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On the Nature of a Critical Methodology

Stephen C. Yanchar, Edwin E. Gantt and Samuel L. Clay
Theory Psychology 2005 15: 27
DOI: 10.1177/0959354305049743

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On the Nature of a Critical
Methodology
Stephen C. Yanchar and Edwin E. Gantt
Brigham Young University
Samuel L. Clay
Brigham Young University–Idaho

Abstract. This article describes an expanded view of methodology—

termed a critical methodology—in the wake of criticisms of the received
view of scientific method. A critical methodology would involve a de-
emphasis on method per se, the need for methodological innovation and the
continual critical examination of the assumptions that undergird methods
and other research resources. It is argued that under a critical methodology,
the processes of theory construction and research would be essentially
processes of argument construction, where arguments can be supported
with many types of evidence. Although there is no final certainty through
method under this framework, progress can result from the tension between
various perspectives in context.
Key Words: argument construction, counterrules, Feyerabend, historical
perspective, methodological pluralism, qualitative methods, quantitative
methods

The received view of scientific method in psychology, borrowing heavily

from the natural sciences and emphasizing empirical, quantitative proce-
dures, has long been a topic of debate and criticism (e.g. Bakan, 1972;
Danziger, 1990; Gergen, 1985; Koch, 1999; Manicas & Secord, 1983;
Michell, 2003; Robinson, 2000). Among the most incisive criticisms, four
have received particular attention in the literature: first, psychological
researchers have been preoccupied with method, historically privileging a
positivist-oriented approach without seriously considering the unique nature
of the subject matter and problems to be investigated (e.g. Hoshmand &
Polkinghorne 1992; Koch, 1959; Manicas & Secord, 1983; Tolman, 1992);
second, the adopted method has been used in a rigid, orthodox fashion (e.g.
Bakan, 1972; Danziger, 1990; Rozin, 2001; Yanchar & Hill, 2003); third,
little genuine scientific advancement has resulted from the adopted method’s
rigid use (e.g. Martin, 1996; Richardson, 1998; Robinson, 2000; Wallach &

Theory & Psychology Copyright © 2005 Sage Publications. Vol. 15(1): 27–50
DOI: 10.1177/0959354305049743 www.sagepublications.com

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28 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 15(1)

Wallach, 1998; Yuille, 1986); and, fourth, the adopted method distorts the
nature and meaning of human existence (e.g. Fuller, 1990; Harré & Secord,
1972; Koch, 1999; Slife & Gantt, 1999). Robinson (2000) captured the
thrust of these critiques well when he argued that:
Progress in science is won by the application of an informed imagination to
a problem of genuine consequence; not by the habitual application of some
formulaic mode of inquiry to a set of quasi-problems chosen chiefly
because of their compatibility with the adopted method. (p. 41)
Two prominent responses to psychology’s problem of methodological
rigidity have been offered: one is to opt for some form of qualitative
research, the other is to adopt a methodological pluralism where the received
method and qualitative alternatives are jointly used to generate more
accurate and possibly complementary understandings of human phenomena
(e.g. Polkinghorne, 1983; Punch, 1998; Slife & Gantt, 1999). Recent
commentary has suggested that many psychologists see methodological
pluralism as a way to overcome rigid adherence to any one method and to
bring much-needed flexibility to psychologists’ research endeavors (Bevan,
1991; Hoshmand & Polkinghorne, 1992; Slife & Gantt, 1999; Wertz, 1999;
Yanchar 1997). Clearly, a methodological position that prizes multiple
methods and a question-driven (rather than method-driven) approach begins
to take the discipline in the direction suggested by critics of psychology’s
historical research practices.
However, methodological reform in psychology may require more than a
presumably open-minded acceptance of both quantitative and qualitative
forms of investigation. In what follows, we will review and thematize
several strands of thought within contemporary philosophy (Feyerabend,
1962, 1993; Gadamer, 1989; Hesse, 1980; Holton, 1973; Toulmin, 2003;
Wartofsky, 1980) and theoretical psychology (e.g. Danziger, 1990; Koch,
1999; Martin, 1996; Polkinghorne, 1983; Slife & Williams, 1995) which
together suggest that any method enables certain types of understanding
while foreclosing on others, and that this constraint must be recognized and
responsibly dealt with in order to achieve progress, particularly when
progress is viewed from a broader historical and philosophical perspective.
Following from this general position, we will argue for what we term a
critical methodology, which involves continued reflection on and revision of
old methods, along with innovation and development of new ones, based on
the exigencies of theoretical exploration and critical disciplinary self-
examination.
It should be understood at the outset, however, that by employing the term
critical methodology, we are not attempting to identify our work with the
Critical Theory school of philosophical thought, as espoused by such
thinkers as Horkheimer (1972) and Habermas (1987). Likewise, the con-
cerns motivating our proposal for a critical methodological stance in

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YANCHAR ET AL.: CRITICAL METHODOLOGY 29

psychology should not be seen as identical to the concerns of Critical

Psychology advocates (e.g. de Boer, 1982; Fox & Prilleltensky, 1997; Sloan,
2000; Tolman & Maiers, 1991). Although we believe each of these traditions
has much to offer psychology in terms of critical reflection on its ideo-
logical, cultural and moral commitments, we intend the term ‘critical’ in the
more general sense of a rigorous, exacting and thorough-going methodo-
logical self-examination. This sort of radical reflection, according to Schrag
(1980), ‘deconstructs the layers of methodological and metaphysical con-
ceptualization that surround man’s inquiries about himself and his world so
as to reopen the text of everyday life and make visible its language, thought,
and praxis’ (p. 126). Thus, rather than offering a set of metatheoretical or
metamethodological prescriptions, we propose an overarching attitude of
critical thinking in the discipline, an attitude aimed at clarifying hidden
philosophical assumptions as well as devising and exploring unorthodox and
creative approaches to fruitful social scientific inquiry.

The Limitations of Method

It is not entirely surprising that scientific psychology has focused so much of

its attention on matters of method. The period of intellectual discourse in
which psychology’s formal properties as an independent scientific discipline
were assembled was marked by an unmistakable preoccupation with episte-
mology and its methodological extensions. From key progenitors of modern
foundationalism, such as Descartes (1637/1993), to logical positivists such
as Carnap (1947), Hempel (1965) and Schlick (1979), there is clear evidence
that method-driven psychology was a product of its intellectual epoch. For
instance, Descartes held that truth was ascertained only after an inquirer had
adopted the correct procedure, which, when identified, would require no
further justification of its use. For Descartes, such a method involved a
detached, objective thinker who started with indubitable axioms (i.e. clear
and distinct ideas) and followed the rules identified in the second discourse
of his Discourse on Method (1637/1993).
Similar to Descartes, logical positivists viewed truth as the product of
proper methodological activity, which for them involved a combination
of logical and synthetic postulates that generated verifiable statements
devoid of any metaphysical or surplus content. From this position followed
the logical positivist article of faith that the meaning of a statement is its
method of verification (Bechtel, 1988; Quine, 1953). Surely not all philos-
ophers and scientists of this expansive period in Western thought treated the
details of method as a primary concern. But modern history shows a strong
bias toward methodological rigidity (e.g. Danziger, 1990; Polkinghorne,
1990), culminating in social scientific disciplines that raised method to the
level of obsession and caricature.

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30 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 15(1)

Developments in 20th-century philosophy of science, however, have cast

considerable doubt on the presumed ability of any method to secure neutral,
sense-data descriptions of physical reality or of human experience (e.g.
Hesse, 1980). The work of philosophers such as Popper (1959), Feyerabend
(1993) and Gadamer (1989) has helped to show the limitations of method in
various and compelling ways. For example, Popper (1959) persuasively
demonstrated the untenability of both induction and verification through
method, particularly the logical-positivist-inspired methods of the 20th
century. Feyerabend (1993) denied the notion that progress in science occurs
through the rigid application of a preset method, and argued for a so-called
‘anarchistic’ view that held as its fundamental axiom: ‘The only principle
that does not inhibit progress is: anything goes’ (p. 14). In making this case,
he argued, among other things, that the most significant scientific advance-
ments have occurred ‘only because some thinkers decided not to be bound
by certain “obvious” methodological rules, or because they unwittingly
broke them’ (p. 14). And Gadamer (1989; see also Kuhn, 1970) suggested
that all methods are inescapably based on truth claims or assumptions that
delimit their range of applicability and effectiveness and, perhaps more
provocatively, render them fundamentally perspectival in nature. This argu-
ment led to the view that a given method is theoretically developed to be
sensitive to certain classes of phenomena: for instance, a quantitative method
assumes the existence of quantifiable entities or processes, a traditionally
empirical method assumes the existence of observables, a rational method
assumes the existence of ideas, and so forth (e.g. Slife & Williams, 1995;
Yanchar, 1997). The output of a method, then, is best viewed as a refinement
of, or an exposition regarding, a presupposed set of claims about reality.
These and related criticisms suggest that methods of scientific investiga-
tion are always designed for certain purposes, and while often very useful in
that regard, all methods are limited by the often unarticulated and hidden
assumptions that give rise to them in the first place. That is, a given method,
when used in its intended way, will be necessarily exclusive; it will not be
sensitive to, or be able to render meaningful and useful accounts of, classes
of phenomena that fall outside of its philosophically circumscribed boundar-
ies (see also Danziger, 1988; Yanchar, 1997). As we will suggest, flexible
and unorthodox uses of method facilitate scientific progress (e.g. Feyera-
bend, 1993), but such uses of method require a reflexivity and theoretical
sensitivity that is not typically associated with scientific investigation in the
modern tradition.
Because methods are inherently limited, the application of a single
method to all questions and phenomena results in flawed and problematic
attempts at scientific understanding. For example, although traditional,
quantitative methods have been considered very successful in many of the
natural sciences, they seem to have fallen short in the investigation of human
phenomena. Indeed, critics within psychology have convincingly argued that

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YANCHAR ET AL.: CRITICAL METHODOLOGY 31

the received scientific method does not permit meaningful accounts of many
aspects of human life and experience (e.g. Fuller, 1990; Gantt & Williams,
2002; Giorgi, 1970; Harré & Secord, 1972; Koch, 1999; Morgan, 1983;
Polkinghorne, 1983; Slife & Williams, 1995; Yanchar & Hill, 2003; Yuille,
1986). The use of a method that must first quantify or operationalize all
variables or meaningful concepts, and that deals primarily in aggregates,
ultimately results in what Sigmund Koch (1999) called ‘ontology-distorting’
theories and conceptual frameworks (p. 308)—that is, theories which
obscure or obviate the rich meaning of human life ordinarily lived (see also
Green, 1992a; Leahey, 1980; Spackman & Williams, 2001). An ontology-
distorting psychology is not in a position to render meaningful and, in
Koch’s sense, accurate understandings of human action.

The Qualitative Turn

Qualitative methods have been appealing because they are not typically as
reliant on the assumptions of the natural science tradition (e.g. Ashworth,
Giorgi, & de Koning, 1986; Kopala & Suzuki, 1999; Kvale, 1996; Pollio,
Henley, & Thompson, 1997) and thus allow for an alternative way of
studying specifically human phenomena. As is now widely acknowledged,
qualitative modes of study permit researchers to obtain very detailed
accounts of human experience, while also taking advantage of natural
settings (see Berg, 1998; Bernard, 2000; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994 for more
detailed accounts of the contributions of qualitative methods to the social
sciences). Qualitative methods allow both the researcher and participant to
engage one another in the common language of everyday experience and
understanding, rather than in the often arbitrary, artificial and constraining
language of numbers. This is viewed by many researchers (e.g. Hoshmand &
Polkinghorne, 1992; Slife & Gantt, 1999) to be a particular strength of
qualitative inquiry: research participants are not required to translate their
experience into a (mathematical) language with which they may have very
little familiarity or affinity. Likewise, this strategy helps minimize the need
for both researcher and participant to operate at an artificial level of
discourse significantly removed from the experiential level of the phenom-
enon under study.
Despite the strengths of qualitative inquiry, however, it is clear that these
methods are not without certain inherent limitations of their own. By their
very nature, qualitative methods are intimately connected to human experi-
ence as lived in the concrete social world. However, as William James
(1890/1950) noted over a century ago, because human experience does not
‘appear to itself chopped up in bits’ (p. 239), and because the focal point of
experience changes in the process of reflective examination, people are
never capable of fully examining their experiences as they have them. When

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32 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 15(1)

a person is called upon to reflect on a task or experience, his or her focus is

immediately shifted from performing the task itself to analyzing the task
being performed. This change in attentional or reflective focus, of course,
can dramatically change the phenomenon under investigation. No longer is
the researcher addressing the actual phenomenon of interest, but rather
reflective, after the fact, reconstructions of the phenomenon as retro-
spectively understood by the research participant. Moreover, those reflective
reconstructions will be prompted and interpreted from within the perspective
of the researcher’s assumptive framework and particular research strategy.
For these reasons, qualitative methods, like quantitative methods, cannot be
relied upon uncritically.
Furthermore, it may well be the case that many experiences common to
daily life are fundamentally inaccessible to reflective, qualitative analysis.
For example, Williams (2000) has discussed the possibility that some
emotional and social experiences fundamentally ‘mis-present’ themselves:
that is, as experienced, they are not, in fact, what they seem to be. An
obvious example of such a phenomenon would be self-deception. Although
some qualitative researchers have studied this phenomenon (e.g. Daniels,
1983; Fischer, 1985), such work has been primarily aimed at enunciating
participants’ recollections of situations in which they came to realize they
were aiming to deceive themselves. A direct examination of the experience
and meaning of self-deception as lived in the moment has not been
undertaken, and, indeed, may not even be possible given the problematic
nature of the data involved (see Churchill, 2000). In a similar vein, Warner
(1986) has argued that certain manifestations of anger are fundamentally
delusional in nature, and, thus, first-person accounts of such experiences can
never be entirely trustworthy, and might even seriously mislead the re-
searcher relying solely on qualitative, descriptive methods of investigation.
Thus, even though aimed at illuminating the meaning and nature of
human experience as lived, qualitative methods, because they typically
require some manner of distanced reflection from experience for the genera-
tion of analyzable data, also force researchers to operate at a distance from
the phenomena to be studied. Although this distancing from lived experience
may be less substantial than that involved in a more traditional, quantitative
design, it still represents an obstacle to the capturing of lived human
experience. Of course, if James and other like-minded thinkers are correct, it
will likely never be possible to adequately ‘capture’ human experience as
lived, and, thus, researchers must be content with psychological accounts
that are always one or more steps removed from actual experience.
While qualitative methods of investigation are clearly not without limita-
tion, they have provided a welcome challenge to the received view; they
have offered a variety of philosophical and methodological alternatives from
which to choose, while casting light on the limitations of positivist-inspired
research. As Wertz (1999) chronicled in a recent review, this challenge

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YANCHAR ET AL.: CRITICAL METHODOLOGY 33

originally led to a qualitative–quantitative debate, with advocates of quali-

tative methods advancing a variety of research alternatives. These alter-
natives can be seen in the writings of Gibson (1979), Giorgi (1970), Maslow
(1968), van Kaam (1966) and others (e.g. Harré & Secord, 1972; Morgan,
1983; J.A. Smith, Harré, & Langenhove, 1995). Another set of authors have
referred to the tension between methodological traditions as ‘method wars’
(Slife & Gantt, 1999, p. 1462), suggesting that there is, at times, a struggle in
the discipline between advocates of these two methods.

Limitations of the Qualitative–Quantitative Debate

Although the qualitative–quantitative debate in psychology may be moving

beyond a clash of methodological orthodoxies, and although there seems to
be an increased interest in combining the two approaches (e.g. Bernard,
2000; Cresswell, 2003; Punch, 1998; Schneider, 1998), most of these
discussions seem to suggest, at least implicitly, that the methodological
options for psychological research are more or less exhausted by two
categories: qualitative and quantitative as traditionally understood. Assum-
ing that one’s research options are limited to either a qualitative perspective,
a quantitative perspective, or some hybrid combination of the two, merely
serves to reintroduce the potential for methodological rigidity that qual-
itative methods were supposed to rectify in the first place. That is, by fixing
the number of research avenues available at two (or three, if the mixed-
method approach is included), it becomes tempting to assume that there are
only two basic (possibly incompatible kinds) of questions to be asked. Such
a view amounts to a form of ‘vicious intellectualism’ (Ayer, 1978, p. xiii;
James, 1907/1978, p. 249), where it is assumed that there can be no more to
say or understand about a phenomenon than what can be specifically
ascertained by the method or methods conventionally deemed appropriate
for its investigation. Such an assumption inevitably narrows psychologists’
scholarly and exploratory possibilities and impedes scientific progress and
understanding. Not only is there the very real possibility that some or many
research questions may require innovative, yet-to-be established modes of
inquiry, there is also the possibility that new forms of inquiry will reveal
human phenomena in enlightening ways and foster new questions to be
investigated.
Indeed, as Feyerabend (1962, 1993) pointed out, the interplay between
past accomplishment and future progress is not always straightforward. It is
often the case that ‘counterrules’—modes of operation that ‘oppose familiar
rules of the scientific enterprise’ (1993, p. 20)—are required to bring new
light to a research question or to properly evaluate a theory. Feyerabend’s
historical examination of the use of counterrules suggested that progress in
science will often occur when its practitioners go beyond rigid or customary

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34 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 15(1)

methodological prescriptions in ways that seem reasonable and defensible

given the demands of the research question. This is true when using
qualitative or quantitative methods.
Thus, to the extent that qualitative–quantitative debates or concatenations
neglect the broader purposes of science, the need for counterrules and the
possibility of continual methodological reinterpretation and innovation, they
are likely to reinvoke a type of received view that stifles creativity and
progress. More specifically, if the focus of psychology is primarily on the
appropriate choice of rote method, rather than on stimulating critical thought
and developing a creative and philosophically informed imagination, then
the discipline will not only become intellectually stagnant, it will also cease
to be scientific in any meaningful or helpful sense—mainstream research
questions only will be permitted, chosen methods will be treated as
unchangeable idols, innovative methods will be marginalized or rejected,
and scientific understanding will not progress beyond the limited accounts of
the past. As Hammersley (1992) put it, ‘the retreat into paradigms [always]
effectively stultifies debate and hampers progress’ (p. 182).
It should be added that this argument applies also to methodological
pluralism. Although a pluralistic approach is viewed by its advocates as a
move beyond methodological rigidity, via the use of whatever method is
best-fitting or most reasonable in a given situation, such a pluralism may still
amount to a form of ‘methodolatry’ (Bakan, 1961, p. 229) if the set of
methods is assumed to be fixed, and is assumed to provide exhaustive
resources for psychological investigation (perhaps with some minor modi-
fications or additions). To the extent that a methodological pluralism is
viewed as monolithic, it only amounts to methodolatry in the plural.

A Critical Methodology

As many have observed, an adequate response to these methodological

concerns begins with an emphasis on the unique questions, subject matter
and purposes of researchers (e.g. Koch, 1959; Slife & Williams, 1995).
Innovative modes of inquiry for the human sciences have also been in rich
supply outside the mainstream of the discipline (e.g. Hoshmand, 1989;
Morgan, 1983; Polkinghorne, 1983; J.A. Smith et al., 1995), suggesting that
a move beyond the ‘quantitative imperative’ (Michell, 2003) is immanently
possible. However, as we have suggested above, no single method or set of
procedures determined in advance can hope to provide adequate resources
for all future research questions and successfully address all problems that
may arise in a program of study. For this reason, we suggest a general
perspective on human science research—which may be termed a critical
methodology—that has much in common with the idea that ad hoc viola-
tions, counterintuition, creativity, tacit understanding and historically un-

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YANCHAR ET AL.: CRITICAL METHODOLOGY 35

orthodox research practices are essential to scientific progress (see

Feyerabend, 1993; Holton, 1973; Polanyi, 1962; Wartofsky, 1980).
In clarifying the meaning of a critical methodology, it is important to note
that the term methodology, as we use it, does not refer merely to a single
method or even a flexible set of research techniques. Rather, our use of the
term denotes a contextual and evolving theory of inquiry within a research
program that includes assumptions about the target subject matter and its
rigorous investigation, as well as practical research strategies that follow
from those assumptions. In this sense, a critical methodology (qua theory of
inquiry) consists partly in a network of background assumptions and partly
in the adoption, development, alteration and application of research strate-
gies that offer the best promise of deepening or enriching the researchers’
understandings of the subject matter.
From this basic methodological position, it follows that the processes of
method selection and method use are inextricably theoretical: investigators
begin with a theoretical and historical sense of the subject matter and
questions worth studying, the appropriate strategies for investigating those
questions, and the most effective ways of handling problems that arise in the
course of research. Indeed, it is the background assumptions and theoretical
context of a research program that problematize some phenomenon or
‘variable’ in the first place and that imply a related set of research questions
and strategies (Mishler, 1979). Understood this way, a critical methodology
would require at least some amount of theoretical coherence within a
program of research (Yanchar, 1997), where the assumptions that inform the
research strategies, subject matter and questions would fit into a more or less
consistent account, even if that account included multiple levels of organiza-
tion or causation to be clarified through further investigation (e.g. Manicas &
Secord, 1983; Rychlak, 1993).
Because, under a critical methodology, methods are viewed as theories of
inquiry rather than as mechanical fact producers, researchers face unique and
challenging responsibilities. More specifically, within a critical method-
ology, it would be incumbent upon researchers to be reflectively critical of
their methods (qua theories) in three important senses. First, the use of a
critical methodology would involve a de-emphasis on method use per se in
favor of a focus on the creative processes of theory formation and problem
solving, which would be aided by various methodological procedures. In this
sense, methods become practice-oriented, or practical extensions of the
researchers’ theories and assumptions through their use as perspectival
research strategies. Method per se would not be treated as psychology’s
reason for existence, its basis for selecting research questions or its ultimate
standard of evaluation.
Second, researchers using a critical methodology would recognize the
need for research strategies—either adopted, modified or developed—that
conform to the subtleties of specific questions within a research program.

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36 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 15(1)

Given the contingent nature of research, method innovation and use could
only be viewed as an evolving, theoretically informed process occurring
synchronously with the critical examination and perhaps refinement of the
researchers’ basic assumptions, research questions and theorizing. A critical
methodology would thus rest on the notion that within any program of
research, contextually sensitive research strategies are required, existing
questions and strategies must be continually examined and often changed
with context and experience, and new questions and strategies must be
formulated based on the practical demands of research.
Third, researchers using a critical methodology would treat its underlying
philosophical framework (including ontological, axiological and epistemo-
logical assumptions) as open to critical examination and intrinsically
changeable. Researchers would recognize the assumptions by which the
methodology is informed, the limitations that are imposed by those assump-
tions, and the possibility that a different set of assumptions might better
inform a human science. No matter how confident researchers may be in
their conceptual framework, they must be open to the possibility that it is
flawed or problematic in ways that hinder the progress of science. Thus, a
critical methodology would overcome stagnation and rigidity by acknowl-
edging that its underlying assumptions are historically situated, temporary
and continually subject to critical examination and revision. This reflective
practice demands a continued examination of the relation between philo-
sophical assumptions (and the research strategies that emerge from them)
and actual research experience, where the two are part and parcel of the
broader context of scientific work.
In defending the notion of a critical methodology, it is important to
distinguish between our claim that methods are limited and do not mechani-
cally yield truth (contrary to the modernist pretension) and the more extreme
claim that in the absence of methodological certitude, there is no basis for
the evaluation of scientific theories and no ground upon which to make
reasonable arguments in favor of one form of practice—scientific or
otherwise—over another. Such a relativistic response (the more extreme
claim) does not necessarily follow from the demise of positivist-style
science and leads to an unwarranted form of skepticism whereby there can
be no defensible or reasonable basis for any kind of belief, evidence or
progress. As Bernstein (1983) has pointed out, when considering the
character of science and epistemology, there is a temptation to be drawn into
the ‘seductive Either/Or’ initiated by Descartes’ pursuit of certainty via
method, within which the only possible alternative to methodological
foundationalism seems to be ‘intellectual and moral chaos’ (p. 18). From
this faulty either/or perspective, scientists face only a ‘fruitless oscillation’
(Putnam, 1995, p. 75) between two equally problematic poles.
It appears that Feyerabend also recognized the potential problems of
relativism and skepticism in a post-positivist science as well as the facile

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YANCHAR ET AL.: CRITICAL METHODOLOGY 37

conclusion that the very idea of evidence or progress be dismissed. Although

he sought to dismantle the view that scientific practice can be guided by a set
of predetermined rational principles—and the opposite view that our princi-
ples of rationality may be determined strictly by practice—he did not
advocate a ‘naı̈ve anarchism’, where ‘all rules and standards are worthless
and should be given up’ (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 231). Rather, he suggested
that all methodological techniques and conventions are limited, and so must
be violated via alteration or rejection when necessitated by the subtleties and
exigencies of research projects. However, it can also be stated that the
historical assumptions of a method are not so much limitations—in the sense
that they obviate what would otherwise have been an objective tool for
mapping reality—but rather are what actually make the method a viable
research tool in the first place. That is, a method’s assumptions are what
render it appropriate for certain types of investigations or corroborations. In
this sense, a method’s assumptions fulfill their purpose by enabling certain
kinds of examinations that can be very helpful and insightful (see Bohman,
1991), even if those examinations do not provide final certainty or neutral
sense-data accounts. The greater foundationalist expectation of a purely
objective method that maps reality is not defensible on either historical or
logical grounds (e.g. Feyerabend, 1993; Hesse, 1980).
In a similar vein, Feyerabend (1993) argued that Kuhn’s much-discussed
incommensurability thesis (Kuhn, 1970; see also Bernstein, 1983; Davidson,
1984; Newton-Smith, 1981; Slife, 2000) is not a problem for practicing
scientists because their use of terms in an ‘open, ambiguous, and counter-
intuitive manner’ (p. 311)—rather than in the unrealistically precise and
reductive manner advocated by logical positivists—actually contributes to
progress. Feyerabend (1977) also argued that his notion of incommensur-
ability was not meant to suggest that different theories with different
terminologies are literally incomparable, which again would usher in a state
of epistemic relativism and skepticism. Rather, his use of the term ‘in-
commensurability’ meant that different theories may not be brought into the
‘usual logical relations of inclusion, exclusion, overlap’, which in turn
‘might make it impossible to establish deductive relations between rival
theories’ (pp. 365–366) and might preclude logical comparisons, crucial
experiments, and so forth.
According to Feyerabend’s notion of incommensurability, then, science is
comprised of many traditions and lacks a transcendent logic for evaluating
theories based on different assumptions and terminologies (see also Bern-
stein, 1983; Slife, 2000). Nonetheless, the fact that different perspectives can
be known intelligently, juxtaposed in various ways and discussed in co-
herent dialogue—particularly in historical perspective (e.g. Feyerabend,
1993; Holton, 1973; Kuhn, 1970; Lakatos, 1970)—implies some underlying
basis for examination and comparison, even if that basis is somewhat
inarticulate and not reducible to pure sensory experience or univocal

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38 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 15(1)

rationality (e.g. Davidson, 1984; see also discussions of hermeneutic realism

in Dreyfus, 1992; Martin & Sugarman, 1999; Richardson, 1998). As
Davidson (1984) suggested in his persuasive refutation of the extreme form
of incommensurability, scientists with different perspectives may be, in a
sense, words rather than worlds apart.
According to the critical methodology we describe, then, the move
beyond orthodox methodologies and acontextual standards of evaluation
does not invoke extreme skepticism and relativism, but rather is an essential
element of scientific progress. In this sense, methodological rules and
procedures, as they are tentatively constituted, provide a useful though
tentative starting point and backdrop for human science research. Moreover,
the need to challenge existing standards of theory testing and methodo-
logical practice is continuous, because there is no transhistorical standard for
evaluating, or necessary conclusion to, scientific investigation. Although
scientific work may lead to deeper insights, which in turn solve problems in
new and better ways, judgments such as ‘deeper’ and ‘better’ are themselves
tentative, contextual and value-laden, and thus also demand continued
critical reflection. For this reason, final scientific certainty through the use of
fixed methods and standards is not likely to be useful or forthcoming as a
goal, though a sort of progress that moves beyond extreme skepticism and
relativism is possible as the tension between many different perspectives
plays out and as creative researchers push the limits of accepted practice and
understanding.

Research as Argument Construction

Under a critical methodology, concepts such as research design, validity,

data, statistics and results would take on new meanings. Rather than
providing the raw material for data-based scientific models or objective
descriptions of reality, these concepts can be viewed as elements of
arguments, which, like other arguments, are assumption-based, value-laden,
historically contingent, fallible, modifiable and evolving. The work of
science, then, would concern the marshaling of evidence to make the
strongest case for or against a theoretical perspective, in whatever manner is
possible and defensible given the target subject matter, audience and
available resources. That is, the traditional scientific projects of theory
development, model building, theory testing and other attempts at descrip-
tion or explanation would be viewed as processes of argument construction.
This conception of science reflects the absence of detached objectivity,
certainty and smooth progression in the advancement of knowledge.
Supporting evidence for or against a scientific argument could derive from
rigorous forms of quantitative and qualitative inquiry, action research, new
or modified methods, methods and techniques from the humanities, histori-

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YANCHAR ET AL.: CRITICAL METHODOLOGY 39

cal research, technological innovation, the examination of assumptions and

other aspects of critical thinking, critical philosophical analysis, reductio ad
absurdum, rhetoric, critique from many theoretical perspectives, and so on.
Arguments worth pursuing could possibly be identified by traditional
standards of rationality such as empirical adequacy, internal consistency,
logical form and parsimony, but also by many non-traditional standards such
as the potential to create insight or controversy, to solve problems, to be
more defensible in terms of ethics and values, to create new perspectives, to
have the potential to lead to greater weight of evidence, to lead to more
effective applications, and so forth. Arguments that appear weak at the
outset might be very insightful and helpful in the long run, while those that
appear strong initially might prove less robust over time (e.g. Feyerabend,
1993; Hofmann, 1999). Underlying this position is the argument that there
are no fixed standards of rationality to regulate the flow of progress and no
smooth movement toward final certainty through method, but rather an
uneven, unpredictable and often paradoxical flow of ideas and the tension
among them that fosters continual innovation, insight and application.
It is not possible to clarify our position with specific rules and procedures
or an operating model because the development of contextual and evolving
theories of inquiry would need to occur within specific programs of research
and be sensitive to the unique questions and challenges that arise therein.
However, our position can be clarified by pointing to theorists outside
psychology who have provided some precedent for our argument (e.g.
Nelson, Megill, & McCloskey, 1987; Toulmin, 2003; Wartofsky, 1980) and
by offering several examples from psychology which demonstrate, prelimin-
arily, that at least a few theorists of different conceptual orientations have
advocated research practices similar to the critical methodology we de-
scribe.
First, Gergen (1985), arguing from a social constructionist view of
psychological inquiry, has suggested that:
Whether rendering the conduct of organisms intelligible or demystifying
existing forms of understanding, research methods can be used to produce
‘objectifications’ or illustrations useful in advancing the pragmatic conse-
quences of one’s work. In this sense it would seem that virtually any
methodology can be employed so long as it enables the analyst to develop
a more compelling case. Although some methods may hold the allure of
large samples, others can attract because of their purity, their sensitivity to
nuance, or their ability to probe in depth. (p. 273)

While Gergen’s position has been criticized for ushering in a type of

relativism (e.g. M.B. Smith, 1994), a hermeneutic appeal can be made to the
notion that progress is attainable, even if it does not terminate in final
certainty through method (see, e.g., Bernstein, 1983; Guignon, 1991; James,
1907/1978; Martin & Sugarman, 2000; Taylor, 1985).

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40 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 15(1)

Second, Cronbach (1988) and Messick (1995), working in the area of

psychological measurement and assessment, rejected traditional validation
research and the idea that validity is a static, thing-like concept captured
with positivist-style research. Rather, they contended that validity be thought
of as interpretive and contextual, properly following from a ‘validity
argument’ that would ‘link concepts, evidence, social and personal conse-
quences, and values’ (Cronbach, 1988, p. 4). In an attempt to move beyond
the positivist-oriented tradition of measurement, this understanding of the
concept of validity—one of the most important methodological concerns of
traditional science—suggests that it is not tests but their uses and inter-
pretations in context that can be valid, and that test uses and interpretations
are valid to the extent that an argument can be effectively made for their
viability in light of all relevant empirical, theoretical, practical, social and
value-related concerns (Messick, 1995).
Third, Martin (1996) has argued that psychological research can be
understood as the formulation, demonstration and critique of psychological
theories from a generally hermeneutic perspective. Although he did not
explicitly describe psychological theorizing and research as the construction
of arguments, his description of the use of methods and evidence fits with
the notion of a critical methodology that we have endorsed. He stated:
Through the iterative, interactive process of theory formulation, demonstra-
tion, and critique, methods are selected, employed, discarded, and/or
continued because of their perceived contribution to progressive theoretical
development. In addition to justifications and warrants such as clarity,
consistency, and coherence, others, such as heuristic fertility, explanatory
and practical utility, and ‘convincingness’ may assist in the adjudication of
theoretical advance. (p. 16)
To further clarify our position, consider a program of research that entails
many features that we have associated with a critical methodology. Although
most well-known research programs in psychology were (are) conducted
under the received view of science, one notable counter-example involves
Ahsen’s theorizing and research in the area of mental imagery. Over the past
several decades, Ahsen (e.g. 1959, 1965, 1977, 1986, 1990, 2003a) has
developed a phenomenologically oriented argument regarding imagery
which holds that the imaging person and the broader context form a ‘unitary
experiential state’ (1984a, p. 34) within the lifeworld, wherein imagery is a
contextual, dynamic, flexible and multifaceted function (see also Gibbs &
Berg, 2002; Hochman, 2002). This position contrasts sharply with the
cognitive view that mind and world constitute two distinct realms and that
mental life consists of representations inside a self-contained information-
processing system. Ahsen’s assumptions and theoretical perspective were
established early in his research program, which led not only to the use of
traditional experimental designs but also to the development of novel
research strategies consistent with his theoretical commitments.

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YANCHAR ET AL.: CRITICAL METHODOLOGY 41

For instance, by modifying the widely used Vividness of Visual Imagery

Questionnaire (VVIQ; Marks, 1973) and its procedure for administration,
Ahsen demonstrated that the vividness of one’s imagery experience fluc-
tuates according to the dynamical elements of the context such as the nature
of the images themselves and the emotions involved in the process of
visualizing them (e.g. Ahsen, 1986, 1990). This general finding, which
contradicts the prevailing cognitive notion that one’s imagery vividness is
largely stable across contexts (i.e. the ‘ability theory’; Ahsen, 1986, p. 2),
could not have emerged if the VVIQ was left unmodified and administered
in the conventional way. Within this line of theorizing and research, Ahsen
(1977) also developed unique methods for studying imagery processes such
as the ‘eidetic’, which he has viewed as essential to all human activity and
mental life. Although a thorough treatment of Ahsen’s methods for studying
eidetic imagery goes beyond the scope of this article, they can be briefly
described as creative modifications and uses of early split-brain research
(e.g. Penfield, 1952; Sumner & Watts, 1936) and clinical procedures
designed to evoke emotional and imagery responses to specified stimuli.
In addition to these theory-based innovations, Ahsen has supported his
argument with a variety of research strategies including traditional experi-
ments and quasi-experiments, various types of qualitative studies, unique
scaling techniques, literary analyses of one’s own life story, and analyses of
history, art, literature, religion, politics and contemporary society (e.g.
Ahsen, 1984b). Recently (e.g. Ahsen, 2003b), he has suggested that con-
tinued advances in theory and method are needed to deepen the field’s
understanding of the embodied, holistic imagery experience. He has particu-
larly emphasized the need for theorizing and research based on formal
causation and on the notion that an implicate order underlies and connects
the diversity of processes, objects and entities in the world (see also Bohm,
1980). This argument, which situates imagery experience and its scholarly
investigation within an implicate order, rather than within the corpuscular
universe of the Newtonian era, departs radically from much prior work in
cognitive science and provides potentially fertile ground for progress in the
field.
These examples are not meant to suggest a privileged set of rules or
methods, but rather to suggest a disposition toward research that avoids
objective excesses, on the one side, and relativistic scepticism, on the other.
Of these examples, Ahsen’s program of research particularly demonstrates
an actual methodology—qua theory of inquiry—that is innovative, multi-
faceted and evolving, yet also theoretically informed and coherent. In this
sense, his contribution concerns not the final truth about a narrowly defined
psychological variable but an argument about what he views as essential to
human experience, supported by many types of evidence and accompanied
by implications for education, therapy and medicine. The basic thrust of a
critical methodology may also exist in other research programs that look

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42 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 15(1)

nothing like Ahsen’s project; they will, however, share a rejection of

formulaic methods and emphasize the creative process of argument con-
struction, based on defensible purposes and assumptions.

Some Questions about a Critical Methodology

The notion of a critical methodology may seem unsatisfying to those who

seek acontextual foundations for knowledge and certainty and who believe
that without some fixed standard for progress and evaluation—even the
evaluation of arguments—there can be no legitimate science at all. However,
such either/or thinking fails to appreciate the historical context of innovation
and progress wherein there is no transcendent rationality to guide the
development and evaluation of ideas (e.g. Feyerabend, 1993; Holton, 1973).
Although standards of evaluation or reasonableness can surely be utilized—
particularly if context-based and located within a research community—such
standards must also be flexible, contextual, evolving and subjected to
continued critical examination.
As Feyerabend argued, the more crucial factor in scientific advance is the
creative tension between perspectives that stimulates the development of
alternative arguments and methods. For instance, the importance of as-
trology to the development of modern astronomy, or of alchemy to the
development of modern chemistry, is not diminished by the fact that
astrology and alchemy were ultimately abandoned as formal sciences.
Indeed, one cannot know in advance which lines of argumentation will fail,
which will stimulate the growth of more accepted arguments, and which will
be dominant for extended periods of time. From this perspective, major
scientific advances can only be fostered by investigators willing to invent,
propound, compete, contradict, critique and compel in ways not typically
accepted in an historical era. To take such a position, of course, is to
abandon a strictly rationalist view of scientific progress and history, but is
not to deny the actual contributions of science throughout history—indeed, it
suggests that progress may often be best known from an historical vantage
and that there is no convincing reason to establish firm standards of
rationality in advance (Feyerabend, 1993).
Other critics may argue that psychological researchers cannot afford to
spend time thinking about the philosophical and theoretical subtleties of
method. A standard and reliable method (or set of methods) that would allow
researchers to address a variety of research questions with minimal tinkering
is all that should be required of a scientific discipline. This concern seems
quite sensible in that researchers must ultimately engage in the process of
investigation without being stymied endlessly on theoretical debates regard-
ing the meaning and value of method. However, without some theoretical
development of a program of research, including a critical examination of

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YANCHAR ET AL.: CRITICAL METHODOLOGY 43

the historical and theoretical importance of the questions to be asked and the
research strategies utilized, there is little reason to have confidence that
researchers have adopted the most appropriate and defensible methods,
that the data collected are meaningful (or indeed, interpretable), and that
the program of research can move in useful directions. Thus a certain
amount of theoretical reflection, critical examination and innovation is
essential to a coherent science. In different ways, other authors have argued
that improving the theoretical and philosophical training of psychologists
would facilitate the move beyond methodolatry and theoretical inadequacy
(e.g. Green, 1992b; Slife & Williams, 1997).
Finally, some critics may argue that the critical methodology we defend is
actually a good description of most research activities in contemporary
psychology. As some may view it, the typical psychological research
program is methodologically innovative, contextual, theoretically coherent,
critically reflective, and so on. In this sense, our position provides little
insight beyond what the typical researcher learns in graduate school and
through subsequent research experience. Based on our examination of
research in psychology, however, we are disinclined to agree with this
criticism. As Green (1992a), Koch (1999), Robinson (2000) and many others
have argued (e.g. Manicas & Secord, 1983; Slife & Williams, 1995), there is
a striking similarity among the methods used in psychological research—
and, indeed, among the kinds of models and theories tested—as evinced in
the vast majority of research reports published in peer-reviewed journals.
Moreover, methodology and statistics texts uniformly describe research as
a straightforward process proceeding from hypothesis to theory, requiring
quantitatively oriented designs such as experiments, quasi-experiments and
correlational studies. Indeed, there is little, if any, suggestion in the
mainstream literature that methods are theoretically informed tools with a
limited range of applicability and effectiveness or that methodological
innovation should often be pursued in the context of specific research
questions. This mainstream approach to method likely follows from the
notion that a discipline is scientific only by virtue of its adherence to the
predominant method of the natural sciences, which will inevitably yield self-
correcting progress. As suggested above, a more persuasive account of
science suggests that a discipline makes scientific progress not because
of rigid adherence to one or another method, but because of ‘the application
of an informed imagination to a problem of genuine consequence’
(Robinson, 2000, p. 41).

Conclusion

We have argued that the received view of science in psychology can be

productively replaced with a more critical and imaginative approach that

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44 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 15(1)

views methods as theoretically informed and contingent tools in the hands of

innovative researchers. We do not suggest that all methods be discarded or
that science be viewed as a relativistic enterprise without clear purpose and
without hope of accomplishing some good. Indeed, in the absence of
universal standards and procedures for evaluating theories and apprehending
final scientific truth, it is our position that psychological science is most in a
position to make progress when theories, models and hypotheses are viewed
as fallible arguments that may stimulate the development of more persuasive
arguments, which in turn hold better promise in solving problems and
generating deeper insights.
However, the historical thrust of this position should be tempered with
critical reflection on the underlying basis of methods, theories and attempts
at progress. There are important metatheoretical or philosophical assump-
tions at play in science (whether or not a given practicing scientist is aware
of them) pertaining to ethics, metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, and so
forth, and the manner in which these assumptions are addressed within a
single program of research will substantially impact the manner in which
that program will unfold—that is, it will determine the kind of phenomena
and questions studied, the research strategies used, the results generated and
the interpretations offered. The viability of a critical methodology, in this
light, depends on the willingness of researchers not only to strive for
creativity and progress in the manner described above, but also to clarify the
underlying assumptions that will inform the research generated. Indeed, such
clarity can contribute to the supporting evidence of an argument (or theory),
provided that the clarified assumptions are shown to be persuasive, perhaps
by being testable in various ways, morally defensible, internally consistent,
able to create positive change or capture something essential to human
experience, and so forth. In stating this, we do not believe we are proposing
anything more radical than a return to the intellectual origins of genuine
scientific inquiry. That is, we are only calling for a deepened awareness of
and commitment to the critical foundations of scientific thinking itself, a
form of critical thinking that allows no approach to knowledge to become so
sacrosanct that it is impervious to thoughtful critique.

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Stephen C. Yanchar is Assistant Professor of Instructional Psychology

and Technology at Brigham Young University. He is primarily interested
in theoretical and philosophical issues in psychology and education,
especially those pertaining to methodology, critical thinking, and the study
of mental imagery and learning. Address: Instructional Psychology and
Technology, 150-H MCKB, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah,
84602, USA. [email: stephen_yanchar@byu.edu]

Edwin E. Gantt is Associate Professor of Psychology at Brigham Young

University. He has authored articles on Levinasian phenomenology and
psychology and edited and contributed to the book Psychology for the
Other: Levinas, Ethics and the Practice of Psychology (Duquesne Uni-
versity Press, 2002). Address: Department of Psychology, 1086 SWKT,
Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, 84602, USA. [email:
ed_gantt@byu.edu]

Samuel L. Clay is a faculty member in the psychology department at

Brigham Young University–Idaho. His research interests include theoret-
ical and philosophical issues in psychology and the psychology of skill.
Address: Department of Psychology, Clarke 208-F, Brigham Young
University–Idaho, Rexburg, Idaho, 83460, USA. [email: clays@byui.edu]

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