STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
[G.R. No. 9527. August 23, 1915. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE TAMPARONG ET
AL., Defendants-Appellants.
The appellants in their own behalf.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE; APPEALS IN THIRD INSTANCE; EXTENT OF REVIEW.
— Under the Spanish criminal procedure, appeals from justices’ courts were allowed only to
Courts of First Instance. By section 43 of General Orders No. 58, this procedure has been so
amended that appeals can be taken to the Supreme Court in such cases when the validity or
constitutionality of a statute is involved. This amendment of the procedure does not carry
with it the right of review of the facts, but is confined to the purpose stated — that is, of
determining the validity or constitutionality of the statute or ordinance upon which the
judgment was predicated. Former cases reviewed, showing that such has uniformly been the
interpretation of section 43 by this court.
DECISION
TRENT, J. :
The defendants were convicted by the justice of the peace of Baguio for having played the
game of chance called "monte" in violation of Ordinance No. 35. They appealed to the Court
of First Instance, where they were again tried and convicted upon the same charge. An appeal
was allowed to this court because the validity of Ordinance No, 35 was drawn in question
during the trial of the cause in the court below.
Two questions are raised by this appeal: (1) Is Ordinance No. 35 valid, and (2) is this court
required under the law to examine the evidence for the purpose of determining the guilt or
innocence of the defendants?
The first question is answered in the affirmative by this court in the case of the United States
v. Joson (26 Phil. Rep., 1). The cases are on all fours, and a further discussion of this branch
1
of the case is unnecessary.
With reference to the second question, it is said that by reason of the defendants’ having in
the lower court questioned the legality of Ordinance No. 35, for the violation of which they
have been convicted, this case has been brought to us in all its details of law and fact,
including the evidence taken at the trial, on which the Court of First Instance founded its
judgment touching the guilt and condemning the defendants. While, on the other hand, it is
contended that the questions of fact, which we are [not] authorized to examine, are those
which are essential to be examined for the purpose of determining the legality of Ordinance
No. 35 and the penalties provided for therein, and no other.
At the outset it may be well to briefly outline the criminal procedure in force in this
jurisdiction prior to the promulgation on the 23d day of April, 1900, of General Orders No.
58.
The royal order dated December 17, 1886, directing the execution of the royal decree of
September 4, 1884, wherein it was ordered that the Penal Code in force in the Peninsula, as
amended in accordance with the recommendations of the code committee, be published and
applied in the Philippine Islands, as well as the Provisional Law of Criminal Procedure which
accompanied it. These two laws, having been published in the Official Gazette of Manila on
March 13 and 14, 1887, became effective four months thereafter.
According to the provisions of Rule 1 of the above-mentioned provisional law, the justices of
the peace, or gobernadorcillos, had original jurisdiction over the offenses set forth in Book 3
of the Penal Code.
Rule 2 provided that "when the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo receives notice that
there has been committed any one of the offenses provided for in Book 3 of the Penal Code
which can be prosecuted by the Government, he shall issue summons for an oral trial to the
complainant, if any, to the alleged culprit, and to the witnesses who may be able to testify as
to the facts, fixing the day and hour for holding the trial. If this (the trial) takes place at the
residence of the promotor fiscal, he shall also be summoned." Rule 3 provided that the same
procedure should be followed in those cases which can only be prosecuted at the instance of a
private party, except that the promotor fiscal was not cited.
Neither the Provisional Law, the criminal procedural laws of the Peninsula, nor the autos
acordados prescribed any special form for the complaint to be presented to the justice of the
peace or the gobernadorcillo. As to this point, it seems that the Compilation of the Laws of
Criminal Procedure of 1879 was applicable. Articles 405, 406, and 412 read: "ART. 405. The
complaint made in writing must be signed by the complainant, and if he cannot do so, by
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
some other person at his request. The authority or official who receives it shall rubricate and
seal every page in the presence of the person who presents it, which also he may do himself
or through another person at his request.
"ART. 406. When the complaint is oral, it shall be reduced to writing by the authority or
official who receives it, wherein, in the form of a declaration, shall be set forth such
information as the complainant may have regarding the act complained of and the
circumstances thereof, and both shall sign it at the bottom. If the complainant cannot sign his
name, some other person shall do so at his request."cralaw virtua1aw library
"ART. 412. Criminal cases that are not instituted by the Government must begin with a
complaint."cralaw virtua1aw library
The oral trial referred to in Rule 2 was held within three days next following the date when
the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo received information that the offense had been
committed (Rule 4), the procedure being that provided for in Rule 9, which reads: "The trial
shall be public, beginning with the reading of the complaint, if any there be, followed by the
examination of the witnesses summoned and the introduction of such other evidence as the
complainant, accuser, and public prosecutor, if he take part, may request and the justice of the
peace or the gobernadorcillo may regard as pertinent. Immediately thereafter the accused
shall be given a hearing, the witnesses who appear in his defense shall be examined, and such
other evidence as the justice or the gobernadorcillo may declare to be admissible shall be
adduced. The parties shall forthwith make such pleas as they think expedient in support of
their respective contentions, the first to speak being the public prosecutor, if he take part, then
the private complainant, and finally the accused.
"The representative of the public prosecutor shall attend the trial for misdemeanors, whenever
he is cited thereto, in accordance with Rule 2."cralaw virtua1aw library
A record of the trial was made, wherein the whole procedure was clearly and succinctly set
forth, and signed by all the parties participating in the trial. (Rule 11.)
After trial and rendition of judgment, either of the parties could appeal to the Court of First
Instance within the first day next following that on which notice of the rendition of judgment
was served. The appeal suspended the judgment. After the appeal had been allowed, the
justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo remitted to the Court of First Instance the original
record and cited the parties to appear within the period of five days before the appellate court.
This time could be extended, if the circumstances of the case required. (Rule 14.) If the
appellant appealed, a day was fixed for the trial; but if he did not appear, the appeal was
dismissed. (Rule 15.) Rule 16 provides the procedure for the trial in the second instance. This
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rule reads: "The hearing at the trial shall be public, and all the proceedings in the case shall be
read therein; then the parties or their attorneys may speak in their turn, and thereafter the
judgment shall be pronounced and communicated to them.
"A record of the trial shall be drawn up in the same manner as fixed by Rule 11."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Rule 17 reads: "In this second instance no evidence may be admitted other than that which,
offered in the first instance, was not taken for reasons independent of the will of the parties
who had offered it."cralaw virtua1aw library
Rule 19 provides: "The judgment of the Court of First Instance will be executory, and there
will be no recourse from the same except that of responsibility before the audiencia del
territorio."cralaw virtua1aw library
The provisions of General Orders No. 58 pertinent to the question under consideration, are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 43. From all final judgments of the Courts of First Instance or courts of similar
jurisdiction, and in all cases in which the law now provides for appeals from said courts an
appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court as hereinafter prescribed. Appeals shall also lie
from the final judgments of justices of the peace in criminal cases to the courts of the next
superior grade, and the decisions of the latter thereon shall be final and conclusive except in
cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute, wherein appeal may be made to
the Supreme Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
"SEC. 54. All cases appealed from a justice’s court shall be tried in all respects anew in the
court to which the same are appealed; but on the hearing of such appeals it shall not be
necessary, unless the appeal shall involve the constitutionality or legality of a statute, that a
written record of the proceedings be kept; but shall be sufficient if the appellate court keeps a
docket of the proceedings in the form prescribed in the next preceding section."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Section 43 has been amended by section 34 of Act No. 1627 so as to read as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"From all final judgments of the Court of First Instance or courts of similar jurisdiction, and
in all cases in which the law now provides for appeals from said courts, an appeal may be
taken to the Supreme Court as hereinafter prescribed. The convicted party may appeal from
any final judgment of a justice of the peace in a criminal cause to the Court of First Instance
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
by filing a notice of appeal with such justice within fifteen days after the entry of judgment.
Upon such notice being so filed, the justice shall forward to the Court of First Instance all
original papers and a transcript of all docket entries in the cause, and the provincial fiscal
shall thereupon take charge of the cause in behalf of the prosecution. The judgment of the
Court of First Instance in such appeals shall be final and conclusive, except in cases involving
the validity or constitutionality of a statute or the constitutionality of a municipal or township
ordinance."cralaw virtua1aw library
In view of the fact that this court took the view, prior to the passage of Act No. 1627, that the
military governor and the framers of General Orders No. 58 intended by the use of the word
"statute" found in section 43 (supra) to include "ordinances," the amendment of this section
by section 34 of that Act does not affect the issue in the instant case. The original section
provided that "an appeal may be made to the Supreme Court in cases involving the validity or
constitutionality of a statute," and the section, as amended, authorizes appeals to the Supreme
Court in the same class of cases.
It is urged that as the civil-law term "appeal" is used in section 43 (supra), we must apply the
same rule of construction that the courts in England and the United States have ,almost
uniformly applied to the same term and thus derive an unqualified review of both the law and
the facts. This doubtless would be a correct position in some jurisdictions in the American
Union, as there the technical civil-law meaning of the term "appeal" is followed. The reason
for so doing is set forth in the case of Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v. Bunn (168 Fed. Rep.,
862), wherein the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The distinction between a ’writ of error,’ which brings up the record in an action of law for a
review of questions of law only, and an ’appeal,’ which involves a rehearing upon both the
facts and the law, is vital. These remedies have their origin and functions in the inherent
difference between courts of law and courts of equity, differences which are recognized in the
Constitution of the United States and the laws of Congress. The ’writ of error’ is a common
law writ, and searches the record for errors of law in the final judgment of a common-law
court. If error is found, the judgment awards a venire facias de novo. The ’appeal’ is a
procedure which comes to us from the civil law along with the fundamentals which go to
make up the jurisprudence of a court of equity. Its office is to remove the entire cause, and it
subjects the transcript to a scrutiny of fact and law and is in substance a new trial."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Under the system of procedure which obtains in the Philippine Islands, both legal and
equitable relief is dispensed in the same tribunal. We have no courts of law and courts of
equity as they are known and distinguished in England and the United States. All cases (law
and equity) are presented and tried in the same manner, including their final disposition in the
3
Supreme Court. Therefore, the word "appeal," as used in section 43 (supra), does not
necessarily imply the removal of the cause from one tribunal to another in its entirety,
subjecting the facts, as well as the law, to a review or a retrial, but it is to be interpreted by the
ordinary rules of construction.
The intention of the framers of General Orders No. 58 i8 the law. In order to ascertain that
intention the provisions of the order must be construed in the light of existing law and the
circumstances at the time of its promulgation.
At the time General Orders No. 58 went into effect, criminal cases originating in Courts of
First Instance came to the audiencia in their entirety, subjecting both the law and the facts to a
review or retrial. But the audiencia, or Philippine Supreme Court, could not review the
judgment of a Court of First Instance in any case tried on appeal from courts of justices of the
peace wherein the latter courts had jurisdiction. Such judgments were final and conclusive.
The aggrieved party could go no further with the case. The only recourse he had was that
mentioned in Rule 19 (supra). The penalties for violations of the provisions of Book 3 of the
Penal Code over which justices of the peace then had jurisdiction were generally arreto or
arresto menor and small fines. This was the law in force at the time section 43 (supra) was
framed and these were the conditions confronting the framers of that section at that time.
What changes did the section make?
Section 43 authorizes appeals to the Supreme Court from all final judgments of Courts of
First Instance "and in all cases in which the law now provides for appeals from said courts."
This part of the section is limited to judgments rendered in criminal cases originating in
Courts of First Instance. This is necessarily true because the latter part of the section makes
the decisions of the "courts of next superior grade (which were Courts of First Instance)
rendered in cases appealed from justices’ courts final and conclusive, except in cases
involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute." The result is that the former procedure
was amended by section 43 so as to also authorize appeals to the Supreme Court in the cases
mentioned in the latter part thereof when the validity or constitutionality of a statute was
drawn in question. To this extent only was the former procedural law changed in so far as, the
question at issue is concerned. Among the reasons which induced the lawmakers to make this
change was the fact that the jurisdiction of justices of the peace was "extended to all offenses
which the Penal Code designates as punishable by arresto mayor in all of its grades." (Sec.
108.)
If we had found the ordinance attacked in the case at bar to be illegal and unconstitutional, the
judgment appealed from would necessarily have to be set aside and defendants would have no
interest in presenting to us the evidence taken at the trial. But we have maintained the legality
of that ordinance, and in so doing have we exhausted our powers and reached the limit of our
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
inquiry? Section 43 does not expressly so limit our power. Neither does it expressly authorize
us to review the testimony touching the guilt or innocence of the defendants.
The distinction between the illegality of a penalty imposed by a municipal corporation and
the correctness of that imposed by a justice of the peace under a municipal ordinance, and
between the illegality of the ordinance and that of the proceedings or actions taken under it, is
plain and broad. An ordinance may, from the standpoint of the regularity of all the
proceedings leading up to and inclusive of its enactment, be absolutely faultless and yet the
ultimate act done or enacted may be inherently or intrinsically illegal or unconstitutional. On
the other hand, the latter may be perfectly unassailable and yet the ordinance be illegal or
unconstitutional by reason of some fact or circumstance connected with its passage. It may,
for instance, have been presented in a wrong manner, at a wrong time, or not voted for as
directed by law. It is to facts of this class or character that section 43 refers when it says "the
latter thereon shall be final and conclusive except in cases involving the validity or
constitutionality of a statute."cralaw virtua1aw library
Such appears to be the meaning and intention manifested from the provisions of the latter part
of section 43, already quoted, especially when they are considered in the light of the former
practice above indicated. Under that practice no appeals whatever were allowed to the
Supreme Court from judgments of Courts of First Instance in cases originating in justices’
courts. We must assume that the framers of section 43 had knowledge of this practice and its
effects. The framers desired to amend this practice to the extent only of providing a way by
which statutory questions, which might arise in these cases, could be reviewed by the
Supreme Court. This object could be very imperfectly obtained, if, when the court assumed
jurisdiction of such a case, it would not only determine the statutory questions, but also
inquire into and determine every other question raised during the progress of the trial. In
effect, this would entirely destroy the former practice, because it would render it possible to
bring every case here in its entirety. All that would be necessary would be to raise some
statutory question, whether material to the decision of the case or not, and the right of appeal
and reexamination of the whole case would be assured. Clearly, no such result was intended,
nor is it manifest from the language employed in section 43. But it is urged that our ruling in
this matter "involves the legal absurdity of disjoining a single case and turning over one
fragment to one court and another parcel to another court." (Elliott on Appellate Procedure,
sec. 17.) In this section the author is speaking of appellate jurisdiction where the distinction
between law and equity is rigidly maintained. He says: "Where a court of equity retains
jurisdiction for one purpose, it will retain it for all purposes." The same author recognizes a
difference in the two systems of appellate jurisdiction — that is, the one where the distinction
between law and equity is maintained and, the other, where the two are blended. (Section 24.)
In this last section the author says: "In some respects an appeal under the code system may be
less comprehensive in its scope than an appeal under the old system," citing Judge Curtis,
4
wherein he said that "it is evident that an appeal under the code system does not necessarily
bring up the entire case." In view of the fact that the code system prevails in the Philippine
Islands, blending legal and equitable rights and providing for one remedial system, our
holding in the instant case is not in conflict with Elliot on Appellate Procedure.
It is also urged that the rule announced in the case of Loeb v. . Columbia Township Trustees
(179 U. S., 472), and followed in the late case of Boise Artesian Hot and Cold Water Co.,
Ltd. v. Boise City (230 U. S., 84), is directly opposed to our holding in the case under
consideration. These two cases went to the Supreme Court of the United States on writs of
error directly from the circuit courts in accordance with the provisions of section 5 of the
Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891. This section provides "that appeals or writs of error may be
taken from the district courts, or from the existing circuit courts, direct to the Supreme Court
in the following cases: . . ." Here Congress maintains the distinction between "appeals" and
"writs of error." In each case above cited the Supreme Court of the United States held that it
not only had jurisdiction to review the constitutional questions, but also every other question
properly arising. The court then proceeded to review all legal questions in those cases and not
questions of fact, for the reason that the cases were before the court on writs of error. Even
granting that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction under the Act above mentioned to review
both questions of law and fact in cases appealed to that court, such holding would not be
antagonistic to our views in the instant case for the reason that our power to review the facts
touching the guilt or innocence of the defendants must be found in section 43 of General
Orders No. 58. Our view is, as above indicated, that the framers of that section did not intend
to confer upon this court that power. And all must admit that the military governor at the time
he promulgated General Orders No. 58 had the power to limit or restrict the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to statutory questions in cases of the character of the one under consideration.
Our ruling in the case at bar is fully supported by the adjudicated cases of this Supreme
Court.
In the case of Trinidad v. Sweeney (4 Phil. Rep., 531), the court said: "Upon the facts stated
in the complaint the plaintiff is entitled to prosecute an appeal to this court; but upon such
appeal the only question to be considered will be that of the validity or invalidity of the
ordinance. We cannot review the evidence nor pass upon any other question of law which
may appear in the record."cralaw virtua1aw library
In United States v. Trinidad (7 Phil. Rep., 325), the defendant was convicted in the municipal
court of the city of Manila for violating a municipal ordinance. He appealed to the Court of
First Instance, where he was again convicted. An appeal was allowed to the Supreme Court
on the ground that the constitutionality or validity of the ordinance was drawn in question. On
appeal the appellant insisted, among other things, that the trial court erred in deciding the case
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
without first consulting with the two assessors. This court held the ordinance valid and, after
quoting with approval the language used in the case of Trinidad v. Sweeney (supra), said: "In
cases where the appeal involves the constitutionality or validity of a statute, the disagreement
of the assessors with the judgment of the Court of First Instance on appeal does not authorize
this court to review the evidence, but its decision shall be confined only to the question of the
validity of the Act or statute in question, as occurs in the present case."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In the case of The United States v. Espiritusanto (23 Phil. Rep., 610), we examined the facts
touching the due enactment of the ordinance. After so doing, the ordinance was held valid,
but the facts touching the guilt or innocence of the appellant were not gone into.
In United States v. Ten Yu (24 Phil. Rep., 1), the court used this language at page 12: "While
we have discussed at length each of the assignments of error made by the appellants,
nevertheless, the only question, in fact, presented by the appeal under the law, in the first
instance, is whether or not the ordinance under which the defendants were sentenced is legal.
Having concluded that said ordinance is legal and within the express powers of the Municipal
Board to enact, the appeal must be dismissed, with costs in this instance against the appellants
in equal parts."cralaw virtua1aw library
In United States v. Abendan (24 Phil. Rep., 165), the court, after quoting the testimony of a
sanitary inspector and after holding the ordinance valid, said: "The evidence in the case,
which is undisputed, is sufficient, in our judgment, to warrant the order complained of. It
does not appear therefrom, the defendant himself having introduced substantially no proof in
the case, that he was treated differently from other persons in that locality, or that he was
required to do a thing that the others had not been required to do, or that he had in any way
been discriminated against in the application of this ordinance to the facts of his case, or that
its application was oppressive or unreasonable in this particular instance.
"The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
Considering this language, together with that used in the opinion wherein the court said, "The
sole question raised on this appeal is that presented by the claim of the appellant that the
ordinance in question is unreasonable and oppressive," it is clear that the court did not intend
to hold that it had authority to examine into the question of the guilt or innocence of
the Appellant.
In United States v. Co Chee (R. G. No. 8269, not reported) the appellants were convicted of a
violation of Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila and, having drawn in question the
validity of that ordinance, an appeal was allowed to this court. In disposing of this case the
5
court said: "Precisely this question was presented in the case of the United States v. Ten Yu
(24 Phil. Rep., 1), just decided by this court, in which we held that said Ordinance No. 152 of
the city of Manila was valid and constitutional. That case is on all fours with the present one,
and the judgment of conviction of the Court of First Instance is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellants, on the authority of that case."cralaw virtua1aw library
No attempt was made to examine or pass upon the testimony touching the guilt or innocence
of the appellants.
In United States v. Tiu Un (R. G., No. 7804); United States v. Gaw Kee (R. G., No. 7816);
United States v. Lim Cui (R. G., No. 7815); United States v. See Kea (R. G., No. 7828);
United States v. Go Tin (R. G., No. 7481); United States v. Sia Kim (R. G., No. 7716);
United States v. Lim Baey (R. G., No. 7915); United States v. Li Tia (R. G., No. 7826); and
United States v. Tam Bak (R. G., No. 7814), not reported, the appellants were convicted for a
violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila and, having drawn in
question the validity of that ordinance, appeals were allowed to this court. This court, upon
the authority of the United States v. Ten Yu (supra), dismissed the appeals and directed the
records to be returned to the court below for execution of the sentences.
Other cases might be cited, but we think the above are sufficient to show that we have
followed in the instant case the uniform holding of this court for more than ten years. In fact,
the court has not, since its organization, held in any case that it has the power to review the
facts touching the guilt of an accused person in cases of the character of the one under
consideration.
Some discussion has arisen in regard to the language we should use in the final disposition of
cases wherein the statute or ordinance has been upheld. Sometimes we say, "The judgment is
affirmed," and at other times we have said "the appeal is dismissed," etc. The result is the
same and it is of little importance which expression we use. But, as the case comes to us on
appeal for the purpose of testing the legality of the statute or ordinance upon which the
judgment rests and as the judgment cannot be executed without the sanction of this court, it is
perfectly legal to "affirm" or "reverse" the judgment as the case may be.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
defendants. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
ARAULLO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I agree to the judgment contained in the foregoing, for the reason that this question has
already been settled by former decisions of this court.
[G.R. No. 10765. December 22, 1916. ]
PACIENTE TAMAYO, father of the minor, Braulio Tamayo, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
CARLOS GSELL, Defendant-Appellant.
William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for Appellant.
Modesto Joaquin for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEY, BUREAU OF LABOR; RIGHT TO REPRESENT INJURED
EMPLOYEES IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES; FEES TAXED AS COSTS. — Trial courts
commit no error in permitting the attorney of the Bureau of Labor to represent injured
employees in personal injury cases and in taxing the attorney’s statutory fees as part of the
costs against the defendant, if the suits be successful, under a statute providing that the
attorney shall bring suit gratuitously for laborers or servants under certain circumstances, and
providing further that the court shall tax the attorney’s fee or fees against the defendant or
defendants if the suit or suits be successful.
2. STATUTES; CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION; EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY ACT.
— When a statute has been adopted from some other state or country and such statute has
been previously construed by the courts of such state or country, the statute is generally
deemed to have been adopted with the construction so given it. Act No. 1874 having been
adopted from the Massachusetts Act, which in turn (as well as similar statutes in some other
states in the United States) was adopted from the English Act, the decisions of the high courts
in those jurisdictions, construing and interpreting the Act, followed.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MASTER’S DEFENSES. — The Act does not affect the doctrine of
assumption of risks and contributory negligence. It does abolish in part the fellow servant
doctrine, that is to say, so far as it relates to the negligence of superintendents.
6
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — While the defenses of assumption of risks and contributory negligence
are available to masters in actions for personal injuries brought under Act No. 1874, these
defenses have their limitations when interposed in actions instituted by or on behalf of minor
or infant employees.
5. ID.; ID.; DUTY OF MASTER TO WARN MINOR OR INFANT EMPLOYEES. — The
obligation of warning is imposed mainly for the sake of the young, or in the case of adults,
where there are concealed defects. The instructions must be sufficient to enable the employee
to avoid injury by the exercise of reasonable care, unless both the danger and the means of
avoiding it are apparent and within the comprehension of the servant.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. — It is actionable negligence for an
employer to place at a dangerous machine an infant or a minor who lacks sufficient age and
capacity to comprehend and avoid the dangers of the employment. The infant employee’s
capacity is the criterion of his responsibility.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; DAMAGES. — The measure of damages recoverable under Act No. 1874 is
that of the Anglo-American common law, which include damages for pecuniary loss, pain
and suffering, and permanent injuries.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACTS OF THE CASE. — The plaintiff’s ward, a young, ignorant boy, was
employed by the defendant to do ordinary work in the performance of which he did not come
into contact with the machinery, and was without any previous warning or instructions and
over the objections of the ward, ordered to assist in cleaning a dangerous machine where his
fingers were caught in the machine, severing the ring finger at the first joint. Held: That
defendant was guilty of negligence and the award of P400 not excessive.
DECISION
TRENT, J. :
This is an action for damages against the defendant Gsell for personal injuries suffered by
Braulio Tamayo, minor son of the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in his
capacity as guardian ad litem of Braulio Tamayo for the sum of P400, without costs, except
P25 fees for the attorney of the Bureau of Labor, the defendant appealed and now urges that
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
the trial court erred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. In permitting the attorney of the Bureau of Labor to conduct the case and awarding him
P25 fees.
2. In finding that Carlos Gsell is the owner of the factory wherein Braulio Tamayo was
injured.
3. In finding that the accident occurred because Braulio Tamayo was assigned to work to
which he was not accustomed and did not understand, without any previous warning as to the
dangers thereof or instructions as to the manner of doing the work, in order to avoid being
injured.
4. In finding that the negligence of the defendant or the persons for whom he is responsible
was the cause of the accident.
5. In declining to sustain the defendant’s defenses of contributory negligence and assumption
of risks.
6. In awarding damages against the defendant in the absence of a showing that the injuries in
any way diminished Braulio Tamayo’s earning capacity.
Act No. 1868, approved June 18, 1908, creating the Bureau of Labor, provides in section 2
that the purpose of the Bureau shall be to see to the proper enforcement of all existing laws
and those which shall be enacted hereafter with reference to labor and capital in the
Philippine Islands and to promote the enactment of all other legislation which shall tend to
establish the material, social, intellectual, and moral improvement of workers; to acquire,
collect, compile, systematize, and submit from time to time reports to the Secretary of
Commerce and Police, statistical data relating to the hours and wages of labor, the number of
workers in each trade or occupation, etc., and to inspect all shops, factories, industrial and
commercial establishments and "to take the proper legal steps to prevent the exposure of the
health or lives of laborers and to aid and assist by all proper legal means laborers and workers
in securing just compensation for their labor, and the indemnity prescribed by law for injuries
resulting from accidents when engaged in the performance of their duties." Sections 2 and 3
of Act No. 1868 were amended by Act No. 2258, but such amendments do not effect the
issues involved in the instant case. Act No. 2385 amends subsection (d) of section 2 and
section 3 of Act No. 1868 and adds several paragraphs to the end of section 4 of that Act and
repeals Act No. 2558. Subsection (d) of section 2, as thus amended,
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
7
"To secure the settlement of differences between employer and laborer and between master
and servant and to avert strikes and lockouts, acting as arbitrator between the parties
interested, summoning them to appear before it, and advising and bringing about, after
hearing their respective allegations and evidence, such arrangement as these may, in his
judgment, show to be just and fair."cralaw virtua1aw library
The pertinent provisions added to section 4 provide that the Bureau of Labor shall also have
an attorney who shall be paid a fixed salary per annum.
"Said attorney shall assist the Director or Assistant Director of Labor in all legal questions by
them submitted to him, and shall bring suit gratuitously, in the proper courts, for laborers or
servants when he shall deem this proper after the failure of the endeavors to bring about a
friendly settlement made by Director or Assistant Director of Labor in the performance of the
duties imposed and the exercise of the powers conferred upon them by subsection (d). . . .
Provided, however, That the attorney of the Bureau of Labor shall not bring suit under this
Act unless the plaintiff shall have previously secured a certificate of indigency from the
proper court."cralaw virtua1aw library
The sentences of the courts trying cases under this Act shall provide, in case of judgment in
favor of the plaintiff, for the payment by the defendant of the sum of twenty-five pesos as
costs of the attorney of the Bureau of Labor, which sum shall be collected in the same manner
as other costs and turned into the Insular Treasury and credited to the general funds.
It is argued that in conferring the power and duty upon the Director of the Bureau of Labor
"to secure the settlement of differences between employer and laborer and between master
and servant and to avert strikes and lockouts" the legislature never intended to bring
negligence cases resulting in personal injuries under the jurisdiction of the Director. If the
attorneys of the Bureau of Labor is authorized to represent the plaintiff in actions such as the
one under consideration he could, it is said, appear on behalf of a laborer charged by his
employer with larceny of materials or on behalf of an employee under prosecution for
assaulting his master. We think this result does not necessarily follow. The Director is given
the power and it is made his duty to aid and assist by all legal means laborers and workers in
securing the indemnity prescribed by law for injuries resulting from accidents. If this cannot
be done by "a friendly settlement," then the attorney "shall bring suit gratuitously" for the
employee if such employee is too poor to employ private counsel. No additional right of
action is given laborers and workers by this legislation.
It was only the intention of the Legislature, as expressed in the acts, to provide the services of
an attorney for pauper employees in certain cases and to tax a portion of the costs of such
services against the defendant if the suit be successful. This, it is true, is advanced legislation
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
when compared with similar Acts in the United States. In Missouri the Bureau of Labor is in
most cases chiefly an instrument for gathering statistics. The arbitration of disputes between
employers and employees is given to a board distinct from the Bureau of Labor (Ann. Stat.,
1906). Minnesota (Statutes of 1894) provides for a Bureau of Labor to gather statistics and
inspect factories, with the power to enforce the laws pertaining to the welfare of the
workingmen, but gives it no power to prosecute civil actions for individuals. In Nebraska the
Bureau of Labor is a statistic gatherer, factory inspector, and protector of the laborer to the
extent that the commissioner may file a complaint for a violation of the Act creating the
Bureau and defining its powers, which the county attorney must prosecute. (Statutes of
Nebraska, 1911.) Other States have similar statutes. Some States provide for public defenders
in criminal cases. In this jurisdiction provisions are made for the defense of pauper criminals
and section 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the Supreme Court and the Courts
of First Instance to assign any lawyer to render professional aid to a party in any pending
action, free of charge, if such court, upon full investigation, shall find that the party is
destitute and unable to employ a lawyer. The statute under consideration requires a certificate
of indigency from the court before the attorney of the Bureau of Labor can institute the
action. The only essential difference between the two systems is a small amount for the
services of the attorney of the Bureau of Labor, which is taxed against defendants when the
plaintiffs are successful, but this cannot be done except in cases where "a friendly settlement"
has failed. Considering the scope and purposes of the Acts, in connection with the fact that
the plaintiffs are paupers, we see no reason for holding that the provisions attacked are in
violation of public policy or transcends the power of the Legislature. Therefore, the first
assignment of error is without merit.
The second assignment of error has not merit. The plaintiff testified positively that the
defendant is the owner of the factory and when another witness was asked who the owner
was, counsel for the defendant stated, "We do not dispute the ownership." No other testimony
was offered on this point and all proceeded thereafter upon the theory that there was no
question about the fact that the defendant is the owner of the match factory, yet counsel, in
their printed brief, say that "there is not one syllable of evidence in the testimony or anywhere
else in the record as to the ownership of this factory."cralaw virtua1aw library
The other assignments of error raise both questions of fact and law. The trial court’s findings
of fact are these:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The facts proven in the case are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That the boy Braulio Tamayo, whose age neither he nor his father, Paciente Tamayo,
knows, nor does it appear of record, but which, in the opinion of the court, is about eleven or
twelve years, was one of the workmen employed in the match factory, situated in Santa Ana,
8
Manila, and owned by the defendant, Carlos Gsell. On the 13th of March, 1914, the boy met
with an accident which consisted of an injury caused by the knife of one of the machines of
the factory which cut the little and ring fingers on the right hand, the latter of which was
severed.
"2. That the accident arose by reason of his being assigned by Eugenio Murcia, one of the
foremen employed in the factory, to perform work to which he was not accustomed. He was
put at the machine of Arcadio Reyes only on the day of the accident, in spite of his persistent
and manifest opposition to assist the machinist; his work was to recover the strips, used in the
manufacture of match boxes, from the machine, Exhibit 1, which were extracted from the
said machine from the wood placed therein. At the same time he had to clean out the pieces
of wood from said strips, which stuck in the machine and obstructed its proper working. Prior
to the date in question the only work entrusted to the boy, Braulio Tamayo, was to pick over
the piles of wood from which the strips used in the manufacture of match boxes were made
and select the best pieces for the purpose.
"3. ue to his inexperience in the work to which, for the first time and without any preparation
or instruction, he had been assigned in essaying to clean that part of the machine where the
pieces of wood from the strips were stuck, he was caught by the knife of the machine and the
ring finger of his right hand was severed. He was thereupon taken to the General Hospital,
where he received medical treatment until he was released.
"4. he plaintiff complied with the provision contained in section 4 of Act No. 1874, advising
the employer, who is the defendant herein, of the accident which had occurred to his son.
"In view of the facts as they were shown in the record, in spite of the conflicting testimony of
the witness of both sides, the court is obliged to give credit to the testimony of the witnesses
for the plaintiff, and since it was not contradicted by Eugenio Murcia, to whom is attributed
the determination to assign Braulio Tamayo, on the date and hour in question, to another
machine and to give him, in spite of his tender years, work of a class to which he was not
accustomed, the responsibility contracted by the employer to indemnify the injured workman,
represented by his father, for the damage and injury which he has suffered, according to the
Act cited, is very clear.
"Eugenio Murcia was one of the foreman employed in the factory; he knew the kind of work
which was assigned to each of the employees in relation to their respective ages and he must
have known that it is not the same thing to select wood lying on the ground, work in which
Braulio Tamayo had been employed ever since he entered the employ of the factory, as to
receive the strips delivered from the machine, Exhibit 1, and to clean the said machine, even
while it was running, of those parts of the strips which might interfere with its working, and
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
he should not have suddenly ordered Braulio Tamayo, taking into account his youth, to
temporarily take the place of a workman who ordinarily performed the work we have spoken
of on Arcadio Reyes’ machine, especially without first preparing him and giving him the
necessary instruction in order to avoid an accident such as that which occurred and one to
which a boy of the age of Braulio Tamayo would be exposed."cralaw virtua1aw library
After a careful examination of the record we are convinced that the foregoing findings of fact
are supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence. This being true and the findings being
the result found by the trial court from conflicting testimony, we certainly are not justified in
reversing the judgment upon this branch of the case. In United States v. Benitez and Lipa (18
Phil. Rep., 513, 517), Justice Moreland, speaking for the court, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In a conflict of testimony such as is presented in this case, this court must depend to a
considerable extent upon the discernment of the judge who sits at the trial. A careful and
discriminating trial judge has unequaled advantages in determining the relative credibility of
opposing witnesses. If he exercises his faculties with shrewdness and sagacity, he performs a
most valuable work for the appellate court. We have searched the record for any evidence
indicating that the learned trial court was mistaken in his judgment as to the relative
credibility of the witnesses or that he had overlooked some fact or circumstance of weight or
influence in passing upon the evidence, or that he had misinterpreted the significance of the
facts as proved. We have been unable to find from the record that the learned trial court has
fallen into such error; and, in accordance with the rule which we have so often laid down,
namely, that this court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon
the relative credibility of opposing witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or its significance
misinterpreted by him, we decline to interfere with the judgment of the trial court upon the
facts in this case."cralaw virtua1aw library
The foregoing well considered rule is perfectly applicable to the case under consideration.
Dr. Vasquez of the General Hospital, who attended Braulio Tamayo at the time he was
injured, testified in reference to the nature and character of the injuries as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. Do you know in what condition the child’s finger was? — A. The finger was mashed.
"Q. Are you sure that it was mashed? — A. Mashed and severed."cralaw virtua1aw library
During the trial of the case counsel for the defendant made this
statement:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
9
"I wish it to appear of record that the right hand of the child shows that the severed finger was
cut at the first joint. It also bears a diagonal scar inside (interior?) and near the tip of the next
finger, the little finger."cralaw virtua1aw library
With reference to whether there was a diminution in the earning capacity of Braulio Tamayo
due to the injuries received and as to the payment of expenses and salary while he was being
treated for the injuries, Geiser, superintendent of the defendant’s factory, testified that the
defendant paid the hospital bill and Braulio’s regular salary of fifty cents a day during the
time he was absent; that after Braulio left the hospital he (the witness) tried to get him to
return to work at the same salary, but he refused to do so; and that Braulio could occupy any
place in the factory which his age would permit, as his hand had been cured. While this
witness did not definitely state that Braulio’s injuries did not diminish his earning capacity
for the work he was doing in the factory, yet it may be inferred, and we so decide, that the
boy can perform his former work in the factory just as well now as he could before the
accident, or in other words, the injuries caused no diminution of his ability to perform such
work. As to the character of the injuries cause no diminution of his ability to perform such
work. As to the character of the injuries, we have the finding of the trial court to the effect
that the little and ring fingers on the right hand were cut, the latter of which was severed, and
the statement of counsel that the ring finger was cut off at the first joint and the little finger
showed a diagonal scar on the inside of the end.
The result is that we have a case where a foreman of a match factory, owned and operated by
the defendant, put a young ignorant employee to work at dangerous machinery without any
previous preparation or instruction. The boy was only 11 or 12 years old and so ignorant that
he did not know his own age. He had been, up to within a few hours before the accident,
which resulted in the severing of his ring finger on his right hand at the first joint, doing only
the very simplest work, in the performance of which he had nothing to do with the machinery.
He was ordered against his persistent and manifest opposition to assist in cleaning out the
pieces of wood "which stuck in the machinery and obstructed its proper working," without
any previous warnings of the dangers incident to such work or previous instruction as to how
he should do the word in order to avoid accidents. He was entirely unfamiliar with that kind
of work, which required at least some knowledge of the working of the machine. The
machine was not defective and the danger resulting from putting one’s finger under the knife
was obvious. To this extent the established facts are against the contentions of the defendant.
The questions of law require an investigation touching the scope and purposes of Act No.
1874, known as the Employers’ Liability Act. We will first inquire into the origin and history
of this Act.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
By a joint resolution of the two Houses, dated February 1, 1908, there were appointed on
April 30, 1908, a committee of twenty-one for the purpose of "preparing and submitting to
the President of the Commission and the Speaker of the Assembly its recommendations on
the Labor Accident Bill presented by the Representative for the Second District of Manila,
Honorable Fernando Ma. Guerrero, and to study, prepare, and submit also any other
recommendations deemed pertinent in the premises." (Vol. 2, p. 298 of the Commission
Journal of 1908.)
Before this committee met for the purpose, as indicated, two other bills were drafted, one by
other member of the Assembly and the other by the Secretary of Commerce and Police, who
was then a member of the Legislature. During the sessions of the committee the three bills
were discussed and by a majority vote a fourth bill was prepared and its passage
recommended. The Assembly then passed a bill substantially the same as that recommended
by the committee. The committee of the Commission, to whom the Assembly bill was
referred, recommended in its report of June 13, 1908, various amendments. These
amendments were adopted by the Commission and the bill, as thus amended, was passed by
that body. The bill in its amended form was returned to the Assembly and passed by it, and
became law (Act No. 1874) on June 19, 1908. The chairman of the joint committee, in his
report to the President of the Commission and the Speaker of the Assembly, in referring to
the bill prepared by the Secretary of Commerce and Police, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"One of these (bills) was prepared in the Department of Commerce and Police for submission
to the committee, which was drawn substantially along the lines which have prevailed in the
State of Massachusetts some years and upon which interpretations have been made by the
Massachusetts courts defining the exact meaning of the provisions of the law." (Vol. 2, p.
298, Commission Journal of 1908.)
A comparison of Act No. 1874 with that of the State of Massachusetts of 1902 shows that the
former is essentially a copy of the latter. The first section of each is exactly the same and, in
so far as the questions under consideration are concerned, there are no differences in the other
sections of the two acts.
It appears from the official proceedings of the joint committee that the Guerrero bill, which
was rejected by the committee and the Legislature, was based on the Spanish law. This is
shown from the following extract from these proceedings:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The clause contained in the Guerrero bill was based on a similar clause found in the Spanish
law, which was put in the same order to make provision for the damage and detriment caused
by work in the mercury mines, and as the Guerrero bill was based on the Spanish law this
clause was put in. . . . For this reason I move that the amendment proposed by Mr. Javier be
10
rejected but that the section as it is drawn up be adopted."cralaw virtua1aw library
Act No. 1874 does not attempt to define generally the rights of master and servants, and is not
a codification of the law. Reference must be made to some other law to define who are
masters, who are servants, what is the scope of the employment, and whether the injury was
the approximate result of the negligence; and negligence itself must be determined by that
other law and not by the Act. The Act does not impose any obligation on the master to
employ competent servants nor to instruct or warn his servants about their work or the
dangers of it. These obligations, if they exist, must be found elsewhere. Neither does the Act
define the word "damages" by setting forth the element thereof, nor does it fix any general
rules for determining the measure of damages in personal injury cases brought. Reference
must be made to some other law to define who are masters, who are servants, what is the
scope of the employment, and whether the injury was the approximate result of the
negligence; and negligence itself must be determined by that other law and not by the Act.
The Act does not impose any obligation on the master to employ competent servants nor to
instruct or warn his servants about their work or the dangers of it. These obligations, if they
exist, must be found elsewhere. Neither does the Act define the word "damages" by setting
forth the element thereof, nor does it fix any general rules for determining the measure of
damages in personal injury cases brought under it. It does provide, however, that in those
cases where damages are awarded for the death of an employee the same shall be assessed
with reference to the degree of culpability of the employer or of the person for whose
negligence the employer is liable. The Act also fixes the minimum and maximum amounts
which may be awarded if death results from the injuries, and the maximum amount of
damages for personal injuries not resulting in the death of the employee. In determining the
important questions here involved for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the
Legislature, must we look to the Civil Code and the decisions of this court in construing its
provisions for our guidance or was the statute adopted with the construction given to it by the
court in the country from which it was copied?
The Massachusetts statute was "copied verbatim, with some variations of detail, from the
English statute (43 and 44 Vict. ch. 42). Therefore, it is proper, if not necessary, to begin by
considering how the English act had been constructed before our statute was enacted."
(Ryalls v. Mechanics’ Mills, 150 Mass., 190, 5 L. R. A., 667.)
The Employers’ Liability Act of Alabama, first enacted in 1885 (Civil Code 1907, Ch. 80,
sec. 3910), is a substantial, if not an exact copy, of the English Act of 1880.
"This court is not finally concluded by the decision of any other State court or the British
court, in their construction of a similar statute, but the opinion of learned courts upon similar
questions are entitled to great weight, and this is especially true when the statute, from which
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
ours was copied had been construed prior to its enactment by our legislature." (Birmingham
Ry. & Electric Co. v. Allen, 99 Ala., 359, 371; 20 L. R. A., 457.)
The Employers’ Liability Act of Colorado (Laws 1893, chap. 77; Mill’s Annotated Statutes,
Supp. 1891-1896, sec. 1511a) was copied from the Massachusetts Act of 1887 and the
Colorado Legislature "presumably adopted the Act with the construction that had been given
it by the courts of that state." (Colorado Milling & Elevator Co. v. Mitchell [1899], 26 Colo.,
284.)
"Generally speaking, when a statute has been adopted from another State or country and such
statute has previously been construed by the courts of such State or country, the statute is
deemed to have been adopted with the construction so given it." (Cerezo v. Atlantic, Gulf &
Pacific Co., 33 Phil. Rep., 425, citing 2 Lewis Sutherland on Stat. Const., sec. 783.)
The law being so clearly traced to its source and the intention of the Legislature being so
apparent, it is necessary to ascertain and be guided by the decisions of the courts in the United
States construing essentially the same law. Further reference will be made to the same
question in considering the sixth assignment of error.
Dresser on Employers’ Liability (vol. 1, sec. 2), says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is apparent that the act has not attempted to define generally the rights and duties of master
and servants, and is not a codification of the law. . . . Constant reference must be made to the
common law to define who are masters and who servants, what is the scope of the
employment, and whether the injury was the proximate result of the negligence; and
negligence itself is determined by the common law, and not by the act. The act, moreover, is
silent concerning certain terms of the contract of service. It does not impose any obligation on
the master to employ competent servants, nor to instruct or warn his servants about their work
or the dangers of its. These obligations were too well settled and important to be taken away
by implication merely, and the courts have held that the act was remedial, and a concurrent,
instead of an exclusive remedy." (Citing cases from Massachusetts, Alabama, Colorado, and
England.)
The courts in the United States, in order to ascertain what changes have been made by the
Employers’ Liability Acts in the "fellow servant rule," held that at common law the master
impliedly agreed to provide competent workmen, and in so doing he was bound to exercise
that measure of care which reasonably prudent men do under similar circumstances, that the
master is not an insurer, and that it was only necessary that the danger in the work be not
enhanced through his fault. The servant on his part, by entering the employment, was held to
impliedly agree to take upon himself the perils arising from the carelessness and recklessness
11
of those who were in the same employment, without regard to their grade, rank or authority in
the service, provided that the act causing the injury was not in the performance of any
personal duty of the master intrusted to the negligent servant. The whole doctrine in brief was
a denial as to the employee of the principle of respondent superior. Under the latter, a stranger
invited upon the master’s premises could recover for the injuries received through the
negligence of the employee. It was this right which was denied to the employee. The effect of
section 1 of the Employers’ Liability Act, the same courts held, is to exempt from the class of
fellow servants, the result of whose negligence the servant was held to have assumed, such
persons as are intrusted by the master with duties of superintendence while in the exercise of
them. The persons must be superintendents within the meaning of the Act and the negligent
act must have been done in the exercise of the controlling functions of superintendent.
Applying these principles to the instant case, there can be no doubt but that Eugenio Murcia,
one of the foreman employed in the defendant’s factory, was exercising the controlling
functions of superintendent when he ordered Braulio Tamayo to assist in keeping the machine
clean. Consequently, if such act constitutes negligence, the defendant is liable in damages for
the injures caused thereby, if it were, under the circumstances, the duty of the defendant or
the foreman to warn Braulio Tamayo as to the dangers incident to such work and instruct him
how the work should be done in order to avoid incidents.
As to whether it was the duty of the defendant or the superintendent to thus warn and instruct
Braulio Tamayo, it is urged that no such duty was imposed on either of them because, as the
danger of putting one’s fingers under the knife was obvious, Braulio assumed all the risks of
the work which he was ordered to do. It is further urged that the defendant is not liable
because Braulio Tamayo was not in the exercise of due care at the time he received the
injuries. In other words, the defendant here interposes the common law defenses of
assumption of risks and contributory negligence. Some confusion has arisen with reference to
these two defenses. The Supreme Court of the United States explained the distinction
between the two in the following language in the recent case of Seaboard Air Line Railway v.
Horton (233 U.S., 492, 503):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The distinction, although simple, is sometimes overlooked. Contributory negligence
involves the notion of some fault or breach of duty on the part of the employee, and since it is
ordinarily his duty to take some precaution for his own safety when engaged in a hazardous
occupation, contributory negligence is sometimes defined as a failure to use such care for his
safety as ordinarily prudent employees in similar circumstances would use. On the other
hand, the assumption of risk, even though the risk be obvious, may be free from any
suggestion of fault or negligence on the part of the employee. The risks may be present,
notwithstanding the exercise of all reasonable care on his part. Some employments are
necessarily fraught with danger to the workman — danger that must be and is confronted in
the line of his duty. Such dangers as are normally and necessarily incident to the occupation
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
are presumably taken into account in fixing the rate of wages. And a workman of mature
years is taken to assume risks of this sort, whether is actually aware of them or not. But risks
of another sort, not naturally incident to the occupation, may arise out of the failure of the
employer to exercise due care with respect to providing a safe place of work and suitable and
safe appliances for the work. These the employee is not treated as assuming until he becomes
aware of the defect or disrepair and of the risk arising from it, unless defect and risk alike are
so obvious that an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances would have observed
and appreciated them. These distinctions have been recognized and applied in numerous
decisions of this court. (Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf R. Co v. McDade, 191 U. S., 64, 68;
Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Ry Co., 220 U. S., 590, 596; Tex. & Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Harvey, 228 U. S., 319, 321; Gila Valley Ry Co. v. Hall, 232 U. S., 94, 102, and cases
cited.)"
In Southern Ry. Co. v. Crockett (23 U. S., 725), the Supreme Court of the United States, in
passing upon the question as to what effect the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of April 22,
1908, has had upon the common law defense of assumption of risks,
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Upon the merits we of course sustain the contention that by the Employers’ Liability Act the
defense of assumption of risk remains as at common law, saving in the cases mentioned in
section 4, that is to say: ’Any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute
enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee.’"
In England it was said in the case of Thomas v. Quartermaine (18 Q. B. D., 685) that the act
had not varied the effect of the maxim volenti non fit injuria, so far as it involves the ordinary
risks inherent in the particular employment. To the same effect is O’Malley v. South Boston
Gas Light Co. (158 Mass., 135); Birmingham Ry & Electric Co. v. Allen (99 Ala., 359);
Whitcomb v. Standard Oil Co. (153 Ind., 513.) There has been, however, a noticeable
difference in the application of the doctrine in favor of the workman since the enactment of
the Employers’ Liability Act, but this change does not affect the issues involved in the instant
case. So it is quite clear that the Legislature in enacting Act No. 1874 intended to establish in
this jurisdiction, if it did not already exist, the defense of assumption of risks; that is, the
servant assumes such dangers as are normally and necessarily incident to the occupation.
At common law the defense of contributory negligence is always available in actions for
compensation for negligence and if proved, defeats the action. The Act has not deprived the
employer of this defense. (Halsbury’s Law of England, vol. 20, p. 138.) In Massachusetts it
was said that assuming the negligence of the superintendent, the servant could not recover if
he were guilty of contributory negligence. (Regan v. Lombard, 192 Mass., 319.) This
doctrine, however, has been more recently partially abrogated by statutes. Under the Federal
12
Employers’ Liability Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat. 65; U. S. Comp. Stat., Supp., 1911, p.
1322), the defense of contributory negligence "is abrogated in all instances where the
employer’s violation of a statute enacted for the safety of his employees contributes to the
injury." And in several states the doctrine of comparative negligence, as to come industries,
has been established by statute. (Cerezo v. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., supra, and cases
cited.) But such is not the case in this jurisdiction in so far as the application of Act No. 1874
is concerned.
"That the defense of contributory negligence, as it is understood in the United States, is
recognized in the Act (Act No. 1874) with all its force and effect, is clear because the first
section requires as an essential requisite that the employee be ’in the exercise of due care’ at
the time of the injury in order to hold the employer liable for damages." (Cerezo v. Atlantic,
Gulf & Pacific Co., supra.)
The Civil Code does not recognize such a complete defense. (Rakes v. Atlantic, Gulf &
Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359, 366; Eades v. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 19 Phil. Rep., 561.)
While the defenses of assumption of risks and contributory negligence are available to master
in actions for personal injuries brought under Act No. 1874, these defenses have their
limitations when interposed in actions for personal injuries of minor or infant employees.
These limitations rest upon the well-established principle that it the duty of masters or their
superintendents to warn such employees as to the dangers of the work and instruct them as to
the manner of doing the work in order to avoid accidents.
"The master is bound to warn and instruct his servant as to all dangers which he knows, or in
the exercise of reasonable care ought to know, and which he has reason to believe the servant
does not know and would not by the exercise of reasonable care discover.
"The duty continues during the employment, and cannot be delegated by the master."
(Dresser on Employers’ Liability, sec. 99.)
In cases where the servant assumes the risks, there is not duty on the part of the master to
warn or instruct him in regard to the work. The obligation of warning "is imposed mainly for
the sake of the young who have not the experience or power to look out for themselves,
which are to be expected in adults, or, in the case of adults, where there are concealed defect."
(Robinska v. Lyman Mills, 174 Mass., 432, 433; O’Neal v. Chicago & I. C. Ry. Co., 132
Ind., 110.)
And "it is clear that, in respect to all matters wherein a young and inexperienced employee is
competent to understand and avoid the dangers, such employee stands upon the same footing
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
with an experienced adult." (Levey v. Bigelow, 6 Ind. App., 677.)
"The distinction between the adult and the child becomes important when it is necessary to
presume knowledge from the character of the danger, and determine whether it was obvious
to a person of the plaintiff’s apparent capacity." (Dresser on Employer’s Liability, sec. 99.)
The dangers of a particular position or mode of doing work are often apparent to a person of
capacity or knowledge of the subject, while others, from youth, inexperience, or want of
capacity, may fail to appreciate them; and a servant, even with his own consent, is not to be
exposed to such dangers, unless with instructions and cautions sufficient to enable him to
comprehend them and to do his work safely, with proper care on his part. This is particularly
so when the master employs for a hazardous work, a child, young person, or other person
without experience, and of immature judgment. In such a case, the master is bound to point
out the dangers of which he has, or ought to have, knowledge, and give to the employee such
instructions as will enable him to avoid injury by the exercise of reasonable care, unless both
the danger and the means of avoiding it are apparent, and within the comprehension of the
servant. But a master is not culpable simply because he hires a minor servant for the
performance of dangerous duties. Shearman and Redfield on Negligence (vol. 1, sec. 218)
state the rule as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Where a servant is set at dangerous work, the mere fact of his minority does not render the
master liable for the risk, if the servant has sufficient capacity to take care of himself, and
knows and can properly appreciate the risk."cralaw virtua1aw library
The following statement of the law relating to the employment of young children occurs in 4
Thompson on Negligence, sec. 3826, and is quoted with approval in Fitzgerald v. Furniture
Co. (131 N. C. 636):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The law, says Thompson on Neg., 978 ’puts upon a master, when he takes an infant into his
service, the duty of explaining to him fully the hazards and dangers connected with the
business, and of instructing him how to avoid them. Nor is this all; the master will not have
discharged his duty in this regard unless the instructions and precautions given are so
graduated to the youth, ignorance and inexperience of the servant as to make him fully aware
of the danger to him, and to place him, with reference to it, in substantially the same state as
if he were an adult.’"
In Taylor v. Wootan (50 Am. St. Rep., 200) it was held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is an actionable wrong for a person to place or employ a child of such immature judgment
as to be unable to comprehend the danger to work with or about a machine of a dangerous
13
character likely to produce injury, . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
With reference to the nature and character of the risks assumed by infant employees, the
court, in Saller v. Friedman Brothers Shoe Co. (130 Mo. App., 712)
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Generally, an employee assumes such risks as are open and obvious or which he would have
observed had he used ordinary caution; but children are not expected to observe closely the
construction of machines at which they are put to work or to appreciate the ordinary risks
incident to their operation, and for this reason are not held to assume the ordinary risks of
their operation, or such risks as they do not perceive and apprehend, and of which they are
not informed and warned against. (Vanesler v. Box Co., 108 Mo. App., l. c. 628-9, 84 S. W.,
201, and cases cited.)"
The law with reference to contributory negligence on the part of infant employees is fairly
well settled in the United States.
In Wynne v. Conklin (86 Ga., 40) the court held that whether the plaintiff [a boy of 13 years
of age] knew of the hazard or peril; whether he was of sufficient age and capacity to
appreciate the same and to provide against danger, are questions of fact which." . . must be
left to the consideration of a jury."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Bare v. Crane Creek Coal Co (61 W. Va., 28) the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is actionable negligence for an employer to engage and place at a dangerous employment a
minor who, although instructed, lacks sufficient age and capacity to comprehend and avoid
the dangers of the employment if the employer has, or should have, notice of the minor’s age
and lack of capacity." (Thomp. on Neg., sec. 4689; 20 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, supra; Goff v.
Norfolk & W. R. Co. supra; 1 Shearm, & Redf. Neg., supra.)
In Saller v. Friedman Brothers Shoe Co., supra, the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Plaintiff, on cross-examination, testified he knew if his fingers were caught between the
upper and lower halves of the molder when they came together, they would be crushed. Of
course he knew this; the simplest child would know as much if it observed the operation of
the machine, but might not, and probably would not make the observation. Plaintiff’s
evidence tends to prove that though he knew his fingers would be mashed if caught between
the two halves of the molder when they came together, yet he swore he never thought of
getting hurt. His evidence shows that the idea that he might be hurt never entered his mind
until he was hurt; while his evidence shows he knew he might be hurt in the manner he was
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
hurt, yet he never thought of or appreciated the danger of getting hurt in that manner. It is
because of this very thoughtlessness and on account of the inexperience of minors that the
law does not hold them to the exercise of the same degree of care as it requires of
adults."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the Brand Case (64 Fla., 184) cited in the recent case of Coons v. Pritchard (L. R. A., 1915
F, 558) the court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As a matter of fact an employee who is an inexperienced youth may not be free from fault
when he is injured, yet in law his youth and inexperience may excuse his fault, and when the
employer has placed him at work the dangers and risks of which the youth does not
appreciate, and the youth is injured because of the dangers of the work, the employer is
liable."cralaw virtua1aw library
The court if Coons v. Pritchard, supra, lays down this rule:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In employing a minor, the duty devolves upon the employer to fully instruct such employee
as to the dangers incident to the particular employment, and in such cases the master is bound
to consider the age, mentality, and lack of capacity and experience of his infant employee,
and make such instructions so full and explicit as to bring the dangers incident to the
employment to the complete comprehension of the minor. The theory seems to be that a
minor presumably ignorant of the use of machinery or dangers incident to his occupation, or
to risks incident to the use of defective machinery, would, without such instructions, be
exposed to those dangers which he could have avoided had his master fully discharged this
duty."cralaw virtua1aw library
The infant employee’s capacity is the criterion of his responsibility. As he grows older, he
becomes more and more amenable to the rules of law in respect to assumption of risk and
contributory negligence applicable to adults, and whether such infant employee has assumed
the risks or been negligent are questions to be answered by the jury in the United States and
by the courts in this jurisdiction.
There is another point in the case at bar which should be taken into consideration and which
bears upon the defendant’s defenses of assumption of risks and contributory negligence, and
that is, the injuries did not occur while Braulio Tamayo was engaged in the particular work
and class of work for which he was employed. On the contrary, he was at the time engaged in
a work outside the ordinary contract of employment and wholly disconnected with it. "To
pick from the piles of wood from which the strips used in the manufacture of match boxes
were made and select the best pieces" is a very different thing from assisting in keeping the
machine clean in order that it would not be obstructed in its proper working. While the record
14
is silent as to who made the contract of employment, yet, taking into consideration the age of
the boy and the interest which the father was taking in his welfare, we may at least presume
that the father consented to the boy’s entering the factory and doing the ordinary work which
he had been engaged in before he was ordered to work at the machine, and the father, in so
doing, had the right to presume that neither the defendant nor those of who represented him
would expose his son to such perils. If the order had been given to a person of mature years,
who was not engaged to do such work, although enjoined to obey the directions of the
foremen, it might, with some possibility, be argued that he should have disobeyed it, as he
must have known that its execution was attendant with danger, or, if he chose to obey that
order, he took upon himself, the risks incident to such work. But Braulio Tamayo occupied a
very different position. He was a mere child without, as we have said, an experience in that
kind of work, and not familiar with the machinery.
In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Fort (84 U. S., 553), Fort brought suit to recover damages
for injury to his son, age 16 years, resulting in the loss of an arm while in the employment of
the railroad company. The boy was employed in the machine shop as a workman or a helper
under the superintendence and control of one Collett and had been chiefly engaged in
receiving and putting away mouldings as they came from a molding machine. After the
service had been continued for a few months, the boy, by order of Collett, ascended a ladder,
resting on a shaft, for the purpose of adjusting a belt by which a portion of the machinery was
propelled and which had gotten out of place. While engaged in an endeavor to execute the
order, his arm was caught in the rapidly revolving machinery and torn from his body. The
jury found that he had been engaged to serve under Collett as a workman or helper and was
required to obey his orders; that the order by Collett to the boy (in carrying out which he lost
his arm) was not within the scope of his duty and employment, but was within that of
Collett’s; that the order was not a reasonable one; that its execution was attended with hazard
to life and limb; and that a prudent man would not have ordered the boy to execute it. A
verdict and judgment in favor of Fort was sustained.
Applying the foregoing principles, which are founded upon reason and justice, to the case
under consideration, we conclude that the trial court did not err in rejecting the defenses of
assumption of risks and contributory negligence interposed by the defendant.
We now come to the consideration of damages. As above stated, the record fails to disclose to
what extent, if any, the earning capacity of Braulio Tamayo has been diminished by reason of
the injuries. He could not, therefore, recover any amount if this action had been brought under
the Civil Code, as the services for medical attendance and salary during the confinement have
been paid by the defendant. (Marcelo v. Velasco, 11 Phil. Rep., 287; Algarra v. Sandejas, 27
Phil. Rep., 284.) But this court has never held that slight lameness or permanent injuries and
pain and suffering are not elements of damages, but simply that damages cannot be allowed
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
for the former, unless the extent of the diminution of the earning power or capacity is shown,
and that the Civil Code does not include damages for the latter.
The English rule as to the measure of damages which may be awarded for personal injuries is
stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England (vol. 10, p. 323), as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In actions for personal injuries, whether such actions are founded on breach of contract to
carry safely, or upon negligence, the jury are to award damages not only for the actual
pecuniary loss occasioned by the injury, but also for the pain and suffering of the plaintiff and
diminution of his capacity for the enjoyment of life, as well as in respect of the probable
inability of the plaintiff to earn an income equal to that which he has earned in the past; and
the probability that but for the injury the plaintiff might have earned an increasing income is
to be taken into account."cralaw virtua1aw library
Shearman and Redfield on the Law of Negligence (vol. 3, p. 1964 [6th ed. ]) in discussing the
measure of damages for personal injuries, say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In an action for negligent injury to the person of the plaintiff, he may recover the expense of
his cure, the value of the time lost by him during his disabilities, and a fair compensation for
the bodily and mental suffering caused by the injury, as well as for any permanent reduction
of his power to earn money, provided, of course, that such damage is a proximate result of the
injury. As already stated, allowance should be made for all such damages, future as well as
part, if reasonably certain to occur." (Citing numerous authorities, including various decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States.)
As these rules rest largely, if not exclusively, upon the Anglo-American common law, it
becomes necessary to inquire just what changes, if any, have been brought about by the
enactment of the Employers’ Liability Acts.
Dresser on Employers’ Liability, section 18, says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Subject to the limitation upon the amount, damages are to be measured in accordance with
the common-law rules."cralaw virtua1aw library
Rene’s Employers’ Liability Acts (2nd ed.) , section 186, says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Massachusetts statute limits the amount of damages recoverable by an employee when
his injury does not result in death to a sum not exceeding four thousand dollars. It does not
prescribe any criterion for estimating the amount, but leaves the question to be settled upon
general principles of law."cralaw virtua1aw library
15
And further on (sec. 198) the same author states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In Alabama it has been decided, in an action under its Employers’ Liability Act, that such
(exemplary or punitive) damages are not recoverable where the injury results in death. The
statute does not limit the amount of damages recoverable, and the measure of damages is
determined upon common-law principles."cralaw virtua1aw library
Labbatt’s Master and Servant ([2d ed. ]), vol. 5, sec. 1730) lays down this
rule:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The provisions specifying the amount recoverable by an injured servant do not give a
measure of damages, but merely fix a limit beyond which the jury cannot award
compensation. Within that limit the measure of damages is left to be determined upon the
ordinary principles which regulate the assessment of the indemnity in actions for personal
injuries."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 1 of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (Act of Congress of April 22, 1908)
provides "That every common carrier by railroad, while engaging in commerce between any
of the several States or Territories, . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, . . ." The Supreme Court of
the United States in Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Vrelland (227 U. S., 59, 65), in referring to
the measure of damages recoverable under the Act, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It (the Act) plainly declares the liability of the carrier to its inured servant. If he had survived
he might have recovered such damages as would have compensated him for his expense, loss
of time, suffering, and diminished earning power."cralaw virtua1aw library
And in St. Louis & Iron Mtn. Ry. v. Craft (237 U. S., 648) the Supreme Court of the United
States sustained a judgment, in an action brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act,
of the State court in favor of the father of the deceased employee for $6,000, being $1,000 for
the pecuniary loss to the father and $5,000 for the pain and suffering of the deceased.
What is the scope of the word damages as used in Act No. 1874? Did the Legislature intend
that the measure of damages should be the same as that in the United States, from which
country the Act was copied, or did it intend that the recovery should be limited to those
elements of damages provided for by the Civil Code in personal injury cases?
In determining these questions it must be borne in mind that the intent of the Legislature is
the law; that the legislative meaning is to be extracted from the statute as a whole. Its clauses
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
are not to be segregated, but every part of a statute is to be construed with reference to every
other part and every word and phrase in connection with its context, and that construction
sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute — its every word; that history of the
statute from the time it was introduced until it was finally passed may afford aid to its
construction; that where one legislature adopts, without change of phraseology, or with only a
merely immaterial change a legislative act of another jurisdiction, if antecedent to its
adoption, the statute has received a settled construction in the jurisdiction from which, the
Legislature is presumed to have adopted the construction along with the statute; and that a
remedial statute is to be liberally construed to accomplish the purpose of its enactment. (Vol.
11, Encyclopedia of United States Supreme Court Reports under "Construction," and cases
cited.)
In Cerezo v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. (supra), the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We do not doubt that it was, prior to the passage of Act No. 1874 and still is, the duty of the
employer in this jurisdiction to perform those duties, in reference to providing reasonably
safe places, and safe and suitable ways, works, and machinery, etc., in and about which his
employees are required to work, which, under the common law of England and America, are
termed personal duties, and which in the United States are held to be such that the employer
cannot delegate his responsibility and liability to his subordinates." (Rakes v. Atlantic, Gulf
& Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359.)
The employer or master also impliedly agrees to furnish competent workmen (article 1903 of
the Civil Code; Chaves and Garcia v. Manila Electric R. R. & Light Co., 31 Phil. Rep., 47).
Therefore, the master, under the Civil Code, can defend against an action by his servant by
proving his own freedom from negligence; that the negligence of the servant was the
immediate cause of the injury or that the accident happened through one of the ordinary risks
of employment. On the other hand the servant can recover a portion of the damages resulting
from the injuries, although he may be guilty of contributory negligence. (Rakes v. Atlantic,
Gulf & Pac. Co. supra.) And the Civil Code does not fix the maximum amount of the
recovery.
Act No. 1874 should be liberally construed in favor of employees. The main purpose of the
Act, as its title indicates, was to extend the liability of employers and to render them liable in
damages for certain classes of personal injuries for which they are not liable under the Civil
Code. And of these classes of cases is that where injuries are caused to employees through the
negligence of the master’s "superintendent," although the master may have used due care in
the selection of his superintendent. To this extent the master’s liability or responsibility has,
in fact, been extended. But the defense of contributory negligence, as it is understood in the
United States, is recognized in the Act with all its force and effect, as the first section requires
16
as an essential requisite to recover that the employee be "in the exercise of due care" at the
time of the injury. The Act does not recognize the rule of comparative negligence. It fixes the
maximum amount which the injured servant may recover. As to these matters, the Act
restricts the master’s liability. And if the measure of damages is limited to conform with the
Civil Code, the master’s liability would be further restricted.
If reference must be made to the Anglo-American common law to define the rights and duties
of the master and servants, as above indicated, what reasons exist for saying that the
Legislature intended that the courts must look to the Civil Code for the meaning and scope of
the word "damages," a word, according to the origin and history of the Act, of purely English
origin, different in its scope from the Spanish word "dano" ? It is said that the Act is an
Employers’ Liability Act and not a law of damages. This contention is without foundation in
law because "to extends and regulate the responsibility of employers" means to enlarge their
pecuniary liability, otherwise the phrase would be meaningless. One’s responsibility is his
liability or obligation. The Act is remedial. By remedial is not meant that it pertains to a
remedy in the sense of procedure such as the character and form of the action, the
admissibility of evidence, etc. The Act defines certain rights which it will aid, and specifies
the way in which it will aid them. So far as it defines, thereby creating, it is "substantive law."
So far as it provides a method of aiding and protecting, it is "adjective law," or procedure.
The right to damages is the essence of the cause of action. It is a substantive right granted by
the Act. Take this away and the injured employee has nothing of value left. No one in this
country has a vested interest in any rule of the Civil Code and the great office of the Act is to
remedy defects in the Civil Code rules as they are developed.
The Congress of the United States, in conferring upon the personal representative of a
deceased person, whose death was the result of a wrongful act, neglect or fault of any person
or corporation in the District of Columbia, a right of action for damages, provided "that in no
case shall the recovery under this Act, exceed the sum of $10,000." (31 Stat. At Large, 1394,
chap. 854.) The Federal Employers’ Liability Act, referred to above, does not limit the
amount of damages which may be recovered in actions brought thereunder. In Hyde v.
Southern Railway Co. (31 App. D. C., 466) the court held that the recovery under the last
named Act was not limited to $10,000 as provided in the former Act. To the same effect is the
case of Devine v. C.R.I. & R.R. Co. (266 Ill., 248).
The inevitable conclusion is, therefore, that the Legislature intended that the measure of
damages in personal injury cases brought under Act No. 1874 shall be the same as that in the
country from which the Act was taken. The result is that Braulio Tamayo is entitled to
recover, through his guardian ad litem, damages for pain and suffering and permanent injury,
such damages being as they are the approximate result of the injuries. Bodily disfigurement is
included in his permanent injury. It needs no proof to show that the severing of the ring finger
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
at the first joint caused pain and suffering and a permanent injury and bodily disfigurement,
although slight. The fact that damages for such injuries cannot be ascertained with
mathematical exactness does not and should not defeat recovery for a reasonable amount.
In Gagnon v. Klauder-Weldon Dyeing Mach. Co. (174 Fed. Rep., 477), the plaintiff was
awarded $4,000. This was reduced to $3,000, the court saying:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As to the damages, there was no evidence that Gagnon has received less wages since his
injury than he did before. He was out nothing. His wages were continued while laid up, and
then he was given employment by defendant and later by others at no less wages than he had
been receiving. But he suffered pain and permanent disfigurement of one hand. He lost two
fingers and that part of the hand immediately below or behind them. His power to lift and
handle things is interfered with and lessened. In some stations or businesses his earning
power or ability to perform his duties would not be interfered with at all; in other it would be
materially. What his future will demand of him cannot be foretold. As a mechanical
blacksmith his ability to do work, handle things, is impaired. I do not think the jury was
affected by passion or prejudice against corporations. They were carefully cautioned against
this. While damages in such cases are largely discretionary with a jury, still that discretion is
always within the control of the court. The pain and suffering in this case was not of long
continuance, the disfigurement is confined to the one hand, the arm is not injured, the
plaintiff can pick up and handle articles and handle all ordinary tools. I am of the opinion that
the damages were excessive, all things considered, and that they should be reduced to
$3,000."cralaw virtua1aw library
In "City of Panama" v. Phelps (101 U. S., 453) the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Damages, in such a case, must depend very much upon the facts and circumstances proved
at the trial. When the suit is brought by the party for personal injuries, there cannot be any
fixed measure of compensation for the pain and anguish of body and mind, nor for the
permanent injury to health and constitution, but the result must be left to turn mainly upon the
good sense and deliberate judgment of the tribunal assigned by law to ascertain what is a just
compensation for the injuries inflicted."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Gahagan v. Aermotor Co. (67 Minn., 252) the plaintiff was awarded $1,800. This was
reduced to $1,200, the court saying:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The only remaining question is whether the damages awarded are excessive. The boy, one of
eight children, was between 8 and 9 years of age. Aside from doing such chores about the
house as he was bidden by his parents, the only work he had ever engaged in was selling
newspapers on the village streets. His father was a butcher, whose occupation was to peddle
17
through the country the flesh of animals which he bought and slaughtered. The injury to the
boy consisted of the mangling of the ends of the ring and middle fingers of the left hand so as
to require their amputation, — the one at the first joint, and the other just below the first joint.
This was successfully done at one operation, and the fingers healed satisfactorily. Of course,
this was necessarily accompanied by considerable pain; and there is some evidence to the
effect that the ends of the fingers may always be somewhat more sensitive to heat and cold
than if not amputated. There was, also, the opinion of a physician that the muscles supplying
those fingers will not develop as fully as they would if the whole fingers were there. It is also
true that the amputation of the ends of these fingers constitutes something of a disfigurement
of the person. We have no desire to belittle the right which ever one, even in the humblest
walks of life, has to the possession of all his faculties, both mental and physical, unimpaired.
But we are compelled to the conclusion that, in any view of the case, the damages awarded to
the boy are excessive. There are certain profession, such as that of instrumental music, where
the loss of the ends of two fingers, even on the left hand, would be quite serious; but is self-
evident, without the aid of evidence, that in all the ordinary occupations of life the injury to
the boy will be almost inappreciable. We have often had occasion to say that the question is
not for what sum of money would a person submit to such an injury, but what sum of money
will compensate for it as far as money can compensate at all; and, where a person asks for
pecuniary compensation, he cannot complain if the loss is estimated on a strictly pecuniary
basis."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Rittel v. Souther Iron Co. (127 Mo. App., 463) in reducing the award from $4,500 to
$3,000 and in disposing of the contention of the appellant that there was no evidence that the
plaintiff’s earning capacity had been diminished by reason of the injuries, the court
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Plaintiff, as stated, was a young man twenty-one years old at the time of the accident, and as
far as appears he made his living by work similar to that he was doing when hurt; he was not
a mechanic, but a common laborer. He testified that he had done no work, from the date of
the injury to the time of the trial; that prior to said time he had been earning nine dollars a
week, and in his opinion he was unable to do the same kind of work he had been doing
theretofore. We think it is a matter of general knowledge that a laboring man who has the
thumb and forefinger of his right hand mashed has suffered a diminution of earning
power."cralaw virtua1aw library
Similar holdings appear in Olsen v. Tacoma Smelting Co. (50 Wash., 128); Rommen v.
Empire Furniture Mfg. Co. ([1911] 118 Pac., 924); Duskey v. Green Lake Shingle Co. (51
Wash., 145); Barclay v. Puget Sound Lumber Co. (48 Wash., 241); Adams v. Peterman Mfg.
Co. (47 Wash., 484); Ball v. Peterman Mfg. Co. (47 Wash., 653); Johnson v. City of Bay City
(164 Mich., 251).
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
This opinion is quite long, necessarily made so by the importance of the questions raised. The
judgment being strictly in accordance with law and the merits of the case, the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the Appellant. So ordered.
Torres, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MORELAND, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The proposition stated in the decision of the court in this case to which I propose to direct my
attention is that the Employers’ Liability Act was intended by the Legislature of the
Philippine Islands to be not only a law enunciating the principles of legal inability resulting
from negligent acts and omissions in certain cases, but a law governing the measure of
damages in such cases, but a law governing the measure of damages in such cases also. The
process of reasoning by which the court reached his conclusion is, in the main, this: The
Employers’ Liability Act of the Philippine Islands is a copy of the Employers’ Liability Act
of the State of Massachusetts; and, says the court, that being so, it necessarily follows that the
Legislature of the Philippine Islands, when it copied and passed the Employers’ Liability Act
of the State of Massachusetts, intended, by virtue of the mere act of copying, to bring to the
Islands not only the Employers’ Liability Act of the State of Massachusetts but the law of that
State governing the measure of damages also.
I cannot bring myself to agree either with the position or with the arguments adduced to
support it. Nothing far short of an express declaration of the Philippine Legislature to that
effect ought to be held to abrogate the settled principles of law governing the measures of
damages in personal injury cases laid down in the Civil Code and to substitute in place
thereof the law of a foreign country. There is no such declaration in the Employers’ Liability
Act. I can find nothing the Act which, in the remotest way, would suggest in my opinion, as
intention to that effect.
The question under consideration arises in this way: A young boy working with dangerous
machinery had the ends of some of the fingers of one hand cut off. On the trial he proved no
pecuniary or actual damages. No one disputes this. The sole question is whether he can
recover damages other than pecuniary or actual damages. The Supreme Court in its opinion
states expressly that, under the law of the Philippine Islands as found in the Civil Code, he
would not be entitled to recover damages for pain, suffering or mental anguish; and that,
therefore, under the Civil Code, he could not maintain this action as he could prove no
18
damages apart from those arising from pain and suffering. The court has, however, met this
difficulty by asserting, as I have before indicated, that the law of damages of the Philippine
Islands does not govern the case at bar for the reason that, the Employers’ Liability Act
having been taken bodily from the State of Massachusetts and brought to the Philippine
Islands, it necessarily follows that the law of the State of Massachusetts governing the
measure of damages was brought along to the Islands with it; and that it is the law of the State
of Massachusetts and not of the Civil Code which governs the measure of damages in the
Philippine Islands.
As I have already stated the Supreme Court holds in this very case that, under the law of the
Philippine Islands, the plaintiff is not entitled to damages, as he proved no damages except
those arising from pain and suffering. It says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We now come to the consideration of damages. As above stated, the record fails to disclose
to what extent, if any, the earning capacity of Braulio Tamayo has been diminished by reason
of the injuries. He could not, therefore, recover any amount if this action had been brought
under the Civil Code, as the services for medical attendance and salary during the
confinement have been paid by the defendant. (Marcelo v. Velasco, 11 Phil. Rep., 287;
Algarra v. Sandejas, 27 Phil. Rep., 284.) But this court has never held that slight lameness or
permanent injuries and pain and suffering are not element of damages, but simply that
damages cannot be allowed for the former, unless the extent of the diminution of the earning
power or capacity is shown, and that the Civil Code does not include damages for the
latter."cralaw virtua1aw library
Before going forward with the discussion, I regard it necessary to examine the statement
contained in the last sentence of the quotation. I confess that I cannot grasp its meaning
except in part. The portion of the statement which I can not understand is this: "But this court
has never held that . . . pain and suffering are not element of damages, but simply that . . . the
Civil Code does not include damages for the latter," that is, pain and suffering. If the court
has held that the Civil Code does not authorize, and, therefore, does not permit, damages for
pain and suffering, and, if the Civil Code contains all the law of the Philippine Islands on the
subject of damages, which no one denies, how can it be said that "this court has never held
that . . . pain and suffering are not elements of damages?" This court has held again and again
that pain and suffering are not an element of damage under the law of the Philippine Islands;
and has again and again refused to allow damages therefor. (Marcelo v. Velasco, 11 Phil.
Rep., 287; Algarra v. Sandejas, 27 Phil. Rep., 284.) The refusal was based on the finding that
there was no law in the Philippine Islands authorizing damages to be given upon that ground.
The court admits in the statement quoted that it has heretofore held "that the Civil Code does
not include damages for the latter," that is, for pain and suffering. How, then, is it possible for
the court now to hold that pain and suffering are elements of damage? And how can it say
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
that the court has not held that pain and suffering are not element of damage? The mere
holding that there was no law in the Philippine Islands authorizing damages on such ground is
of itself a declaration that pain and suffering are not an element of damage. If the court has
declared that there is no law authorizing relief of a certain kind, it is equivalent to a
declaration that the courts are not authorized to grant such relief.
I proceed with the discussion of the position taken by the court on the main question.
It must be said at the outset that the court rests its decision mainly on the statement that the
law of damages of Massachusetts came here by virtue of the mechanical act of the draftsman
of the Legislature of copying a statute of that State — a statute, by the way, entirely different
from the one which this court holds was brought over. So far as I can see, there is no
discussion of the grounds of this statement; no examination of the Act copied; no quotation of
or even reference to any provision of law or statute to support the allegations; nothing except
a naked statement of the court that it was brought over. The contention that the mere
mechanical act of the copying of the Employers’ Liability Act of the State of Massachusetts
by the Philippine Legislature produced necessarily the momentous result of repealing the law
of this country regulating an important subject and of introducing in place thereof the law of
Massachusetts, appears on its face, it seems to me, so unsound, that the most cogent and
powerful reason should be assigned to support it. The court has neglected to refer to any Act
of the Philippine Legislature, to any statute, or to any other law to sustain its assertion. It
simply says that the mere act of copying the Massachusetts Employers’ Liability Act is all
that was necessary to enact into law not the Massachusetts Employers’ Liability Act but the
Massachusetts law of damages.
There is possibly one exception to the statement that the court has neither cited nor referred to
any statute, law, decision, principle or custom to support so strange a theory. It has preferred
to the word "damages" which it found in the Employers’ Liability Act. But that is all. It does
not even quote or cite the sentence in which the word appears. It is wrenched from its setting
and torn from the context and examined as a thing separate and apart, a species with no
family or genus, something for a philologist, but not for a court. This reference by the court to
the word "damages" and the argument based upon that isolated word, may be called an
exception to or a qualification of my statement. I hesitate to admit it; for the reference is of
such a nature that it serves only to prove the correctness of the statement. If the court could
find nothing more in the Act of the Philippine Legislature to support its contention than a
lone word taken from the statute, then is my statement, I believe, more than justified.
The quotation made from the opinion of the court is the opening statement in its argument to
support the proposition that the Philippine Legislature brought from the State of
Massachusetts with the Employers’ Liability Act the Massachusetts law of damages in
19
negligence cases. As I regard this conclusion as erroneous I propose to follow the steps of the
court in its argument for the purpose of determining where the difficulty lies. Immediately
after the statement quoted comes a discussion of the rule of damages in negligence cases in
England and in the various States of the Union and as set down by the Federal courts. Cases
are cited to show that pain and suffering are elements of damage under the common law. The
court quotes from the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of the United States in cases arising
under it to show that the rule of damages as laid down by the Federal courts includes
compensation for pain and suffering. It is to be noted, however, that, when the Supreme Court
was discussing and applying the law of damages in those cases it was not discussing,
interpreting or applying the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. It was construing and applying
the law governing the measure of damage; and the law of damage has no mere relation to the
law governing the principles of legal inability than the law of bailments has to the law of real
property. It must be said, therefore, that the whole discussion of the court concerning the
measure of damages at common law, and its citations of and quotations from decisions of
courts on that subject, are immaterial to the discussion of the very first proposition necessary
to be established in this case to sustain the decision of this court; and that is that the
Massachusetts law governing the measure of damages in personal injury cases was brought to
the Philippine Islands by and along with the Employers’ Liability Act and is now in force
here. Until it is established that the Massachusetts law is here, it is idle to discuss what that
law is. Now, what is the proof offered to demonstrate the correctness of the contention that
the Massachusetts law of damages is a part of the Philippine Law? Until that contention is
shown to be correct beyond question, what good, I repeat, can result from a disquisition on
the measure of damage at common law? Again I ask, what has been offered on that subject?
Proceeding with its argument, the court says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"What is the scope of the word damages as used in Act No. 1874 (the Employers’ Liability
Act)? Did the Legislature intend that the measure of damages should be the same as that in
the United States, from which country the Act was copied, or did it intend that the recovery
should be limited to those elements of damages provided for by the Civil Code in personal
injury cases?"
With this inquiry before me I see no reason for the existence of the previous steps in the
discussion taken by the court. What may have been the law of damages as laid down by the
Federal courts, the State courts, or the English courts has nothing to do with the discussion as
to whether the Legislature of the Philippine Islands introduced into this country the law of
damages of the State of Massachusetts. The discussion as to what is the measure of damages
in England and in the various States of the Union would be material, as I have already said,
only after the proposition had been established that the law of damages of England and of the
United States had been imported into the Philippine Islands. But the question whether that
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
law was actually imported into the Philippine Islands has nothing to do with the question as
to what that law really is.
I note here what I have before intimated, that the court does not cite the provisions of the
Employers’ Liability Act of the Philippine Islands which shows that the law of damages of
the State of Massachusetts or of England or of the United States was brought over to the
Islands along with the Act itself. I should be interested to have the court point out the
particular provision on which it relies to accomplish the striking result which its decision
produces. I confess I can find no provision which I can even remotely construe into producing
such an effect. In order that the whole Act be before us I have reproduced it in a footnote,
including the title, 1 and an examination of it discloses instantly that there is not a provision
in it which, so far I can judge, can be held to introduce into the Philippine Islands the law of
damages of the State of Massachusetts or of any other state or country. Nor can I obtain such
a result by viewing the Act as a whole. The title says that it is "An Act to extend and regulate
the responsibility of employers for personal injuries and deaths suffered by their employees
while at work." In the marginal notes of the official Act it is called "Employers’ Liability
Act." All the Act does or purports to do is to alter in some particular the principles of legal
inability governing negligent acts or omissions then operative in the Philippine Islands. It
does not touch and does not profess to touch the legal principles upon which damages are
assessed in such cases, that is, the law governing the measure of damage. The law governing
legal liability is quite distinct and separate from the law governing damages. The former tells
us whether an action will lie or not; the latter tells us how much plaintiff’s judgment will be.
The former tells us what must be proved to establish liability; the latter how to prove the
amount to be recovered. While the former lays down the foundation for the latter, they are,
nevertheless, separate branches of the law, wholly unlike, wholly apart from each other, and
governed by principles which have nothing in common. They are treated separately by courts,
text books and encyclopedias. They have no more relation to each other than the law of wills
and the law of waters.
This being so, how do the following remarks of the court, which immediately follow the last
question, assist it to the conclusion that the law of damages of the State of Massachusetts
came to the Philippine Islands with the Employers’ Liability Act?
"In determining these questions it must be borne in mind that the intent of the Legislature is
the law; that the legislative meaning is to be extracted from the statute as a whole. Its clauses
are not to be segregated, but every part of a statute is to be construed with reference to every
other part and every word and phrase in connection with its context, and that construction
sought gives effect to the whole of the statute — its every word."cralaw virtua1aw library
Speaking generally, I have no objection to the principles enunciated in this quotation. But, it
20
seems to me, the court has not applied them. It would seem, rather, that the court has
disregarded them. Let us examine the Act and admit that "the intent of the Legislature is the
law," that "the legislative meaning is to be extracted from the statute as a whole," that "its
clauses are not to be segregated," and that we must give effect to "its every word," and what
is the result? Are we, in the light of these principles, to say that the Legislature intended to
enact a law governing the measure of damages in the Philippine Islands when the title which
the Legislature itself gave to the Act for the express purpose of telling us in a summary way
what it proposed to do, shows that it tended to deal solely with the principles of legal liability
and not with a distinct and separate branch of the law known as the measure of damage? Are
we to say this when, so far as my judgment goes, the provision of the Act are in absolute
conformity with its title and both which seem to refute the contention that the Legislature
intended that the Act, in addition to being a liability Act, should also be an Act dealing with
the measure of damage which should change in a marked degree the present law on that
subject? Can the Legislature be said to have intended such a sweeping change? Is there
anything in the Act which justifies the repeal of numerous and important articles of the Civil
Code, and the reversal of the decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting and applying them?
Where is the provision in the Act which declares that this country, a country of the Roman
law, of the civil law, of the Spanish law, shall be agitated and confounded by a fundamental
change in its century old system of damages in personal injury cases? Read the law, "its every
word," and then say whether the Legislature intended that one law of damages should apply
to personal injuries sustained by one class of persons and a different law to injuries sustained
by another class of persons; or that a person who had both legs cut off through the negligence
of his employer should be able to obtain damages for pain and suffering, while his brother,
who had both legs cut off through the negligence of a railroad company not his employer,
should not be able to recover such damages?
It seems to me that such results should not be held to have been produced except upon the
clear and explicit provisions of the statute. Where are these provisions? Is not the invasion of
an established and settled system, by a foreign law, of sufficient importance to require at least
a reference to the specific authority under which the invasion occurs? And if there is any
doubt about the authority should the invasion be permitted to succeed?
But the court seems to think that it has found a sufficient reason for the invasion. It says, as I
have already intimated, that it finds somewhere in the statute the word "damages." The
discovery of this word is that which provoked the question put by the court, already quoted,
in which it asks "What is the scope of the word damages as used in Act No. 1874? Did the
Legislature intend that the measure of damages should be the same as that in the United
States, from which country, the Act was copied, or did it intend that the recovery should be
limited to those elements of damages provided for by the Civil Code in personal injury
cases?"
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
These questions are immediately followed by the statement, also quoted, of the principles
governing the conduct of one who desires to ascertain the intent of the Legislature; but I am
afraid that the court did not follow those principles when it seized upon the lone word
"damages," discovered in the Act as the talisman which would disclose the intent which
governed the Philippine Legislature when it passed the Employers’ Liability Act; for, while
the court has just declared that the intent of the Legislature "is to be extracted from the statute
as a whole," that its words and clauses "are not to be segregated," that "every part . . . is to be
construed with reference to every other part and every word and phrase in common with its
neighbors," nevertheless, it seizes upon the single word "damages," and, upon this word
segregated from its "context," and, without even a reference to any other line or word in the
statute, bases a doctrine which changes in large part the nature of the Act. The result thus
obtained violates, it seems to me, the enacting clause, destroys the distinction between legal
inability and measure of damage which the Act respects, introduces into the Philippine
Islands a new system of law, repeals important provisions of the Civil Code, and makes
unjust distinctions between employees and other classes of persons equally deserving.
I cannot agree to this reasoning which is, in my judgment, the only item of argument or
discussion in the opinion which is directed to the point to which my dissent and discussion
refer:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"If reference must be made to the Anglo-American common law to define the rights and
duties of master and servants as above indicated, what reasons exist for saying that the
Legislature intended that the courts must look to the Civil Code for the meaning and scope of
the word ’damages,’ a word, according to the origin and history of the Act, of purely English
origin, different in its scope from the Spanish word ’dano?’ It is said that the Act is an
Employers’ Liability Act and not a law of damages. This contention is without foundation in
law because ’to extend and regulate the responsibility of employers’ means to enlarge their
pecuniary liability, otherwise the phrase would be meaningless. One’s responsibility is his
liability or obligation. The Act is remedial. By remedial is not meant that it pertains to a
remedy in the sense of procedure such as the character and form of the action, the
admissibility of evidence, etc. The act defines certain rights which it will aid, and specified
the way in which it will aid them. So far as it defines, thereby creating, it is ’substantive law.’
So far as it provides a method of aiding and protecting, it is ’adjective law,’ or procedure. The
right to damage is the essence of the cause of action. It is a substantive right granted by the
Act. Take this away and the injured employee has nothing of value left. No one in this
country has a vested interest in any rule of the Civil Code and the great office of the Act is to
remedy defects in the Civil Code rules as they are developed."cralaw virtua1aw library
Let us examine the argument in detail. We may start out by doubting the correctness of the
21
inferential statement found in the very first sentence of the quotation. I did not know that it
was necessary to refer "to the Anglo-American common law to define the rights and duties of
master and servant, as indicated above." I had supposed that the very purpose of the
Employers’ Liability Act was to define those rights and duties, so far as they relate to injuries
occurring to employees while at work. I had believed that the precise object of employers’
liability acts in the States was the abrogation of the so-called Anglo-American common law,
and of the Employers’ Liability Act of the Philippine Islands to abrogate the civil law as
contained in the Civil Code by substituting in its place a statute which specifically and in
detail defines those rights and duties. While the statute may be held to have given an
additional remedy, certainly, when the remedy conferred by the statute is selected by the
employee the common law in the States, the civil law here, ceases to operate. I had supposed,
also, that where there is a statute dealing with a given subject, and which completely covers
it, the statute is exclusively that to which we must look to ascertain the law on that subject. It
is true that, in any word or provision of the statute is ambiguous and needs interpretation or
construction before it can be applied, then we might, under certain circumstances, go to the
decisions of the courts of a foreign state to ascertain what ideas they have expressed under
similar conditions. But no such reference is permitted unless the provisions of the statute to
be applied in the particular case are so ambiguous and uncertain as to require interpretation or
construction before application is possible. The statute is the law and the only law concerning
the matter of which it treats.
I must, therefore, doubt the correctness of the first sentence of the court’s only argument.
There is no ambiguity in those provisions of the statute applicable to the case at bar. No one
claims there is. The courts asserts none. Until we know what provisions the court has held
applicable we cannot know whether they are ambiguous or not. The case before us is a simple
one, only three questions being involved — (First.) Was the defendants’ superintendent
negligent in placing a child at work with dangerous machinery? (Second.) Was the child
guilty of contributory negligence? (Third.) Was there damage proved and how much? The
statute specifically covers every question of law in this case. It does not, of course, cover the
questions of fact. Neither does the common law nor the civil law. But it covers every legal
aspect of the case and clearly and definitely and without ambiguity lays down the rules which
govern it; and I believe it to be erroneous to say the "reference must be made to the Anglo-
American common law to define the rights and duties of master and servants." The
Employers’ Liability Act is the sole source of authority on that subject in the Philippine
Islands in cases where it is invoked and is applicable. Reference to the common law is
unnecessary. Aside from the fact that, in the absence of the Act, we would refer to the Civil
Code and not to the common law, it may be said that the Act is itself sufficient for every
purpose and the courts have no right to go outside of it on the assumption that interpretation
is necessary. As we said in the case of Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico (24 Phil. Rep., 504,
513):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
"The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction
and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them. They are very last functions which a court should exercise. The
majority of the laws need no interpretation or construction. They require only application, and
if there were more application and less construction, there would be more stability in the law,
and more people would know what the law is."cralaw virtua1aw library
Let us proceed to the next sentence. "It is said," continues the court, "that the act is an
Employers’ Liability Act and not a law of damages. This contention is without foundation in
law because "to extend and regulate the responsibility of employers’ means to enlarge their
pecuniary liability, otherwise the phrase would be meaningless."cralaw virtua1aw library
It seems to me that there is here a failure to grasp the difference between extending one’s
liability and increasing the amount one must pay after liability is established. All that the Act
does is to increase the number of occasions on which the employer will have to respond in
damages. In other words, it makes it easier for his injured employee to establish his liability.
It removes from his path certain hindrances and obstructions. Where the employer would not
have been liable before the act was passed, he is liable now. Where, before the act was
passed, a certain amount of proof was required, now less is required. The act changes the
source from which the injured employee draws his rights; and, in changing the source, it at
the same time increases the number of rights and the ease with which they may be exercised.
But the change in the source of rights and increase in the ease with which they may be
exercised in very far from an increase in the amount of the judgment the employee will get as
the ultimate result of an exercise of those rights. A right of action has nothing whatever to do
with the amount of recovery; yet these are precisely the two things the court has confused to
such an extent as to call them the same. To increase the number of occasions in which an
employer will be liable is an entirely different thing from increasing the amount of damages
which he will have to pay on each of the increased occasions. 1 Moreover, looked at from a
standpoint other than principle, it would be mulcting the employer from both pockets at the
same time. The occasions of his liability would be increased and the amount he would have to
pay on each of those increased occasions would also be augmented by the amount of damages
allowed for pain and suffering. That the Legislature did not intend such a result is evident
from the fact that, while the Act increased the occasions on which employers would be liable
and the ease with which the employee might take advantage of those occasions, at the same
time and as a partial compensation, the act limited the amount of the latter’s recovery in
certain cases.
I pass over the intervening sentence of the quotation and come at once to these: "The right to
damages is the essence of the cause of action. It is a substantive right and granted by the Act.
22
Take this away and the injured employee has nothing of value left." "One’s responsibility is
his liability or obligation." Let all this be admitted, and still we may properly put the question,
what has it to do with the matter in hand? Here again, it seems to me, is the confusion
between a right of action and the amount of the recovery. No one is denying the employee his
right of action. Indeed, as for myself, I am contending that the Act increases the number of
occasions on which he will have a right of action. All I am doing is combating the proposition
that an increase in the number of occasions on which the employer is liable means an increase
in the amount of the recovery on any given occasion. I desire to maintain the distinction
between a right of action and the amount of the recovery; the liability and the amount to be
paid; the principles governing legal inability and those governing the measure of damages.
Having arrived at the conclusion that no damages was proved, I do not pass on the other
questions discussed by the court.
Endnotes:
1. No. 1874. — AN ACT OF EXTEND AND REGULATE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
EMPLOYERS FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND DEATHS SUFFERED BY THEIR
EMPLOYEES WHILE AT WORK.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
SECTION 1. If personal injury is caused to an employee, who, at the time of the injury, is in
the exercise of due care, by reason of —
First, a defect in the condition of the ways, works, or machinery connected with or used in the
business of the employer, which arose from, or had not been discovered or remedied in
consequence of, the negligence of the employer or of a person in his service who had been
instructed by him with the duty of seeing that the ways, works, or machinery were in proper
condition; or
Second, the negligence of a person in the service of the employer who was intrusted with and
was exercising superintendence and whose sole or principal duty was that of superintendence,
or, in the absence of such superintendent, of a person acting as superintendent with the
authority or consent of such employer; or
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
Third, the negligence of a person in the service of the employer who was in charge or control
of a signal, switch, locomotive engine, or train upon a railroad; the employee, or his legal
representatives, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, have the same rights to
compensation and of action against the employers as if he had not been an employee, nor in
the service, nor engaged in the work, of the employer.
A car which is in use by, or which is in possession of, a railroad corporation shall be
considered as part of the ways, works, or machinery of the corporation which uses or has it in
possession, within the meaning of clause one of this section, whether it is owned by such
corporation or by some other company or person. One or more cars which are in motion,
whether attached to an engine or not, shall constitute a train within the meaning of clause
three of this section, and whoever, as part of his duty for the time being, physically controls
or directs the movements of a signal, switch, locomotive engine, or train shall be deemed to
be a person in charge or control of signal, switch, locomotive engine, or train within the
meaning of said clause.
SEC. 2. If, as the result of the negligence of the employer or that of a person for whose
negligence the employer is liable under the provision of section one, an employee is killed or
dies by reason of injuries received, his widow, or legal heirs, or next of kin who at the time of
his death were dependent upon his wages for support, shall have a right of action for damages
against the employer.
SEC. 3. If, under the provisions of this Act, damages are awarded for the death, they shall be
assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the employer or of the person for
whose negligence the employer is liable.
The amount of damages which may be awarded in an action under the provisions of section
one for a personal injury to an employee, in which no damages for his death are awarded
under the provisions of section two, shall not exceed two thousand pesos.
The amount of damages which may be awarded in such action, if damages for his death are
awarded under the provisions of section two, shall not be less than five hundred pesos nor
more than two thousand five hundred pesos for both the injury and the death.
SEC. 4. No action for damages for injuries or death under this Act shall be maintained if a
report thereof is not furnished to the employer within ninety days of the date, place, and cause
of the injury of if the action is not brought within one year from the time of the accident
causing the injury or death. The report required by this section shall be made in writing and
signed by the person injured or by another in his name, or if, on account of physical or mental
disability, it is impossible for the person injured to give the notice within the time provided
23
by this section, the same may be given within ten days after such disability shall have been
removed, and in case of death without said report having been given and without the person
having for ten days at any time after the period above mentioned been able to give such
notice, the widow, legal heirs, or next of kin dependent upon his wages for support, may give
such notice within thirty days following the death of the laborer. No report given under the
provisions of this Act shall be considered void or insufficient by reason only of some
inaccuracy as regards the date, place, or cause of the injury, if there was no intention to
mislead or the employer has not been misled by reason of such inaccuracy.
SEC. 5. All actions for damages which may be brought under this Act shall have preference
over all other matters save and except criminal cases and habeas corpus matters on the
dockets of the courts of first instance, and shall be promptly tried by the court and decided
within fifteen days after final submission of the case to the court for decision.
On application to the court by the party injured or by his duly authorized representatives, the
court may make a proper allowance for food and medical attendance during the pendency of
the action and while medical attendance is still necessary by reason of the injury: Provided,
however, That the defendant in the action shall be given an opportunity to be heard before
any such allowance is made.
SEC. 6. If an employer enters into a contract, written or verbal, with an independent
contractor to do part of such employer’s work, or if such contractor enters into a contract with
a subcontractor to do all or any part of the work comprised in such contractor’s contract with
the employer, such contract or subcontract shall not bar the liability of the employer for
injuries to the employees of such contractor or subcontractor caused by any defect in the
condition of the ways, works, machinery, or plant, if they are the property of the employer or
are furnished by him and if such defect arose or had not been discovered or remedied through
the negligence of the employer or of some person intrusted by him with the duty of seeing
that they were in proper condition.
SEC. 7. An employer who shall have contributed to an insurance fund created and maintained
for the mutual purpose of indemnifying an employee for personal injuries for which
compensation may be recovered under the provisions of this Act or who shall have
contributed to any relief society for the same purpose may prove in mitigation of the damages
recoverable by an employee under the provisions of this Act such proportion of the pecuniary
benefit which has been received by such employee from any fund or society on account of
such contribution of said employer as the contribution of such employer to such fund or
society bears to the whole contribution thereto.
SEC. 8. An employee or his legal representatives shall not be entitled under the provisions of
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
this Act to any right of action for damages against his employer if such employee knew of the
defect or negligence which caused the injury and failed within a reasonable time to give or
cause to be given information thereof to the employer or to some person superior to himself
in the service of the employer who was intrusted with general superintendence.
SEC. 9. This Act shall not be applicable to domestic servants or agricultural laborers.
SEC. 10. Any agreement to renounce the benefits of this Act made by the laborer prior to the
occurrence of any accident resulting in his injury or death shall be null and void.
SEC. 11. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, June 19, 1908.
1. This principle was expressly applied in the recent case of Dharamdas v. Haroomall (35
Phil. Rep., 183), where the headnote reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Where a statute deals exclusively with the principles touching the liability of persons in a
specified class of cases it will not be held to affect the law of the land governing damages
applicable in such cases when liability has been established."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the body of the opinion the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This, as will be seen at a glance, simply confers the right to bring a civil action to obtain the
relief which, formerly, could be secured, only in a criminal action. No rule or measure of
damages is laid down by the Act; and the statute having for its only purpose the giving of an
’additional remedy’ and not revoking, repealing or modifying ’any other civil remedy which
the existing law may afford,’ affects in no way the law of the land relating to the rule or
measure of damages in such cases. The statute really affects method only. It does not interfere
with the substantive law. The right always existed in all cases. The statute simply offers
another method of making that right effective. The nature of the right and the results flowing
therefrom, both criminally and civilly, are unaffected by the Act."
G.R. No. L-10662        December 14, 1956
24
ROQUE SENARILLOS, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
EPIFANIO HERMOSISIMA, ET. AL., respondents-appellants.
Antonio Abad Tormis for appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr. for
appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Upon petition of Roque Senarillos (appellee before us) and after due hearing, Judge M. M.
Mejia of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (in Case no. R-4001), issued a writ of mandamus
to compel the respondents Municipal Mayor and Council of Sibonga, Cebu, to reinstate
petitioner to the position of Chief of Police of Sibonga, Cebu, declaring null and void his
removal from that post, although the same was approved by the council and confirmed by the
Director of Civil Service and the Board of Civil Service Appeals; and required the
respondents Municipal Treasurer of Sibonga and Provincial Treasurer of Cebu to pay
petitioner Senarillos his salary at P840.00 per annum from January 3, 1952, and taxing costs
against respondents Municipal Mayor and Council of Sibonga. Respondents have appealed.
The parties are agreed that Roque Senarillos, being a civil service eligible, was appointed
Chief of Police of Sibonga, Cebu, and served as such until January 2, 1952. On that date,
upon charges filed by one Roque Geraldizo and despite his denials, Senarillos was suspended
by the Municipal Mayor of Sibonga, and investigated by a "police committee" composed of
three councilors, created by Resolution No. 2. Series 1952, of the municipal council.
Notwithstanding express protest on the part of Senarillos that the investigation should not be
conducted by a committee, but by full council, as provided by Republic Act 557. the
committee proceeded to try his case, and on April 15, 1952, rendered an adverse decision,
signed later by the municipal council. This decision was appealed to, and on August 28, 1952,
was affirmed by, the Commissioner of civil Service, and later in October, 1954, by the Civil
Service Board of Appeals.lawphil.net
In the meantime, upon the expiration of the original period of suspension, Municipal Mayor
Hermosisimo again suspended Senarillos on the strength of Administrative Case No. V-6,
which was never tried; and as the sixty days of the second suspension expired, the Chief of
Police was reinstated on May 25, 1952. However, on July 9, 1952 the Municipal Mayor filed
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
a criminal case for swindling against Senarillos, and suspended him for the third time. The
criminal case was dismissed on July 24, 1954. Then on April 27, 1955, Senarillos resorted to
the Court of First Instance for relief.
That the investigation of police officers under Republic Act No. 557 (as distinguished from
section 2272 of the Administrative Code) must be conducted by the council itself, and not by
a mere committee thereof, is now established jurisprudence and no longer open to question
since our decision in Festejo vs. Mayor of Nabua, 96 Phil., 286; 51 Off. Gaz. p. 121,
reaffirmed in subsequent decisions.
The second reason for invalidating the investigation is the fact that the charges were
investigated by a committee of the city council, not by the council itself. While it is
true that we had held in Santos vs. Mendoza, 48 Off. Gaz., No. 11, p. 4801, that such
a procedure is valid, the law has been changed since the above decision. Republic
Act No. 557 has eliminated the provision authorizing investigation by a committee of
the council. We held that the change meant that the investigation should be by the
council itself (Festejo vs. Municipal Mayor of Nabua, G.R. No. L-4983, prom.
December 22, 1954). We affirmed this doctrine in the recent case of
Covacha vs. Amante, G.R. Nos. 8790-8797, August 14, 1956, 52 Off. Gaz. No. 11, p.
5109).
Therefore, it is clear that under the present law, the "police committee" constituted by the
Municipal Council of Sibonga had no jurisdiction to investigate the appellee Chief of Police;
hence the decision against him was invalid, even if concurred in by the rest of the councilors,
specially since the petitioner called attention from the beginning to the impropriety and
illegality of the committee's actuations, and of his trial by only some and not all the members
of the council. The subsequent reaffirmation of their decision by the Civil Service authorities
could not validate a proceeding that was illegal and ab initio void.
That the decision of the Municipal Council of Sibonga was issued before the decision in
Festejo vs. Mayor of Nabua was rendered, would be, at the most, proof of good faith on the
part of the police committee, but can not sustain the validity of their action. It is elementary
that the interpretation placed by this Court upon Republic Act 557 constitutes part of the law
as of the date it was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect.lawphil.net
Respondents also claim that petitioner was guilty of laches, on the strength of Unabia vs.
Mayor of Cebu, 99 Phil., 258 and related decisions. Suffice it to observe that the persistent
efforts of the appellee to secure from the Civil Service authorities a reversal of the unlawful
25
decisions of the Municipal Council of Sibonga, and the harassment and prosecution to which
he was subjected by the mayor, who suspended petitioner-appellee three times, are more than
adequate evidence that the appellee did not sleep on his rights or abandon his office. His
appeal was finally decided by the Civil Service on October of 1954, and this case was filed
less than a year later, in April 1955.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with the sole modification that the reimbursement of
petitioner-appellee's salary shall not include the pay corresponding to the period from May
26, to July 8, 1952, since it was stipulated (p. 14) that he was paid for that time. Costs against
respondents, Municipal Mayor and the Council of Sibonga, Cebu. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. L-8414. February 28, 1957.]
MANGHARAM B. HEMMANI, Petitioner, v. THE EXPORT CONTROL
COMMITTEE, Respondent.
De la Cruz, Fernandez & Mate for Appellant.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Assistant Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista
for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. EXPORTATION; ARTICLES PROHIBITED; TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT
INCLUDES AUTOMOBILE: TERM "PERSONNEL EFFECTS" CONSTRUED. — Among
the articles the exportation of which is prohibited by Executive Order No. 453 (47 Off. Gaz.,
No. 6, p. 2793), as amended by Executive Order No. 482 (48 Off. Gaz., 10, p. 5039), are . . .
transportation equipment of all types, including surplus equipment, spare parts, accessories,
wires and other allied articles, . . . ." Automobile is included in the term ‘transportation
equipment of all types" and cannot be considered as or comprehended in the expression
"personal effects." This expression in common understanding without any qualifying words
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
includes only such tangible property as attends the person. The term cannot be extended to
include automobile. Hence, automobiles are subject to statutory or reglementary prohibition
against exportation.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF PROHIBITION. — Petitioner was
granted permission by the Export Control Committee to ship his automobile to Japan on
condition that he would file a bond equal to the value of the car, to guarantee the return of the
same to the Philippines. Petitioner failed to re-export the car back. Held: That petitioner is
duty bound to pay the equivalent value of the automobile which cannot be confiscated
because it is beyond the jurisdiction of this country. That is why petitioner was granted to
give the bond and should pay the Government for the automobile that it could not seize or
forfeit.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GOVERNMENT MAY REQUIRE POSTING OF BOND EVEN IF
NOT PRESCRIBED BY STATUTE. — Granting that the Export Control Committee was not
authorized to require petitioner to file the bond in question, nevertheless, the Republic of the
Philippines being a political entity has an incident to its sovereignty the capacity to enter into
contracts and take bonds in cases appropriate to the just exercise of its power through its
instrumentalities or agencies whenever, as in the instant case, such contracts or bonds are not
prohibited by law, although the making of such contracts or the taking of such bonds may not
have been specifically prescribed by any preexisting statute.
DECISION
The Solicitor General has made an accurate exposition of the facts of the case. They may be
summarized as follows: On August 28, 1952, petitioner requested permission from the Export
Control Committee, created under section 2 of Republic Act No. 613 and composed of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as Chairman, the Secretary of National
Defense and the Administrator of Economic Coordination, as Members, to ship his Hudson
Sedan, Model 1949, Motor No. 48149039, valued at P4,500, to Osaka, Japan, on board the
S.S. President Wilson, "to be used in connection with his business thereat." The respondent
Committee approved the request on the same day, on condition that petitioner would file a
bond equal to the value of the car, to guarantee the return of the same to the Philippines
within six months from the date of its shipment.
On August 29, 1952, petitioner posted with the Filipinas Compañia de Seguros a surety bond
(Annex A) in the sum of P4,500 in favor of the Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of
26
Customs), guaranteeing that the Hudson Sedan car would be re-exported back to the
Philippines from Japan within six months from the execution of the bond. Accordingly,
petitioner took the car in question to Osaka, Japan, on August 29, 1952, but failed to bring it
back to the Philippines as promised. Instead petitioner filed two requests for extension of six
months each to be allowed to re-export the car back to the Philippines until March 1, 1954,
alleging that he was still on a business tour and it would be impracticable to return the car on
time. Notwithstanding the two extensions given him by the respondent the car in question
was not brought back to the Philippines.
On February 24, 1954, Atty. Teotimo A. Roja, in behalf of the petitioner, requested the
respondent to order the cancellation of the surety bond of P4,500 that he and the Filipinas
Compañia de Seguros (Bond No. 27914) had executed, alleging that it would be
impracticable and expensive to return the car to Manila, considering its dilapidated condition
and utility in Japan, but the respondent denied said request, though at its meeting held on
February 24, 1954 it decided to reduce the liability under the bond to P2,250.00 for the reason
that this was the value that the car would have at the state it was then if it were brought back
to the Philippines, thus allowing a depreciation of 15 per cent each year.
On May 13, 1954, petitioner requested respondent for a reconsideration of its resolution of
February 24, 1954, alleging that:" (1) the Committee had no jurisdiction to impose said
penalty; and (2) granting, for the sake of argument that the Committee had jurisdiction to
impose said penalty, the penalty imposed was highly excessive and violative of the
Constitutional prohibition against excessive fines." Again this motion for reconsideration was
denied by the respondent under date of June 30, 1954; hence the institution of this petition in
the Court of First Instance of Manila on July 6, 1954, which was answered by the Solicitor
General in due time. The case was then submitted on a stipulation embodying the facts
aforementioned, and the Court rendered decision on September 24, 1954. dismissing the
petition for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. From this decision the petitioner
appealed to Us and in the instance his counsel maintains that the lower court
erred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. In not finding that appellant’s car in question is personal effect and therefore not subject to
statutory or reglementary prohibition against exportation;
2. In not sustaining appellant’s claim that the bringing out of his car in the instant case did not
constitute exportation;
3. In not finding that the respondent had acted without jurisdiction in requiring appellant to
file a bond and later ordering its forfeiture; and
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
4. In denying the petition for certiorari.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 613, approved on May 11, 1951, authorizes the President "to
control, curtail, regulate and/or prohibit the exportation or re-exportation of materials, goods
and things referred to in Section 2 of the Act and to issue rules and regulations as would be
necessary to carry out the provisions thereof." Section 2 of said Act prescribes in turn "that all
applications for permit to export or re-export any of the articles mentioned in the preceding
section 1, should be filed before a Committee to be composed of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources as Chairman, the Secretary of National Defense and the Administrator
of Economic Coordination as Members." Republic Act No. 613 further provides the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 1. In order to promote economic rehabilitation and development and to safeguard
national security, it shall be unlawful for any person, association or corporation to export or
re-export to any point outside the PHILIPPINES MACHINERIES AND THEIR SPARE
PARTS, scrap metals, medicines, foodstuffs, abaca seedlings, gasoline, oil, lubricants and
military equipment or supplies suitable for military use without a permit from the President
which may be issued in accordance with the provisions of the next succeeding
section."cralaw virtua1aw library
In virtue of the power vested in him, the President issued on June 19, 1951, Executive Order
No. 453, series of that year (47 Off. Gaz. No. 6, p. 2793), section 2 whereof reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 2. The exportation of all articles included in the list marked Annex A, hereto attached
as an integral part of this Order, is absolutely prohibited: Provided, however, That licenses
issued or authority granted prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 613, by the
Interdepartmental Committee from February 28, 1951, by the Civil Aeronautics Board or the
Civil Aeronautics Administration and by the Sugar Quota Office on nonferrous metals
pursuant to the Cabinet Resolution of November 21, 1950, are valid and subsisting."cralaw
virtua1aw library
(The articles pertinent to this case that are included in the list marked Annex A referred to
above are enumerated in Paragraph IV of said annex which will be quoted hereafter).
The President, however, amended this Executive Order by another, No. 482, issued on
October 31, 1951 (47 Off. Gaz., No. 10, p. 5039), in the following
manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 2. The exportation of all articles included in the list marked Annex A, hereto attached
27
as an integral part of this Order, is absolutely prohibited: Provided, however, That in
exceptionally meritorious cases and where the Committee is fully satisfied that the overall
economic and military requirements of the country are not prejudiced, such exportation may
be allowed subject to the provisions of Section 4 of this Order", (which refers only to
applications concerning articles included in the list marked Annex C and not in Annex A).
Because of the amendment made by Executive Order No. 482, the Hudson Sedan automobile
herein involved was allowed by the Committee to be exported to Osaka, Japan, with the
obligation on the part of the plaintiff to re-export it back to the Philippines from Japan within
the period granted to him to do so, extensions included, which obligation he failed to fulfill.
Naturally, he is in duty bound to abide by the consequences of his failure and must pay the
amount of the bond he posted, as ultimately reduced, or P2,250. Plaintiff, however, contends
that his car in question was his personal effect and, therefore, not subject to statutory or
reglementary prohibition against exportation. It seems, however, that plaintiff confuses the
term" personal effects" with "property of the person" or "personal property." As pointed out
by the Solicitor General:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The word ‘personal’ used with ‘effects’ much restricts its meaning (Child v. Orton, 183, A.
709, 710-119 N.J. Eq. 438), and certainly (that meaning, cannot be extended to include
automobiles. The expression in common understanding without any qualifying words
includes only such tangible property as attends the person.
Among the articles the exportation of which is prohibited according to said Executive Order
are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘IV. Imported Machinery (light and heavy), mechanical, electrical, agricultural, construction,
engineering, and transportation equipment of all types, including surplus equipment, spare
parts, accessories, wires and other allied articles, except those already approved by the
Bureau of Customs or NICA or order Government agencies as well as licenses covered in
section 2 herein.’
It is undisputed that petitioner’s car is covered within the term ‘transportation equipment of
all types’ and not as ‘personal effects’, as counsel would want to classify it. Petitioner’s car
was admittedly brought by him to Osaka, Japan, ‘to be used in connection with his business’
(p. 16, Record on Appeal), and that when he asked for extension of time to re-export the
motor vehicle back to the Philippines, his reason was that ‘he was still on a business tour, (p.
17, Record on Appeal).
If by personal effects of passengers in transit transportation equipment used in one’s business
were included, then it would be a simple matter to defeat the intention of the law, that is, to
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
promote the economic and industrial development of the country. To seal any possible
loophole, the Executive Order made it clear that exportation of all articles included in the list
is prohibited irrespective of the use for which they were intended."cralaw virtua1aw library
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of laws is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative
intent (Roldan and Daza v. Villaroman (1949), 69 Phil. 12), and the intention of the
Legislature in enacting a law is part of the law itself, and is to be followed and applied, where
ascertainable, in construing apparently conflicting provisions (Altaban v. Masbate
Consolidated Mining Co., Et. Al. (1940) — 69 Phil. 696). These principles of statutory
construction are more true in the case at bar because the wording of the law is too plain and
clear.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General further contends that contrary to the assertions of
plaintiff’s counsel, the respondent is expressly authorized by the provisions of section 6 of
said Executive Order No. 453 to require the petitioner to file a bond in this case to insure
either the reaching of goods to their intended destination or its return to the Philippines, and
section 4 of Republic Act No. 613 provides that in case of a violation of said Act which
regulates, controls and/or prohibits certain exports from the Philippines, the materials
intended for export in violation of said Act and the rules and regulations thereunder, shall be
confiscated by and forfeited to the Government. Consequently, if the petitioner violated the
provisions of said Executive Orders by not returning or re-exporting back to the Philippines
the automobile in question, and this property cannot be confiscated because it is beyond the
jurisdiction of this country, it would appeal to reason that plaintiff should pay the equivalent
value of the automobile which he placed beyond the reach of the Government of the
Philippines. That is why he was required to give the bond and should pay the Government for
the automobile that it could not seize and forfeit.
But even assuming arguendo, that the respondent were not authorized to require the petitioner
to file the bond in question, nevertheless, the Republic of the Philippines being a political
entity has as an incident to its sovereignty the capacity to enter into contracts and take bonds
in cases appropriate to the just exercise of its power through its instrumentalities or agencies
whenever, as in the instant case, such contracts or bonds are not prohibited by law, although
the making of such contracts or the taking of such bonds may not have been specifically
prescribed by any pre-existing statute (Solicitor-General’s brief, p. 6-8).
Certainly petitioner could not have taken from the Philippines his automobile if he had not
furnished the bond required from him and which he voluntarily furnished. He had been
enjoying the benefits which the bond intended to secure and now he cannot come and allege
that he is not bound by the terms of the bond. The present case has a legal aspect similar to
the one We solved in the case of Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas and S. S. Co. of
28
1912 & S. S. Co. Svandoorg (A. P. Moller, Maersk Line), Petitioner, v. The Collector of
Internal Revenue, respondent, G. R. No. L-9071, promulgated January 31, 1957. It appeared
in that case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That while the M/V Hulda Maersk, represented locally by Tabacalera, was moored
alongside Manila’s Pier No. 9, its chief steward, Henry Anderson, took from its stores 30
cases of cigarettes of foreign manufacture, which he sold to two persons in uniform for two
thousand dollars ($2,000.00). With his help the cargo was surreptitiously unloaded and
withdrawn from the pier, import taxes unpaid. The Customs authorities somehow discovered
the anomaly, and promptly investigated. Anderson admitted the sale; Captain Jansen, the
ship’s master, swore that the cigarettes belonged to the ship’s stores and declared their
willingness to pay the corresponding duties upon presentation of the bill to their local agents,
the Tabacalera. The latter in turn, thru its Acting Manager of the Shipping Department,
Edward N. Bosch, who was present during the investigation, signed the following
guaranty:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The Commissioner of Customs
Manila
DEAR SIR:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
We hereby confirm our agreement to pay immediately upon presentation of the corresponding
bills, all taxes due on 30 (Thirty) Cases Chesterfield, Lucky Strike and Camel cigarettes, each
case containing fifty cartoons of two hundred cigarettes each, removed from the above vessel.
Accordingly, on March 5, 1952, upon receipt of the corresponding bill, Tabacalera paid the
amount of P6,613.05 representing specific taxes on the foresaid cigarettes. Thereafter it
submitted a request for refund, which the Collector of Internal Revenue dented, and the Court
of Tax Appeals likewise denied."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the cited case Tabacalera’s demand for returned was made after the ship Hulda Maersk and
the persons involved in the attempted smuggle had already left the Philippines, a fact that the
Bureau of Customs would not have allowed to happen if the Tabacalera had not agreed to pay
the taxes due upon presentation of the bill, and We affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax
Appeals rendered in the case.
Wherefore, on the strength of the foregoing considerations and finding no error in the
decision appealed from, We hereby affirm the same with costs against plaintiff. It is so
ordered.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, vs.
Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur. THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Samar, and PANCHITO REFUNCION, respondents.

Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the City of Fiscal of
Manila and the Office of Provincial Fiscal of Samar for petitioners.
G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978
Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, BRANCH VII, and PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS, NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-16.
GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C. MAISO, EDUARDO A.
LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T. DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO,
Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.
MARIANO COTIA, JR., ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO
V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO A. REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG,
and EDGARDO M. MENDOZA, respondents. Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.

G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented,
BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO ARPON, VICTOR respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO VERSOZA, respondents. Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they
involve one basic question of law.
G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978
These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely: the Court of First
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, Instance of Manila, Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the
vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, Petitions) and, the Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding,
BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ, SABINO BUENO Y (1 Petition).
CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y
UBALDO, respondents. Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal
possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash
G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978 filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed
before them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or
dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege

29
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3

facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and
state one essential element of the crime. place of the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.

Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute 2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court presided by Judge
the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD Maceren follows:
for short) No. 9? This is the central issue which we shall resolve and dispose of, all other
corollary matters not being indispensable for the moment. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO
LAQUI Y AQUINO, accused.
A — The Information filed by the People —
CRI
1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Purisima M.
follows: CA
SE
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO NO.
CANDELOSAS Y DURAN, accused. 296
77
Crim. Case No. 19639
VIO
VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION L.
1081 OF
PA
INFORMATION R.
3,
The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a
violation of paragraph 3, Presidential Decree No. 9 of Proclamation 1081, PD
committed as follows: 9 IN
RE
That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the City of Manila, L.
Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, TO
feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and LOI
control one (1) carving knife with a blade of 6-½ inches and a wooden handle
of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11-¾ inches, which the said accused No.
carried outside of his residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or 266
implement necessary to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection of
therewith. the
Chi
Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66) ef

30
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3

Exe NO.
cuti 933
ve
date For:
d
Apr ILL
il 1, EG
197 AL
5 PO
SSE
INFORMATION SSI
ON
The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a OF
VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in
relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief Executive dated April 1, DE
1975, committed as follows: AD
LY
That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila, WE
Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and AP
knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed and pointed weapon, to ON
wit: an ice pick with an overall length of about 8½ inches, the same not being
used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor being used in (VI
connection therewith. OL
ATI
Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32) ON
OF
The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the PD
date and place of the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved. NO.
9)
3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar is quoted
hereunder: INFORMATION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus PANCHITO The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses
REFUNCION, accused. PANCHITO REFUNCION of the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by the President of
CRI the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated
M. Sept. 21 and 23, 1972, committed as follows:
CA
SE
31
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at Barangay
Barruz, Municipality of Matuginao, Province of Samar Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorabe Court, the abovenamed accused,
knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously carried with him outside of
his residence a deadly weapon called socyatan, an instrument which from its
very nature is no such as could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to
earn a livelihood, which act committed by the accused is a Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)
B. — The Orders of dismissal —
In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with the submittal of
the defense that one essential element of the offense charged is missing from the Information,
viz: that the carrying outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon
is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection,
or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.
1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:
... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed weapon
or the like outside residence may be prosecuted and tried under P.D. No. 9,
the information must specifically allege that the possession of bladed weapon
charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in furtherance of the conditions
of rampant criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are
contemplated and recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor.
Devoid of this specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the
information is not complete, as it does not allege sufficient facts to constitute
the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in these cases under
consideration suffer from this defect.
xxx xxx xxx
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe
the murmurings of detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of
possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before,
policemen - of course not all can be so heartless — now have in their hands
P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying
32
risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted
kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came
from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had to
have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the
coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of
a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already
serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the
infamous paltik.
For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and wisely
applied, its necessity can never be assailed. But it seems it is back-firing,
because it is too hot in the hands of policemen who are inclined to
backsliding.
The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the heart of
the Fiscal and the conscience of the Court, and hence this resolution, let
alone technical legal basis, is prompted by the desire of this Court to apply
said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-66)
2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by Proclamation
No. 1081 is the maintenance of law and order throughout the Philippines
and the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence as well
as any act of insurrection or rebellion. It is therefore reasonable to conclude
from the foregoing premises that the carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt
weapons outside of one's residence which is made unlawful and punishable
by said par. 3 of P.D. No. 9 is one that abets subversion, insurrection or
rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder or is
intended to bring about these conditions. This conclusion is further
strengthened by the fact that all previously existing laws that also made the
carrying of similar weapons punishable have not been repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that Presidential Decree No. 9 does
not contain any repealing clause or provisions.
xxx xxx xxx
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly weapons if not
concealed in one's person and if not carried in any of the aforesaid specified
places, would appear to be not unlawful and punishable by law.
With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the
prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui, contends in his
opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now made unlawful and
punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the intention
of the person carrying such weapon because the law makes it "mala
prohibita". If the contention of the prosecution is correct, then if a person
happens to be caught while on his way home by law enforcement officers
carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just bought from a store in
order that the same may be used by one's cook for preparing the meals in
one's home, such person will be liable for punishment with such a severe
penalty as imprisonment from five to ten years under the decree. Such person
cannot claim that said knife is going to be used by him to earn a livelihood
because he intended it merely for use by his cook in preparing his meals.
This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9 were to be
interpreted and applied in the manner that that the prosecution wants it to be
done. The good intentions of the President in promulgating this decree may
thus be perverted by some unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It may be
used as a tool of oppression and tyranny or of extortion.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the act
which the President intended to make unlawful and punishable by
Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, is one
that abets or is intended to abet subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder. (pp. 28-30, rollo of L-
46229-32)
3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order dismissing the
Information filed before him, thus:
... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited Presidential
decree, the same should be or there should be an allegation that a felony was
committed in connection or in furtherance of subversion, rebellion,
33
insurrection, lawless violence and public disorder. Precisely Proclamation
No. 1081 declaring a state of martial law throughout the country was issued
because of wanton destruction to lives and properties widespread
lawlessness and anarchy. And in order to restore the tranquility and stability
of the country and to secure the people from violence anti loss of lives in the
quickest possible manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives and deadly
weapons without a permit unless the same would fall under the exception is
prohibited. This conclusion becomes more compelling when we consider the
penalty imposable, which is from five years to ten years. A strict enforcement
of the provision of the said law would mean the imposition of the Draconian
penalty upon the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during martial
law, as a matter of status symbol, carrying deadly weapons is very common,
not necessarily for committing a crime nor as their farm implement but for
self-preservation or self-defense if necessity would arise specially in going to
and from their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo of L-46997)
In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before arraignment of the
accused. In the criminal case before the Court of (First Instance of Samar the accused was
arraigned but at the same time moved to quash the Information. In all the cases where the
accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate release unless held on
other charges.
C. — The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the People.
As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged with illegal possession
of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.
We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9
DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7
DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972,
RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
THEREFORE.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972,
the Philippines has been placed under a state of martial law;
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6
dated September 22, 1972 and General Order No. 7 dated September 23,
1972, have been promulgated by me;
WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos and public disorder mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No.
1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms, explosives and other
deadly weapons;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of
all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in older to attain the desired result
of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7,
do hereby order and decree that:
1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is unlawful
and the violator shall, upon conviction suffer:
(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution as a
Military, Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, it the firearm involved in
the violation is unlicensed and is attended by assault upon, or resistance to
persons in authority or their agents in the performance of their official
functions resulting in death to said persons in authority or their agent; or if
such unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of crimes against persons,
property or chastity causing the death of the victim used in violation of any
other General Orders and/or Letters of Instructions promulgated under said
Proclamation No. 1081:
(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life
imprisonment as a Military Court/Tribunal/commission may direct, when the
violation is not attended by any of the circumstances enumerated under the
preceding paragraph;
(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be imposed
upon the owner, president, manager, members of the board of directors or
other responsible officers of any public or private firms, companies,
corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the
34
firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity concerned to
be used in violation of said General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.
2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand grenades, rifle
grenades and other explosives, including, but not limited to, "pill box
bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or other incendiary device
consisting of any chemical, chemical compound, or detonating agents
containing combustible units or other ingredients in such proportion,
quantity, packing, or bottling that ignites by fire, by friction, by concussion,
by percussion, or by detonation of all or part of the compound or mixture
which may cause such a sudden generation of highly heated gases that the
resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive effects on
continguous objects or of causing injury or death of a person; and any
person convicted thereof shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from
ten to fifteen years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt
weapon such as "fan knife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong,"
"kris," or club, except where such articles are being used as necessary tools
or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in connection
therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Military
Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is
committed during the commission of or for the purpose of committing, any
other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon the offender in its maximum
extent, in addition to the penalty provided for the particular offenses
committed or intended to be committed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-two.
(SGD)
FERDINAN
D E.
MARCOS
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
Pre
side
nt
Republic of
the
Philippines
D. — The arguments of the People —
In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as stated earlier joins the
City Fiscal of Manila and the Provincial Fiscal of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the
questioned orders of dismissal, the main argument advanced on the issue now under
consideration is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the prohibited acts need
not be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum
prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.1
The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the intention of
the accused who commits the act is immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is
voluntarily perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and condemns not only the carrying of said
weapon in connection with the commission of the crime of subversion or the like, but also
that of criminality in general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre-
martial law days. It is also argued that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined
not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information.2
E. — Our Ruling on the matter —
1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 3
Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a
complaint or information to be sufficient it must, inter alia state the designation of the offense
by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is
essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his
defense accordingly.  4
35
To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, it is imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated or
mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact, another compelling reason exists why a specification of
the statute violated is essential in these cases. As stated in the order of respondent Judge
Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is the subject of another penal statute
and a Manila city ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides:
Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his
person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: ... Any
person violating the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction in a
court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not exceeding five
hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or
both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No. 3928 which took
effect on December 4, 1957, in turn penalizes with a fine of not more than P200.00 or
imprisonment for not more than one months, or both, at the discretion of the court, anyone
who shall carry concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise its deadly
character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon ... in any public
place. Consequently, it is necessary that the particular law violated be specified as there
exists a substantial difference between the statute and city ordinance on the one hand and
P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the circumstances of the commission of the crime and the
penalty imposed for the offense.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are
deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3).  5 P. D. 9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or
provision, and repeal by implication is not favored.  6 This principle holds true with greater
force with regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the
state and liberally in favor of the accused.  7 In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides
that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non- observance shall
not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made to fall, at the
discretion of a police officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under the statute, or the city ordinance,
or the presidential decree. That being the case, the right becomes more compelling for an
accused to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential elements of the offense
charged against him, if he is not to become an easy pawn of oppression and harassment, or
of negligent or misguided official action — a fear understandably shared by respondent
Judges who by the nature of their judicial functions are daily exposed to such dangers.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in the caption as well as
in the body of the Information with a violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the
elements of the offense treated in the presidential decree in question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of
any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a
livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to
abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed,
outside of the scope of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a
simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a
criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree is the
motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city
ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so warrant.
Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonably, logical, and valid
construction given to P.D. 9(3).
3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where a
person carries outside his residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree
irrespective of motivation, intent, or purpose, converts these cases into one of "statutory
construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is manifest from the
conflicting views which arise from its implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a
judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by
the basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the
accused and strictly against the state.
4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure — a presidential decree in
these cases — the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the
law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v.
Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is
within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in
absurdity, injustice and contradictions.  8
There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason for P.D. 9(3).
36
First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. These
events are clearly spelled out in the "Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1)
the state of martial law in the country pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21,
1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7
which are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion,
rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid public disorder mentioned in
Proclamation 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and
other deadly weapons.
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a statute usually introduced by
the word "whereas", is not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers,
or cure inherent defects in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-42050-66); that the explanatory note
or enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed limits the violation of the decree, cannot prevail
over the text itself inasmuch as such explanatory note merely states or explains the reason
which prompted the issuance of the decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo of 46997)
We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall
within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the
decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which
enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff
sanctions stated therein.
A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as to
the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and objects which are to be
accomplished, by the provisions of the statute." (West Norman Timber v.
State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble";
emphasis supplied)
While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the
statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to,
but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which otherwise does not exist."
(James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words and Phrases,
"Preamble")
In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this Court had occasion to
state that '(L)egislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a
whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of
statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a
meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
is considered with those with which it is associated. Thus, an apparently general provision
may have a limited application if read together with other provisions.  9
Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or intent.
In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the presidential decree
states:
NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of
an the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in order to attain the desired result
of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7,
do hereby order and decree that:
xxx xxx xxx
From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related
to the desired result of Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and
7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and therefore have no
relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed weapons. With respect
to Proclamation 1081 some of the underlying reasons for its issuance are
quoted hereunder:
WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our duly
constituted government and against our people, and having committed and
are still committing acts of armed insurrection and rebellion consisting of
armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes, wanton acts of murders, spoilage,
plunder, looting, arsons, destruction of public and private buildings, and
attacks against innocent and defenseless civilian lives and property, all of
which activities have seriously endangered and continue to endanger public
order and safety and the security of the nation, ...
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of anarchy
and lawlessness, chaos and disorder, turmoil and destruction of a magnitude
equivalent to an actual war between the forces of our duly constituted
government and the New People's Army and their satellite organizations
because of the unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults, violence,
murders, assassinations, acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats,
37
intimidations, treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders and depredations
committed and being committed by the aforesaid lawless elements who have
pledged to the whole nation that they will not stop their dastardly effort and
scheme until and unless they have fully attained their primary and ultimate
purpose of forcibly seizing political and state power in this country by
overthrowing our present duly constituted government, ... (See Book I, Vital
Documents on the Declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines by the
Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp. 13-39)
It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation
connected with or related to the afore-quoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is
within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.
Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the
evils sought to be remedied. (U.S. v. American Tracking Association, 310
U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v. Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil.
725, 731; emphasis supplied)
When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in
mind, and the statute should be construed with reference to its intended
scope and purpose. (Statutory Construction by E.T. Crawford, pp. 604-605,
cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de
Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis supplied)
5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the consequences of the
measure if a strict adherence to the letter of the paragraph is followed.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. 9-a
It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the Republic there
was no intent to work a hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act
of oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on. 10
At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following:
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe
the murmurings of detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of
possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before,
policemen - of course not all can be so heartless — now have in their hands
P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying
risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted
kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came
from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had to
have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the
coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of
a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already
serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the
infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66)
And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results
in absurdity at times. To his example We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a
lawyer by profession, after gardening in his house remembers to return the bolo used by him
to his neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away and while crossing the street meets a
policeman. The latter upon seeing the bolo being carried by that citizen places him under
arrest and books him for a violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential decree have been
conceived to produce such absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results?
6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of an
accused.
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the tenderness of the law of
the rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which
mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited."  11 The purpose is not to
enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise
definition of forbidden acts.12
Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner, viz:
Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be brought
within their terms who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be
pronounced criminal which is not made clearly so by the statute. (U.S. v.
Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)
38
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only
factor controlling the interpretation of such laws, instead, the rule merely
serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in
determining the meaning of penal laws. (People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684,
692)
F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in
order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an
Information is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. 13 Where the facts are
incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in
order.
Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant may move to quash
the complaint or information when the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged with knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, failure to allege
in the Information that the judgment was rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal.  14
In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became
Chief Justice of the Court affirmed an order of the trial court which quashed an Information
wherein the facts recited did not constitute a public offense as defined in Section 1, Republic
Act 145.  15
G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People could have availed itself
of other available remedies below.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:
Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. — If the motion
to quash is sustained the court may order that another information be filed.
If such order is made the defendant, if in custody, shall remain so unless he
shall be admitted to bail. If such order is not made or if having been made
another information is not filed withuntime to be specified in the order, or
within such further time as the court may allow for good cause shown, the
defendant, if in custody, shall be discharged therefrom, unless he is in
custody on some other charge.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be
amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the
defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of
form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the Informations in these
cases, viz:
First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed an amended
Information to include the second element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of
respondent Judges. We have ruled that if the facts alleged in the Information do not
constitute a punishable offense, the case should not be dismissed but the prosecution should
be given an opportunity to amend the Information.16
Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint either under Section
26 of Act No. 1780, quoted earlier, or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by
Ordinance No. 3928, especially since in most if not all of the cases, the dismissal was made
prior to arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.
Section 8. Rule 117 states that:
An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in
section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of this rule.
Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is barred only when the
criminal action or liability had been extinguished (Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash
was granted for reasons of double jeopardy. (ibid., [h])
As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully invoked by the accused in
all these cases should new complaints be filed against them, is a matter We need not resolve
for the present.
H. — We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the prosecuting arm of
the government true to the oath of office they have taken will exercise utmost circumspection
and good faith in evaluating the particular circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and
39
just conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3) and the prosecution under
said decree is warranted and justified. This obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face of
the severe penalty imposed for the offense.
On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A. Nocon on his letter to the
City Fiscal of Manila on October 15, 1975, written for the Secretary, now Minister of Justice,
where he stated the following:
In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so that
persons accused of carrying bladed weapons, specially those whose purpose
is not to subvert the duly constituted authorities, may not be unduly indicted
for the serious offenses falling under P.D. No. 9.17
Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the wisdom of a law, it
is however a judicial task and prerogative to determine if official action is within the spirit
and letter of the law and if basic fundamental rights of an individual guaranteed by the
Constitution are not violated in the process of its implementation. We have to face the fact
that it is an unwise and unjust application of a law, necessary and justified under prevailing
circumstances, which renders the measure an instrument of oppression and evil and leads the
citizenry to lose their faith in their government.
WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM the Orders of
respondent Judges dismissing or quashing the Information concerned, subject however to
Our observations made in the preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right
of the State or Petitioner herein to file either an amended Information under Presidential
Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other existing statute or city ordinance as the
facts may warrant.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, Teehankee, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Castro, C.J. and Antonio, J, concur in the result.
Aquino, J, took no part.
 
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3

  G.R. No. L-5060             January 26, 1910

Separate Opinions THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
  LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-appellant.

BARREDO, J., concurring. Rodriguez & Del Rosario, for appellant.

I concur with the qualification that under existing jurisprudence conviction is possible,
without the need of amending the information, for violation of other laws or ordinances on
concealment of deadly weapons.
Makasiar, J, concurs.
CONCEPCION, JR., J, concurring:
I concur with the additional observation that accused could properly be convicted of a
violation of Act 1780 of the Philippine Commission or of the ordinance.
 
 
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court that the appellant
slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the
information, without a permit from the municipal treasure of the municipality wherein it was
slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act
regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was
slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that
under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the
slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure. Sections 30, 31, 32, and
33 of the Act are as follows:

Separate Opinions SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal
slaughterhouse except upon permit secured from the municipal treasure. Before
issuing the permit for the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, the
BARREDO, J., concurring.
municipal treasurer shall require for branded cattle the production of the original
certificate of ownership and certificates of transfer showing title in the person
I concur with the qualification that under existing jurisprudence conviction is possible, applying for the permit, and for unbranded cattle such evidence as may satisfy said
without the need of amending the information, for violation of other laws or ordinances on treasurer as to the ownership of the animals for which permit to slaughter has been
concealment of deadly weapons. requested.

Makasiar, J, concurs. SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal
treasurer unless such animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and
CONCEPCION, JR., J, concurring: in no event shall a permit be given to slaughter for food any animal of any kind
which is not fit for human consumption.
I concur with the additional observation that accused could properly be convicted of a
violation of Act 1780 of the Philippine Commission or of the ordinance. SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all permits for slaughter
issued by him, and such record shall show the name and residence of the owner, and
40
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
the class, sex, age, brands, knots of radiated hair commonly know as remolinos or
cowlicks, and other marks of identification of the animal for the slaughter of which
permit is issued and the date on which such permit is issued. Names of owners shall
be alphabetically arranged in the record, together with date of permit.
A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to
the provincial treasurer, who shall file and properly index the same under the name of
the owner, together with date of permit.
SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human
consumption or killing for food at the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle
except upon permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, shall be punished by a
fine of not less than ten nor more than five hundred pesos, Philippine currency, or by
imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than six months, or by both such
fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the
prohibition contained in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of
slaughter of large cattle for human consumption in a municipal slaughter without a permit
duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a
municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer; and it
is urged that the municipality of Carmen not being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse,
neither the prohibition nor the penalty is applicable to cases of slaughter of large cattle
without a permit in that municipality.
We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the
slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured
from the municipal treasurer, and (2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large
cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the penalty provided in
section 33 applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption,
anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the
killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.
It may be admitted at once, that the pertinent language of those sections taken by itself and
examined apart from the context fairly admits of two constructions: one whereby the phrase
"at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting both the word
"slaughtered" and the words "killed for food" in section 30, and the words "slaughtering or
causing to be slaughtered for human consumption" and the words "killing for food" in section
33; and the other whereby the phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as
41
limiting and restricting merely the words "killed for food" and "killing for food" as used in
those sections. But upon a reading of the whole Act, and keeping in mind the manifest and
expressed purpose and object of its enactment, it is very clear that the latter construction is
that which should be adopted.
The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against theft and
to make easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed,
or stolen. To this end it provides an elaborate and compulsory system for the separate
branding and registry of ownership of all such cattle throughout the Islands, whereby owners
are enabled readily and easily to establish their title; it prohibits and invalidates all transfers
of large cattle unaccompanied by certificates of transfer issued by the proper officer in the
municipality where the contract of sale is made; and it provides also for the disposition of
thieves or persons unlawfully in possession, so as to protect the rights of the true owners. All
this, manifestly, in order to make it difficult for any one but the rightful owner of such cattle
to retain them in his possession or to dispose of them to others. But the usefulness of this
elaborate and compulsory system of identification, resting as it does on the official registry of
the brands and marks on each separate animal throughout the Islands, would be largely
impaired, if not totally destroyed, if such animals were requiring proof of ownership and the
production of certificates of registry by the person slaughtering or causing them to be
slaughtered, and this especially if the animals were slaughtered privately or in a clandestine
manner outside of a municipal slaughterhouse. Hence, as it would appear, sections 30 and 33
prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a municipal
slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer, and
section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such permits in the office of the
municipal and also of the provincial treasurer.
If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by the
appellant, it will readily be seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the registry
and record of the brands and marks of identification of all large cattle in the Islands would
prove in large part abortion, since thieves and persons unlawfully in possession of such cattle,
and naturally would, evade the provisions of the law by slaughtering them outside of
municipal slaughterhouses, and thus enjoy the fruits of their wrongdoing without exposing
themselves to the danger of detection incident to the bringing of the animals to the public
slaughterhouse, where the brands and other identification marks might be scrutinized and
proof of ownership required.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that
construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of
the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to
defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. We are of opinion,
therefore, that sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing
to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit
provided for in section 30.
It is not essential that an explanation be found for the express prohibition in these sections of
the "killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse" of such animals, despite the fact that this
prohibition is clearly included in the general prohibition of the slaughter of such animals for
human consumption anywhere; but it is not improbable that the requirement for the issue of a
permit in such cases was expressly and specifically mentioned out of superabundance of
precaution, and to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding in the event that some of the
municipalities should be disposed to modify or vary the general provisions of the law by the
passage of local ordinances or regulations for the control of municipal slaughterhouse.
Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of section 31 of the Act leads to the same
conclusion. One of the secondary purposes of the law, as set out in that section, is to prevent
the slaughter for food of carabaos fit for agricultural and draft purposes, and of all animals
unfit for human consumption. A construction which would limit the prohibitions and
penalties prescribed in the statute to the killing of such animals in municipal slaughterhouses,
leaving unprohibited and unpenalized their slaughter outside of such establishments, so
manifestly tends to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator, that unless imperatively
demanded by the language of the statute it should be rejected; and, as we have already
indicated, the language of the statute is clearly susceptible of the construction which we have
placed upon it, which tends to make effective the provisions of this as well as all the other
sections of the Act.
It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a permit to slaughter his carabao, and that it
was denied him on the ground that the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work or for draft
purposes." Counsel for appellant contends that the statute, in so far as it undertakes to
penalize the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption as food, without first obtaining a
permit which can not be procured in the event that the animal is not unfit "for agricultural
work or draft purposes," is unconstitutional and in violation of the terms of section 5 of the
Philippine Bill (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902), which provides that "no law shall be enacted
which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
It is not quite clear from the argument of counsel whether his contention is that this provision
of the statute constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of
eminent domain without providing for the compensation of the owners, or that it is an undue
42
and unauthorized exercise of the police power of the State. But whatever may be the basis of
his contention, we are of opinion, appropriating, with necessary modifications understood, the
language of that great jurist, Chief Justice Shaw (in the case of Com. vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met.,
55, where the question involved was the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting and
penalizing the taking or carrying away by any person, including the owner, of any stones,
gravel, or sand, from any of the beaches in the town of Chesea,) that the law in question "is
not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just
and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular
use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the public. All
property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure
the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interest of the community."
It may be conceded that the benificial use and exclusive enjoyment of the property of all
carabao owners in these Islands is to a greater or less degree interfered with by the provisions
of the statute; and that, without inquiring what quantum of interest thus passes from the
owners of such cattle, it is an interest the deprivation of which detracts from their right and
authority, and in some degree interferes with their exclusive possession and control of their
property, so that if the regulations in question were enacted for purely private purpose, the
statute, in so far as these regulations are concerned, would be a violation of the provisions of
the Philippine Bill relied on be appellant; but we are satisfied that it is not such a taking, such
an interference with the right and title of the owners, as is involved in the exercise by the
State of the right of eminent domain, so as to entitle these owners to compensation, and that it
is no more than "a just restrain of an injurious private use of the property, which the
legislature had authority to impose."
In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84), wherein the doctrine laid down in
Com. vs. Tewksbury (supra) was reviewed and affirmed, the same eminent jurist who wrote
the former opinion, in distinguishing the exercise of the right of eminent domain from the
exercise of the sovereign police powers of the State, said:
We think it is settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil
society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his
title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that is
shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. . . . Rights
of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious,
and to such reasonable restrain and regulations establish by law, as the legislature,
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may
think necessary and expedient.
This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to
take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency
requires it; which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable
compensation therefor. The power we allude to is rather the police power, the power
vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than
to mark its boundaries or prescribe limits to its exercise.
Applying these principles, we are opinion that the restrain placed by the law on the slaughter
for human consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not an
appropriation of property interests to a "public use," and is not, therefore, within the principle
of the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain. It is fact a mere restriction or
limitation upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to be determental to the public
welfare. And we think that an examination of the general provisions of the statute in relation
to the public interest which it seeks to safeguard and the public necessities for which it
provides, leaves no room for doubt that the limitations and restraints imposed upon the
exercise of rights of ownership by the particular provisions of the statute under consideration
were imposed not for private purposes but, strictly, in the promotion of the "general welfare"
and "the public interest" in the exercise of the sovereign police power which every State
possesses for the general public welfare and which "reaches to every species of property
within the commonwealth."
For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a virulent contagious or infectious
disease had threatened the total extinction of carabaos in these Islands, in many sections
sweeping away seventy, eighty, and in some cases as much as ninety and even one hundred
per cent of these animals. Agriculture being the principal occupation of the people, and the
carabao being the work animal almost exclusively in use in the fields as well as for draft
purposes, the ravages of the disease with which they were infected struck an almost vital
blow at the material welfare of the country. large areas of productive land lay waste for years,
and the production of rice, the staple food of the inhabitants of the Islands, fell off to such an
extent that the impoverished people were compelled to spend many millions of pesos in its
importation, notwithstanding the fact that with sufficient work animals to cultivate the fields
43
the arable rice lands of the country could easily be made to produce a supply more that
sufficient for its own needs. The drain upon the resources of the Islands was such that famine
soon began to make itself felt, hope sank in the breast of the people, and in many provinces
the energies of the breadwinners seemed to be paralyzed by the apparently hopeless struggle
for existence with which they were confronted.
To meet these conditions, large sums of money were expended by the Government in
relieving the immediate needs of the starving people, three millions of dollars were voted by
the Congress of the United States as a relief or famine fund, public works were undertaken to
furnish employment in the provinces where the need was most pressing, and every effort
made to alleviate the suffering incident to the widespread failure of the crops throughout the
Islands, due in large measure to the lack of animals fit for agricultural work and draft
purposes.
Such measures, however, could only temporarily relieve the situation, because in an
agricultural community material progress and permanent prosperity could hardly be hoped for
in the absence of the work animals upon which such a community must necessarily rely for
the cultivation of the fields and the transportation of the products of the fields to market.
Accordingly efforts were made by the Government to increase the supply of these animals by
importation, but, as appears from the official reports on this subject, hope for the future
depended largely on the conservation of those animals which had been spared from the
ravages of the diseased, and their redistribution throughout the Islands where the need for
them was greatest.
At large expense, the services of experts were employed, with a view to the discovery and
applications of preventive and curative remedies, and it is hoped that these measures have
proved in some degree successful in protecting the present inadequate supply of large cattle,
and that the gradual increase and redistribution of these animals throughout the Archipelago,
in response to the operation of the laws of supply and demand, will ultimately results in
practically relieving those sections which suffered most by the loss of their work animals.
As was to be expected under such conditions, the price of carabaos rapidly increase from the
three to five fold or more, and it may fairly be presumed that even if the conservative
measures now adopted prove entirely successful, the scant supply will keep the price of these
animals at a high figure until the natural increase shall have more nearly equalized the supply
to the demand.
Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this sudden rise in the price of cattle,
the crime of cattle stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands, necessitating
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
the enactment of a special law penalizing with the severest penalties the theft of carabaos and
other personal property by roving bands; and it must be assumed from the legislative
authority found that the general welfare of the Islands necessitated the enactment of special
and somewhat burdensome provisions for the branding and registration of large cattle, and
supervision and restriction of their slaughter for food. It will hardly be questioned that the
provisions of the statute touching the branding and registration of such cattle, and prohibiting
and penalizing the slaughter of diseased cattle for food were enacted in the due and proper
exercise of the police power of the State; and we are of opinion that, under all the
circumstances, the provision of the statute prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter for human
consumption of carabaos fit for work were in like manner enacted in the due and proper
exercise of that power, justified by the exigent necessities of existing conditions, and the right
of the State to protect itself against the overwhelming disaster incident to the further
reduction of the supply of animals fit for agricultural work or draft purposes.
It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in these Islands, and disclosed by the official
reports and records of the administrative and legislative departments of the Government, that
not merely the material welfare and future prosperity of this agricultural community were
threatened by the ravages of the disease which swept away the work animals during the years
prior to the enactment of the law under consideration, but that the very life and existence of
the inhabitants of these Islands as a civilized people would be more or less imperiled by the
continued destruction of large cattle by disease or otherwise. Confronted by such conditions,
there can be no doubt of the right of the Legislature to adopt reasonable measures for the
preservation of work animals, even to the extent of prohibiting and penalizing what would,
under ordinary conditions, be a perfectly legitimate and proper exercise of rights of
ownership and control of the private property of the citizen. The police power rests upon
necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private property by police
regulation can be justified, we think that the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of
carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion must be held to be authorized as a
reasonable and proper exercise of that power.
As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the case of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U.S., 133,
136):
The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful
subject of discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is
universally conceded to include everything essential to the public safely, health, and
morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of
whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has been held
that the State may order the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise
44
endangering the lives of passers-by; the demolition of such as are in the path of a
conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or
unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of
railways and other means of public conveyance, and of interments in burial grounds;
the restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities; the compulsary vaccination
of children; the confinement of the insane or those afficted with contagious deceases;
the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression of obscene
publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and
places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this, however, the State may
interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large
discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the
interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of
such interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.)
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public
interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and
unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as
to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is
subject to the supervision of the court.
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the
statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of
carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or
draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the
community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident
owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of
animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be
measurably and dangerously affected.
Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p.
149) that by this "general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity
of the State; of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no question ever was, or, upon
acknowledge and general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are
concerned."
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3

And Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations" (6th ed., p. 738) says: "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law," a provision which itself is adopted from the Constitution of the United
It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which the police power States, and is found in substance in the constitution of most if not all of the States of the
is or may be exercised, because the various cases in which the exercise by one Union.
individual of his rights may conflict with a similar exercise by others, or may be
detrimental to the public order or safety, are infinite in number and in variety. And The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be affirmed
there are other cases where it becomes necessary for the public authorities to interfere with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
with the control by individuals of their property, and even to destroy it, where the
owners themselves have fully observed all their duties to their fellows and to the Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
State, but where, nevertheless, some controlling public necessity demands the
interference or destruction. A strong instance of this description is where it becomes
necessary to take, use, or destroy the private property of individuals to prevent the
spreading of a fire, the ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any
other great public calamity. Here the individual is in no degree in fault, but his
interest must yield to that "necessity" which "knows no law." The establishment of G.R. No. L-25326 May 29, 1970
limits within the denser portions of cities and villages within which buildings
constructed of inflammable materials shall not be erected or repaired may also, in IGMIDIO HIDALGO and MARTINA ROSALES, petitioners,
some cases, be equivalent to a destruction of private property; but regulations for this vs.
purpose have been sustained notwithstanding this result. Wharf lines may also be POLICARPIO HIDALGO, SERGIO DIMAANO, MARIA ARDE, SATURNINO
established for the general good, even though they prevent the owners of water-fronts HIDALGO, BERNARDINA MARQUEZ, VICENTE DIMAANO, ARCADIA
from building out on soil which constitutes private property. And, whenever the DIMAANO, TEODULA DIMAANO, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS and THE
legislature deem it necessary to the protection of a harbor to forbid the removal of PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, respondents.
stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may establish regulations to that effect
under penalties, and make them applicable to the owners of the soil equally with G.R. No. L-25327 May 29, 1970
other persons. Such regulations are only "a just restraint of an injurious use of
property, which the legislature have authority" to impose. HILARIO AGUILA and ADELA HIDALGO, petitioners,
So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of vs.
circumstances, and without the fault of the power, that which was once lawful,
proper, and unobjectionable has now become a public nuisance, endangering the
POLICARPIO HIDALGO, SERGIO DIMAANO, MARIA ARDE, SATURNINO
public health or the public safety. Milldams are sometimes destroyed upon this
HIDALGO, BERNARDINA MARQUEZ, VICENTE DIMAANO, ARCADIA
grounds; and churchyards which prove, in the advance of urban population, to be
DIMAANO, TEODULA DIMAANO, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS and THE
detrimental to the public health, or in danger of becoming so, are liable to be closed
PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, respondents.
against further use for cemetery purposes.
Jose O. Lara for petitioners.
These citations from some of the highest judicial and text-book authorities in the United
States clearly indicate the wide scope and extent which has there been given to the doctrine us
in our opinion that the provision of the statute in question being a proper exercise of that Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for respondents.
power is not in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill, which provide that
 
45
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Two petitions for review of decisions of the Court of Agrarian Relations dismissing
petitioners' actions as share tenants for the enforcerment of the right to redeem agricultural
lands, under the provisions of section 12 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code. As the same
issue of law is involved and the original landowner and vendees in both cases are the same,
the two cases are herein jointly decided.
Respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time of the execution of the deeds of
sale on September 27, 1963 and March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven above-named private co-
respondents, the owner of the 22,876-square meter and 7,638-square meter agricultural
parcels of land situated in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas, described in the decisions under
review.
In Case L-25326, respondent-vendor sold the 22,876-square meter parcel of land, together
with two other parcels of land for P4,000.00. Petitioners-spouses Igmidio Hidalgo and
Martina Resales, as tenants thereof, alleging that the parcel worked by them as tenants is
fairly worth P1,500.00, "taking into account the respective areas, productivities,
accessibilities, and assessed values of three lots, seek by way of redemption the execution of
a deed of sale for the same amount of P1,500.00 by respondents-vendees 1 in their favor.
In Case L-25327, respondent-vendor sold the 7,638-square meter parcel of land for P750.00,
and petitioners-spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo as tenants thereof, seek by way of
redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same price of P750.00 by respondents-
vendees in their favor.
As stated in the decisions under review, since the parties stipulated on the facts in both cases,
petitioners-tenants have for several years been working on the lands as share tenants. No 90-
day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed
by section 11 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on
August 8, 1963) was given by respondent-vendor to petitioners-tenants. Subsequently, the
deeds of sale executed by respondent-vendor were registered by respondents register of deeds
and provincial assessor of Batangas in the records of their respective offices notwithstanding
the non-execution by respondent-vendor of the affidavit required by section 13 of the Land
Reform Code.2 The actions for redemption were timely filled on March 26, 1965 by
petitioners-tenants within the two-year prescriptive period from registration of the sale,
prescribed by section 12 of the said Code.
46
The agrarian court rendered on July 19, 1965 two identical decisions dismissing the petitions
for redemption.
It correctly focused on the sole issue of law as follows: "(T)he only issue in this case is
whether or not plaintiffs, as share tenants, are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are
working from the purchasers thereof, where no notice was previously given to them by the
vendor, who was their landholder, of the latter's intention to sell the property and where the
vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3844 before the
registration of the deed of sale. In other words, is the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12
of Republic Act No. 3844 applicable to share tenants?"
But proceeding from several erroneous assumptions and premises, it arrived at its erroneous
conclusion that the right of redemption granted by section 12 of the Land Reform Code is
available to leasehold tenants only but not to share tenants, and thus dismissed the petitions:
"(S)ec 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, which comes under Chapter I of said Act, under the
heading 'Agricultural Leasehold System,' reads as follows:
'SEC. 12. Lessee's Right of Redemption. — In case the landholding is sold to
a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter
shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and
consideration: Provided: further, That where there are two or more
agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to
the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption
under this Section may be exercised within two years from the registration of
the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption.'
The systems of agricultural tenancy recognized in this jurisdiction
are share tenancy and leasehold tenancy. (Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 1199;
Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 3844). A share tenant is altogether different from
a leasehold tenant and their respective rights and obligations are not co-
extensive or co-equal. (See Secs. 22 to 41, inclusive, and Secs. 42 to 48,
inclusive, of Republic Act No. 1199; see also Secs. 4 to 38, inclusive, of
Republic Act No. 3844).
It is our considered view that the right of redemption granted by Section 12
of Republic Act No. 3844 is applicable to leasehold tenants only, but not
to share tenants, because said provision of law clearly, definitely, and
unequivocally grants said right to the 'agricultural lessee,' and to nobody else.
In enacting the Agricultural Land Reform Code, Congress was fully aware of
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
the existence of share tenancy and in fact provided for the abolition of the
agricultural share tenancy system. (Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 3844.) If it were
the intention of Congress to grant the right of redemption to share tenants, it
would have unmistakably and unequivocally done so. We cannot extend said
right to share tenants through judicial legislation, wherever our sympathies
may lie.
The agrarian court fell into several erroneous assumptions and premises in holding that
agricultural share tenancy remains recognized in this jurisdiction; that "a share tenant is
altogether different from a leasehold tenant and their respective rights and obligations are not
co-extensive or co-equal"; and that the right of redemption granted by section 12 of the Land
Reform Code" is applicable to leasehold tenants only, but not to share tenants, because said
provision of law clearly, definitely, and unequivocally grants said right to the 'agricultural
lessee,' and to nobody else."
1. The very essence of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of
agricultural share tenancy as proclaimed in its title. Section 4 of the Code expressly outlaws
agricultural share tenancy as "contrary to public policy" and decrees its abolition. 3 Section 2
of the Code expressly declares it to be the policy of the State, inter alia, "to establish owner
cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture and, as
a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial development; to achieve a
dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and
practices; ... and to make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible
citizens, and a source of strength in our democratic society." 4 It was error, therefore, for the
agrarian court to state the premise after the Land Reform Code had already been enacted, that
"the systems of agricultural tenancy recognized in this jurisdiction are share tenancy
and leasehold tenancy." A more accurate statement of the premise is that based on
the transitory provision in the first proviso of section 4 of the Code, i.e. that
existing share tenancy contracts are allowed to continue temporarily in force and effect,
notwithstanding their express abolition, until whichever of the following events occurs
earlier: (a) the end of the agricultural year when the National Land Reform Council makes the
proclamation declaring the region or locality a land reform area; or (b) the shorter period
provided in the share tenancy contracts expires; or (c) the share tenant sooner exercises his
option to elect the leasehold system.
In anticipation of the expiration of share tenancy contracts — whether by contractual
stipulation or the tenant's exercise of his option to elect the leasehold system instead or by
virtue of their nullity — occuring before the proclamation of the locality as a land reform
area, the same section 4 has further declared in the third proviso thereof that in such event,
47
the tenant shall continue in possession of the land for cultivation and "there shall be presumed
to exist a leasehold relationship under the provisions of this Code."
2. The foregoing exposes the error of the agrarian court's corollary premise that
"a share tenant is altogether different from a leasehold tenant." The agrarian court's dictum
that "their respective rights and obligations are not co-extensive or co-equal "refer to
their contractual relations with the landowner, with respect to the contributions given,
management, division or payment of the produce. 5
But the Land Reform Code forges by operation of law, between the landowner and the farmer
— be a leasehold tenant or temporarily a share tenant — a vinculum juris with certain vital
juridical consequences, such as security of tenure of the tenant and the tenant's right to
continue in possession of the land he works despite the expiration of the contract or the sale
or transfer of the land to third persons, and now, more basically, the farmer's pre-
emptive right to buy the land he cultivates under section 11 of the Code 6 as well as the right
to redeem the land, if sold to a third person without his knowledge, under section 12 of the
Code.
This is an essential and indispensable mandate of the Code to implement the state's policy of
establishing owner-cultivatorship and to achieve a dignified and self-reliant existence for the
small farmers that would make them a pillar of strength of our Republic. Aside from
expropriation by the Land Authority of private agricultural land for resale in economic
family-size farm units "to bona fide tenants, occupants and qualified farmers,"7 the purchase
by farmers of the lands cultivated by them, when the owner decides to sell the same —
through rights of pre-emption and redemption — are the only means prescribed by the Code
to achieve the declared policy of the State.
3. The agrarian court therefore facilely let itself fall into the error of concluding that the right
of redemption (as well as necessarily the right of pre-emption) imposed by the Code is
available to leasehold tenants only and excludes share tenants for the literal reason that the
Code grants said rights only to the "agricultural lessee and to nobody else." For one, it
immediately comes to mind that the Code did not mention tenants,
whether leasehold or share tenants, because it outlaws share tenancy and envisions the
agricultural leasehold system as its replacement. Thus, Chapter I of the Code, comprising
sections 4 to 38, extensively deals with the establishment of "agricultural leasehold relation,"
defines the parties thereto and the rights and obligations of the "agricultural lessor" and of
the "agricultural lessee" (without the slightest mention of leasehold tenants) and the statutory
consideration or rental for the leasehold to be paid by the lessee. There is a studied omission
in the Code of the use of the term tenant in deference to the "abolition of tenancy" as
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
proclaimed in the very title of the Code, and the elevation of the tenant's status to that of
lessee.
Then, the terms "agricultural lessor" and "agricultural lessee" are consistently used
throughout the Chapter and carried over the particular sections (11 and 12) on pre-emption
and redemption. The agrarian court's literal construction would wreak havoc on and defeat
the proclaimed and announced legislative intent and policy of the State of establishing owner-
cultivatorship for the farmers, who invariably were all share tenants before the enactment of
the Code and whom the Code would now uplift to the status of lessees.
A graphic instance of this fallacy would be found in section 11 providing that "In case
the agricultural lessor decides to sell the landholding the agricultural lessee shall have the
preferential right to buy the same under reasonable terms and conditions." It will be seen that
the term "agricultural lessor" is here used interchangeably with the term "landowner"; which
conflicts with the Code's definition of "agricultural lessor" to mean "a person natural or
juridical, who, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, lets or grants
to another the cultivation and use of his land for a price certains." 8 Obviously, the Code
precisely referred to the "agricultural lessor (who) decides to sell the landholding," when it
could have more precisely referred to the "landowner," who alone as such, rather than a civil
law lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor, could sell the landholding, but it certainly cannot
be logically contended that the imprecision should defeat the clear spirit and intent of the
provision.
4. We have, here, then a case of where the true intent of the law is clear that calls for the
application of the cardinal rule of statutory construction that such intent or spirit must prevail
over the letter thereof, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, since
adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would
defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.
Section 11 of the Code providing for the "agricultural lessee's" preferential right to buy the
land he cultivates provides expressly that "the entire landholding offered for sale must be pre-
empted by the Land Authority if the landowner so desires, unless the majority of the lessees
object to such acquisition," presumably for being beyond their capabilities. Taken together
with the provisions of Chapter III of the Code on the organization and functions of the Land
Authority and Chapter VII on the Land Project Administration and the creation and functions
of the National Land Reform Council, (in which chapters the legislature obviously was not
laboring under the inhibition of referring to the term tenants as it was in Chapter I
establishing the agricultural leasehold system and decreeing the abolition of share tenancy, 9
the Code's intent, policy and objective to give both agricultural lessees and farmers who
48
transitionally continue to be share tenants notwithstanding the Code's enactment, the same
priority and preferential rights over the lands under their cultivation, in the event of
acquisition of the lands, by expropriation or voluntary sale, for distribution or resale that may
be initiated by the Land Authority or the National Land Reform Council, are clearly and
expressly stated.
Thus Chapter III, section 51 of the Code decrees it the responsibility of the Land Authority
"(1) To initiate and prosecute expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of private
agricultural lands as defined in Section one hundred sixty-six of chapter XI of this Code for
the purpose of subdivision into economic family — size farm units and resale of said farm
units to bona fide tenants, occupants and qualified farmers ... and "(2) To help bona fide
farmers without lands of agricultural owner-cultivators of uneconomic-size farms to acquire
and own economic family-size farm units ...."
Similarly, Chapter VII, section 128 of the Code, in enjoining the National Land Reform
Council to formulate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the Code's provisions
for selection of agricultural land to be acquired and distributed and of the beneficiaries of the
family farms, ordains the giving of the same priority "to the actual occupants personally
cultivating the land either as agricultural lessees or otherwise with respect to the area under
their cultivation."
5. It would certainly result in absurdity, contradictions and injustice if a share tenant would be
denied the rights of pre-emption and redemption which he seeks to exercise on his own
resources, notwithstanding that the National Land Reform Council has not yet proclaimed
that all the government machineries and agencies in the region or locality envisioned in the
Code are operating — which machineries and agencies, particularly, the Land Bank were
precisely created "to finance the acquisition by the Government of landed estates for division
and resale to small landholders, as well as the purchase of the landholding by the agricultural
lessee from the landowner." 10 The non-operation in the interval of the Land Bank and the
government machineries and agencies in the region which are envisioned in the Code to assist
the share tenant in shedding off the yoke of tenancy and afford him the financial assistance to
exercise his option of electing the leasehold system and his preferential right of purchasing
the land cultivated by him could not possibly have been intended by Congress to prevent the
exercise of any of these vital rights by a share tenant who is able to do so, e.g. to purchase the
land, on his own and without government assistance. It would be absurd and unjust that while
the government is unable to render such assistance, the share tenant would be deemed
deprived of the very rights granted him by the Code which he is in a position to exercise even
without government assistance.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
6. Herein lies the distinction between the present case and Basbas vs. Entena 11 where the
Court upheld the agrarian court's dismissal of the therein tenant's action to redeem the
landholding sold to a third party by virtue of the tenant's failure to tender payment or consign
the purchase price of the property. There, the tenant-redemptioner was shown by the evidence
to have no funds and had merely applied for them to the Land Authority which was not yet
operating in the locality and hence, the Court held that no part of the Code "indicates or even
hints that the 2-year redemption period will not commence to run (indefinitely) until the
tenant obtains financing from the Land Bank, or stops the tenant from securing redemption
funds from some other source." 12 In the present case, the petitioners-tenants' possession of
funds and compliance with the requirements of redemption are not questioned, the case
having been submitted and decided on the sole legal issue of the right of redemption being
available to them as share tenants. The clear and logical implication of Basbas is where the
tenant has his own resources or secures redemption funds from sources other than the Land
Bank or government agencies under the Code, the fact that the locality has not been
proclaimed a land reform area and that such government machineries and agencies are not
operating therein is of no relevance and cannot prejudice the tenant's rights under the Code to
redeem the landholding.
7. Even from the landowner's practical and equitable viewpoint, the landowner is not
prejudiced in the least by recognizing the share tenant's right of redemption. The landowner,
having decided to sell his land, has gotten his price therefor from his vendees. (The same
holds true in case of the tenant's exercise of the pre-emptive right by the tenant who is called
upon to pay the landowner the price, if reasonable, within ninety days from the landowner's
written notice.) As for the vendees, neither are they prejudiced for they will get back from the
tenant-redemptioner the price that they paid the vendor, if reasonable, since the Code grants
the agricultural lessee or tenant the top priority of redemption of the landholding cultivated
by him and expressly decrees that the same "shall have priority over any other right of legal
redemption." In the absence of any provision in the Code as to manner of and amounts
payable on redemption, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code apply in a suppletory
character. 13 Hence, the vendees would be entitled to receive from the redemptioners the
amount of their purchase besides "(1) the expenses of the contract, and any other legitimate
payments made by reason of the sale; (and) (2) the necessary and useful expenses made on
the thing sold." 14
8. The historical background for the enactment of the Code's provisions on pre-emption and
redemption further strengthens the Court's opinion. It is noted by Dean Montemayor 15 that
"(T)his is a new right which has not been granted to tenants under the Agricultural Tenancy
Act. It further bolsters the security of tenure of the agricultural lessee and further encourages
agricultural lessees to become owner-cultivators.
49
In the past, a landlord often ostensibly sold his land being cultivated by his
tenant to another tenant, who in turn filed a petition for ejectment against the
first tenant on the ground of personal cultivation. While many of such sales
were simulated, there was a formal transfer of title in every case, and the first
tenant was invariably ordered ejected.
There is indication in this case of the same pattern of sale by the landowner to another
tenant, 16 in order to effect the ejectment of petitioners-tenants. This is further bolstered by the
fact that the sales were executed by respondent-vendor on September 27, 1963 and March 2,
1954 shortly after the enactment on August 8, 1963 of the Land Reform Code — which
furnishes still another reason for upholding ... petitioners-tenants' right of redemption, for
certainly a landowner cannot be permitted to defeat the Code's clear intent by precipitately
disposing of his lands, even before the tenant has been given the time to exercise his newly
granted option to elect the new agricultural leasehold system established by the Code as a
replacement for the share tenancy outlawed by it.
9. Clearly then, the Code intended, as above discussed, to afford the farmers'
who transitionally continued to be share tenants after its enactment but who inexorably
would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the
same priority and preferential right as those other share tenants, who upon the enactment of
the Code or soon thereafter were earlier converted by fortuitous circumstance into
agricultural lessees, to acquire the lands under their cultivation in the event of their voluntary
sale by the owner or of their acquisition, by expropriation or otherwise, by the Land
Authority. It then becomes the court's duty to enforce the intent and will of the Code, for "...
(I)n fact, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof.' (Tañada vs.
Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 23, 1957, citing 82 C.J.S., p. 526.) A statute 'should be construed
according to its spirit or intention, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law.'
(Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 855.) By this, we do not correct the
act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to 'its intent.' (Lopez &
Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 850)." 17 The Court has consistently held in
line with authoritative principles of statutory construction that, it will reject a narrow and
literal interpretation, such as that given by the agrarian court, that would defeat and frustrate
rather than foster and give life to the law's declared policy and intent. 18 Finally, under the
established jurisprudence of the Court, in the interpretation of tenancy and labor legislation, it
will be guided by more than just an inquiry into the letter of the law as against its spirit and
will ultimately resolve grave doubts in favor of the tenant and worker. 19
The agrarian court's dismissal of the cases at bar should therefore be reversed and petitioners-
tenants' right to redeem the landholdings recognized section 12 of the Code.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3

In Case L-25326, however, the deed of sale executed by respondent-vendor in favor of
respondents-vendees for the price of P4,000.00 covers three parcels of land, while what is
sought to be redeemed is only the first parcel of land of 22,876 square meters, described in
the deed. Petitioners-tenants' allegation that the proportionate worth of said parcel "taking
into account the respective areas, productivities, accessibilities and assessed values of the
three lots," is P1,500.00, was traversed by respondents in their answer, with the claim that
"the said land is fairly worth P20,000.00. 20 While the vendor would be bound by, and cannot
claim more than, the price stated in the deed, and the Code precisely provides that the farmer
shall have "the preferential right to buy the (landholding) under reasonable terms and
conditions" or "redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration" 21 with a view to
affording the farmer the right to seek judicial assistance and relief to fix such reasonable price
and terms when the landowner places in the notice to sell or deed an excessive or exorbitant
amount in collusion with the vendee, we note that in this case the deed of sale itself
acknowledged that the selling price of P4,000.00 therein stated was not the fair price since an
additional consideration therein stated was that the vendees would support the vendor during
his lifetime and take care of him, should he fall ill, and even assumed the expenses of his
burial upon his death:
Ang halagang P4,000.00 ay hindi kaulat sa tunay na halaga ng mga lupa
subalit ang mga bumili ay may katungkulan na sostentohin ako habang ako'y
nabubuhay, ipaanyo at ipagamot ako kung ako ay may sakit, saka ipalibing
ako kung ako ay mamatay sa kanilang gastos at ito ay isa sa alang-alang o
consideracion ng bilihang ito.
Under these circumstances, since the agrarian court did not rule upon conflicting claims of
the parties as to what was the proportionate worth of the parcel of land in the stated price of
P4,000.00 — whether P1,500.00 as claimed by petitioners or a little bit more, considering the
proportionate values of the two other parcels, but the whole total is not to exceed the stated
price of P4,000.00, since the vendor is bound thereby — and likewise, what was the
additional proportionate worth of the expenses assumed by the vendees, assuming that
petitioners are not willing to assume the same obligation, the case should be remanded to the
agrarian court solely for the purpose of determining the reasonable price and consideration to
be paid by petitioners for redeeming the landholding, in accordance with these observations.
In Case L-25327, there is no question as to the price of P750.00 paid by the vendees and no
additional consideration or expenses, unlike in Case L-25326, supra, assumed by the
vendees. Hence, petitioners therein are entitled to redeem the landholding for the same stated
price.
ACCORDINGLY, the decisions appealed from are hereby reversed, and the petitions to
redeem the subject landholdings are granted.
In Case L-25326, however, the case is remanded to the agrarian court solely for determining
the reasonable price to be paid by petitioners therein to respondents-vendees for redemption
of the landholding in accordance with the observations hereinabove made.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Barredo and
Villamor, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., is on leave.
[G.R. No. L-6160. March 21, 1911.]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL NAVARRO, ET
AL., Defendants-Appellants.
Ramon Fernandez, for Appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. ELECTION LAW; TRUE TEST OF PROPERTY QUALIFICATION OF VOTERS. —
Under the provisions of the Election Law (Act No. 1582), the true test of the property
qualification of a voter, prescribed in subsection (b) of section 13 thereof, is the assessed and
not the actual or market value of the real estate owned by him.
2. ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; LEGISLATIVE INTENT. — When the language
of a particular section of a statute admits of more than one construction, that construction
should be adopted which tends to give effect to the manifest purposes sought to be obtained
by the legislator; and a construction should be rejected which would defeat, or strongly tend
to defeat, the intention of the legislator as expressed in other sections of the same statute.
DECISION

50
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
CARSON, J.:
The appellants in this case were convicted in the court below of a violation of section 30 of
the Election Law (Act No. 1582), and each of them was sentenced to pay a fine of P200 and
costs, to be extinguished at the rate of one day’s imprisonment for each P2 of fine and costs
remaining unpaid.
The evidence of record satisfactorily establishes that each of the appellants made oath, before
an election officer in the municipality of Piddig, in proceedings had in connection with the
general held on the 2d day of November, 1909, that he owned real property to the value of
P500. The evidence further discloses that at the time none of these appellants, except Daniel
Navarro and Genaro Calixto, but each of these defendants having proven that he owned, at
the time when he made oath to the value of his property, real estate of the assessed value of
more than P500, the judgment of conviction as to them should be reversed.
It will be seen that the proof upon which the judgment of conviction rests is limited to
evidence touching the assessed value of the property owned by the person making oath that
he is a qualified voter. It has been suggested that, under the statute, the true test of the
qualification of a voter is the actual or market value of the real property owned by him and
not the assessed value thereof, so that proof that one is not the owner of real property of the
assessed value of P500 is not proof that he is lacking this qualification of a voter, in the
absence of further proof that he is not the owner of unassessed real property of the value of
P500, or that the assessed property owned by him is not of the actual or market value of P500
whatever may be the amount for which it is assessed.
But while the statute does not in express terms declare that it is the ownership of property of
the assessed value of P500 which determines this qualification of a voter, nevertheless, that
such was the intention of the legislator become clear from an examination of the immediate
context of the provision of the statute defining the "property qualification" of voters, and of
the statute as a whole, keeping in mind the purpose and object sought to be attained by the
provisions of the statute generally, and particularly of those provisions defining qualifications
and disqualifications of voter and providing machinery whereby persons entitled to vote may
be secured in the exercise of that right, while any unlawful attempt to vote is severely
penalized.
In the first place this qualification is made immediately alternative to the qualification based
51
upon an annual payment of a fixed amount of the established taxes, both qualifications falling
under a single head. This striking juxtaposition under one head or class of these separate and
distinct kinds of qualifications at once suggests that in the mind of the legislator there was
some intimate relation which justified their being thus bound together, as it were, under one
head. The liability for the payment of a substantial amount of "the established taxes" at once
suggests itself as the relation which must have been in the mind of the legislator, and since
taxes are collected upon "real property" in accordance with its assessed value, we think we
are justified in concluding that it was the intention of the legislator to limit the grant of the
voting franchise based upon ownership of real property to owners of real property to the
assessed value of P500.
Our conclusion that this is the true meaning to be given the language of this section of the
statute is reinforced by the fact that another section of the statute provides that "any person" is
disqualified from voting "who is delinquent in the payment of public taxes assessed since
August thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight," this being the only disqualifying
provision based on the nonpayment of taxes. It is quite clear that this provision was directed
to the case of delinquency in the payment of land taxes as well as all other taxes, and it would
indeed be an anomaly if the failure to pay assessed land taxes would disqualify one person, as
a voter its value, while the possession of nonassessed real estate, whatever its value, could be
held as the sole and sufficient ground upon which another person may qualify as a voter.
Finally, the most superficial examination of the statute as a whole discloses that many of its
most important provisions looking to the due administration of the law as a whole — that is
to say, as an election law — and especially those provisions intended to secure the purity of
the ballot box, would be in large measure defeated, if not rendered wholly abortive by any
other construction of the language of the provision under consideration than that which we
give it. We confidently assert that, if a successful challenge of the right to vote, asserted by
one basing his claim on his alleged ownership of property of the value of P500, could only be
successfully maintained by proof that the real or market value of the land owned by him is
less than P500, then the task assigned by the law to the electoral boards, the registration
boards, the judges of elections, and other elective officers, as well as to the courts of the
Islands, could never be efficiently and intelligently performed so as to secure practical results
within the limited time necessarily allowed to them for the performance of their respective
duties in connection with elections, in the event of any general or even considerable attack on
the purity of the ballot box by persons setting up an illegal claim of a right to vote based on
this property qualification. While on the other hand, such a construction placed on the
language of the statute, would place, for practical purposes, almost arbitrary power in the
hands of dishonest registration based on their property qualification, and to deny their right of
registry on the pretense that the proof offered of the existence of such qualification is not
satisfactory.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
When the language of a particular section of a statute admits of more than one construction,
that the construction should be adopted which tends to give effect to the manifest purposes
and objects sought to be attained by the enactment of the statute as a whole; and a
construction should be rejected which would defeat or strongly tend to defeat the intention of
the Legislature as expressed in the other sections of the same statute. Applying this rule in
construing the provision of the Election Law under consideration, we have no doubt that it is
the ownership of real property to the assessed value of P500, whatever may be the real or
market value thereof, which constitutes the qualification of voters prescribed in subsection (b)
section 13 of the Election Law.
The judgment of the court below, convicting and sentencing the appellants in this case, is
affirmed as to all and each of them, except Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixto, with a
proportionate share of the costs of this instance against the appellants as to whom the
judgment is affirmed, the provision for the extinguishment of the penalty and costs being
modified, however, so as to exclude therefrom the amount of the costs and so as to fix the
rate of extinguishment at one day’s imprisonment for each P2.50 of the fine imposed.
The judgment convicting and sentencing Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixto is reversed and
those appellants are acquitted of the offense with which they are charged, with the costs of
both instances de oficio as to them.
Arellano, C.J., Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-29906 January 30, 1976
RODOLFO GENERAL and CARMEN GONTANG, petitioners,
vs.
LEONCIO BARRAMEDA, respondent.
Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners.
E.V. Guevarra for respondent.
52
ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals (Second Division) in
CA-G.R. No. 38363-R, entitled "Leoncio Barrameda, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Development
Bank of the Philippines (Naga Branch, Naga City), Rodolfo General and Carmen Gontang,
defendants-appellees," which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur in its Civil Case No. 5697, "dismissing the complaint with costs against
plaintiff".
Appellate Court's decision has the following dispositive portion:
We therefore find that the appealed judgment should be reversed and set
aside and another one entered declaring (1) null and void the sale executed
on September 3, 1963, by defendant Development Bank of the Philippines in
favor of its defendants Rodolfo General and Carmen Gontang, (2) T.C.T. No.
5003 cancelled and (3) the mortgaged property redeemed; and ordering the
Clerk of the lower court to deliver the amount of P7,271.22 deposited to
defendants Rodolfo General and Carmen Gontang and the Register of Deeds
to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of plaintiff in lieu of
T.C.T. No. 5003 upon payment by him of corresponding fees; with costs
against the defendants in both instances.
Undisputed facts are:
Plaintiff seeks to redeem the land formerly embraced in Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 1418, containing an area of 59.4687 hectares, situated in barrio
Taban, Minalabac Camarines Sur; to annul any and all contracts affecting
said property between the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and
Rodolfo General and Carmen Gontang and to recover damages, attorney's
fees and costs.
The land in dispute was mortgaged by plaintiff to the DBP to secure a loan of
P22,000.00. For failure of the mortgagor to pay in full the installments as
they fall due, the mortgagee foreclosed extrajudicially pursuant to the
provisions of Act 3135. On April 23, 1962, the provincial sheriff conducted
an auction sale in which the mortgagee, as the highest bidder, bought the
mortgaged property for P7,271.22. On May 13, 1963, the sheriff executed a
final deed of sale in favor of the DBP (Exhibit 2) and the DBP executed an
affidavit of consolidation of ownership (Exhibit 3). Upon registration of the
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
sale and affidavit on September 2, 1963 (Exhibit 1), TCT No. 1418 in the
name of plaintiff was cancelled and TCT No. 5003 issued to the DBP
(Exhibit-5) in its stead. On September 3, 1963, defendants Rodolfo General
and Carmen Gontang purchased the land from their codefendant. The sale in
their favor was annotated on TCT No. 5003 on November 26, 1963 only.
Prior to the date last mentioned, or on November 20, 1963, plaintiff offered
to redeem the land. In view of the refusal of the DBP to allow the
redemption, plaintiff commenced this suit. The original complaint was filed
in court on November 23, 1963. On August 12, 1964, plaintiff deposited with
the clerk of court the sum of P7,271.22, representing the repurchase price of
the land.
The trial court held that the one-year period of redemption began to run on
April 23, 1962, when the sale at public auction was held, and ended on April
24, 1963; that the plaintiff's offer to redeem on November 20, 1963 and the
deposit of the redemption price on August 12, 1964 were made beyond the
redemption period; and that defendants Rodolfo General and Carmen
Gontang 'are legitimate purchasers for value.
Two principal issues raised are:
(1) In the interpretation and application of Section 31, Commonwealth Act
459 (Law that created the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, now
Development Bank of the Philippines) which provides:
The Mortgagor or debtor to the Agricultural and Industrial
Bank whose real property was sold at public auction,
judicially or extra- judicially, for the full or partial payment
of an obligation to said bank shall, within one year from the
date of' the auction sale, have the right to redeem the real
property ... (Emphasis supplied),
shall the period of redemption start from the date of auction sale or the date
of the registration of the sale in the register of deeds as the respondent
Appellate Court held?
(2) Were petitioners under obligation to look beyond what appeared in the
certificate of title of their vendor the Development Bank of the Philippines
53
and investigate the validity of its title before they could be classified as
purchasers in good faith?
Petitioners' principal contentions are: that Section 31 of Commonwealth Act No. 459 which
created the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, predecessor of the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation and the Development Bank of the Philippines, clearly provides that the right to
redeem the real property sold at public auction judicially or extra-judicially may only be
exercised "within one year from the date of the auction sale"; that there is no provision in
Commonwealth Act No. 459 expressly stating that the redemption period of one year shall
start from the registration of the certificate of sale in the register of deeds; that Sec. 31 of C.
A. 459 is a specific provision of law which governs redemption of real property foreclosed by
the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (now the Development Bank of the Philippines), and
prescribes the redemption period for both judicial and extra-judicial foreclosures of mortgage;
that insofar as foreclosures of mortgage by banking and financial institutions are concerned,
the period of redemption applicable must be the one prescribed in their respective charters as,
in the case at bar, Section 31, C.A. No. 459; that the ruling in the case of Agbulos vs. Alberto,
G.R. No. L-17483, July 31, 1962, cited by respondent Appellate Court as a basis for its
decision, is not applicable to the case at bar because this Court based its Agbulos ruling on
Section 26 (now Sec. 90) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, wherein it is not clear when the
period of redemption should start (date when execution sale was conducted, or when the
certificate of sale was executed by sheriff, or when the certificate of sale was registered in the
registry of deeds), and this Court ruled that as the land involved in that case is registered
under the Torrens system, the date of redemption should begin to run from the date of
registration, unlike in the case at bar where Section 31 of Commonwealth Act 459
specifically and clearly provides that the running of the redemption period shall start from the
date of the auction sale; and that the ruling of this Court in Gonzales vs. P.N.B., 48 Phil. 824,
also invoked by respondent Appellate Court as a basis for its decision, is likewise not
applicable to the case at bar because the provisions on the matter of the P.N.B. Charter, Act
No. 2938, are different from that of Commonwealth Act 459. Section 32 of Act 2938, which
is now Section 20 of R.A. No. 1300 (PNB Charter) provides that the mortgagor shall have the
right to redeem within one year the sale of the real estate. This is Identical to the provision
appearing in Sec. 26, now Sec. 30, Rule 39, Rules of Court, while under Sec. 31 of
Commonwealth Act 459, the period of redemption should star, on the date of the auction
sale, and the latter provision is applicable specifically and expressly to the case at bar.
It is also petitioners' principal argument that the ruling in Metropolitan Insurance Company,
substituted by spouses Loreto Z. Marcaida and Miguel de Marcaida vs. Pigtain 101 Phil.
1111, 1115-1116, wherein this Court, in construing Sec. 6 of Act No. 3135, categorically
stated that the one year redemption period shall start from the date of sale and not from the
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
report of the sale or the registration of the sale certificate in the office of the Register of
Deeds, is more applicable to the present case. The pertinent portion of the decision in the
Marcaida case follows:
But again the appellants claim that in this particular case, the statutory
redemption period of one year should begin from December 17, 1954, when
the auction sale was actually recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds
of Manila and not from December 15, 1953, when the sale at public auction
of the properties in question took place. We find its contention to be also
untenable in view of the clear provision of the aforesaid Section 6 of Act No.
3135 to the effect that the right of redemption should be exercised within one
year from the date of the sale. It should not be overlooked that the
extrajudicial sale in question was for foreclosure of a mortgage and was not
by virtue of an ordinary writ of execution in a civil case. ... And since the
appeallants had failed to redeem the land in question within the time allowed
by Section 6 of Act 3135, the appellee has perfect right to require the
cancellation of the attachment lien in question. (Emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding the impressive arguments presented by petitioners, the crucial issue to
determine is the choice of what rule to apply in determining the start of the one year
redemption period, whether from the date of the auction sale or from that of the registration
of the sale with the registry of deeds. In other words it is whether a literal interpretation of the
provision of Section 31 of Commonwealth Act 459 — that the period of redemption shall
start from the date of the auction sale — shall govern, or whether the words, "auction sale"
shall be considered in their ordinary meaning or in the same sense that site is used in the texts
of Section 26, now 30, of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and Section 26 of Act 2938, now
Section 20, R.A. 1300 (Charter of PNB). Stated differently, should the word "sale" used in
the above indicated provisions of the Rules of Court and the PNB Charter, under whichWe
ruled that the redemption period shall start from the registration of the sale in the registry of
deeds be applied to foreclosure sales for the DBP and give to the words auction sale" in its
charter the same meaning of "sale" as used in connection with registered land?
We are of the view that a correct solution to the foregoing issue must entail not merely trying
to determine the meaning of the words auction sale" and "sale" in different legislative
enactments, but, more importantly, a determination of the legislative intent which is quite a
task to achieve as it depends more on a determination of the purpose and objective of the law
in giving mortgagors a period of redemptiom of their foreclosed properties. Mortgagors
whose properties are foreclosed and are purchased by the mortgagee as highest bidder at the
auction sale are decidedly at a great disadvatage because almost invariably mortgagors forfeit
54
their properties at a great loss as they are purchased at nominal costs by the mortgagee
himself who ordinarily bids in no more than his credit or the balance threof at the auction
sale. That is the reason why the law gives them a chance to redeem their properties within a
fixed period. It cannot be denied that in all foreclosures of mortgages and sale of property
pursuan to execution, whether judicial or extrajudicial in nature, under different legislative
enactments, a public auction sale is a indispensable pre-requisite to the valid disposal of
properties used as collateral for the obligation. So that whether the legislators in different
laws used as collateral for the obligation. So that whether the legislators in different laws
used the term "sale" or "auction sale" is of no moment, since the presumption is that when
they used those words "sale" and "auction sale" interchangeable in different laws they really
referred to only one act — the sale at public auction indispensably necessary in the
disposition of mortgaged properties and those levied upon to pay civil obligations of their
owners.
In the case of Ernesto Salazar, et al. vs. Flor De Lis Meneses, et al.,G.R. No.
L-15378, promulgated July 31, 1963, this Court stated:
The issue decisive of this appeal is the one raised by appellants in their third
assignment of error, which is to this effect: that the lower court erred in not
holding that the period of redemption in this case, as far as appellants are
concerned, started only on May 26, 1956, registered. Should We rule to this
effect, it is clear that hen appellants attempted to exercise their right to
redeem, as judgment creditors of the deceased mortgagor by judgment
subsequent to the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, and when they initiated the
present action on October 1, 1956, the period of redemption had not yer
expired.
We find appellants' contention to be meritorious. In the case of Agbulos vs.
Alberto, G.R. No. L-17483, promulgated on July 31, 1962, We held:
The property involved in the present case is registered land.
It is the law in this jurisdiction that when property brought
under the operation of the Land Registration Act
sold, the operative act is the registration of the deed of
conveyance. The deed of sale does not take effect this a
conveyance or bind the land it is registered. (Section 50, Act
496; Tuason vs. Raymundo, 28 Phil. 635; Sikatuna vs.
Guevara, 43 Phil. 371; Worcester vs. Ocampo, 34 Phil. 646)
(Emphasis supplied)
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
We find no compelling reason to deviate from the aforequoted ruling and not apply the same
to the present case. To Us petitioners' main contention that there is a great deal of difference
in legislative intent in the use of the words 94 auction sale" in Sec. 31 of Commonwealth Act
459 and the word "sale" in See. 32 of Act 2938, and See. 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
pales into insignificance in the light of Our stand that those words used interchangeably refer
to one thing, and that is the public auction sale required by law in the disposition of properties
foreclosed or levied upon. Our stand in the Salazar case and in those mentioned therein
(Garcia vs. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-13029, June 30, 1959; Gonzales et al. vs. Philippine
National Bank et al. 48 Phil. 824) is firmly planted on the premise that registration of the
deed of conveyance for properties brought under the Torrens System is the operative act to
transfer title to the property and registration is also the notice to the whole world that a
transaction involving the same had taken place.
To affirm the previous stand this Court has taken on the question of when the one year period
of redemption should start (from the time of registration of the sale) would better serve the
ends of justice and equity especially in this case, since to rule otherwise would result in
preventing the respondent-mortgagor from redeeming his 59.4687 hectares of land which was
acquired by the Development Bank of the Philippines as the highest bidder at the auction sale
for the low price of only P7,271.22 which was simply the unpaid balance of the mortgage
debt of P22,000.00 after the respondent-mortgagor had paid the sum of P14,728.78. As it is,
affirmance of the Appellate Court's decision would not result in any loss to petitioners since
the amount of P7,271.22 they paid to the Bank will be returned to 'them. What further
strengthen's Our stand is the fact found by the respondent Appellate Court that respondent
Barrameda has always been in possession of the disputed land.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, We find it no longer necessary to determine
whether the petitioners are purchasers in good faith of the land involved, since the respondent
Barrameda redeemed the mortgaged property within the legal period of redemption and,
consequently the sale of the property executed on September 3, 1963, by the Development
Bank of the Philippine in favor of the petitioners is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Appellate Court is affirmed, with costs against
petitioners.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., affirmed.
G.R. No. L-41106 September 22, 1977
55
LITEX EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
GEORGE A. EDUVALA, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge, BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS Departmentof Labor and FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS
(F.F.W.), respondents.
Esteban M. Mendoza for petitioner.
F. F. Bonifacio, Jr. for respondent FFW.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno
and Solicitor Romeo C. de la Cruz for respondent George A. Eduvala, etc.
FERNANDO, J.:
In this and certiorari and prohibition proceeding, what is sought to be nullified is an Order of
respondent George A. Eduvala, the then Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
requiring that a memorandumm election be held among the members of the Litex Employees
Association, petioner labor union, to ascertain their wishes as to their wishes as to their
affiliation with respondent Federation of Free Workers. It is the contention of petitioner
Union that there is no statutory authorization for the holding of such a referendum election.
That is the decisive issue in this comtroversy. In support of the competence of respondent
public official, Article 226 of the Present Labor Code is cited. It reads thus: "The Bureau of
Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Division in the the regional offices of the Labor
shall have and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiation or upon request of either or
both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and disputes, grievances of probe
arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces, whether natural or
non-agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective
bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance Procedure and/or voluntary
arbitration." 1 The comment of the then Acting Solicitor General, now Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeal, Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., treated as the answer, 2 maintained that the wording
of the above provision sustains the authority thus challenged. There is considerable
persuasiveness to such a view. It would be an unduly restrictive interpretation them if a
negative answer were Seven to the question posed. It would be oblivious to the basic end and
aim of the pant Labor Code to confer on the Department of Labor and its bereaus the
competence to pass upon and decide labor controversies and thus minimize judicial
intervention. There is no legal basis for nullifying such order.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
This later dispute originated from a petition of respondent Federation of Free Workers filed
with the Bureau of labor Relations against petitioner labor Union to hold a referendum among
the members of the union for the of determining whether they desired to be affiliated with
such Federation. It was alleged that a "great majority" of the members of the union desired
such affiliaion, but that its President, a certain Johnny de Leon, was opposed. The contention
of petitioner Union acting through its counsel was that only about 700 out of more than 2,200
employees of the company had manifested their desire to affliate with the Federation and that
a substantial number of such had since then repudiated their signatures. It also raised the
point that what was sought was a certification election which was not proper as there was a
certified collective bargaining agreement between the union and the company. The
Compulsory Arbitrator, after a careful study of the pleadings, reached the conclusion that the
truth of the matter could best be assertained by a referendum election. Respondent as Officer-
in-Charge of the Bureau of labor Relations affirmed. Hence this petition directed to this
Court, as a jurisdictional question is raised.
The petition, as noted at the outset, lacks merit.
1. Article 226 of the New Labor Code cannot be misread to signify that the authority
conferred on the Secretary of labor and the officials of the Department is limited in character.
On the contrary, even a cursory reading thereof readily yields the conclusion that in the
interest of industrial peace and for the promotion of the salutary constitutional objectives of
social justice and protection to labor, the competence of the governmental entrusted with
supervision over disputes involving employers and employees as well as "inter-union and
intra-union conflicts," is broad and expensive. Thereby its purpose becomes crystal-clear. As
is quite readily discernible where it concerns the promotion of social and economy rights, the
active participation in the implementation of the codal objective is entrusted to the executive
department. There is no support for any allegation of jurisdictional infirmity, considering that
the language employed is well-nigh inclusive with the stress on its "and exclusive authority to
act." If it were otherwise, its policy might be rendered futile. That is to run counter to a basic
postulate in the canons of statutory interpretation. Learned Hand referred to it as the
proliferation of purpose. As was emphatecally asserted by Justice Frankfurter: "The
generating consideration is that legislation is more than composition. It is an active
instrument of government which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to
be achieved. It is in this connection that Holmes said, 'words are flexible.' Again it was
Holmes, the last judge to give quarter to loose thinking or vague yearning, who said that 'the
general purpose is a more is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which
grammar or formal logic may lay down.' And it was Holmes who chided courts for being apt
to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law when those words import a policy that
goes beyond them." 3 What is intended by the framers of code or statute is not to be
56
frustrated. Even on the assumption that by some strained or literal reading of the employed, a
doubt can be raised as to its scope, the 'immitation should not be at war with the end sought to
be attained. It cannot be denied that if through an ingenious argumentation, limits may be set
on a statutory power which should not be there, there would be a failure to effectuate the
statutory purpose and policy. That kind of approach in statutory construction has never
recommended itself. 4
2. Nor has petitioner made out a case of grave abuse of since the matter involved is a dispute
as to whether or not the members of petitioner labor union had decided, contrary to the
wishes of its president, to join respondent Federation. What better way could there be of
ascertaining the truth there than to hold the referendum election. The guarantee of fairness as
to whether there is accuracy depends on the impartiality and neutrality of the Bureau of Labor
Relations. There is nothing in petitioner's submission to indicate that such would not be the
case. Under such circumstances then, petitioner labor union could not be held to allege that
there was an abuse, much less a grave abuse, of the discretionary authority vested in such
office. It suffices to take note of how often this Court, after a careful consideration of the
issue involved, had rejected such a contention in certification cases, analogous, if not similar
in character. Invariably, the imputation that the holding of an election for the purpose of
determining with exactitude the wishes of the employees concerned as amounting to arbitrary
exercise exercise of a power had been rejected. 5
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. This decision is immediately
executory.
Barredo, Concepcion Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.
 
 
Separate Opinions
ANTONIO, J., concurring:
The respondent public officer has sufficient authority, under the labor Code, to conduct the
referendum aforementioned.
AQUINO, J., concur:
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3

Because the instant case was rendered moot by the 1975 petition of FFW for a certification
election among the employees and workers of Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. If a certification
election will be held, a referendum is not necessary.
 
Separate Opinions
ANTONIO, J., concurring:
The respondent public officer has sufficient authority, under the labor Code, to conduct the
referendum aforementioned.
AQUINO, J., concur:
Because the instant case was rendered moot by the 1975 petition of FFW for a certification
election among the employees and workers of Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. If a certification
election will be held, a referendum is not necessary.
G.R. No. L-30458 August 31, 1976
criminal complaint for libel filed by private respondent with the Municipal Court of Balanga,
Bataan, against petitioner, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1575. 3 Pursuant to such criminal
complaint, respondent Judge conducted a preliminary investigation. 4 Then came the
challenged order to the effect that the offense charged is one that falls within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the municipal court of Balanga, Bataan, with the records of the case being
referred to the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan for the filing of the corresponding
information. 5 Subsequently, the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan pursuant to such order of
respondent Judge, filed an information for libel against petitioner in the Municipal Court of
Balance Bataan. 6 A plea of not guilty was entered by him upon arraignment. 7 On the same
day, in a motion to quash, he raise the question of jurisdiction, his allegation being that it is a
court of first instance and not a municipal court that could try the offense. 8 Respondent Judge
denied such motion to quash. 9 The motion for reconsideration having been filed and
thereafter denied, 10 this present petition was filed. As noted at the outset, the Jalandoni
doctrine is decisive. Petitioner is entitled to the writs prayed for.
The initial impression yielded, even upon the most cursory reading of the petition, was that it
embodied a correct appreciation of the applicable law, Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code. 11 Accordingly, respondents were not only inquired to answer, but a restraining order
was issued. There was nothing they could say in their subsequent pleadings that militated
against the assertion of petitioner as to a court of first instance having exclusive jurisdiction.
Accordingly, as noted, we find for him.

FRANCISCO Q. BOCOBO, petitioner, 1. The of the recent Jalandoni decision makes clear why this petition should prosper. Thus:
vs. Mere is no need to make mention again that it is a court of first instance that is specifically
VICENTE M. ESTANISLAO, Municipal Judge of Balanga, Bataan; and JESUS designated to try a libel case Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code so provides. Its language
MATIC respondents. is categorical; its meaning is free from doubt. This is one of those statutory Provisions that
leaves no room for interpretation. All that is required is application. What the law ordains
Rodolfo M. Acob for petitioner. must then be followed. It is as simple as that. It did not appear to be so to respondent Judge.
He would go ahead. He therefore did invite a suit of this character bent as he was on treading
Dakila F. Castro & Associates for respondents. grounds where his presence was, to put it at its mildest, unwelcome. He must be rescued. 12 It
was likewise noted in the Jalandoni decision that there has been as yet no previous case where
a municipal court "has been sustained in its determination to go ahead and try on the merits a
prosecution for libel ..." 13
FERNANDO, J.:
2. It is the contention of respondents that the alleged libel, having arisen from a radio
It is the assumption of jurisdiction over a criminal case for libel by respondent Municipal broadcast, is triable by a municipal court, for in a later portion of Article 360 the phrase 'by
Judge Vicente Estanislao 1 of Balanga, Bataan, that is assailed in this certiorari and similar mean is not repeated thus leading them to conclude that it is Only where there is
prohibition proceeding. The merit of the petition is apparent if there be deference, as should "defamation in writing' that there is conferment of exclusive jurisdiction in a court of first
be the case, to the ruling in Jalandoni v. Endaya. 2 There was, according to the petition, a instance. Such an argument does not carry weight. It loses sight of the basic Purpose of the

57
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
act, namely, to prevent inconvenience or even harassment to those unfortunate enough to be
accused of libel, if any municipal court where there was publication could be chosen by the
complainant as the venue. Since a radio broadcast may be spread far and wide, much more so
than in cases of newspaper publications, it is not difficult to imagine how deplorable the
effect would be for one indicted for such an offense even if he could rely on a sound and
valid offense. This is contrary to the legal tradition of the Philippines dating back to the
landmark case of United States v. Bustos, 14 where Justice Malcolm emphasized that to
prevent dilution of the constitutional right to free speech and free press, every libel
prosecution should be tested on the rigorous and exacting standard of whether or not it could
be violative of such fundamental guarantee. It is a commitment, to such a final postulate that
is the basis of Article 360 as amended. Its purpose is therefore crystal-clear. As noted
in Sarcos v. Castillo 15 It is fundamental that once the policy or purpose of the law has been
ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. From Ty Sue v. Hord decided in
1909, it has been our constant holding that the choice between conflicting theories falls on
that which best accords with the letter of the law and with its purpose. The next year, in an
equally leading decision, United States v. Toribio, there was a caveat against a construction
that would tend 'to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator.' Then came the admonition
in Rivera v. Palmaroli against an application so narrow 'as to defeat the manifest purpose of
the legislator.' This was repeated in the latest case, Commissioner of Customs v. Caltex, in
against identical language. 16 Such an excerpt was quoted with approval in Automotive Parts
and Equipment Company v. Lingad. 17 It is of the essence of judicial duty then to construe
statutes to reflect fidelity to such a concept. In the apt language of Frankfurter: "A decent
respect for the policy of Congress must save us from imputing to it a self-defeating, if not
disingenuous purpose. 18 Certainly, we must reject a construction that at best amounts to a
manifestation of verbal ingenuity but is certainly at war with the policy enshrined in the law.
3. The further point was raised by respondents that under Republic Act No. 3828, concurrent
jurisdiction was conferred on municipal judges in the capitals of provinces with a court of
first instance, in which the penalty provided for by law does not exceed prision
correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or a fine of P6,000.00 or both, such
fine or imprisonment being the penalty for libel by means of radio broadcast as provided
under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. For then that would mean that there was an
implied repeal of the earlier amendatory act, Republic Act No. 1289 vesting exclusive
jurisdiction on courts of first instance. Such a point was raised and rejected in the Jalandoni
opinion in these words: "It suffices by way of refutation to call attention to the doctrine on
repeals by implication as set forth in the latest case of Villegas v. Subido. Thus: 'It has been
the constant holding of this court that repeals by implication are not favored and will not be
so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended. Such a doctrine goes as far
back as United States v. Reyes, a 1908 decision. It is necessary then before such a repeal is
58
deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same
subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. There must be a showing of
repugnancy clear and convincing in character. The language used in the latter statute must be
such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that
falls short of that standard does not suffice. What is needed is a manifest indication of the
legislative purpose to repeal An even more relevant excerpt from Villegas also follows: 'More
specifically, a subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms and application, is not to
be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do
so is manifest. This is so even if the provisions of the latter are sufficiently comprehensive to
include what was set forth in the special act. This principle has likewise been consistently
applied in decisions of this Court from Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty, decided as far back
as 1919." 19 That would seem to take care in a neat and conclusive manner, of this last but
futile effort to uphold what was done by respondent Judge.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the challenged orders of January 15,
1968 as well as of January 27, 1969 are nullified and set aside on the ground that the
exclusive jurisdiction of libel cases belongs to a court of first instance. The writ of prohibition
prayed for is likewise granted and the restraining order issued by this Court is made
permanent, except for the purpose of dismissing the case for lack of
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-28463 May 31, 1971
REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, respondents.
Agrava & Agrava for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de
Castro and Solicitor Santiago M. Kapunan for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
It is a novel question that this petition for the review of a decision of respondent Court of Tax
Appeals presents. Petitioner Republic Flour Mills, Inc. would have this Court construe the
words "products of the Philippines" found in Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code 1 as
excluding bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) on the ground that, coming as they do from wheat
grain which is imported in the Philippines, they are merely waste and not the products, which
is the flour produced.2 That way, it would not be liable at all for the wharfage dues assessed
under such section by respondent Commission of Customs. It elevated the matter to
respondent Court, as the construction it would place on the aforesaid section appears too
strained and far remote from the ordinary meaning of the text, not to mention the policy of
the Act. We affirm.
In the decision of respondent Court now sought to be reviewed, after stating that what was
before it was an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Customs holding petitioner
liable for the sum of P7,948.00 as wharfage due the facts were set forth as follows:
"Petitioner, Republic Flour Mills, Inc., is a domestic corporation, primarily engaged in the
manufacture of wheat flour, and produces pollard (darak) and bran (ipa) in the process of
milling. During the period from December, 1963 to July, 1964, inclusive, petitioner exported
Pollard and/or bran which was loaded from lighters alongside vessels engaged in foreign
trade while anchored near the breakwater The respondent assessed the petitioner by way of
wharfage dues on the said exportations in the sum of P7,948.00, which assessment was paid
by petitioner under protest."3 The only issue, in the opinion of respondent Court, is whether or
not such collection of wharfage dues was in accordance with law. The main contention before
respondent Court of petitioner was "that inasmuch as no government or private wharves or
government facilities [were] utilized in exporting the pollard and/or bran, the collection of
wharfage dues is contrary to law."4 On the other hand, the stand of respondent Commissioner
of Customs was that petitioner was liable for wharfage dues "upon receipt or discharge of the
exported goods by a vessel engaged in foreign trade regardless of the non-use of government-
owned or private wharves."5 Respondent Court of Tax Appeals sustained the action taken by
the Commissioner of Customs under the appropriate provision of the Tariff and Customs
Code, relying on our decision in Procter & Gamble Phil. Manufacturing Corp. v.
Commissioner of Customs.6 It did not feel called upon to answer the question now before us
as, in its opinion, petitioner only called its attention to it for the first time in its memorandum.
Hence, this petition for review. The sole error assigned by petitioner is that it should not,
under its construction of the Act, be liable for wharfage dues on its exportation of bran and
pollard as they are not "products of the Philippines", coming as they did from wheat grain
which were imported from abroad, and being "merely parts of the wheat grain milled by
Petitioner to produce flour which had become waste."7 We find, to repeat, such contention
unpersuasive and affirm the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals.
59
1. The language of Section 2802 appears to be quite explicit: "There shall be levied, collected
and paid on all articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of the
Philippines ... exported from the Philippines, a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a
fee for wharfage ...." One category refers to what is imported. The other mentions products of
the Philippines that are exported. Even without undue scrutiny, it does appear quite obvious
that as long as the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above
section. Petitioner appeared to have entertained such a nation. In its petition for review before
respondent Court, it categorically asserted: "Petitioner is primarily engaged in the
manufacture of flour from wheat grain. In the process of milling the wheat grain into flour,
petitioner also produces 'bran' and 'pollard' which it exports abroad." 8 It does take a certain
amount of hair-splitting to exclude from its operation what petitioner calls "waste" resulting
from the production of flour processed from the wheat grain in petitioner's flour mills in the
Philippines. It is always timely to remember that, as stressed by Justice Moreland: "The first
and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them."9 Petitioner ought to have been aware that deference to such a
doctrine precludes an affirmative response to its contention. The law is clear; it must be
obeyed. It is as simple, as that. 10
2. There is need of confining familiar language of a statute to its usual signification. While
statutory construction involves the exercise of choice, the temptation to roam at will and rely
on one's predilections as to what policy should prevail is to be resisted. The search must be
for a reasonable interpretation. It is best to keep in mind the reminder from Holmes that
"there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what obviously
means." 11 To paraphrase Frankfurter, interpolation must be eschewed but evisceration
avoided. Certainly, the utmost effort should be exerted lest the interpretation arrived at does
violence to the statutory language in its total context. It would be then to ignore what has
been stressed time and time again as to limits of judicial freedom in the construction of
statutes to accept their view advanced by petitioner.
3. Then, again, there is the fundamental postulate in statutory construction requiring fidelity
to the legislative purpose. What Congress intended is not to be frustrates. Its objective must
be carried out. Even if there be doubt as to the meaning of the language employed, the
interpretation should not be at war with the end sought to be attained. No undue reflection is
needed to show that if through an ingenious argument, the scope of a statute may be
contracted, the probability that other exceptions may be thought of is not remote. If petitioner
were to prevail, subsequent pleas motivated by the same desire to be excluded from the
operation of the Tariff and Customs Code would likewise be entitled to sympathetic
consideration. It is desirable then that the gates to such efforts at undue restriction of the
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
coverage of the Act be kept closed. Otherwise, the end result would be not respect for, but
defiance of, a clear legislative mandate. That kind of approach in statutory construction has
never recommended itself. It does not now. 12
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 27, 1967 is
affirmed. With costs against petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur.
Castro, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
G.R. No. L-14859             March 31, 1962
MACARIO KING, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
PEDRO S. HERNAEZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents-appellants.
Sycip, Salazar and Associates for petitioners-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellants.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On January 1, 1957, Macario King, a naturalized Filipino citizen, became the owner of the
business establishment known as "Import Meat and Produce", a grocery wholesale and retail
business, previously owned by the Philippine Cold Stores, Inc. In the business 15 persons
were employed 12 of whom are Filipinos and the other 3 Chinese. The three Chinese were
old employees of the previous owner, the Philippine Cold Stores, Inc., one having been
employed as purchaser and the other two as salesmen.
Three weeks after King had acquired the business as aforesaid, he sought permission from the
President of the Philippines to retain the services of the three Chinese employees pursuant to
Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act 108, coursing his letter thru the Secretary of Commerce
and Industry. This official recommended to the President the disapproval of King's request on
the ground that aliens may not be appointed to operate or administer a retail business under
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1180 which requires that its capital be wholly owned by
citizens of the Philippines, the only exception thereto being the employment of technical
personnel which may be allowed after securing to that effect an authorization from the
President. The President approved the recommendation of the Secretary of Commerce and
60
Industry since the positions of purchaser and salesmen occupied by the three Chinese
employees are not technical positions within the meaning of Section 2-A of Commonwealth
Act 108, as amended by Republic Act No. 134.
As a result of such adverse ruling, Macario King and his three Chinese employees filed a
petition for declaratory relief, injunction and mandamus on August 25, 1958 against the
Secretary of Commerce and Industry and the Executive Secretary before the Court of First
Instance of Manila praying that they be given relief because they are "uncertain and in doubt
as to their rights and duties under Republic Act No. 1180 and Commonwealth Act No. 108,
as amended by Republic Act No. 134, in view of the aforesaid rulings of the Department of
Commerce and Industry and of the Executive Secretary." They alleged that said rulings are
illegal in view of the respective situations and positions of petitioners in the retail
establishment, the purpose and language of the laws abovementioned, and the constitutional
guarantee of the rights of an employer to employ and of an employee to work accorded to
citizens and aliens alike. The lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction ex parte
upon petitioners' filing a bond in the amount of P5,000.00.1äwphï1.ñët
Respondents filed an answer setting up certain affirmative and special defenses tending to
show that the petition does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. With
regard to the declaratory relief, respondents claim that such remedy is not available to
petitioners because they have already committed a breach of the statute which is apparent on
the face of the petition, meaning that the employment of the three Chinese as salesmen and
purchaser in the store of Macario King is a violation of the Section 1 of the Retail Trade Act
which provides that only citizens of the Philippines can engage in retail trade, as well as of
Section 2-A of the Anti-Dummy Law which prohibits Chinese citizens to intervene in the
management, operation, administration or control of such business, whether as an officer,
employee or laborer with or without remuneration. Respondents further claim that the three
Chinese employees are not technical men who are exempted from the operation of the law,
and even if they are, they need the authorization of the President which they failed to obtain
in their case.
With regard to the petition for preliminary injunction, respondents contend that the requisites
for its issuance have not been satisfied. And with regard to the petition for mandamus,
respondents alleged that petitioners have failed to show that respondents have unlawfully
neglected any duty which they are called upon to perform and which would make them liable
for such relief. Hence, respondents prayed that the petition be dismissed and that the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the court ex parte be lifted.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
To this answer, petitioners filed a reply, which was followed by a rejoinder and sur-rejoinder,
with a detailed discussion of the arguments advanced in support thereof. And because the
motion to dismiss filed by respondents had been denied for lack of merit, trial proceeded,
after which the lower court entered judgment holding "that petitioner Macario King may
employ any person, although not a citizen of the Philippines or of the United States of
America, including the three petitioners herein as purchaser and salesmen, in any position in
his retail business not involving participation, or intervention in the management, operation,
administration or control of said business; that petitioners Lim Pin, Chang Pak and Ng See
Keng are entitled to continue as purchaser and salesmen, respectively, in Macario King's
Import Meat and Produce or in any other retail establishment; that the writ of preliminary
injunction issued against respondents ordering the to desist from interfering by criminal
and/or administrative action with the rights of the petitioners as above defined, is hereby
declared final; and, finally, respondents are hereby ordered to allow and permit petitioners to
enjoy and exercise their rights in the manner and to the extent aforestated." Respondents took
the present appeal before this Court.
The center of controversy between petitioners-appellees and respondents-appellants hinges on
the interpretation be given to Section 1, Republic Act No. 1180, in relation to Section 2-A,
Commonwealth Act 108, as amended by Republic Act No. 134. For ready reference we quote
the pertinent provisions: .
SECTION 1. No person who is not a citizen of the Philippines, and no association,
partnership, or corporation the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, shall engage directly or indirectly in the retail business: ... (Emphasis
supplied) .
SEC. 2-A. Any person, corporation, or association which, having in its name or under
its control, a right, franchise, privilege, property or business, the exercise or
enjoyment of which is expressly reserved by the Constitution or the laws to citizens
of the Philippines, or of any other specific country, or to corporations or associations
at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, permits or
allows the use, exploitation or enjoyment thereof by a person, corporation or
association not possessing the requisites prescribed by the Constitution or the laws of
the Philippines; or leases, or in any other way transfers or conveys said right,
franchise, privilege, property or business to a person, corporation or association not
otherwise qualified under the Constitution, or the provisions of the existing laws; or
in any manner permits or allows any person, not possessing the qualifications
required by the Constitution or existing laws to acquire, use, exploit or enjoy a right,
franchise, privilege, property or business, the exercise and enjoyment of which are
61
expressly reserved by the Constitution or existing laws to citizens of the Philippines
or of any other specific country, to intervene in the management, operation,
administration or control thereof, whether as an officer, employee or laborer therein,
with or without remuneration except technical personnel whose employment may be
specifically authorized by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of
the Department Head concerned.... (emphasis supplied) .
With regard to the Retail Trade Law, this Court had already occasion to rule on its
constitutionality. We held that the same is valid and that its purpose is to completely
nationalize the retail trade in the Philippines. In other words, its primordial purpose is to
confine the privilege to engage in retail trade to Filipino citizens by prohibiting any person
who is not a Filipino citizen or any entity whose capital is not wholly owned by citizens of
the Philippines from engaging, directly or indirectly, in the retail business. The
nationalization of retail trade is, therefore, complete in the sense that it must be wholly owned
by a Filipino citizen or Filipino controlled entity in order that it may be licensed to operate.
The law seeks a complete ban to aliens who may not engage in it directly or indirectly. And
the reasons behind such ban are the pernicious and intolerable practices of alien retailers who
in the past have either individually or in organized groups contrived in many dubious ways to
control the trade and dominate the distribution of goods vital to the life of our people thereby
resulting not only in the increasing dominance of alien control in retail trade but at times in
the strangle hold on our economic life. These reasons were well expressed by Mr. Justice
Labrador in the following wise: .
"But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to
lie in the predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance
may truly endanger the national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and
action and thorough organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such
complete unison and concert on such vital matters as the fixing of prices, the
determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in the market,
and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or
distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete
subservience of national retailers and of the producers and consumers alike, can be
placed completely at their mercy...
"... Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a
fact within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook or
ignore in the interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the
part of the public that alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by a
pernicious and intolerable practices, the mention of a few of which would suffice for
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
our purposes; that at some time or other they have cornered the market of essential
commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to justify and enhance
profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to the
inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the
Government has had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the
public from their continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have
violated price control laws, especially on foods and essential commodities, such that
the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their
immediate and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they have
secret combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the
law of supply and demand; that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and
traders who would not cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint of
freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded tax
laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated import and export
prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and contempt of lawful authority.
It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous
bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government.
As a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the
Government and by their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action which
impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the above
practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may
come in the future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big
centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of
war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of
harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized
and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the
communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the
State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the
national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country,
the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State. (Lao H. Ichong v.
Hernandez, et al., G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957).
The purpose of the enactment of the Retail Trade Law, therefore, is clear. As expressed by
this Court, it is to translate the general preoccupation of the Filipinos against the threat and
danger to our national economy caused by alien dominance and control of the retail business
by weeding out such threat and danger and thus prevent aliens from having a strangle hold
62
upon our economic life. But in so doing the legislature did not intend to deprive aliens of
their means of livelihood. This is clearly pointed out in the explanatory note of the law: .
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons
who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our
economic life. If the persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are
those who owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our
free institutions and who have no permanent state in our people's welfare, we are not
really the masters of our own country. All aspects of our life, even our national
security, will be at the mercy of other people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive
persons who are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While
this bill seeks to take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the
Philippines a power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life
and endanger our national security, it respects existing rights.
It is in the light of this view of the Retail Trade Law that the issue was posed whether the
prohibition to aliens from engaging in such trade is intended merely to ban them from its
ownership and not from its management control or operation. However, from the context of
the law as well as from the decision of this Court in the Ichong case, it may be safely inferred
that the nationalization of the retail trade is merely confined to its ownership and not its
management, control, or operation. Nevertheless, this apparent flaw in the Retail Trade Law
cannot be availed of by an unscrupulous alien as a convenient pretext to employ in the
management of his business persons of his ilk to flout the law or subvert its nationalistic
purpose, for in pari materia with such law we have the Anti-Dummy Law (Commonwealth
Act No. 108, as amended by Republic Act No. 134), which seeks "to punish acts of evasion
of the laws of nationalization of certain rights, franchises or privileges." Read in connection
with the Retail Trade Law, the Anti-Dummy Law would punish acts intended to circumvent
the provisions of the former law which nationalize the retail business.
The question that now arises is: Is the employment of aliens in non-control positions in a
retail establishment or trade prohibited by the Anti-Dummy Law?
Petitioners contend that their employment is not prohibited either by the Retail Trade Law or
the Anti-Dummy Law. The three Chinese petitioners testified that they had nothing to do with
the management and control of the business, nor do they participate in its profits outside of
their monthly salaries. They had been employed long before the enactment of Republic Act
No. 1180. They only wait for customers and sell according to the prices appearing on the tags
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
previously fixed by their manager Macario King. They desire to continue in the employ of
Macario King in his business and their job is their only means of earning support for
themselves and their families. Lim Pin who is employed as buyer declared that his duties
include no more than buying the groceries appearing in a list prepared and given to him from
time to time by Macario King, and at no more than the prices indicated in said list.
Respondents did not present any evidence to contradict these facts, as they merely relied their
motion to dismiss.
It is evident that petitioners' theory is that since they do not intervene in the management,
operation, administration or control of the retail establishment of Macario King they are not
covered by the Anti-Dummy Law. Indeed, they contend, Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1180
mirrors the legislative intent to nationalize the retail trade merely thru the ownership by
Filipinos of the business, and as stated by this Court in the Ichong case, the ownership of the
retail business by non-citizens lies at the foundation of the prohibition, and since there is
nothing in the Retail Trade Law which prohibits a Filipino-owned retail enterprise from
employing an alien and the dummy law merely limits the prohibition to any position that
relates to management, operation, administration or control, petitioners contend that they may
be allowed to continue in their positions without doing violence to both the Retail Trade Law
and the Anti-Dummy Law. In other words, they draw a line of distinction between one class
of alien employees occupying positions of control and another class occupying non-control
positions.
Respondents, on the other hand, sustain a different view. They hold that the language of the
Anti-Dummy Law bans aliens' employment in both control and non-control positions. They
contend that the words management, operation, administration and control, followed by and
blended with the words "whether as an officer, employee or laborer therein", signify the
legislative intent to cover the entire scale of personnel activity so that even laborers are
excluded from employment, the only exemption being technical personnel whose
employment may be allowed with the previous authorization of the President. This
contention, according to respondents, results from the application of the rule known in
statutory construction as redendo singula singulis. This means that the antecedents
"management, operation, administration and control" and the consequents "officer, employee,
and laborer" should be read distributively to the effect that each word is to be applied to the
subject to which it appears by context most properly relate and to which it is most applicable
(Vol. 2, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Section 4819).
We agree to this contention of respondents not only because the context of the law seems to
be clear on what its extent and scope seem to prohibit but also because the same is in full
accord with the main objective that permeates both the Retail Trade Law and the Anti-
63
Dummy Law. The one advocates the complete nationalization of the retail trade by denying
its ownership to any alien, while the other limits its management, operation, administration
and control to Filipino citizens. The prevailing idea is to secure both ownership and
management of the retail business in Filipino hands. It prohibits a person not a Filipino from
engaging in retail trade directly or indirectly while it limits the management, operation,
administration and control to Filipino citizens. These words may be technically synonymous
in the sense that they all refer to the exercise of a directing, restraining or governing influence
over an affair or business to which they relate, but it cannot be denied that by reading them in
connection with the positions therein enumerated one cannot draw any other conclusion than
that they cover the entire range of employment regardless of whether they involve control or
non-control activities. When the law says that you cannot employ an alien in any position
pertaining to management, operation, administration and control, "whether as an officer,
employee, or laborer therein", it only means one thing: the employment of a person who is
not a Filipino citizen even in a minor or clerical or non-control position is prohibited. The
reason is obvious: to plug any loophole or close any avenue that an unscrupulous alien may
resort to flout the law or defeat its purpose, for no one can deny that while one may be
employed in a non-control position who apparently is harmless he may later turn out to be a
mere tool to further the evil designs of the employer. It is imperative that the law be
interpreted in a manner that would stave off any attempt at circumvention of this legislative
purpose.
In this respect, we agree with the following remark of the Solicitor General: "Summing up,
there is no point in distinguishing employments in positions of control from employments in
non-control positions except to facilitate violations of the Anti-Dummy Law. It does not
require ingenuity to realize that the law is framed up the way we find it so that no difficulties
will be encountered in its enforcement. This is not the first time to use the words of the
United States Supreme Court ... that a government wants to know, without being put to a
search, that what it forbids is carried out effectively." .
There is an intimation in the decision of the trial court that if the employment of aliens in
non-control positions is prohibited as respondents so advocate, it may impair the right of a
citizen under our Constitution to select, pick and employ any one who in his opinion may be
amenable to his business provided he is not a criminal, a communist, or affected by a
contagious disease, in the same manner as one may not be deprived of his right to associate
with people of his own choice because those are rights that are guaranteed by our
Constitution. The language of the trial court on this matter follows: .
There is no question that a Filipino citizen has a right under the Constitution and the
laws of this Republic to engage in any lawful business, to select, pick and employ
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
anyone who in his opinion may be amenable, congenial, friendly, understanding and
profitable to his business provided that they are not originals, say communists, or
affected by some contagious disease or morally unfit. The right to associate with our
friends or people of our choice cannot be seriously contested in a democratic form of
government. This is one of the most cherished privileges of a citizen. Nullify it and it
will produce a communist control of action in our free movement and intercourse
with our fellow citizens as now prevails in Russia and other Soviet satellites History
has amply demonstrated that in countries where personal liberties are limited,
curtailed or hampered, communism thrives; while in the lands where personal
liberties are protected, democracy lives. We need but look at the horizon and see
terrible and sinister shadows of some catastrophic events threatening to annihilate all
our hopes and love for liberty if we are to traffic with our rights as citizens like any
other ordinary commodities. It is our sacred and bounden duty to protect individual
rights so that by their benign influence real democracy may be nurtured to full
maturity.
xxx     xxx     xxx
There is no need of any lengthy discussion as to the rights of a Filipino citizen to
employ any person in his business provided the latter is not a criminal, affected with
some contagious disease, or a recognized human derelict. The right to employ is the
same as the right to associate. The right to associate is admittedly one of the most
sacred privileges of a Filipino citizen. If a Filipino citizen has the right to employ any
person in his business, has a naturalized citizen the same rights? We hold and sustain
that under the Constitution and laws of this country, there is no difference between a
natural-born citizen and a naturalized citizen, with the possible exception, as
provided by the Constitution, that while the former can be President, Vice-President
or member of Congress, the latter cannot. But outside of these exceptions, they have
the same rights and privileges.
It is hard to see how the nationalization of employment in the Philippines can run counter to
any provision of our Constitution considering that its aim is not exactly to deprive citizen of a
right that he may exercise under it but rather to promote enhance and protect those that are
expressly accorded to a citizen such as the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. The
nationalization of an economic measure when founded on grounds of public policy cannot be
branded as unjust, arbitrary or oppressive or contrary to the Constitution because its aim is
merely to further the material progress and welfare of the citizens of a country. This is what
we expressed in no uncertain terms in the Ichong Case when we declared constitutional the
nationalization of the retail trade. Indeed, we said there that it is a law "clearly in the interest
64
of the public, nay of the national security itself, and indisputability falls within the scope
police power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the
supreme welfare of its citizens." True, this fundamental policy was expressed in a decision
the subject of which concerns the constitutionality of the Retail Trade Act, but since the Anti-
Dummy Law is but a mere complement of the former in the sense that it is designed to make
effective its aims and purposes and both tend to accomplish the same objective either by
excluding aliens from owning any retail trade or by banning their employment if the trade is
owned by Filipinos, and the target of both is "the removal and eradication of the shackles of
foreign economic control and domination" thru the nationalization of the retail trade both in
ownership and employment, the pronouncement made in one regarding its constitutionality
applies equally if not with greater reason to the other both being complementary one to the
other. Indeed, in nationalizing employment in retail trade the right of choice of an employer is
not impaired but its sphere is merely limited to the citizens to the exclusion of those of other
nationalities.
We note that the case cited by the trial court to substantiate its conclusion that freedom to
employ is guaranteed by our Constitution is Meyer v. Nebraska, 67 Law Ed. 1042, which is
also the same case relied upon by petitioners in support of their proposition that "the liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to engage in any of the common
occupations of life". We also note that this is the same case cited by counsel for Lao Itchong
to support the same proposition in his advocacy of the unconstitutionality of the
nationalization of the Retail Trade Law which did not deserve favorable consideration by this
Court in the Itchong case. To refute counsel's argument that the retail trade is a common
occupation the pursuit of which cannot be impaired and consequently the right to employ
therein is guaranteed by our Constitution, suffice it to state that we brushed aside such theory
in the Itchong case in view of the monopolistic control exercised by aliens in the retail
business and their "deadly strangle hold on the national economy endangering the national
security in times of crisis and emergency". The circumstances surrounding the enforcement of
the Retail Trade Law being the very foundation of the Anti-Dummy Law the same
circumstances that justify the rejection of counsel's proposition in the Itchong case should
also apply with regard to the application of the Meyer case in the consideration of the
constitutionality of the Anti-Dummy Law.
The thinking of the lower court that the nationalization of employment in retail trade
produces communistic control or impairs a right guaranteed by the Constitution to a citizen
seems to have as basis its pronouncement that "the right to employ is the same as the right to
associate". This promise has no foundation in law for it confuses the right of employment
with the right of association embodied in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. Section 1,
paragraph 6, of said Bill of Rights, provides that "the right to form associations or societies
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3

for purposes not contrary to law, shall not be abridged", and this has as its main purpose "to relief. It cannot, therefore, be said that King has already breached the law when he filed the
encourage the formation of voluntary associations so that thru the cooperative activities of present action..
individuals the welfare of the nation may be advanced." 1 Petitioners have never been denied
the right to form voluntary associations. In fact, they can so organize to engage in any WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. This preliminary injunction issued by
business venture of their own choosing provided that they comply with the limitations the trial court on December 6, 1958 is hereby lifted. The petition for mandamus is dismissed,
prescribed by our regulatory laws. These laws cannot be assailed as abridging our with costs against appellees.
Constitution because they were adopted in the exercise of the police power of the State (Lao
Itchong case, supra). Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and De Leon,
JJ., concur.
Against the charge that this nationalization movement initiated by Congress in connection
with several measures that affect the economic life of our people places the Philippines in a G.R. No. L-1925            September 16, 1948
unique position in the free world, we have only to cite the cases of Commonwealth v.
Hans, 81 N.E. 149, and Bloomfield v. State, 99 N.E. 309, which this Court considered as FLAVIANO MEJIA, TEOFILO P. GUADIZ, RUPERTO Z. TANDOC and
basic authorities for nationalization of legislative measures in the Lao Ichong case. Similar POLICRONIO DE VENECIA, petitioners,
laws had been declared constitutional by the Supreme Court of California and the United vs.
States Supreme Court in a series of cases involving contracts under the Alien Land Law, and PEDRO U. BALOLONG, RICARDO VILLAMIL, TORIBIO QUIMOSING and
because of the similarities of the facts and laws involved therein we can consider the CRISOLOGO ZARATE, respondents.
decisions rendered in said cases of persuasive force and effect in the determination of the
present case.2 Ramon Diokno and Alejo Mabanag for petitioners.
Alipio F. Fernandez, Jacinto Callanta and Jose Fenoy for respondents.
We wish to add one word with regard to the procedural aspect raised in respondents' brief. It
is respondents' theory that a complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after a FERIA, J.:
contract or statute has been breached. The law does not even require that there shall be an
actual pending case. It is sufficient that there is a breach of the law, or an actionable violation,
This is an action of quo warranto instituted by the petitioners, Flaviano Mejia, Teofilo P.
to bar a complaint for declaratory judgment (Vol. 2, Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Guadiz, Ruperto Z. Tandoc and Policronio de Venecia against the respondents, Pedro U.
1957 Ed., 145). The pertinent provisions of the Anti-Dummy Law postulate that aliens cannot
Balolong, Ricardo Villamil, Toribio Quimosing and Crisologo Zarate on the ground that the
be employed by Filipino retailers except for technical positions with previous authority of the
appointments of the latter by the President as councilors of the City of Dagupan were null and
President, and it is contended that Macario King had in his employ his Chinese co-petitioners
void, and therefore they are unlawfully holding their offices, and that the former are entitled
for a period of more than 2 years in violation of Section 2-A of Republic Act No. 134. Hence,
to said offices because they were elected as such in the general election for provincial,
respondents contend, due to their breach of the law petitioners have forfeited their right to file
municipal, and city officials on November, 1947.
the present action for declaratory relief.
The petitioners in this case presented their certificates of candidacy for councilors of the City
It appears, however, that alien petitioners were already in the employ of the establishment
of Dagupan and were elected as such on the general election for provincial and municipal
known as "Import Meat and Produce" previously owned by the Philippine Cold Stores, Inc.
officials held on November 11, 1947, in conformity with the provision of the Election Code.
when Macario King acquired the ownership of said establishment and because of the doubt he
The four respondents have also presented their certificates of candidacy for councilors of
entertained as regards the scope of the prohibition of the law King wrote the President of the
Dagupan and were defeated; but the President of the Philippines on December 30, 1947,
Philippines to request permission to continue said petitioners in his employment, and
appointed the respondents as councilors of the City of Dagupan, in lieu of the petitioners
immediately after the request was denied, he instituted the present petition for declaratory
elected as such in said general election.

65
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
Under sections 7 and 11 of Act No. 170, the Mayor of the City of Dagupan shall be appointed
by the President of the Philippines, and the municipal or city councilors thereof shall be
elected during every general election for provincial, municipal officers in accordance with the
Election Code. Section 7 of the Revised Election Code prescribes that on the second Tuesday
of November, 1947, and on the same date every four years thereafter a regular election shall
be held to elect the officials who will occupy all elective provincial, city and municipal
offices throughout the Philippines. And, according to section 88 of the same Act No. 170,
"the city government provided for in this charter shall be organized on such a date as may be
fixed by the President of the Philippines and upon the qualification of the City Mayor and the
appointment or election of the members of the Municipal Board. Pending the next general
election for provincial and municipal officials, the offices of the members of the Municipal
Board shall be filled by appointment of the President of the Philippines, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments.
The validity of the appointment of the respondents as councilors of the City of Dagupan by
the President of the Philippines depends upon whether the City of Dagupan was created and
came into existence on June 20, 1947, the date Act No. 170 became effective, or on January
1, 1948, when the city government was organized by Executive Order No. 96. If the first, it is
obvious that the "next general election" referred to in section 11 in connection with section
88, of Act No. 170 above quoted, when the members of the Municipal Council of the City of
Dagupan were to be elected, was that held on November 11, 1947, and the President had no
power to appoint the herein respondents. Because the offices of the members of the
Municipal Board of the City of Dagupan could be filled by appointment of the President, with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments, only if the date for the organization of the
city government were fixed pending or before the next general election for provincial and
municipal officials according to the above quoted provisions of section 88 of Act No. 170.
After said general election they shall be filled by the persons elected as such.
Section 2 of Act No. 170, which became effective upon its approval on June 20, 1947,
provides that:
Sec. 2 Territory of Dagupan City. — The City of Dagupan, which is hereby created,
shall comprise the present territorial jurisdiction of the municipality of Dagupan, in
the Province of Pangasinan.
The President of the Philippines may, by executive order, increase the territory of the
City of Dagupan by adding thereto such contiguous barrios or municipalities as may
be necessary and desirable in the public interest. (Emphasis ours.).
66
It is evident that the City of Dagupan created by said Act came into existence as a legal entity
or a public corporation upon the approval of Act No. 170, on June 20, 1947; because a statute
which, like Act No. 170, is to take effect upon its approval, is operative from the exact
instance upon its approval or becoming a law. The fact that by Executive Order No. 96
promulgated in October 1947, the President of the Philippines added the municipality of
Calasiao "to the City of Dagupan" as expressly stated in said Executive Order, is a
recognition that the city was already created and in existence then, because the President is
only authorized to increase the territory of the City and not of the Municipality of Dagupan.
But as a city is a public corporation or a judicial entity, and as such can not operate or transact
business by itself but through its agents or officers, it was necessary that the government of
the city be organized, that is, that the officials thereof be appointed or elected in order that it
may act or transact business as such public corporation or city.
The date of the organization of the city government of Dagupan which the President is
authorized to fix by the provisions of section 88, is not and can not be the date of the creation
of the city, not only because, as we have stated, the City of Dagupan came into existence on
the same date June 20 in which Act No. 170 creating the said city became effective, but
because what was to be organized, according to said section 88, is the city government, and
not the city as an entity, and the word "organize" means "to prepare [the city] for transaction
of business, as assembly, by choosing officers, committees, etc." (Funk and Wagnall College
Standard Dictionary.) It is obvious that to create a public corporation or city is one thing and
to organize the government thereof is another. A public corporation is created and comes into
existence from the moment the law or charter that creates it becomes effective, and in case of
a private corporation it comes into existence as a juridical entity from the time the articles of
incorporation thereof is registered in the proper bureau or office in accordance with law. But
a public as well as a private corporation cannot act or transact business before the governing
body thereof is organized or the officers who shall act for or in their representation have been
chosen either by appointment or election. The organization of the government of a city
presupposes necessarily the previous existence of the city at the time its government is
organized, because no officials of the city may be appointed or elected before the city has
come into existence.
Undoubtedly, the contention of the respondents that the next general election referred to in
sections 11 and 88, in which the members of the Municipal Board of the City of Dagupan
shall be elected, was not the one held on November 11, 1947, because the City of Dagupan
had not then been organized, but the next general election in 1951, is predicated upon the
erroneous assumption that January 1 of 1948 fixed by Executive Order No. 115 as the date
for the organization of the city government of Dagupan was the date of the creation of said
city or when it came into existence, and is apparently supported by the erroneous and
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
confusing wording of the said Executive Order No. 115 which uses the phrase "organization
of the City of Dagupan, instead of "organization of the city government of Dagupan" as
expressly provided in said section 88 of Act No. 170.
The territory of the City of Dagupan is fixed by section 2 of Act No. 170, as comprising the
territory of the old municipality of Dagupan. Although the President is authorized by the
same section to increase the territory of the city by adding to it such contiguous territory as he
may designate, the exercise of such authority by the President would not and could not affect
the existence of the city, nor the organization of its government. If a new territory is annexed
to the City of Dagupan in time before the election the inhabitants thereof may vote for the
councilors of the city. Otherwise or if the annexation takes place after the election, the
inhabitants of the territory so annexed shall come under the jurisdiction of the government of
said city, although they had not voted for the members of the council thereof. There is
nothing in the record to show that the inhabitants of the Municipality of Calasiao annexed in
October 1947 to the City of Dagupan had voted for the councilors of the city during the
general election in November 1947; but whether they had voted or not is immaterial for the
reasons above stated, and because said municipality was segregated from the City of Dagupan
by Executive Order No. 115 on December 1947, and the government of said city was
organized on January 1, 1948.
Since the election of the members of the Municipal Board of the City of Dagupan created on
June 20, 1947, was to take and took place at the general election held on November 11, 1947,
and the President of the Philippines was empowered by section 88 to appoint those members
only if the organization of the city government had taken place pending or before the said
election, it necessarily follows that the appointments of the respondents effected on
December 30, 1947, are null and void.
In view of all the foregoing, the four respondents shall be ousted and altogether excluded
from the position of councilor of the City of Dagupan which they are now unlawfully
holding, and that the four petitioners elected by popular vote during the general election on
November 11, 1947, be placed in possession of those offices. It is so ordered with costs
against the respondents.
Moran, C.J., Perfecto, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
67
PARAS, J., dissenting:
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 170 provides that "the City of Dagupan, which is hereby
created, shall comprise the present territorial jurisdiction of the municipality of Dagupan, in
the Province of Pangasinan," and that "the President of the Philippines may, by executive
order, increase the territory of the City of Dagupan by adding thereto such contiguous barrios
or municipalities as may be necessary and desirable in the public interest." Upon the other
hand, section 88 of the Act provides as follows: "The City government provided for in this
Chapter shall be organized on such a date as may be fixed by the President of the Philippines
and upon the qualification of the City Mayor and the appointment or election of the members
of the Municipal Board. Pending the next general election for provincial and municipal
officials, the offices of the members of the municipal board shall be filled by appointment of
the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
It is noteworthy that section 88 is entitled "Change of government" and falls under Article
XV in turn entitled "Transitory provisions." It may, therefore, be considered as the enabling
provisions of the Charter of the City of Dagupan. In other words, the municipality of
Dagupan was to assume its legal transformation into a city only on compliance with the
conditions set forth in section 88 of Republic Act No. 170. Which conditions were complied
with when the President of the Philippines in his Executive Order No. 96, later superseded by
Executive Order No. 115, fixed "the first of January, nineteen hundred and forty-eight, as the
date for the organization of the City of Dagupan and qualification of the City Mayor and
members of the Municipal Board appointed in accordance with section 88 of Republic Act
No. 170." Section 2, which merely delimits the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Dagupan,
should be construed in relation to section 88. If, as contended by the petitioners, the City of
Dagupan came into existence on June 20, 1947, when Act No. 170 was approved, section 88
should logically have been eliminated or should have provided, to suit petitioners' theory, that
"the City government shall be organized upon the qualification of the City Mayor and the
election of the members of the Municipal Board at the next general election." The lawmakers
well knew that a general election was to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1947.
And yet, in section 88, the President of the Philippines is empowered to fill by appointment
the offices of the members of the Municipal Board pending the next general election, and this
power was undoubtedly inserted to enable the City of Dagupan to have even an appointive
governing body between the date of the organization of the City government as fixed by the
President and the general election to be held after said date. In our opinion, therefore, the
government of the City of Dagupan must be deemed to have been formally organized —
which also completed the juridical existence of the City of Dagupan as a political division —
only on January 1, 1948, the date fixed in Executive Order No. 96 which was subsequently
superseded by Executive Order No. 115.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3

Even accepting petitioners' contention that the creation of the City of Dagupan on June 20,
1947 (when Act No. 170 was approved) is one thing, and the organization of its government
on January 1, 1948, by proper executive order is another thing, the fact remains that section
88 expressly empowers the President to fix the date of the organization of said city
government and to appoint the members of the municipal board pending the next general
election, which can only mean the election following the date fixed by the President. In view
of the specific provisions of section 88 of Act No. 170, section 10 of the Revised Election
Code which lays down the general rule as to the filling of elective offices in a new political
division, invoked by the petitioners, has no application.
of incorporation, with the result that even in the case of private corporations, the existence of
a governing body arises simultaneously with the act of registration.
Wherefore, it is my view that the respondents, who were appointed on December 30, 1947, in
accordance with section 88 of Act No. 170, have a legal right to sit and act as members of the
Municipal Board of the City of Dagupan until the next general elections. Whether or not this
result bespeaks good politics is a question addressed to the political department, and not to
the courts.

As the petitioners were elected in the general elections held on November 11, 1947, their
right to hold office pertained to the old municipality of Dagupan or its government, and
therefore did not subsist upon the organization of the government of the City of Dagupan on PABLO, M.:
January 1, 1948. As a matter of fact, although in Executive Order No. 96 the President
decreed that "upon the organization of the City of Dagupan, the municipality of Calasiao shall Concurro con esta disidencia.
be joined to, and made an integral part of, said City," the voters in Calasiao did not vote, in
the elections held on November 11, 1947, as electors of the City of Dagupan; the petitioners
neither campaigned nor obtained votes in Calasiao, and the electors of Dagupan voted for a
mayor and a vice-mayor, all of which conclusively show that for all legal purposes Dagupan,
which (under the theory of the petitioners) would have included Calasiao under said
Executive Order No. 96, was not yet considered as having become a City on November 11, RESOLUTION
1947.
January 25, 1949                        
The enabling provisions of section 88 find practical analogy in Act No. 3117 passed by the
Philippine Legislature in 1923 which provided, in section 1, that "the Province of Leyte is FERIA, J.:
hereby divided into two provinces completely independent from each other, which shall be
denominated Oriental Leyte and Occidental Leyte, respectively, and the Governor-General is The motion for reconsideration and the dissenting opinions are predicated on an erroneous
hereby authorized to designate by executive order the date on which the division herein premise or confusion of the creation or existence of a municipal corporation, be it called city
provided for is to take effect, which shall in no case be prior to the year nineteen hundred and or municipality, with the functioning thereof through the officers provided or designated by
twenty-four." For all we know, the Governor-General never issued such executive order. Will law to represent or act for said corporation.
any one now dare allege that two provinces in Leyte had in fact been created or organized by
the mere passage of Act No. 3117? In the case at bar, suppose the President did not issue If the coming into existence of a juridical entity, such as a city or municipality, and the
Executive Orders Nos. 96 and 115, may it be pretended that the City of Dagupan has ever organization of the government thereof and appointment or election of its officers are one and
become a complete political entity? the same thing, it would not have been necessary for section 2168 of the Administrative Code
to provide as a legal fiction that "Where provision is made for the creation or organization of
Comparison is made to a private corporation which, it is argued, becomes a juridical entity a new municipality, it shall come into existence as a separate corporate body upon the
from the time its articles of incorporation is registered. It should, however, be remembered qualification of the president, vice-president, and a majority of the councilors, unless some
that the Corporation Law requires the names of the directors who are to serve until their other time be fixed therefor by law." And the law could not fix some other time for its coming
successors are elected and qualified as provided in the by-laws, to be inserted in the articles

68
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
into existence, different from the organization of its government or appointment and
qualification of its officers.
That Congress has expressly fixed the date for the creation or coming into existence of the
City of Dagupan in the Republic Act No. 170, that is the date said Act became effective or
was approved on June 20, 1947, is evident. Because section 1 of said Act provides that "The
City of Dagupan which is hereby created shall comprise the present territorial jurisdiction of
Dagupan, Pangasinan," and according to section 90 of the same Act, shall take effect upon its
approval on June 20 of 1947. (Emphasis ours.) And because the President is not authorized to
create the City of Dagupan, but only to fix, by Proclamation, the organization of the
government of the City, and appoint the officers thereof, the Mayor and the members of the
city council, if the government of the City is organized before the next general elections for
provincial and municipal officials on November 1947, in which the councilors of the City
were to be elected, or appoint only the Mayor if the organization is made after the said
elections. The government of the city could not be organized and its officers appointed or
elected before the city had been created or come into existence, for it would be absurd to elect
or appoint the officers of a public or private corporation or any other entity which does not
yet exist.
A juridical institution or entity can not act as such, but it may exist, before the officers
provided by law to represent and act in its behalf or representation had been appointed or
elected. A court of justice or a municipal corporation law creating or establishing it becomes
in force or effective, but it can not act as such court or municipal corporation before the judge
to preside the former, or the municipal officers have been elected or appointed and have
qualified. So the City of Dagupan comprising the territory of the Municipality of Dagupan
came into existence from the date Act No. 170, which created it was approved and became
effective, although it could not act or function as such city before the government thereof had
been organized or the city officers had been elected or appointed and had qualified.
After Act No. 170 which created the City of Dagupan took effect, and before the organization
of the government of the City of Dagupan, the political subdivision which comprises the
territory of the Municipality of Dagupan has continued to act as a municipality, because the
government of the city had not yet been organized and the officers thereof appointed or
elected. The conversion of that municipality into a city by the above mentioned Act No. 170
did not make ipso facto the acts of the elected officers of the said municipality acts of the
City of Dagupan, because the latter can only act as a city through the city officers designated
by law after they have been appointed or elected and have qualified. In the meantime or
during the period of transition the Municipality of Dagupan had to act or function temporarily
as such; otherwise there would be chaos or no government at all within the boundaries of the
69
territory. The status of the Municipality of Dagupan may be likened to that of a public officer
who can not abandon his office although his successor has already been appointed, and has to
continue in office, whatever the length of time of the interregnum, until his successor
qualifies or takes possession of the office.
We can not take into consideration and discuss the contention in the motion for
reconsideration that during the last general election for municipal officers, there were also
candidates for the position of Mayor, Vice-Mayor or councilors of the Municipality of
Dagupan, because there were also no allegation to that effect in the verified pleading of the
parties, petition of the petitioners and answer of the respondents, evidencing such fact. It was
mentioned for the first time in the memorandum filed by the respondents. This court can not
predicate its conclusion on facts not alleged and admitted in the pleadings or proven during
the hearing of the case. But even assuming it to be true, the erroneous filing of such
certificates of candidacy can not change the law or vitiate the election of the petitioners as
councilors of the City of Dagupan. The only fact that appears in the petition and can be
considered as true because not denied but admitted in the answer, is that the petitioners have
presented their certificates of candidacy as candidates for the positions of councilors of the
City of Dagupan.
The case of the City of Dansalan is a very different from the case at bar. The City of Dagupan
was created directly by Act No. 170, which provides in its section 2 that the city is thereby
created, and therefore became a city from the date the said Act took effect or approved on
June 20, 1947. While Act No. 592 does not contain, expressly or impliedly, similar provision
as it only provides for the charter of the City of Dansalan, which would come into existence
only upon the organization of the government of the city of the appointment of the City
Mayor and the majority of the members of the city council by the President, because the law
creating it does not provide otherwise, that is, it does not fix the time of it its creation
different from that of the organization of its government or appointment and election of its
officers, as in the case at bar. Section 2168 of the Administrative Code, applicable by
analogy, provides that "Where provision is made for the creation or organization of a new
municipality, it shall come into existence as a separate corporate body upon the qualification
of the president, vice-president, and a majority of the councilors, unless some other time be
fixed therefore by law." (Emphasis ours.).
Having come to the conclusion that the City of Dagupan was created and came into existence
on June 20, 1947, it follows that the phrase "pending the next general elections for provincial
and municipal officials" in section 88 of Act No. 170, must be construed to refer to the
general election for provincial and municipal officials in November 1947, which was the next
one after the creation or coming into existence of the City of Dagupan on June 20, 1947, and
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3

not to any general election for provincial or municipal officials after the organization of the PARAS, J.:
government of the City of Dagupan by Presidential Proclamation, for the following reasons:
I dissent.
First, because section 11 of said Act No. 170 expressly provides that the "municipal
councilors of the City of Dagupan shall be elected during every general election for
provincial and municipal officials in accordance with the Election Code," and according to
section 7 of the Election Code, "When a new political division is created, the inhabitants of
which are entitled to participate in the elections, the elective officers thereof shall, unless PABLO, M.:
otherwise provided, be chosen at the next general election" (Emphasis ours). And there is
nothing in Act No. 170 which provides otherwise. On the contrary said Act follows the Concurro con esta desidencia.
general provision of section 7 of the Election Code, with the modification that the President is
authorized only to appoint the elective officers pending the election, and not to order a special
election of such officers, taking into consideration the short time intervening between the
creation of the City on June 20, and the election of its officers in November, 1947, and their
qualification on January 1, 1948.
OZAETA, J.:
Secondly, section 88 of Act No. 170, provides that the city government of Dagupan "shall be
organized on such a date as may be fixed by the President of the Philippines, and upon I vote to grant respondents' motion for reconsideration so that the court may re-examine its
qualification of the city mayor and the appointment or election of the members of the decision herein and rectify what I consider an erroneous construction of the statute involved.
municipal board." To hold that the next general elections to which the law refers are those to
be held after the date of the organization of the City Government, set by the President, would The case hinges on whether the city of Dagupan came into existence as a public corporation
make the alternative provision "or election of the members of the municipal board," nugatory or political entity upon the approval of its charter (Republic Act No. 170) on June 20, 1947,
or superfluous, because on the date set for the organization of the Government of the City of or upon the organization of the city government and the qualification of its officers on
Dagupan, there would never be members of the Municipal Board elected. January 1, 1948, as fixed by Executive Order No. 96 (later superseded by Executive Order
No. 115) by virtue of section 88 of the charter.
And, finally, because to construe that the next general election for provincial or municipal
officers, refers to the general election next or after the organization of the government of the By a vote of six to two, the court held in effect that the former municipality of Dagupan,
City by Presidential Proclamation, would be to grant the latter discretion to defeat the purpose Pangasinan, ipso facto became a city — that is to say, a political entity separate from and
of the law or the creation of the City of Dagupan by Congress, because as Act No. 170 does independent of the province of Pangasinan — by the mere approval of Republic Act No. 170,
not fix the time within which the President should proclaim the organization of the on the ground that said Act took effect upon its approval on June 20, 1947. I think that
government of the City, the President may never fix the date of such organization, which is conclusion is erroneous and fraught with absurd consequences, as I shall presently endeavor
untenable. to demonstrate:

Motion for reconsideration is denied. 1. A city as a municipal corporation cannot be said to exist until and unless it is recognized
and enabled to exercise the powers and prerogatives conferred upon it by its charter. And
Moran, C.J., Perfecto, Briones, Tuason, and Reyes, JJ., concur. since those powers and prerogatives can only be exercised by its officers and agents, it is
patent that the corporation cannot be said to have come to life until said officers and agents
have been appointed or elected and have duly qualified. It is futile, as the majority opinion
attempts, to distinguish between the "organization of the city of Dagupan and the "and the

70
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
"organization of the city government of Dagupan," as if a city could be organized without
organizing its government. The city of Dagupan was a mere geographical expression and did
not become a political entity until its government was organized and inaugurated by
appointing its officers and installing them in office. The majority opinion itself says that "as a
city is a public corporation or a juridical entity, and as such can not operate or transact
business by itself but through its agents or officers, it was necessary that the government of
the city be organized, that is, that the officials thereof be appointed or elected in order that it
may act or transact business as such public corporation or city." Yet the opinion adds that
"the date of the organization of the city government of Dagupan which the President is
authorized to fix by the provisions of section 88 is not and can not be the date of the creation
of the city, not only because . . . the city of Dagupan came into existence on the same date,
June 20, on which Act No 170 creating said city became effective, but because what was to
organized, according to said section 88, is the city government, and not the city as the
entity . . ." The error lies in the false assumption that there can be a city without a city
government; that the mere enactment of a city charter ipso facto converts the territory
comprised within the city limits into a living political entity. We say such assumption is false
because a city cannot come into existence as a political entity independent from the province
of which it formerly formed part unless these two indispensable steps are taken: first, it must
be created by law and, second, its government must be organized according to the law. These
two steps have to be taken successively. They cannot be taken simultaneously because in
order to appoint or elect officers the law authorizing such appointment or election must first
be approved. When that law says that it shall take effect upon its approval, it simply means
that once it is approved the second step may be taken and the city government thus organized
shall function in accordance with the provisions of that law.
To say that a city can exist as a political entity without a city government is just as absurd as
to say that an automobile can function without an engine. The approval of the charter of the
city of Dagupan by the Congress with the transitory provision in section 88 providing for the
organization of the city government by the President of the Philippines on such date he may
fix, may properly be likened to the manufacture of the body of an automobile; and the
selection and inauguration of the officers of the city, to the selection and installation of the
engine of the automobile. Just as the manufactured vehicle did not become an automobile
until its engine was properly installed, the city of Dagupan did not become a political entity
until its government was organized and its officers installed in office.
2. The Opinion of the majority that the municipality of Dagupan was ipso facto converted
into the city of Dagupan on June 20, 1947, by the mere approval and the taking effect on that
date of Republic Act. No. 170, necessarily implies that the municipality of Dagupan became a
city, or a political entity independent of the province of Pangasinan, on said date. Such a
71
result, however, is utterly unacceptable, not to say absurd, for no one will contend that the
municipal mayor and municipal councilors of the municipality of Dagupan who were holding
office as such on and before June 20, 1947, ipso facto became city mayor and city councilors
of the city of Dagupan on said date — and hence free from any supervision or intervention
whatsoever by the provincial governor and provincial board of Pangasinan — by the mere
approval of Republic Act No. 170. In reality, as everybody knows, Dagupan continued to be a
municipality and a part of the province of Pangasinan, and its officers were subject to the
supervision of the provincial governor and the provincial board, until the government of the
city of Dagupan was inaugurated on January 1, 1948.
Under section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, the provincial governor has
supervisory authority over the municipal officers. Section 2232 of the same Code requires the
municipal secretary to forward to the provincial board a correct copy of each resolution and
ordinance passed at a session of the municipal council within thirty six hours after such
session; and section 2233 authorizes the provincial board to declare invalid any such
resolution or ordinance, and "the effect of such action shall be the annul the resolution or
ordinance in question." Suppose that between June 20 and December 31, 1947, the municipal
council of Dagupan passed an ordinance which, under section 2233, the provincial board
declared invalid. May the city of Dagupan now insist on enforcing said ordinance with the
decision of this court in this case the provincial board of Pangasinan no longer had any
jurisdiction to annul said ordinance because Dagupan had become a city and independent of
the province when said ordinance was approved by the municipal council? Moreover,
following the decision of this court, Dagupan may claim from the province of Pangasinan all
the land taxes collected in Dagupan corresponding to the period from June 20 to December
31, 1947, on the ground that during said period it was independent from the province. The
absurdity of such claims makes patent the absurdity of such claims makes patent the
absurdity of the decision on which they are based.
3. The case of the city of Dansalan cited by the respondent is also in point. Commonwealth
Act No. 592, which was approved and took effect on August 19, 1940, created the city of
Dansalan out of the territory comprised within the boundaries and limits of the municipality
of Dansalan (sections 1, 2, and 3). Section 4 provided that "the President of the Philippines
shall appoint, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly, the mayor, the city secretary, the members of the city council, the city health
officer, the city engineer, the chief of police, the city treasurer, the city assessor, and the city
attorney, and he may remove at pleasure any of them"; and section 33, entitled "Change of
government," provided that "the City Government provided for in this Charter shall be
organized immediately after the appointment and qualifications of the city mayor and a
majority of the members of the city council." Nevertheless, the President has not appointed
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
said officers, and the city government of Dansalan has never been organized, with the result
that Dansalan has up to this date continued to be a municipality and a part of the province of
Lanao. Following the decision of this court in this case the municipality of Dansalan may
now consider itself a city and proclaim its independence from the province of Lanao.
What a serious political turmoil the decision of this court in this case would entail!
[G.R. No. L-1347. May 12, 1948.]
YELLOW TAXI AND PASAY TRANSPORTATION WORKERS UNION (CLO),
recurrente, contra, MANILA YELLOW TAXI CAB COMPANY, INC., recurrida.
D. Severino P. Izon, en representacion de la recurrente.
D. Amado B. de Leon y D. Isaac N. Lico, en representacion de la recurrida.
SYLLABUS
1. PATRONO Y EMPLEADO; SUSPENSION TEMPORAL DEL NEGOCIO;
COMPENSACION DE LOS OBREROS; CASO DE AUTOS. — Siguiendo varias
decisiones dictadas en consonancia con el articulo 2, Regla 44 de los Reglamentos, la Corte
no reviso las conclusiones de hecho del Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales. Pero de ellas la
Corte dedujo que la suspension temporal del negocio de transportacion de la recurrida no se
debio al desso injusto de privar a los obreros de su trabajo: fue el resultado forzoso de la
inservibilidad de los coches, que ya no podian prestar al publico un servicio adecuado y,
sobre todo, seguro. Si la recurrida, estando en condiciones para reparar los coches viejos y no
lo hizo, cabe concluir que tuvo la insana intencion de privar a los miembros de la recurrente
de su trabajo; entonces la suspension del negocio no estaba justificada. En tal caso, los
miembros de la recurrente que perdieron su trabajo tienen derecho a pedir debida
compensacion. En el caso presente, no hubo paro injustificado. Ordenar a la recurrida que
pague indemnizacion a los choferes que no prestaron ningun servicio porque los coches ya
eran inservibles no es administrar justicia: es fomentar la injusticia.
2. ID., ID.; ID.; HERMENEUTICA LEGAL; EL ESPIRITU DEBE PREVALECER SOBRE
LA LETRA DE UNA LEY. — El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a
los tribunales en la aplicacion de sus disposiciones. No deben atenerse a la letra de la ley
cuando la interpretacion literal se separa de la intencion de la legislatura y especialmente
cuando lleva a conclusiones incompatibles con el objeto manifiesto de la ley. Cuando hay
conflicto entre la interpretacion literal y la interpretacion fundada en el proposito de la ley, la
72
ultima debe prevalecer.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TRIBUNAL DE RELACIONES INDUSTRIALES; FACULTAD PARA
DECIDIR RECLAMACION PRESENTADA DESPUES DE LA SUSPENSION O PARO
DEL NEGOCIO. — El Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales tiene facultad para decidir la
reclamacion de los obreros aunque se haya presentado despues de la suspension de los
negocios del patrono, o despues del paro. En tal caso, el Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales
debe investigar si el cierre del negocio esta justificado o no, si se ha hecho de buena o de
mala fe. Si no esta justificado, entonces esta en orden el determinar que compensacion debe
pagar el patrono a los obreros que han cesado en su trabajo sin previa notificacion dentro de
un tiempo razonable.
DECISION
PABLO, J.:
Se trata de una apelacion por certiorari contra la decision del Tribunal de Relaciones
Industriales.
La recurrente, en vez de discutir la conclusion de dicho Tribunal — que no hay disputa
industrial entre las partes porque se presento la reclamacion un dia despues de la suspension
de los negocios de la compañia — contiende que el Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales tiene
facultad (a) para resolver la disputa entre la recurrida y sus obreros que ascienden a mas de 30
y que fueron despachados de su trabajo sin previa notificacion y (b) para determinar la
compensacion de los mismos.
Las conclusiones de hecho del Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales en su decision apelada son
las siguientes: "la compañia recurrida antes de estallar la guerra se dedicaba al negocio de
transportacion por medio de taxicabs con certificado de conveniencia publica. Despues de la
liberacion de la Ciudad de Manila y sus arrabales, abrio de nuevo su negocio pero suspendio
otra vez su operacion el 11 de Septiembre de 1946. Debido a dicha suspension, tuvieron que
cesar en su trabajo 42 choferes, 15 mecanicos y un muchacho, proveedor de gas. De este
numero de empleados despedidos, 37 choferes, un mecanico y un proveedor de gas son
miembros de la union recurrente que es la Yellow Taxi and Pasay Transportation Workers’
Union (CLO). Mas tarde, cuatro o cinco de los choferes afectados fueron sacados por la
compañia recurrida para manejar los coches de servicio y dos de estos son miembros de la
union recurrente; que antes de la suspension de la operacion no se habia presentado ninguna
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
demanda en contra de la compañia recurrida por la union recurrente; que antes de la
suspension, la compañia recurrida tenia en operacion 24 coches, para el manejo de los cuales
los choferes alternaban, recibiendo una comision de 20% del total de las cobranzas
registradas por los taximetros; que los dias de pago eran las fechas 1, 11 y 21 de cada mes;
que la union recurrente es una organizacion obrera cuyo registro esta bajo consideracion en el
Departamento del Trabajo, y esta afiliada al Congreso de Organizaciones Obreras (CLO); que
la suspension de la operacion del negocio de taxicab de la recurrida, asi como la venta de sus
coches y otros materiales relacionados a su operacion, estan de acuerdo con la resolucion
adoptada por la Junta Directiva el 4 de Septiembre de 1946; que la recurrida obtuvo de la
Comision de Servicios Publicos, el 14 de Octubre de 1946, una orden (Exhibit 1)
autorizandola a retirar del servicio publico 17 coches, sujeto a ciertas condiciones; que las
piezas de repuesto necesarias para la reparacion de los taxicabs durante su operacion no se
podian conseguir sino a precios de 4 a 27 veces mas altos que los precios antes de la guerra
(Exhibits 2 al 12) de suerte que el mantenimiento de sus coches resulto muy costoso a la
compañia; que cinco meses antes de la suspension de su operacion, las ganancias de la
compañia empezaron a declinar hasta tal extremo que en el mes de Agosto de 1946 ya se
registro perdida y, en el mes siguiente, Septiembre, una perdida, mucha mas grande debido a
que ya no habia ingresos por la suspension de su operacion; pero mientras tanto retenia a los
empleados de oficina.
"El examen hecho por el auditor del Tribunal revela que las ganancias netas de la compañia
durante su operacion hasta el fin de Septiembre de 1946, y que fueron transferidas al surplus
eran P12,762.12; que en Agosto de 1946, la recurrida sufrio una perdida neta de P533.65, y
en Septiembre de 1946, P6,784.22.
"Dicho examen demuestra, ademas, que la partida de gasto que ha consumido una porcion
muy grande de las ganancias del negocio es la de ’Reparaciones de los autos,’ cuyo total en
30 de Septiembre de 1946, ascendia a P27,808.89, que es mas grande que el gasto para
’Salarios de Oficina’ montante a P26,316.10, correspondiente a dicho periodo."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Siguiendo varias decisiones de este Alto Tribunal, dictadas en consonancia con el articulo 2,
Regla 44 de los Reglamentos, no revisamos estas conclusiones de hecho. Pero de ellas
podemos deducir que la suspension temporal del negocio de transportacion de la recurrida no
se debio al deseo injusto de privar a los obreros de su trabajo: fue el resultado forzoso de la
inservibilidad de los coches, que ya no podian prestar al publico un servicio adecuado y,
sobre todo, seguro. Si la recurrida, estando en condiciones para reparar los coches viejos y no
lo hizo, cabe concluir que tuvo la insana intencion de privar a los miembros de la recurrente
de su trabajo; entonces la suspension del negocio no estaba justificada. En tal caso, los
miembros de la recurrente que perdieron su trabajo tienen derecho a pedir debida
73
compensacion. En el caso presente, no hubo paro injustificado.
Suponiendo por un momento que hubiera estallado un incendio en la cochera de la recurrida y
que todos los coches hayan sido quemados — en vez de quedar inservibles los coches de puro
viejos y que no era posible su reparacion sin tener que comprar piezas de repuesto a precio de
4 a 27 veces mas alto que en tiempo normal — ¿obligariamos a la recurrida a pagar
compensacion o indemnizacion a los choferes porque, sin previo aviso, perdieron su trabajo?
Bajo tales circunstancias, no creemos que sea justa semejante resolucion porque la suspension
del negocio no se ha hecho de mala fe o con el proposito de privar a los obreros de su trabajo.
Ordenar a la recurrida que pague indemnizacion a los choferes que no prestaron ningun
servicio porque los coches ya eran inservibles no es administrar justicia: es fomentar la
injusticia.
El articulo 4 de la Ley No. 559 del Commonwealth dispone que "El Tribunal tomara
conocimiento . . . de cualquier conflicto . . . industrial que motive o de lugar a una huelga o
paro a causa de diferencias que surjan en la cuestion de jornales, participacion o
compensacion, destituciones, ceses o suspensiones de empleados u obreros." Ateniendose al
significado literal de esta disposicion, el Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales decidio que en el
presente caso no hay disputa entre las partes porque la reclamacion de los miembros de la
recurrente se presento un dia despues de la suspension de la operacion de los negocios de la
recurrida. Esta interpretacion de la ley es insostenible. El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser
la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacion de sus disposiciones. No deben atenerse
a la letra de la ley cuando la interpretacion literal se separa de la intencion de la legislatura y
especialmente cuando lleva a conclusiones incompatibles con el objeto manifiesto de la ley.
Cuando hay conflicto entre la interpretacion literal y la interpretacion fundada en el proposito
de la ley, la ultima debe prevalecer. (2 Sutherland Statutory Construction, 693; Vergara
contra Limjap, 56 Jur. Fil., 153.)
La intencion de la legislatura al aprobar la ley que crea el Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales
era proveer a los obreros de un remedio rapido y sencillo para obtener justicia en sus disputas
con el patrono. Es obvio que un obrero que ha sido privado indebidamente de su trabajo por
el patrono con ocasion del paro debe tener derecho a ser oido por el Tribunal de Relaciones
Industriales. Suponiendo que en vez de una suspension justificada, como ha habido en el
presente caso, la recurrida, sin perder en sus negocios, sino que, por el contrario, marginaba
buenas ganancias, y solo con el proposito de echar del servicio a los choferes y otros obreros,
haya declarado el paro, ¿no tienen estos derecho de acudir al Tribunal de Relaciones
Industriales para pedir remedio a su cese indebido? Deben acudir a los tribunales ordinarios?
¿No tienen derecho a pedir compensacion por haber perdido su trabajo porque la empresa, sin
motivo justificado y de mala fe, suspendio sus negocios? El paro y la huelga, no perjudican
solamente a las partes — al patrono y al obrero — sino tambien al publico en general. De ahi
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
es que el Estado en el ejercicio de su poder de policia quede obligado a intervenir en uno u
otro caso. El Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales no solamente debe tomar conocimiento de
las disputas industriales surgidas antes de la declaracion de la huelga o del paro sino tambien
de las que surgieren despues. Las reclamaciones sobre daños causados a los obreros por su
cese con ocasion del paro tiene que surgir necesariamente despues y no puede ser antes. Si no
tiene facultad o jurisdiccion el Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales para conocer de esas
reclamaciones nacidas despues ya de declarado el paro, entonces quedarian desamparados los
echados del trabajo sin justificacion alguna. El patrono entonces tendria un procedimiento
indirecto de despachar a los obreros sin ningun remedio de parte de estos, que es contrario al
mandato constitucional de que "el Estado debera proteger a todos los trabajadores . . . y
debera regular las relaciones entre el trabajo y el capital." (Titulo XIII, seccion 6 de la
Constitucion.) Y el proposito primordial de la ley que crea el Tribunal de Relaciones
Industriales es "proveer a la proteccion del obrero."
Despues de madura consideracion declaramos que el Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales
tiene facultad para decidir la reclamacion de los obreros aunque se haya presentado despues
de la suspension de los negocios del patrono, o despues del paro. En tal caso, el Tribunal de
Relaciones Industriales debe investigar si el cierro del negocio esta justificado o no, si se ha
hecho de buena o de mala fe. Si no esta justificado, entonces esta en orden el determinar que
compensacion debe pagar el patrono a los obreros que han cesado en su trabajo sin previa
notificacion dentro de un tiempo razonable.
En el caso presente declaramos que de acuerdo con las conclusiones del Tribunal de
Relaciones Industriales, la suspension de la operacion de los taxis estaba justificada.
No es justo obligar a una empresa que continue operando su negocio que esta perdiendo.
Se desestima la apelacion.
Moran, Pres., Feria, Bengzon, Briones y Tuason, MM., estan conformes.
Hilado and Padilla, JJ., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner complains of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, dated December 16,
1946, dismissing petitioner’s complaint filed in case No. 34-V, where they alleged that
74
respondent company dismissed them from the service without previous notice or warning or
justification, only because the majority of the employees are members of the petitioning
union.
The lower court ruled that, because petitioner’s demands were presented to the respondent
company on September 12, 1946, one day after the suspension of the operation of the
company’s business, the latter has not committed any unfair labor competition and there is no
industrial dispute between the parties.
Petitioner prays for the reversal of the decision of dismissal and that it be granted a new trial,
maintaining that the Court of Industrial Relations erred in declaring that there is no industrial
dispute between the parties, the declaration implying that there is no such matter upon which
to exercise its jurisdiction.
Petitioner invokes the provisions of sections 1 and 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, in
connection with the constitutional provisions that "the promotion of social justice to insure
the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the state" and
that "the state shall afford protection to labor . . . and shall regulate the relations between
landowner and tenant and between labor and capital in industry and agriculture."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The Court of Industrial Relations adopted a narrow-minded point of view when it ruled that
there is no industrial dispute between the parties upon the simple fact that petitioners
presented to respondent company their demands only on September 12, 1946, one day after
the employees of said company who are members of the petitioning labor union have been
dismissed or laid off. The presentation of said demands was and is not an essential element
for the existence of a labor dispute between employer and employees. In the present case,
from the very instant that the members of the complaining labor union were dismissed or laid
off without their consent, there arose a labor dispute. Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
103 should be interpreted to comprehend a situation such as is presented in the present case.
The sentence "causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout" embodied in said section should
not be read as limitative but rather as descriptive of the nature or import of the dispute of
which the Court of Industrial Relations is to take cognizance for settlement.
From the very facts found by the Court of Industrial Relations, we are convinced that the
members of the petitioning labor union were unjustifiably laid off, the respondent company
using as a pretext a temporary suspension of the business because its old equipment could no
longer be continued to be operated at a profit, and that action of the company was motivated
by the affiliation of the members of the petitioning union with the Congress of Labor
Organizations (CLO).
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
Forty-two drivers, fifteen mechanics and a gas boy were laid off from work. Of their number,
thirty-seven drivers, one mechanic, and the gas boy are members of the petitioning union.
Four or five drivers were later taken back to man the service cars of the company.
According to respondent’s answer, the company has acquired new 1947 cars.
If the laying off of the members of the petitioning labor union was due to the going down of
the profits of the business of the company during the five months before the suspension of the
business to the extent that in August, 1946, the operation already registered a loss, why had
the company dismissed its employees suddenly on September 11, 1946, without any previous
advice or hint to the affected drivers and mechanics, so that they may have time to look for
other jobs and not just leave them empty-handed in the streets? If the company was to acquire
and had acquired brand new cars to replace the old ones, what is the reason for a sudden
suspension of the business while waiting for the new cars to be put in operation?
For all the foregoing, we vote for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations, dated December 16, 1946, and to order said court to proceed with the retrial of the
case so as to determine the relief that should be granted to the members of the petitioning
union in accordance with the pronouncements made hereof,
PARAS, J.:
I concur in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Perfecto.
[G.R. No. L-12727. February 29, 1960. ]
MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC., petitioner and appellant, v. GAMES AND
AMUSEMENTS BOARD, ET AL., respondents and appellees. PHILIPPINE RACING
CLUB, INC., petitioner-intervenor and Appellant.
Lichauco, Picazo & Agcaoili for Appellant.
First Assistant Government Corporate Counsel Simeón M. Gopengco and Attorney
Pedro L. Bautista for appellee PCSO.
75
Assistant Solicitor General José P. Alejandro and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for the
other appellees.
César S. de Guzman for Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. HORSE RACING; HOLDING OF RACES BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND
ENTITIES MERELY PERMISSIVE. — Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309, as amended by
Republic Act No. 983, specifically reserved 23 Sundays and 16 Saturdays for the Philippine
Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the White Cross, Inc. and the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office, and 12 Saturdays to the President for other charitable, relief or civic purposes. The
remaining racing days were assigned to private individuals and entities duly licensed by the
Games and Amusements Board, like the appellants. When Republic Act No. 1502 increased
the sweepstakes draw and races to twelve but without specifying the days on which they are
to be run, the Games and Amusement Board resolved to reduce the number of racing days
assigned to private individuals and entities by six. Appellants protested, contending that the
said increase should be taken from the Saturdays reserved to the President, or should be
assigned to any other day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday, and legal holiday. Held:
Appellants have no vested right to the unreserved racing days because their holding of races
on those days is merely permissive, subject to the licensing and determination by the Games
and Amusements Board. When, therefore, Republic Act No. 1502 increased by six the
sweepstakes draw and races but without specifying the days for holding them, the Board had
no alternative except to make room for the additional races from among the only available
racing days unreserved by the law.
2. ID.; ID.; HORSE RACING ON WEEK DAYS PROHIBITED. — The law does not
authorize the holding of horse races with betting on week days (Article 198 of the Revised
Penal Code).
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES; INTENTION
OF AUTHOR MUST NOT ONLY BE ASCERTAINED BUT IT IS NECESSARY THAT
SUCH INTENTION HAS BEEN EXPRESSED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO GIVE IT LEGAL
EFFECT AND VALIDITY. — In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute,
unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary written document, it is not enough to obtain
information as to the intention or meaning of the author or authors, but also to see whether
the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
validity. In short, the purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know what the author meant by the
language he used, but also to see that the language used sufficiently expresses that meaning.
The legal act, so to speak, is made up of two elements — an internal and an external one; it
originates in intention and is perfected by expression. Failure of the latter may defeat the
former. (59 C. J., 1017).
DECISION
BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by petitioner Manila Jockey Club, Inc., in the
Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 31274), in which the Philippine Racing
Club, Inc. intervened as party in interest with leave of court, praying that judgment be
rendered against respondents Games and Amusements Board (GAB), Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and Executive Secretary Fortunato de
Leon:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) Interpreting Republic Acts Nos. 303 and 1502 in such a manner that the 30 Sundays
unreserved for charitable institutions and therefore belonging to the private racing clubs under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309 continue to pertain to said private entities, and that the 6
additional sweepstakes races authorized under Republic Act No. 1502 should be held on 6 of
the 12 Saturdays not reserved for any private entity or particular charitable institution under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309, or on any other day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday
and legal holiday;
"(b) Holding that respondent PCSO does not have the right or power to appropriate or use the
race tracks and equipment of petitioner without its consent, nor can respondents compel
petitioner to so allow such use of its race tracks and equipment under pain of having its
license revoked."cralaw virtua1aw library
Respondents duly filed their respective answers to said petition and the case as heard. After
hearing, the court, on July 5, 1957, rendered a decision which, in part,
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The court does not deem it necessary to rule on the deprivation of property of the petitioner
and the intervenor without due process of law, as feared by them, because as they have stated,
76
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office is using their premises and equipment under
separate contracts of lease voluntarily and willingly entered into by the parties upon payment
of a corresponding rental. There is therefore no deprivation of property without due process
of law.
"Wherefore, the court is of the opinion and so holds that once a month on a Sunday not
reserved for the Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the White Cross and other charitable institutions
by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office is
authorized to hold one regular sweepstakes draw and races, pursuant to Section 9 of Republic
Act No. 1502, thus reducing the number of Sundays which may be alloted to private entities
by the Games and Amusements Board. . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
From this judgment, petitioner and intervenor interposed the present appeal.
The issue is the proper placement of the six (6) additional racing days given to the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office, in virtue of Republic Act No. 1502, approved on June 16, 1956.
The authorized racing days specifically designated and distributed in Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 309, the basic law on horse racing in the Philippines, as later amended by Republic
Act No. 983, are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A. Sundays:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) For the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society 12 Sundays
(2) For the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Sundays
(3) For the White Cross, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . 4 Sundays
(4) For the Grand Derby Race of the Philippine
Anti-Tuberculosis Society. . . . . . . . . . 1 Sunday
____
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Sundays
(5) For private individuals and entities duly
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3

December 30th, have been reserved for private individuals and entities duly licensed by the
licensed by the GAB, other Sundays not GAB.

reserved under this Act, as may be deter- As stated, Republic Act No. 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races of the PCSO to
twelve but without specifying the days on which they are to be run. To accommodate these
mined by the GAB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Sundays additional races, the GAB resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private
individuals and entities by six. Appellants protested, contending that the said increased
or 30 for Leap years should be taken from the 12 Saturdays reserved to the President, for charitable, relief, or civic
purposes, or should be assigned to any other day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday, and
Total for the year . . . . . . . . . . 52 Sundays legal holiday.

or 53 for leap years Appellants’ contention cannot be sustained. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309, as amended
by Republic Act No. 983, by express terms, specifically reserved 23 Sundays and 16
B. Saturdays:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Saturdays for the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the White Cross, Inc. and the PCSO,
and 12 Saturdays to the President for other charitable, relief, or civic purposes. These days
(1) For the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society 12 Saturdays can not be disposed of by the GAB without authority of law. As to the remaining racing days,
the law provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
(2) For the White Cross, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 4 Saturdays
"SEC. 4. Racing days. — Private individuals and entities duly licensed by the Commission on
(3) For private Individuals and entities duly Races (now GAB) may hold horse races on Sundays not reserved under this Act, on twenty-
four Saturdays as may be determined by the said Commission (GAB), and on legal holidays,
licensed by GAB and as may be determined except Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, July fourth, commonly known as Independence
Day, and December thirtieth, commonly known as Rizal Day."cralaw virtua1aw library
by it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Saturdays
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that appellants have no vested right to the
(4) For races authorized by the President for unreserved Sundays, or even to the 24 Saturdays (except, perhaps, on the holidays), because
their holding of races on these days is merely permissive, subject to the licensing and
charitable, relief, or civic purposes other determination by the GAB. When, therefore, Republic Act No. 1502 was enacted increasing
by six (6) the sweepstakes draw and races, but without specifying the days for holding them,
than the particular charitable institutions the GAB had no alternative except to make room for the additional races, as it did, from
among the only available racing days unreserved by any law — the Sundays on which the
named above, all other Saturdays not private individuals and entities have been permitted to hold their races, subject to licensing
and determination by the GAB.
reserved for the latter . . . . . . . . . . 12 Saturdays
It is suggested that the GAB should have chosen any week days or Saturday afternoons. In
____________ the first place, weeks days are out of the question. The law does not authorize the holding of
horse races with betting on week days (See Article 198, of the Revised Penal Code).
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Saturdays Secondly, sweepstakes races have always been held on Sundays. Besides, it is not possible to
hold them on Saturdays afternoons as, it is claimed, a whole day is necessary for the mixing
C. Legal Holidays: All, except Thursday and Friday of the Holy Week, July 4th and of the sweepstakes balls, the drawing of winning sweepstakes numbers, and the running of
77
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
the sweepstakes races. Be that as it may, since the law has given certain amount of discretion
to the GAB in determining and allocating racing days not specifically reserved, and since the
court does not find that a grave abuse of this discretion has been committed, there seems to be
no reason, legal or otherwise, to set aside the resolution of the GAB.
Furthermore, appellants contend that even granting that the six (6) additional sweepstakes
races should be run on Sundays, yet if they are held on a club race day, the GAB should only
insert them in the club races and not give the whole day to the PCSO, to the exclusion of
appellants. In support of this contention, the following quotation from the debate in the House
of Representatives before the voting on House Bill No. 5732, which became Republic Act
No. 1502, is cited:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Mr. ABELEDA. If there are no more amendments, I move that we vote on the measure.
"Mr. MARCOS Mr. Speaker, before we proceed to vote on this bill, I want to make it of
record that it is the clear intention of the House to increase by two the ten regular and special
Sweepstakes races making it all in all, twelve, and that in cases where a sweepstakes race
falls in a club race days the Sweepstakes race should be inserted in the club race.
"Mr. ABELEDA. The gentleman from Ilocos Norte is correct. . . . ." (t.s.n., Proceedings in
House of Representatives, Congress, May 17, 1956; Italics supplied.)
Appellants cite in their briefs a number of authorities sustaining the view that in the
interpretation of statutes susceptible of widely differing constructions, legislative debates and
explanatory statements by members of the legislature may be resorted to, to throw light on
the meaning of the words used in the statutes. Upon the other hand, the appellees, likewise,
quote in their briefs other authorities to the effect that statements made by the individual
members of the legislature as to the meaning of provisions in the bill subsequently enacted
into law, made during the general debate on the bill on the floor of each legislative house,
following its presentation by a standing committee, are generally held to be inadmissible as
an aid in construing the statute. Legislative debates are expressive of the views and motives
of individual members and are not safe guides and, hence, may not be resorted to in
ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the lawmaking body. It is impossible to determine
with certainty what construction was put upon an act by the members of the legislative body
that passed the bill, by resorting to the speeches of the members thereof. Those who did not
speak, may not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke, might differ from each
other. 1
In view of these conflicting authorities, no appreciable reliance can safely be placed on any of
them. It is to be noted in the specific case before us, that while Congressmen Marcos and
78
Abeleda were, admittedly, of the view that the additional sweepstakes races may be inserted
in the club races, still there is nothing in Republic Act No. 1502, as it was finally enacted,
which would indicate that such an understanding on the part of these two members of the
Lower House of Congress received the sanction or conformity of their colleagues, for the law
is absolutely devoid of any such indication. This is, therefore, not a case where a doubtful
wording is sought to be interpreted; rather, if we adopt appellants’ theory, we would be
supplying something that does not appear in the statute. It is pertinent to observe here that, as
pointed out by one of appellants’ own cited authorities, 2 in the interpretation of a legal
document, especially a statute, unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary written document, it
is not enough to obtain information to the intention or meaning of the author or authors, but
also to see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way as to give it
legal effect and validity. In short, the purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know what the
author meant by the language he used, but also to see that the language used sufficiently
expresses that meaning. The legal act, so to speak, is made up of two elements — an internal
and an external one; it originates in intention and is perfected by expression. Failure of the
latter may defeat the former. The following, taken from 59 Corpus Juris 1017, is in line with
this theory:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The intention of the legislature to which effect must be given is that expressed in the statute
and the courts will not inquire into the motives which influence the legislature, or individual
members, in voting for its passage; nor indeed as to the intention of the draftsman, or the
legislature, so far as it has been expressed in the act. So, in ascertaining the meaning of a
statute the court will not be governed or influenced by the views or opinions of any or all
members of the legislature or its legislative committees or any other persons."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Upon the other hand, at the time of the enactment of Republic Act No. 1502 in June, 1956,
the long, continuous, and uniform practice was that all sweepstakes draws and races were
held on Sundays and during the whole day. With this background, when Congress chose not
to specify in express terms how the additional sweepstakes draws and races would be held, it
is safe to conclude that it did not intend to disturb the then prevailing situation and practice.
"On the principle of contemporaneous exposition, common usage and practice under the
statute, or a course of conduct indicating a particular undertaking of it, will frequently be of
great value in determining its real meaning, especially where the usage has been acquired in
by all parties concerned and has extended over a long period of time; . . . . (59 C. J. 1023)
Likewise, the language of Republic Act No. 1502 in authorizing the increase, clearly speaks
of regular sweepstakes draws and races. If the intention of Congress were to authorize
additional sweepstakes draws only which could, admittedly, be inserted in the club races, the
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
law would not have included regular races; and since regular sweepstakes races were
specifically authorized, and it would be confusing, inconvenient, if not impossible to mix
these sweepstakes races with the regular club races all on the same day (and it has never been
done before), the conclusion seems inevitable that the additional sweepstakes draws and races
were intended to be held on a whole day, separate and apart from the club races.
Appellants’ contention that to compel them to permit the PCSO to use their premises and
equipment against their will would constitute deprivation of property without due process of
law, deserves no serious consideration. As the lower court has found, every time the PCSO
uses appellants’ premises and equipment, they are paid rentals in accordance with the terms
of separate contracts of lease existing between them and the PCSO.
The decision appealed from, being in consonance with the above findings and considerations
of this Court, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Labrador, Concepción, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Gutiérrez
David, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 16808. January 3, 1921. ]
ANDRES BORROMEO, Plaintiff, v. FERMIN MARIANO, Defendant.
Fisher & DeWitt for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Feria for defendant.
SYLLABUS
1. QUO WARRANTO; JUDGES; APPOINTMENT, TRANSFER, AND REMOVAL. — B
was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District on July 1, 1914. He qualified and
took possession of office on that date. On February 25, 1920, he was appointed Judge of the
Twenty-first Judicial District and M was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial
District. B has since the latter date refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial
District. Held: That B is lawfully entitled to the possession of the office of Judge of the Court
of First Instance of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District.
79
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; "APPOINT," CONSTRUED. — The term "appoint" found in the proviso to
section 155 of the Administrative Code, is well-known in law and whether regarded in its
legal or in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to the nomination or designation of an
individual.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Judges of First Instance are not appointed Judges of First Instance of
the Philippine Islands but are appointed Judges of the Courts of First Instance of the
respective judicial districts of the Philippine Islands. They hold this position of Judge of First
Instance of definite districts until they either resign, reach the age of retirement, or are
removed through impeachment proceedings. The intention of the law is to recognize separate
and distinct judicial offices.
4. ID.; ID.; ID. — The proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code must be given a
meaning which will not render abortive the main portions of the law, especially those relating
to the removal of judges.
5. ID.; ID.; ID. — Appointment and qualification to office are separate and distinct things.
Appointment is the sole act of those vested with the power to make it. Acceptance is the sole
act of the appointee. Persons may be chosen for office at pleasure; there is no power in these
Islands, however, which can compel a man to accept the office.
6. ID.; ID.; ID. — The language of the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code
does not empower the Governor-General to force upon the judge of one district an
appointment to another district against his will, thereby removing him from his former
district.
7. ID.; ID.; ID. — The reasonable force of the language used in the proviso to section 155 of
the Administrative Code taken in connection with the whole of the Judiciary Law, and the
accepted canons of interpretation, and the principles of the law of public officers, leave room
for no other construction than that a Judge of First Instance may be made a judge of another
district only with his consent.
8. ID.; ID.; GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; DIVISION OF POWERS.
— On occasion, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has applied the accepted theory
of the division of powers, and has unhesitatingly refused to interfere with the official acts of
the Governor-General or to intrude on the rights and privileges of the Philippine Legislature.
The court has also had to defend the judiciary against legislative and executive encroachment.
9. ID.; ID.; INDEPENDENCE OF JUDICIARY. — It was the American conception of an
independent judiciary which was instituted in the Philippines and which has since served as
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
one of the chief glories of the government and one of the most priceless heritages of the
Filipino people.
10. ID.; ID.; ID. — It is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the
law is.
11. ID.; ID.; ID. — Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a
mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are
permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and who are
independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the
other two departments of government.
12. STATUTES; RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. — The cardinal rule of
statutory construction requires the court to give effect to the general legislative intent if that
can be discovered within the four corners of the Act.
13. ID.; ID. — When the object intended to be accomplished by the statute is once clearly
ascertained, general words may be restrained to it and those of narrower import may be
expanded to embrace it, to effectuate the intent.
14. ID.; ID. — Such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted, as will give effect to all
provisions of the statute.
15. ID.; ID.; PROVISO. — The office of a proviso is to limit the application of the law. It is
contrary to the nature of a proviso to enlarge the operation of the law. It should not be
construed so as to repeal or destroy the main provisions of the statute. A proviso which is
directly repugnant to the purview or body of an Act is inoperative and void.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J. :
Quo warranto proceedings have been instituted in this court to determine the right of the
plaintiff and of the defendant to the office of Judge of the Court of First Instance of the
Twenty-fourth Judicial District.
The only facts, and these are undisputed ones, which need be noticed, are the following:
80
Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial
District, effective July 1, 1914. He duly qualified and took possession of the office on that
date. On February, 25, 1920, he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District, and
Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Judge Borromeo
has since the latter date consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first
Judicial District.
Judges of First Instance are appointed by the Governor-General with the consent of the
Philippine Senate to serve until they reach the age of 65 years. (Adm. Code, secs. 65, 66,
148.) One Judge of First Instance is commissioned for each judicial district, except the ninth.
(Sec. 154.) The oath of office of the judge is "filed with the clerk of the court to which the
affiant pertains and shall be entered upon its records." (Sec. 128.) Judges of First Instance
may only be detailed by the Secretary of Justice to temporary duty in a district other than
their own for the purpose of trying land registration cases and for vacation duty. (Sec. 155.)
The concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code, to which particular
attention is addressed by the Attorney-General, is, "but nothing herein shall be construed to
prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being appointed to be judge of another
district." A Judge of First Instance can be removed from office by the Governor-General only
if in the judgment of the Supreme Court sufficient cause shall exist involving serious
misconduct or inefficiency in office. (Sec. 173.)
The cardinal rule of statutory construction requires the court to give effect to the general
legislative intent if that can be discovered within the four corners of the Act. When the object
intended to be accomplished by the statute is once clearly ascertained, general words may be
restrained to it and those of narrower import may be expanded to embrace it, to effectuate the
intent. Along with this fundamental principle is another, equally well-established, that such a
construction is, if possible, to be adopted, as will give effect to all provisions of the statute. (2
Lewis Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 662, et seq.; In re Allen [1903], 2 Phil., 630;
Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 287.)
Leaving out of consideration for the moment the last part of section 155 of the Administrative
Code, the provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and unambiguous. Judges of First
Instance are appointed judges of the courts of first instance of the respective judicial districts
of the Philippine Islands. They are not appointed judges of first instance of the Philippine
Islands. They hold these positions of judges of first instance of definite districts until they
resign, retire, or are removed through impeachment proceedings. The intention of the law is
to recognize separate and distinct judicial offices.
The concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code, although not beginning
with the usual introductory word, "provided," is nevertheless, in the nature of a proviso, and
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
should be construed as such. The office of a proviso is to limit the application of the law. It is
contrary to the nature of a proviso to enlarge the operation of the law. It should not be
construed so as to repeal or destroy the main provisions of the statute. A proviso which is
directly repugnant to the purview or body of an Act is inoperative and void. (See generally,
25 R. C. L., pp. 984, et seq.; and specifically, the leading cases of McKnight v. Hodge [1909],
55 Wash., 289, 104 Pac., 504, 40 L. R. A. [N. S. ], 1207; McCormick v. West Duluth [1891],
47 Minn., 272, 50 N. W., 128; Idaho Power & Light Co. v. Blomquist [1916], 26 Idaho, 222;
141 Pac., 1083, Ann. Cas. [1916 E], p. 282, where these principles concerning, provisos are
applied.)
To arrive at a correct decision with reference to the proviso before us, let it first be recalled
that the law is emphatic in its specification that, save when judges of first instance are
detailed to try land registration cases or when assigned to vacation duty, "no judge of first
instance shall be required to do duty in any other district than that for which he is
commissioned." The keyword to the proviso which follows is "appointed." This word should
here be given its usual signification. Many of the decisions follow the definition of; "appoint"
found in the Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia. "Appoint" is there defined as "to allot, set
apart, or designate; nominate or authoritatively assign as for a use, or to a position or office."
All the authorities unite in saying that the term "appoint" is well-known in law and whether
regarded in its legal or in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to the nomination or designation
of an individual. Appointment signifies no more than selection for public office. (4 C. J.,
1402, 1404, citing numerous decisions.)
The effect to be given to the word "appoint" is corroborated by the principles of the law of
public officers. Appointment and qualification to office are separate and distinct things.
Appointment is the sole act of those vested with the power to make it. Acceptance is the sole
act of the appointee. Persons may be chosen for office at pleasure; there is no power in these
Islands which can compel a man to accept the office. (22 R. C. L., 423.) If, therefore, anyone
could refuse appointment as a judge of first instance to a particular district, when once
appointment to this district is accepted, he has exactly the same right to refuse an
appointment to another district. No other person could be placed in the position of this Judge
of First Instance since another rule of public officers is, that an appointment may not be made
to an office which is not vacant. (29 Cyc., 1373.) In our judgment, the language of the proviso
to section 155 of the Administrative Code, interpreted with reference to the law of public
officers, does not empower the Governor-General to force upon the judge of one district an
appointment to another district against his will, thereby removing him from his district.
Returning again to the principle of statutory construction that a proviso should not be given a
meaning which would tend to render abortive the main portions of the law, it should further
be recalled that judges of first instance are removable only through a fixed procedure.
81
Moreover, impeachment proceedings, as conducted by the Supreme Court, may be in the
nature of jurisdiction, conferred upon the Supreme Court by ratification of the Congress of
the United States, which, it has uniformly been held, cannot be diminished. (We make no
ruling on this point because unnecessary for the resolution of the case.) But, certainly, if a
judge could be transferred from one district of the Philippine Islands to another, without his
consent, it would require no great amount of imagination to conceive how this power could
be used to discipline the judge or as an indirect means of removal. A judge who had, by a
decision, incurred the ill-will of an attorney or official, could, by the insistence of the
disgruntled party, be removed from one district demoted, and transferred to another district,
at possibly a loss of salary, all without the consent of the judicial officer. The only recourse of
the judicial officer who should desire to maintain his self-respect, would be to vacate the
office and leave the service. Unless we wish to nullify the impeachment section of the
Administrative Code, and thus possibly to encroach upon the jurisdiction conferred upon the
Supreme Court by the Organic Law, section 155 must be interpreted so as to make it
consistent therewith.
What we have said is reenforced by the authorities most directly in point. In the early
decision of Marbury v. Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch, 137), the Supreme Court of the United
States, in unmistakable terms, explained the powers of the Judiciary in enforcing the
Constitution as the Supreme Law of the Land and held that the President of the ,United States
had no power to remove a justice of the peace of the District of Columbia from office. Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall said that "When the officer is not removable at the will of the
executive, the appointment is not revocable, and cannot be annulled: it has conferred legal
rights which cannot be resumed. The discretion of the executive is to be exercised, until the
appointment has been made. But having once made the appointment, his power over the
office is terminated, in all cases where, by law, the officer is not removable by him. The right
to the office is then in the person appointed, and he has the absolute unconditional power of
accepting or rejecting it." The great jurist further on observed that "It is, emphatically, the
province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is."cralaw virtua1aw library
In State of Louisiana v. Downes ([1869], 21 La. Ann, 490), the Supreme Court of Louisiana
said that a judge of a court could, under the Constitution of that State, only be removed from
office by impeachment, by address of the Legislature, or by proceedings under the intrusion
act. It was held that the appointment and commissioning by the Governor of the State of a
party to an office which has legally been filled, without the vacancy being first declared
according to law, was an absolute nullity.
The Attorney-General brings to our notice an obsolete law which had escaped us, and which,
if any lingering doubts exist, would serve to remove them. This law is Act No. 396, enacted
by the Philippine Commission in 1902. Section 4 thereof, separate and distinct from the other
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
provisions of the Act, and not tacked on as a proviso, provided that "any judge of a Court of
First Instance . . . may be transferred from one judicial district to another by order of the Civil
Governor, with the advice and consent of the Commission. Any judge so transferred shall,
upon such transfer, cease the performance of judicial duties in the district to which he was
originally appointed, and shall be the regular judge thereafter in the judicial district to which
he has been so assigned." But Act No. 396 was thrice repealed by the Philippine Legislature;
the first time, impliedly by the enactment of Act No. 2347, the Judiciary Reorganization Act,
and subsequently, expressly by the Administrative Code of 1916 and the Administrative Code
of 1917. Instead, also, of continuing the phraseology of section 4 of Act No. 396, the
Legislature merely included the proviso to which we have alluded. It cannot, therefore, admit
of doubt that the members of the Philippine Legislature had before them the Act of the
Philippine Commission and preferred, not to perpetuate the old law, but to insert language of
their own. The purpose of the Philippine Legislature was clearly to safeguard the interests of
the judiciary, and this laudable purpose, it is for us now to effectuate.
Far more convincing than precedent or argument are great and basic principles long inherent
in popular government intended to create an independent judiciary. A history of the struggle
for a fearless and an incorruptible judiciary prepared to follow the law and to administer it
regardless of consequences, can be perused with ever-recurring benefit. Since the early days
of the Republic, the judicial system in the United States, with certain exceptions which only
served to demonstrate more fully the excellence of the whole, has been viewed with pride,
and confidently relied upon for justice by the American people. The American people
considered it necessary "that there should be a judiciary endowed with substantial and
independent powers and secure against all corrupting or perverting influences; secure, also,
against the arbitrary authority of the administrative heads of the government." (Woodrow
Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States, pp. 17, 142.) It was such a
conception of an independent judiciary which was instituted in the Philippines by the
American administration and which has since served as one of the chief glories of the
government and one of the most priceless heritages of the Filipino people.
The Attorney-General in the argument in support of his motion for reconsideration, quotes
the last preceding sentence and says that he dissents therefrom. The number of authoritative
replies to the proposition advanced by the law officer of the government relative to the
intention to establish an independent judiciary in these Islands, is limited only by space in
which to quote them. Possibly we can do no better than to make our own the language of Mr.
Justice Trent, speaking for a unanimous court, in Severino v. Governor-General and
Provincial Board of Occidental Negros ([1910], 16 Phil., 366, 384), when he said: "This
government, being modelled after the Federal and State governments in the United States,
now possesses a complete governmental organization, with executive, legislative, and judicial
departments, which are exercising functions as independent of each other as the Federal or
82
State governments." (For the legislative version of the same idea, see Administrative Code,
sec. 17.)
On occasion, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has applied the accepted theory of
the division of powers, termed by the United States Supreme Court as "one of the chief merits
of the American system of written constitutional law" (Kilbourn v. Thompson [1881], 13
Otto, 168), and has unhesitatingly refused to interfere with the official acts of the Governor-
General or to intrude on the rights and privileges of the Philippine Legislature. (In re
Patterson [1902], 1 Phil., 93; Severino v. Governor-General and Provincial Board of
Occidental Negros, supra; In re McCulloch Dick [1918], 38 Phil., 41; U. S. v. Bull [1910], 15
Phil., 7; U. S. v. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1; Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and
Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886.) As an instance of this class of decisions, in Veloso v. Boards of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, supra, this court, in considering the right of the Philippine
Senate to be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its elective members,
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The grant of power to the Philippine Senate and the Philippine House of Representatives,
respectively is full, clear, and complete. . . . The judiciary, with its traditional and careful
regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the legislature to
remain where the sovereign authority has placed it. Since, therefore, the Philippine Senate is
made the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its elective members, this
tribunal neither can, nor ought, to take jurisdiction of the case."cralaw virtua1aw library
Although much more reluctantly, and also much more infrequently we are happy to add, the
court has had to defend the judiciary against legislative and executive encroachment.
(Ocampo v. Cabangis [1910], 15 Phil., 626; In re Guariña [1914], 24 Phil., 37; Barrameda v.
Moir [1913], 25 Phil., 44; and Province of Tarlac v. Gale [1913], 26 Phil., 338.) As an
instance of the latter class of decisions, in Province of Tarlac v. Gale, supra, Mr. Justice
Moreland, speaking for the court, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The judiciary is one of the coordinate branches of the Government. (Forbes v. Chuoco
Tiaco, 16 Phil., 534; United States v. Bull, 15 Phil., 7.) Its preservation in its integrity and
effectiveness is necessary to the present form of Government. . . . It is clear . . . that each
department is bound to preserve its own existence if it live up to the duty imposed upon it as
one of the coordinate branches of the government. Whatever a person or entity ought to do or
must do in law, it has the power to do. This being true, the judiciary has the power to
maintain its existence; and whatever is reasonably necessary to that end, courts may do or
order done. But the right to live, if that i3 all there is of it, is a very small matter. The mere
right to breathe does not satisfy ambition or produce results. Therefore, courts have not only
the power to maintain their life, but they have also the power to make that existence effective
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
for the purpose for which the judiciary was created. They can, by appropriate means, do all
things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an
effective institution of Government. Courts have, therefore, inherent power to preserve their
integrity, maintain their dignity and to insure effectiveness in the administration of justice.
This is clear; for, if the judiciary may be deprived of any one of its essential attributes, or if
any one of them may be seriously weakened by the act of any person or official, then
independence disappears and subordination begins. The power to interfere is the power to
control, and the power to control is the power to abrogate. The sovereign power has given life
to the judiciary and nothing less than the sovereign power can take it away or render it
useless. The power to withhold from the courts anything really essential for the
administration of justice is the power to control and ultimately to destroy the efficiency of the
judiciary. Courts cannot, under their duty to their creator, the sovereign power, permit
themselves to be subordinated to any person or official to which their creator did not itself
subordinate them."cralaw virtua1aw library
A stirring plea has been made by the learned representative of the Government for a decision
which will work for the public welfare. We agree that, under the peculiar conditions existing
in the Philippines, it is sometimes well for a judge not to remain indefinitely in a particular
district. But it is a far cry from this premise to the use of a method not sanctioned by existing
law and savoring of military discipline. Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of
men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance
with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside
influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal
and coordinate to the other two departments of government. We are pleased to think of judges
as of the type of the erudite Coke who, three centuries ago, was removed from office because
when asked "if in the future he would delay a case at the King’s order," replied: "I will do
what becomes me as a judge."cralaw virtua1aw library
For the reasons given, we are of opinion that the reasonable force of the language used in the
proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code taken in connection with the whole of the
Judiciary Law, and the accepted canons of interpretation, and the principles of the law of
public officers, leave room for no other construction than that a Judge of First Instance may
be made a judge of another district only with his consent.
It is our holding that the plaintiff Andres Borromeo is lawfully entitled to the possession of
the office of Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District. It is
our judgment that the defendant Fermin Mariano shall be ousted from the office of Judge of
the Twenty fourth Judicial District, and the plaintiff placed in possession of the same. The
motion for reconsideration filed by the Attorney-General is denied. No costs shall be allowed.
Let this be entered as the order of the court. So ordered.
83
Araullo, Street and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., signed the original decision, but was not present when the motion for
reconsideration was filed and when this decision was promulgated.
Separate Opinions
VILLAMOR, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I dissent. The interpretation, which the majority give to the last clause of section 155 of the
Administrative Code, in the sense that it requires the consent of a judge of the Court of First
Instance in order that he may be transferred from one judicial district to another, is an
amendment of the law, an act which should be done only by the legislative branch of the
government. I am not unaware of the possibility that the power of the Governor-General to
effect such transfers of Judges of First Instance with the consent of the Senate may produce
as a result the resignation of the judge thus transferred if he does not accept the transfer.
However, this fact should be referred to the legislature in order that it may amend the law if it
sees fit to do so. The provisions of the law being clear, the court should apply it in the manner
and form in which it has been passed by the legislature, without attempting to attach thereto a
condition, as that of the consent of the judge transferred, which the legislature did not see fit
to require.
It is pretended that the appointment to a specific position in the Government requires, among
other elements, the acceptance thereof, without which it would not produce any effect.
However, with reference to the transfer of judges a new appointment is made only to
distinguish a permanent transfer from a temporary assignment to sit in another district, which
is forbidden by law, except for the purposes of land registration cases; and a new oath is taken
only to attest the fact that the transfer has been effected and that the transferred judge has
taken possession of the office in the new district for the purposes of jurisdiction. But, in
reality, in this case there is no new employee, there is not a different office. The transferred
judge continue, being a judge as much as before his transfer, holds the same office with all
the attributes and powers thereto annexed, and enjoys the same privileges, with the sole
difference as to the place in which jurisdiction is exercised. In this case, according to the law,
the prior consent of the judge is not necessary in order that he may be transferred to another
district, for the good of the public service, which is the basis of the power to make such
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
transfers, is over and above the personal interests of every citizen.
It is also contended that the last clause of section 155 is a danger to the independence of the
judiciary. But if this legal provision is considered in relation to section 5 of the
Administrative Code, which presumes that administrative discretion is exercised for the good
of the service and the benefit of the public; and if it is furthermore considered that the
executive power to effect transfers of judges is subject to the approval of a restraining body,
that is, the Senate, it seems, in my opinion, that this legal provision is a prudent measure
tending to protect the interest of good public service.
According to law, the Governor-General has the discretion to make transfers of judges from
one district to another, with the consent of the Senate. Therefore, to the Governor-General
and to the Senate, and not to the judges, is the power granted to determine how such
discretion should be exercised. In the case at bar there is not even a single allegation that such
discretion has been abused in disregard of the law, and therefore, there is no way by which
this court may disapprove the transfer of the petitioner decided to be effected by the
Governor-General in the exercise of the discretionary powers conferred upon him by law.
If the consent of a judge is an essential requisite to his transfer to another district, it must also
be an essential requisite to his assignment to sit in another district to try land registration
cases or as vacation judge, for in both cases, the same reason exists, that is, the danger to the
independence of the judiciary, which is the foundation of the majority opinion. The result
would be the complete repeal of section 155 of the Administrative Code through the
interpretation given by this court. And an interpretation leading to such result should be
discarded for it is contrary to the doctrines of statutory construction cited in the majority
opinion, to wit: That the court should give effect to the general intention of the legislator, if it
may be gathered from all the viewpoints from which the law is examined; and that, if
possible, that construction should be adopted which gives effect to all the provisions of the
law (2 Lewis’ Sutherland, Statutory Construction, page 662 et seq.; In re Allen [1903], 2
Phil., 630; sec. 207 of the Administrative Code).
But what is the intention of the legislator in the legal provision now under consideration? The
provisions of the law are clear and it is not necessary either to stretch the imagination or
resort to other jurisdictions, to discover the intention of the legislator. Section 155 of the
Administrative Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"For the purpose of trying land registration cases only a judge of first instance may, if the
84
public interests so require, be detailed by the Department Head to temporary duty in a district
other than his own. Save when so detailed or when assigned to vacation duty, no judge of first
instance shall be required to do duty in any other district than that for which he is
commissioned; but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a judge of first instance of
one district from being appointed to be judge of another district."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is admitted by the authorities on the subject that the object of a saving clause or proviso is
(1) to except something from the legal provision in question, or (2) to restrict the provisions
thereof, or (3) to exclude all possible reason for erroneously construing such provision so as
to make it applicable to cases which the legislature did not intend to include therein.
In whatever sense the proviso in question is interpreted, there is no reason for requiring the
consent of the judge for a temporary or permanent transfer to another district The intention of
the legislature, as gathered from the provisions of the law, is that no judge shall be required to
render services in another district, except to try land registration cases or to act as vacation
judge, but without prejudice to his being appointed by the Governor-General as judge of
another district.
That discharge is a different thing from transfer is a self-evident proposition requiring no
proof. That a judge appointed to another district may refuse to accept his transfer is not
disputed by anyone. But if he leaves the office by abandonment or resignation, such result is
not a necessary effect of the transfer but of his free will.
The majority decision tries to solve the proposition that if the remedy prayed for is not
granted judges would lose their judicial independence. But we should remember, in this
connection what Judge Cooley, one of the most eminent American jurists, in resolving the
proposition that if it should be held that the Governor cannot be compelled to fulfill purely
ministerial duties, those in possession of legal rights would, in many cases, be without
remedy, said in the case of Sutherland v. Governor (29 Mich., 320), to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Practically, there are a great many such cases, but theoretically, there are none at all. All
wrongs, certainly, are not redressed by the judicial department. A party may be deprived of a
right by a wrong verdict, or an erroneous ruling of a judge, and though the error may be
manifest to all others than those who are to decide upon his rights, he will be without redress.
A person lawfully chosen to the Legislature may have his seat given by the house to another,
and be thus wronged without remedy. A just claim against the State may be rejected by the
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
board of auditors, and neither the governor nor the courts can give relief. A convicted person
may conclusively demonstrate his innocence to the governor, and still be denied a pardon. In
which one of these cases could the denial of redress by the proper tribunal constitute any
ground for interference by any other authority? The law must leave the final decision upon
every claim and every controversy somewhere, and when that decision has been made, it
must be accepted as correct. The presumption is just as conclusive in favor of executive
action as in favor of judicial."cralaw virtua1aw library
A case in which the court discussed the proposition that there can be no wrong whatever
without any remedy is that of People v. Bissell (19 III., 229). In that case the court
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is urged upon us, that in a government of laws there must be an adequate remedy for every
wrong, and that where a clear right exists, there must be some mode of enforcing that right.
While human society is governed by so imperfect a being as man, this can be true only in
theory. If we are to compel the Governor or the legislature to right every wrong which may
arise from their omissions of duty, then surely they must, in order to make this Utopian
system perfect, have the power to compel us to do right in every case. May it not be as well
supposed that we will act perversely, and refuse to perform a duty imposed upon us, to the
injury of the citizen, as that the Governor will do so? In the formation of the government,
equal confidence was rightfully reposed in each department, to which appropriate and
independent duties were assigned."cralaw virtua1aw library
The proceeding instituted in this case is entitled Quo Warranto, a proceeding for determining
the right of a Judge of First Instance to sit in a determined judicial district. But there can be
no doubt that in this question is involved the power of the Governor-General to appoint
Judges of First Instance. While the petition in this case does not include the Governor-
General as party respondent, nevertheless, the judgment of this court must in the same
manner necessarily affect him who authorized the appointment now in dispute and the
appointee, now respondent Judge Fermin Mariano. This conclusion is inevitable for the case
deals with the appointment of a judge made by the Governor General in the exercise of his
discretional powers. Indeed this court cannot decide this case by granting the prayer of the
petitioner without disapproving the manner in which this power of the Governor-General has
been exercised. Has the court jurisdiction to do this?
Section 26 of the Jones Act provides, among other things:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
85
"The Judges of the Courts of First Instance shall be appointed by the Governor-General, by
and with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate."cralaw virtua1aw library
In view of this legal provision and of section 155 of the Administrative Code, to maintain that
a Judge of First Instance may not be transferred to another district without his consent
amounts to judicially determining that the Governor-General cannot exercise the power
conferred upon him by law to transfer a judge from one district to another without the consent
of the judge concerned.
The question whether courts possess or do not possess jurisdiction to control the official acts
of the Governor has been raised before many courts of the United States. And this Supreme
Court, in the case of Severino v. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental
Negros (16 Phil., 366, 387, 400, 402), after examining the various cases in which this
question was raised in the United States, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We think that the weight of authority, based upon legal principles and sound reasoning,
supports the proposition that in the United States the supreme courts of the States do not have
jurisdiction to control the official acts of the governor. For better reasons we conclude that
this court has no jurisdiction, either by mandamus or injunction, to control the official acts of
the Governor-General, inasmuch as we have seen that his duties, powers, and responsibilities
are more comprehensive than those conferred upon any State Governor. When the Philippine
legislative body confers upon the Governor-General powers and duties, it does so for the
reason that he is in a better position to know the needs of the country than any other member
of the executive department, and with the full confidence that he will perform such duties,
under his official oath, as his best judgment dictates. If this had not been the intention of the
legislatures they could have placed the duty upon some other official of the executive
department. It no doubt is sometimes very necessary for the Governor-General to perform
certain important executive duties without delay, and should this court attempt to distinguish
between purely ministerial and discretionary duties, conferred upon him by law, and attempt
to determine in each case which are purely ministerial, which are political, or which are
discretionary, the Governor-General, to that extent would become subservient to the
judiciary. To avoid this is why the three great coordinate departments of the Government
were created and made independent of each other. President McKinley in creating civil
government in this country took into consideration these fundamental principles of separate
and independent departments, which have been demonstrated to be essential to a republican
form of government, and conferred upon the Governor-General, as the Executive of the
Philippine Islands, the power to execute the laws according to his best judgment, holding him
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
responsible to the President of the United States, without interference on the part of the
judiciary. In so doing he reposed in the Executive of this country great confidence, realizing
that he, the Executive, acting independently of the judiciary, would be in a better position to
carry out the great underlying principles of American institutions for the peace and happiness
of the inhabitants of this country. The President realized that the final decision of every
question in controversy must be left somewhere, and when such decision has been made it
must be accepted as correct. The presumption is just as conclusive in favor of executive
actions as to its correctness and justness, as it is in favor of judicial action."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In another part of this decision this court added:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Inasmuch as the three coordinated departments of the Government, the executive,
legislative, and judicial, have been established and are operating, as we have said, as
independently of each other as the same three coordinated branches created under the
constitution of the Federal and State governments are operating in the American Union, and
in view of the fact that there have been conferred upon the Chief Executive of these Islands
more extensive powers, duties and responsibilities than have been conferred upon the
governors of the various States of the Union, we think the reason for the holdings of the
courts of the United States, which have passed upon this question are worthy of
consideration. We might here add that we have no doubt that the present incumbent of the
office of Governor-General, a man who is ready and willing at all times to render obedience
to the law, would follow the mandate of this court, but such willingness to be governed by the
order of this court would not of itself give us jurisdiction. Nor should he manifest (which he
has not done) his intention to not obey the mandate of this court, this would not be sufficient
reason for us to abstain from requiring him to comply with such mandate in case we have
jurisdiction."cralaw virtua1aw library
And in the dispositive part of the decision the court among other things said: "That we can
not and should not entertain a complaint which seeks to control or interfere with the official
duties of the Governor-General."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield (16 Phil., 534), this court, adhering to
the same principle announced in the case of Severino v. Governor-General and Provincial
Board of Occidental Negros, supra, established the following doctrine:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In a government of separate and independent departments, executive, legislative, and
86
judicial, with separate and distinct functions, one department will not attempt to interfere with
the performance of the exclusive duties of another. To permit such an interference would
destroy the independence of the separate departments and would make one subject to the
control of the others. For the judiciary to interfere, for the purpose of questioning the manner
of exercising the legal and political duties of the chief executive head of the Government or to
control the action of the legislative department, would, in effect, destroy the independence of
the departments of the Government and would make all departments subject to the ultimate
control of the judicial. Such a conclusion or condition was never contemplated by the
organizers of the Government."cralaw virtua1aw library
In deciding the present petition, ordering that the respondent judge Fermin Mariano should be
ousted from the office of Judge of the Twenty-fourth District and that possession thereof
should be surrendered to the petitioner Andres Borromeo, has not this court judicially
determined that the appointment of the former to said district and that of the latter to the
twenty-first, both made by the Governor General, with the advice and consent of the
Philippine Senate, are not well made and are contrary to the immovability of judges and
should therefore be annulled by this court? What does the decision of the majority mean but
that it is a real intrusion in the exercise of the powers conferred upon the executive and
legislative departments of the Government? And is this not openly contrary to the doctrines
established in the decisions cited of this Supreme Court itself, where the much-vaunted
independence of the executive, legislative, and judicial departments is proclaimed?
The petition is denied.
The motion for reconsideration should be granted.
G.R. No. L-42935             February 15, 1935
FELIPE REGALADO, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE YULO, Secretary of Justice,
JUAN G. LESACA, Judge of First Instance of Albay,
and ESTEBAN T. VILLAR, respondents.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
L.R. Peña for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for respondents.
Respondent Villar in his own behalf.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an action of quo warranto originally brought in this court to determine the respective
rights of the petitioner Felipe Regalado and one of the respondents, Esteban T. Villar, to the
office of justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay. The issue in the case is whether or not under
the provisions of section 203 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3899, the
justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace appointed prior to the approval of the
last mentioned Act who reached the age of sixty-five years after said Act took effect shall
cease to hold office upon reaching the age of sixty-five years.
The facts as stipulated are principally the following: Felipe Regalado qualified for the office
of justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay, on April 12, 1906. On September 13, 1934,
Regalado became sixty-five years of age. As a consequence, shortly thereafter, the judge of
first instance of Albay, acting in accordance with instructions from the Secretary of Justice,
designated Esteban T. Villar, justice of the peace of Tabaco, Albay, to act as justice of the
peace of Malinao, Albay. Regalado surrendered the office to Villar under protest. On
December 17, 1934, Villar qualified as justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay, and entered
upon the discharge of the duties of the office.
The text of section 203 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3899, reads in
Spanish, the language in which this Act was enacted by the Philippine Legislature, as
follows:
ART. 203. Nombramiento y distribucion de jueces de paz. — El Gobernador General
nombrara, con el consejo y consentimiento del Senado de Filipinas, un juez de paz y
un juez de paz auxilizr para la Ciudad de Baguio y para cada municipio, township, y
distrito municipal da las Islas Filipinas y si el interes publico asi lo exigiere para
cualquier otra division politica de menos importancia y territorio no organizado en
dichas Islas: Entendiendose, Que los jueces de paz y jueces de paz auxiliares seran
nombrados para servir cumplir sesenta y cinco años de edad: Entendiendose, ademas,
Que los actuales jueces de paz y jueces de paz auxiliares que al tiempo de la vigencia
de esta Ley hayan cumplido sesenta y cinco años de edad, cesaran el primero de
enero de mil novecientos treinta y tres en sus cargos; y el Gobernador General, con el
consejo y consentimiento del Senado de Filipinas, hara nuevos nombramientos para
cubrir las vacantes que habran de ocurir por ministerio de esta Ley.
87
The English version of the same codal section, as amended, reads as follows:
SEC. 203. Appointment and distribution of justices of the peace. — One justice of the
peace and one auxiliary justice of the peace shall be appointed by the Governor-
General, with the advise and consent of the Philippine Senate, for the City of Baguio,
and for each municipality, township, and municipal district in the Philippine Islands,
and if the public interests shall so require, for any other minor political division or
unorganized territory in said Islands: Provided, That justices and auxiliary justices of
the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five
years: Provided, further, That the present justices and auxiliary justices of the peace
who shall, at the time this Act takes effect, have completed sixty-five years of age,
shall automatically cease to hold office on January first, nineteen hundred and thirty-
three; and the Governor-General, with the advise and consent of the Philippine
Senate, shall make new appointments to cover the vacancies occurring by operation
of this Act.
Petitioner Regalado insists that the law is clear and accordingly needs no interpretation. The
meaning of the law according to him is that only those justice of the peace and auxiliary
justices of the peace ceased to hold office who had completed sixty-five years of age on or
before November 16, 1931, when Act No. 3899 took effect. On the other hand, the Solicitor-
General, as attorney for the respondents, admits that the provisions of the second proviso
added to section 203 of the Administrative Code by Act No. 3899, are not very specific, but
that according to the real intention of the law the only sensible and proper construction that
could be place on the proviso in question in that under its provisions all justices of the peace
and auxiliary justices of the peace, whether appointed prior to the approval of the Act or
subsequent thereto, who had completed the age of sixty-five years of age at the time of the
approval of the Act, and those who shall complete that age thereafter, shall cease to hold
office, the former on January 1, 1933, and the latter at the time they complete that age.
All are agreed that the language which should prevail in the interpretation of Act No. 3899 is
Spanish, but that the English text may be consulted to explain the Spanish. The English text is
deficient in that it includes the word "automatically", the equivalent of which does not appear
in the Spanish. Also, in the Administrative Code containing a compilation of section 203, as
amended, the word "office" was omitted after the word "hold". Finally, the spanish uses the
term "al teimpo de la vigencia de esta ley", translated into English as "at the time this Act
takes effect". But the Solicitor-General insists that the equivalent of the term "al" is "at" and
that "at" can be construed as equivalent to "during".
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
The Solicitor-General properly invites attention to the history of the law and from that history
would deduce the legislative intention to be effectuated. Let us briefly notice this point.
Originally judges of first instance and justices of the peace had no age limits on their tenures
of office. Eventually, however, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2347. That law not
only provided that judges of first instance shall serve until they have reached the age of sixty-
five years, but it further provided that "... the present judges of Courts of First Instance ...
vacate their positions on the taking effect of this Act: and the Governor-General, with the
advice and consent of the Philippine Commission, shall make new appointments of judges of
the Courts of First Instance ... ." This law was held valid. (Chanco vs. Imperial [1916], 34
Phil., 329.) Subsequently section 203 of the Administrative Code, relating to justices of the
peace, was amended by section 1 of Act No. 3107 by adding at the end thereof the following
proviso: "... Provided, That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to
serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years." It was held that the law should be
given prospective effect only and was not applicable to justices and auxiliary justices of the
peace appointed before it went into effect. (Segovia vs. Noel [1925], 47 Phil., 543.)
Thereafter the matter again came before the Philippine Legislature and apparently it was in
the mind of certain members of the Legislature to make the law fixing the age limit for
justices of the peace retroactive in nature. At least the bill as introduced in the Senate, and
providing: "Entendiendose, ademas, Que los actuales jueces de paz y jueces de paz auxiliares
que al tiempo de la vigencia de esta Ley hayan cumplido sesenta y cinco años de edad,
cesaran automaticamente en sus cargos; y el Gobernador General, con el consejo y
consentimiento del Senado de Filipinas, hara nuevos nombramientos para cubrir las vacantes
que habran de ocurrir por ministerio de esta ley," — appears to have had this purpose both
because of the langage used and because of what can be gleaned from the debates on the bill
while it was under consideration in the Senate. But when the bill left the Philippine
Legislature it was in a different form, for the word "automaticamente" had been omitted and
instead there was to be found the words "el primero de enero de mil novecientos treinta y
tres".
The Solicitor-General finally points out that the Secretary of Justice has consistently
interpreted the proviso in question as meaning, that all justices of the peace and auxiliary
justices of the peace no matter when appointed who had completed the age of sixty-five years
prior to the approval of the law and those who shall complete that age thereafter, shall cease
to hold office upon their attaining that age. It is of course a cardinal rule that the practical
construction of a statute by the department whose duty it is to carry it into execution is
entitled to great weight. Nevertheless the court is not bound by such construction and the rule
does not apply in cases where the construction is not doubtful.
88
The fundamental purpose in enacting Act No. 3899, it is argued, was to correct the
phraseology of the first proviso to section 203 of the Administrative Code added thereto by
Act No. 3107, and to place justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace on the
same footing as regards their cessation from office by reason of age. We are asked for
effectuate this legislative purpose. We would accede if that result was obtainable by any
logical construction of the law whether strict or liberal. But we cannot reach that result when
to do so compels us to rewrite a law and to insert words or phrases not found in it. If the court
should do that it would pass beyond the bounds of judicial power to usurp legislative power.
The intent of the Legislature to be ascertained and enforced is the intent expressed in the
words of the statute. If legislative intent is not expressed in some appropriate manner, the
courts cannot by interpretation speculate as to an intent and supply a meaning not found in
the phraseology of the law. In other words, the courts cannot assume some purpose in no way
expressed and then construe the statute to accomplish this supposed intention.
Delving a little more deeply into the meaning of the law as applied to the case of the
petitioner, at the time Act No. 3899 took effect he was one of the "actuales jueces de paz"
(present justices of the peace). Giving the term "al tiempo de la vigencia de la ley" the
ordinary meaning of "at the time this Act takes effect," which was on November 16, 1931, on
that date the petitioner was not sixty-five years of age. Proceeding further, the phrase "hayan
cumplido se senta cinco años de edad", appearing in English as "have completed sixty-five
years of age", is of the past tense and could not regularly be taken to contemplate the future.
Finally the phrase "el primero de enero de mil novecientos treinta y tres", in English "on
January first nineteen hundred and thirty-three", is also a date in the past, for on that date the
petitioner had not yet reached the age of sixty-five.
Before we conclude, let us again return to the consideration of the law and see if it would be
possible under any logical interpretation, to give the law the meaning which the Government
insists it should have. Supposing we give to the phrase "al tiempo de la vigencia de esta ley"
the unusual meaning of "within the time this Act is effective", but having done so, we then
reach the barrier that the petitioner within the time this Act is effective must have completed
sixty-five years of age and cease to hold office on January 1, 1933. The petitioner having
become sixty-five years of age on September 13, 1934, could not be included under a law
which required justices of the peace sixty-five years of age to cease to hold office on January
1, 1933.
For the reasons given, we are of the opinion that the natural and reasonable meaning of the
language used in Act No. 3899 leaves room for no other deduction than that a justice of the
peace appointed prior to the approval of the Act and who completed sixty-five years of age on
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
September 13, 1934, subsequent to the approval of the Act, which was on November 16,
1931, and who by the law was required to cease to hold office on January 1, 1933, is not
affected by the said Act. Accordingly it is our judgment that the respondent Esteban T. Villar
be ousted from the office of justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay, and that the petitioner
Felipe Regalado be placed in possession of the same. So ordered, without special
pronouncement as to the costs.
Villa-Real, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-14526             March 31, 1965
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION; CARLOS A. GO THONG & COMPANY;
CEBU NAVIGATION COMPANY, INC.; CEBU-BOHOL FERRY CO., INC.;
COROMINAS, RICHARDS NAVIGATION CO., INC.; HIJOS DE F. ESCANO, INC.;
PACIFIC LINES, INC.; ROYAL LINES, INC.; SOUTHERN ISLAND SHIPPING
CORPORATION; SWEET LINES SHIPPING; VISAYAN TRANSPORTATION CO.,
INC.; PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO.; COMPAÑIA MARITIMA; and
GENERAL SHIPPING CO., INC., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
THE CITY OF CEBU; FELIPE PAREJA, as City Treasurer of Cebu; THE HON.
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., as Mayor of the City of Cebu, defendants-appellees.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for plaintiffs-appellants.
Cebu City Fiscal and Quirico del Mar for defendants-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
The principal question here is whether or not under its charter, Commonwealth Act No. 58,
the City of Cebu may provide by ordinance for the collection of wharfage from shipping
concerns whose vessels dock at the public wharves of piers located in said city but owned by
the National Government. The ordinance, No. 207, was purportedly enacted by the Municipal
Board on August 14, 1956 and approved by the City Mayor on the following August 27.
Plaintiffs paid the wharfage charges under protest since September 1, 1956 and on May 8,
1957 filed this action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to have the said ordinance
declared void, its enforcement enjoined in so far as the wharves, docks and other landing
places belonging to the National Government were concerned, and all the amounts thus far
collected by defendants refunded to them.
89
The court a quo dismissed the complaint after trial and the case has come to us on appeal by
plaintiffs.
Appellants have raised some questions of fact, and in particular point out certain events and
circumstances to show that ordinance No. 207 was not and could not have been enacted, as
alleged by appellees, on August 14, 1956. This case, however, may be decided solely on the
legal issue presented by the parties.1äwphï1.ñët
The Municipal Board's authority to pass the ordinance is claimed by appellees under section
17 (w) of the charter of the City of Cebu, which states:
SECTION 17. General powers and duties of the Board.—Except as otherwise
provided by law, and subject to the conditions and limitations thereof, the Municipal
Board shall have the following legislative powers:
xxx     xxx     xxx
(w) To fix the charges to be paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public
wharves, docks, levees, or landing places.
The lower court ruled upholding appellees' contention in this respect, that in using the terms
"public wharves, docks, levees, or landing places," the legislature made no distinction
between those owned by the National Government and those owned by the City of Cebu and
that consequently both fall within the scope of the power granted. Appellants assail this
construction as erroneous, first in the light of the generally accepted meaning of "public
wharf" as it may have a bearing on the right or authority to charge wharfage and, secondly, in
view of other related provisions of the same city charter.
The word "public", as employed to describe a wharf, does not refer to its ownership either by
the National Government or by a province or municipality. It denotes rather the nature of its
use. Thus public wharves have been held to be those used generally by the public, free of
charge or for compensation, while a private wharf is one whose owner or lessee has exclusive
enjoyment or use thereof (Hamilton v. Portland State Pier Site District, 112 A. 836). Piers, or
landing places and wharves may be private or they may be in their nature, public, although
the property may be in an individual owner, where the latter is under obligation to concede to
others the privilege of landing their goods or of mooring their vessels there, upon payment of
a reasonable compensation as wharfage (Dutton v. Strong, 17 Law Ed. 29, 1 Black 35, 66
U.S. 339). So a wharf may be public whether it belongs to the National Government, to a
municipal corporation or to a private individual or concern.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
Assuming the public character of a wharf by reason of its availability for public use, the right
to impose wharfage dues rests on a different basis — that of ownership. For wharfage is a
charge against the vessel by way of rent or compensation for its being allowed to lie
alongside a wharf for the purpose of loading or unloading freight (Phil. Sugar Centrals
Agency vs. Insular Collector of Customs, 51 Phil. 131, citing Parkersburg and Ohio River
Transportation Co. vs. City of Parkersburg, 27 Law Ed. 584) and, of course, for the use of the
artificial facilities offered for that purpose (City of Shreveport vs. Red River and Coast Line,
55 Am. Rep. 504). That the right to charge wharfage is based on ownership has been
impliedly recognized by this Court in Province of Mindoro v. Cruz, 74 Phil. 108, as follows:
"... the subsequent classification of the port of Calapan as a national port did not, and was not
intended to, divest the province of Mindoro of its part ownership of the wharf and,
accordingly, of its right to collect wharfage for its use as it had theretofore done"; and "not
until its complete ownership has become vested in the National Government by the mode of
transfer provided by law may the province of Mindoro be divested of this right."
Under the foregoing test the right to collect the wharfage in question here belongs to the
National Government, as in fact it has always collected the same from appellants. It is
unreasonable to conclude that the legislature, simply because it employed the term "public
wharves" in section 17 (w) of the charter of the City of Cebu, thereby authorized the latter to
collect wharfage irrespective of the ownership of the wharves involved. The National
Government did not surrender such ownership to the city; and there is no justifiable ground to
read into the statute an intention to burden shipowners, such as appellants, with the obligation
of paying twice for the same purpose.
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not
of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory
construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite
different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered
with those with which it is associated. Thus an apparently general provision may have a
limited application if viewed together with other provisions.
Section 17 (w) of the charter of the City of Cebu is a case in point. It authorizes the
Municipal Board to fix the charges to be paid by all watercrafts landing at or
using public wharves, docks, levees, or landing places. There is indeed no distinction therein
between public wharves owned by the National Government and those owned by the city
itself. But the subsection immediately preceding (v) impliedly establishes such a distinction.
It empowers the Municipal Board "to provide for the construction and maintenance, and
regulate the use, of public landing places, wharves, piers, docks and levees." It seems fairly
evident that when the lawmaking body used the term "public wharves, etc." in subsection 2, it
90
meant to refer to those mentioned in the preceding subsection, namely, the "public wharves,
etc." constructed and therefore owned by the City of Cebu. Section 30 of the charter has a
similar bearing on the question, in granting to the City Engineer "the care and custody of
all public docks, wharves, piers, levees, and landing places, when erected" — undoubtedly
referring to those constructed and owned by the city. For in so far as those belonging to the
National Government are concerned they remain under the exclusive control, direction and
management of the Bureau of Customs, according to section 1142 of the Revised
Administrative Code. And appellants have accordingly been paying to the National
Government fees for the use of its wharves in Cebu, pursuant to law, particularly Republic
Act No. 1371 which took effect on July 1, 1955 and was later on embodied in the new Tariff
and Customs Code.
The court a quo ruled that Section 17 (w) of the city charter is "plainly evincive of the power
to tax for revenue purposes," and therefore the wharfage charges imposed by ordinance
pursuant thereto are proper even if the amounts actually collected are much more than what
may be justified as license fees under the police power of regulation of "shipping offices"
granted under section 17 (1) of the same charter. The power to tax is an attribute of
sovereignty and for it to be exercised by a municipal corporation requires a clear delegation
of the power by means of charter grant or by a general enabling statute. The power is not
inherent in a municipal corporation (Saldaña vs. City of Iloilo, 55 O.G. 10267), and if there is
any doubt as to whether or not such power has been delegated to it the doubt must be resolved
negatively (We Wa Yu vs. City of Lipa, 54 O.G. 4055).
But even if the wharfage dues authorized under Section 17(w) be considered as taxes for
revenue, such authority nevertheless is limited to public wharves, docks, levees and other
landing places belonging to the City of Cebu and not to those owned by the National
Government under the exclusive supervision of the Bureau of Customs.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is reversed; Ordinance No.
207 of the City of Cebu is declared null and void, and appellees are ordered to refund to
appellants all amounts collected thereunder and to refrain from making such collection. Costs
against appellees.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon,
J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
MAPALAD AISPORNA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner-accused Aisporna seeks the reversal of the decision
dated August 14, 1974 1 in CA-G.R. No. 13243-CR entitled "People of the Philippines,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. Mapalad Aisporna, defendant-appellant" of respondent Court of
Appeals affirming the judgment of the City Court of Cabanatuan 2 rendered on August 2,
1971 which found the petitioner guilty for having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act
(Act No. 2427, as amended) and sentenced her to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189
of the Insurance Act on November 21, 1970 in an information 3 which reads as follows:
That on or before the 21st day of June, 1969, in the City of Cabanatuan,
Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously act as agent in the solicitation or procurement of an application
for insurance by soliciting therefor the application of one Eugenio S. Isidro,
for and in behalf of Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., a duly organized
insurance company, registered under the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines, resulting in the issuance of a Broad Personal Accident Policy
No. 28PI-RSA 0001 in the amount not exceeding FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00) dated June 21, 1969, without said accused having first
secured a certificate of authority to act as such agent from the office of the
Insurance Commissioner, Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The facts, 4 as found by the respondent Court of Appeals are quoted hereunder:
IT RESULTING: That there is no debate that since 7 March, 1969 and as of
21 June, 1969, appellant's husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna was duly licensed
by Insurance Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros, with
91
license to expire on 30 June, 1970, Exh. C; on that date, at Cabanatuan City,
Personal Accident Policy, Exh. D was issued by Perla thru its author
representative, Rodolfo S. Aisporna, for a period of twelve (12) months with
beneficiary as Ana M. Isidro, and for P5,000.00; apparently, insured died by
violence during lifetime of policy, and for reasons not explained in record,
present information was filed by Fiscal, with assistance of private prosecutor,
charging wife of Rodolfo with violation of Sec. 189 of Insurance Law for
having, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously acted, "as agent in the
solicitation for insurance by soliciting therefore the application of one
Eugenio S. Isidro for and in behalf of Perla Compaña de Seguros, ... without
said accused having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such agent
from the office of the Insurance Commission, Republic of the Philippines."
and in the trial, People presented evidence that was hardly disputed, that
aforementioned policy was issued with active participation of appellant wife
of Rodolfo, against which appellant in her defense sought to show that being
the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as
clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro
had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was
absent and so she left a note on top of her husband's desk to renew ...
Consequently, the trial court found herein petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the trial
court's decision was affirmed by the respondent appellate court finding the petitioner guilty of
a violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Hence, this present
recourse was filed on October 22, 1974. 5
In its resolution of October 28, 1974, 6 this Court resolved, without giving due course to this
instant petition, to require the respondent to comment on the aforesaid petition. In the
comment 7 filed on December 20, 1974, the respondent, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, submitted that petitioner may not be considered as having violated Section
189 of the Insurance Act. 8 On April 3, 1975, petitioner submitted his Brief 9 while the
Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent, filed a manifestation 10 in lieu of a Brief on
May 3, 1975 reiterating his stand that the petitioner has not violated Section 189 of the
Insurance Act.
In seeking reversal of the judgment of conviction, petitioner assigns the following
errors 11 allegedly committed by the appellate court:
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
THAT RECEIPT OF COMPENSATION IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT OF THE CRIME DEFINED BY THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF
SECTION 189 OF THE INSURANCE ACT.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE
WEIGHT TO EXHIBITS F, F-1, TO F-17, INCLUSIVE SUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH PETITIONER'S GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING HEREIN PETITIONER.
We find the petition meritorious.
The main issue raised is whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first
paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of
the same section. In other words, it is necessary to determine whether or not the agent
mentioned in the first paragraph of the aforesaid section is governed by the definition of an
insurance agent found on its second paragraph.
The pertinent provision of Section 189 of the Insurance Act reads as follows:
No insurance company doing business within the Philippine Islands, nor any
agent thereof, shall pay any commission or other compensation to any person
for services in obtaining new insurance, unless such person shall have first
procured from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as
an agent of such company as hereinafter provided. No person shall act as
agent, sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of applications
for insurance, or receive for services in obtaining new insurance, any
commission or other compensation from any insurance company doing
business in the Philippine Islands, or agent thereof, without first procuring a
certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, which
must be renewed annually on the first day of January, or within six months
thereafter. Such certificate shall be issued by the Insurance Commissioner
only upon the written application of persons desiring such authority, such
application being approved and countersigned by the company such person
desires to represent, and shall be upon a form approved by the Insurance
Commissioner, giving such information as he may require. The Insurance
Commissioner shall have the right to refuse to issue or renew and to revoke
92
any such certificate in his discretion. No such certificate shall be valid,
however, in any event after the first day of July of the year following the
issuing of such certificate. Renewal certificates may be issued upon the
application of the company.
Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of
any insurance company, or transmits for a person other than himself an
application for a policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or
assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance
agent within the intent of this section, and shall thereby become liable to all
the duties, requirements, liabilities, and penalties to which an agent of such
company is subject.
Any person or company violating the provisions of this section shall be fined
in the sum of five hundred pesos. On the conviction of any person acting as
agent, sub-agent, or broker, of the commission of any offense connected with
the business of insurance, the Insurance Commissioner shall immediately
revoke the certificate of authority issued to him and no such certificate shall
thereafter be issued to such convicted person.
A careful perusal of the above-quoted provision shows that the first paragraph thereof
prohibits a person from acting as agent, sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement
of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from
the Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent
within the intent of this section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty
to be imposed for its violation.
The respondent appellate court ruled that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second
paragraph of Section 189 of the aforesaid Act but under its first paragraph. Thus —
... it can no longer be denied that it was appellant's most active endeavors that
resulted in issuance of policy to Isidro, she was there and then acting as
agent, and received the pay thereof — her defense that she was only acting as
helper of her husband can no longer be sustained, neither her point that she
received no compensation for issuance of the policy because
any person who for compensation solicits or obtains
insurance on behalf of any insurance company or transmits
for a person other than himself an application for a policy of
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to
act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance
agent within the intent of this section, and shall thereby
become liable to all the duties, requirements, liabilities, and
penalties, to which an agent of such company is subject.
paragraph 2, Sec. 189, Insurance Law,
now it is true that information does not even allege that she had obtained the
insurance,
for compensation
which is the gist of the offense in Section 189 of the Insurance Law in its 2nd
paragraph, but what appellant apparently overlooks is that she is prosecuted
not under the 2nd but under the 1st paragraph of Sec. 189 wherein it is
provided that,
No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker, in the
solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance, or
receive for services in obtaining new insurance any
commission or other compensation from any insurance
company doing business in the Philippine Island, or agent
thereof, without first procuring a certificate of authority to
act from the insurance commissioner, which must be
renewed annually on the first day of January, or within six
months thereafter.
therefore, there was no technical defect in the wording of the charge, so that
Errors 2 and 4 must be overruled. 12
From the above-mentioned ruling, the respondent appellate court seems to imply that the
definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph of Section 189 is not applicable
to the insurance agent mentioned in the first paragraph. Parenthetically, the respondent court
concludes that under the second paragraph of Section 189, a person is an insurance agent if he
solicits and obtains an insurance for compensation, but, in its first paragraph, there is no
necessity that a person solicits an insurance for compensation in order to be called an
insurance agent.
93
We find this to be a reversible error. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended
to define the word "agent" mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid
section. More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the
definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189. Hence —
Any person who for compensation ... shall be an insurance agent within the
intent of this section, ...
Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph holds true with
respect to the agent mentioned in the other two paragraphs of the said section. The second
paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and interpretative clause intended to qualify the term
"agent" mentioned in both the first and third paragraphs of the aforesaid section.
Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned
in the first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of
Section 189. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a
whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing
the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. 13 A statute must
be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. 14 The
meaning of the law, it must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any single part,
portion or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences but from a general
consideration or view of the act as a whole.  15 Every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context. This means that every part of the statute must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment, not separately and independently. 16 More importantly, the doctrine of associated
words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be
made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is
associated. 17
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also
applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive a compensation by the
agent is an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid section. The
appellate court has established ultimately that the petitioner-accused did not receive any
compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro. Nevertheless, the
accused was convicted by the appellate court for, according to the latter, the receipt of
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
compensation for issuing an insurance policy is not an essential element for a violation of the
first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
We rule otherwise. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a misdemeanor
for any person for direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate of
authority to act as an insurance agent, an information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to
receive compensation either directly or indirectly, charges no offense. 18 In the case of Bolen
vs. Stake, 19 the provision of Section 3750, Snyder's Compiled Laws of Oklahoma 1909 is
intended to penalize persons only who acted as insurance solicitors without license, and while
acting in such capacity negotiated and concluded insurance contracts for compensation. It
must be noted that the information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the negotiation of
an insurance contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This
allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be
sustained. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of
the crime must be alleged and proved. 20
After going over the records of this case, We are fully convinced, as the Solicitor General
maintains, that accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the accused is acquitted of the
crime charged, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-95630 June 18, 1992
SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and MA. LUISA VEROY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. WILLIAM L. LAYAGUE, Presiding Judge, Branch XIV, Regional Trial
Court at Davao City; and BRIG. GEN. PANTALEON DUMLAO, Commanding
General, PC-Criminal Investigation Service, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This was originally a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court: certiorari, to review the Order of the respondent Judge dated October 2, 1990
denying herein petitioner's Motion for Hospital Confinement; mandamus, to compel
94
respondent Judge to resolve petitioners' long pending motion for bail; and prohibition, to
enjoin further proceedings on the ground that the legal basis therefore is unconstitutional for
being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Petitioners are husband and wife who owned and formerly resided at No. 13 Isidro St.,
Skyline Village. Catalunan Grande, Davao City. When petitioner Leopoldo Veroy was
promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System sometime
in June, 1988, he and his family transferred to 130 K-8th St., East Kamias, Quezon City,
where they are presently residing. The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was
left to two (2) houseboys, Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a
portion of the premises. The Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna Soguilon for the
salary of the said houseboys and other expenses for the upkeep of their house. While the
Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house, only the key to the kitchen, where the circuit
breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soguilon to give her access in case of an
emergency. Hence, since 1988, the key to the master's bedroom as well as the keys to the
children's rooms were retained by herein Petitioners so that neither Edna Soguilon nor the
caretakers could enter the house.
On April 12, 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station, PC/INP, acting upon
a directive issued by Metrodiscom Commander Col. Franco Calida, raided the house of
herein petitioners in Davao City on information that the said residence was being used as a
safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers
but did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search
warrant. Petitioner Ma. Luisa was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by
Capt. Obrero to ask permission to search the house in Davao City as it was reportedly being
used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy
responded that she is flying to Davao City to witness the search but relented if the search
would not be conducted in the presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet, an officer of the PC/INP,
Davao City and a long time family friend of the Veroys. The authority given by Ma. Luisa
Veroy was relayed by Capt. Obrero to Major Macasaet who answered that Ma. Luisa Veroy
has called him twice by telephone on the matter and that the permission was given on the
condition that the search be conducted in his presence.
The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the house of herein petitioners in
Skyline Village to conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner Ma.
Luisa Veroy. The caretakers facilitated their entry into the yard, and using the key entrusted
to Edna Soguilon, they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen. However, a locksmith by
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
the name of George Badiang had to be employed to open the padlock of the door leading to
the children's room. Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet then entered the children's room and
conducted the search. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing
seven (7) live bullets in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer. Three (3) half-full jute
sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP (samples of which were attached as Annexes
"H" and "H-1" of the petition) (Rollo, pp. 49-55) were also found in the children's room. A
search of the children's recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing
assorted polo shirts, men's brief, two (2) pieces polo barong and short sleeve striped gray
polo. sweat shirt, two (2) pairs men's socks, a towel made in U.S.A., one blanket, a small
black bag, Gandhi brand, containing a book entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the
Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted
medicines and religious pamphlets was found in the master's bedroom. Sgt. Leo Justalero was
instructed by Capt. Obrero to make an inventory and receipt of the articles seized, in the
house (Annex "F" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 48). Said receipt was signed by Eric Burgos, one
of the caretakers, and George Badiang, the locksmith, as witnesses. Sgt. Justalero turned over
the articles to Sgt. Rodolfo Urbano at the police station.
The case was referred for preliminary investigation to Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor
Rodolfo Ponferrada who was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City by the
Department of Justice through Department Order No. 88 dated May 16, 1990. In a resolution
dated August 6, 1990, Fiscal Ponferrada recommended the filing of an information against
herein petitioners for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion) (Annex "L" of the Petition, Rollo, p.
71). Hence, on August 8, 1990. an Information for the said offense was filed by the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Davao City before the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region,
Davao City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 20595-90 and entitled "People of the Philippines
v. Atty. Leopoldo Veroy and Mrs. Maria Luisa Veroy" (Annex "K" of the Petition, Rollo, p.
70). No bail was recommended by the prosecution.
The aforementioned resolution dated August 6, 1990 of Fiscal Ponferrada was received by the
petitioners on August 13, 1990. On the same day, the latter filed a Motion for Bail before
herein respondent Judge Layague which was denied on August 17, 1990 for being premature
since at that time, petitioners had not yet been arrested. Despite the fact that the warrants for
their arrest have not yet been served on them, herein petitioners voluntarily surrendered
themselves to Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, PC-CIS Chief, since it was the CIS that initiated
the complaint. However, the latter refused to receive them on the ground that his office has
not yet received copies of their warrants of arrest.
95
In the meantime, on August 15, 1990, herein petitioners were admitted to the St. Luke's
Hospital for various ailments brought about or aggravated by the stress and anxiety caused by
the filing of the criminal complaint. On August 17, 1990, Brig. Gen. Dumlao granted their
request that they be allowed to be confined at the hospital and placed under guard thereat.
In an Indorsement dated August 20, 1990, the CIS through Capt. Benjamin de los Santos,
made its return to the trial court informing the latter of the voluntary surrender of herein
petitioners and the fact that they were under hospital confinement. Herein Petitioner reiterated
their Motion for Bail. In an Order dated August 24, 1990 (Annex "M" of the Petition, Rollo,
p. 74), the hearing for the Motion for Ball was set for August 31, 1990 to enable the
prosecution to present evidence it opposition to said motion. The prosecution filed its written
opposition (Annex "N" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 75) on August 28, 1990, arguing that the
evidence of petitioners' guilt was strong and thereafter presented its evidence.
On September 21, 1990, respondent Judge required the CIS to produce the bodies of herein
petitioners on October 1, 1990 for arraignment (Annex "O" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 76).
Upon their arraignment, herein Petitioners entered a plea of not guilty and filed an "Urgent
Motion for Hospital Confinement" (Annex "OO" of the Petition Rollo, p. 77) which was
denied by the court in its Order dated October 2, 1990 (Annex "P" of the Petition, Rollo, p.
80). It likewise ordered their commitment at the Davao City Rehabilitation Center, Ma-a,
Davao City pending trial on the merits. Herein petitioners argued orally a motion for
reconsideration which was opposed by the prosecution. At the conclusion thereof, the court a
quo issued a second order annex "Q" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 83) denying then motion for
reconsideration and as to the alternative prayer to reopen the motion for hospital confinement,
set the continuance thereof to October 17, 1990. It was further ordered that the petitioners
shall remain under the custody of the PC-CIS pending resolution of the case.
Meanwhile, petitioners were returned to the St. Luke's Hospital where their physical
condition remained erratic. On or about October 18, 1990, herein petitioners were informed
that Brig. Gen. Dumlao had issued a directive for their transfer from the St. Luke's Hospital to
Camp Crame on the basis of the October 2, 1990 Order (Annex "Q" of the Petition, Rollo, p.
83). Petitioners made representations that the tenor of the court order warranted maintenance
of the status quo, i.e., they were to continue their hospital confinement. However, Brig, Gen.
Dumlao informed them that unless otherwise restrained by the court, they would proceed
with their transfer pursuant to the order of the trial court.
Hence, this petition on October 25, 1990 this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering: (a)
respondent Hon. William L. Layague to refrain from further proceeding with petitioners'
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
"Motion for Hospital Confinement" in Criminal Case No. 20595-90 entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Leopoldo Veroy and Ma. Luisa Veroy"; and (b) respondent Brig. Gen.
Pantaleon Dumlao to refrain from transferring petitioners from the St. Luke's Hospital (Rollo,
pp. 84-A to 84-C).
On November 2, 1990, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' Motion for Bail
(Annex "A" of the Second Supplemental Petition, Rollo, p. 133). Petitioners filed a
Supplemental Petition on November 7, 1990 (Rollo, P. 105) and a Second Supplemental
Petition on November 16, 1990 (Rollo, p. 120) which sought to review the order of the trial
court dated November 2, 1990 denying their petition for bail.
Acting on the Supplemental Petition filed by Petitioners and taking into consideration several
factors such as: a) that the possibility that they will flee or evade the processes of the court is
fairly remote; b) their poor medical condition; and c) the matters in their Second
Supplemental Petition especially since the prosecution's evidence refers to constructive
possession of the disputed firearms in Davao City through the two (2) caretakers while
petitioners lived in Manila since 1988, this Court, on November 20, 1990, granted petitioners'
provisional liberty and set the bail bond at P20,000.00 each (Rollo, p. 141). Petitioners posted
a cash bond in the said amount on November 23, 1990 (Rollo, pp. 143-145).
The petition was given due course on July 16, 1991 (Rollo, p. 211). Respondents adopted
their Comment dated December 28, 1990 (Rollo, pp. 182-191) as their Memorandum while,
petitioners filed their Memorandum on September 9, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 218-269).
As submitted by the respondents, and accepted by petitioners, the petition for mandamus to
compel respondent Judge to resolve petitioners' Motion for Bail, and the petition
for certiorari to review the order of respondent judge initially denying their Motion for
Hospital Confinement, were rendered moot and academic by the resolutions of this Court
dated November 20, 1990 and October 25, 1990, respectively. What remains to be resolved is
the petition for prohibition where petitioners raised the following issues:
1. Presidential Decree No. 1866, or at least the third paragraph of Section 1
thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution;
2. Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been repealed by Republic Act No.
6968;
96
3. Assuming the validity of Presidential Decree No. 1866 the respondent
judge gravely abused his discretion in admitting in evidence certain articles
which were clearly inadmissible for being violative of the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
The issue of constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been laid to rest in the case
of Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990 (181 SCRA 648), where this Court
held that the declaration of unconstitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 is wanting in legal basis since it is neither a bill of attainder nor
does it provide a possibility of a double jeopardy.
Likewise, petitioners' contention that Republic Act 6968 has repealed Presidential Decree No.
1866 is bereft of merit. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the words and
phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. its meaning and the intention of the
legislature must be determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity
in the words, there is no room for construction (Provincial Board of Cebu v. Presiding Judge
of Cebu, CFI, Br. IV, G.R. No. 34695, March 7, 1989 [171 SCRA 1]). A perusal of the
aforementioned laws would reveal that the legislature provided for two (2) distinct offenses:
(1) illegal possession of firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866; and (2) rebellion, coup
d' etat, sedition and disloyalty under Republic Act 6968; evidently involving different
subjects which were not clearly shown to have eliminated the others.
But petitioners contend that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is couched in general
or vague terms. The terms "deal in", "acquire", "dispose" or "possess" are capable of various
interpretations such that there is no definiteness as to whether or not the definition includes
"constructive possession" or how the concept of constructive possession should be applied.
Petitioners were not found in actual possession of the firearm and ammunitions. They were in
Quezon City while the prohibited articles were found in Davao City. Yet they were being
charged under Presidential Decree No. 1866 upon the sole circumstance that the house
wherein the items were found belongs to them (Memorandum for Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 242-
244).
Otherwise stated, other than their ownership of the house in Skyline Village, there was no
other evidence whatsoever that herein petitioners possessed or had in their control the items
seized (Ibid., pp. 248-250). Neither was it shown that they had the intention to possess the
Firearms or to further rebellion (Ibid., P. 252).
In a similar case, the revolver in question was found in appellant's store and the question
arouse whether he had possession or custody of it within the meaning of the law.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
This Court held that:
The animus possidendi must be proved in opium cases where the prohibited
drug was found on the premises of the accused and the same rule is
applicable to the possession of firearms. The appellant denied all knowledge
of the existence of the revolver, and the Government's principal witness
stated that there were a number of employees in the store. The only testimony
which tends to show that the appellant had the possession or custody of this
revolver is the inference drawn from the fact that it was found in his store,
but we think that this inference is overcome by the positive testimony of the
appellant, when considered with the fact that there were a number of
employees in the store, who, of course, could have placed the revolver in the
secret place where it was found without the knowledge of the appellant. At
least there is a very serious doubt whether he knew of the existence of this
revolver. In such case the doubt must be resolved in favor of the appellant.
(U.S. v. Jose and Tan Bo., 34 Phil. 724 [1916])
But more importantly, petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the articles seized
in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa
Veroy to break open the door of their residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining
thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any
authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house. The items taken were,
therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights As such, they
are inadmissible in evidence against them.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid
warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search
incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain
view (People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 [193 SCRA 122]).
None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house of
herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for
rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house
because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he
himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the
97
house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was
indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of
rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample
time to procure a search warrant but did not.
In a number of cases decided by this Court, (Guazon v. De Villa, supra.; People v.
Aminnudin, G.R. No. L-74869, July 6, 1988 [163 SCRA 402]; Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. L-
69401, June 23, 1987 [151 SCRA 279]), warrantless searches were declared illegal because
the officials conducting the search had every opportunity to secure a search Warrant. The
objects seized, being products of illegal searches, were inadmissible in evidence in the
criminal actions subsequently instituted against the accused-appellants (People v. Cendana,
G.R. No. 84715, October 17, 1990 [190 SCRA 538]).
Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not
follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala
prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because
they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated
and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are
therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the
petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms. (Roan v.
Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]). Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search
warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must
be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or voluntariness there is no
crime.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition as granted and the criminal case against the
petitioners for illegal possession of firearms is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 103578 January 29, 1993
JUDGE RODOLFO T. ALLARDE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT and the MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF
MUNTINLUPA, respondents.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus seeking to annul and set aside the decisions
dated June 5, 1991, November 5, 1991, August 20, 1991 and January 27, 1992 of the
Commission on audit (COA) which denied petitioner's request for inclusion of the monthly
allowance he had been receiving from the Municipality of Muntinlupa as Metropolitan Trial
Court Judge, as part of his retirement benefits.
Petitioner Rodolfo T. Allarde was the Presiding Judge of Branch LXXX, Metropolitan Trial
Court in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, until his courtesy resignation was accepted on January
13, 1987. He applied for retirement under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1438, which this Court approved on July 11, 1989.
In computing his total retirement pay, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
included the amount of P240,000.00 representing the five-year lump sum of the P4,000.00-
monthly allowance which he had been receiving from the Municipality of Muntinlupa during
his incumbency therein as judge, provided said lump sum of P240,000.00 should be charged
to the funds of the municipality pursuant to Section 30 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 866, and
subject to the availability of funds. On April 16, 1990, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Muntinlupa, by Resolution No. 90-145, appropriated and awarded the amount of P240,000.00
in favor of the petitioner.
However, petitioner's claim for payment of that additional retirement benefit reached the
Metro Manila Authority which denied it on the ground that:
. . . the Commission on Audit who is the final authority on questions of
money claims against the government has already ruled (in similar cases as
the one at bar) that (like) allowances formerly granted you by the Municipal
Government of Muntinlupa, by the very nature and intent of the grant, "are
expense items not to be equated with compensation for purposes of
computing retirement benefits." (p. 49, Rollo.)
On April 4, 1991, the petitioner filed his claim with the Commission on Audit (COA). On
June 5, 1991, the COA rendered Decision No. 1877 denying the claim.
On September 9, 1991, petitioner flied a Memorandum/Motion for Reconsideration of the
decision, but the COA issued Decision No. 1983 dated November 5, 1991, reiterating its
denial of the petitioner's claim.
98
A second reconsideration met the same fate (COA Decision No. 2159, dated January 27,
1992). Hence, this petition for review.
The sole issue in this case is: whether or not the P4,000.00 monthly allowance that the
petitioner had been receiving from the Municipality of Muntinlupa should be included in the
computation of his retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1438.
Petitioner's claim is anchored on Section 3 of Republic Act No. 910. An Act Providing For
The Retirement of Justices and All Judges in the Judiciary, as amended by P.D. No. 1438
which provides:
Sec. 3. Upon retirement, a justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of
Appeals, or a judge of the Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court,
Agrarian Relations, Tax Appeals, Juvenile and Domestic Relations, city or
municipal court, or any other court hereafter established shall be
automatically entitled to a lump sum of five years' gratuity computed on the
basis of the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of
transportation, living and representation allowances he was receiving on the
date of his retirement; Provided, however, that if the reason for the retirement
be any permanent disability contracted during his incumbency in office and
prior to the date of retirement he shall receive only a gratuity equivalent to
ten years' salary and allowances aforementioned with no further annuity
payable monthly during the rest of the retiree's natural life.
As clearly specified in the law, only transportation, living and representation allowances may
be included in the computation of the first
five-year lump sum retirement benefits for members of the judiciary.
It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a
statute are not obscure or ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be
determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there
is no room for construction (Provincial Board of Cebu vs. Presiding Judge of Cebu, CFI,
Branch IV, 171 SCRA 1).
Accordingly, the provisions of Section 3, P.D. No. 1438, which are clear and unambiguous,
should be given their plain and natural meaning. Inasmuch as the law limits the computation
of the lump sum of 5 years' gratuity to "the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly
aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances that the judge was receiving
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
on the date of his retirement," it is understood that other allowances are excluded. Inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius.
The petitioner failed to prove that the P4,000.00 additional monthly allowance that he was
receiving from the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa was a representation, living or
transportation allowance, for as indicated in the sample disbursement voucher that he used to
fill up whenever he claimed such allowance, the amount was in the nature of reimbursement
for expenses which Judge Allarde certified "were incurred by me while performing my
duties."
(p. 52, Rollo.)
The pertinent observations of the COA in its decision dated June 5, 1991 are quoted as
follows:
Upon a close scrutiny and examination of PD 1438, we note that the
allowances contemplated therein are "transportation, living and
representation allowances" being granted to Justices and Judges from
national and/or local funds as authorized by existing laws, rules and
regulations which constitute integral part of their remuneration. (Vide.
WHEREAS clauses) That being so, these allowances are deemed as
commutable in character and, hence, partake of the nature of additional
compensation. For this reason, they are included in the computation of the
retirement benefits of Justices and Judges as provided in the said law.
In your case, however, it appears that the allowances you have been
collecting from the Municipality of Muntinlupa during your stint therein as
Municipal Trial Court Judge were non-commutable or reimbursable in
nature, let alone the fact that there is no indication as to whether they were
transportation, living or representation allowances. This conclusion can be
readily drawn from the copy of a sample voucher forming part of the set of
papers accompanying your present claim whereby you sought to collect
"payment of the allowance of P4,000.00 a month for the period January
1-31, 1985" from the Municipality of Muntinlupa, and whereon you had to
"certify that the expenses were incurred by me (you) while performing my
(your) duties covering the period heretofore cited," thereby signifying the
reimbursable nature thereof. (Emphasis and words in parenthesis ours)
Evidently then, the allowances that you now seek to collect as part of your
retirement gratuity are expense items that cannot be equated with salary or
compensation. On this score, it was patent error for the GSIS to identify such
99
allowance as "RATA" and to include the aggregate amount thereof
corresponding to a 60-month period in its computation of your retirement
gratuity as the local share of the Municipality of Muntinlupa. (p. 52, Rollo.)
Letter of Instruction No. 1418 which authorizes local governments to pay additional
allowances to judges of the courts within their territorial jurisdiction, limits the amount of
such allowance and does not provide that it shall be treated as part of the judge's
remuneration in computing the retirement benefits.
WHEREAS, some local government units are ready, willing, and able to pay
additional allowances to Judges of the various courts within their respective
territorial jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx
3. The allowances provided in this letter shall be borne exclusively by the
National Government. However, provincial, city and municipal
governments may pay additional allowances to the members and personnel
of the Judiciary assigned in their respective areas out of available local funds
but not to exceed P1,500.00: Provided, that in Metropolitan Manila, the city
and municipal governments therein may pay additional allowances not
exceeding P3,000.00. (Emphasis ours). (pp.
42-43, Rollo.)
As observed by the Solicitor General the use of the word "may" signifies that the allowance
may not be demanded as a matter of right, but is entirely dependent on the will of the
municipality concerned (p. 43, Rollo). It should be treated as an honorarium, an amount that
is "given not as a matter of obligation but in appreciation for services rendered, a voluntary
donation in consideration for services which admit of no compensation in money" (Santiago
vs. Commission on Audit, 199 SCRA 128, 130).
As the Solicitor General aptly observed: such additional allowance does not constitute an
integral part of the judge's remuneration for it may or may not be given by the local
government and it is dependent on the liberality of the latter. If said allowance were to be
included in the computation of the retirement benefits of judges, the result would be
inequality and disparity in their retirement benefits. For there are rich municipalities that can
give generous allowances to the judges of the courts within their territorial jurisdiction, and
there are poorer municipalities that can give less substantial amounts or none at all. The result
would be an unseemly jockeying among the trial judges for assignment in the wealthy
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
municipalities, and injustice to those who may be assigned to the less affluent regions, for
while they may have the same rank and perform essentially the same tasks, their more
fortunate colleagues would be enjoying more benefits. The retirement law was not intended to
deal unequally and unfairly with the judges.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the Commission on
Audit, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 80223. February 5, 1993.]
B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC., Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS (11th Division),
HON. TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
172, Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and ROSALIA DE
JESUS, Respondents.
Tañada, Vivo & Tan and Librado Valenzuela for Petitioner.
Herminio L. Ruiz for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; MOTIONS; EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION, NO LONGER ALLOWED EXCEPT IN THE SUPREME
COURT. — The Court holds that the respondent court did err in affirming the order of the
trial court granting a 5-day extension to file a motion for reconsideration and later accepting
and resolving the said motion although filed more than two months from December 21, 1986,
the last day of the extended period. The extension should not have been granted at all as it
was barred by the ruling in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson, (142 SCRA 208).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE WITH PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION. — In other
words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the
Court’s Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which
100
the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet,
not strictly enforceable. (Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 144 SCRA 161).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the present case, the motion for extension of time
was filed on December 16, 1986, more than five months after the expiration of the grace
period on June 30, 1986. As earlier noted, the 5-day extension should not have been given in
the first place, following Habaluyas; and to make matters worse, the motion for
reconsideration itself was filed more than 2 months after the said extension. Under the rules,
even assuming the validity of the extension, the motion should have been denied outright for
tardiness as the order sought to be reconsidered had already long become final.
4. ID.; ID.; LITIGATIONS SHOULD BE DECIDED ON THEIR MERITS AND NOT ON
TECHNICALITIES. — (O)ne does not have any vested right in technicalities. In meritorious
cases, a liberal not literal interpretation of the rules becomes imperative and technicalities
should not be resorted to in derogation of the intent of the rules which is the proper and just
determination of litigations. Litigations should, as such as possible be decided on their merits
and not on technicality. As has been the constant ruling of this Court, every party-litigant
should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause
free from the constraints of technicalities. (Lim v. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 33)
5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 2016 (URBAN
LAND REFORM CODE; TEN-YEAR PERIOD UNDER SECTION 2 THEREOF,
COUNTED BACKWARD FROM 1978. — We agree that in reckoning the ten-year period
under Section 2 of P.D. 2016, the trial court should count backward from 1978, the year P.D.
1517 was issued, instead of waiting until the lapse of ten years after 1978. We see no error in
the opinion of the National Housing Authority that "tenant families who should benefit from
this Urban Land Reform Program are those who have been residing in the area for ten years
or more prior to the issuance of the said P.D. 1517." We are convinced that the more rational
reading of the said provision is that the ten-year period must be reckoned from 1968, ten
years before the issuance of P.D. 1517. This interpretation would give more rights to the
intended beneficiaries of the decree and thus make more meaningful the constitutional
objective of decent housing for all persons, in the cities and in the farms.
6. ID.; INTENTION OF THE LAWMAKERS ASCERTAINED FROM THE CONTEXT OF
THE WHOLE STATUTE. — It is an accepted canon of construction that the intention of the
lawmakers must be ascertained not from a consideration of a single word or a particular
phrase of the law, but from the context of the whole stature, including its whereas clauses.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
In the civilized society, every person has the basic right to a roof over his head, to shelter him
from the elements and — no less importantly — to give him a sense of self-respect as a
human being. Even the carabao has its shed and the bird its nest. The homeless person is
entitled to the solicitude and tenderness of the State, as the Constitution itself affirms under
the social justice policy, which now specifically calls for agrarian and urban land reform and
housing.
The case at bar involves the proper implementation of this policy.
On March 3, 1986, petitioner B.E. San Diego, instituted an action in the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, against private respondent Rosalia de Jesus for recovery of
possession of a parcel of land situated at Navarette St., Arkong Bato, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. 1
In her answer, De Jesus argued that the land where her house was erected was included in the
project site for Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) of the government and therefore subject to
the provisions of P.D. 2016. 2
On September 8, 1986, she filed a motion to dismiss based on the same ground. This was
denied by Judge Samilo Barlongay on November 3, 1986, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
The Court finds the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss to be without merit. Presidential Decree
No. 2016, prohibiting the eviction of the occupants-families from lands identified and
proclaimed as areas for priority development or Urban Land Reform Zone is explicit in
Section 2 thereof that the tenant or occupant family who cannot be evicted from or otherwise
dispossessed of the land must have been residing thereat "for 10 years or more reckoned from
the date of the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1517 otherwise known as the Urban Land
Reform Law."cralaw virtua1aw library
Presidential Decree No. 1517 was promulgated on June 11, 1978, hence, 10 years from said
date will be June 10, 1988. Therefore the defendant as of this time is not yet protected against
eviction or dispossession from the land. The defendant’s contention that the 10 years should
101
be counted from the date of possession does not find basis in the law which she is invoking,
for the law is clear that 10 years or more should be "reckoned from the date of issuance of
Presidential Decree No. 1517." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
On December 16, 1986, the date of the scheduled pre-trial conference, Judge Teresita Dizon-
Capulong, the new presiding judge of the above-named court, granted De Jesus a 5-day
extension, or until December 21, 1986, within which to file a motion for reconsideration of
the order denying her motion to dismiss. 3 However, it was only on March 5, 1987, or 73
days later, that the motion for reconsideration was finally filed. 4
On March 25, 1987, the trial court reconsidered its order of November 3, 1986, on the
following justification:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In reconsidering its Order dated November 3, 1986, this Court is guided by the clarification
of the date of effectivity of P.D. 2016 by the National Housing Authority which is the alter
ego of the President of the Philippines who issued Presidential Decree 2016 and Presidential
Decree 1517 to which the former decree is intimately related. In the communication dated
October 21, 1986 to the defendant by the General Manager of the said National Housing
Authority it is stated thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Please be informed that the date of issuance of PD 1517 is 1978 and ten years or more
reckoned from that date is 1968. Hence, tenant families who should benefit from this Urban
Land Reform Program are those who have been residing in the area for ten (10) years or more
prior to the issuance of said P.D. 1517."cralaw virtua1aw library
It further held that the private respondent was among those persons who might be protected
from eviction by P.D. 2016, but it was necessary for her to show that she had been in
occupancy of the subject land for ten years or longer as required by the decree.cralawnad
On April 8, 1987, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of this order, but its motion was
denied on April 24, 1987, for lack of merit. The petitioner then sought certiorari and
prohibition with a prayer for preliminary injunction from the Court of Appeals on the ground
that the orders of the trial court dated March 25, 1987, and April 8, 1987, were issued with
grave abuse of discretion. 5
On August 10, 1987, in an exhaustive and well-reasoned decision penned by now Presiding
Justice Lorna Lombos-de la Fuente of the Court of Appeals, the petition was dismissed. 6 The
respondent court sustained the reliance of the trial court on the interpretation of Section 2 of
P.D. 2016 by the National Housing Authority regarding the computation of the ten-year
period.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
The respondent court said the interpretation was "a sensible one and (was) one which (would)
effectuate, rather than nullify or negate. the purpose/purposes of the two above-mentioned
decrees." It added that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . It bears emphasis that the NHA is the very agency charged by P.D. 2016 with the duty of
implementing its provisions (Secs. 4 & 8, id.). By settled jurisprudence, such an
interpretation, coming as it does from the administrative agency charged with the
implementation of the law in question, deserves to be accorded full faith and credence. . . .
From this decision, the present petition was filed on October 22, 1987, to raise the following
issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Whether respondent RTC’s orders of March 25, 1987 and April 24, 1987, later affirmed
by respondent Court of Appeals in its decision of August 10, 1987 and its subsequent Minute
Resolution of October 6, 1987, are procedurally sanctioned by the Habaluyas ruling or not
and, in the latter case, whether these orders are grossly abusive of discretion and/or
jurisdiction vis-a-vis the Supreme Court’s stern instructions in Habaluyas.
(2) Whether or not the ten-year period of occupancy mentioned in Section 2 of P.D. 2016 is
to be counted backward, as all respondents contend, or forward, as petitioner contends.
On the first question, the Court holds that the respondent court did err in affirming the order
of the trial court granting a 5-day extension to file a motion for reconsideration and later
accepting and resolving the said motion although filed more than two months from December
21, 1986, the last day of the extended period.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The extension should not have been granted at all as it was barred by the ruling in Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson, 7 where we held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly
enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration
may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and
the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or
deny the extension requested. (May 30, 1986).
and in Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 8 where we explained the prospective
application of the rule and the operation of the grace period thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
102
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of
the Court’s Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within
which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as
yet, not strictly enforceable.
In the present case, the motion for extension of time was filed on December 16, 1986, more
than five months after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. As earlier noted,
the 5-day extension should not have been given in the first place, following Habaluyas; and to
make matters worse, the motion for reconsideration itself was filed more than 2 months after
the said extension. Under the rules, even assuming the validity of the extension, the motion
should have been denied outright for tardiness as the order sought to be reconsidered had
already long become final.
All this notwithstanding, the Court will disregard the procedural lapses in this case in the
interest of substantive justice. We have held in earlier cases that —
. . . (O)ne does not have any vested right in technicalities. In meritorious cases, a liberal not
literal interpretation of the rules becomes imperative and technicalities should not be resorted
to in derogation of the intent of the rules which is the proper and just determination of
litigations. Litigations should, as much as possible be decided on their merits and not on
technicality. As has been the constant ruling of this Court, every party-litigant should be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause free from the
constraints of technicalities. 9
. . . Strict adherence to technical adjective rules should never be unexceptionally required,
specially in the context of facts from which substantial compliance with the rules may be
reasonably inferred; a contrary precept would result in a failure to decide cases on their
merits. It should be the function of Courts to afford parties — litigants the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of their causes, free from the constraint of
technicalities. In the disposition of controversies, reasonable and justifiable liability in the
application of procedural rules should be the guiding principle, where otherwise substantial
justice would be jeopardized; inadequacies and errors of form should be overlooked when
they would defeat rather than help in arriving at a just and fair result as to the essential merits
of any case. 10
Strict application of technical rules will be disregarded to obviate injustice. . . . 11
The case before us shall be considered under the exception rather than the rule because the
substantive issue raised by private respondent deserves a close examination by the Court.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
Especially since it affects the social justice policy, we feel that a definitive pronouncement
regarding the proper interpretation of P.D. 1517 and P.D. 2016 is advisable if not necessary,
as a guide in future similar cases.
Parenthetically, the Court notes that the petitioner has invoked the Habaluyas ruling only in
this petition now before us. The legality of the extension for the filing of the motion for
reconsideration and the subsequent tardiness of that motion were not raised in the
proceedings below, which is why the respondent court did not rule upon the issue. We can
only wryly observe that if the petitioner insists on the strict application of technicalities it
must be hoist by its own petard and disarmed by its earlier omission.
On the second and more vital question, we hold also for the private Respondent. This is the
fundamental reason why we have chosen not to strictly apply the procedural rules in this
case.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
We agree that in reckoning the ten-year period under Section 2 of P.D. 2016, the trial court
should count backward from 1978, the year P.D. 1517 was issued, instead of waiting until the
lapse of ten years after 1978.
Section 6 of P.D. 1517, which took effect on June 11, 1978 provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
SECTION 6. Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas. Within the Urban Zones legitimate
tenants who have resided on the land for ten years or more who have built their homes on the
land and residents who have legally occupied the lands by contract, continuously for the last
ten years shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the right of first refusal to
purchase the same within a reasonable time and at reasonable prices, under terms and
conditions to be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Management
Committee created by Section 8 of this Decree.
Section 2 of P.D. 2016, which took effect on January 23, 1986, reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
SECTION 2. No tenant or occupant family, residing for ten years or more reckoned from the
date of issuance of Presidential Decree 1517 otherwise known as the Urban Land Reform
Law, in land proclaimed as Areas for Priority Development or Urban Land Reform Zones or
is a project for development under the ZIP in Metro Manila and the SIR Program in the
regional cities shall be evicted from the land or otherwise dispossessed.
The above-quoted provisions should not be isolated from the other provisions of P.D. 1517
103
and P.D. 2016. It is an accepted canon of construction that the intention of the lawmakers
must be ascertained not from a consideration of a single word or a particular phrase of the
law, but from the context of the whole statute, including its whereas clauses. 12
We see no error in the opinion of the National Housing Authority that "tenant families who
should benefit from this Urban Land Reform Program are those who have been residing in
the area for ten years or more prior to the issuance of the said P.D. 1517."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The respondent Court of Appeals, in upholding this interpretation, correctly observed that —
Upon examination of the whereas clauses of P.D. 2016. We are informed of the
premises/purposes for its issuance, namely: to supply or correct the deficiencies in the
implementation of P.D. 1517 — that despite the institution by said decree of a nationwide
land reform program and the proclamation of urban land reform zones or areas for priority
development, "resident families" therein nonetheless "are being evicted from such lands" in
violation of Section 6 of said P.D. which provides that qualified families in said zones/areas
"shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the right of first refusal to
purchase the same" : and that landowners of subject lands are able to go around said
provision (Section 6), by offering to sell the land to occupant families at a very high price
which is beyond the occupant’s capacity to pay and subsequently evicting them for failure to
exercise their option to buy the said land, this rendering the said decree inoperative and of no
consequence. If the interpretation suggested by petitioner were to be adopted, thus resulting
in the postponement to 1988 of the operation of the prohibition found in abovesaid Section 6
against the eviction or dispossession of the qualified residents of lands in the abovementioned
areas/zones, certainly the aforestated purposes of P.D. 2016 would be defeated because the
landowners would in the meanwhile be able to evict or dispossess the qualified residents in
subject areas/zones.
Such an interpretation also runs counter to the express mandate of Section 9 of P.D. 2016 that
the same "shall take effect immediately" (which is January 23, 1986): and even of Section 24
of P.D. 1517 which likewise declares that the said enactment "shall take effect immediately"
(which is June 11, 1978).chanrobles.com : virtual law library
If the ten-year period were counted forward from 1978, the qualified residents who have been
in possession of the subject property for more than ten years prior to 1978 would nevertheless
have been subject to eviction any time before 1988. This interpretation would render the
decree inoperative until 1988 and negate the rationale of "the rule on non-eviction (which) is
to preclude unscrupulous landowners from demanding a steep price for the land from their
tenants with the view of evicting the latter should they fail to exercise their right of first
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
refusal." P.D. 2016 was obviously intended to become effective immediately to protect
qualified tenants who had at that time already occupied the subject property for ten years or
more.
The case of Nidoy v. Court of Appeals 13 is not applicable because the main issue resolved
there was whether or not apartment-dwellers were considered qualified tenants under P.D.
2016, not whether the ten-year period should be counted backward or forward from 1978.
We are convinced that the more rational reading of the said provision is that the ten-year
period must be reckoned from 1968, ten years before the issuance of P.D. 1517. This
interpretation would give more rights to the intended beneficiaries of the decree and thus
make more meaningful the constitutional objective of decent housing for all persons, in the
cities and in the farms.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the interpretation
of the National Housing Authority on the reckoning of the ten-year period prescribed under
P.D. 2016 is AFFIRMED, and the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, is
directed to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 2379-V-86 to determine whether or not
the private respondent is a qualified resident under P.D. 2016. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 17122             February 27, 1922
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.
Williams & Ferrier for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
JOHNS, J.:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An
Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under
extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the
104
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and
regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions of
which are as follows:
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause,
conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to
issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit:
(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn.
(b) To establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or sale of the
commodities referred to or have such distribution or sale made by the Government
itself.
(c) To fix, from time to time the quantities of palay rice, or corn that a company or
individual may acquire, and the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant
may demand.
(d) . . .
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in any other manner obstruct
the production or milling of palay, rice or corn for the purpose of raising the prices
thereof; to corner or hoard said products as defined in section three of this Act; . . .
Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within
the meaning of this Act, but does not specify the price of rice or define any basic for fixing
the price.
SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the regulations,
orders and decrees promulgated in accordance therewith shall be punished by a fine
of not more than five thousands pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two
years, or both, in the discretion of the court: Provided, That in the case of companies
or corporations the manager or administrator shall be criminally liable.
SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of
State, shall consider that the public interest requires the application of the provisions
of this Act, he shall so declare by proclamation, and any provisions of other laws
inconsistent herewith shall from then on be temporarily suspended.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
Upon the cessation of the reasons for which such proclamation was issued, the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, shall declare the
application of this Act to have likewise terminated, and all laws temporarily
suspended by virtue of the same shall again take effect, but such termination shall not
prevent the prosecution of any proceedings or cause begun prior to such termination,
nor the filing of any proceedings for an offense committed during the period covered
by the Governor-General's proclamation.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice
should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him
with the sale of rice at an excessive price as follows:
The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of
the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation
with the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands, the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro
Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price
greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the
Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No.
2868. Contrary to law.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court
erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the
accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved
July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919;
and that the law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation
itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it
authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted
that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for
any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and
105
promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the
Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to
the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or
define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the
proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to
what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: "For any
cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn."
The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to
the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-General, "with
the consent of the Council of State," is authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules
and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act." It does not specify or
define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules
or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That
is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the
order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the Governor-General to say what
is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of
rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out the
purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General
issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who,
with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any
cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an
emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a
proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all
powers are vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature
to make the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law.
The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no
authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the
law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own
jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not
constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature itself has the power to fix the
price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that
power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative
power to the Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the
Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated
to the Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative
power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does
nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power
and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a
law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of
which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is
unconstitutional and void.
The Supreme Court of the United States in what is known as the Granger Cases (94 U.S.,
183-187; 24 L. ed., 94), first laid down the rule:
Railroad companies are engaged in a public employment affecting the public interest
and, under the decision in Munn vs. Ill., ante, 77, are subject to legislative control as
to their rates of fare and freight unless protected by their charters.
The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to establish reasonable maximum rates of
charges for the transportation of freights and passengers on the different railroads of
the State is not void as being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or to
that of the State.
It was there for the first time held in substance that a railroad was a public utility, and that,
being a public utility, the State had power to establish reasonable maximum freight and
passenger rates. This was followed by the State of Minnesota in enacting a similar law,
providing for, and empowering, a railroad commission to hear and determine what was a just
and reasonable rate. The constitutionality of this law was attacked and upheld by the Supreme
Court of Minnesota in a learned and exhaustive opinion by Justice Mitchell, in the case of
State vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul ry. Co. (38 Minn., 281), in which the court held:
Regulations of railway tariffs — Conclusiveness of commission's tariffs. — Under
Laws 1887, c. 10, sec. 8, the determination of the railroad and warehouse commission
as to what are equal and reasonable fares and rates for the transportation of persons
and property by a railway company is conclusive, and, in proceedings
by mandamus to compel compliance with the tariff of rates recommended and
published by them, no issue can be raised or inquiry had on that question.
Same — constitution — Delegation of power to commission. — The authority thus
given to the commission to determine, in the exercise of their discretion and
judgement, what are equal and reasonable rates, is not a delegation of legislative
power.
It will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission expressly provides —
106
That all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of passengers and
property shall be equal and reasonable.
With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad commission to investigate
all the facts, to hear and determine what is a just and reasonable rate. Even then that law does
not make the violation of the order of the commission a crime. The only remedy is a civil
proceeding. It was there held —
That the legislative itself has the power to regulate railroad charges is now too well
settled to require either argument or citation of authority.
The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the power to
adopt rules and regulations, or to investigate and determine the facts, in order to carry
into effect a law already passed, is apparent. The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and the conferring an authority or discretion to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law.
The legislature enacts that all freights rates and passenger fares should be just and
reasonable. It had the undoubted power to fix these rates at whatever it deemed equal
and reasonable.
They have not delegated to the commission any authority or discretion as to what the
law shall be, — which would not be allowable, — but have merely conferred upon it
an authority and discretion, to be exercised in the execution of the law, and under and
in pursuance of it, which is entirely permissible. The legislature itself has passed
upon the expediency of the law, and what is shall be. The commission is intrusted
with no authority or discretion upon these questions. It can neither make nor unmake
a single provision of law. It is merely charged with the administration of the law, and
with no other power.
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
Dowling vs. Lancoshire Ins. Co. (92 Wis., 63). The opinion says:
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard
policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the
place of all others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to
maters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and
without which the act could not possibly be put in use as an act in confirmity to which all fire
insurance policies were required to be issued.
The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and
provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left
to the judgement of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in
form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take
effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court in United
States vs. Grimaud (220 U.S., 506; 55 L. ed., 563), where it was held that the rules and
regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture as to a trespass on government land in a forest
reserve were valid constitutional. The Act there provided that the Secretary of Agriculture ". .
. may make such rules and regulations and establish such service as will insure the object of
such reservations; namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve the forests
thereon from destruction; and any violation of the provisions of this act or such rules and
regulations shall be punished, . . ."
The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says:
In refusing permits to use a forest reservation for stock grazing, except upon stated
terms or in stated ways, the Secretary of Agriculture merely assert and enforces the
proprietary right of the United States over land which it owns. The regulation of the
Secretary, therefore, is not an exercise of legislative, or even of administrative,
power; but is an ordinary and legitimate refusal of the landowner's authorized agent
to allow person having no right in the land to use it as they will. The right of
proprietary control is altogether different from governmental authority.
The opinion says:
From the beginning of the government, various acts have been passed conferring
upon executive officers power to make rules and regulations, — not for the
government of their departments, but for administering the laws which did govern.
None of these statutes could confer legislative power. But when Congress had
legislated power. But when Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it could
107
give to those who were to act under such general provisions "power to fill up the
details" by the establishment of administrative rules and regulations, the violation of
which could be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress, or by penalties
fixed by Congress, or measured by the injury done.
That "Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally
recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
ordained by the Constitution."
If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation of the rule, the defendants drove
and grazed their sheep upon the reserve, in violation of the regulations, they were
making an unlawful use of the government's property. In doing so they thereby made
themselves liable to the penalty imposed by Congress.
The subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate are defined. The lands are set apart as a
forest reserve. He is required to make provisions to protect them from depredations and from
harmful uses. He is authorized 'to regulate the occupancy and use and to preserve the forests
from destruction.' A violation of reasonable rules regulating the use and occupancy of the
property is made a crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress."
The above are leading cases in the United States on the question of delegating legislative
power. It will be noted that in the "Granger Cases," it was held that a railroad company was a
public corporation, and that a railroad was a public utility, and that, for such reasons, the
legislature had the power to fix and determine just and reasonable rates for freight and
passengers.
The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were just and reasonable, the legislature
could delegate the power to ascertain the facts and determine from the facts what were just
and reasonable rates,. and that in vesting the commission with such power was not a
delegation of legislative power.
The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a "Wisconsin standard policy of fire
insurance," and the court held that "the act, . . . wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly
what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy
required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance
commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could
not be delegated."
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which
were promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve.
These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it
legislative authority.
The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is
pointed out and clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:
That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other
department of the government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in
constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government established by the constitution.
Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it
may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or event,
or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to
delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes,
or intends to make, its own action to depend.
The Village of Little Chute enacted an ordinance which provides:
All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o'clock P.M. each day and remain
closed until 5 o'clock on the following morning, unless by special permission of the
president.
Construing it in 136 Wis., 526; 128 A. S. R., 1100,1 the Supreme Court of that State says:
We regard the ordinance as void for two reasons; First, because it attempts to confer
arbitrary power upon an executive officer, and allows him, in executing the
ordinance, to make unjust and groundless discriminations among persons similarly
situated; second, because the power to regulate saloons is a law-making power vested
in the village board, which cannot be delegated. A legislative body cannot delegate to
a mere administrative officer power to make a law, but it can make a law with
provisions that it shall go into effect or be suspended in its operations upon the
ascertainment of a fact or state of facts by an administrative officer or board. In the
present case the ordinance by its terms gives power to the president to decide
108
arbitrary, and in the exercise of his own discretion, when a saloon shall close. This is
an attempt to vest legislative discretion in him, and cannot be sustained.
The legal principle involved there is squarely in point here.
It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and
regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any
price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would
be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is
to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it
must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General
issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at
any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime.
The Executive order2 provides:
(5) The maximum selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby fixed, for the time
being as follows:
In Manila —
Palay at P6.75 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 29 centavos per ganta.
Rice at P15 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta.
Corn at P8 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 34 centavos per ganta.
In the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the maximum price shall be the
Manila price less the cost of transportation from the source of supply and necessary
handling expenses to the place of sale, to be determined by the provincial treasurers
or their deputies.
In provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other producing provinces, the
maximum price shall be the authorized price at the place of supply or the Manila
price as the case may be, plus the transportation cost, from the place of supply and
the necessary handling expenses, to the place of sale, to be determined by the
provincial treasurers or their deputies.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
(6) Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby directed to communicate with,
and execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry,
for the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their
respective localities.
The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale price that the industrial
or merchant may demand." The law is a general law and not a local or special law.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices
in other and different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to
determine the other and different prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here, then,
you would have a delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General, and a delegation
by him of that power to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who "are hereby directed to
communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce
and Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their
respective localities." The issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General was the
exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that power.
Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law and does not authorize the Governor-
General to fix one price of rice in Manila and another price in Iloilo. It only purports to
authorize him to fix the price of rice in the Philippine Islands under a law, which is General
and uniform, and not local or special. Under the terms of the law, the price of rice fixed in the
proclamation must be the same all over the Islands. There cannot be one price at Manila and
another at Iloilo. Again, it is a mater of common knowledge, and of which this court will take
judicial notice, that there are many kinds of rice with different and corresponding market
values, and that there is a wide range in the price, which varies with the grade and quality.
Act No. 2868 makes no distinction in price for the grade or quality of the rice, and the
proclamation, upon which the defendant was tried and convicted, fixes the selling price of
rice in Manila "at P15 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta," and is uniform as to
all grades of rice, and says nothing about grade or quality. Again, it will be noted that the law
is confined to palay, rice and corn. They are products of the Philippine Islands. Hemp,
tobacco, coconut, chickens, eggs, and many other things are also products. Any law which
single out palay, rice or corn from the numerous other products of the Islands is not general
or uniform, but is a local or special law. If such a law is valid, then by the same principle, the
Governor-General could be authorized by proclamation to fix the price of meat, eggs,
chickens, coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or any other product of the Islands. In the very nature
of things, all of that class of laws should be general and uniform. Otherwise, there would be
an unjust discrimination of property rights, which, under the law, must be equal and inform.
Act No. 2868 is nothing more than a floating law, which, in the discretion and by a
109
proclamation of the Governor-General, makes it a floating crime to sell rice at a price in
excess of the proclamation, without regard to grade or quality.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-
General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at
any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General
to say what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what
was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined
conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality,
also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law
should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended.
The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define the
conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation
no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-
General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the
different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta
of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by
Executive order No. 53."
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to
authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of
rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice
in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.
It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice and profiteering,
which worked a severe hardship on the poorer classes, and that an emergency existed, but the
question here presented is the constitutionality of a particular portion of a statute, and none of
such matters is an argument for, or against, its constitutionality.
The Constitution is something solid, permanent an substantial. Its stability protects the life,
liberty and property rights of the rich and the poor alike, and that protection ought not to
change with the wind or any emergency condition. The fundamental question involved in this
case is the right of the people of the Philippine Islands to be and live under a republican form
of government. We make the broad statement that no state or nation, living under republican
form of government, under the terms and conditions specified in Act No. 2868, has ever
enacted a law delegating the power to any one, to fix the price at which rice should be sold.
That power can never be delegated under a republican form of government.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3

In the fixing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice, the law was not dealing The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged. So ordered.
with government property. It was dealing with private property and private rights, which are
sacred under the Constitution. If this law should be sustained, upon the same principle and for Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
the same reason, the Legislature could authorize the Governor-General to fix the price of Romualdez, J., concurs in the result.
every product or commodity in the Philippine Islands, and empower him to make it a crime to
sell any product at any other or different price.

It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for such reason the provision of the
Constitution should be suspended. But the Stubborn fact remains that at all times the judicial Separate Opinions
power was in full force and effect, and that while that power was in force and effect, such a
provision of the Constitution could not be, and was not, suspended even in times of war. It MALCOLM, J., concurring:
may be claimed that during the war, the United States Government undertook to, and did, fix
the price at which wheat and flour should be bought and sold, and that is true. There, the
I concur in the result for reasons which reach both the facts and the law. In the first place, as
United States had declared war, and at the time was at war with other nations, and it was a
to the facts, — one cannot be convicted ex post facto of a violation of a law and of an
war measure, but it is also true that in doing so, and as a part of the same act, the United
executive order issued pursuant to the law, when the alleged violation thereof occurred on
States commandeered all the wheat and flour, and took possession of it, either actual or
August 6, 1919, while the Act of the Legislature in question was not published until August
constructive, and the government itself became the owner of the wheat and flour, and fixed
13, 1919, and the order was not published until August 20, 1919. In the second place, as to
the price to be paid for it. That is not this case. Here the rice sold was the personal and private
the law, — one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to
property of the defendant, who sold it to one of his customers. The government had not
the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.
bought and did not claim to own the rice, or have any interest in it, and at the time of the
(U.S. vs. Cohen Grocery Company [1921], 255 U.S., 81, holding section 4 of the Federal
alleged sale, it was the personal, private property of the defendant. It may be that the law was
Food Control Act of August 10, 1917, as amended, invalid.)
passed in the interest of the public, but the members of this court have taken on solemn oath
to uphold and defend the Constitution, and it ought not to be construed to meet the changing
winds or emergency conditions. Again, we say that no state or nation under a republican form In order that there may not be any misunderstanding of our position, I would respectfully
of government ever enacted a law authorizing any executive, under the conditions states, to invite attention to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in German Alliance Ins.
fix the price at which a price person would sell his own rice, and make the broad statement Co. vs. Lewis ([1914, 233 U.S., 389), concerning the legislative regulation of the prices
that no decision of any court, on principle or by analogy, will ever be found which sustains charged by business affected with a public interest, and to another decision of the United
the constitutionality of the particular portion of Act No. 2868 here in question. By the terms States Supreme Court, that of Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark ([1892], 143 U.S., 649), which
of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact adopts as its own the principles laid down in the case of Locke's Appeal ([1873], 72 Pa. St.,
laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of 491), namely; "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a
the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority of the Governor- law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes,
General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of
power in violation of the organic law. government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend
which cannot be known to the law-making power, and must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry
and determination outside of the halls of legislation."
This opinion is confined to the particular question here involved, which is the right of the
Governor-General, upon the terms and conditions stated in the Act, to fix the price of rice and
make it a crime to sell it at a higher price, and which holds that portions of the Act Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.
unconstitutional. It does not decide or undertake to construe the constitutionality of any of the
remaining portions of the Act. G.R. No. 17226             March 1, 1922

110
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
L. S. MOON & CO., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
Honorable FRANCIS BURTON HARRISON, Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands,
Honorable DIONISIO JAKOSALEM, Secretary of Commerce and Communications,
and Honorable JUSTO LUKBAN, Mayor of the city of Manila, defendants-appellees.
Thos. d. Aitken for appellant.
Jose A. Santos for appellees.
STATEMENT
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff and appellant "is a duly registered partnership,
domiciled and doing business in Manila."
That the hon. Francis Burton Harrison is the duly appointed, qualified and acting,
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, and, as such, its Chief Executive; that the
Hon. Dionisio Jakosalem is the duly appointed, qualified and acting Secretary of
Commerce and Communications and the official designated by executive order of the
said Govern-General as the executive in charged of rice, its sale and distribution in
the Philippine Islands; that the said Justo Lukban is the duly appointed, qualified and
acting Mayor of the city of Manila, and, as such, designated by the said Governor-
General and Secretary of Commerce and Communications as their assistant in charge
for the city of Manila of rice, its sale and distribution.
That on September 24, the plaintiff was the owner of 2,330 ½ kilos of rice, No. 1
quality, imported from Siam at a cost to plaintiff of P26.32, Philippine currency, per
cavan, and 150 cavans of glutinous rice imported from Hongkong on the 14th day of
July, 1919, at a cost of P22,25 per cavan; that the said rice at the time of its purchase
was bought in the open market and at the then prevailing market prices.
That defendants, pursuant to Act No. 2868 of the Philippine Legislature and pursuant
to Executive Orders No. 56 and 67 issued by authority of said Act, have seized the
said 2,330½ kilos of Siam rice of plaintiff and deprived him of it, for the purpose of
distribution to the public at large; that said seizure was made without compensation
to plaintiff, although defendants have promised to pay there for at the rate of P16.25,
Philippine currency, a cavan and no more, which price is below the reasonable value
of the rice and is unjust; that payment at said rate does not constitute just
compensation and a seizure under the circumstances alleged constitutes a
111
confiscation of private property contrary to the fundamental and organic law of the
Philippine Islands and an invasion of those constitutional rights that no one may be
deprived of his property except by due process of law and with just compensation;
that the just and reasonable value of the rice seized as aforesaid in Manila at the time
of said seizure was with respect to the Siam rice mentioned P26.32 per cavan.
That so much of said Act No. 2868 and its defendant Executive Orders that fix an
arbitrary maximum selling price for rice and corn is unconstitutional and void as
being in contravention of the Constitution of the United States and the Jones Bill, in
so far as they guarantee to individuals the right to own and dispose of lawful property
as they please and guarantee that the same may not be taken without due process of
law and just compensation.
That in so far as Act No. 2868 purports to make it a crime to sell rice above the maximum
price fixed by Executive Orders, it is unconstitutional and an invasion of property rights
guaranteed by the Jones Bill, and that defendants threaten prosecution for each violation.
It is further alleged that the action is brought on behalf of certain firms and generally on
behalf of all rice importers, and that the enforcement of the provisions of Act No. 2868 would
result in a great multiplicity of civil and criminal actions, and that this case is one of common
and general interest affecting alike all dealers and importers of rice and corn, and that the
reasonable price of the rice seized an confiscated is P26.25 per cavan. Plaintiff prays
judgment as follows:
First. That defendants, their subordinates, agents, attorneys and employees be enjoined from
further seizure of rice stocks.
Second. That defendants be ordered to return stocks seized as alleged or in lieu thereof pay to
the owners a just and reasonable compensation therefor as may be fixed by this court.
Third. That so much at Act No. 2868 as permits the fixing of a maximum sale price for rice
and corn and provides for the punishment of infractions of said law be declared
unconstitutional and its enforcement enjoined.
Fourth. For such other and further relief as to this court may see just and proper; to which the
defendants filed the following demurrer:
I. The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action, because —
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
(1) The court has no jurisdiction to control by injunction the official acts of
the Governor-General, and
(2) This is in effect a suit against the State.
II. There is a misjoinder of parties plaintiff, because, upon the facts alleged in the
complaint, the plaintiff L. S. Moon & Co. has no right to sue on behalf of others not
named in the complaint.
III. The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,
because —
(1) Act No. 2868 of the Philippine Legislature is constitutional, in that its
enactment was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State;
(2) The facts stated in the complaint do not entitle the plaintiffs to the relief
demanded, in that —
(a) Plaintiff's have another adequate remedy at law;
(b) The court has no jurisdiction to control by injunction the official
acts of the Governor-General:
(c) "Plaintiff prays an injunction against the enforcement of a
criminal statute upon the ground that it is unconstitutional; but the
constitutionality of a criminal statute may not properly be determined
in an action against the Chief Executive for injunction, to prevent its
enforcement. The validity of a criminal statute may be determined in
a criminal action for an alleged violation thereof;" and
(d) "The action is against the defendants in their respective official
capabilities, and no facts are alleged which, if proved, would
authorize a personal judgment against defendants for the value of the
rice seized by them in their official capacities to a statute, even
though the statute be unconstitutional, and the law does not authorize
a money judgment against these defendants as public officials by
reason of acts performed by them in their official capacities."
112
IV. The complaint is, upon its face, ambiguous, unintelligible and uncertain,
particularly in the following respect, to wit: ". . . Plaintiff pleads irreparable injury by
reason of the official acts of the defendants, and yet prays judgment against them for
the return of the rice 'or in lieu thereof pay to the owners a just and reasonable
compensation therefor as may be fixed by this court.'"
Wherefore, defendants pray that the complaint be dismissed, with costs.
The trial court sustained the demurrer upon the second, third, and fourth grounds, and
overruled it as to the first, to which ruling the plaintiff duly excepted.
October 8, 1920, the court dismissed the action, to which the plaintiff duly excepted and
appealed to this court, assigning the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in sustaining the second ground of demurrer to the second
amended complaint to the effect that there was a misjoinder of parties plaintiff.
II. The lower court erred in sustaining the third ground of demurrer to the second
amended complaint to the effect that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.
III. The lower court erred in sustaining the fourth ground of demurer to the second
amended complaint to the effect that the complaint was ambiguous, unintelligible and
uncertain.
IV. The lower court erred in not holding the acts complained of as an illegal invasion
of private rights and the Act (No. 2868) authorizing them as unconstitutional.
V. The lower court erred in dismissing the action without first having had a trial on
the merits.
JOHNS, J.:
The complaint against "Honorable Francis Burton Harrisons as Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, Honorable Dionisio Jakosalem as Secretary of Commerce and
Communications, and Honorable Justo Lukban as Mayor of the city of Manila, defendants,"
and it is specifically alleged "that the Hon. Dionisio Jakosalem is the duly appointed,
qualified and acting Secretary of Commerce and Communications and the official designated
by executive order of the said Governor-General as the executive in charge of rice, its sale
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
and distribution in the Philippine Islands; that the said Justo Lukban is the duly appointed,
qualified and acting Mayor of the city of Manila, and, as such, designated by the said
Governor-General and Secretary of Commerce and Communications as their assistant in
charge for the city of Manila of rice, its sale and distribution."
That is to say, as to the acts claimed to have been committed by the defendants Jakosalem and
Lukban, it is specifically alleged that they were under and by virtue of the orders and
instructions of the Governor-General, and that in the commission of the alleged acts, they
were simply obeying the Governor-General, who was their superior officer.
At the time of their commission and the filing of the complaint, Honorable Francis Burton
Harrison was the duly appointed, qualified and acting Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands. This court will take judicial knowledge of the fact that he no longer holds that
position, and that for some time it has been held by the Honorable Leonard Wood. The
complaint is against the Honorable Francis Burton Harrison as Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands. This court will take judicial knowledge of the fact that he no longer holds
that positions, and that for some time it has been held by the Honorable Leonard Wood.
The complaint is against the Honorable Francis Burton Harrison as Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, and is not against him as a citizen or private person. No order of
substitution has been made. Hence, you have a case pending against defendants who were
acting under the orders of a Governor-General, who has ceased to be Governor-General . The
complaint prays "that the defendants, their subordinates, agents, attorneys and employees be
enjoined from further seizure of rice stocks." Upon that branch of the case, an injunction
against the defendants has become, and is now, a moot question. The action is against the
Governor-General in his official capacity, and he no longer holds that position. The alleged
acts of Jakosalem and Lukban were committed by them as agents and servants of the
Governor-General. It must follow that the plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction against the
defendants. A restraining order as to them would be vain and useless.
The complaint alleges, in substance, that the 2,330½ kilos of rice was of the market value and
reasonably worth P26.32, Philippine currency, per cavan, and that the defendants seized the
rice and took it away from the plaintiff, "for the purpose of distribution to the public at large,"
and that they have promised to pay him P16.25, Philippine currency, a cavan, and are not
willing to pay any more, and that the seizure was a confiscation of private property contrary
to the fundamental and organic law of the Philippine Islands, and in violation of a
constitutional right. The complaint alleges that the acts were committed under Act No. 2868
of the Philippine Legislature, and pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 56 and 67 issued by
authority of said Act.
113
Section 1 of the Act says:
The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause, conditions
arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and
promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency
measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act to wit:
(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice
or corn.
(b) To establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or sale
of the commodities referred to or have such distribution or sale made by the
Government itself.
(c) To fix, from time to time, the quantities of palay, rice or corn that a
company or individual may acquire, and the maximum sale price that the
industrial or merchant may demand.
(d) To purchase, if necessary, through any Government Department or
Bureau or through any company established by the Government, or through
any other agency that the Government may designate, the amounts of rice,
palay or corn that may be necessary for distribution and resale preferably and
as far as possible at the centers of production.
xxx     xxx     xxx
SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of
State, shall consider that the public interest requires the application of the provisions
of this Act, he shall so declare by proclamation, and any provisions of other laws
inconsistent herewith shall from then on be temporarily suspended.
From the pleadings, we must assume that in the commission of the alleged acts, the
Governor-General was acting in his official capacity, and was engaged in the performance of
a duty enjoined upon him by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands. It is now contended
that the law in question is unconstitutional and void. At the time of the alleged acts, he was
exercising the discretionary power which was vested in him as Governor-General. Whatever
may be the rule as to the personal liability of an Executive, after a law has been finally
declared unconstitutional, no court has ever held and no final decision will ever be found
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
holding an Executive personally liable in damages for the exercise of a discretionary power
under a law before it has been held unconstitutional.
Machem on Public Officers, p. 394, pars. 603, 604 and 605, says:
Par. 603. Governmental duties are owing to the public. — Again, the duties, which
are imposed upon these great departments are such as are owing to the public at large
and not to individuals, and this rule is as true of the executive department in the
exercise of the constitutional powers confided to it as such, as it is of either of the
others. For the performance of such duties, as has been seen, the officer must respond
only to the public and not to individuals.
Par. 604. Governmental powers are confided to the discretion of the officer. — So, as
also, the powers which by the constitutional are conferred upon the executive
department are usually of such a nature as are confided to its discretion. They are
often called political powers, and for their due administration the judgment and
discretion of the officer to who they are confided must be appealed to. In the exercise
of such powers, it is well settled that the officer will not be controlled by the courts,
but he is, as was said by Chief Justice Marshall, "accountable only to his country in
his political character, and to this conscience."
Par. 605. Governmental officers not liable to private action. — Following out the
doctrine of the preceding sections, therefore, it may be laid down as a general rule
that no public officer or agency charged with the exercise of governmental authority
of this description, can be called upon to answer, in a private action, for the manner
in which that authority has been exercised.
In paragraph 607, the same authors says:
President of the United States. — No case has yet arisen in which it has been
attempted to hold the President of the United States amenable to a private action for
his official conduct; and, certainly, so far as the performance of the great political
power which are conferred upon him is concerned, no such action could be
maintained. Speaking of this subject, Chief Justice Marshall said: "It is scarcely
necessary for the court to disclaim all pretensions to such a jurisdiction. An
extravagance, so absurd and excessive, could not have been entertained for a
moment. The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals,
not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they
114
have a discretion. Question in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution
and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court."
Par. 608. Cabinet officers and heads of departments. — The same immunity has been
extended to cabinet officers and the heads of departments in the performance of those
duties which are confided to their official judgment and discretion. . . .
Par. 609. Governor of States. — The same immunity extends also to the governors of
States, "The governor of the State," says Judge Cooley, "is vested with a power to
grant pardons and reprieves, to command the militia, of refuse his assent to laws, and
to take the steps necessary for the proper enforcement of the laws; but neglect of
none of these can make him responsible in damages to the party suffering therefrom. .
. . The executive, in these particulars, exercises his discretion, and he is not
responsible to the court for the manner in which his duties are performed. Moreover,
he could not be made responsible to private parties without subordinating the
executive department to the judicial department, and this would be inconsistent with
the theory of republican institutions. Each department, within its province, is and
must be independent."
For the same reason, the rule of nonliability applies to judicial officer.
Page 400, par. 619, the same author says:
Judicial officer not liable to private action for judicial act within his jurisdiction. —
It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by authority and reason, that no civil
action can be sustained against a judicial officer for the recovery of damages by one
claiming to have been injured by the officer's judicial action within his jurisdiction.
From the very nature of the case, the officer is called upon by law to exercise his
judgment in the matter, and the law holds his duty to the individual to be performed
when he has exercised it, however erroneous or disastrous in its consequences it may
appear either to the party or to others.
There is a legal presumption that any law enacted by the Legislature is valid, and the
Governor-General had a legal right to assume that Act No. 2868 was valid. It was neither his
official province nor duty to say whether the Act was or was not constitutional.
By the organic law, it is the duty of the legislature to make the law; of the executive to
enforce; and of the courts to construe the law. The courts only have the power to declare a
law unconstitutional. In the very nature of things, it is not the duty of the Governor to say
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
whether a law is or is not constitutional. It is his duty to enforce the law until such time as it
has legally been declared unconstitutional. To hold an executive personally liable in an action
for damages for the performance or nonperformance of official duty, in legal effect, would
make him a judge as to when a law is or is not constitutional.
If it is the duty of the executive to both construe and enforce the law, and he is personally
liable in damages for a wrongful construction of the law, very few laws would be enforce,
and no reputable and responsible man would accept the office of Governor.
In their learned and exhausting brief, counsel for appellant have not cited any authority, and
none will ever be found, holding a governor personally liable in an action for damages, for
the enforcement of any law before it has legally been declared unconstitutional.
In the instant case, Act No. 2868 was enacted by the Legislature. By its terms and provisions,
certain duties were thrust upon the Governor-General. He had a legal right to assume that the
law was valid, and in the exercise of his discretion, he undertook to enforce the law and to
carry out its terms and provisions, and it is that of which the plaintiff complains.
Although we do not agree with some of the statements and conclusions of the trial court,
under the existing facts, an injunction as to defendants here is a moot question, and would be
a vain and useless order of the court. Hence, the plaintiff is not entitled to that relief.
Whatever may be the rule as to such alleged acts committed after a law has been declared
void, assuming that all the facts which plaintiff alleges are true, at the time of their
commission, the defendants has a right to assume that the law was valid and are not
personally liable to the plaintiff in an action for damages. For such reason, the judgment of
the lower court is affirmed, without costs to either party in this court.
Assuming that the market value of rice was P26.32 per cavan, and that the defendants were
only ready and willing to pay P16.25 per cavan, it may be claimed that the taking of the rice
was a confiscation of his property to the amount of the difference between the actual value
and the proposed value. But, conceding that to be true, the defendants are not personally
liable in an action for damages. Their acts were official and discretionary, and they had a
legal right to assume that the law was valid. In the commission of the alleged acts, they were
acting for, and representing, the Government of the Philippine Islands under a law enacted by
its Legislature, and it is elementary that without its consent no suit or action lies against the
Government itself. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
115
Separate Opinions
STREET, J., concurring:
The complaint in this case suffers in may opinion from the defect of an improper joinder of
distinct causes of action, and for this reason the judgment of the trial court may properly be
affirmed. The misjoinder of different causes is discernible in the circumstance that the
complaint purports to be brought specifically on behalf of the following persons and firms, to
wit, "L. S. Moon & Co., Kwong Nam Sang, Wong Yon, Kwong Tan Chong and generally on
behalf of all rice importers, there being many such in business in the cities of Manila, Iloilo
and Cebu, and also on behalf of all the dealer of important or locally grown rice, of whom
there are thousands doing business throughout the Philippine Islands." (Par. VIII of
complaint.) In the second paragraph of the prayer for relief it is asked that the defendant
officials be ordered to return to their respective owners the stocks of rice seized by them, and
in other parts of the same prayer injunctive relief is sought against the enforcement of Act
No. 2868.
It is evident that the various acts of seizure here complained of constituted wrong against the
respective owners property in attempting to enforce their different causes of action in a single
proceeding. Moreover, I am unable to see the propriety of joining a cause of action founded
on the particular grievance of one personality in the same action in which is it sought to
enforce rights pertaining to many.
It the prayer of the complaint had been limited to a petition to recover of the rice alleged o
have been taken from L. S Moon & Co., it would in my opinion have stated a good cause of
action; and the right of the plaintiff to recover such rice would not be in any degree
prejudiced by reason of the official character of the persons by whom the unlawful seizure
was made.
The statement in the opinion to the effect that this action is not now maintainable, for the
reason that the official named as defendants have been succeeded in office by other persons is
a proposition to which I am unable to subscribe as I am under the impression that an action
against a public officers is not abated by a change in the incumbency of the office pending the
action, where the action is in its nature against the office (1 C. J., 146); and the practice of
this court has, I think, been inconformity with this idea.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
G.R. No. L-39699 March 14, 1979
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CELSO AVELINO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First In. stance of Cebu,
Branch XIII, and the City of Mandaue, respondents.
Gadioma & Colon for petitioner.
Lorenzo A. Parandiang, Jr. and Amadeo D. Seno for respondent City of Mandaue.
FERNANDO, J.:
It is understandable for petitioner San Miguel Corporation to expect the speedy determination
of its claim that the challenged ordinance of respondent City of Mandaue 1 imposing a
specific tax should be nullified. Hence its concern at the failure of respondent Judge Celso
Avelino of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XIII, to grant its motion to dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction a complaint for the collection of such tax filed by
respondent City. The challenged order reads as follows: "Acting on the [motion to dismiss]
filed by the defendant through counsel on October 11, 1974 and the [opposition] thereto filed
by the plaintiff through counsel on October 17, 1974, the Court finds no justifiable reason in
dismissing the Complaint at this stage of the proceedings and hereby denies said
motion." 2 Offhand, it would not be easy to assail its correctness, manifesting as it does
caution and care in ascertaining the principal question involved in the suit for the collection
of the specific tax, which is its validity. It is undoubted that under the Constitution, even the
legislative body cannot deprive this Court of its appellate jurisdiction over all cases coming
from inferior courts where the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance or the legality of
any tax, impost, assessment, or toll is in question.3 Since it is likewise expressly provided in
Section 43 of the Judiciary Act that the original jurisdiction over all civil actions involving
the legality of any tax, impost or assessment appertains to the Court of First Instance, 4 it
takes a certain degree of ingenuity to allege that the lower court was bereft of such authority.
Counsel for petitioner, Attorney Demosthenes B. Gadioma, both in the petition and in his
scholarly and exhaustive memorandum, did seek to impart plausibility to a suit of this
character by relying not so much on the alleges ultra vires or constitutional infirmity of the
ordinance but rather on the failure of respondent City to follow the procedure set fort in the
Local Tax Code. 5 It was contended that there was a finding of invalidity by the then Acting
Justice Secretary, at present Acting Minister of Justice, Catalino Macaraig, Jr. There is
116
inaccuracy in such a characterization as the actual phrase used by such dignitary is that it "is
of doubtful validity. 6 The argument pressed is that a suit for collection is not the appeal
provided for in the last sentence of Section 47: "The decision of the Secretary of Justice shall
be final and executory unless, within thirty days upon receipt thereof, the aggrieved party
contents the same in a court of competent jurisdiction." 7 Respondent City disagrees. It is its
submission that the suit for collection cannot be viewed other than as an appeal. The
aggrieved party, here respondent City, in the suit for collection, did definitely contest the
correctness of the decision of the Secretary of Justice in a court of competent jurisdiction —
this, even on the assumption that there was a finding a invalidity. The statutory purpose is
thus satisfied. Such an action is in accordance with the traditional and appropriate procedure
to test the legality of a statute, decree, or ordinance.
This Court finds such an approach persuasive. It conforms to the authoritative principle that
the question of validity is for the judiciary to decide. As far back as the leading case
of Marbury v. Madison, 8 where the American Supreme Court enunciated the principle of
judicial review, Chief Justice Marshall stressed: "It is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is." 9 That was precisely what was done by
respondent City. It has likewise in its favor the fact that even the very decision of the Acting
Secretary of Justice relied upon did not squarely rule on the validity of the ordinance but only
on its "doubtful character." The writs prayed for, certiorari and prohibition, cannot issue.
The facts are undisputed. Respondent City, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 231,
enacted in 1973, to take effect on January 1, 1974, the challenged ordinance, otherwise
known as the Mandaue City Tax Code. The City Treasurer, on April 1, 1974, demanded from
petitioner payment of the made specific tax on the total volume of beer it produced in the City
of Mandaue. Petitioner, on April 8, 1974, contested the correction of said specific tax "on the
ground that Section 12(e) (7) in relation to Section 12(e) (1) and (2), Mandaue City
Ordinance No. 97, is illegal and void because it imposed a specific tax beyond its territorial
jurisdiction. " The matter was then referred by respondent City to its City Fiscal pursuant to
such Presidential Decree. Its validity was sustained. Then came the appeal to the Secretary of
Justice, with the then Acting Secretary of Justice Macaraig, as noted, rendering the opinion
that it is "of doubtful validity." A suit for collection was thereafter filed by the City where it
squarely put in issue the validity of such ordinance, thus contesting the opinion of the Acting
Secretary of Justice.
The crucial issue from the petitioner's standpoint is whether the filing of such action after
such opinion was rendered may be considered "an appeal" under the Presidential Decree.
Hence the motion to dismiss by petitioner, which was denied, respondent Judge finding "no
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
justifiable reason at [that] stage of the proceedings 10 rating in this petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
To repeat, the petition must fait The writs prayed for cannot be granted.
1. Tersely and bluntly put, petitioner would deny the jurisdiction of respondent Judge to pass
upon the validity of a challenged ordinance in an appropriate action. To say the least, there is
unorthodoxy in such an approach What immediately calls attention is its novelty. It is
opposed to and is not in conformity with the accepted juridical norm that the validity of a
statute, an executive order or ordinance is a matter for the judiciary to decide and that
whenever in the disposition of a pending case such a question becomes unavoidable, then it is
not only the power but the duty of the Court to resolve such a question. In the pending suit by
respondent City, sought to be dismissed by petitioner corporation, it specifically prayed "that
Ordinance No. 97, Series of 1973, of the herein plaintiff is valid, legal, and enforceable in
accordance with law; ... 11 Since both under the Constitution and the Judiciary Act,
respondent Judge is vested with jurisdiction to make such a declaration, it would be, at the
very least, premature for the corrective power of this Tribunal to be interposed , just because
he did not, "at [that] stage of the proceedings," grant -the motion to dismiss on the allegation
that there was lack of jurisdiction. The authorities support squarely the procedure followed by
respondent City to remove doubts as to the validity of the ordinance in question. 12 Even more
in point are these two decisions with reference to the municipal power to impose specific
taxes on beverages manufactured within its territorial boundaries, City of Bacolod v.
Gruet 13 and City of Naga v. Court of Appeals. 14 It is worth mentioning that in the first case
cited, the entity involved is petitioner corporation, then known as San Miguel Brewery, Inc.,
defendant and appellant Gruet being sued in his capacity as manager of its Coca-Cola Plant in
Bacolod City.
2. There is this reinforcement to the conclusion reached. To so construe Section 47 would be
to raise a serious constitutional question For it would in effect bar what otherwise would be a
proper case cognizable by a court precisely in the exercise of the conceded power of judicial
review just because the procedure contended for which is that of an "appeal" under the
circumstances a term vague and ambiguous, was not followed. Petitioner may not be
sufficiently aware of the implications of such a proposition. It would run counter to the well-
settled doctrine that between two possible modes of constructions, the one which would not
be in conflict with what is ordained by the Constitution is to be preferred. Every intendment
of the law should lean towards its validity, not its invalidity. 15 The judiciary, as noted by
Justice Douglas, should 6 favor that t interpret ration of legislation which gives it the greater
chance of giving the test of constitutionality. 16
117
3. The inherent weakness of this suit for certiorari and prohibition is likewise discernible
from the fact that the then Acting Secretary of Justice Macaraig limited himself to a finding
that the ordinance in question was "of doubtful validity. 17 That is far from a categorical
declaration of its being repugnant to the Constitution or its being ultra vires. That betrays a
realization that unless and until the judiciary speaks in no uncertain terms, the presumption of
validity continues misgivings as to the likelihood of an alleged infringement of any binding
norm do not suffice. There is this aphorism from Justice Malcolm "To doubt is to
sustain. 18 That is merely to accord recognition to the well-settled and binding doctrine that
only in a very clear case is the judiciary judged in nullifying a statute, or ordinance.
4. One last word. The decision y does not extend to any de determination by this Court as to
the validity, or lack of it, of the assailed ordinance. To do so would be, at the very least,
premature. That is a function for the lower court to perform.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The of the case before respondent Judge should be
conducted as speedily as circumstances permit. Costs against petitioner.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. L-4465. July 12, 1951.]
CHINESE FLOUR IMPORTERS ASSOCIATION, MANILA,
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner-Appellee, v. PRICE STABILIZATION BOARD
(PRISCO), Respondents-Appellants. MANUEL RUSTIA, ERNESTO Y. SIBAL and
other members of the Philippine Flour Institute, Inc., Intervenors and appellants.
Government Corporate Counsel Pompeyo Diaz and Second Assistant Corporate
Counsel Hilarion U. Jarencio for respondents and appellants.
Claro M. Recto, Manuel O. Chan, Vicente Formoso, Jr., Tan & Nuguid for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. IMPORT CONTROL; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 426. — While the Pratra, now Prisco, is
given the power and authority to determine and regulate the allocation of wheat flour, the
allocation shall be made in accordance with the pattern set in section 14 of Republic Act No.
426, and not under Executive Order No. 305. The only purpose of the appendices to said
Republic Act is to itemize the commodities which are deemed controlled, the import quota of
which need to be fixed by the Import Control Board in accordance with section 7 of the law
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
for the purpose of allocating them to the importers. They do not necessarily indicate that
those excluded therefrom are not subject to the operation of said Act, because they also come
under the provisions of section 9 which have reference to items of import not enumerated in
the appendices. It must be noticed that, aside from wheat flour, there are other commodities
that are excepted from Appendix C, among which may be mentioned oats and infant foods,
umbrella fabrics, salmon and sardines, corned beef, hams and shoulders, master records, yarn
and threads, industrial starch and table cutlery. Other articles are similarly excepted in
Appendix D. The importation of those articles is governed by section 9, which has reference
to items of import not enumerated in appendices C and D.
2. IMPORT CONTROL; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 426; PROVISO OF SECTION 15
CONSTRUED. — The second part of section 15, which is preceded by the word "provided"
can only refer to the clause immediately preceding it in section 15 and can have no other
meaning than that the function of allocating the wheat flour instead of being assigned to the
Import Control Commissioner was assigned to the Pratra which heretofore has been charged
with said duty by Executive Order No. 305. It simply means that the authority to determine
and grant flour quota allocations was taken from the Import Control Commissioner and given
to the Pratra now Prisco, which must have been done presumably because of the practice and
experience heretofore enjoyed by said office in so far as the allocation of wheat flour import
quota is concerned under the provisions of Executive Order No. 305, which was issued to
implement and carry out the objectives of the International Wheat Flour Agreement.
3. IMPORT CONTROL; PRISCO’S FUNCTIONS IN QUOTA ALLOCATIONS. — The
fixing of quota is a function that the law gives to the Import Control Board (sec. 3) in
accordance with the schedule and pattern set in sections 7 and 14 of Republic Act No. 426, so
that once the quotas are fixed, the allocation thereof becomes the concern of the Import
Control Commissioner. The Import Control Board is the policy- determining body that fixes
and allocates the import quota, whereas the Import Control Commissioner is the executive
officer charged with the execution of the policy and directives of the Board. Upon the other
hand, the proviso gives to the Pratra exclusive power and authority to determine and regulate
the allocation because the intention is to give to that office the power and authority not only
to allocate the quota but also to pass on the financial capacity and other requisite
qualifications of the importers to whom the quota should be allocated. This is a function
which the Pratra has been exercising before the approval of Republic Act No. 426 in the light
of the rules and regulations adopted by the Import Flour Board under the provisions of
Executive Order No. 305, and the Pratra has a machinery for determining and passing upon
the fitness and financial qualifications of the importers, and that machinery is the one
contemplated in the proviso of section 15. But in allocating the import quota to the importers
once they have been screened and determined, the Pratra should follow the pattern set in
section 14 of Republic Act No. 426.
118
4. IMPORT CONTROL; NATIONALIZATION OF FLOUR TRADE. — The policy of our
government of placing the importation of wheat flour exclusively in the hands of Filipino
importers in line with the policy of our Government to encourage and foster the spirit of
nationalism among our people in business, commerce and industry in the Philippines, is
indeed very plausible and should be encouraged to give a break to our countrymen so that
they may have a greater share in our local trade, business and commerce but plausible though
it may be, such policy should, however, be adopted gradually so as not to cause injustice and
discrimination to alien firms or businessmen of long standing in the Philippines and who have
been long engaged in this particular trade thereby contributing with their money and efforts to
the economic development of our country. In fact, this is the policy that our Congress has set
in an unmistakable manner in Republic Act No. 426. When the Pratra decided to ignore
entirely the rights of the old importers, simply because they are aliens, in complete disregard
of this policy of our Government, these importers have the right to recur to the sanctuary of
justice for redress for they too are entitled to certain rights under our Constitution.
5. MANDAMUS; SECTION 14 OF REPUBLIC ACT IS MANDATORY. — The guaranteed
purchases of the Philippine Government of wheat flour must be allocated among old and new
importers in accordance with the mandatory provisions of section 14 of Republic Act No.
426. And being old importers of wheat flour, the members of the plaintiff association are
entitled as a matter of right to quota allocations of this commodity; hence, their remedy is
mandamus.
6. MANDAMUS; NON-EXISTENCE OF APPEAL TO PRESIDENT — Executive Order
No. 90, creating the Pratra, now Prisco, contains no provision requiring direct appeal to the
President before action could be taken in court against the Pratra in connection with the
performance of its functions. The Pratra (Prisco) being an agency created by the President, it
is presumed that its action bear his official approval. Such appeal, therefore, is deemed
unnecessary. Neither can the acts of the Pratra be considered as acts of the President even if
the import licenses to be issued by the Pratra are to be signed by authority of the President,
because the Pratra is a mere agency or instrumentality of the executive branch of the
Government whose functions can be looked into by the Courts without infringing the
principle of the separation of powers.
7. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; PARTIES; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST;
ORGANIZATION OR ASSOCIATION AS PARTY IN REPRESENTATION OF ITS
MEMBERS. — In Gallego v. Kapisanan Timbulan ng mga Manggagawa, (83 Phil., 124) it
was held that a labor organization has legal personality to file a complaint in representation of
its members. By analogy, the plaintiff has legal personality to represent its members in this
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
case. This case can also be considered as class suit under section 18, Rule 3, of the Rules of
Court.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an appeal interposed by respondents as well as intervenors from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Manila ordering the Price Stabilization Corporation (PRISCO) to
grant flour quota allocations to the members of the petitioner association and other qualified
importers pursuant to the provisions of sections 12 and 14 of Republic Act No. 426 on the
basis of their quota allocations for the years 1948 and 1949, and dismissing the complaint of
the intervenors.
On September 5, 1950, the Chinese Flour Importers Association, Manila, Philippines, filed in
the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for mandamus to compel the Philippine Relief
and Trade Rehabilitation Administration (PRATRA) and the Philippine Wheat Flour Board to
issue in favor of petitioner’s members the import quota allocations of wheat flour to which
they claim to be entitled under sections 12 and 14 of Republic Act No. 426, known as Import
Control Law, with a prayer that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the
PRATRA and the Wheat Flour Board from granting flour allocations and import licenses
therefor to new importers in excess of the latter’s shares in the portion reserved for new
importers by the provisions of Republic Act No. 426. After hearing, the writ was granted. In
the meantime, Manuel S. Rustia, Ernesto Y. Sibal, and other members of the Philippine Flour
Institute Inc., were allowed to intervene. The parties having agreed to submit the case on the
pleadings and on their respective memoranda, because it involves only a question of law, the
trial court rendered judgment as stated in the early part of this decision. From this judgment
respondents and intervenors appealed. On November 16, 1950, petitioner filed a motion for a
writ of execution pending appeal from the judgment of the trial court. The motion was
granted over the objection of the respondents, and in order to stay the execution, respondents
were allowed to file a supersedeas bond. The case is now before us purely on questions of
law.
The background of this case is as follows: On March 23, 1949, the Republic of the
Philippines signed the International Wheat Agreement together with the governments of
forty-one (41) other countries, which was entered into for the purpose of assuring supplies of
119
wheat to importing countries and markets of wheat to exporting countries at equitable and
stable prices (Part 1, article 1). The agreement fixes the quantities of wheat representing the
guaranteed sales of an exporting country to the importing countries and the guaranteed
purchases of an importing country from the exporting countries, and specifies the prices for
such sales and purchases (arts. III and VI). The guaranteed purchases of the Philippines as an
importing country is 196,000 metric tons of wheat every crop year during the period of the
agreement which expires on July 31, 1953, (Annex A to art. III). The Agreement also
provides that the exporting and importing countries shall be free to fulfill their guaranteed
quantities through private channels or otherwise (art. III).
By a resolution approved on February 17, 1950, the Senate of the Philippines concurred in the
acceptance of the Agreement by the President "with the understanding that nothing contained
in this Agreement shall be construed as in any way curtailing or abridging the right, authority
and discretion of the Philippine Government to distribute and allocate among the private
importers in the Philippines the guaranteed purchases of the Philippine Government." This
Agreement became effective with respect to the Philippines on February 27, 1950.
On March 17, 1950, the President issued Executive Order No. 305 regulating the importation
of wheat flour into the Philippines by way of implementation of the International Wheat
Agreement and authorizing the PRATRA to control its importation and distribution. The
Order provides that from March 17, 1950, no wheat flour should be imported into the
Philippines without any import license duly issued by the PRATRA which shall be signed by
its General Manager by authority of the President. It also provides that the 196,000 metric
tons of wheat, which the Philippine Government has guaranteed to purchase yearly under the
International Wheat Agreement, shall be imported in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines and that the said quantity of wheat shall in turn be allocated to local consumers,
dealers and/or importers of flour who may be authorized by the General Manager of the
PRATRA pursuant to the rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Philippine Wheat
Flour Board created in said order. On the same date, the Philippine Flour Board issued
circular No. 1, containing the required rules and regulations, and since said date, the
PRATRA began allocating the importation of wheat flour into the Philippines under the
Agreement by virtue of Executive Order No. 305.
On May 19, 1950, Republic Act No. 426 was approved. This Act provides for the allocation
of import commodities to old and new importers and lays down the pattern to be followed
with respect to the amount of quota allocations. It provides that 70 per cent, 60 per cent and
50 per cent of the total import quota for the fiscal years 1950- 51, 1951-52 and 1952-53
respectively shall be allocated to old importers, and 30 per cent, 40 per cent and 50 per cent
respectively of said quota for the same fiscal years shall be allocated to new importers
(section 14). It designates the Import Control Commissioner as the official authorized to
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
allocate the import quota among the various importers, with the exception of wheat flour for
the allocation of which the Pratra was given exclusive power and authority.
On October 3, 1950, Executive Order No. 350 was issued by the President creating the Price
Stabilization Corporation, known as PRISCO, and dissolving the PRATRA effective as of
that date. In view thereof, the PRISCO was substituted for PRATRA as party in this case.
Appellee is an association of fifty-nine (59) licensed Chinese importers of flour which was
organized under the laws of the Philippines and was registered in the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Its members individually imported wheat flour in 1946, 1947 and 1948, and as
such are old importers within the meaning of section 1 of Republic Act No. 426. They are
duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and have individually filed with the PRATRA
the prescribed applications for wheat flour import quota allocations and for licenses to import
their quota into the Philippines. They made representations and demands upon the PRATRA
and the Philippine Wheat Flour Board in order that they may be given import quota
allocations of wheat flour in the amount which should correspond to them in accordance with
section 14 of Republic Act No. 426, but their demands were disregarded and their
representations ignored. They made the same representations and demands upon the Prisco,
but with the same result. Considering this attitude of the PRATRA to be discriminatory,
unfair and oppressive, appellee filed the present action.
Stripped of unnecessary verbiage, the basic issue involved in this case may be boiled down as
follows: Shall the PRATRA, now PRISCO, make the allocation of import quota on wheat
flour in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 426, as claimed by the appellee,
or shall it make such allocation in accordance with sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No.
305 in conjunction with section 15 of Republic Act No. 426, as claimed by the appellants?.
Let us discuss both theories.
Appellants’ theory is "that the importation and allocation of wheat flour must be governed by
sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 305, in conjunction with section 16 of Republic Act
No. 426." They allege that the allocation of wheat flour is not subject to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 426; that wheat flour being considered as a class by itself, Republic Act
No. 426 does not apply to this particular commodity; and that in so far as wheat flour is
concerned, the PRATRA, now PRISCO, has the exclusive power to use its discretion in the
allocation of wheat flour, which discretion is not subject to judicial control.
On the other hand, it is appellee’s theory (1) that being old importers of wheat flour,
appellee’s members are entitled as a matter of right to quota allocations in the amount which
should be determined in accordance with section 14 of Republic Act No. 426; (2) that as the
120
agency designated by section 15 of said Act and charged with the function of determining and
regulating the allocation of wheat flour among importers, it is the duty of the PRATRA, now
PRISCO, to allocate this commodity in accordance with section 14; (3) that in denying,
neglecting, and refusing to give import quota allocations to appellee’s members in the amount
indicated in section 14, the PRATRA, now PRISCO, has unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which is specifically enjoined upon it by section 14, and has thereby
excluded appellee’s members from the use and enjoyment of their rightful shares in the wheat
flour quota under section 14; and (4) that appellee’s remedy is mandamus.
The theory of appellants "that the importation and allocation of wheat flour must be governed
by sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 305, in conjunction with section 15 of Republic
Act No. 426", is mainly based upon the provisions of said section 15 and appendix "C" of
Republic Act No. 426. It is therefore important to examine and analyze these provisions.
Section 15 of said Act provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Any existing law, executive order or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding, no
Government, office, agency, or instrumentality, except the Import Control Commissioner,
shall allocate the import quota among the various importers: Provided, That the Philippine
Rehabilitation and Trade Rehabilitation Administration shall have exclusive power and
authority to determine and regulate the allocation of wheat flour, among importers.
"Quota allocations of any importer for any particular article, including wheat flour, shall not
be transferable.
"It shall be illegal to cede, transfer, sell, rent, lease or donate, his or its import quota
allocation or license either directly or indirectly by the use of any simulation, strategy or
scheme, under the provisions of this Act, and any violation thereof shall be punishable with
the forfeiture by the Commissioner of the import quota or license of the erring party without
prejudice to his subjection to the penal provisions of this Act."cralaw virtua1aw library
Appendix "C" likewise provides in part:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(Controlled Non-essential Imports)
"Flour, all kinds, except wheat flour."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is contended that, under the above quoted provisions, wheat flour has been removed from
the scope and operation of Republic Act No. 426 and placed under Executive Order No. 305
and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder by the Wheat Flour Board because,
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
while on one hand, section 15 of said Act declares that no government office, agency or
instrumentality, except the Import Control Commissioner, shall allocate the import quota
among the various importers, on the other hand, the same section declares in its proviso that
Pratra shall have exclusive power and authority to determine and regulate the allocation of
wheat flour among importers, and while Appendix "C" of Republic Act No. 426 contains a
list of all controlled non-essential imports, however, in the group of flour of all kinds listed
therein, wheat flour is excepted, or excluded therefrom. The said proviso and exclusion,
appellants claim, confirm their view that wheat flour has been excluded from the operation of
Republic Act No. 426.
This argument is met by appellee in this wise: In arguing that because wheat flour is excluded
in Appendix "C" this commodity is deemed removed from the scope and operation of
Republic Act No. 426, appellants have completely misunderstood the purpose of the
appendices. These appendices were made part of the Act merely to establish a range of
percentage reductions on the items listed therein which shall guide the Import Control Board
in fixing the import quota of said items in accordance with section 7 where express reference
is made to the appendices. If wheat flour was excepted from Appendix "C", it is because the
amount of wheat flour which may be imported into the Philippines and its price are already
fixed and determined in the International Wheat Agreement. There is, therefore, no need for
fixing the import quota of wheat flour.
We agree with this line of reasoning of counsel for the appellee. The only purpose of the
appendices is to itemize the commodities which are deemed controlled, the import quota of
which need to be fixed by the Import Control Board in accordance with section 7 of the law
for the purpose of allocating them to the importers. They do not necessarily indicate that
those excluded therefrom are not subject to the operation of said Act, because they also come
under the provisions of section 9 which have reference to the items of import not enumerated
in the appendices. In this connection, we also notice, as pointed out by counsel for the
appellee, that, aside from wheat flour, there are other commodities that are excepted from
Appendix "C", among which may be mentioned: Oats and infant foods, umbrella fabrics,
salmon and sardines, corned beef, hams and shoulders, master records, yarn and threads,
industrial starch and table cutlery. Other articles are similarly excepted in appendix "D."
Certainly, appellants can not seriously contend that these articles are not within the purview
of Republic Act No. 426 by the mere fact that, like wheat flour, they are excepted in
appendices "C" and "D." To our mind, their importation is governed by section 9 we have
already adverted to, which has reference to items of import not enumerated in the appendices.
This section provides that no such items of import shall be allowed an import license and
exchange cover in excess of its import value (C. I. F.) for the year 1948, except agricultural
machineries, equipment and other machinery, and materials and equipment for dollar-
producing and dollar-saving industries, which means that as regards those articles not
121
mentioned in the appendices they can also be imported by those who had imported them in
1948, subject only to the limitation that the import quota shall not exceed their import value
in 1948, and to the reservation in favor of new importers provided for in section 14 of
Republic Act No. 426.
As regards appellants’ contention that the second part of section 15, which is preceded by the
word "provided" operates as an exception to exclude wheat flour from the provisions of the
Act, we likewise find more tenable the line of reasoning of the appellee on the matter. Said
proviso, in our opinion, can only refer to the clause immediately preceding it in section 15
and can have no other meaning than that the function of allocating the wheat flour instead of
being assigned to the Import Control Commissioner was assigned to the PRATRA which
heretofore has been charged with said duty by Executive Order No. 305. It simply means that
the authority to determine and grant flour quota allocations was taken from the Import
Control Commissioner and given to the PRATRA, now PRISCO, which must have been done
presumably because of the practice and experience heretofore enjoyed by said office in so far
as the allocation of wheat flour import quota is concerned under the provisions of Executive
Order No. 305, which was issued to implement and carry out the objectives of the
International Wheat Flour Agreement. If the intention of the law is to exempt said wheat flour
from the provisions of Republic Act No. 426, the proper place of said proviso would be in
section 22, which contains the repealing clause, and not in section 15. Indeed, if the intention
of the law is to except Executive Order No. 305 from the operation of Act No. 426, that
exception would have been clearly stated in said section 22.
"The proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding parts of the
clause, to which it is attached. Lewis’ Sutherland, Statutory Construction, sections 352, 420;
Friedeman v. Sullivan, 48 Ark. 213, 2 S. W. 785; United States v. Babbit, 1 Black 55, 17 L.
Ed. 94; McRae v. Holcomb, 46 Ark. (306), 310; Towson v. Denson, 74 Ark. 302, 306, 86 S.
W. 661. (Hackney v. Southwest Hotels, 195 S. W. 2d. 55, 58.)"
"The term "provided", is frequently regarded as used, not as qualifying the operation of the
statute, but as conjunctive to an independent paragraph. Provisos have therefore frequently
been held to bring in new matter rather than to limit or explain that which has gone before.
(50 Am. Jur., sec. 436.)"
"The natural and appropriate office of a proviso is to modify the operation of that part of the
statute immediately preceding the proviso, or to restrain or qualify the generality of the
language that it follows. Indeed, the presumption is that a proviso in a statute refers only to
the provision to which it is attached, and, as a general rule, a proviso is deemed to apply only
to the immediately preceding clause or provision. (50 Am. Jur., sec. 438.)"
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
"The operation of a proviso is usually and properly confined to the clause or distinct portion
of the enactment which immediately precedes it, and does not extend to or qualify other
sections, unless the legislative intent that it shall so operate is clearly disclosed; and, a
fortiori, a proviso contained in an amendatory statute will not be extended to the original act.
(50 Am. Jur., sec. 640.)"
"Since the proviso in sec. 7205 applies only to that section, and not to sec. 7204, it follows
that there is no limitation of liability as to the value of property entrusted by the guest to the
hotelkeeper under sec. 7204. (59 C. J. 1090)."cralaw virtua1aw library
To bolster up the contention that the proviso of section 15 of Act No. 426 has the effect of
excluding the importation of wheat flour from the operation of said Act, counsel for
appellants lay stress in the phraseology used by the law in that, while the first part provides
that the Import Control Commissioner shall allocate the import quota, the proviso prescribes
that the PRATRA shall have power and authority to determine and regulate the allocation. In
other words, the first part uses the word "allocate" with respect to Import Control
Commissioner, whereas the proviso employs the phrase "to determine and regulate the
allocation" which, it is contended, is broader in scope and confers absolute discretion upon
the PRATRA to make the allocation without following the pattern set in section 14 of the
same Act.
The claim is based upon a misconception of the true import of the terms used in the law. The
reason why the first part of section 15 merely employs the word allocate when referring to
Import Control Commissioner is because the fixing of quota is a function that the law gives to
the Import Control Board (section 3) in accordance with the schedule and pattern set in
sections 7 and 14 of Republic Act No. 426, so that once the quotas are fixed, the allocation
thereof becomes the concern of the Import Control Commissioner. The Import Control Board
is the policy-determining body that fixes and allocates the import quota, whereas the Import
Control Commissioner is the executive officer charged with the execution of the policy and
directives of the Board. Upon the other hand, the proviso gives to the PRATRA exclusive
power and authority to determine and regulate the allocation because the intention is to give
to that office the power and authority not only to allocate the quota but also to pass on the
financial capacity and other requisite qualifications of the importers to whom the quota
should be allocated. This is a function which the Pratra has been exercising before the
approval of Republic Act No. 426 in the light of the rules and regulations adopted by the
Import Flour Board under the provisions of Executive Order No. 305, and the PRATRA has
the machinery for determining and passing upon the fitness and financial qualifications of the
importers, and that machinery is the one contemplated in that proviso. But in allocating the
import quota of the importers once they have been screened and determined, it is our opinion
that the PRATRA should follow the pattern set in section 14 of Republic Act No. 426.
122
We wish to take note of the inference drawn by appellants from the use of the phrase
"including wheat flour" in the second paragraph of section 15 which prohibits the transfer of
quota allocations of any importer for any particular article pointing out that by the use of that
phrase, the legislator meant to exclude wheat flour from the other provisions of the Act,
specially the provisions of sections 12 and 14 relative to the quota allocations. The argument
is spacious, for it fails to recognize that the intention of Congress in inserting said phrase is
precisely to dispel the doubt that may be engendered by the proviso of the first paragraph of
section 15. The preceding paragraph excluded wheat flour from among the imported
commodities which the Import Control Commissioner is called upon to allocate, and the
insertion becomes necessary to avoid any inference that wheat flour is also excepted from the
second paragraph of the section. The insertion was made just to leave no doubt that wheat
flour comes within the purview of Republic Act No. 426.
Appellants may inquire, what are the provisions of Executive Order No. 305 which are
inconsistent with Republic Act No. 426? The answer is simple. There are several that may be
mentioned, the most important of which are: on the matter of allocation, the Executive Order
provides that wheat flour shall be allocated to local consumers, dealers and/or importers (sec.
2), whereas Act No. 426 provides that the wheat flour shall be allocated only among
importers within the meaning of said Act (sec. 15). While the Executive Order does not
classify who are qualified importers, nor give any pattern for the allocation of quota, the Act
divides the importers into old and new importers, prescribes their qualifications (sections 1
and 14), and establishes the basis to be followed in determining the amount of quota
allocations which may be given to them (sections 9, 12, 13 and 14). The Executive Order
creates a Board which is authorized to issue rules and regulations to be followed by the
PRATRA in the allocation of wheat flour (section 3), whereas the Act provides that the
determination and regulation of wheat flour among importers is a function that is exclusively
given to the PRATRA, which as a consequence it may exercise without necessarily being
bound by such rules and regulations (section 13). Needless to say that, as far as the issue
involved in this case is concerned, where the provisions of Executive Order are inconsistent
with or repugnant to the provisions of the Act, the mandate of the Act must prevail and must
be followed. In this connection, we note that section 5 of the Rules and regulations adopted
by the Wheat Flour Board to implement the provisions of Executive Order No. 305, provides
that 20 per cent of wheat flour to be imported may be reserved for direct importation by the
PRATRA for stabilization purposes, and the 80 per cent shall be distributed first to direct
consumers who are financially able and who by themselves have been regularly importing
their flour requirements, then to qualified Filipino importers, and finally to other importers.
Because these provisions are repugnant to the pattern set for the allocation of quota in section
14 of Republic Act No, 426, they must be deemed to have been impliedly repealed by section
22 of the same Act. It follows that PRATRA can only make the allocation of wheat flour now
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
by observing the pattern set in said section 14.
We are urged to interpret the provisions of Act No. 426 in a way that may exclude wheat
flour from its operation in order to allow the PRATRA to carry out its policy of placing the
importation of wheat flour exclusively in the hands of Filipino importers in line with the
policy of our Government to encourage and foster the spirit of nationalism among our people
in business, commerce and industry in the Philippines. We have been informed, and have
taken notice of the claim, that the PRATRA recently in line with the above mentioned policy
of nationalism has determined to allocate the import quota of wheat flour exclusively among
the new importers, to the complete exclusion of the old importers, under the claim that it has
absolute discretion to do so subject only to the restrictions that may be imposed by the Chief
Executive.
We are not oblivious of this policy of our Government which is indeed very plausible and
should be encouraged to give a break to our countrymen so that they may have greater share
in our local trade, business and commerce in line with the spirit of nationalism underlying our
Constitution, but plausible and patriotic though it may be, such policy should, however, be
adopted gradually so as not to cause injustice and discrimination to alien firms or
businessmen of long standing in the Philippines and who have been long engaged in this
particular trade thereby contributing with their money and efforts to the economic
development of our country. In fact, this is the policy that our Congress has set in an
unmistakable manner in Republic Act No. 426. This is also the policy that our President has
expressed in the letter he sent to the PRATRA relative to the determination of import quota
allocations of wheat flour. 1 When the Pratra decided to ignore entirely the rights of the old
importers, simply because they are aliens, in complete disregard of this policy of our
Government, these importers have the right to recur to the sanctuary of justice for redress, for
they too are entitled to certain rights under our Constitution.
"Aliens within the state of their residence enjoy certain rights and privileges like those
enjoyed by its citizens, such as free access to the courts and the equal protection of the laws.
Nor may aliens be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Citizens
may, of course, be preferred to non-citizens without violating constitutional guaranties. They
are excluded from the enjoyment of political rights, such as the right to vote and to hold
public office. Other restrictions may be imposed for reasons of public policy and in the
exercise of police power." (Padilla’s Civil Code, pp. 95-96).
It is claimed that wheat flour as a commodity is a class by itself because it has been the
subject of an International Wheat Agreement and as such should be excepted from the
provisions of Republic Act No. 426. What is their special in wheat flour which should make
it a class by itself? This commodity is an import, as are other import items, and the
123
International Wheat Agreement is merely a trade agreement the objectives of which are to
assure supplies of wheat to importing countries and markets for wheat to exporting countries
at equitable and stable prices. The Agreement merely regulates the outflow and inflow of
flour between and among the countries signatories thereto. But the agreement does not
interfere with the internal laws of the signatory countries regarding imports and exports, and
as a matter of fact it provides in Article II that "Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
to exempt any private trader from any laws or regulations to which he is otherwise subject",
and in the resolution approved by the Senate on February 17, 1950, the Senate concurred in
its acceptance by the President "with the understanding that nothing contained in this
Agreement shall be construed as in any way curtalling or abridging the right, authority and
discretion of the Philippine Government to distribute and allocate among the private
importers in the Philippines the guaranteed purchases of the Philippine Government."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Wheat flour is, therefore, like any other commodity whose importation should be regulated,
and as such should be included within the purview of Republic Act No. 426. A perusal of this
act will show that it is all comprehensive and covers the whole field of imports. It is the
general and basic law on imports intended to replace and substitute all prior laws, executive
orders, and rules and regulations on the same subject. Section 22 which provides that "Any
Act or executive order, rules or regulations whose provisions are contrary to, or in
contravention with any provision of this Act are hereby repealed", clearly reveals the intent of
Congress to establish a uniform system of rules on imports and to nullify the heretofore
existing laws, executive orders, and rules and regulations which may be inconsistent with the
Act. No reason is perceived, therefore, why wheat flour shall be regarded as a class by itself
and should be excluded from its operation simply because it has been the subject of an
international agreement.
To the foregoing considerations we may add that to interpret Republic Act No. 426 as
excluding wheat flour from its operation, as contended by appellants, would be tantamount to
an undue delegation of powers to the PRATRA and would render the Act unconstitutional
and void. As a general rule, the functions of legislation may not be delegated by the
legislative to the executive department or to any executive or administrative officer, board, or
commission, except as such delegation may be expressly authorized by a constitutional
provision. And a statute that vests an arbitrary discretion in administrative officers with
respect to an ordinary lawful business, profession or appliance, or fails to prescribe a uniform
rule of action or to lay down a guide or standard whereby the exercise of discretion may be
measured, is void and unconstitutional. We are not prepared to adopt such interpretation.
"As the general rule is stated in Corpus Juris, which statement has been cited and quoted with
approval, the functions of legislation may not be delegated by the legislative to the executive
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
department or to any executive or administrative officer, board, or commission except as such
delegation may be expressly authorized by a constitutional provision, and the constitution
affords the measure of the powers which may be granted to purely administrative boards or
officers. Hence, where executive officers or bodies are charged with the administration of
statutes, the legislature must ordinarily prescribe a policy, standard, or rule for their guidance
and must not vest them with an arbitrary or uncontrolled discretion with regard thereof or as
to the matters or persons to which the statutes shall be applied. So the legislature cannot vest
in executive officers or bodies an uncontrolled power to vary, change, or suspend a statute
unless the constitution so provides." (16 C. J. S. pp. 348-349.)
"The practical question which arises in this problem is the determination of what is a proper
and reasonable discretion and what is an invalid arbitrary discretion. The general accepted
rule as to this question is to the effect that a statute or ordinance vests an arbitrary discretion
in administrative officers with respect to an ordinarily lawful business, profession, or
appliance, if it fails to prescribe a uniform rule of action or fails to lay down a guide or
standard whereby the exercise of discretion may be measured. Any law which authorizes the
issuing or withholding of licenses, permits or approvals or sanctions other administrative
functions in such a manner as the designated officials arbitrarily choose, without reference to
all of the class to which the law under consideration was intended to apply and without being
controlled or guided by any definite rule or specified conditions to which all similarly
situated may conform, is unconstitutional and void." (11 Am. Jur., p. 947.)
Our attention has been invited to resolution No. 43, approved by the Senate of the Philippines
after this case has been decided by the lower court, in which it is reiterated that the intent and
policy of the Senate in inserting in the law the proviso under consideration is to afford
Filipino business enterprises more substantial participation in the vital wheat flour import
trade. Indeed, in that resolution, it is intimated that the proviso of section 15 of Act No. 426
came into being as an amendment of the Senate with the considered object of utilizing the
PRATRA as the sole arbiter in fixing wheat flour allocations in consonance with the national
policy to advance the field of Filipino participation in the business enterprises in the
Philippines. But it is to be regretted that the attempted clarification has not been written into
the law, and the resolution has not been concurred in by the House, and as such it does not
have any binding effect in the determination of this case. The resolution does not have the
effect of law. The same cannot swerve this Court from its constitutional duty to interpret the
law in accordance with well-known rules of statutory construction.
"While a court may not inquire into the intent of a legislator, it is bound to ascertain the
legislative intent from what was done by the legislature as an entity." (People v. Marxhauson,
171 N. W. p. 537.)
124
"A legislative construction placed on a prior statute is without binding force in a judicial
proceeding and court is free to place its own construction on the prior statute." In re
Cauldwell’s Estate, 36 N. Y. Swd 43, 178 Misc. 916. (10 Fifth Dec. Digest, p. 1527.)
"A legislative declaration of opinion as to meaning of earlier statute, without a positive
legislative act, is not binding on the court in the construction of the earlier statute, since
statutory construction is a ’judicial’ not a ’legislative function’. — State ex rel Washington-
Oregon I v. Co. Dobson, 130 P2d 939, 169, Or. 546." (40 Fifth Dec. Digest, p. 1528.)
". . . under the general rule that a legislative resolution does not have force or effect as a law,
a legislative resolution as to the proper construction of a statute is not binding on the courts."
Boyer — Campbell Co. v. Fry, 271 Mich. 221, 260 N. W. 165, 98 ALP. 827 (50 Am. Jur. p.
331.)
The other point stressed by the appellants is that mandamus does not lie in this case because
the power vested in the PRISCO to determine and regulate the allocation of wheat flour
among importers requires exercise of discretion. They claim that it is elementary that
mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty, and in issuing the
writ, the trial court in effect has ordered the PRISCO not merely to act, but to act in a
particular manner, to wit: to give wheat flour allocations to Chinese importers. The
contention presupposes that the power and authority vested in the PRISCO to determine and
regulate the allocation of wheat flour among importers is to be governed exclusively by the
provisions of Executive Order No. 305. Under this theory, the claim is indeed well taken, for
there is no doubt that the aforesaid order gives to the PRISCO wide range of discretion to
allocate the import quota of wheat flour to the importers. But the assumption runs counter to
our theory that, while the PRISCO is given the power and authority to determine and regulate
the allocation of wheat flour, the allocation shall be made in accordance with the pattern set
in section 14 of Republic Act No. 426. Such being the case, the guaranteed purchases of
wheat flour must be allocated among old and new importers in accordance with the
mandatory provisions of section 14. And being old importers of wheat flour, the members of
the appellee are entitled as a matter of right to quota allocations of this commodity, hence
their remedy is mandamus.
The claim that appellee has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, other than the special civil action for mandamus, by a direct appeal to the President of
the Philippines, would be tenable if Executive Order No. 90, creating the PRATRA, now
PRISCO, contain a provision requiring such appeal before action could be taken in court
against the PRATRA in connection with the performance of its functions. But no such appeal
is therein provided, and the PRATRA, now PRISCO, being an agency created by the
President, it is presumed that its actions bear his official approval. Such appeal, therefore, is
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
deemed unnecessary. Neither can the acts of the PRATRA be considered as acts of the
President even if the import licenses to be issued by the PRATRA are to be signed by
authority of the President, because the PRATRA is a mere agency or instrumentality of the
executive branch of the Government whose functions can be looked into by the Courts
without infringing the principle of the separation of powers.
"In addition to the various federal boards and officers considered supra this section,
mandamus may lie, in a proper case, to compel action by other federal boards or officers.
Thus it has been held that a collector of customs may be compelled by mandamus to perform
purely ministerial duties;" (55 C. J. S. p. 202).
"Mandamus lies to compel the interstate commerce commission to perform a purely legal
duty, in the performance of which no act of judgment is involved; also to proceed and decide
a case according to its judgment and discretion, where it refuses to proceed at all on the
ground that it is without jurisdiction and where in fact the law requires it to do so." (55 C. J.
S. p. 202).
"Mandamus lies to compel the commissioner of patent to perform ministerial duties; and it is
a proper remedy where he acts beyond his authority and without warrant of law." (50 C. J. S.
p. 201).
The remaining question to be determined refers to the claim that the Chinese Flour Importers
Association is not the real party in interest in this case and, therefore, the petition should be
dismissed. It is true that the petition has been filed in the name of the association, but it is
likewise true that the association has filed the petition in behalf of its members who are all
old importers and are entitled to import quota allocations under the law. This association dealt
with the PRATRA directly, and vice versa, in so far as the subject matter of litigation is
concerned, and it is this association that filed the bond for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. In Gallego Et. Al. v. Kapisanan Timbulan
ng mga Manggagawa, * 46 Off. Gaz., 4245, it was held that a labor organization has legal
personality to file a complaint in representation of its members. By analogy, the appellee has
legal personality to represent its members in this case. This case can also be considered as
class suit under section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants. The writ
of preliminary injunction issued by the lower court is hereby made final.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and Jugo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
125
PARAS, C.J. :
Mr. Justice Feria voted with the majority.
PABLO, M., concurrente:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Los apelantes contienden que el articulo 15 de la Ley Numero 426 concede al PRISCO
facultad y autoridad exclusivas para determinar la asignacion a los importadores. Dicho
articulo dice textualmente:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 15. No obstante las disposiciones en contrario de la ley, orden ejecutiva o reglamento
vigente, ninguna oficina, organismo o dependencia del Gobierno, con excepcion del
Comisionado de Control de Importaciones, asignara la cuota de importacion a los varios
importadores: Entendiendose, Que la Administracion de Ayuda Comercial y Rehabilitacion
de Filipinas tendra la facultad y autoridad exclusivas de determinar y reglamentar la
asignacion de la harina de trigo a los importadores.
"No seran transferibles las asignaciones de cuota de un importador para cualquier mercancia
determinada, incluyendo la harina de trigo.
"Sera ilegal ceder, traspasar, vender, arrendar o donar, su asignacion o licencia de cuota de
importacion, ya sea directa o indirectamente, o por medio del uso de alguna simulacion,
estrategia o ardid, a las personas o entidades que no tengan derecho a la cuota de importacion
bajo las disposiciones de esta Ley, y la infraccion de la misma sera castigada con la perdida
de la cuota o licencia de importacion del infractor, que sera decretada por el Comisionado, sin
perjuicio de estar sujeto a las disposiciones de esta Ley."cralaw virtua1aw library
Si las disposiciones de este articulo se aplicasen independientemente de las del articulo 14, —
como pretenden los apelantes — el PRISCO tendria poderes omnimodos: podria conceder a
dos o mas importadores chinos — que pueden ser nuevos o antiguos — la asignacion de toda
la cuota de importacion de harina de trigo correspondiente a Filipinas, o podria asignarla a
dos o mas importadores indios, en perjuicio del importador filipino y de todos los demas
importadores. La discrecion concedida al PRISCO, de acuerdo con el sentido literal del
articulo, es absoluta: puede asignarla solamente a dos o tres importadores australianos
(antiguos o nuevos), privando de ella a todos los demas; puede distribuir la importacion entre
varios importadores de diferentes nacionalidades y en la cantidad que crea conveniente, sin
necesidad de apoyarse en base alguna sobre que fundar esta distribucion; puede concederla
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
solamente a importadores filipinos, pero tambien puede no concederles ni un solo saco de
harina, sino a dos o tres importadores marroquies. En tal caso, toda la cuota de harina para
Filipinas podria colocarse en manos o a disposicion de los importadores extranjeros
solamente. Esto seria desastroso, tanto mas si estallara una tercera guerra mundial. La vida de
los habitantes de Filipinas estaria a merced de esos dos o tres importadores extranjeros. Se
repetiria lo que hemos sufrido durante el regimen japones. Mientras algunos extranjeros, que
privaban en los altos consejos del comandante en jefe de ejercito invasor, amasaban fortuna
con el acaparamiento de articulos de primera necesidad, el pueblo se moria de hambre. No
creo que la Legislatura haya dado al PRISCO una facultad tan ilimitada, que puede ser tan
proteccionista como desastrosa. Proteccionista si asigna toda la importacion a los
importadores filipinos y desastrosa si la concede a desalmados extranjeros. Si la intencion de
la Legislatura fuera entregar al comerciante filipino el control inmediato y absoluto del
negocio de importacion de harina de trigo, habria puesto en la ley "importadores filipinos," en
vez de "importadores" solamente.
Teniendo en cuenta la recomendacion del Presidente en la sesion del Gabinete de 4 de agosto
de 1950 y la resolucion Numero 43 del Senado de 12 de diciembre de 1950, se puede concluir
que la Legislatura ha tenido la intencion de conceder al comerciante filipino participacion
sustancial en la importacion de harina de trigo, pero no la de adoptar la politica drastica de
eliminar inmediata y completamente a los antiguos importadores, colocando en su lugar a los
nuevos. Por eso, establecio un proceso de aumento gradual de la participacion del nuevo
importador en la distribucion de las cuotas de importacion.
El articulo 14 de la Ley Numero 426 da oportunidad a los antiguos importadores de hacer su
composicion de lugar durante los años de 1950 a 1953, durante los cuales, de una manera
gradual y razonable, se ira disminuyendo la participacion de los antiguos importadores y
aumentando la de los nuevos, en la importacion de "cualesquier mercancias, efectos o
articulos de consumo." La harina de trigo esta incluido indudablemente en estas ’mercancias,
efectos o articulos de consumo." Fuerza es concluir, por tanto, que el articulo 14 es la base
sobre la cual el PRISCO ha de distribuir la harina de trigo. Durante ese proceso, los antiguos
importadores pueden decidir si han de dejar el negocio de importar harina de trigo o de
continuarlo, dedicandose al mismo tiempo a otras actividades para mantener su negocio. Es
una medida razonable y justa, y evita fricciones innecesarias.
Opino que el articulo 15 debe interpretarse en consonancia con las disposiciones del articulo
14.
Concurro, ademas, con la opinion de la mayoria.
126
Endnotes:
1. "His Excellency, the President, at the Cabinet meeting held on August 4, 1950, decided
that in the matter of allocating quotas for flour importation, alien firms of long standing in the
Philippines and generally known to have been engaged in this particular trade should not be
discriminated against but should receive a fair and equitable share of the business, without,
however, prejudice, as a matter of national policy, to giving preferences to Filipino importers
in the allocation of new flour quotas, and to gradually place the business in Filipino hands.
"It is requested that this policy enunciated by the President referred to herein and in the next
preceding indorsement, be used as a basis by the PRATRA in the allocation of flour quotas.
"By authority of the President."
* 83 Phil., 124.
G.R. No. L-6355-56             August 31, 1953
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellant.
Manuel O. Chan for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring
section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino
David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of
P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46,
representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950,
as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December
31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special pronouncement as to
costs.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the same question of law,
they were jointly submitted for determination in the lower court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg
presiding, in a rather exhaustive and well considered decision found and held that under the
doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection
of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of
their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and
so ordered the refund of said taxes.
We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the proposition and the
arguments pro and cons involved in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are raised,
brought up and presented here. In that case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the
United States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O 'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S.,
277, that taxing the salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such salary
and so violates the Constitution. We shall now confine our-selves to a discussion and
determination of the remaining question of whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly
section 13, can justify and legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial
officers.
According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal
Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by
Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduced what he considers the
pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act
No. 590.
For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article VIII of our Constitution:.
SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall
hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. They shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos,
and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.
As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional provision, we held in the
Perfecto case that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their
salaries, because the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of
their salaries during their continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the
127
Constitution. Thereafter, according to the Solicitor General, because Congress did not
favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case, Congress promulgated Republic Act No.
590, if not to counteract the ruling in that decision, at least now to authorize and legalize the
collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. We quote section 13 of Republic
Act No. 590:
SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is
hereby declared not to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or
by law.
So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution,
particularly section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are exempt from payment of
income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries,
specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Now comes the Legislature and in section 13,
Republic Act No. 590, says that "no salary wherever received by any public officer of the
Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be considered as exempt from the
income tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said income tax is not a diminution of
his compensation. Can the Legislature validly do this? May the Legislature lawfully declare
the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a
decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise? To
determine this question, we shall have to go back to the fundamental principles regarding
separation of powers.
Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the
power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of
carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws
belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the
laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is
constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law,
but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a
conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may
not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution. (Bandy vs.
Mickelson et al., 44N. W., 2nd 341, 342.)
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by
the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because
they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the
courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative
and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in violation
of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the
Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution.
Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts
will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be
taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals. (11
Am. Jur., 714-715.)
Under the American system of constitutional government, among the most important
functions in trusted to the judiciary are the interpreting of Constitutions and, as a
closely connected power, the determination of whether laws and acts of the
legislature are or are not contrary to the provisions of the Federal and State
Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.).
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says that
taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear
example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the
Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the
Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and
established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act,
or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding
weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not
conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be
usurping a judicial function in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied)
The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision,
validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it
shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am. Jur., 919,
emphasis supplied)
We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task
and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard
128
to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the
Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific
portion of the Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its
meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and
instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court
determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may
be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of
the Constitution by the Legislative department. That would be neither wise nor desirable,
besides being clearly violative of the fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of
government, particularly those governing the separation of powers.
So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the practical side thereof, we
believe that the collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and evident diminution
thereof. Under the old system where the in-come tax was paid at the end of the year or
sometime thereafter, the decrease may not be so apparent and clear. All that the official who
had previously received his full salary was called upon to do, was to fulfill his obligation and
to exercise his privilege of paying his income tax on his salary. His salary fixed by law was
received by him in the amount of said tax comes from his other sources of income, he may
not fully realize the fact that his salary had been decreased in the amount of said income tax.
But under the present system of withholding the income tax at the source, where the full
amount of the income tax corresponding to his salary is computed in advance and divided
into equal portions corresponding to the number of pay-days during the year and actually
deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday, said official actually does not receive
his salary in full, because the income tax is deducted therefrom every payday, that is to say,
twice a month. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. As Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, his salary is fixed at p12,000 a year, that is to say, he should receive P1,000 a month
or P500 every payday, — fifteenth and end of month. In the present case, the amount
collected by the Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is P1,744.45 for one year.
Divided by twelve (months) we shall have P145.37 a month. And further dividing it by two
paydays will bring it down to P72.685, which is the income tax deducted form the collected
on his salary each half month. So, if Justice Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not
exempt from payment of the income tax, instead of receiving P500 every payday, he would
be actually receiving P427.31 only, and instead of receiving P12,000 a year, he would be
receiving but P10,255.55. Is it not therefor clear that every payday, his salary is actually
decreased by P72.685 and every year is decreased by P1,744.45?
Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill No. 1127, which
became Republic Act No. 590, it would seem that one of the main reasons behind the
enactment of the law was the feeling among certain legislators that members of the Supreme
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
Court should not enjoy any exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism and love for their
country, they should pay income tax on their salaries. It might be stated in this connection
that the exemption is not enjoyed by the members of the Supreme Court alone but also by all
judicial officers including Justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of inferior courts. The
exemption also extends to other constitutional officers, like the President of the Republic, the
Auditor General, the members of the Commission on Elections, and possibly members of the
Board of Tax Appeals, commissioners of the Public Service Commission, and judges of the
Court of Industrial Relations. Compares to the number of all these officials, that of the
Supreme Court Justices is relatively insignificant. There are more than 990 other judicial
officers enjoying the exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court of Appeals, about 107
Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of the Peace. The reason
behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal
Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of
this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990
judicial officials.
The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on
public policy. As said by Justice Van Devanter of the United States Supreme Court in the
case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U. S., 245):
The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the
judges, but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men to
the bench and to promote that independence of action and judgment which is
essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations and pervading principles of
the Constitution and to the administration of justice without respect to person and
with equal concern for the poor and the rich. Such being its purpose, it is to be
construed, not as a private grant, but as a limitation imposed in the public interest; in
other words, not restrictively, but in accord with its spirit and the principle on which
it proceeds.
Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines enjoying this
exemption, especially when the great bulk thereof are justices of the peace, many of them
receiving as low as P200 a month, and considering further the other exemptions allowed by
the income tax law, such as P3,000 for a married person and P600 for each dependent, the
amount of national revenue to be derived from income tax on the salaries of judicial officers,
were if not for the constitutional exemption, could not be large or substantial. But even if it
were otherwise, it should not affect, much less outweigh the purpose and the considerations
that prompted the establishment of the constitutional exemption. In the same case of Evans
vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court declared "that they (fathers of the Constitution)
129
regarded the independence of the judges as far as greater importance than any revenue that
could come from taxing their salaries.
When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment
of income tax on his salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his office, provided and
secured by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to
secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. When we come to the
members of the Supreme Court, this excemption to them is relatively of short duration.
Because of the limited membership in this High Tribunal, eleven, and due to the high
standards of experience, practice and training required, one generally enters its portals and
comes to join its membership quite late in life, on the aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and
being required to retire at seventy, assuming that he does not die or become incapacitated
earlier, naturally he is not in a position to receive the benefit of exemption for long. It is
rather to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give more benefit. They are
relatively more numerous, and because of the meager salary they receive, they can less afford
to pay the income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid would
be real, substantial and onerous.
Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or abhorrent in it, as long as it
is based on public policy or public interest. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when
charged with the commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House of
Representatives except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace are exempt from
arrest, during their attendance in the session of the Legislature; and while all other citizens are
generally liable for any speech, remark or statement, oral or written, tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead, Senators and Congressmen in making such statements during their sessions
are extended immunity and exemption.
And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this exemption. Persons,
natural and juridical, are exempt from taxes on their lands, buildings and improvements
thereon when used exclusively for educational purposes, even if they derive income
therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].) Holders of government bonds are exempted from the
payment of taxes on the income or interest they receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4], National
Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act No. 566). Payments or income received
by any person residing in the Philippines under the laws of the United States administered by
the United States Veterans Administration are exempt from taxation. (Republic Act No. 360).
Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army who served in the Armed
Forces of the United States, allowances earned by virtue of such services corresponding to the
taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are exempted from income tax. (Republic Act No.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3

210). The payment of wages and allowances of officers and enlisted men of the Army Forces
of the Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from taxation. (Republic Act No. 35). In
other words, for reasons of public policy and public interest, a citizen may justifiably by
constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary obligation of paying taxes
on his income. Under the same public policy and perhaps for the same it not higher
considerations, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt
judicial officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their compensation,
thereby insuring the independence of the Judiciary.
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to
the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution
thereof and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and
application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and
jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not
legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later
interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute
runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the
land.
In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with no pronouncement as to costs.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring:
Without expressing any opinion on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of
Perfecto vs. Meer, G. R. No. L-2314, in view of the part I had in that case as former Solicitor
General, I wish however to state that I concur in the opinion of the majority to the effect that
section 13, Republic Act No. 590, in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial
officer shall be considered "not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the
Constitution or by law", constitutes an invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the
judiciary. In this sense, I am of the opinion that said section is null and void, it being a
transgression of the fundamental principle underlying the separation of powers.
PARAS, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I dissent for the same reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Ozaeta in
Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, in which I concurred. But I disagree with the majority in
ruling that no legislation may provide that it be held valid although against a provision of the
Constitution.
G.R. No. 96541 August 24, 1993
DEAN JOSE JOYA, CARMEN GUERRERO NAKPIL, ARMIDA SIGUION REYNA,
PROF. RICARTE M. PURUGANAN, IRMA POTENCIANO, ADRIAN CRISTOBAL,
INGRID SANTAMARIA, CORAZON FIEL, AMBASSADOR E. AGUILAR CRUZ,
FLORENCIO R. JACELA, JR., MAURO MALANG, FEDERICO AGUILAR
ALCUAZ, LUCRECIA R. URTULA, SUSANO GONZALES, STEVE SANTOS,
EPHRAIM SAMSON, SOLER SANTOS, ANG KIU KOK, KERIMA POLOTAN,
LUCRECIA KASILAG, LIGAYA DAVID PEREZ, VIRGILIO ALMARIO,
LIWAYWAY A. ARCEO, CHARITO PLANAS, HELENA BENITEZ, ANNA MARIA
L. HARPER, ROSALINDA OROSA, SUSAN CALO MEDINA, PATRICIA RUIZ,
BONNIE RUIZ, NELSON NAVARRO, MANDY NAVASERO, ROMEO SALVADOR,
JOSEPHINE DARANG, and PAZ VETO PLANAS, petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), CATALINO
MACARAIG, JR., in his official capacity, and/or the Executive Secretary, and
CHAIRMAN MATEO A.T. CAPARAS, respondents.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:

130
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
All thirty-five (35) petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from proceeding with the auction
sale scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters Paintings
and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum
of Manila and placed in the custody of the Central Bank.
The antecedents: On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote
then President Corazon C. Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed
Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and
Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc. (Christie's of New York, or CHRISTIE'S)
concerning the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings
and antique silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila
alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and
cronies.
On 14 August 1990, then President Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement allowing
Christie's of New York to auction off the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines.
On 15 August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas, representing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie's of New York.
According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction
the eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila
as well as the silverware contained in seventy-one (71) cartons in the custody of the Central
Bank of the Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG
and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of the agreement. 1
On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit (COA) through then Chairman Eufemio C.
Domingo submitted to President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the
Consignment Agreement of 15 August 1990 to the effect that: (a) the authority of former
PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality;
(b) the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; (c) PCGG had a poor track
record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, (d) the assets subject of auction were
historical relics and had cultural significance, hence, their disposal was prohibited by law. 2
On 15 November 1990, PCGG through its new Chairman David M. Castro, wrote President
Aquino defending the Consignment Agreement and refuting the allegations of COA
131
Chairman Domingo.3 On the same date, Director of National Museum Gabriel S. Casal issued
a certification that the items subject of the Consignment Agreement did not fall within the
classification of protected cultural properties and did not specifically qualify as part of the
Filipino cultural heritage.4 Hence, this petition originally filed on 7 January 1991 by Dean
Jose Joya, Carmen Guerrero Nakpil, Armida Siguion Reyna, Prof. Ricarte M. Puruganan,
Irma Potenciano, Adrian Cristobal, Ingrid Santamaria, Corazon Fiel, Ambassador E. Aguilar
Cruz, Florencio R. Jacela, Jr., Mauro Malang, Federico Aguilar Alcuaz, Lucrecia R. Urtula,
Susano Gonzales, Steve Santos, Ephraim Samson, Soler Santos, Ang Kiu Kok, Kerima
Polotan, Lucrecia Kasilag, Ligaya David Perez, Virgilio Almario and Liwayway A. Arceo.
After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issued immediately our
resolution denying the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of
the artworks on the ground that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a
restraining order and that proper parties had not been impleaded.
On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of
$13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury. 5
On 5 February 1991, on motion of petitioners, the following were joined as additional
petitioners: Charito Planas, Helena Benitez, Ana Maria L. Harper, Rosalinda Orosa, Susan
Carlo Medina, Patricia Ruiz, Bonnie Ruiz, Nelson Navarro, Mandy Navasero, Romeo
Salvador, Josephine Darang and Paz Veto Planas.
On the other hand, Catalino Macaraig, Jr., in his capacity as former Executive Secretary, the
incumbent Executive Secretary, and Chairman Mateo A.T. Caparas were impleaded as
additional respondents.
Petitioners raise the following issues: (a) whether petitioners have legal standing to file the
instant petition; (b) whether the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced
in the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation" which is under the protection of the state
pursuant to the 1987 Constitution and/or "cultural properties" contemplated under R.A. 4846,
otherwise known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act;" (c) whether
the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion on which can be disposed of
through the joint concurrence of the President and Congress;
(d) whether respondent, PCGG has the jurisdiction and authority to enter into an agreement
with Christie's of New York for the sale of the artworks; (e) whether, PCGG has complied
with the due process clause and other statutory requirements for the exportation and sale of
the subject items; and, (f) whether the petition has become moot and academic, and if so,
whether the above issues warrant resolution from this Court.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
The issues being interrelated, they will be discussed jointly hereunder. However, before
proceeding, we wish to emphasize that we admire and commend petitioners' zealous concern
to keep and preserve within the country great works of art by well-known old masters.
Indeed, the value of art cannot be gainsaid. For, by serving as a creative medium through
which man can express his innermost thoughts and unbridled emotions while, at the same
time, reflecting his deep-seated ideals, art has become a true expression of beauty, joy, and
life itself. Such artistic creations give us insights into the artists' cultural heritage — the
historic past of the nation and the era to which they belong — in their triumphant, glorious, as
well as troubled and turbulent years. It must be for this reason that the framers of the 1987
Constitution mandated in Art. XIV, Sec. 14, that is the solemn duty of the state to "foster the
preservation, enrichment, and dynamic evolution of a Filipino national culture based on the
principle of unity in diversity in a climate of free artistic and intellectual expression." And, in
urging this Court to grant their petition, petitioners invoke this policy of the state on the
protection of the arts.
But, the altruistic and noble purpose of the petition notwithstanding, there is that basic legal
question which must first be resolved: whether the instant petition complies with the legal
requisites for this Court to exercise its power of judicial review over this case.
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the
legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper
party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 6 But the most important are the first
two (2) requisites.
On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an
action.7 This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every
action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all
persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall
be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is
brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal
question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
132
incidental interest.8 Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one
based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party. 9
There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on
legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a
public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, 10 and when a
taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public
funds. 11
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the
preservation and protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to
restrain respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty
to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV,
Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The Cultural Properties
Preservation and Protection Act," governing the preservation and disposition of national and
important cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise that the
paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by the people
in general to view and enjoy as great works of art. They allege that with the unauthorized act
of PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their right to public
property without due process of law in violation of the Constitution. 12
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They
themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of
the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-
stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman was
former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this
basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the
members thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate
these paintings when they were placed on exhibit.
Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos
couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and
anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the Marcos administration was toppled by
the revolutionary government, these paintings and silverware were taken from Malacañang
and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The
confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be
understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the
government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process
and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be
raised only by the proper parties — the true owners thereof — whose authority to recover
emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution.
Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces
have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to
question their alleged unauthorized disposition.
Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned citizens, it does not
fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 13 this Court
laid down the rule that a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public
right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the
Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty
required of respondent officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining
of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the
continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a privilege and
is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer
can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit
can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public
funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,
which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. 14 Obviously, petitioners are not
challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to
be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique
silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money.
Anent the second requisite of actual controversy, petitioners argue that this case should be
resolved by this Court as an exception to the rule on moot and academic cases; that although
the sale of the paintings and silver has long been consummated and the possibility of
retrieving the treasure trove is nil, yet the novelty and importance of the issues raised by the
petition deserve this Court's attention. They submit that the resolution by the Court of the
issues in this case will establish future guiding principles and doctrines on the preservation of
the nation's priceless artistic and cultural possessions for the benefit of the public as a
whole. 15
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy
— one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-
133
legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. 16 A case becomes
moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, 17 such as the case before us. Since the
purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding
the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date — 11 January 1991 — which is long past,
the issues raised in the petition have become moot and academic.
At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the discretion to take
cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal
standing when paramount public interest is involved. 18 We find however that there is no such
justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule.
Section 2 of R.A. 4846, as amended by P.D. 374, declares it to be the policy of the state to
preserve and protect the important cultural properties and national cultural treasures of the
nation and to safeguard their intrinsic value. As to what kind of artistic and cultural properties
are considered by the State as involving public interest which should therefore be protected,
the answer can be gleaned from reading of the reasons behind the enactment of R.A. 4846:
WHEREAS, the National Museum has the difficult task, under existing laws
and regulations, of preserving and protecting the cultural properties of the
nation;
WHEREAS, inumerable sites all over the country have since been excavated
for cultural relics, which have passed on to private hands, representing
priceless cultural treasure that properly belongs to the Filipino people as their
heritage;
WHEREAS, it is perhaps impossible now to find an area in the Philippines,
whether government or private property, which has not been disturbed by
commercially-minded diggers and collectors, literally destroying part of our
historic past;
WHEREAS, because of this the Philippines has been charged as incapable of
preserving and protecting her cultural legacies;
WHEREAS, the commercialization of Philippine relics from the contact
period, the Neolithic Age, and the Paleolithic Age, has reached a point
perilously placing beyond reach of savants the study and reconstruction
of Philippine prehistory; and
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
WHEREAS, it is believed that more stringent regulation on movement and a
limited form of registration of important cultural properties and of designated
national cultural treasures is necessary, and that regardless of the item, any
cultural property exported or sold locally must be registered with the
National Museum to control the deplorable situation regarding our national
cultural properties and to implement the Cultural Properties Law (emphasis
supplied).
Clearly, the cultural properties of the nation which shall be under the protection of the state
are classified as the "important cultural properties" and the "national cultural treasures."
"Important cultural properties" are cultural properties which have been singled out from
among the innumerable cultural properties as having exceptional historical cultural
significance to the Philippines but are not sufficiently outstanding to merit the classification
of national cultural treasures. 19 On the other hand, a "national cultural treasures" is a unique
object found locally, possessing outstanding historical, cultural, artistic and/or scientific value
which is highly significant and important to this country and nation. 20 This Court takes note
of the certification issued by the Director of the Museum that the Italian paintings and
silverware subject of this petition do not constitute protected cultural properties and are not
among those listed in the Cultural Properties Register of the National Museum.
We agree with the certification of the Director of the Museum. Under the law, it is the
Director of the Museum who is authorized to undertake the inventory, registration,
designation or classification, with the aid of competent experts, of important cultural
properties and national cultural treasures. 21 Findings of administrative officials and agencies
who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are
generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported
by substantial evidence and are controlling on the reviewing authorities because of their
acknowledged expertise in the fields of specialization to which they are assigned. 22
In view of the foregoing, this Court finds no compelling reason to grant the petition.
Petitioners have failed to show that respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG exercised
their functions with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of their jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-9515. February 20, 1957.]
134
MARIA B. CASTRO, Petitioner, v. HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII and WILLIAM L. BURR, Respondents.
Rosendo Tansinsin for Petitioner.
Jose Ma. Recto and Paterno R. Canlas for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. COURTS; MOOT QUESTIONS; NOT WITHIN THE FUNCTION OF COURT TO ACT
UPON AND DECIDE. — As general rule, it is not within the function of a court to act upon
and decide a moot question or speculative, theoretical, or abstract question or proposition, or
a purely academic question, . . . The application of the rule that a court will not determine
moot questions or abstract propositions has resulted in other expression or rules to the effect
that the court will not express an opinion in a case in which no practical relief can be granted,
or which can have no practical effect; . . . ." (1 C.J.S. pp. 1013-1015.)
DECISION
BENGZON, J.:
In a detainer suit in the Manila municipal court, William L. Burr was ordered to pay Maria B.
Castro accrued rents amounting to P9,225 plus P1,000 as attorneys fees.
Burr appealed to the Court of First Instance and filed a supersedeas bond in the amount of
P10,225 "to secure the payment to the plaintiff (Castro) of the rents, damages and costs
adjudicated to the plaintiff in the appealed decision up to the rendition thereof in the event the
said decision be affirmed by the appellate court." It was subscribed by him as principal, and
by the Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. as surety.
After a regular hearing, the Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, Judge of the Manila court of first
instance, found that full enjoyment of his mental-faculties. It should be stated reversed the
decision, and awarded Burr P2,000 as attorneys fees to be paid by plaintiff after deducting the
corresponding rent for five days. About a week later, Burr submitted a motion to cancel the
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
supersedeas bond, for being functus officio, in view of the decision favorable to him, Maria
B. Castro objected, contending that the Court’s decision had not yet become final, and that
the bond answered for rents "down to the time of final judgment in the action."
The judge granted the motion explaining (1) there was no reason for the bond to subsist,
inasmuch as the decision it sought to stay had become functus officio and (2) the supersedeas
bond should continue only when "it is the defendant who appeals from the decision of the
court of first instance" — which was not the case.
Having failed in a motion to reconsider, Maria B. Castro instituted this special civil action to
vacate the order of cancellation, alleging want of jurisdiction and/or abuse of discretion.
Thereafter she brought to the Court of Appeals the main case, insisting on her right to collect
rents. And she won: she got in that Court judgment for rents in the sum of P9,225. But the
quashing of the bond was not discussed in such appeal.
Answering the complaint before us, William L. Burr as respondent defended his co-
respondent’s order on the very grounds hereinbefore stated. He also argued that petitioner
should have appealed the order in due time to the Court of Appeals, instead of starting this
new litigation.
One thing is noticeable: the Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. is not a party before this
Court. Therefore any judgment in this case revoking Judge Tan’s order and/or reviving the
supersedeas bond will not affect said Surety Co. To direct its inclusion will not do; because,
as to such surety the cancellation order has become final long ago.
On the other hand, a judgment herein against Burr would entail no material advantage to
petitioner. Bond or no bond, she is entitled to recover rents from him in accordance with the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Now, then, as the other respondent is merely a nominal party, the issues framed for our
resolution become no more than academic, of no practical effect.
". . ., as a general rule it is not within the function of a court to act upon and decide a moot
question or speculative, theoretical, or abstract question or proposition, or a purely academic
question, . . . .
The application of the rule that a court will not determine moot questions or abstract
propositions has resulted in other expressions or rules to the effect that the court will not
express an opinion in a case in which no practical relief can be granted, or which can have no
135
practical effect; . . . ." (1 C. J. S. pp. 1013-1015.)
This case is moot and should be, as it is hereby dismissed 1 without costs. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J. B. L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 108399. July 31, 1997]
RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG), the BOARD OF ELECTION SUPERVISORS
composed of Atty. RUBEN M. RAMIREZ, Atty. RAFAELITO GARAYBLAS, and
Atty. ENRIQUE C. ROA, GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, in her capacity as Director of the
Barangay Bureau, City Treasurer Atty. ANTONIO ACEBEDO, Budget Officer
EUFEMIA DOMINGUEZ, all of the City Government of
Manila, Petitioners, v. ROBERT MIRASOL, NORMAN T. SANGUYA, ROBERT DE
JOYA, ARNEL R. LORENZO, MARY GRACE ARIAS, RAQUEL L. DOMINGUEZ,
LOURDES ASENCIO, FERDINAND ROXAS, MA. ALBERTINA RICAFORT,and
BALAIS M. LOURICH, and the HONORABLE WILFREDO D. REYES,Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Metro Manila, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 19, 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 36),1 nullifying an order of the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG), which in effect cancelled the general elections for the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) slated on December 4, 1992 in the City of Manila, on the ground
that the elections previously held on May 26, 1990 served the purpose of the first elections
for the SK under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160).
Section 423 of the Code provides for a SK in every barangay, to be composed of a chairman,
seven (7) members, a secretary, and a treasurer. Section 532(a) provides that the first
elections for the SK shall be held thirty (30) days after the next local elections. The Code took
effect on January 1, 1992.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
The first local elections under the Code were held on May 11, 1992. Accordingly, on August
27, 1992, the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 2499, providing guidelines for
the holding of the general elections for the SK on September 30, 1992. The guidelines placed
the SK elections under the direct control and supervision of the DILG, with the technical
assistance of the COMELEC.2 After two postponements, the elections were finally scheduled
on December 4, 1992.
Accordingly, registration in the six districts of Manila was conducted. A total of 152,363
youngsters, aged 15 to 21 years old, registered, 15,749 of them filing certificates of
candidacies. The City Council passed the necessary appropriations for the elections.
On September 18, 1992, however, the DILG, through then Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III,
issued a letter-resolution exempting the City of Manila from holding elections for the SK on
the ground that the elections previously held on May 26, 1990 were to be considered the first
under the newly-enacted Local Government Code. The DILG acted on a letter of Joshue R.
Santiago, acting president of the KB City Federation of Manila and a member of City Council
of Manila, which called attention to the fact that in the City of Manila elections for the
Kabataang Barangay (the precursor of the Sangguniang Kabataan) had previously been held
on May 26, 1990. In its resolution, the DILG stated:
[A] close examination of... RA 7160 would readily reveal the intention of the legislature to
exempt from the forthcoming Sangguniang Kabataan elections those kabataang barangay
chapters which may have conducted their elections within the period of January 1, 1988 and
January 1, 1992 under BP 337. Manifestly the term of office of those elected KB officials
have been correspondingly extended to coincide with the term of office of those who may be
elected under RA 7160.
On November 27, 1992 private respondents, claiming to represent the 24,000 members of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the RTC of Manila to
set aside the resolution of the DILG. They argued that petitioner Secretary of Interior and
Local Government had no power to amend the resolutions of the COMELEC calling for
general elections for SKs and that the DILG resolution in question denied them the equal
protection of the laws.
On November 27, 1992, the trial court, through Executive Judge, now COMELEC Chairman,
Bernardo P. Pardo, issued an injunction, ordering petitioners to desist from implementing the
order of the respondent Secretary dated September 18, 1992,... until further orders of the
Court. On the same day, he ordered petitioners to perform the specified pre-election activities
in order to implement Resolution No. 2499 dated August 27, 1992 of the Commission on
136
Elections providing for the holding of a general election of the Sangguniang Kabataan on
December 4, 1992 simultaneously in every barangay throughout the country.
The case was subsequently reraffled to Branch 36 of the same court. On January 19, 1993, the
new judge, Hon. Wilfredo D. Reyes, rendered a decision, holding that (1) the DILG had no
power to exempt the City of Manila from holding SK elections on December 4, 1992 because
under Art. IX, C, 2(1) of the Constitution the power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall
is vested solely in the COMELEC; (2) the COMELEC had already in effect determined that
there had been no previous elections for KB by calling for general elections for SK officers in
every barangay without exception; and (3) the exemption of the City of Manila was violative
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because, according to the DILGs records, in
5,000 barangays KB elections were held between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 but
only in the City of Manila, where there were 897 barangays, was there no elections held on
December 4, 1992.
Petitioners sought this review on certiorari. They insist that the City of Manila, having
already conducted elections for the KB on May 26, 1990, was exempted from holding
elections on December 4, 1992. In support of their contention, they cite 532(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which provides that:
All seats reserved for the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan in the different
sanggunians shall be deemed vacant until such time that the sangguniang kabataan chairmen
shall have been elected and the respective pederasyon presidents have been
selected: Provided, That, elections for the kabataang barangay conducted under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 at any time between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 shall be
considered as the first elections provided for in this Code. The term of office of the kabataang
barangay officials elected within the said period shall be extended correspondingly to
coincide with the term of office of those elected under this Code. (emphasis added)
They maintain that the Secretary of the DILG had authority to determine whether the City of
Manila came within the exception clause of 532(d) so as to be exempt from holding the
elections on December 4, 1992.
The preliminary question is whether the holding of the second elections on May 13,
19963 rendered this case moot and academic. There are two questions raised in this case. The
first is whether the Secretary of Interior and Local Government can exempt a local
government unit from holding elections for SK officers on December 4, 1992 and the second
is whether the COMELEC can provide that the Department of Interior and Local Government
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
shall have direct control and supervision over the election of sangguniang kabataan with the
technical assistance by the Commission on Elections.
We hold that this case is not moot and that it is in fact necessary to decide the issues raised by
the parties. For one thing, doubt may be cast on the validity of the acts of those elected in the
May 26, 1990 KB elections in Manila because this Court enjoined the enforcement of the
decision of the trial court and these officers continued in office until May 13, 1996. For
another, this case comes within the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. 4 For the question whether the
COMELEC can validly vest in the DILG the control and supervision of SK elections is likely
to arise in connection with every SK election and yet the question may not be decided before
the date of such elections.
In the Southern Pacific Terminal case, where the rule was first articulated, appellants were
ordered by the Interstate Commerce Commission to cease and desist from granting a shipper
what the ICC perceived to be preferences and advantages with respect to wharfage charges.
The cease and desist order was for a period of about two years, from September 1, 1908
(subsequently extended to November 15), but the U.S. Supreme Court had not been able to
hand down its decision by the time the cease and desist order expired. The case was decided
only on February 20, 1911, more than two years after the order had expired. Hence, it was
contended that the case had thereby become moot and the appeal should be dismissed. In
rejecting this contention, the Court held:
The question involved in the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission are usually
continuing (as are manifestly those in the case at bar), and these considerations ought not to
be, as they might be, defeated, by short-term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review,
and at one time the government, and at another time the carriers, have their rights determined
by the Commission without a chance of redress.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Roe v. Wade,6 petitioner, a pregnant woman, brought suit in 1970 challenging anti-abortion
statutes of Texas and Georgia on the ground that she had a constitutional right to terminate
her pregnancy at least within the first trimester. The case was not decided until 1973 when
she was no longer pregnant. But the U.S. Supreme Court refused to dismiss the case as moot.
It was explained: [W]hen, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the normal
266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the
usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy
litigation seldom will survive. Our laws should not be that rigid. Pregnancy provides a classic
justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be capable of repetition, yet
evading review.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
137
We thus reach the merits of the questions raised in this case. The first question is whether
then DILG Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III had authority to determine whether under 532(d)
of the Local Government Code, the City of Manila was required to hold its first elections for
SK. As already stated, petitioners sustain the affirmative side of the proposition. On the other
hand, respondents argue that this is a power which Art.IX,C, 2(1) of the Constitution vests in
the COMELEC. Respondents further argue that, by mandating that elections for the SK be
held on December 4, 1992 in every barangay, the COMELEC in effect determined that there
had been no elections for the KB previously held in the City of Manila.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
First. As already stated, by 4 of Resolution No. 2499, the COMELEC placed the SK elections
under the direct control and supervision of the DILG. Contrary to respondents contention, this
did not contravene Art. IX, C, 2(1) of the Constitution which provides that the COMELEC
shall have the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. Elections for SK officers are not
subject to the supervision of the COMELEC in the same way that, as we have recently held,
contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC. In Mercado v. Board of Election Supervisors,8 it was contended that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 is null and void because: (a) it prescribes a
separate set of rules for the election of the SK Chairman different from and
inconsistent with that set forth in the Omnibus Election Code, thereby
contravening Section 2, Article 1 of the said Code which explicitly provides that
it shall govern all elections of public officers; and, (b) it constitutes a total,
absolute, and complete abdication by the COMELEC of its constitutionally and
statutorily mandated duty to enforce and administer all election laws as provided
for in Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution; Section 52, Article VIII of
the Omnibus Election Code; and Section 2, Chapter 1, Subtitle C, Title 1, Book V
of the 1987 Administrative Code.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rejecting this contention, this Court, through Justice Davide, held:
Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and that portion of paragraph (2), Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution on the COMELECs exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
contests involving elective barangay officials refer to the elective barangay officials under the
pertinent laws in force at the time the Omnibus Election Code was enacted and upon the
ratification of the Constitution. That law was B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, and the elective barangay officials referred to were the punong barangay
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
and the six sangguniang bayan members. They were to be elected by those qualified to
exercise the right of suffrage. They are also the same officers referred to by the provisions of
the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines on election of barangay officials. Metropolitan
and municipal trial courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over contests relating to their
election. The decisions of these courts were appealable to the Regional Trial Courts.
....
In the light of the foregoing, it is indisputable that contests involving elections of SK
(formerly KB) officials do not fall within Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and
paragraph 2, Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution and that no law in effect prior to the
ratification of the Constitution had made the SK chairman an elective barangay official. His
being an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay does not make him one for the law
specifically provides who are its elective members, viz., the punong barangay and the seven
regular sangguniang barangay members who are elected at large by those who are qualified to
exercise the right of suffrage under Article V of the Constitution and who are duly registered
voters of the barangay.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The choice of the DILG for the task in question was appropriate and was in line with the
legislative policy evident in several statutes. Thus, P.D. No. 684 (April 15, 1975), in creating
Kabataang Barangays in every barangay throughout the country, provided in 6 that the
Secretary of Local Government and Community Development shall promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be deemed necessary to effectively implement the provisions of this
Decree. Again, in 1985 Proclamation No. 2421 of the President of the Philippines, in calling
for the general elections of the Kabataang Barangay on July 13-14, 1985, tasked the then
Ministry of Local Government, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, and the
Commission on Elections to assist the Kabataang Barangay in the conduct of the elections.
On the other hand, in a Memorandum Circular dated March 7, 1988, President Corazon C.
Aquino directed the Secretary of Local Government to issue the necessary rules and
regulations for effecting the representation of the Kabataang Barangay, among other sectors,
in the legislative bodies of the local government units.
The role of the COMELEC in the 1992 elections for SK officers was by no means
inconsequential. DILG supervision was to be exercised within the framework of detailed and
comprehensive rules embodied in Resolution No. 2499 of the COMELEC. What was left to
the DILG to perform was the enforcement of the rules.
Second. It is contended that, in its resolution in question, the COMELEC did not name the
barangays which, because they had conducted kabataang barangay elections between January
138
1, 1988 and January 1, 1992, were not included in the SK elections to be held on December 4,
1992. That these barangays were precisely to be determined by the DILG is, however, fairly
inferable from the authority given to the DILG to supervise the conduct of the elections.
Since 532(d) provided for kabataang barangay officials whose term of office was extended
beyond 1992, the authority to supervise the conduct of elections in that year must necessarily
be deemed to include the authority to determine which kabataang barangay would not be
included in the 1992 elections.
The authority granted was nothing more than the ascertainment of a fact, namely, whether
between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 elections had been held in a given kabataang
barangay. If elections had been conducted, then no new elections had to be held on December
4, 1992 since by virtue of 532(d) the term of office of the kabataang barangay officials so
elected was extended correspondingly to coincide with the term of office of those elected
under [the Local Government Code of 1991]. In doing this, the Secretary of Interior and
Local Government was to act merely as the agent of the legislative department, to determine
and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect. 11 There was no undue
delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. That
this is constitutionally permissible is the teaching of our cases. 12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Third. Respondents claim, however, that the May 26, 1990 KB elections in Manila were void
because (a) they were called at the instance of then Mayor Gemiliano C. Lopez who did not
have authority to do so and (b) it was not held under COMELEC supervision.
The 1990 elections for the Kabataang Barangay were called by then Manila Mayor Gemiliano
C. Lopez, Jr., who in his Executive Order No. 21 dated April 25, 1990 stated:
WHEREAS, the Kabataang Barangay as an organization provided for under Batas Pambansa
Bilang 337, has been practically dormant since the advent of the present national
administration;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to involve the youth in the affairs and undertakings of the
government to ensure the participation of all sectors of our population in the task of nation
building;
WHEREAS, the last elections for the Kabataang Barangay officers were held in November
1985 yet, which is over their three years term of office;
WHEREAS, most of the present crop of KB officers are way past the age limit provided for
under the law;
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
....
The elections were actually held on May 26, 1990 in the 897 barangays of Manila. Later, on
June 30, 1990, KB City Federation elections were conducted.
It was precisely to foreclose any question regarding the validity of KB elections held in the
aftermath of the EDSA revolution and upon the effectivity of the new Local Government
Code that the exception clause of 532(d) was inserted. The proceedings of the Bicameral
Conference Committee which drafted the Code show the
following:13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: Isa-cite na lang ko ano iyong title o chapter o section, ha!
HON. LINA:...
Page 436, lines 13 to 14 delete within eighteen months prior to December 31, 1990, and in
lieu thereof, insert from 1988 up to the effectivity of the Code. The rationale....
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: How should it be read?
HON. LINA: It will read as follows: Provided however, that the Local Government Units
which have conducted elections for the Kabataang Barangay as provided for, in Batas
Pambansa Bilang 337, up to the effectivity....
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: So, any deletion from the word within, ha, up to....
HON. LINA: Remove the words, the phrase, within eighteen months prior to December 31,
1990, and insert from 1988 up to the effectivity of this Code.
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: From?
HON. LINA: From 1988 up to the effectivity of this Code. Kasi meron nang mga election, eh,
na ginawa, eh. There are five thousand barangays, based on the record of the DILG, out of
forty thousand, imagine that, na nag-conduct na ng election nila based on the KB Constitution
and By-Laws, and theyre sitting already, now if we do not recognize that, mag[ka]karoon sila
ng question.
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: Accepted, Mr. Chairman.
139
Section 532(d) may thus be deemed to be a curative law. Curative laws, which in essence are
retrospective in effect, are enacted to validate acts done which otherwise would be invalid
under existing laws, by considering them as having complied with the existing laws. Such
laws are recognized in this jurisdiction. 14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Fourth. It is finally contended that the exemption of the barangays of the City of Manila from
the requirement to hold elections for SK officers on December 4, 1992 would deny the youth
voters in those barangays of the equal protection of laws. Respondents claim that only in the
barangays in the City of Manila, which then numbered 897, were elections for SK not held in
1992 on the ground that between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 there had already been
SK elections held, when, according to petitioners own evidence, during that period, SK
elections had actually been conducted in 5,000 barangays.
Whether this claim is true cannot be ascertained from the records of this case. Merely
showing that there were 5,000 barangays which similarly held KB elections between January
1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 does not prove that despite that fact these same barangays were
permitted to hold elections on December 4, 1992. For one thing, according to the Manila
Bulletin issue of November 18, 1992 (p. 9), 568 barangays in the Province of Bulacan did not
have SK elections on December 4, 1992 either, because they already had elections between
January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992. For another, even assuming that only barangays in
Manila were not permitted to hold SK elections on December 4, 1992 while the rest of the
5,000 barangays were allowed even if KB elections had already been held there before, this
fact does not give the youth voters in the 897 Manila barangays ground for complaint because
what the other barangays did was contrary to law. There is no discrimination here.
In People v. Vera15 this Court struck down the Probation Law because it permitted unequal
application of its benefits by making its applicability depend on the decision of provincial
governments to appropriate or not to appropriate funds for the salaries of probation officers,
with the result that those not disposed to allow the benefits of probations to be enjoyed by
their inhabitants could simply omit to provide for the salaries of probation officers. The
difference between that case and the one at bar lies in the fact that what youth voters in the
other barangays might have been allowed was not a right which was denied to youth voters in
Manila. If those barangays were not entitled to have SK elections on December 4, 1992 but
nevertheless were allowed to have such elections, that fact did not mean those in Manila
should similarly have been allowed to conduct elections on December 4, 1992 because the
fact was that they already had their own, just two years before on May 26, 1990. Respondents
equal protection argument violates the dictum that one wrong does not make another wrong
right.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 is
REVERSED and the case filed against petitioner by private respondents is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120193 March 6, 1996
LUIS MALALUAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EVANGELISTA, respondents.
 
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p
Novel is the situation created by the decision of the Commission on Elections which declared
the winner in an election contest and awarded damages, consisting of attorney's fees, actual
expenses for xerox copies, unearned salary and other emoluments for the period, from March,
1994 to April, 1995, en masse denominated as actual damages, notwithstanding the fact that
the electoral controversy had become moot and academic on account of the expiration of the
term of office of the Municipal Mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato.
Before us is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction, seeking the review of the
decision en banc1 of the Commission of Elections (COMELEC) denying the motion for
reconsideration of the decision2 of its First Division,3 which reversed the decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court5 in the election case6 involving the herein parties. While the Regional
Trial Court had found petitioner Luis Malaluan to be the winner of the elections for the
position of Municipal Mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, the COMELEC, on the
contrary, found private respondent Joseph Evangelista to be the rightful winner in said
elections.
Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Joseph Evangelista were both mayoralty
candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, in the Synchronized National
and Local Elections held on May 11, 1992. Private respondent Joseph Evangelista was
proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor for having
garnered 10,498 votes as against petitioner's 9,792 votes. Evangelista was, thus, said to have a
winning margin of 706 votes. But, on May 22, 1992, petitioner filed an election protest with
the Regional Trial Court contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said municipality.
140
The trial court declared petitioner as the duly elected municipal mayor of Kidapawan, North
Cotabato with a plurality of 154 votes. Acting without precedent, the court found private
respondent liable not only for Malaluan's protest expenses but also for moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees. On February 3, 1994, private respondent appealed the trial court
decision to the COMELEC.
Just a day thereafter that is, on February 4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for execution
pending appeal. The motion was granted by the trial court, in an order, dated March 8, 1994,
after petitioner posted a bond in the amount of P500,000.00. By virtue of said order,
petitioner assumed the office of Municipal Mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and
exercised the powers and functions of said office. Such exercise was not for long, though. In
the herein assailed decision adverse to Malaluan's continued governance of the Municipality
of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, the First Division of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) ordered Malaluan to vacate the office, said division having found and so
declared private respondent to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor of said municipality. The
COMELEC en banc affirmed said decision.
Malaluan filed this petition before us on May 31, 1995 as a consequence.
It is significant to note that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May, 1992
elections expired on June 30, 1995. This petition, thus, has become moot and academic
insofar as it concerns petitioner's right to the mayoralty seat in his municipality 7 because
expiration of the term of office contested in the election protest has the effect of rendering the
same moot and academic.8
When the appeal from a decision in an election case has already become moot, the case being
an election protest involving the office of mayor the term of which had expired, the appeal is
dismissible on that ground, unless the rendering of a decision on the merits would be of
practical value.9 This rule we established in the case of Yorac vs. Magalona 10 which we
dismissed because it had been mooted by the expiration of the term of office of the Municipal
Mayor of Saravia, Negros Occidental. This was the object of contention between the parties
therein. The recent case of Atienza vs. Commission on Elections, 11 however, squarely
presented the situation that is the exception to that rule.
Comparing the scenarios in those two cases, we explained:
Second, petitioner's citation of Yorac vs. Magalona as authority for his main
proposition is grossly inappropriate and misses the point in issue. The sole
question in that case centered on an election protest involving the mayoralty
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
post in Saravia, Negros Occidental in the general elections of 1955, which
was rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the term of office in
December, 1959. It did not involve a monetary award for damages and other
expenses incurred as a result of the election protest. In response to the
petitioner's contention that the issues presented before the court were novel
and important and that the appeal should not be dismissed, the Court held —
citing the same provision of the Rules of Court upon which petitioner
staunchly places reliance — that a decision on the merits in the case would
have no practical value at all, and forthwith dismissed the case for being
moot. That is not the case here. In contradistinction to Yorac, a decision on
the merits in the case at bench would clearly have the practical value of either
sustaining the monetary award for damages or relieving the private
respondent from having to pay the amount thus awarded. 12
Indeed, this petition appears now to be moot and academic because the herein parties are
contesting an elective post to which their right to the office no longer exists. However, the
question as to damages remains ripe for adjudication. The COMELEC found petitioner liable
for attorney's fees, actual expenses for xerox copies, and unearned salary and other
emoluments from March, 1994 to April, 1995, en masse denominated as actual damages,
default in payment by petitioner of which shall result in the collection of said amount from
the bond posted by petitioner on the occasion of the grant of his motion for execution pending
appeal in the trial court. Petitioner naturally contests the propriety and legality of this award
upon private respondent on the ground that said damages have not been alleged and proved
during trial.
What looms large as the issue in this case is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in awarding the aforecited damages in favor of private respondent.
The Omnibus Election Code provides that "actual or compensatory damages may be granted
in all election contests or in quo warranto proceedings in accordance with
law." 13 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provide that "in all election contests the Court may
adjudicate damages and attorney's fees as it may deem just and as established by the evidence
if the aggrieved party has included such claims in his pleadings." 14 This appears to require
only that the judicial award of damages be just and that the same be borne out by the
pleadings and evidence The overriding requirement for a valid and proper award of damages,
it must be remembered, is that the same is in accordance with law, specifically, the provisions
of the Civil Code pertinent to damages.
141
Article 2199 of the Civil Code mandates that "except as provided by law or by stipulation,
one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as
he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages."
The Civil Code further prescribes the proper setting for allowance of actual or compensatory
damages in the following provisions:
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the
obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties
have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation
was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obliger shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-
performance of the obligation.
Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all
damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been
foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
Considering that actual or compensatory damages are appropriate only in breaches of
obligations in cases of contracts and quasi-contracts and on the occasion of crimes and quasi-
delicts where the defendant may be held liable for all damages the proximate cause of which
is the act or omission complained of, the monetary claim of a party in an election case must
necessarily be hinged on either a contract or a quasi-contract or a tortious act or omission or a
crime, in order to effectively recover actual or compensatory damages. 15 In the absence of
any or all of these, "the claimant must be able to point out a specific provision of law
authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing party" 16. For
instance, the claimant may cite any of the following provisions of the Civil Code under the
chapter on human relations, which provisions create obligations not by contract, crime or
negligence, but directly by law:
Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's
act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right
to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and
for other relief. . . . 17
Claimed as part of the damages to which private respondent is allegedly entitled to, is
P169,456.00 constituting salary and other emoluments from March, 1994 to April, 1995 that
would have accrued to him had there not been an execution of the trial court's decision
pending appeal therefrom in the COMELEC.
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction is that notwithstanding his subsequent ouster as a
result of an election protest, an elective official who has been proclaimed by the COMELEC
as winner in an electoral contest and who assumed office and entered into the performance of
the duties of that office, is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances legally
provided for the position. 18 We ratiocinated in the case of Rodriguez vs. Tan that:
This is as it should be. This is in keeping with the ordinary course of events.
This is simple justice. The emolument must go to the person who rendered
the service unless the contrary is provided. There is no averment in the
complaint that he is linked with any irregularity vitiating his election. This is
the policy and the rule that has been followed consistently in this jurisdiction
in connection with positions held by persons who had been elected thereto
but were later ousted as a result of an election protest. The right of the
persons elected to compensation during their incumbency has always been
recognized. We cannot recall of any precedent wherein the contrary rule has
been upheld. 19
142
In his concurring opinion in the same case, however, Justice Padilla equally stressed
that, while the general rule is that the ousted elective official is not obliged to
reimburse the emoluments of office that he had received before his ouster, he would
be liable for damages in case he would be found responsible for any unlawful or
tortious acts in relation to his proclamation. We quote the pertinent portion of that
opinion for emphasis:
Nevertheless, if the defendant, directly or indirectly, had committed unlawful
or tortious acts which led to and resulted in his proclamation as senator-elect,
when in truth and in fact he was not so elected, he would be answerable for
damages. In that event the salary, fees and emoluments received by or paid to
him during his illegal incumbency would be a proper item of recoverable
damage. 20
The criterion for a justifiable award of election protest expenses and salaries and
emoluments, thus, remains to be the existence of a pertinent breach of obligations
arising from contracts or quasi-contracts, tortious acts, crimes or a specific legal
provision authorizing the money claim in the context of election cases. Absent any of
these, we could not even begin to contemplate liability for damages in election cases,
except insofar as attorney's fees are concerned, since the Civil Code enumerates the
specific instances when the same may be awarded by the court.
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the
plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and
skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's
liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. 21
Given the aforecited laws, and jurisprudence on the matter at issue, let us now look into the
basis of respondent COMELEC for awarding actual damages to private respondent in the
form of reimbursement for attorney's fees, actual expenses for xerox copies, and salary and
other emoluments that should have accrued to him from March, 1994 to April, 1995 had the
RTC not issued an order for execution pending appeal.
The First Division of the COMELEC ruled on private respondent's claim for actual or
compensatory damages in this wise:
. . . under the present legal setting, it is more difficult than in the past to
secure an award of actual or compensatory damages either against the
protestant or the protestee because of the requirerments of the law.
In the instant case, however, We are disposed to conclude that the election
protest filed by the protestant is clearly unfounded. As borne out by the
results of the appreciation of ballots conducted by this Commission,
apparently the protest was filed in bad faith without sufficient cause or has
been filed for the sole purpose of molesting the protestee-appellant for which
he incurred expenses. The erroneous ruling of the Court which invalidated
ballots which were clearly valid added more injury to the protestee-appellant.
This would have been bearable since he was able to perfect his appeal to this
Commission. The final blow, however, came when the Court ordered the
execution of judgment pending appeal which, from all indications, did not
comply with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
There was no good and special reason at all to justify the execution of
judgment pending appeal because the protestee's winning margin was 149
143
votes while that of the protestant — after the Court declared him a winner —
was only a margin of 154 votes. Clearly, the order of execution of judgment
pending appeal was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
For these reasons, protestee-appellant seeks to recover the following:
1. Actual damages representing attorney's fees for the new counsel who
handled the Appeal and the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals . . . P372,500.00
2. Actual expenses for xerox copying of Appellants Brief and the annexes
(14 copies at P1.50 . . . P11,235.00
3. Actual expenses for xerox copying of ballots . . . P3,919.20
4. Actual damages for loss of salary and other emoluments since March 1994
as per attached Certification issued by the Municipal Account of Kidapawan .
. . P96,832.00 (up to October 1994 only)
Under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation can be recovered (as actual damages) in the case of clearly
unfounded civil action or proceeding. And, while the case of Eulogio
Rodriguez, Sr. vs. Carlos Tan (91 Phil. 724) disallowed recovery of salaries
and allowances (as damages) from elected officials who were later ousted,
under the theory that persons elected has (sic) a right to compensation during
their incumbency, the instant case is different. The protestee-appellant was
the one elected. He was ousted not by final judgment bur by an order of
execution pending appeal which was groundless and issued with grave abuse
of discretion. Protestant-appellee occupied the position in an illegal manner
as a usurper and, not having been elected to the office, but merely installed
through a baseless court order, he certainly had no right to the salaries and
emoluments of the office.
Actual damages in the form of reimbursement for attorney's fees
(P372,500.00), actual expenses for xerox copies (P15,154.00), unearned
salary and other emoluments from March 1994 to April 1995 or 14 months at
P12,104.00 a month (P169,456.00), totalled P557,110.00. To (sic) this
amount, however, P300,000.00 representing that portion of attorney's fees
denominated as success fee' must be deducted this being premised on a
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
contingent event the happening of which was uncertain from the beginning.
Moral damages and exemplary damages claimed are, of course, disallowed
not falling within the purview of Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code.
It goes without saying that if the protestant-appellee fails to pay the actual
damages of P257,110.00, the amount will be assessed, levied and collected
from the bond of P500,000.00 which he put up before the Court as
a condition for the issuance of the order of execution of judgment pending
appeal. 22
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforecited decision on March 29, 1995.
The COMELEC en banc, however, did not find any new matter substantial in nature,
persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to compel reconsideration of said decision
and accordingly affirmed in toto the said decision. Hence, this petition raises, among others,
the issue now solely remaining and in need of final adjudication in view of the mootness of
the other issues anent petitioner's right to the contested office the term for which has already
expired.
We have painstakingly gone over the records of this case and we can attribute to petitioner no
breach of contract or quasi-contract; or tortious act nor crime that may make him liable for
actual damages. Neither has private respondent been "able to point out to a specific provision
of law authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing party." 23
We find respondent COMELEC's reasoning in awarding the damages in question to be fatally
flawed. The COMELEC found the election protest filed by the petitioner to be clearly
unfounded because its own appreciation of the contested ballots yielded results contrary to
those of the trial court. Assuming, ex gratia argumentis, that this is a reasonable observation
not without basis, it is nonetheless fallacious to conclude a malicious intention on the part of
petitioner to molest private respondent on the basis of what respondent COMELEC perceived
as an erroneous ruling of the trial court. In other words, the actuations of the trial court, after
the filing of a case before it, are its own, and any alleged error on its part does not, in the
absence of clear proof, make the suit "clearly unfounded" for which the complainant ought to
be penalized. Insofar as the award of protest expenses and attorney's fees are concerned,
therefore we find them to have been awarded by respondent COMELEC without basis, the
election protest not having been a clearly unfounded one under the aforementioned
circumstances.
Respondent COMELEC also found the order granting execution of judgment pending appeal
to be defective because of alleged non-compliance with the requirement that there be a good
144
and special reason 24 to justify execution pending appeal. We, however, find that the trial
court acted judiciously in the exercise of its prerogatives under the law in issuing the order
granting execution pending appeal. First, it should be noted that the applicability of the
provisions of the Rules of Court, relating to execution pending appeal, has ceased to be
debatable after we definitively ruled in Garcia vs. de Jesus 25 that "Section 2, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, which allows Regional Trial Courts to order executions pending appeal upon
good reasons stated in a special order, may be made to apply by analogy or suppletorily to
election contests decided by them." 26 It is not disputed that petitioner filed a bond in the
amount of P500,000.00 as required under the Rules of Court.
It is also now a settled rule that "as much recognition should be given to the value of the
decision of a judicial body as a basis for the right to assume office as that given by law to the
proclamation made by the Board of Canvassers." 27
. . . Why should the proclamation by the board of canvassers suffice as basis
of the right to assume office, subject to future contingencies attendant to a
protest, and not the decision of a court of justice? Indeed . . . the board of
canvassers is composed of persons who are less technically prepared to make
an accurate appreciation of the ballots, apart from their being more apt to
yield extraneous considerations . . . the board must act summarily, practically
raising (sic) against time, while, on the other hand, the judge has the benefit
of all the evidence the parties can offer and of admittedly better technical
preparation and background, apart from his being allowed ample time for
conscientious study and mature deliberation before rendering
judgment . . . . 28
Without evaluating the merits of the trial court's actual appreciation of the ballots
contested in the election protest, we note on the face of its decision that the trial court
relied on the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) handwriting
experts which findings private respondent did not even bother to rebut. We thus see
no reason to disregard the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty on the part of the trial court judge. Capping this combination of circumstances
which impel the grant of immediate execution is the undeniable urgency involved in
the political situation in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato. The appeal
before the COMELEC would undoubtedly cause the political vacuum in said
municipality to persist, and so the trial court reasonably perceived execution pending
appeal to be warranted and justified. Anyway, the bond posted by petitioner could
cover any damages suffered by any aggrieved party. It is true that mere posting of a
bond is not enough reason to justify execution pending appeal, but the nexus of
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3

circumstances aforechronicled considered together and in relation to one another, is That portion of the decision awarding actual damages to private respondent Joseph
the dominant consideration for the execution pending appeal. 29 Evangelista is hereby declared null and void for having been issued in grave abuse of
discretion and in excess of jurisdiction.
Finally, we deem the award of salaries and other emoluments to be improper and lacking
legal sanction. Respondent COMELEC ruled that inapplicable in the instant case is the ruling SO ORDERED.
in Rodriguez vs. Tan 30 because while in that case the official ousted was the one proclaimed
by the COMELEC, in the instant case, petitioner was proclaimed winner only by the trial Narvasa, Padilla, Reg
court and assumed office by virtue of an order granting execution pending appeal. Again,
respondent COMELEC sweepingly concluded, in justifying the award of damages, that since [G.R. No. 112965. January 30, 1997]
petitioner was adjudged the winner in the elections only by the trial court and assumed the
functions of the office on the strength merely of an order granting execution pending appeal, PHILIPPINES TODAY, INC., BETTY GO-BELMONTE, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN,
the petitioner occupied the position in an illegal manner as a usurper. ARTURO A. BORJAL, and ISAAC G. BELMONTE petitioners, v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FELIX R. ALEGRE, JR., Respondents.
We hold that petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who undertakes to
act officially without any color of right, 31 the petitioner exercised the duties of an elective DECISION
office under color of election thereto. 32 It matters not that it was the trial court and not the
COMELEC that declared petitioner as the winner, because both, at different stages of the PANGANIBAN, J.:
electoral process, have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral contests. At the risk of
sounding repetitive, if only to emphasize this point, we must reiterate that the decision of a
May a "Memorandum for File" which did not mention the words "resign" and/or
judicial body is no less a basis than the proclamation made by the COMELEC-convened
"resignation" nonetheless juridically constitute voluntary resignation? In answering this
Board of Canvassers for a winning candidate's right to assume office, for both are
question, the Court took into account not merely the literal meaning of the words and phrases
undisputedly legally sanctioned. We deem petitioner, therefore, to be a "de facto officer who,
used but, more importantly, the peculiar circumstances attendant to its writing as well as
in good faith, has had possession of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining
antecedent, contemporaneous and subsequent actions, which were inconsistent with the desire
thereto" 33 and is thus "legally entitled to the emoluments of the office." 34
for continued employment of the writer, an intelligent executive occupying a position of trust
in the Philippine Star and gifted with an unusual writing ability.
To recapitulate, Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code only provides for the granting in
election cases of actual and compensatory damages in accordance with law. The victorious
These circumstances and actions are explained by this Court in re- solving this petition for
party in an election case cannot be indemnified for expenses which he has incurred in an
certiorari assailing the Decision 1 of the National Labor Relations Commission (Second
electoral contest in the absence of a wrongful act or omission or breach of obligation clearly
Division) 2 in NLRC NCR CA 001863-91 entitled "Felix R. Alegre, Jr. vs. Philippines Today,
attributable to the losing party. Evidently, if any damage had been suffered by private
Inc." promulgated on September 30, 1993, which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter
respondent due to the execution of judgment pending appeal, that damage may be said to be
Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr., dated May 15; 1991. In a Resolution dated November 16, 1993,
equivalent to damnum absque injuria, which is, damage without injury, or damage or injury
petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. 3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
inflicted without injustice, or loss or damage without violation of a legal right, or a wrong
done to a man for which the law provides no remedy. 35
The Facts
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. While we uphold the COMELEC
decision dated May 5, 1995 that private respondent Joseph Evangelista is the winner in the The undisputed facts are as follows: Petitioner Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI) is the owner of
election for mayor of the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, that portion of the the Philippine Star, a daily newspaper of national and international circulation, while the
decision is deemed moot and academic because the term of office for mayor has long expired. individual petitioners are officers and members of the board of directors of PTI, namely,
Betty Go-Belmonte, chairman of the board; Arturo A. Borjal, president; Maximo V. Soliven,
145
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
publisher and chairman, editorial board; and Isaac G. Belmonte, treasurer. Private
Respondent Felix R. Alegre, Jr. was employed by PTI in July 1986 as a senior investigative
reporter of the Philippine Star with a monthly salary of eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00). He
later became chief investigative writer and then assistant to the publisher. His monthly
compensation was correspondingly increased to ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
On October 20, 1988, Respondent Alegre filed a request for a thirty-day leave of absence
effective on the same date, citing the advice of his personal physician for him to undergo
further medical consultations abroad. 4 Four days later, on October 24, 1988, he wrote a
"Memorandum for File" 5 addressed to Petitioner Betty Go-Belmonte with copies furnished to
members of the board of directors of PTI, the text of which is reproduced below:
"MEMORANDUM FOR FILE.
FOR : BETTY GO-BELMONTE
Chairman & CEO, The STAR Group of Publications
FROM : FELIX R. ALEGRE, JR.
DATE : 24 October 1988
SUBJECT : HAVING IT ALL
Truth like medicine hurts. But it cures.
The nice little chat we had last Thursday was most revealing. And certainly disconcerting.
What you had to tell me pained me, of course. But it has helped me just as much. It enabled
me to see things clearly in their right perspectives. More importantly, it provided me with the
answers to the questions that had long nagged me in my wakeful state.
For quite a time, I got this sinking feeling of being treated like a pariah of sorts by most of the
senior executives around here. The frustration at my inability to put a finger at such a feeling
somehow enhanced the angst within me. Until our chat. Now all the demons of my anxiety
have been exorcised. And I am left alone to lick the wounds of my betrayal. It isn't easy, I
know. But I shall pull through. Your candor and demonstrated faith in my person have been
most assuaging. And for that alone, I am most grateful.
146
It has never occurred to me that, in my acceptance of the invitation from no less than the
publisher himself, to join him at the Philippines Today, Inc., and the STAR Group of
Publications, I was unwittingly signing my own death warrant as well. The insults he had
later on hurled at my person, the malicious innuendoes he had spread around, casting doubts
on my personal and professional integrity, had mercilessly torn at my soul, causing
metaphysical death.
My credentials as a working journalist, I'd like to believe, got me this job at the STAR in the
first place. And my bylines in the series of articles in the STAR From Day One of my official
affiliation with the Company, should establish that fact.
I was an investigative reporter at the Manila Times when the publisher offered me to work
with him at the STAR in 1986. I was given the assignment as senior investigative reporter,
then chief investigative writer, until I was given a fancy title of assistant to the publisher.
As a corporate guy assisting the publisher in his day-to-day official functionand this is where
I feel very strongly about citing some specifics of the things I did in this area, to wit:
... (omitted are said "specifics" of Respondent Alegre's accomplishments as assistant to the
publisher deemed by this Court as not relevant to the appreciation of this memorandum in
relation to the consideration of the petition.)
As can be gleaned from this recital of some of the "things done" (despite my distaste for
trumpeting one's deeds, but has to be said, to set the record straight, in this instance), one can
see that I obviously don different hats at any one time, doing administration and operations
functions, apart from my journalistic duties. That I work as a teamplayer, and trying hard to
be good at (sic) it, cannot be denied.
FOR DOING ALL THESE in the best spirit of corporate team-upmanship, what did I get in
RETURN?
1. A pittance, salary/compensation-wise
2. Being conveniently bypassed in promotions, pay hikes, and other perks
3. Hindered from active participation in corporate affairs, by shooting at my ideas that
otherwise would have been workable and profitable for the Company and its people (CF.
Item 2 of my memo dtd 06 September 88 which had you interested in and supportive of).
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3

4. Personally and professionally maligned, and accused of being an NPA (non-performing
asshole, pardon my French).
By and large, all that I got are the twin demons of a civilized, unconscionable society:
ECONOMIC INJUSTICE and PROFESSIONAL SABOTAGE.
When push comes to a shove... anything or everything comes crashing down. I'M HAVING
IT ALL!
During our board meeting yesterday, we discussed your letter dated October 24, 1988, and
the Board decided to accept your resignation and that it would take effect on November 22,
1988 upon expiration of your one-month leave.
I would like to take this opportunity to say that we were happy to have had you with the
STAR Group of Publications and that we would like to wish you the best of luck.
God bless. Thank you.

Since I am on leave, I guess I won't be able to see you for a while. I wish to take this Very truly yours,
opportunity to express my profound appreciation and sincere thanks for your genuine con-
cren (sic) and honest initiatives to do a good turn on my behalf. You have been most candid BETTY GO BELMONTE
and forthright with me. I can't be any less.
Chairman of the Board
Thank you for everything. God bless. The Philippine Star"

Very sincerely, The following day, Respondent Alegre wrote Petitioner Belmonte expressing surprise over
the acceptance of his "resignation" as stated in the above-quoted letter. His letter 7 partly
(Sgd.) FELIX R. ALEGRE, JR. stated:

copy furnished: "It certainly beats me to be told that my 'resignation' has been accepted, when in truth and in
fact no such move, however implicit it may be, and no such letter has ever been made from
Members-of the Board, Phils. Today, Inc. my end.

Dr. Ronaldo G. Asuncion xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Antonio Roces" I am writing this letter not, certainly, to make any appeal, but simply to go on record that I
did not resign. I filed a leave of absence. Yes. And that was dully (sic.,) approved. Then I sent
On December 6, 1988, Respondent Alegre received from Petitioner Belmonte a letter, 6 as you a memorandum for file expressing my sentiments on certain things, candid statements
follows: that came to b4 (sic) expressed inspired by your candor and sincerity in our last little chat.
Now, if you read that memo to mean resignation, that is your responsibility. And I am not just
"November 9, 1988 about to contest it. x x x"

MR. FELIX ALEGRE This was followed by another letter on January 2, 1989, wherein Alegre, through
counsel, 8 reiterated that he never resigned. He accused petitioners of illegal dismissal as can
Dear Jun, be perceived allegedly from the discrimination against him in promotions, benefits and the
ploy to oust him by considering his memorandum as a resignation. He claimed that as a
result, he suffered mental anguish, social humiliation, besmirched reputation and moral
shock. He thus demanded indemnification for "the material and moral losses he has incurred".
147
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
He further wrote that he was not insisting to be taken back after being shown that he was no
longer wanted in the company.
Counsel 9 for petitioners, in a reply on January 19, 1989, explained that the acceptance of
Alegre's resignation was a collective decision of the board of directors since "nobody in his
right mind would write a memorandum of the sort he wrote and still not resign. To them, the
memorandum was tantamount to a resignation even if Mr. Alegre did not say so in so much
words." With respect to his claim for damages, petitioners' counsel said, "he has not shown
any specific fact or circumstance that would justify his claim, even remotely." Hence, "the
Star cannot accede to the same."
On May 17, 1989, Respondent Alegre filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages
against herein petitioners. 10 The labor arbiter dismissed said complaint in his decision of May
15, 1991. We quote significant portions of said decision:
"This office has minutely disected (sic) the letter and while it be said that nothing therein
mentions about resigning from his position as Assistant to the Publisher, a perusal of the
letter as a whole shows that the intention of the complainant was to resign from his post. The
subject as "Having it all" together with his frustrations and disappointment in the office
coupled with his statement that "when push comes to a shove, everything comes crushing
(sic) down" and that: he is "having it all" and with his concluding sentence of "Thank you for
everything" are (sic) clear indications that he was in fact resigning.
As a journalist and a writer, complainant need not write his letter of resignation in black and
white. He can do so in many other ways, words and actions to show his real intention of
leaving his job.
xxx xxx xxx
Complainant's subsequent overt acts particularly his failure to report to his job after the
expiration of his leave of absence, his being gainfully employed with the Office of Senator
Laurel (as Chief of Staff) and his act of clearing and removing his personal files, things and
belongings from his desk prior to his (complainant) knowledge or receipt of the letter
accepting his resignation(,) clearly indicates that complainant was not terminated from his job
but rather he resigned from his job...
xxx xxx xxx
148
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint
for illegal dismissal and damages for lack of merit, and ordering respondent, Philippines
Today, Inc., to pay complainant the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS
by way of separation pay in the interest of compassionate labor justice and; dismissing
Respondents (sic) counterclaim for damages for lack of merit. 11
On appeal by Alegre, the above decision was set aside by the NLRC. Adopting the definition
in Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edition) of resignation as a "formal renouncement or
relinquishment of an office," it held that herein Respondent Alegre did not resign as there was
no actual act of relinquishment to constitute complete and operative resignation. According to
the NLRC, the request for a leave of absence by Respondent Alegre meant that he intended to
return after the period of his absence. Such intent was bolstered by his filing of a request for
an extension of his leave. Further, when he received the letter of Petitioner Belmonte dated
November 9, 1988 informing him of the acceptance by the Board of his resignation, he
immediately wrote a letter to Petitioner Belmonte, expressing in no uncertain terms that he
did not resign. These circumstances led the NLRC to hold that Respondent Alegre was
constructively dismissed without just cause and to order petitioners to pay him full
backwages for three years from the time of dismissal, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. 12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Issues
Petitioners argue that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion:
1. in finding them guilty of illegally dismissing Respondent Alegre;
2. in awarding Respondent Alegre moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees without
any factual and legal basis; and,
3. even assuming that Respondent Alegre was illegally dismissed, in contravening and
disregarding this Court's ruling in Alex Ferrer, et al. vs. NLRC (Second Division) 13 by
erroneously computing backwages, as it did not deduct the amounts earned by Respondent
Alegre while he was admittedly employed in the office of Senator Sotero H. Laurel.
The pivotal question is whether the Memorandum for File of Respondent Alegre addressed to
Petitioner Belmonte constitutes a letter of resignation.
In construing it so, petitioners advance these arguments: (1) Respondent Alegre had spoken
openly to Petitioner Belmonte of his desire to leave the Philippine Star; (2) the contents of his
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
memorandum indicate an intention on his part not to return to his job even if he did not
categorically mention resignation; (3) he never returned to work after his authorized leave
expired and even cleared his desk of his personal belongings; and, (4) he obtained
employment as chief of staff of the office of Senator Sotero Laurel for which he was paid a
higher salary. Having been led to believe that Alegre wanted to resign and in honestly
perceiving his memorandum as a resignation letter, petitioners cannot be held liable for moral
and exemplary damages because they believe their action was in accordance with law. Lastly,
petitioners contend that, even assuming they were liable for illegal dismissal, the NLRC, in
granting backwages, should have deducted the amount earned by Alegre from his subsequent
employment.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that he had no intention of resigning from
PTI. He insists that: (1) in writing the memorandum, he was merely lamenting the work
environment at PTI and apprising Petitioner Belmonte of the situation; (2) a resignation
should be unequivocal in nature; (3) his non-return to work after his original leave expired is
explained by his subsequent request for an extension thereof due to medical reasons; (4) and
the letter of Petitioner Belmonte obviated any desire for him to return to his work since
petitioners practically terminated his employment. He further contends that petitioners'
tenacious resistance in admitting their mistake bespeaks of bad faith and shows their real
intention to end his services, which entitles him to moral and exemplary damages. In
representation of public respondent, the Solicitor General supported private respondent's
position.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Pivotal Issue: Did the Memorandum for File Constitute Voluntary Resignation?
After a thorough scrutiny of the Memorandum for File of Respondent Alegre and a careful
deliberation on the peculiar circumstances attendant to its writing and the antecedent,
contemporaneous and subsequent actions of private respondent, we hold that said
memorandum juridically constituted a letter of resignation.
We see merit in the findings and conclusions drawn by the labor arbiter. They are more in
accord with prudence, common sense and sound judgment. The labor arbiter correctly
deduced from Alegre's memorandum and attendant actuations that he resigned. In contrast,
the NLRC was too strict in its interpretation of what constitutes "resignation." It adhered
literally to the dictionary meaning of the word without relating it to the peculiarity of the
149
factual circumstances surrounding the case. Courts and quasi-judicial bodies, in the exercise
of their functions and in making decisions, must not be too dogmatic as to restrict themselves
to literal interpretations of words, phrases and sentences. A complete and wholistic view must
be taken in order to render a just and equitable judgment.
Incendiary words and sarcastic remarks negate alleged desire to improve relations
Alegre's choice of words and way of expression betray his allegation that the memorandum
was simply an "opportunity to open the eyes of (Petitioner) Belmonte to the work
environment in petitioners' newspaper with the end in view of persuading (her) to take a hand
at improving said environment." Apprising his employer (or top-level management) of his
frustrations in his job and differences with his immediate superior is certainly not done in an
abrasive, offensive and disrespectful manner. A cordial or, at the very least, civil attitude,
according due deference to one's superiors, is still observed, especially among high-ranking
management officers. The Court takes judicial notice of the Filipino values of pakikisama and
paggalang which are not only prevalent among members of a family and community but
within organizations as well, including work sites. An employee is expected to extend due
respect to management, the employer being the "proverbial hen that lays the golden
egg," 14 so to speak. An aggrieved employee who wants to unburden himself of his
disappointments and frustrations in his job or relations with his immediate superior would
normally approach said superior directly or otherwise ask some other officer possibly to
mediate and discuss the problem with the end in view of settling their differences without
causing ferocious conflicts. No matter how the employee dislikes his. employer
professionally, and even if he is in a confrontational disposition, he cannot afford to be
disrespectful and dare to talk with an unguarded tongue and/or with a baleful pen. Here,
respondent Alegre was anything but respectful and polite. His memorandum is too affrontive,
combative and confrontational. It certainly causes resentment, even when read by an
objective reader. His incendiary words and sarcastic remarks, to quote some:
"For quite a time, I got this sinking feeling of being treated like a pariah of sorts by most of
the senior executives around here. The frustration at my inability to put a finger at such a
feeling somehow enhanced the angst within me....Now all the demons of my anxiety have
been exorcised. And I am left alone to lick the wounds of my betrayal. x x x
It has never occurred to me that, in my acceptance of the invitation from no less than the
publisher himself, to-join him... I was unwittingly signing my own death warrant as well. The
insults he had later on hurled at my person, the malicious innuendoes he had spread around
casting doubts on my personal and professional integrity, had mercilessly torn at my soul,
causing metaphysical death."
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
negate any desire to improve work relations with Petitioner Soliven and other PTI executives.
Such strongly worded letter constituted an act of "burning his bridges" with the officers of the
company.
Seeking relief incompatible withwriting offensive letter
Any management officer, much so an immediate superior, would be offended, if not enraged,
with the insults and innuendoes stated in said memorandum; more so because the
memorandum was not directly addressed to him but to the chairman and CEO and copy
furnished all other officers and members of the board of directors. Any discerning mind can
perceive that the letter is not simply a recitation of respondent Alegre's gripes,
disappointments, frustrations and heartaches against the company and its officers particularly
Petitioner Soliven, as postulated by the Solicitor General in his comment. 15 If it were so, why
was it not addressed directly to the person concerned? His memorandum clearly indicated
that his problems involved, or were supposedly caused by only one person, Mr. Soliven, his
immediate superior. But it was not even addressed to him! How can he expect amends in their
relations if that was all he wanted? The Solicitor General was simply turning a blind eye to
the obvious fact that said memorandum, for all intents and purposes, was intended, wittingly
or unwittingly, to end employment relations.
Respondent Alegre a well-educated journalist
It should not escape our attention that respondent Alegre is a. professional journalist and
persuasive writer. On top of that, he was a law graduate. He must have known the drilling
effect of his bitter and sarcastic remarks upon the petitioners and must have intended the
same. Ordinary words are to be construed in their ordinary meaning. Commonsense dictates
that Alegre meant to resign when he wrote the memorandum. Otherwise, he should have used
a more tempered language and a less confrontational tone. Moreover, he held a position of
evident responsibility requiring the utmost confidence of his immediate superior. As assistant
to the publisher doing, in his very own words, "administration and operations functions, apart
from (my) journalistic duties," it is apparent that Alegre was not employed simply for his
writing skills. Top management certainly reposed full trust and confidence in him and placed
him in a position of considerable management influence.
PTI officers of uncommon intelligence and perception
Furthermore, his memorandum was addressed to the chairman and chief executive officer of
PTI and furnished all members of the board of directors. These officers which include the
likes of the late Betty Go-Belmonte, Maximo V. Soliven and Arturo A. Borjal, long-time and
150
well-respected journalists acclaimed locally and internationally, are themselves people of
uncommon perception and intellect. They will not miscomprehend the meaning and intent of
Alegre's memorandum, which was not by any means a simple way of seeking relief but well a
way to get out of the company. What else could he have meant with these concluding
remarks:
"By and large, all that I got are the twin demons of a civilized, unconscionable society:
ECONOMIC INJUSTICE and PROFESSIONAL SABOTAGE.
When push comes to a shove.... anything or everything comes crashing down. I'M HAVING
IT ALL!"
Respondent Alegre, being a journalist himself and having worked with them for sometime,
knew how his letter would be perceived and received. Besides, as discussed earlier, Alegre is
likewise a well-educated man of more than average intelligence. The conclusion is inevitable
that he had more than enough sense to anticipate the consequences and effects of his words
and actions. Indeed, what a man sows, he reaps.
Trust and confidence breached
In addition, respondent Alegre is a highly confidential employee who holds his job at the
pleasure of his employer or, stated otherwise, for as long as he enjoys the trust and
confidence of his employer. Corollarily, he likewise must repose trust and confidence in his
employer or, at the very least, his immediate superior. But any superior hurled with invectives
from a confidential employee, much more one occupying a managerial position at the same
time, will definitely lose trust and confidence in the latter. And there can be no way to
interpret such letter other than as a withering of trust and confidence by the employee in his
boss. The use of offensive language can only mean expression of disloyalty and disrespect. It
renders the writer unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. It is
beyond human nature to expect two persons with underlying mistrust in each other to
continue to work together effectively, not to say, harmoniously.
Antecedent, Contemporaneous and Subsequent Actions Affirming Resignation
In addition to his memorandum and the circumstances attendant thereto which were just
discussed, the Court notes some peculiar actions confirming Alegres' intention to terminate
his employment with the Star.
(1) Medical reasons for leave of absence not proved
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
First, he claims that his leave of absence was due to medical reasons, for which he was
supposed to seek relief abroad. However, the Court scoured the records but found nothing to
show that he actually underwent any medical check-up. Much less, medical examination
abroad. Nothing really backs up such claim except his bare statements which, evidentially,
are at best self-serving.
(1) Cleared desk of personal belongings
Second, respondent Alegre cleared his desk of his personal belongings even before he knew
of the acceptance of his resignation. 16 Such act certainly bares his intent to leave his job.
Respondent Alegre has not refuted nor offered any sufficient explanation for this action. We
cannot but-give due credit to the petitioners' contention that such act was expressive of his
intent to resign.
(1) Did not report back to work
Third, respondent Alegre did not return to his job after his authorized leave of absence
expired in November 1988. Although he sent another letter 17 requesting for an extension of
his leave, there is no showing on record that the same was approved by petitioners. It is
standard office procedure that applications for leave of absence are subject to the approval of
the employer. These are not automatically granted upon filing. Except to cite in his request
"travel log (sic) coupled with advice of my physician," respondent Alegre has not proven the
emergency nature of the cause/s of his extended leave. Again, we cannot but give due
credence to petitioners' contention that this was another operative evidence of Alegre's intent
to resign.
His non-return to work, though, is not equivalent to abandonment of work. For in the latter, it
is necessary to prove "clear and deliberate intent" coupled with unjustified. absence and overt
acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work
anymore. 18 In the case at bench, Alegre voluntarily resigned through his memorandum albeit
written in the guise of a grievance letter. The law and jurisprudence on abandonment have
thus no application in the present case.
(4) Not deprived of chance to return to work
Fourth, if Respondent Alegre had really no intention to resign, he could have reported back to
work. His contention that he was effectively deprived of any chance to return to his work
because of the acceptance of his purported resignation cannot be sustained. He claims that he
received the notice dated November 9, 1988 only on December 6, 1988. But this means that
151
for about two weeks after his leave expired, he had all chances to return to his work. Yet he
chose not to. The obvious reason is that he had actually no intention of doing so.
(5) Alegre expressly manifested intention to resign
Prior to sending his memorandum, Respondent Alegre informed Petitioner Belmonte of his
intention to resign from the Philippine Star. This is shown by the testimony (cross
examination) of the late Mrs. Belmonte before the labor arbiter on January 13, 1990 as
follows:
"ATTY. BORRETA:
And you took that action, meaning the Board acted on this Memo for File which you
considered as his letter of resignation without consulting or talking with the complainant
first?
WITNESS:
The complainant had also applied for leave of absence and he talked with me that he was
leaving for the United States. Actually I remember he requested a conversation but he did not
specify what the conversation was about, Your Honor. He was telling me that he wanted to
leave, has signed another job. And I told him that is not my prerogative and I am only
Chairman of the Board; and he came upon the recommendation of our Publisher and he was
at that time Assistant to the Publisher; that he should talk to the Publisher first and I even
advised him to patch up whatever differences he might have. In that conversation, he said
something about leaving and he even said to me that when he leaves, he would ask his two
(2) sons who were working with us to leave too. And I think I made a comment, and that
must be what he was referring to. I said; oh, but your sons are very hardworking. In fact I said
the Publisher, Max Soliven, told me that 'sana you were as good as your sons' maybe that was
his feeling. That is my way of trying to tell him that your sons are very hard-working because
he said when I leave I am going to ask them to leave too. Maybe because of that he gave me
the impression that he wanted to leave.
ATTY. BORRETA:
And this happened before he wrote this memo for file on October 24, 1988?
WITNESS:
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
Yes, sir
ATTY. BORRETA:
And because of that you got the impression that he had the intention to resign?
WITNESS:
Yes sir" 19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(6) Assumed job in another office
Finally, the most telling of the actions undertaken by Respondent Alegre which evidently
demonstrate his intent to resign was his immediate employment as chief of staff of the office
of then Senator Sotero H. Laurel, with a much higher compensation at P14,600.00 per month
plus P2,000.00 per month driver's allowance. He admitted in his testimony before the labor
arbiter on November 6, 1989 that he was employed therein about a year before (the date of
his testimony) or sometime in November 1988. 20 The date coincided with the period of his
leave of absence or immediately thereafter. If he had no intention of resigning and was on
leave for medical reasons as he alleged, why then did he commence a new job in another
office at about the same period? His assumption of a new job prior to receiving Mrs.
Belmonte's letter on December 6, 1988 is clearly inconsistent with any desire to remain in
employment with PTI. This is particularly evident because both jobs required full-time work.
Moreover, working in a newspaper which prides in its independence from partisan activities
is incompatible with a concurrent political office held by respondent.
Side Issue: May a Resignation Be Unilaterally Withdrawn?
Having established that Respondent Alegre resigned, we now tackle the corollary issue of
whether he can unilaterally withdraw his resignation. We hold that he cannot do so.
The case of Intertrod Maritime, Inc. vs. NLRC 21 is in point. The employee therein who was a
ship engineer, while at Port Pylus, Greece, requested for relief due to "personal reasons." The
master of the ship, who had authority to "sign off" an employee requesting relief, approved
his request but informed the employee that repatriation expenses were for his account and that
he had to give thirty days notice in view of clause 5 of the employment contract. When the
vessel was at Port Said, Egypt four days later, the master "signed him off" and paid him in
cash all amounts due him less repatriation expenses. On his return to the Philippines, the
employee filed a complaint charging his employer with breach of employment contract and
152
violation of the National Seamen Board rules and regulations. He claimed that his request for
relief was only for the sole purpose of enabling him to take care of a fellow member of the
crew who was hospitalized in Greece. Hence, after he was disallowed from disembarking
thereat, the reason no longer existed and, consequently, he was illegally dismissed when he
was forced to "sign off" in Egypt even as he signified his intention of continuing his work.
The Court ruled against the employee. It held that resignations, once accepted, may not be
withdrawn without the consent of the employer. If the employer accepts the withdrawal, the
employee retains his job. If the employer does not, the employee cannot claim illegal
dismissal. To say that an employee who has resigned is illegally dismissed, is to encroach
upon the right of employers to hire persons who will be of service to them.
Obviously, this is a recognition of the contractual nature of employment which requires
mutuality of consent between the parties. An employment contract is consensual and
voluntary. Hence, if the employee "finds-himself in a situation where he believes that
personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, then he has no
other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment". 22 If accepted by the
employer, the consequent effect of resignation is severance of the contract of employment.
A resigned employee who desires to take his job back has to re-apply therefor and he shall
have the status of a stranger who cannot unilaterally demand an appointment. He cannot
arrogate unto himself the same position which he earlier decided to leave. To allow him to do
so would be to deprive the employer of his basic right to choose whom to employ. Such is
tantamount to undue oppression of the employer. It has been held that an employer is free to
regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment including
hiring. 23 The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, impels neither the oppression nor
self-destruction of the employer. 24
Consistent with our ruling in Intertrod, the resignation of respondent Alegre after its
acceptance by petitioners can no longer be withdrawn without the consent of the latter. In
fairness to the employer, an employee cannot backtrack on his resignation at his whim and
without the conformity of the former.
The instant case is unlike Molave Tours Corporation vs. NLRC 25 and People's Security, Inc.
vs. NLRC. 26 In Molave, acting on reports that the employee was on several occasions found
drunk within work premises, the employer required him to explain in writing said charges.
Notwithstanding his explanation and request for a confrontation with his accusers, the
employee was made to sign a resignation letter. Two months after, he filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter, affirmed by the NLRC, found that the employee was
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
merely forced and intimidated into resigning. The Court reiterated that resignation must be
voluntary on the part of the employee. It thus ordered the employer to reinstate the employee
and award backwages and other benefits due him since there was no effective resignation.
Likewise in People's Security, there was a finding of involuntary resignation. The employees
therein who were security guards were not given assignments by their employer after the
latter's security services contract with Meralco expired. The employees requested for loans to
be deducted from their security bond deposits, which requests were denied by the employer
who insisted that they must turn in their resignations first before their security bond deposits
could be released. Not having been given new work assignments and being in dire financial
need, the employees submitted their resignation letters. Three months later, they filed money
claims which were later amended to include illegal dismissal. The employer contended that
the employees voluntarily severed their employment because they turned in their resignation
letters and assumed jobs with another security agency. Again the Court held that resignation
is a voluntary act of the employee. When the employees were told that they would not be
granted loans unless they resigned, they had no choice since they desperately needed money
to meet their respective families' needs. They were also forced to accept jobs at another
agency as a practical solution to their employment problems which were caused by the
employer's refusal and failure to provide them with new assignments.
In the case of Indophil vs. NLRC, 27 on the other hand, the employee voluntarily submitted a
resignation letter but later tried to retrieve the same. He contended though, that he was
thereafter prevented by the company guard from entering the work premises because of his
resignation. He sued for illegal dismissal. His employer claimed abandonment of work since
he was required to report and to explain his unauthorized absences but did not. In holding that
there was no dismissal, the Court regarded the employer's act of requiring the employee to
report and explain his unauthorized absences as non-acceptance of the previous resignation of
the employee. Thus, the employer still considered him as its employee in spite of the filed
resignation letter. With respect to the latter's allegation that he was prevented by the company
guard from entering the premises, the Court chided him for not having inquired into its
veracity and for simply relying on the bare statement of the guard. It said that the employee
should be more vigilant of his rights.
The above three cases are dissimilar to the case at bar. In the first two cases, there were
involuntary resignations while in the third there was an unaccepted resignation. In the instant
case, however, the resignation was voluntary and it was accepted by the employer. Thus, our
grant of the petition.
153
Since we find no case of illegal dismissal, we will no longer pass upon the two other issues
raised by petitioners which are mere consequences of the contrary finding made by the
NLRC. Necessarily, there can be no award of any moral or exemplary damages, backwages
and separation pay.
Epilogue
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code mandate a bias in favor of labor. Hence, this Court,
as a matter of judicial policy, leans backwards to protect labor and the working class against
the machinations and incursions of their more financially entrenched employers. In the
present case, however, it is obvious to us that private respondent's memorandum could not
have been intended merely to persuade management to improve the work environment at
the Philippine Star. Rather, it was evidently a recitation of the facts and reasons why
respondent Alegre could no longer continue working under what he believed were unbearable
conditions in the work place. The offensive language used by a well-educated man endowed
with unusual writing skill could not have been intended merely for the "suggestion box." That
it was addressed and given to persons of uncommon perception themselves takes the letter
out of ordinary employer employee communications. It is true that there was no direct
mention of the word "resignation." However, the incendiary words employed denote a clear
intent to end the writer's association of trust and confidence with his superiors and employer.
This intent becomes even more manifest when viewed in light of attendant acts of Alegre,
particularly his prolonged leave of absence, his clearing of his own desk of personal
belongings, his failure to report back to work after the expiration of his approved leave, his
verbal expression of his intent to resign, and most notably, his assumption of a higher paying
job in a political office which was incompatible with his work at the Star.
In deciding cases, this Court does not matter-of-factly apply and interpret laws in a vacuum.
General principles do not decide specific cases. Rather, laws are interpreted always in the
context of the peculiar factual situation of each case. Each case has its own flesh and blood
and cannot be decided simply on the basis of isolated clinical classroom principles. The
circumstances of time, place, event, person, and particularly attendant circumstances and
actions before, during and after the operative fact should all be taken in their totality so that
justice can be rationally and fairly dispensed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the NLRC are SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this
Court is made PERMANENT. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
G.R. No. L-33052 August 31, 1981
ANGEL R. QUIMPO, petitioner,
vs.
LEONCIO MENDOZA, as Treasurer for the City of Cagayan de Oro, and in his
personal capacity, and JUDGE BERNARDO TEVES, as Presiding Judge of Branch IV
of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance
of Misamis Oriental, Branch IV, dismissing the suit for mandamus and damages filed by
herein petitioner Angel R. Quimpo against herein respondent Leoncio Mendoza, as Treasurer
of the City of Cagayan de Oro and in his personal capacity.
The background facts are stated in the decision of the lower court, thus:
Petitioner Angel Quimpo is the owner of a building located in Cagayan de
Oro City assessed at P20,000.00 for 1969 under Tax Declaration No. 2102.
The realty tax of said building is P400.00 yearly payable in four equal
installments, the first installment to be paid on or before March 31. The
second installment, on or before June 30; the third installment, on or before
September 30; and the last installment, on or before December 31. (Sec. 4,
RA 5447).
Petitioner paid on time the first three installments amounting to P300.00, but
with respect to the last installment of P100.00 which was to be paid on or
before December 31, it was only on August 27, 1970 that he tendered the
amount of P124.00, which covered, according to his computation, the tax or
last installment of P100.00 and the penalty of P24.00 to herein respondent
City Treasurer of Cagayan de Oro, who refused the payment insisting that
petitioner ought to pay the last installment of P100.00 plus the penalty of
P96.00 or a total of P196.00 (Stipulations, pars. 3 & 4) based on and
computed according to Section 42 of the City Charter of Cagayan de Oro RA
521) and the Provincial Circular No. 18-64 dated July 17, 1964 of the
Secretary of Finance (Exhibit 2 and Stipulations, par. 7).
154
On September 2, 1970 petitioner deposited by way of consignation the
above-mentioned amount of P124.00 with the Clerk of Court (Stipulations,
par. 5) and instituted the instant action of mandamus, with damages, against
herein respondent City Treasurer in his official as well as personal capacity,
praying for judgment:
1. ORDERING the respondent to accept the payment of taxes for the last
installment and the penalty therefor in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
TWENTY FOUR (Pl24.00);
2. ORDERING the respondent to issue the official receipt for the final
payment of the taxes for 1969, and a tax clearance certificate;
3. DECLARING the act of the respondent in imposing the penalty on the full
amount of the tax even if the late payment was only on the last installment as
illegal, unjust, immoral and oppressive;
4. ORDERING respondent in his personal capacity, to pay damages in the
total amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (Pl2,000.00), by way of
actual moral, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees, and costs;
5. ORDERING such just and equitable reliefs and remedies under the
premises. 1
The court below sustained the City Treasurer, relying on the main opinion of this Tribunal in
the case of Padilla vs. City of Pasay and City Treasurer (L-24039, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA
1349).
The decision under review states:
The law imposes only one annual real estate tax (plus the additional tax
under RA 5447). This tax is due and payable only once, on or before March
31 of every year. Before the effectivity of RA 5447 the taxpayer was given
the option to pay the tax in two installments, the first on or before May 31,
and the second on or before October 30th. The payment in two installments
was a privilege extended to the taxpayer for his accommodation and
convenience. With the imposition of the additional tax of one per centum on
the assessed value of real property in addition to the real property tax
regularly levied thereon the amount of the tax shouldered by the taxpayer has
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
practically been doubled, and it is for this reason, to the mind of the Court,
that the new law now allows him to pay his real tax in four equal installments
instead of only two. There is only one tax, payable in four equal installments
on specified dates; not four different taxes, each with a different due date. ... .
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ruling of the Supreme Court in the
above-mentioned Padilla case applies squarely to the case at bar. Hence, the
tax liability of petitioner is P100.00, corresponding to the unpaid last
installment, plus P96.00 computed at 2% of the original tax of P400.00 for
every full month of delinquency but not to exceed 24% from April, 1969 to
July 1970. 2
The lower court further held that it was without authority to entertain the suit for failure of
petitioner to comply with the provisions of the Charter of Cagayan de Oro (Republic Act No.
521) on payment of tax under protest. 3
Against the foregoing judgment, petitioner assigns the following errors:
1. Respondent Judge erred when he ruled that under Section 4, R.A. 5447,
the installments for the basic and additional real property tax have only one
due date but are payable in four equal installments
2. Respondent Judge erred in ruling that on the question of the imposition of
the tax penalty, said penalty must first be paid under protest before the suit
can prosper; and
3. Respondent Judge erred in ruling that the error of respondent City
Treasurer, if any, arose from an honest interpretation of the law or their
meaning, and therefore no damages can be awarded.
In resolving the first assignment of error, it is well to set forth the pertinent provisions of law,
R.A. 521 (Charter of Cagayan de Oro City), to wit:
Section 42. Taxes on real estate. A tax, the rate of which shall not exceed two
per centum ad valorem to be determined by the Municipal Board, shall be
levied annually on or before the second Monday of January on the assessed
value of all real estate in the city subject to taxation. All taxes on real estate
for any year shall be due and payable annually on the first day of June, and
155
from this date such taxes together with all penalties accruing thereto shall
constitute a lien on the property subject to such taxation.
xxx xxx xxx
At the option of the taxpayer, the tax for any year may be paid in two installments to be fixed
annually by the Municipal Board simultaneously with the rate per centum of ad valorem
taxation; Provided, That the time limit for the first and second installments shall be set at not
later than the thirty first day of May and the thirtieth day of October of each year,
respectively.
xxx xxx xxx
At the expiration of the time for the payment of the real estate tax without penalty, the
taxpayer shall be subject, from the first day of delinquency, to the payment of a penalty at the
rate of two per centum for each full month of delinquency that has expired, on the amount of
the original tax due, until the tax shall have been paid in full or until the property shall have
been forfeited to the city as provided in this Act: Provided, That in no case shall the total
penalty exceed twenty-four per centum of the original tax due.
xxx xxx xxx
On January 1, 1969, Republic Act No. 5447 took effect, imposing an additional tax on real
property and providing, inter alia, that "the pertinent provisions of the corresponding
charters of chartered cities to the contrary notwithstanding, the basic and the additional
property tax shall be due and payable in four equal installments; the first installment shall be
due and payable on or before March 31; the second installment, on or before June 30; the
third installment, on or before September 30; and the last installment on or before December
31." 4
Petitioner contends that R.A. 5447 explicitly amended the respective city charters, including
R.A. 521, by providing that the real property tax now becomes due in four equal installments
and becomes payable in four equal installments; that the term "original tax due" in R.A. 521
is only proper if the tax has one due date and is payable in two or more installments; and, that
R.A. 5447, having been enacted after the Padilla case relied upon by respondent court, was
obviously intended to cure the harsh but mandatory law as interpreted in said decision.
We agree with petitioner that, contrary to the conclusion of the lower court, the
aforementioned Padilla case does not apply squarely to the case at bar.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
In Padilla, the applicable law was Republic Act No. 183, otherwise known as the Charter of
the City of Pasay. Therein petitioner Teodoro Padilla paid the first installment of his 1963
real property tax on time but paid his second installment only on December 23, 1963, instead
of October 30 of the same year, as required by R.A. 183. This Court held that his delinquency
penalty should be based on the amount of the original tax due, and computed from June
first 5 when said tax became due and payable. We quote below the pertinent portions of the
decision as follows:
In appellant's brief, it is submitted that the taxpayer having been given an
option to pay his realty tax in two installments and the appellant having paid
within the permissible period, the first installment, he could not be
considered delinquent insofar as the first half of the realty tax is due. His
delinquency should date only from November 1, 1963 by virtue of his failure
to pay on October 30 of the same year. For appellant, it is inconclusive "how
he can be declared delinquent from June 1, 1963 since the second installment
of his real estate tax was not yet due on that date but will have become due
and payable only on the thirtieth of October 1963". The decision then,
according to appellant, "negates the taxpayer's option to pay his realty tax in
two (2) installments as expressly granted" by law and amounted to
unwarranty judicial legislation.
Appellant's theory is not inherently implausible. Nonetheless, it must yield to
the specific language of the law which is controlling. The last sentence of the
first paragraph of the controlling legal provision reads thus: "All taxes on real
estate for any year shag be due and payable annually on the first day of June
and from this date such taxes together with all penalties accruing thereto shall
constitute a lien on the property subject to such taxation. Two paragraphs
later, the taxpayer is given the option to pay 'in two installments to be fixed
annually by the Municipal Board simultaneously with the rate per centum ad
valorem taxation:" Provided, That the time limit for the first and second
installments shall be set at not later than the thirty-first day of May and the
thirtieth day of October of each year, respectively.' Then comes the provision
as to the penalty to be imposed in case of delinquency and how to fix the
same: At the expiration of the time for the payment of the real estate tax
without penalty, the taxpayer shall be subject, from the first day of
delinquency, to the payment of a penalty at the rate of two per centum for
each fun month of delinquency that has expired, on the amount of the
original tax due, until the tax shall have been paid in fun or until the property
shall have been forfeited to the city as provided in this ACT: Provided, That
156
in no case shall the total penalty exceed twenty- four per centum of the
original tax due.
Construed together, the above provisions yield no other conclusion but that
the taxes are due and payable 'on the first day of June' from which date 'such
taxes together with all penalties accruing thereto shall constitute a lien on the
property subject to such taxation. It is true the taxpayer is given the option to
pay in two installments with the respective dates for the payment thereof 'at
not later than the thirty-first day of May and the thirtieth day of October of
each year, respectively.' Then comes the crucial and decisive provision. 'At
the expiration of the time for the payment of the real estate tax without
penalty, the taxpayer shall be subject, from the first day of delinquency, to
the payment of a penalty at the rate of two per centum for each full month of
delinquency that has expired, on the amount of the original tax due, until the
tax shall have been paid in full or until the property shall have been forfeited
to the city ... .
The law is specific and mandatory. It calls for application as thus worded.
There is no room for interpretation. The penalty is to be based 'on the amount
of the original tax due.' The fact that the first installment was made on time
does not benefit the taxpayer at all, thereafter the second installment were not
paid on time. In effect then, the option thus granted, to pay in two
installments, must be strictly complied with, otherwise the operation of the
plain statutory command that the tax due and payable on June 1st becomes
unavoidable and delinquency is to be computed from such a date.
The aforecited provisions of R.A. 183 (Charter of Pasay City) applied and interpreted in
the Padilla case are indeed almost Identical to the corresponding provisions in R.A. 521
(Charter of Cagayan de Oro City), the law applicable to the case at bar. However,
the Padilla decision was promulgated on June 29, 1968, or prior to the passage of R.A. 5447
which, as already stated, took effect on January 1, 1969. As the tax penalty in question was
imposed on the real estate tax for 1969, the subsequent enactment of R.A. 5447 must be taken
into consideration with R.A. 521 and the pronouncements of this Court in the Padilla case.
A careful reading of the applicable provisions of R.A. 521 and R.A. 5447 reveals the extent to
which the former law was modified or amended by the later statute. While R.A. 521, among
others, provides that the real property tax is "due and payable annually on the first day of
June", R.A. 5447 declares that the same tax (including the additional tax) "shall be due and
payable in four equal installments." In other words, R.A. 521 specifically and expressly
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
provides for one due date for the whole annual real estate tax. R.A. 5447, on the other hand,
does not provide for such a specific singular date for the payment of the entire tax, but
directly and unmistakably mandates that the tax shall be due and payable in four equal
installments spread over the period of whole year, Each installment is due and payable on or
before a specified statutory limit. The last installment is due and payable on or before
December 31 of each year, hence it is only thereafter, or commencing January 1 of the
following year, that delinquency starts as to this final installment. This being so, it only
logically follows that the penalty for delinquency should be computed from January 1.
The next question now poses itself What is the basis for the computation of the tax penalty in
case of delinquency? The sixth paragraph of Section 42, R.A. 521 (supra), provides that the
taxpayer is subject to " a penalty at the rate of two per centum for each full month of
delinquency that has expired, on the amount of the original tax due ... ." There is no
corresponding or amendatory provision in R.A. 5447. This later law does not cover the aspect
of penalty in case of delinquency in the payment of the real estate tax. In the absence of such
penalty provision, respondent City Treasurer insists that the penalty of 2% be based on the
original tax due whereas petitioner maintains that it should be the amount of the installment
due and not paid.
We rule for the petitioner, following the general rule in the interpretation of tax statutes that
such statutes are construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.
Moreover, simple logic fairness and reason cannot countenance an exaction or a penalty for
an act faithfully done in compliance with the law. Since petitioner is allowed by law to pay
his real estate tax in four equal installments due and payable on four specified dates and
having paid the first three (3) installments faithfully and religiously, it is manifest injustice,
sheer arbitrariness and abuse of power to penalize him for doing so when he fails to pay the
fourth end last installment.
That it is the legislator's intention to subject the taxpayer to the payment of the penalty of two
(2) per centum on the amount of the delinquent tax for each month of delinquency or fraction
thereof, is clearly evident in the promulgation of P.D. No. 464 enacting the Real Property Tax
Code, Sec. 66 thereof which provides:
Sec. 66. Penalty for delinquency. — Failure to pay the real property tax
before the expiration of the period for the payment without penalty of the
quarterly installments thereof shall subject the taxpayer to the payment of a
penalty of two per centum on the amount of the delinquent tax for each
month of delinquency or fraction thereof until the delinquent tax shall be
fully paid: Provided, That in no case shall the total penalty exceed twenty-
157
four per centum of the delinquent tax. The rate of penalty for tax delinquency
fixed herein shall be uniformly applied in all provinces and cities. (emphasis
supplied)
P.D. 464 was promulgated effective June 1, 1974. Section 66 of the P.D. evidently supplies
the omission of a penalty provision in Republic Act 5447. However, since R.A. 5447
amended R.A. 521, the City Charter of Cagayan de Oro City in making the basic and
additional property tax to be due and payable in four (4) equal installments, We hold that the
penalty provision of R.A. 521, Sec. 42 is deemed modified by implication.
Accordingly, petitioner's total liability as of August 27, 1970 when he tendered payment to
respondent City Treasurer may be computed as follows: P100.00 (the fourth and last
installment) plus P16.00 penalty (8 months of delinquency from January to August, 1970 at
two per centum on the amount of the delinquent tax of P100.00) which totals Pl 16.00.
As to the second assignment of error, We do not agree with the respondent court that failure
of the petitioner to comply with Section 42 and Section 58 (b) of R.A. 521 requiring payment
of taxes under protest, rendered the court without authority to entertain the suit. Section 58(b)
provides that no court shall entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax assessed under
this Chapter until the taxpayer shall have paid, under protest, the taxed assessed against
him ... ." (emphasis supplied.) The phrase "tax assessed" clearly refers to the annual real
estate tax imposable on the taxable real property.
May the phrase "tax assessed" be interpreted to include not only the tax itself but also all
penalties accruing thereto'? The legislative intent is not clear on this point, reading Section 42
to Section 58 of the Act. However, in the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Bautista,
G.R. No. L-12250 and L-12259, May 27, 1959, this Court, speaking thru Justice Roberto
Concepcion, who later became Chief Justice, held that a surcharge is not a "tax" in itself, and
We quote:
It will be noted that the surcharge of five per centum (5%) and the interest of
one per centum (1 %) a month, referred to in Section 51 (e) are imposed upon
the "tax unpaid." Similarly, under said section 72, the "surcharge of fifty per
centum (50%) of the amount of" the "deficiency tax," imposable "in case
of ... a false or fraudulent return," shall be "added" to the "tax or to the
deficiency tax". In other words, the aforementioned surcharge of 50% is not a
"tax" in itself, and hence, not subject to the 5% surcharge and to the interest
of 1% a month on the "unpaid tax", prescribed in section 51(e). Although,
pursuant to section 72, said 50% surcharge "shall be collected at the same
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
time and in the same manner and as part of that tax", the likeness to the tax
therein mentioned refers exclusively to the "time" and "manner"-meaning the
method-of collection, not to the amount to be collected which is not
procedural, but substantive in character."
Since a surcharge is in the nature of a penalty, the ruling cited above is aptly applicable in the
instant case. Furthermore, the particular circumstances herein cast doubt as to the
applicability of Section 58(b), R.A. 521, which must be resolved in favor of the petitioner.
We must take into consideration his apparent good faith in relying on the amendatory
provisions of R.A. 5447, and the admitted fact that he tendered payment of the last
installment of his 1969 realty tax to respondent City Treasurer, together with the tax penalty
in accordance with his computation, though erroneous, before filing this case in court. We
likewise take into account the fact that even said respondent Treasurer erred in interpreting
the law. It may be added that it could have been more expedient for the latter to have
accepted the amount tendered by petitioner in August, 1970, for after all, the tax itself was
not in question. As to the balance of the tax penalty, said respondent's recourse would have
been Section 43 of R.A. 521 which provides:
After a property shall have become delinquent in the payment of taxes and
said taxes and the corresponding penalties shall remain unpaid ninety days
after payment thereof shall have become due, the city treasurer, or his
deputy, if he desires to compel payment through seizure of any personal
property of any delinquent person or persons, shall issue a duly authenticated
certificate, based on the records of his office, showing the fact of delinquency
and the amount of the tax and penalty due from said delinquent person or
persons or from each of them. Such certificate shall be sufficient warrant for
the seizure of the personal property belonging to the delinquent person or
persons in question not exempt from seizure; and these proceedings may be
carried out by the city treasurer, his deputy, or any other officer authorized to
carry out legal proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)
Anent the last assigned error, We agree with the conclusion reached by respondent court that
petitioner is not entitled to actual, moral or exemplary damages prayed for in his Complaint.
It does not appear that herein respondent City Treasurer's actuations or decisions were tainted
with bad faith. As this Court held in the case of Cabungcal, et al. vs. Mayor Cordova and
Gustilo L-16934, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 584), "(a)n erroneous interpretation of the
meaning of the provisions of an ordinance (by the City Mayor) does not constitute nor does it
amount to bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award of damages."
158
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering petitioner to pay to the City Treasurer
of Cagayan de Oro City the amount of P116.00 representing full payment of the last
installment of P100.00 on the realty tax for the year 1969 and the tax penalty of P16.00 for
eight months of his delinquency from January, 1970 to August, 1970; and ordering said City
Treasurer to accept the aforesaid payment, issue the official receipt therefor and a tax
clearance certificate covering the aforementioned real estate tax and penalty. No costs.
Judgment modified.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez and Melencio- Herrera, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-16704             March 17, 1962
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General and Ernesto T. Duran for respondent-appellee.
BARRERA, J.:
On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the
following tenor: .
Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the
System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all
bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration.
All these will comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-
1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one
month.
Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel,
wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as
contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding
overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective
monthly premium contributions, and submitting, "In order to assist your System in arriving at
a proper interpretation of the term 'compensation' for the purposes of" such computation,
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
their observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the general interpretation
of the words "compensation", "remuneration" and "wages". Counsel further questioned the
validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to
promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official
Gazette.
Overruling these objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not
a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official
Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere
statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed.
Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this Court on appeal.
The single issue involved in this appeal is whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or
regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social
Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of
this Act."
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation
and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an
administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it
"makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion
or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law (Parker, Administrative
Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and regulations when promulgated in
pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law,
partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal
sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms,
after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the
legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the
administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules
and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law. (Davis, op. cit., p. 194.) .
A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed
and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are
not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit., 195-197).
On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is
the courts that finally determine what the law means.
159
Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the
amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation"
contained in Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as
follows: .
(f) Compensation — All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any
remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the
remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances
or overtime pay; and (3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may
make, although not legally required to do so.
Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to:
(f) Compensation — All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any
remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the
remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month.
It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime
pay given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded, or exempted from
the definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the
amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the
effect of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those
concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as amended,
which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the
law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how
the law should be construed. 1äwphï1.ñët
The case of People v. Jolliffe (G.R. No. L-9553, promulgated on May 30, 1959) cited by
appellant, does not support its contention that the circular in question is a rule or regulation.
What was there said was merely that a regulation may be incorporated in the form of a
circular. Such statement simply meant that the substance and not the form of a regulation is
decisive in determining its nature. It does not lay down a general proposition of law that any
circular, regardless of its substance and even if it is only interpretative, constitutes a rule or
regulation which must be published in the Official Gazette before it could take effect.
The case of People v. Que Po Lay (50 O.G. 2850) also cited by appellant is not applicable to
the present case, because the penalty that may be incurred by employers and employees if
they refuse to pay the corresponding premiums on bonus, overtime pay, etc. which the
employer pays to his employees, is not by reason of non-compliance with Circular No. 22,
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
but for violation of the specific legal provisions contained in Section 27(c) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 1161.
We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the
System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining
the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions
should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication
in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.
It hardly need be said that the Commission's interpretation of the amendment embodied in its
Circular No. 22, is correct. The express elimination among the exemptions excluded in the
old law, of all bonuses, allowances and overtime pay in the determination of the
"compensation" paid to employees makes it imperative that such bonuses and overtime pay
must now be included in the employee's remuneration in pursuance of the amendatory law. It
is true that in previous cases, this Court has held that bonus is not demandable because it is
not part of the wage, salary, or compensation of the employee. But the question in the instant
case is not whether bonus is demandable or not as part of compensation, but whether, after
the employer does, in fact, give or pay bonus to his employees, such bonuses shall be
considered compensation under the Social Security Act after they have been received by the
employees. While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their
well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined
in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it
can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose
and another meaning for some other purpose. Such is the case that is now before us. Republic
Act 1161 specifically defined what "compensation" should mean "For the purposes of this
Act". Republic Act 1792 amended such definition by deleting same exemptions authorized in
the original Act. By virtue of this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law,
whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in
question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs against appellant. So ordered.
[G.R. No. L-9669.  January 31, 1956.]
NICANOR G. SALAYSAY, Acting Municipal Mayor of San Juan del Monte,
Rizal, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE FRED RUIZ CASTRO, Executive Secretary, Office
of the President of the Philippines, HONORABLE WENCESLAO PASCUAL,
Provincial Governor of Rizal, and DOCTOR BRAULIO STO.
DOMINGO, Respondents.
160
 
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The facts in this case are not disputed. Briefly stated, they are as follows. Engracio E. Santos
is the duly elected Municipal Mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal, and the Petitioner Nicanor
G. Salaysay is the duly elected Vice-Mayor. In the month of September, 1955 and for some
time prior thereto, Santos was under suspension from his office due to administrative charges
filed against him and so Petitioner Salaysay acted as Mayor under section 2195 of the
Revised Administrative Code providing that in case of temporary disability of the Mayor
such as absence, etc., his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor. On September 8,
1955, while acting as Mayor, Salaysay filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office of
Mayor.
Interpreting said action of Salaysay in running for the office of Mayor as an automatic
resignation from his office of Vice-Mayor under the provisions of section 27 of the Revised
Election Code, as a consequence of which he no longer had authority to continue acting as
Mayor, the Office of the President of the Philippines on September 12, 1955 designated
Braulio Sto. Domingo acting Municipal Vice-Mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal. On the
same date Salaysay was advised by Respondent Provincial Governor Wenceslao Pascual of
Rizal that in view of his (Salaysay’s) automatic cessation as Vice-Mayor due to his having
filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor, and in view of the appointment of
Sto. Domingo, as acting Vice-Mayor by the President of the Philippines, and because he
Pascual) had directed Sto. Domingo to assume the office of Mayor during the suspension of
Mayor Santos, he (Salaysay) should turn over the office of Mayor to Sto. Domingo. On
September 13, 1955, Salaysay was also advised by Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro to
turn over the office of Mayor to Sto. Domingo immediately, otherwise he might be
prosecuted for violation of Article 237 of the Revised Penal Code for prolonging performance
of duties.
Salaysay refused to turn over the office of Mayor to Sto. Domingo and brought this action of
Prohibition with preliminary injunction against Executive Secretary Castro, Governor Pascual
and Sto. Domingo, to declare invalid, illegal and unauthorized the designation of Sto.
Domingo as acting Vice-Mayor of San Juan del Monte as well as his designation by
Governor Pascual to assume the office of Mayor during the suspension of Mayor
Santos; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryto order Respondents to desist and refrain from molesting,
interfering or in any way preventing Petitioner from performing his duties as acting
Municipal Mayor and prohibiting Sto. Domingo from performing or attempting to perform
any of those powers and duties belonging to Petitioner. Acting upon a prayer contained in the
petition, we issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
Petitioner contends that his case does not come under section 27 of the Election Code for the
reason that when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor, he was actually
holding said office. The Respondents, however, maintain that the office Petitioner was
actually holding when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor was that of
Vice-Mayor, the one to which he had been duly elected; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat he
was not actually holding the office of Mayor but merely discharging the duties thereof and
was merely acting as Mayor during the temporary disability of the regular incumbent.
Elaborating, Respondents claim that a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor merely discharges the
duties of the office but does not exercise the powers thereof; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat
his tenure is provisional, lasting only during the temporary disability of the regular
incumbent. Petitioner counters with the argument that a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor does
not only discharge the duties of the office of Mayor but also exercises the powers
thereof; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that while acting as Mayor, he actually holds the
office of Mayor for all legal purposes.
It is clear that Petitioner’s stand is taken from the point of view of his acting as Mayor and
not of his office of Vice-Mayor, while Respondents’ position is taken from the point of view
of Petitioner actually holding the office of Vice-Mayor though incidentally and temporarily
discharging the duties of the office of Mayor.
We have given the case considerable study and thought because we find no precedents to aid
and guide us. The parties have ably adduced pertinent and extensive citations and arguments
not only at the original hearing but also at the re-hearing. As to whether a Vice- Mayor acting
as Mayor may be regarded as actually holding the office of Mayor, there are plausible
arguments and good reasons for either side. We are inclined to agree with Petitioner that one
acting as Mayor not only discharges the duties of the office but also exercises the powers of
said office, and that in one sense and literally, he may legitimately be considered as actually
holding the office of Mayor. But there is also force and logic in the argument
of Respondents that inasmuch as a Vice-Mayor takes over the duties of the Mayor only
temporarily and in an acting capacity, he may not be regarded as actually holding the office,
because the duly elected Mayor incumbent though actually under temporary disability such as
suspension, illness or absence (section 2195, Revised Administrative Code) could and should
be considered as retaining his right to the office of Mayor and actually holding the
same; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryotherwise there would be a situation where two officials at
the same time would be having a right to the same office and actually holding the same. In
view of the possible uncertainty and doubt as to whether or not a Vice-Mayor by acting as
Mayor can be regarded as actually holding said office of Mayor, we have to go back and
resort to the legislative proceedings had, particularly the discussions and interpellations in
both houses of Congress leading to the enactment of section 27 of the Revised Election Code,
with a view to ascertaining the intention of that body. After all, in interpreting a law, the
161
primary consideration is the ascertainment of the intent and the purpose of the legislature
promulgating the same.
“Statute law is the will of the legislature; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand the object of all
judicial interpretation of it is to determine what intention is conveyed, either expressly or by
implication, by the language used, so far as it is necessary for determining whether the
particular case or state of facts presented to the interpreter falls within it.” (Black, Handbook
on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws, 2nd ed., p. 11.)
HISTORY OR BACKGROUND OF SECTION 27
REVISED ELECTION CODE
Before the enactment of section 27 of the Revised Election Code, the law in force covering
the point or question in controversy was section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666. Its burden
was to allow an elective provincial, municipal, or city official such as Mayor, running for the
same office to continue in office until the expiration of his term. The legislative intention as
we see it was to favor re- election of the incumbent by allowing him to continue in his office
and use the prerogatives and influence thereof in his campaign for re- election and to avoid a
break in or interruption of his incumbency during his current term and provide for continuity
thereof with the next term of office if re-elected.
But section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666 had reference only to provincial and municipal
officials duly elected to their offices and who were occupying the same by reason of said
election at the time that they filed their certificates of candidacy for the same position. It did
not include officials who hold or occupy elective provincial and municipal offices not by
election but by appointment. We quote section 2, Commonwealth Act No.
666:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office other than the one
for which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered resigned from his once from the
moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.”
However, this was exactly the situation facing the Legislature in the year 1947 after the late
President Roxas had assumed office as President and before the elections coming up that
year. The last national elections for provincial and municipal officials were held in 1940,
those elected therein to serve up to December, 1943. Because of the war and the occupation
by the Japanese, no elections for provincial and municipal officials could be held in 1943.
Those elected in 1940 could not hold-over beyond 1943 after the expiration of their term of
office because according to the views of the Executive department as later confirmed by this
Court in the case of Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil., 12, through Commonwealth Act
No. 357, Congress had intended to suppress the doctrine or rule of hold- over. So, those
provincial and municipal officials elected in 1940 ceased in 1943 and their offices became
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
vacant, and this was the situation when after liberation, President Osmeña took over as Chief
Executive. He filled these vacant positions by appointment. When President Roxas was
elected in 1946 and assumed office in 1947 he replaced many of these Osmeña appointees
with his own men. Naturally, his Liberal Party followers wanted to extend to these appointees
the same privilege of office retention thereto given by section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666
to local elective officials. It could not be done because section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666
had reference only to officials who had been elected. So, it was decided by President Roxas
and his party to amend said section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666 by substituting the phrase
“which he is actually holding”, for the phrase “for which he has been lastly elected” found in
section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 666. The amendment is now found in section 27 of the
Revised Election Code which we quote below:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“SEC. 27.  Candidate holding office. — Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official
running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered
resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.”
The purpose of the Legislature in making the amendment, in our opinion, was to give the
benefit or privilege of retaining office not only to those who have been elected thereto but
also to those who have been appointed; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarystated differently, to
extend the privilege and benefit to the regular incumbents having the right and title to the
office either by election or by appointment. There can be no doubt, in our opinion, about this
intention. We have carefully examined the proceedings in both Houses of the Legislature.
The minority Nacionalista members of Congress bitterly attacked this amendment, realizing
that it was partisan legislation intended to favor those officials appointed by President
Roxas; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut despite their opposition the amendment was passed.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT
We repeat that the purpose of the Legislature in enacting section 27 of the Revised Election
Code was to allow an official to continue occupying an elective provincial, municipal or city
office to which he had been appointed or elected, while campaigning for his election as long
as he runs for the same office. He may keep said office continuously without any break,
through the elections and up to the expiration of the term of the office. By continuing in
office, the office holder was allowed and expected to use the prerogatives, authority and
influence of his office in his campaign for his election or re-election to the office he was
holding. Another intention of the Legislature as we have hitherto adverted to was to provide
for continuity of his incumbency so that there would be no interruption or break, which
would happen if he were required to resign because of his filing his certificate of candidacy.
Bearing this intention of the Legislature in this regard in mind, can it be said that a Vice-
Mayor like the Petitioner herein, merely acting as Mayor because of the temporary disability
of the regular incumbent, comes under the provision and exception of section 27 of the
Election Code? The answer must necessarily be in the negative. A Vice Mayor acts as Mayor
162
only in a temporary, provisional capacity. This tenure is indefinite, uncertain and precarious.
He may act for a few days, for a week or a month or even longer. But surely there, ordinarily,
is no assurance or expectation that he could continue acting as Mayor, long, indefinitely,
through the elections and up to the end of the term of the office because the temporary
disability of the regular, incumbent Mayor may end any time and he may resume his duties.
VICE-MAYOR ACTING AS MAYOR, OUTSIDE
LEGAL CONTEMPLATION
The case of a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor could not have been within the contemplation and
the intent of the Legislature because as we have already stated, that lawmaking body or at
least the majority thereof intended to give the benefits and the privilege of section 27 to those
officials holding their offices by their own right and by a valid title either by election or by
appointment, permanently continuously and up to the end of the term of the office, not to an
official neither elected nor appointed to that office but merely acting provisionally in said
office because of the temporary disability of the regular incumbent. In drafting and enacting
section 27, how could the Legislature have possibly had in mind a Vice-Mayor acting as
Mayor, and include him in its scope, and accord him the benefits of retaining the office of
Mayor and utilizing its authority and influence in his election campaign, when his tenure in
the office of Mayor is so uncertain, indefinite and precarious that there may be no opportunity
or occasion for him to enjoy said benefits, and how could Congress have contemplated his
continuing in the office in which he is acting, when the very idea of continuity is necessarily
in conflict and incompatible with the uncertainty, precariousness and temporary character of
his tenure in the office of Mayor?
“ACTUALLY HOLDING OFFICE” EQUIVALENT
TO “INCUMBENT”
All these doubts about the meaning and application of the phrase “actually holding office”
could perhaps have been avoided had the intention of this Legislature been phrased
differently. It could perhaps have more happily used the term “incumbent” to refer to those
provincial and municipal officials who were holding office either by election or by
appointment, and so had a legal title and right thereto. As a matter of fact, this term
“incumbent” was actually used by Congressman Laurel in explaining the idea of the
committee that drafted this amendment to section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666, of which
committee he was the Chairman. The deliberations of the lower House as quoted by the very
counsel for Petitioner reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Mr. ROY.  What must be the reason, then, Mr. Chairman of the Committee for deleting the
words ‘has been lastly elected’?
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
“Mr. LAUREL.  The idea is to cover the present incumbents of the local offices.” (II
Congressional Record 1143.)
In this connection, a happier phraseology of another portion of section 27 could have been
used for purposes of precision. For instance, the first part of said section reads
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running
for an office”, and yet as we have already said, the Legislature intended said section to refer
to officials who were appointed by President Roxas to fill vacancies in provincial, municipal
and city elective offices. In other words, those officials were not really elected or elective
officials but they were officials occupying or holding local elective offices by appointment.
All this goes to show that we should not and cannot always be bound by the phraseology or
literal meaning of a law or statute but at times may interpret, nay, even disregard loose or
inaccurate wording in order to arrive at the real meaning and spirit of a statute intended and
breathed into it by the law-making body.
MEANING OF PHRASE “RESIGNED FROM HIS OFFICE”
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 180 in providing that a local elective official running for an
office other than the one he is actually holding, is considered resigned from his office, must
necessarily refer to an office which said official can resign, or from which he could be
considered resigned, even against his will. For instance, an incumbent Mayor running for the
office of Provincial Governor must be considered as having resigned from his office of
Mayor. He must resign voluntarily or be compelled to resign. It has to be an office which is
subject to resignation by the one occupying it. Can we say this of a Vice-Mayor acting as
Mayor? Can he or could he resign from the office of Mayor or could he be made to resign
therefrom No. As long as he holds the office of Vice-Mayor to which he has a right and legal
title, he, cannot resign or be made to resign from the office of Mayor because the law itself
requires that as Vice- Mayor he must act as Mayor during the temporary disability of the
regular or incumbent Mayor. If he cannot voluntarily resign the office of Mayor in which he
is acting temporarily, or could not be made to resign therefrom, then the provision of section
27 of the Code about resignation, to him, would be useless, futile and a dead letter. In
interpreting a law, we should always avoid a construction that would have this result, for it
would violate the fundamental rule that every legislative act should be interpreted in order to
give force and effect to every provision thereof because the Legislature is not presumed to
have done a useless act.
“A statute is a solemn enactment of the state acting through its legislature and it must be
assumed that this process achieve result. It cannot be presumed that the legislature would do a
futile thing.” (Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, p. 237.)
EXAMPLE
163
To emphasize and illustrate this inapplicability of section 27 to a Vice-Mayor acting as
Mayor, let us consider an example. A Vice-Mayor while acting as Mayor files his certificate
of candidacy for the office of Vice-Mayor. In other words, he wants to run for re-election.
The Provincial Governor, especially if belonging to a different political party wants to keep
him out of the office of Mayor, especially during the electoral campaign, and instead have his
party man, the councilor who obtained the highest number of votes in the last elections, act as
Mayor (section 2195, Revised Administrative Code). So, he hastens to the Municipal building
and enters the Mayor’s office where the Vice-Mayor has installed himself. Using the same
argument of herein Petitioner, he tells the Vice-Mayor that inasmuch as while acting as
Mayor, he was “actually holding” said office of Mayor, and because while thus holding it, he
filed his certificate of candidacy for Vice-Mayor which is a different office, he must be
considered resigned from the office of Mayor; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand he even asks
him to leave the Mayor’s room and office. The Vice-Mayor, a law abiding citizen acquiesces
and obeys, he reluctantly, leaves and abandons the office of the Mayor and repairs to his own
room as Vice-Mayor. But he has a happy inspiration and remembers the law (section 2195,
Revised Administrative Code); chan roblesvirtualawlibraryhe rushes back to the office of the
Mayor and tells the Governor and the authorities that he is still the Vice-Mayor because when
he filed his certificate of candidacy for Vice-Mayor, he was also actually holding said office,
and so did not lose it; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat as such Vice-Mayor, he can act and
must act as Mayor during the temporary disability of the incumbent, because he cannot resign
and no one can make him resign from the office of Mayor; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand he
defies the Governor to oust him from the office and room of the Mayor. The Governor is
helpless for the Vice-Mayor is right, that is, if we apply section 27 of the Election Code to
him. This possible, undesirable and anomalous situation is another reason why section 27
may not be applied to the case of a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor.
In the above given example, the Governor might contend that when the Vice-Mayor filed his
certificate of candidacy for Mayor, he was actually holding only the office of Mayor and not
that of Vice-Mayor and so he lost his office of Vice-Mayor. But that contention of the
Governor is untenable. Even counsel for herein Petitioner in his memorandum admits that a
Vice-Mayor while acting as Mayor, also actually holds his office of Vice-Mayor. And it has
to be that way. A Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor does not cease to be Vice-Mayor. In fact, that
is his real, principal and basic office or function. Acting as Mayor is only an incident, an
accessory. Let him cease holding the office of Vice-Mayor even for an instant, and he
automatically also ceases acting as Mayor. Furthermore, a Vice-Mayor has administrative
duties to perform. He is an ex-officio member of the Municipal Council and he is in charge of
the barrio or district where the town offices are located (section 2204, Revised Administrative
Code). While acting as Mayor he may not say that he ceases to hold the office of Vice-
Mayor and so cannot look after the needs of the residents of his district and present them to
the town council.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
ANOTHER EXAMPLE
The regular incumbent Mayor files his certificate of candidacy for the same office of Mayor.
Then he goes on leave of absence or falls sick and the Vice-Mayor acts in his place, and
while thus acting he also files his certificate of candidacy for the same office of Mayor. Then
the Vice-Mayor also goes on leave or falls sick or is suspended, and because the regular
Mayor is still unable to return to office, under section 2195 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the councilor who at the last general elections received the highest number of votes,
acts as Mayor and while thus acting he also files his certificate of candidacy for the office of
Mayor. The Vice-Mayor also campaigns for the same post of Mayor claiming like the
herein Petitioner that he did not lose his office of Vice-Mayor because he filed his certificate
of candidacy while acting as Mayor and thus was actually holding the office of Mayor. Using
the same argument, the councilor who had previously acted as Mayor also campaigns for his
election to the same post of Mayor while keeping his position as councilor. Thus we would
have this singular situation of three municipal officials occupying three separate and distinct
offices, running for the same office of Mayor, yet keeping their different respective offices,
and strangely enough two of those offices (Vice- Mayor and Councilor) are different from the
office of Mayor they are running for. Could that situation have been contemplated by the
Legislature in enacting section 27 of the Revised Election Code? We do not think so, and yet
that would happen if the contention of the Petitioner about the meaning of “actually holding
office” is to prevail.
CONGRESS CONTEMPLATED ONLY ONE OFFICE
ACTUALLY HELD
Another argument against the contention that a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor actually holds
the office of Mayor, occurs to us. For purposes of ready reference we again quote section 27
in its entirety:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“SEC. 27.  Candidate holdings office. — Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official
running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered
resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.”
It will readily be noticed from the quoted section, especially the words underlined by us that
the Legislature contemplated only one office, not two or more. To us, this is significant as
well as important. As we have previously stated, there is no question that a Vice-Mayor
acting as Mayor still holds the office of Vice-Mayor. Petitioner himself admits this in his
written argument and even contends that there is nothing wrong or illegal in an official
holding two offices at the same time provided there is no incompatibility between them. If the
Legislature believed that a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor actually holds the office of Mayor
and that he would thus be actually holding two offices, then it would have provided in section
27 for offices in the plural instead of employing the words office, his office, and the one
164
which it used in the singular. Besides this clear expression of legislative intent for only one
office being actually held and to be resigned from, to say that the Vice-Mayor when acting as
Mayor is actually holding two offices would create confusion and uncertainty because we
would not know which office he would be considered resigned from.
TWO OFFICIALS “ACTUALLY HOLDING” THE SAME
ELECTIVE OFFICE
We have already said that a Mayor under temporary disability continues to be Mayor
(Gamalinda vs. Yap * No. L-6121, May 30, 1953) and actually holds the office despite his
temporary disability to discharge the duties of the office; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryhe
receives full salary corresponding to his office, which payment may not be legal if he were
not actually holding the office, while the Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor does not receive said
salary but is paid only a sum equivalent to it (section 2187, Revised Administrative Code).
Now, if a Mayor under temporary disability actually holds the office of Mayor and the Vice-
Mayor acting as Mayor, according to his claim is also actually holding the office of Mayor,
then we would have the anomalous and embarrassing situation of two officials actually
holding the very same local elective office. Considered from this view point, and to avoid the
anomaly, it is to us clear that the Vice-Mayor should not be regarded as holding the office of
Mayor but merely acting for the regular incumbent, a duty or right as an incident to his office
of Vice-Mayor and not as an independent right or absolute title to the office by reason of
election or appointment.
ACTING MAYOR AND ACTING AS MAYOR, DISTINGUISHED
Petitioner claims that he is the acting Mayor. Respondents insist that Petitioner is merely
acting as Mayor. It is pertinent and profitable, at least in the present case, to make a
distinction between an Acting Mayor and a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor. When a vacancy
occurs in the office of Mayor, the Provincial Governor under section 21(a) or the President
under section 21(b), (d) and (e) of the Election Code appoints or designates an Acting Mayor.
In that case the person designated or appointed becomes the Mayor and actually holds the
office for the unexpired term of the office (section 21 [f]) because when he was appointed
there was no regular incumbent to the office. However, when a Vice-Mayor acts as Mayor,
there is no vacancy in the post of Mayor. There is a regular incumbent Mayor only that the
latter is under temporary disability. So, strictly and correctly speaking, the Vice-Mayor may
not be considered Acting Mayor. He is only acting as Mayor temporarily, provisionally and
during the temporary disability of the regular incumbent. He is not the incumbent. In baseball
parlance, Petitioner is only a “pinch hitter”, — pinch hitting for, say, the pitcher in an
emergency. As a mere pinch hitter his name does not grace the regular line up, he is not the
pitcher, does not hold the position of pitcher, neither does he receive all the benefits and
privileges of the regular pitcher.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
Ordinarily, this apparently fine and subtle distinction would seem unimportant and
unnecessary. When a Vice-Mayor acts as Mayor we usually call him Mayor or Acting Mayor
and deal with him as though he were the regular incumbent; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut
there are times and occasions like the present when it is necessary to make these distinction
and use correct and precise language in order to determine whether or not under section 27 of
the Election Code a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor like the Petitioner herein comes within the
phrase “actually holding office” used in that section.
EXCEPTION TO BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY
Section 26 of the Revised Election Code provides that every person holding an appointive
office shall ipso facto cease in his office on the date he files his certificate of candidacy. Then
we have section 27 of the same Code as well as section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 666
which it amended, both providing that local elective officials running for office shall be
considered resigned from their posts, except when they run for the same office they are
occupying or holding. It is evident that the general rule is that all Government officials
running for office must resign. The authority or privilege to keep one’s office when running
for the same office is the exception. It is a settled rule of statutory construction that an
exception or a proviso must be strictly construed specially when considered in an attempt to
ascertain the legislative intent.
“Exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly, but reasonably construed;  chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythey extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exception. Where a
general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former nor
add to the latter by implication, and it is a general rule that an express exception excludes all
others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of this rule, to inquire
whether, in the particular case, it accords with reason and justice cralaw .” (Francisco,
Statutory Construction, p. 304, citing 69 C.J., section 643, pp. 1092-1093; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryItalics supplied.)
“As in all other cases, a proviso should be interpreted consistently with the legislative intent.
Where the proviso itself must be considered. In an attempt to determine the intent of the
Legislature, it should be strictly construed. This is true because the legislative purpose set
forth in the general enactment expresses the legislative policy and only those subjects
expressly exempted by the proviso should be freed from the operation of the statute.
(Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., Vol. 2, pp. 471-472.)
Applying this rule, inasmuch as Petitioner herein claimed the right to retain his office under
the exception above referred to, said claim must have to be judged strictly, — whether or not
his mere acting in the office of Mayor may be legally interpreted as actually holding the same
so as to come within the exception. As we have already observed, literally and generally
165
speaking, since he is discharging the duties and exercising the powers of the office of Mayor
he might be regarded as actually holding the office; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut strictly
speaking and considering the purpose and intention of the Legislature behind section 27 of
the Revised Election Code, he may not and cannot legitimately be considered as actually
holding the office of Mayor.
RETENTION OF OFFICE
We have, heretofore discussed the case as regards the resignation of an office holder from his
office by reason of his running for an office different from it; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
our conclusion is that it must be an office that he can or may resign or be considered resigned
from; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that the office of Mayor is not such an office from the
stand point of a Vice-Mayor. Let us now consider the case from the point of view of retaining
his office because he is running for the same office, namely — retention of his office. As we
have already said, the Legislature intended to allow an office holder and incumbent to retain
his office provided that he runs for the same. In other words, he is supposed to retain the
office before and throughout the elections and up to the expiration of the term of the office,
without interruption. Can a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor be allowed or expected to retain the
office of Mayor ? The incumbent Mayor running for the same office can and has a right to
keep and retain said office up to the end of his term. But a Vice-Mayor merely acting as
Mayor and running for said office of Mayor, may not and cannot be expected to keep the
office up to the end of the term, even assuming that by acting as Mayor he is actually holding
the office of Mayor, for the simple reason that his holding of the same is temporary,
provisional and precarious and may end any time when the incumbent Mayor returns to duty.
Naturally, his temporary holding of the office of Mayor cannot be the retention or right to
keep the office intended by the Legislature in section 27 of Republic Act No. 180. So that,
neither from the point of view of resignation from the office of Mayor nor the standpoint of
retention of said office, may a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor, like herein Petitioner, come
within the provisions and meaning of section 27 of the Election Code, particularly the
exception in it.
SUPPOSED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST VICE-MAYOR
ACTING AS MAYOR
During the hearing and oral argument of this case, the suggestion was made, which
suggestion was also used as an argument during the deliberations among the members of this
Tribunal, that to include in section 27 particularly the phrase “actually holding office” one
who has been appointed as acting official such as Acting Mayor and at the same time exclude
a Vice-Mayor who acts as Mayor, would be discriminating against an official (Vice-Mayor)
who by statutory provision and sanction is required to act as Mayor, and give more
importance to one merely appointed to said office. We fail to see any discrimination for the
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
reason that an appointee to the office of Mayor fills a vacancy and serves until the end of the
term of the office, whereas a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor fills no vacancy because there is
none and he serves only temporarily until the disability of the incumbent, such as suspension,
absence, illness, etc. is removed. Now, if a vacancy is created in the office of Mayor by
removal, resignation, death or cessation of the incumbent, then the Vice-Mayor automatically
fills the vacancy, becomes Mayor (section 2195, Revised Administrative Code), and serves
until the end of the term (section 21[f], Revised Election Code). That is the time when he may
invoke section 27 because he would then be actually holding the office of Mayor.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we believe and hold that a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor does not “actually
hold the office” of Mayor within the meaning of section 27 of Republic Act No. 180; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat a Vice-Mayor who files his certificate of candidacy for the office
of Mayor, even while acting as Mayor, is considered resigned from the office of Vice-Mayor
for the reason that is the only office that he “actually holds” within the contemplation of
section 27 of the Revised Election Code and the office he is running for (Mayor) is naturally
other than the one he is actually holding (Vice-Mayor); chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that
having ceased to be a Vice- Mayor, he automatically lost all right to act as Mayor.
A word of explanation. This decision should have been promulgated long before now. In
truth, this Tribunal was anxious and determined to decide this case before the last November
elections, at least before the newly elected local officials assumed office. However, after
long, careful deliberations the court was deadlocked, the vote standing five to five. The
rehearing ordered by us as decreed by law failed to break the deadlock. It was only when the
new addition to the membership of the Tribunal, Mr. Justice Endencia studied the case,
weighed the arguments and considered the authorities on either side, that the tie vote could be
broken. He voted for and signed the present opinion which now becomes the majority
opinion.
The question involved in the present case may in a way be regarded as moot. Just the same,
we doomed it advisable to proceed with its final determination, even elaborate on the
discussion of its different aspects, by reason of its importance and for the information and
guidance of local elective officials, and perchance so that the Legislature, apprised of the
judicial interpretation and meaning given to section 27 of the Revised Election Code, may be
in a better position to decide whether to continue and leave it as it stands on the statute books,
or amend or change it before the next general elections.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for prohibition is denied, with costs. The writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued is hereby dissolved.
Padilla, Jugo, Labrador and Endencia, JJ., concur.
166
 
Separate Opinions
REYES, A., J., concurring:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The chief function of statutory construction is to ascertain the intention of the lawmaker and,
that intention has been ascertained, to give effect thereto. By reference to legislative record
Mr. Justice Montemayor has, I think, arrived at the true legislative intent and has therefore
fashioned his opinion 50 as to give effect to that intent. I readily subscribe to that opinion as
the correct judicial solution to the present controversy.
REYES, J. B. L., J., dissenting:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I fully concur with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Concepcion, but would only add that
I fail to see how the majority can hold that the vice-mayor, acting as mayor, cannot be
considered resigned from the mayoralty, because “it has to be an office which is subject to
resignation by the one occupying it.” That conclusion would only be true if the law required
the candidate to resign voluntarily from his office. But the law does not require him to
resign; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryit considers him resigned, treats him as if he had
resigned; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that is altogether a different thing. In order that an
official can be considered resigned all that is needed is that the office be one that he could
forfeit or loss. And the mayoralty is certainly an office that can be lost or forfeited
by Petitioner, even if he could not resign from it. The trouble, I suppose, is that the structure
of our language is such that (as semanticists have pointed out) it enables us not only to use
words about realities but also to use words about words.
And it is precisely because the law here involved decrees a forfeiture that restrictive
interpretation becomes imperative and doubts should be resolved against the Petitioner’s
forfeiting his office.
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This case hinges on the interpretation of section 27 of Republic Act No. 180 (Revised
Election Code), reading:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one
which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” (Italics supplied.)
The main issue is whether Petitioner Nicanor G. Salaysay is “actually holding” the office of
municipal mayor of San Juan del Monte, Province of Rizal.
ORDINARY AND LEGAL MEANING OF THE PHRASE
“ACTUALLY HOLDING”
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
“Actual” implies
“Real, in opposition to constructive or speculative, something ‘existing in act.’ State vs.
Wells, 31 Conn. 213; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryreal as opposed to nominal; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryAstor vs. Merritt, 111 U. S. 202, 4 Sup. Ct. 413, 28 L. Ed. 401.’
(Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed., p. 130.) (Italics supplied.)
“That which exists in fact, a reality.” (Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2nd ed., p.
27.) (Italics supplied.)
According to Ballantine Law Dictionary (1948 ed., p. 28):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“That which is actual is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely
possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive. See Steen vs. Modern
Woodmen of America, 296, 111, 104, 17 A. L. R. 406, 412, 129 N. E. Rep. 546.” (Italics
supplied.)
Hence, “actually” means “in act or fact; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryin reality; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarytruly as, he was actually there.” (Funk & Wagnalls, New Standard
Dictionary, 1952 ed., p. 31.) In other words, actually “is opposed to seemingly, pretendedly,
or feignedly as actually engaged in farming means really, truly, in fact. (In re Strawbridge &
Mays, 39 Ala. 367)” (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., p. 130.)
Upon the other hand, to “hold” is “to possess; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryto occupy; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryto be in possession and administration of; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryas
to hold office.” (Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 897.) Consequently, to “actually hold” is to
possess in fact or in reality, that is to say, physically or materially.
A public office, however, “is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by
which for a given period either fixed by law or induring at the pleasure of the creating power,
an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.” (Mechem, Public Officers, section 1.)
Being intangible, it is incapable of physical or material occupation. As a consequence, the
actually holding of an office is determined by its physical, external or tangible manifestations,
namely, the exercise of the powers and performance of the duties appurtenant thereto. For this
reason, it has been held that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Actually holds office — within statute regulating tax commission’s salaries, means
discharge of duties after due appointment and qualification. (Acts 1923, p. 14, section 1;  chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryp 184, section 85.)” (Words and Phrases, Vol. 2, p. 266) (Italics
supplied.)
“‘Actually holds office’ means the discharge of the duties thereof after due appointment and
qualification, as required by law, subject to removal at the will of the appointing power.
167
Touart vs. State ex rel. Callaghan, 173 Ala. 453, 56 So. 211; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryWilliams, Judge vs. Schwarz, 197 Ala. 40, 72 So. 330, Ann. Cas.
1918D, 869; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryNolen’s case, 118 Ala. 154, 24 So. 251.” (Brussel vs.
Brandon, 136 So. 577.) (Italics supplied.)
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that, being the vice-mayor of San Juan del Monte,
Rizal, Petitioner Salaysay is, and has been, discharging the duties of mayor of said
municipality, since the suspension of its mayor, Engracio E. Santos. Consequently, the former
is “actually holding” the office of the mayor.
PETITIONER DISCHARGES ALL OF THE DUTIES AND
HAS ALL THE POWERS OF THE MAYOR
Although maintaining that Petitioner merely performs said duties, without the powers vested
in said office, the Solicitor General has been unable to name a single power of the mayor
which may not be legally exercised by the vice-mayor, during the former’s suspension.
That Petitioner possesses all the powers attached to the office of the mayor is conceded in the
very opinion of the majority. Indeed, in the case of Eraña vs. Vergel de Dios (47 Off. Gaz.,
2303, 2307), it was held that appointments “or other official acts made by the Undersecretary
of Health when acting as Department Head, have the same efficacy and legal effect as the
acts of the regular incumbent,” who was then absent. Inasmuch as Petitioner is clothed with
all the duties and powers of the municipal mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal, — and this by
operation of law (section 2196, Revised Administrative Code) — we cannot escape the
conclusion that he is “actually holding” said office.
PETITIONER IS THE “ACTING MAYOR”
In fact, while performing said duties and exercising said powers, Petitioner “acts as mayor”,
or is the “acting mayor.” This is admitted (1) in the majority opinion, which states
that Petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of the mayor while “acting
as mayor” (pp. 1, 2, 8 and 16); chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2) in the very letter of the
Provincial Governor of Rizal (Annex C), to Petitioner herein, advising him of the
appointment of Respondent Sto. Domingo as Acting Municipal Vice-Mayor, which letter is
addressed to said Petitioner as “Acting Municipal Mayor.” This is in conformity with our
view, in Eraña vs. Vergel de Dios (supra), to the effect that the Undersecretary of Health who,
during the absence of the Secretary of Health, performs the duties of the latter — pursuant to
section 79 of the Revised Administrative Code — is the “Acting Secretary” of Health, and
that his acts, as such, have “the same efficacy or legal effect” as those of the Secretary of
Health.
Now, then, “acting”, according to Ballentine Law Dictionary (p. 19) is “substituting, taking
the place of another officer temporarily, as an acting Judge.” Since an acting mayor,
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
therefore, temporarily takes the place of the regularly elected mayor, who, prior thereto, was
actually holding said office, it follows that the same is actually in the possession of, and,
hence, “actually holding” the former, upon the aforementioned substitution.
Said majority opinion states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Petitioner claims that he is the acting mayor. Respondents insist that Petitioner is merely
acting as Mayor. It is pertinent and profitable, at least in the present case, to make a
distinction between an Acting Mayor and a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor. When a vacancy
occurs in the office of Mayor, the Provincial Governor under section 21 (a) or the President
under section 21 (b), (d) and (e) of the Election Code appoints or designates an Acting
Mayor. In that case the person designated or appointed becomes the Mayor and actually holds
the office for the unexpired term of the office (section 21[f]) because when he was appointed
there was no regular incumbent to the office. However, when a Vice-Mayor acts as Mayor,
there is no vacancy in the post of Mayor. There is a regular incumbent Mayor only that the
latter is under temporary disability. So, strictly and correctly speaking, the Vice-Mayor may
not be considered Acting Mayor. He is only acting as Mayor temporarily, provisionally and
during the temporary disability of the regular incumbent. He is not the incumbent. In baseball
parlance, Petitioner is only a pinch hitter,’ pinch hitting for, say, the pitcher in an emergency.
As a mere pinch hitter his name does not grace the regular line up, he is not the pitcher, does
not hold the position of pitcher, neither does he receive all the benefits and privileges of the
regular pitcher” (pp. 17-18).
To begin with, when a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of municipal mayor, under
section 21 (b) of Republic Act No. 180, no appointment or designation is made by the
President, for the vice- mayor becomes the mayor. Upon the other hand, section 21(d) and (e)
of said Act provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“When a local officer-elect dies before assumption of office, or fails to qualify for any reason,
the President may in his discretion either call a special election or fill the office by
appointment.
“In case a special election has been called and held and shall have resulted in a failure to
elect, the President shall fill the office by appointment.”
The appointments made by the President under either paragraph may be temporary or
permanent in nature. If permanent, the appointee is the mayor, not “acting mayor.” If
temporary, the appointee is an “acting mayor” who, said opinion impliedly admits, holds
actually the office of mayor.
Secondly, there is no legal distinction between the phrases “acting mayor” and “acting as
mayor.” The distinction in these expressions is imposed merely by the rules of grammar.
When availed of as a gerund of the verb “to act,” for the purpose of indicating the capacity in
168
which an act has been performed, the word “acting” must be followed by the preposition
“as,” which is improper when said word is used as a noun, to describe the status of an officer.
Thus, the Undersecretary of Health, “acting as” Secretary of Health, during the absence of the
latter, is “acting Secretary of Health.” (Eraña vs. Vergel de Dios, supra.) Similarly, the vice-
mayor “acting as mayor” during the suspension of the mayor, is the “acting mayor,” and, this
is confirmed by the aforementioned letter of the Provincial Governor of Rizal (Annex C) and
by the established practice — referred to in the aforesaid majority opinion — of addressing
the vice-mayor discharging the duties of the Mayor, either as “Mayor” or as “acting mayor.”
Thirdly, the word “acting,” when preceding the title of an office, simply connotes, in legal
parlance, the temporary nature with which said office is held (Austria vs. Amante, 45 Off.
Gaz., 2829). What is more, it indicates that the “acting” officer is physically in possession of
the office, or actually holding it.
Fourthly, although a “pinch hitter” may not be the “regular pitcher,” when he pitches or bats,
is he not the “actual” pitcher or batter? When he “strikes out” a batter or connects a “hit”, or
commits an “error”, is the “strike out”, “hit”, or “error” not counted actually, as a real one?
Fifthly, the vice-mayor acting as mayor, during the suspension of the mayor, is in a better
position than a pinch-hitter, who, it is said, does not “receive all the benefits and privileges of
the regular pitcher.” Said acting mayor has all the powers and duties of the suspended mayor,
who, in turn, cannot discharge the functions of his office or even receive the emoluments
attached thereto, until exonerated or reinstated.
PETITIONER HAS ASSUMED THE OFFICE OF MAYOR
When a vice-mayor discharges the duties of a suspended mayor, the former “assumes” the
office of the latter. This was acknowledged, expressly, in Laxamana vs. Baltazar (48 Off.
Gaz., 3869), and by implication in said case of Eraña vs. Vergel de Dios (supra). Thus, in the
aforementioned communication of the Provincial Governor of Rizal, Petitioner was informed
that Respondent Sto. Domingo, who has been appointed Acting Vice-Mayor, was to “assume
the office of mayor during the suspension of Mayor Engracio E. Santos”. Considering that to
assume an office is to take possession thereof, it is obvious to us that a vice-mayor
performing the functions of the mayor who has been suspended, actually holds the office of
the latter.
PETITIONER’S POSSESSION OF THE OFFICE OF MAYOR
HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
Again, said Provincial Governor and the Executive Secretary have directed and
advised Petitioner “to turn over the office of mayor” to Respondent Sto. Domingo, thus
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
implicitly, but, clearly, conceding that Petitioner herein is the actual holder of said office.
Otherwise, how could he turn it over, even if he wanted to, to said Respondent?
This is so patent that the majority opinion accepts the fact “that one acting as mayor not only
discharges the duties of the office, but, also exercises the powers of said office  cralaw so that
in one sense and literally, he may be legitimately considered as actually holding the office of
the mayor”, and that “when a vice-mayor acts as mayor we usually call him mayor or acting
mayor and deal with him as though he were the regular incumbent” (p. 18). These views, we
believe, must, however, be qualified. Petitioner is the “actual” holder of the mayor’s office,
not “in one sense and literally,” but in every sense, namely, literally and legally, in ordinary
parlance, as well as from the viewpoint of the law on Public Officers. Similarly,
although Petitioner is not the regular incumbent of the office of mayor, he is its actual and
legal incumbent, for he holds office — and, accordingly, he is its actual incumbent —
pursuant to law, which legalizes his status.
“ACTUAL HOLDING” AND “CONSTRUCTIVE HOLDING
DISTINGUISHED
The issues would, perhaps, be clearer if we considered at closer range, the nature of a public
office, the essence of which is the right, authority and duty, forming part of the sovereign
functions of the government, delegated by operation of law. Insofar as public officers are
concerned, two other elements are material, namely, (1) title to the office, and (2) authority to
exercise its powers and discharge its duties. The former is usually acquired either by
appointment or by popular election, although, in some instances, it may be secured by
legislative enactment. Thus, by statutory provision, a vice-mayor becomes ipso facto the
mayor upon the death, removal, resignation or permanent disqualification of the regularly
elected mayor (section 21[b], Republic Act No. 180). The latter, in general, exists when the
possessor of the former assumes office. At times, however, the regular incumbent cannot
exercise the functions of his office, as when he:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) is ousted by
another, who enters upon the discharge of said functions; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryor (2)
absent or becomes temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryor (3) is suspended from office by competent authority.
If, in the first case, the person who effected the ouster, and assumed the office in question,
has color of title, which is defective, and the people, unaware of the defect, submit to, or
invoke, his action, supposing him to be the officer he claims to be, he is legally considered a
de facto officer, the one ousted being regarded a de jure officer. It should be noted that the
status of a de facto officer requires the concurrence of the following conditions, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) there must be a de jure office; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary(b) there must be actual possession of the office; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand (c) this must be coupled with color of title. — In such event, the de
169
facto officer is “actually holding” the office. The person vested with a valid title thereto, or
the de jure officer, is not in material possession of the office. Hence he is not “actually
holding” the same. Yet, he is deemed to hold the office, in the sense only that there is no
vacancy which may be filled by appointment or election, as the case may be. As a
consequence, the office is held by two individuals, in different
capacities:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the de facto officer actually holds the office, whereas
the de jure officer retains possession thereof by legal fiction. This distinction between the
actual and the constructive possession of a public office is vitally important in the case at bar.
If the office involved in the second and third cases is that of a municipal mayor, the law
(section 2195, Revised administrative Code; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryLaxamana vs.
Baltazar, supra) requires the vice-mayor to discharge the duties of the mayor. In compliance
with such requirement, the vice- mayor assumes the office of mayor, wields its powers,
performs its duties, and, as a consequence, actually holds said office. The regular incumbent
does not exercise said power or perform said duties, because he cannot do so, owing, in the
second case, to his absence or disability, and, in the third case, to the order of suspension,
which temporarily divests him of said powers and duties. The suspended officer is legally
deprived of the authority to exercise those powers and perform said duties. Should he do so,
in violation of the order of suspension, his acts would be null and void, for, in the eyes of the
law, the mayor is, not he, but the vice-mayor acting as mayor. In short, said order oust the
mayor, for the time being, from physical possession of the office, thus resulting in its
“temporary vacancy” (Laxamana vs. Baltazar, supra), which is actually filled by the vice-
mayor acting as mayor, in compliance with section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The suspended mayor merely hold the legal title to the office, and, in this sense, only he is in
constructive possession thereof. His condition is comparable to the holder of the naked title to
a property, the usufruct of which is vested in another, who is in the material possession and
enjoyment of said property. The latter is physically occupied by the usufructuary, in the same
manner as Petitioner is “actually holding” the office of mayor, unlike the suspended mayor
who, though actually holding the title to the office, does not hold the office itself, except
constructively, or by legal fiction.
AS ACTING MAYOR, PETITIONER RECEIVES THE COMPENSATION FOR THE
OFFICE OF MAYOR
Pursuant to section 2187 of the Revised Administrative Code, “the mayor shall receive full
salary when absent from the municipality” on official business “or  cralaw when he is absent
from his office because of illness contracted through no fault of his own, provided the
absence in the latter case does not exceed thirty days during the year  cralaw; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand if during such authorized or justified absence the vice-
mayor  cralaw temporarily discharge the local duties of the mayor,” said vice-mayor “may
receive compensation in an amount to be fixed by the council  cralaw which shall not be in
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
excess of the salary of the mayor for the same period.” However, section 2192 provides that
“a municipal officer suspended from duty pending an investigation of charges against him
shall receive no pay during such suspension; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut upon subsequent
exoneration or reinstatement, the Department Head may order the payment of the whole or
part of the salary accruing during such suspension.” The vice-mayor, acting as mayor during
the suspension of the mayor, “shall receive compensation equivalent to the salary of the
mayor.” (Section 2187, Revised Administrative Code.)
In line with a practice established as early as 1916 — when the first Administrative Code was
adopted — and followed, then, by the Department of the Interior, now, by the Division of
Local Governments in the Office of the President, as well as by the Department of Finance
and the Office of the Auditor General (before, the Insular Auditor), said compensation of the
vice-mayor, acting as mayor, in lieu of the suspended mayor, is paid from the appropriation
for salary of the mayor. Should the suspended mayor be eventually exonerated or reinstated
with pay, as provided in section 2192, the municipal council approves a new appropriation
therefor, the original appropriation for salary of the mayor having been applied to the
payment of the emoluments of the acting mayor.
The distinction between the case of a mayor who is absent on official business or is sick,
without his fault, for not more than 1 month a year, and the mayor who is suspended, as
regards the right to compensation — for both the mayor and the vice-mayor acting in his
place — and the appropriation from which payment shall be made, constitutes another
tangible and significant evidence that, when the mayor is suspended, the vice-mayor, who
discharges the duties of the mayor, is regarded by law as the actual holder of the office of
mayor. This conclusion becomes even more imperative when we consider that, by explicit
legal provision, said vice-mayor may no longer receive his per diems as vice-mayor, for
attendance of the sessions of the council (section 2187, Revised Administrative Code.) Thus,
during his incumbency as “acting mayor”, by which name he comes to be known, he is more
a mayor than a vice-mayor.
In the case of Rodriguez vs. Tan (48 Off. Gaz., 3330), the Petitioner in an election protest, for
the office of Senator, who won said protest, was not allowed to recover the salary collected
by the defeated protestee during the period of his incumbency, despite the fact that the latter
had actually held office merely as a de facto officer. Surely, Petitioner herein, who had, not
only the right, but, also, the duty, to act as mayor, even if temporarily, has a better status than
a de facto officer and, like the latter, at least, must be considered legally as the actual holder
of the office of mayor.
THE SUSPENDED MAYOR DOES NOT “ACTUALLY” HOLD THE OFFICE OF
MAYOR
170
As already adverted to, when a mayor is suspended his office becomes temporarily vacant
(Laxamana vs. Baltazar, supra; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarysection 2195, Revised
Administrative Code; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarySection 21[a], Republic Act No. 180). This
fact is absolutely inconsistent with the theory that he actually holds the office of mayor,
during the period of suspension.
Moreover, said mayor may be “reinstated” in office (section 2192, Revised Administrative
Code). This means necessarily that, during said suspension, the mayor does not actually hold
his office, for reinstatement is restoration to a possession formerly enjoyed, and thereafter
lost. Such loss of actual possession is total. The suspended mayor retains nothing but the
naked title - he is completely stripped of the beneficial enjoyment of the powers appurtenant
to the office. The forfeiture, though temporary, of the official attributes — save as to the
naked title — is such that the suspension ipso facto deprives the mayor even of the right to
compensation. (Section 2192, Revised Administrative Code). What is more, the emoluments
attached to his office become due, by operation of law (section 2187, do. do.), to the vice-
mayor acting as mayor.
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT
It is urged that the phrase “actually holding”, in section 27 of Republic Act No 180, was
meant to refer only to “permanent” incumbents and does not apply to those holding office in a
temporary character. We cannot accept this view, for the following reasons, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1.  The law is plain, simple and clear. The resignation therein provided is inapplicable to any
elective local official who runs for an office he actually holds. It does not qualify the nature
of said possession, so long as, it is “actual”. It is irrelevant, therefore, whether the office is
held temporarily or permanently.
2.  One of the purposes of Congress, it is claimed, in providing that the filing of the certificate
of candidacy shall not operate as a resignation, when a local elective officer runs for an office
he is actually holding, is that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“By continuing in office the office holder allowed and expected to use the prerogatives
authority and influence of his office in his campaign for his election or re-election to the
office he was holding.
It is obvious, however, that — as the one vested by law with the authority to exercise the
powers and discharge the duties of the mayor — Petitioner is the person who could carry out
said alleged intent of the law-maker. Upon the other hand, the suspended mayor could not be
so, even if he wanted to, for his suspension prevents him from availing himself, during the
election campaign, of the authority, influence and prerogatives of the office of mayor.
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
3.  Admittedly, if the acting mayor had been appointed by the President, the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor would not operate as a resignation from said
office. Said presidential appointee could have received, however, either a regular or
permanent appointment, or a designation or temporary appointment. We are unable to find
any valid and sufficient reason — and none has been offered in the majority opinion — why a
discrimination should be made in favor of the person so given, by the Executive, a temporary
appointment and against one, like Petitioner herein, chosen by the law itself, from which the
Chief Magistrate of the land derives his power to make said appointment.
4.  The last paragraph of section 2 of Commonwealth Act No 666, the former election law,
reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one
for which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered resigned from his office from the
moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.”
This provision was amended by section 27 of Republic Act No. 180, which eliminated the
clause “other than the one for which he has been last elected”, and substituted, in lieu thereof,
the words “other than the one which he is actually holding”. Explaining the purpose of the
amendment, in reply to criticisms made by members of the Senate who belonged to the then
minority party, Senator Tirona, Chairman of the Committee sponsoring the measure on the
floor of the Senate and, in effect, majority spokesman in relation thereto, had the following to
say:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Precisamente, por el hecho de que una gran mayoria de los gobernadores provinciales,
miembros de la Junta Provincial, alcaldes, vice alcaldes y concejales municipales, son de
nombramiento, queda justificada la disposicion del articulo 27, porque si se aplicara a esos
funcionarios la prohibicion de que no pueden ser candidatos a los cargos que ocupan a menos
que dimitan, se produciria un grave desbarajuste que podria perjudicar la administracion de
los asuntos provinciales y municipales. Por que? Porque el cambio de todos esos funcionarios
provinciales no se podria hacer facilmente, Daria lugar a muchos conflictos de grupos o
facciones; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarya una infinidad de cuestiones.” Congressional record of
the 1st Congress of the Republic, Vol. II, p. 108). (Italics supplied.)
It is apparent, from the foregoing, that the amendment merely sought to minimize the number
of vacancies resulting from the filing of certificate of candidacy by persons holding local
elective offices. The reason was both administrative and political. Administrative, because
too many vacancies, it was feared, would gravely disrupt the administration of local
governments. Political, because every vacancy would create the difficult problem of filing the
same precisely on the eve of elections. Indeed, each vacancy is more likely to lead to political
discontent than to political expediency, considering that, for every appointment to fill a
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vacancy, there would generally be several disappointed and disillusioned candidates therefor,
who might, as a consequence work against the administration.
5.  The journals of Congress contain ample evidence of the fact that, when section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 666 was amended by section 27 of Republic Act No. 180, the
members of both Houses knew that there existed a sizeable number of local officials holding
elective positions by virtue of presidential appointments, some of which were temporary in
nature. Yet, Congress approved the amendment with the understanding that it would apply
equally to the permanent and the temporary appointees of the executive branch. Obviously,
therefore, the phrase “actually holding”, in said section 27, does not refer solely to
“permanent” officers.
6.  Although the aforementioned amendment was bitterly criticized by the minority members
of Congress, by reason of its favorable effects upon said presidential appointees and upon the
political party then in power, nothing was said in the course of the deliberations of the
lawmaking body, to indicate, even if remotely, the intent to exclude, from the benefits of said
amendment, those who may be actually holding local elective offices by operation of law.
Said journals are absolutely silent on this point.
7.  It is argued for the Respondents that section 27 contemplates an office from which its
incumbent could resign, and that it could not apply, therefore, to the office of mayor,
which Petitioner claims to hold actually, for, as vice-mayor acting as mayor during the
suspension of the mayor, said Petitioner cannot resign from the office of mayor. Let us
examine carefully said section 27, which, for convenience, we reproduce once more.
“An elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one
which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.”
It will be noted that the word “office” is twice used therein; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryfirstly, in the expression “running for an office, other than the one
which he is actually holding;” and, secondly in the clause “shall be considered resigned from
his office.” Obviously, the latter refers to an office from which it is possible to resign. Does
the former allude to an analogous situation? We do not think so, for the “office” first
mentioned is the one for which the candidate is running. Moreover, it specifically refers to an
office “other than the one which he is actually holding.” Even if the office actually held by
the candidate were one he could give up by resignation, he could not possibly do so as to the
“other” office, for which he seeks the popular mandate, because he does not hold that office
as yet.
Must the office he is “actually holding” be one from which he could resign, if he so desired?
One can resign from an office to which he had been duly elected or appointed. If such were
the office contemplated in section 27, the same would have used only the word “holding,”
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3

without the qualification “actually,” it being clear — particularly to the members of
Congress, most of whom are lawyers — that an office may be held materially by one who has
not been elected or appointed thereto, such as the case of a vice-mayor acting as mayor, in
compliance with Article 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code, in view of the suspension
of the mayor.
The situation visualized in section 27 would be more apparent had Petitioner filed his
certificate of candidacy for the office of provincial governor. This being other than the offices
he is actually holding — those of vice-mayor and mayor — he would be deemed, by
operation of said section 27, resigned from “his” office, namely that of vice-mayor. Having
thus relinquished this office, we would, necessarily, have no more authority to act as mayor.
In other words, the office he is “actually holding” need not be necessarily his office, and this
is not unusual under the Law on Public Office. Otherwise, the word “actually” would be not
only unnecessary, but inconsistent with the alleged purpose of the law.
8.  It is next said that, in section 27 of Republic Act No. 180, “Congress contemplated only
one office actually held.” This view is based upon the clause “an office other than the one
which is based upon the clause “an office other than the one which he is actually holding,” in
said provision, with emphasis on the phrase “the one”. It will be recalled that said clause is
only an amendment of the last paragraph of section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 666,
reading:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one
for which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered resigned from his office from the
moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” (Italics supplied.)
In other words, the word “one” was not inserted by Republic Act No. 180. It was part of said
section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 666, which referred to an elective local official “running
for an office other than the one for which he has been lastly elected.” Since, normally, a
person is elected to only one office, it was only natural for said section 2 of Commonwealth
Act No. 666 to use the word “one”. But, let us suppose that, during the effectivity of
Commonwealth Act No. 666, a law was passed permitting an individual to run for, and hold,
two offices, say, for instance, the positions of municipal mayor and member of the provincial
board, and that while holding both elective offices, the incumbent should, in a subsequent
election, file his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor only, would he not be entitled
to continue in office, as mayor and as member of the provincial board, despite the fact that he
is not running for the last office? Obviously, the word “one” was used in Commonwealth Act
No. 666 (section 2) merely because it assumed that the person concerned had been elected
only to one office. This did not mean, however, that one legally elected to, and holding, two
elective offices, was sought to be excluded from the benefits of said enactment.
Similarly, section 27 of Republic Act No. 180 assumes — in line with the ordinary course of
events — that one discharging the duties of a given office does not hold any other office,
without implying necessarily, that, otherwise, he would be denied the benefits of said
provision. As pointed out in the preceding pages, the purpose of said provision was to permit
an incumbent to remain in office if he did not seek to change the status quo, such as the case
of Petitioner herein.
EXAMPLES ANALYZED
Several examples have been given to illustrate the alleged validity of Respondents’ pretense.
Let us analyze said examples:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The first is, substantially, as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary A vice-mayor, while acting
as mayor, filed his certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor. Thereupon, the provincial
governor, alleging that said candidate is actually holding the office of mayor and that he is
not running for such office, asked him to vacate it. After giving up, reluctantly, the office of
mayor, the vice-mayor, asserts that he actually holds the office of vice-mayor; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat, since he is running for re-election therefor, he is not deemed
resigned as vice-mayor; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that, as vice- mayor, he is entitled to
act as mayor. Then, the assertion is made that “this possible, undesirable and anomalous
situation is another reason why section 27 may not be applied to the case of a vice-mayor,
acting as mayor.” But, why should this situation be undesirable or anomalous ? Is it not
merely a natural and logical consequence of the fact that section 2195 of the Revised
Administrative Code requires the vice-mayor, in the event therein contemplated, to hold, at
the same time, two offices, namely, the office of vice-mayor and that of mayor? Is the holder
of such offices not bound to discharge the duties of both? Is he, as a consequence, not
entitled, logically and by law, to all the privileges and prerogatives attached to said offices? Is
the right to run for election to an office actually held, without resigning therefrom, not one of
such privileges or prerogatives? Is it not only fair, just and reasonable that the increased
responsibilities of the vice-mayor, acting as mayor, be coupled with a corresponding increase
in his powers, exemptions and immunities?
The second example is couched in the following language:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The regular incumbent Mayor files his certificate of candidacy for the same office of Mayor.
Then he goes on leave of absence or falls sick and the Vice-Mayor acts in his place, and
while thus acting he also files his certificate of candidacy for the same office of Mayor. Then
the Vice-Mayor also goes on leave or falls sick or is suspended, and because the regular
Mayor is still unable to return to office, under section 2195 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the councilor who at the last general elections received the highest number of votes,
acts as Mayor and while thus acting he also files his certificate of candidacy for the office of
Mayor. The Vice-Mayor also campaigns for the same post of Mayor claiming like the

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 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3
herein Petitioner that he did not lose his office of Vice-Mayor because he filed his certificate
of candidacy while acting as Mayor and thus was actually holding the office of Mayor. Using
the same argument the councilor who had previously acted as Mayor also campaigns for his
election to the same post of Mayor while keeping his position as councilor. Thus we would
have this singular situation of three municipal officials occupying three separate and distinct
offices, running for the same office of Mayor, yet keeping their different respective offices,
and strangely enough two of those offices (Vice- Mayor and Councilor) are different from the
office of Mayor they are running for. Could that situation have been contemplated by the
Legislature in enacting section 27 of the Revised Election Code? We do not think so, and yet
that would happen if the contention of the Petitioner about the meaning of “actually holding
office” is to prevail.” (pp. 14-15.)
The example is most ingenious, but, to our mind, not in point. In order that the mayor, the
vice-mayor and the municipal councilor alluded to could run for mayor, without resigning
from their respective offices, pursuant to section 27 of Republic Act No. 180, it would be
necessary that each be “actually holding” the office of mayor. Inasmuch, however, as “actual
holding” is equivalent to material or physical possession, and “possession as a fact cannot be
recognized at the same time in two different personalities, except in cases of co-possession”
(Article 538, Code of Civil Procedure) it follows that it would be necessary to determine
which one, among the officers involved in the example, is “actually holding” the office of
mayor, and that the person declared to be in physical possession of such office should be the
only one not deemed to have resigned in consequence of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for mayor. Although not indispensable for the determination of the case at bar, it
would seem that said privilege belongs solely to the officer in fact discharging the duties of
the office of mayor, at the time of the expiration of the statutory period for the filing of
certificate of candidacy. Indeed, until then, the other officers could withdraw the certificates
of candidacy already filed by them, and file other certificates of candidacy for the respective
offices actually held by them at such time, thus avoiding the implicit resignation which
otherwise may result from the application of said section 27.
EXCEPTIONS MUST BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY
The rule of statutory construction to the effect that exceptions must be strictly construed, has
been invoked in favor of Respondents herein. It is claimed that, as a matter of general rule, a
local elective official who runs for an elective office is, pursuant to section 27 of Republic
Act No. 180, deemed to have resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat such rule does not apply, when he
runs for an office other than the one he is actually holding; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
that, this is the exception which should be construed strictly.
The argument is logical, but its major premise is predicated upon the assumption that said
section 27 establishes the general rule. We believe, otherwise. To our mind, the general rule
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is that an elective official shall remain in office for the full term for which he was elected,
although he may have filed a certificate of candidacy. The exception is that he shall be
deemed to have resigned from his office, from the time of the filing of said certificate of
candidacy, if (1) he is a provincial, municipal or city official, and (2) the office for which he
runs is other than the one he is actually holding. If he runs for the office he is actually
holding, the general rule applies — he shall not be deemed to have resigned from his office.
In other words, the provision implying a resignation from the filing of the certificate of
candidacy in the exception, which should be construed strictly.
This interpretation is demanded, not merely by the fact that Republic Act No. 180 is a part of
our law on Public Officers, and should be construed jointly with the latter, but, also, by the
fundamental principles underlying the democratic system of government established in the
Philippines. Indeed, petition was chosen by the direct vote of the people, in whom
sovereignty resides. Upon the other hand, Republic Act No. 180 was passed not by the people
themselves, but by their representatives. The people elected Petitioner herein for a term
ending on December 31, 1955. In the absence of clear, positive and unequivocal provision of
law to the contrary, the member of Congress, as agents of the people, must be presumed to
have intended to respect said direct mandate of their principal.
In the case of a vice-mayor acting as mayor, who runs for mayor, the intention of Congress to
oust him from both offices is far from being patent or incontestible. In fact, the plain and
ordinary meaning of the language used in section 27 of Republic Act No. 180, in relation to
sections 2187, 2192 and 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code, connotes that Petitioner is
actually holding the office of mayor, for which he ran at the last general elections, and that,
accordingly, he shall not be deemed to have resigned upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for said office. Indeed, it is admitted, in the majority opinion, that the letter of said
section 27 favors Petitioner herein - said opinion states that, literally, Petitioner is actually
holding the office of mayor. At any rate, the factors analyzed in the foregoing pages, the very
efforts exerted in said opinion to bolster up the stand therein taken and the conflicting views
among the members of this Court, who are almost equally divided on the issue under
consideration, eloquently demonstrate that the law upon which Respondents rely is, at least,
not free from ambiguities or doubts. Hence, the same should resolved in favor of Petitioner’s
continuance in office, for the full term for which he was elected.
THE ACTUAL HOLDER OF AN OFFICE HAS PRESUMPTIVELY A BETTER RIGHT
THERETO
Although a public office is not property, in the strict sense of the word, the right to a given
person to hold a particular office partakes of the nature of a property, in that he cannot be
deprived of such right without due process of law, (42 Am. 886-888; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryState vs. Wadhams, 67 N.W. 64, 64 Minn. 318, 324; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryChristy vs. Kingfisher, 76 P. 135, 1375, 13 Okl. 585; chan
 STATCON CASES: WEEK 3

roblesvirtualawlibraryHamilton vs. Brennan. 119 N.Y.S. 2d 83 [20 Gen. Digest p. 364]); chan is the persons “actually holding” said office, does not amount merely to a construction of the
roblesvirtualawlibrary11 O.S. 1951 Su 572 — Laison vs. Bunch, 225 P. 2d. 486 (21 Gen. meaning of “actually, holding”, but to giving thereto its opposite meaning, its exact antithesis.
Digest p. 348) — 1953; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryEmerson vs. Hughes, 90 A. 2d. 910, 117 With due respect to the learned view of our distinguished colleagues to the contrary, we do
Vt. 270 [19 Gen. Digest p. 287 — 1953; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryHanchey vs. State ex rel not feel that judicial power may go that far, consistently with the principle of separation of
Roberts 52 So 2d. 429 [15 Gen. Digest p. 369, 1952]). powers.
A person actually holding an office, pursuant to law, is, therefore, in a condition analogous to Wherefore, we are of the opinion that the petition should be granted and that the writ of
one in physical possession of a property, under claim of ownership. Pursuant to Article 541 of preliminary injunction, issued upon the institution of this case, should be made permanent.
the Civil Code of the Philippines, such “possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the
 
legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or
prove it.” He who wishes to recover the property from its possessor as owner must prove, Endnotes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
therefore, a better title thereto. Similarly, the actual holder of an office, under color of title,    *  93 Phil., 310.
like Petitioner herein, must be respected and protected, in the enjoyment of said possession,
unless the party seeking to eject him therefrom shall establish satisfactorily that said title is
defective and that his (claimant’s) is the legitimate and stronger title. In other words, doubts
must be resolved in favor of the actual holder of the office.
At any rate, to our mind, the law is patently in favor of Petitioner herein. When he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal, he was actually
discharging the duties and exercising the powers of said office. The public and the very
Government, as well as the law (section 2187, Revised Administrative Code), regarded him
as the acting mayor of said municipality. He received the emoluments appurtenant to the
office. He had all of the responsibilities attached thereto, including the civil and criminal
liabilities which would accrue to the regularly elected mayor, in case of nonfeasance,
misfeasance or malfeasance in office.
Upon the other hand, having been suspended as mayor of San Juan del Monte, Engracio
Santos was stripped of his functions as such, he could not, and did not, discharge the same.
He was not entitled to collect the compensation corresponding to said office, which
compensation was paid to herein Petitioner. In other words, the latter was literally and legally
in actual physical possession of the office of mayor.
Moreover, the language of section 27 of Republic Act No. 180 is too plain, simple and clear
to admit of construction. It is well settled that “where the intention of the legislature is so
apparent from the face of the statute there can be no question as to the meaning, there is no
room for construction.” (People ex rel. Wood vs. Sands, 102 Cal. 12, 36 Pac. 404.)
Again, in ordinary, as well as in legal, parlance, to hold actually an office is to have physical
or legal possession thereof, to occupy the office in fact or really, as distinguished from, or
opposed, to its presumptive or constructive possession. To declare, therefore, that Engracio
Santos — who does not, and cannot, perform the functions of mayor of San Juan del Monte
— not Petitioner herein — who actually, really, materially and in fact discharges the same —

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