People v Duca, October 30, 2009

G.R No. 171175

FACTS:

Respondent was charged for falsification of official documents

and penalized under Art. 172 of RPC. He made it appear that the
signature appearing on the sworn statement of the owner for the
preparation of the tax declaration is that of his brother, who is the
true owner and was out of the country at that time. MCTC and
RTC found him guilty of the offense but upon appeal to the CA by
the respondent, he was acquitted resolving that he was
authorized verbally to register the house on his brother’s behalf
which was subsequently followed by a Special Power of Attorney
which cures the defect from the beginning. Petitioner, through the
OSG, argued that he was denied due process as he was not
notified to bring an action on behalf of the People.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion

resulting in lack or excess of jurisdiction.

RULING:

YES. The authority to represent the State in:

1. All criminal proceedings
2. All civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or its officers in their official capacity a party
On appeal before the CA and SC is solely vested the OSG. All
criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. OSF is
regarded as the appellate counsel of the People and such should
have been allowed to be heard but records show that CA failed to
require OSG to file his comments.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction and are
void ab initio. The respondent appealed for a petition for review
under Rule 42 which required him to serve copies of his petition to
the adverse party (OSG). Failure to do so would require CA to
dismiss the case thus CA is found to have committed grave abuse
of discretion in rendering assailing decisions.

Note: Writ of certiorari lies only when the petitioner has no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In this case, the petitioners could have appealed to the SC but
instead filed a petition for certiorari. This is justified since the CA
decision was void for lack of due process.

Leviste V Alameda
G.R No. 182677, August 3, 2010
Facts:

Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) was, by Information, charged

with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12,
2007, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
Petitioner was placed under police custody while confined at the
Makati Medical Center. After the petitioner posted a bond that the
trial court approved, he was released from detention, and his
arraignment was set.
The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the
conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion
praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow
the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to
conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in cases when an accused is arrested without a

warrant, the remedy of preliminary investigation belongs only to
the accused.

HELD:

No. The Court holds that the private complainant can move for
reinvestigation.

All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information

shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor The private complainant in a criminal case is merely a
witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask
for the reinvestigation of the case after the information had been
filed in court, the proper party for that being the public prosecutor
who has the control of the prosecution of the case. Thus, in cases
where the private complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel
in the criminal action and is granted the authority to prosecute, the
private complainant, by counsel and with the conformity of the
public prosecutor, can file a motion for reinvestigation.
In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be
conducted by the public prosecutor, the permission or consent of
the court must be secured. If after such re-investigation the
prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw the information or
otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed course
of action may be taken but shall likewise be addressed to the
sound discretion of the court.
Once the trial court grants the prosecution’s motion for
reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the
authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having
brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is
thus equipped with discretion – wide and far-reaching – regarding
the disposition thereof, subject to the trial court’s approval of the
resulting proposed course of action.

ROSALINDA PUNZALAN, RANDALL PUNZALAN AND

RAINIER PUNZALAN vs. MICHAEL GAMALIEL J. PLATA AND
RUBEN PLATA

G.R. No. 160316 September 2, 2013

FACTS:

The Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors in

Mandaluyong City. On the eve of August 13, 1997, Dencio dela
Peña, a house boarder of the Platas, was in front of a store near
their house when the group of Rainier Punzalan, Randall
Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex "Toto" Ofrin, and
several others ganged up on him. Dela Peña was able to escape
but while he was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas’ family
driver, who was carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun from Cagara
and pointed it at the group chasing him to scare them. Michael
Plata, who was nearby, intervened and tried to wrestle the gun
away from Dela Peña. The gun accidentally went off and hit
Rainier Punzalan in the thigh.

Thereafter, Rainier filed a criminal complaint for Attempted

Homicide against Michael Gamaliel Plata (Michael) and one for
Illegal Possession of Firearms against Robert Cagara (Cagara).
On the other hand, Michael, Ruben Plata (Ruben), and several
others filed several complaints against petitioners Rosalinda,
Randall, Rainier, and several individuals before the Office of the
City Prosecutor, Mandaluyong City.

On July 28, 1998, the Office of the City Prosecutor, in its Joint
Resolution, dismissed the complaints filed against the petitioners
for lack of sufficient basis both in fact and in law.

On July 28, 1998, the Office of the City Prosecutor, in its Joint
Resolution, dismissed the complaints filed against the petitioners
for lack of sufficient basis both in fact and in law.

Subsequently, the respondents filed their separate petitions

before the DOJ. On March 23, 2000, the DOJ modified July 28,
1998, Joint Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor and
ordered the filing of separate information against the petitioners.
The latter filed a motion for reconsideration, dated April 28, 2000.
Upon review, the DOJ reconsidered its findings and ruled that
there was no probable cause. In its Resolution, dated June 6,
2000, the DOJ set aside its March 23, 2000 Resolution and
directed the Office of the City Prosecutor to withdraw the
information.

Not in conformity, the respondents moved for a reconsideration of

June 6, 2000, Resolution but the DOJ denied the motion.
Aggrieved, the respondents elevated the matter to the CA by way
of certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
DOJ Secretary which ordered the withdrawal of the separate
information.

On September 29, 2003, the CA annulled and set aside the June
6, 2000, and October 11, 2000 Resolutions of the DOJ and
reinstated its March 23, 2000 Resolution which ordered the filing
of separate information against the petitioners.

Hence, this petition. In essence, the petitioners argue that the

determination of the existence of a probable cause is lodged with
the prosecutor, who assumes full discretion and control over the
complaint. They insist that the DOJ committed no grave abuse of
discretion when it directed the Office of the City Prosecutor to
withdraw the information. In the absence of grave abuse of
discretion, they contend that the courts should not interfere with
the discretion of the prosecutor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court can interfere in finding probable cause

by a prosecutor.

RULING:

No. The well-established rule is that the conduct of preliminary

investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor.

The prosecution of crimes lies with the executive department of

the government whose principal power and responsibility is to see
that the laws of the land are faithfully executed. "A necessary
component of this power to execute the laws is the right to
prosecute their violators." Succinctly, the public prosecutor is
given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause
exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed
the crime and should be held for trial.

Consequently, the Court considers it a sound judicial policy to

refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations
and to leave the DOJ a wide latitude of discretion in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause for the prosecution of the supposed offenders.
The rule is based not only upon the respect for the investigatory
and prosecution powers granted by the Constitution to the
executive department but upon practicality as well.

Thus, the rule is that this Court will not interfere in the findings of
the DOJ Secretary on the insufficiency of the evidence presented
to establish probable cause unless it is shown that the questioned
acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of
discretion, thus "means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The party
seeking the writ of certiorari must establish that the DOJ
Secretary exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as would
amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.

In the present case, there was no clear evidence of grave abuse

of discretion committed by the DOJ when it set aside its March
23, 2000 Resolution and reinstated the July 28, 1998 Resolution
of the public prosecutor.
Evidently, the conclusions arrived at by the DOJ were neither
whimsical nor capricious as to be corrected by certiorari. Even on
the assumption that the DOJ Secretary made erroneous
conclusions, such error alone would not subject his act to
correction or annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
After all, not "every erroneous conclusion of law or fact is an
abuse of discretion.

CRESPO v MOGUL

FACTS:

Information for estafa was filed against Mario Crespo. When the
case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion to defer
arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for
review filed with the Secretary of Justice for the filing of the
information. The presiding judge, Leodegario Mogul denied the
motion but the arraignment was deferred to afford time for the
petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court. Crespo then
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a writ of injunction
in the CA to restrain the respondent judge from proceeding with
the arraignment of the accused. The Solicitor General
recommended that the petition be given due course and the CA
granted the same.

Meanwhile, the Undersecretary of Justice Catalino Macaraig

reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and
directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against Crespo. A motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal with the
RTC, but the respondent judge denied the same and set the date
and time for the arraignment. Crespo then filed in the CA a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with TRO to restrain Mogul
from enforcing his judgment, which was again issued by the CA.
Later on, the CA rendered a decision and dismissed the petition
of Crespo and lifted the TRO. Hence this present petition.

ISSUE/S:

1. W/N a fiscal has the authority to file a motion to dismiss on the

ground of insufficiency of evidence after the information has been
submitted to the court?

2. W/N Mogul acted with grave abuse of discretion in giving due

course to the arraignment of the accused?

HELD:

1. Yes, but it must be with the permission of the judge.

2. No, the court acquires jurisdiction of the accused upon the filing
of the information by the fiscal.

It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the

fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie case that would
warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere
with the fiscal’s discretion and control of the criminal prosecution.
Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for
insufficiency of evidence has the authority to do so, and Courts
that grant the same commit no error. The fiscal may re-investigate
a case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-
investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his
guilt may not be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, such authority is not without any limitations. The same
is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal and it may
be elevated for review by the Secretary of Justice. Consequently,
the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the
case be filed in Court or otherwise, that a piece of information is
filed in Court. The filing of a complaint or information in Court
initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction
over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the
case. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the
filing of the information in the proper court. Should the fiscal find it
proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the
permission of the Court must be secured. In order to avoid such a
situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial
court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable,
refrain from entertaining a petition for review from the action of the
fiscal, when the information has already been filed in Court.

Webb vs People

G.R. No. 127262 July 24, 1997

Facts

The petitioners, in this case, were charged with the crime

of rape with

homicide for allegedly raping Carmela Vizconde and on

the occasion thereof, killing Carmela herself and her
mother, Estrellita, and her sister, Jennifer.
Petitioner Webb and his co-accused, Gerardo Biong, had
sought the disqualification of the respondent judge on the
ground that the respondent judge allegedly told the media
words that would seem to have already concluded their
conviction of guilt for the crime committed, thus, being bias
and partiality against them.

Issue:

Whether the respondent judge has consistently and

repeatedly shown bias and hostility against petitioners

Decision:

No, the Judge was not biased in this case.

A party has the right to seek the inhibition or

disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be
wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and independent in
handling the case. This right must be weighed with the
duty of a judge to decide cases without fear of repression.
Hence, to disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and
prejudice the movant must prove the same by clear and
convincing evidence. This is a heavy burden and
petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proof.

In this case, the petitioners failed to adduce any extrinsic

evidence to prove that the respondent judge was
motivated by malice or bad faith in issuing the assailed
rulings. Petitioners simply lean on the alleged series of
adverse rulings of the respondent judge which they
characterized as palpable errors. This is not enough.
It is true that the respondent judge erred in some of her
rulings such as her rejection of the petitioners' one
hundred thirty-two (132) pieces of evidence. It appears,
however, that the respondent judge reversed this
erroneous ruling and already admitted these 132 pieces of
evidence after finding that "the defects in (their)
admissibility have been cured through the introduction of
additional evidence during the trial on the merits.” This
correction diminishes the strength of the petitioners'
charge that the respondent judge is hopelessly biased
against them.

Therefore, they have not consistently shown bias and

hostility against petitioners.

Eugene Firaza vs. People of the Philippines

Facts:

Eugene Firaza was appointed as a confidential agent of

the NBI in Caraga Regional Office. He was issued with a
firearm and a mission order to gather and report to the
NBU such information as may be relevant to the
investigations undertaken by it.

Firaza also served as a manager for RF Communications

in connection with which he dealt with Christopher Rivas
(Provincial Auditor of Surigao del Sur), for the
establishment of the Public Calling Office in the
Municipality of Lianga, Surigao del Sur.
On August 11, 2000, while in Firaza and Rivas had their
meeting at the latter’s restaurant, a heated argument
commenced between them which opted Rivas to point his
gun at Rivas. Firazo was accosted by P/Insp. Mullanida
and PO2 Ronquillo by which they discovered that Firaza’s
permit to carry a firearm outside the residence had expired
more than a month earlier or on July 5, 2000.

A criminal complaint was filed against Firaza for

“Unauthorized Carrying of License Firearm Outside
Residence.” He has then convicted of that offense.

Firaza now argued that the complaint charged against him

should be “Illegal Possession of Firearms” and not
“Carrying Firearms Outside of Residence” as the phrase in
the complaint reads “with an expired license or permit to
carry outside residence...” being “merely descriptive of the
alleged unlicensed nature of the firearm.

Issue:

WON the complaint was sufficient.

Held:

Yes. The allegations in a complaint on information

determine what the offense is charged. The alleged acts
or omissions complained of constituting the offense need
not be in the terms of the statute determining the offense,
but in such form, as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce its
judgment.

Firaza cannot seriously claim that his constitutional right to

be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him was violated. For the transcript of
Stenographic notes of the proceedings before the trial
court shows that he, through his counsel, was duly
informed of the nature of the cause against him.

The mission order issued to Firaza authorized him to carry

firearms “in connection with confidential cases assigned to
him.” Admittedly, Firaza was at Riva’s restaurant in
connection with a private business transaction.
Additionally, the mission order did not authorize him to
carry his duly issued firearm outside of his residence.

PEOPLE VS CRISTOBAL

GR No. 159450, March 30, 2011

FACTS:

The accused-appellant, Olivia Garcia Cristobal, the teller

of Prudential Bank, is charged with qualified theft.
Cristobal is entrusted with cash and other accountabilities,
with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon
her by her employer, with intent to gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take, steal and
carry away cash money amounting to $10,000.00,
belonging to the Prudential Bank, Angeles Main Branch.
Virgilio Frias, Prudential bank’s senior audit examiner,
inventories the cash accountabilities by manually counting
the money. While the books of the branch showed that the
appellant had cash accountability of $25, 040.52, the
money in her cash box was only $5,040.52. Asked about
the shortage, the accused presented to Frias a withdrawal
memo dated January 2, 1996, showing a withdrawal of
$10,000.00 from Dollar Savings Account No. FX-836 ("FX-
836") of Adoracion Tayag and her co-signatory, Apolinario
Tayag. From the account ledger, Frias also discovered
that a deposit of $10,000.00 was made on January 2,
1996. Thereafter, Frias compared the signature and found
a "big difference". He referred the matter to the branch
manager, Edgardo Panlilio. When Panlilio again asked the
appellant to explain, he later started to cry and said she
would explain to the bank president. The appellant sent a
letter to the bank president. The Appellant apologized and
explained her shortage of $10,000.00 and another
shortage of P2.2 Million which the audit team had also
discovered.

ISSUE:

Was the information filed against the accused fatally

defective?

RULING:
NO. Section 6 and 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides the sufficiency of the allegation of the time
or date of the commission of the offense.

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A

complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
time of the commission of the offense; and the place
wherein the offense was committed.

Section 11. Time of the commission of the offense. – It is

not necessary to state in the complaint or information the
precise time at which the offense was committed except
when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the
act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as
near to the actual date at which the offense was
committed as the information or complaint will permit.

Conformably with these rules, the information was

sufficient because it stated the approximate time of the
commission of the offense through the words "on or about
the 2nd of January, 1996," and the accused could
reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with
which she was charged from a reading of its contents as
well as gather by such reading whatever she needed to
know about the charge to enable her to prepare her
defense.
The information herein did not have to state the precise
date when the offense was committed, considering that
the date was not a material ingredient of the offense. As
such, the offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date
of its commission. Verily, December 29, 1995, and
January 2, 1996, dated only four days apart.

People vs Asilan, Gr 188322

Facts:

PO1 Randy Adovas, member of PNP, while handcuffing a

still unknown person, was attacked and stabbed at the
back by accused Joseph Asilan who also took the police’s
service gun and fired shots at him. Both the stab wounds
and gunshots were the cause of death of the police officer.
This event was witnessed by Binosa, a barker in Teresa
Sta. Mesa, and a student Pol San Diego, both identified
Asilan as the suspect.

Asilan was tried and RTC found him guilty of the crime of
murder, qualified by treachery in attacking the police
officer from behind, depriving him of a chance to defend
himself-reclusion perpetua. Asilan was however acquitted
in the allegations of direct assault as the RTC found no
evidence that the police were effecting an arrest, or if he
was indeed in the performance of his duty. CA affirmed
the decision in toto, hence, this petition.
The accused claims that his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him was infringed when he was convicted of
murder when the qualifying circumstance of treachery was
not alleged in the information.

Issue:

WON treachery may be appreciated in the case even

though it was not alleged in the information.

Ruling:

This Court does not find merit in Asilan’s contention that

he cannot be convicted of murder because his acts of
treachery were not alleged with specificity in the
Information. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure states:

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A

complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
time of the commission of the offense; and the place
wherein the offense was committed.

When the offense is committed by more than one person,

all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information. This Court held that under Section 6, the
Information is sufficient if it contains the full name of the
accused, the designation of the offense given by the
statute, the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the
name of the offended party, the approximate date, and the
place of the offense."48 The Information herein complied
with these conditions. Contrary to Asilan’s contention, the
qualifying circumstance of "treachery" was specifically
alleged in the Information. "The rule is that qualifying
circumstances must be properly pleaded in the Information
in order not to violate the accused’s constitutional right to
be properly informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him." Asilan never claimed that he was
deprived of his right to be fully apprised of the nature of
the charges against him due to the insufficiency of the
Information.

People v Cilot

G.R No. 208410

Facts:
AAA, then seventeen (17) years old, was employed as a sales
lady at a drug store in PPP City. She first met Mary Joy when the
latter went to the drug store on 7 December 2006 and introduced
herself as a relative of AAA. Mary Joy promised AAA an overseas
work for a fee. Thus, AAA gave Mary Joy a total of P1,500.00. On
28 December 2006 at around 6:00a.m., AAA went for a jog. When
she passed by the house of Mary Joy, the latter suddenly grabbed
her and forced her to enter the house. Thereat, Mary Joy took
AAA's cellular phone and sent a message to AAA's female
employer that she left the store because the former's husband
had been abusing her. Mary Joy threatened AAA with a gun and a
grenade if AAA would try to escape. AAA was detained from 26
December 2006 until 9 January 2007. On 8 January 2007 at
around 11:00 p.m., AAA was awakened by Mary Joy's live-in
partner, Orlando.  Orlando kicked AAA and dragged her into the
bed that he and Mary Joy shared.  Orlando forced AAA to lie
down. Mary Joy held AAA's breast, removed her bra, and inserted
her finger into AAA's vagina.  Thereafter, Orlando inserted his
penis twice into AAA's vagina. AAA was crying and at the same
time trying to resist the couple's advances but to no avail on the
following day, Mary Joy brought AAA to a mall in Bicutan to meet
with AAA's relatives regarding AAA's alleged debt to Mary Joy.
When they were met by AAA's aunt, uncle and sister, they took
AAA from Mary Joy and brought her to a police station to report
the incident. Appellants were arrested at their house.

Issues:
AAA, then seventeen (17) years old, was employed as a sales
lady at a drug store in PPP City. She first met Mary Joy when the
latter went to the drug store on 7 December 2006 and introduced
herself as a relative of AAA. Mary Joy promised AAA an overseas
work for a fee. Thus, AAA gave Mary Joy a total of P1,500.00. On
28 December 2006 at around 6:00a.m., AAA went for a jog. When
she passed by the house of Mary Joy, the latter suddenly grabbed
her and forced her to enter the house. Thereat, Mary Joy took
AAA's cellular phone and sent a message to AAA's female
employer that she left the store because the former's husband
had been abusing her. Mary Joy threatened AAA with a gun and a
grenade if AAA would try to escape. AAA was detained from 26
December 2006 until 9 January 2007. On 8 January 2007 at
around 11:00 p.m., AAA was awakened by Mary Joy's live-in
partner, Orlando.  Orlando kicked AAA and dragged her into the
bed that he and Mary Joy shared.  Orlando forced AAA to lie
down. Mary Joy held AAA's breast, removed her bra, and inserted
her finger into AAA's vagina.  Thereafter, Orlando inserted his
penis twice into AAA's vagina. AAA was crying and at the same
time trying to resist the couple's advances but to no avail on the
following day, Mary Joy brought AAA to a mall in Bicutan to meet
with AAA's relatives regarding AAA's alleged debt to Mary Joy.
When they were met by AAA's aunt, uncle and sister, they took
AAA from Mary Joy and brought her to a police station to report
the incident. Appellants were arrested at their house.[7]
The issue for resolution is whether appellants have been proven
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape.
whether appellants have been proven guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape.
Ruling:
The elements of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he
kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the
latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be
illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the
following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by
simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill
him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female, or a public officer.[18]The crime of kidnapping was proven
by the prosecution. Appellants are private individuals. The primary
element of the crime of kidnapping is the actual confinement or
restraint of the victim, or the deprivation of his liberty. It is not
necessary for the victim to be locked up or placed in an
enclosure; it is sufficient for him to be detained or deprived of his
liberty in any manner.  AAA was forcibly taken and detained at the
house of appellants where she was deprived of her liberty for 12
days or from 28 December 2006 until 9 January 2007. AAA was
consistently threatened by the couple. Whenever the couple
would leave the house, they would padlock the door to prevent
AAA from escaping. AAA is a female and was a minor at the time
that she was kidnapped.
The crime of rape was established through AAA's further
narration
The crime of rape was also established through the testimony of
AAA that first, Mary Joy committed an act of sexual assault by
inserting her finger into AAA's vagina followed by Orlando who
had carnal knowledge of AAA by inserting his penis into AAA's
vagina. Orlando succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA
through the use of threat and intimidation.

Instead of convicting the appellants of the separate offenses of

kidnapping and rape as charged in three separate pieces of
information, the trial court found the appellants guilty of the
special complex crime of kidnapping with rape. The trial court
clearly relied on the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, which provides that if the victim is killed
or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed. This provision gives rise to a special complex
crime, where the law provides a single penalty for two or more
component offenses.
The trial court would have been correct had there been
Information specifically filed for the crime of kidnapping with rape.
in charging the commission of a complex offense, the information
must allege each element of the component offenses with the
same precision that would be necessary if they were made the
subject of a separate prosecution.
Criminal Case No. 134484-H charged Orlando only with rape.
Criminal Case No. 134485-H charged Mary Joy with rape through
sexual assault, while Criminal Case No. 134486-H accused-
appellants of kidnapping. A piece of information charging a
special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case,
should include that which alleges the commission of kidnapping
qualified by extortion of ransom and that which alleges rape on
the same occasion. Considering that the existing Information does
not contain the essential and material ingredients for the
commission of kidnapping with rape, appellants cannot be
convicted for that special complex crime. Appellants can only be
convicted of the separate offenses of kidnapping and rape, both
of which were duly proven.

MALTO VS THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR NO. 164733

FACTS:

At the time of incident, AAA, the complainant, was 17 yrs old. She
was a college student at Assumption College in San Lorenzo
Village, Makati City. On the other hand, the petitioner, Michael
John Z. Malto, was a 28-yr old professor of AAA in philosophy in
the first semester of school yr. 1997-1998.
The petitioner pursued AAA and they became sweethearts. In
November 26, 1997, after threatening AAA of ending their
relationship, AAA gave in to the petitioner to engage in sexual
intercourse with him inside the motel.

In July 1999, AAA ended their relationship and she learned that
he was either intimately involved with or was sexually harassing
his students in Assumption College and in other colleges where
he taught and that the accused was terminated from De La Salle
University – Aguinaldo and Assumption College. It was then that
AAA realized that she was actually abused by the petitioner. AAA
confided all that happened between her and petitioner to her
mother, BBB.

BBB filed an administrative complaint to the school and a criminal

case in the City Prosecutor of Pasay City.

The petitioner, in his defense, alleged that they only became

sweethearts when AAA was already 19 while he was already out
of Assumption College.

The trial court convicted Malto for violation of Article III, Section 5
(a) paragraph 3 of RA 7610 which was modified by the Court of
Appeals as a violation of paragraph (b) and not of paragraph (a)
of Section 5.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Malto is guilty of a violation of RA 7610?

RULING:
Yes, Malto is guilty of a violation of paragraph b of section 5 of RA
7610. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610
provide:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children,

whether male or female, who, for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate, or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.

SOMBILON, JR., vs. PEOPLE

GR No. 175528 – September 30, 2009

FACTS:

Jovelyn Puerin, 15-year-old minor, was investigated by the

Appellant at the Calinan Police Station, Davao City in connection
with a complaint of theft. Jovelyn alleged that the Appellant, in
conducting the investigation, took her inside a room and locked it.
They stayed in the room for an hour where the appellant
electrocuted and sexually molested Jovelyn.

Thereafter, they went out of the room where appellant announced

to P03 Mendez and Aileen Dagic that she already admitted
having stolen the necklace. The police officer allowed Jovelyn and
her mother to go home on the condition that they would pay the
value of the necklace.
Because Jovelyn was trembling and crying, Mrs. Puerin brought
her to the Medical Clinic of St. Luke where she was given a
tranquilizer in order to calm down. Upon regaining composure,
she revealed that she was electrocuted and sexually molested by
the petitioner.

The petitioner was then charged with the crime of Acts of

Lasciviousness, under Art. 336, in relation to Art. 344 of the RPC.

RTC Davao: Guilty of acts of lasciviousness with the aggravating

circumstance of the petitioner’s taking advantage of his public
position.

CA: Affirmed

Petitioner’s defense:

 As he admits merely touching the victim, the petitioner argues

that the act of touching did not

constitute lewdness.

 He could only be convicted of unjust vexation.

 While the victim was being touched, the latter tried to cover her
body with her arms.

The police station does not favor the perpetration of the crime of
acts of lasciviousness.

ISSUE:

WON Sombilon, Jr. is guilty of acts of lasciviousness.

HELD: YES!

Under Art. 336 of the RPC, the elements of Acts of lasciviousness

are as follows: (1) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness
or lewdness;

(2) the act of lasciviousness is committed against a person of

either sex;

(3) It is done under the following circumstances:

a) By using force or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise

unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of

authority; or

d) When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is

demented.

The term “lewd” is commonly defined as something indecent or

obscene; it is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual
desire. What constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct must be
determined from the circumstance of each case.

The petitioner’s acts of kissing the victim, fondling her breast and
touching her private parts constitutes lascivious conduct and
cannot be viewed as mere unjust vexation. The intention of the
petitioner was not merely to annoy or irritate the victim nor to
force her to confess the theft. He could have easily achieved that
when he electrocuted the latter. Instead, the petitioner intended to
gratify his sexual desires.