suggested directions for future research
include the roles of a contract’s duration and sub-con-
tracting mechanism.
Lastly, for some practical reasons, such as the questions
raised in relation to sub-Saharan Africa in the literature
and the authors’ knowledge of the region, we have con-
ducted our analysis using cases from sub-Saharan Africa.
It would be interesting to examine the effects of regional
factors through some sort of comparative analysis in future
studies.
 12   A. T. ODOEMENA AND M. HORITA
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to the management of the Tanzanian Railways
Limited (TRL) and Reli Asset Holding Company (RAHCO) for
their willing cooperation and support during the field study.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
This work was supported by the Japanese Council for Science,
Technology, and Innovation (CSTI), the Cross-ministerial Strate-
gic Innovation Promotion Program (SIP), and the “Infrastructure
Maintenance, Renovation, and Management” (with funding
agency, JST).
Downloaded by [Pepperdine University] at 17:48 08 August 2017
ORCID
Anthony T. Odoemena   http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6817-9380
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