1) Sagrado Orden v. Nacoco, G.R. No.

L-3756, June 30, 1952 (List of sources

is exclusive.)
FACTS:
1. Petitioner's/Plaintiff's claims/s (no more than 3 sentence)
On January 4, 1943, a piece of real property (land with warehouse) owned by the said
plaintiff, located in Pandacan, Manila, was acquired by Taiwan Tekkosho, aJapanese
corporation, for the sum of P140,000. On April 4, 1946, after liberation, theAlien
Property Custodian of the United States of America took possession, control, and
custody of the property, which was later occupied and used by the defendant after being
vacated by the previous occupant, Copra Export Management Corporation,under a
custodian agreement. Plaintiff seeks to reclaim possession of the property, aswell as to
recover the rentals for its occupancy and use in the amount of P3000 per month, from
August 1946, when the defendant occupied the land to the date it was vacated, claiming
that the land belongs to the plaintiff because the acquisition of the land by Taiwan
Tekkosho was carried out under threats, duress, and intimidation,
rendering the sale null and void.
2. Respondent's/Defendant's claim/s (no more than 3 sentences)
The defendant/The National Coconut Corporation made its argument concerning the
occupation of property on August 1946 to December 14, 1948. (1) Want of"ownership
rights" of the Philippine Alien Property Administrator did not render illegal or invalidate
its grant to the defendant of the free use of the property; (2) The decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila declaring the sale by the plaintiff to the Japanese purchaser null
and void ab initio and that the plaintiff was and has remained as the legal owner of the
property, without legal interruption, is not conclusive; (3) Reservation to the plaintiff of
the right to recover from the defendant corporation not binding on the latter; (4) Use of
the property for commercial purposes in itself alone does not justify payment of rentals;
(5) Defendant's possession was in good faith; and (6) Defendant's possession in the
nature of usufruct.

3. Decisions of the Lower Court

The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgement releasing the liability of
National Coconut Corporation (defendant) and The Republic of the Philippines
(intervenor) but keeping the right of Sagrada Orden de Predicadores del Santisimo
Rosario del Filipinas (plaintiff) in retrieving the reasonable rentals from National Coconut
Corporation (defendant) with the sum of P3,000 a month from August 1946 up to the
date the defendant leaves the premises. The judgement declares that theproperty
owner has always been the Sagrada Orden de Predicadores del Santisimo Rosario del
Filipinas (plaintiff) because the sale to the Japanese purchaser was void ab initio and
that the property is not in the scope of having rights by the Alien Property
Administration. The trial court further declares that National Coconut Corporation
(defendant) cannot assert any better rights than Alien Property Administrator
(predecessor). And lastly, National Coconut Corporation (defendant) must pay
reasonable rentals for its occupation because they used the property and had a
subleased portion.

ISSUE:
4. Issue/s (one sentence)
Whether or not the defendant, National Coconut Corporation, is obligated to pay rent to
the plaintiff, Sagrada Orden de Predicadores del Santisimo Rosario del Filipinas, for
commercial use of the lot.
HELD:
5. Disposition of the Case (one sentence)
Except for the part of the judgment that is being appealed, which sentences defendant-
appellant to pay rentals from August 1946 to February 28, 1949, the judgment is upheld
in its entirety.
6. Dictum (no more than five sentences addressing the issue relevant to the
topic under discussion)
The defendant is not responsible to pay the rentals since there was no privity of contract
or obligation between the Alien Property Custodian and the Taiwan Tekkosho. A party
allowed by the United States Alien Property Custodian to occupy and use the enemy
property is not liable to pay rentals therefor to the pre-war owner prior to the annulment
of the enemy's title to the property even when the enemy acquired it by duress, because
there was no privity (of contract or obligation) between the Alien Property Custodian and
the enemy owner, the former's title being based, by legal provision, on the right to seize
enemy property. The occupant's obligation to pay rentals, like any other obligation, must
arise from law, contract, quasi-contract, crime, or negligence (article 1089, Spanish Civil
Code). If occupant took possession of the property with the permission of the Alien
Property Custodian, without any express or implied agreement between them that
rentals would be paid for the use and occupation of the enemy property, none may be
recovered by the pre-war owner. As to the rentals collected by said occupant from its
lessee, the same should accrue to it as a possessor in good faith.
2) Mangonon vs. CA G.R. No. 125041 June 30, 2006

FACTS:
1. Petitioner’s / Plaintiff’s claim/s (no more than three sentences)

On the 17th of March 1994, on behalf of her then-minor children, Rebecca

Angela (Rica) and Regina Isabel (Rina) Delgado, petitioner Ma. Belen B.
Mangonon filed a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support. Despite
having already been admitted to two universities in the United States of America,
Rica and Rina were fiscally unable to undertake collegiate education, which is
why they sought financial assistance from responder Federico and the latter's
father, Francisco, who were known to be financially well-off. The Petitioner
alleges that Rica and Rina are her legitimate daughters by respondent Federico
since they were born within seven months of her annulled marriage to him and so
qualify for general and educational support.

2. Respondent’s / Defendant’s claim/s (no more than three sentences)

Francisco stated that the birth certificates do not bear Federico's signature.
Francisco goes on to say that the petitioner and her second husband must
bear the burden because the latter has assumed the responsibilities and
duties of a natural father. Federico was aware of Rica and Rina's birth
seventeen years later and claimed that he could not be the father and
provide the support they required. Respondent Francisco contended that
because the petitioner and her twin daughters are now US citizens, the
Family Code provisions could not be invoked.

3. Decision of the lower courts

The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 March 1996 and Resolution
dated 16 May 1996 affirming the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati order,
fixing the amount of support pendente to Php 5,000.00 for Rica and Rina has
now been modified by the Court of Appeals due to the evidence shown that Rica
and Rina are legitimate family members of Francisco and Frederico Delgado.
Francisco Delgado was held liable to support pendente lite in the amount to be
determined by the trial court.

ISSUE:
4. Issue/s (one sentence)
Whether respondent Francisco C. Delgado should be held financially
responsible for his granddaughters.

HELD:
 5. Disposition of the case (one sentence) Premises considered, the Decision
of the Court of Appeals on March 20, 1996, and Resolution on May 16, 1996,
affirming the Order dated September 12, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 149, Makati, establishing the amount of assistance pendente lite to
P5,000.00 for Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel, is modified in that respondent
Francisco Delgado is found accountable for support pendente lite in the amount
to be decided by the trial court, where it shows this petition is partially granted.

6. Dictum (no more than five sentences addressing the issue relevant to the
topic under discussion)

Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco Delgado is

tasked to give financial support to his granddaughters Rica and Rina being the
immediate family of the twins after their parents, wherein it has been established
that Francisco has the financial ability to support the two. For the amount of
pendente lite support to be given, the court takes to it from the provision of the
law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the necessities of the
recipient and the resources or means of the giver. Guided by this, the court holds
respondent Francisco partially liable for the expenses incurred by Rica and Rina
in their studies, which constitutes to half the amount of their school expenses as
support pendente lite. However, considering that Rica and Rina’s education may
have been done already by the promulgation of this decision, the court finds it
proper to award pendente lite in dues, which are to be computed from the time
the twins have entered college until the time they have had finished their
respective studies.

3) PSBA vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 84698 January 4, 1992

FACTS:

1. Plaintiff’s/ Petitioner’s Claim:

On August 30, 1985, a 3rd-year commerce student, Carlitos Bautista died due to
a stabbing incident by the non-assailants who were not members of the school
community on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business
Administration (PSBA). The deceased student's parents filed a suit in Regional Trial
Court Manila Branch 47 presided by Judge Regina Ordonez-Benitez for the damages
versus the petitioners, PSBA, and its authorities. Petitioners sought dismissal of the suit
because they were presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which states
that there are no grounds for action against them because jurisprudence on the subject
holds that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are excluded from the rule in the
said article.
 2. Respondent’s/ Defendant’s claims:

The defendants intended to hold the plaintiff’s responsibility for the victim's death
due to the alleged negligence, carelessness, and lack of security measures, means,
and procedures before, during, and after the victim's attack.

3. Decisions of the lower courts:

The Regional Trial Court Manila Branch 47 on an order on December 8, 1987,

denied the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss and overruled the averment of the appellant, but
on January 25, 1988, a motion for reconsideration was discussed. The complainant
then castigated the trial court’s ruling before the respondent appellate court, but on an
order on June 10, 1988, the trial court’s ruling was ratified. A plea for reconsideration of
the respondent appellate was rejected on 22 August 1988.

ISSUE:

4. Issue/s

Whether or not the Philippine School of Business Administration and its school
authorities can be held accountable for Carlos Bautista's death through the law of quasi-
delict.

HELD

5. Disposition of the case:

Considering the conjectures of this claim, the suit is rejected, and RTC Manila, Br.
47 must continue proceedings in accordance with the court’s decision against the
petitioners.

6. Dictum:

No, the petitioners are not absolved from legal responsibility under quasi-delicts.
Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain
peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between
the Philippine School of Business Administration, and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on
quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising
from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only
between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied, however,
this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort
even when there obtains a contract. It can be concluded that should the act which
breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then there is a
cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict, thus, in the circumstances obtaining
the present case, there is no finding that the contract between the school and Carlitos
Bautista had been breached through the former’s negligence in providing proper
security measures.

4) YHT Realty Corporation vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 126780, February 17,
2005

FACTS:

1. Petitioner’s/Plaintiff’s claim/s (no more than 3 sentences)

YHT Realty Corporation, Brunhilda Tan, Erlinda Lainez, and Anicia Payam
appealed for review of the decision of the court of appeals from October 19,
1995, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13,
of Manila, dated 16 December 1991 which states that they are collectively liable
and accountable to the damages in the action filed by Australian businessman-
philanthropist Maurice Mcloughlin due to the disappearance of his American and
Australian Dollars that is deposited in the safety deposit box of Tropicana
Copacabana Apartment Hotel that is operated and owned by YHT Realty
Corporation. Resolution was submitted by the petitioners regarding the following
issues: (1) if the court’s decision on the appearance and following loss of the
subjects (money and jewelry) is supported by the evidence on record; (2) the
findings of gross negligence on the petitioners because of their performance and
duties as hotelier is supported in the evidences on record; (3) if the "Undertaking
For The Use of Safety Deposit Box" admittedly fulfilled and performed by private
respondent in nullified and void; and (4) if the damages granted to the
respondent are proper accordingly.

3. Respondent’s/Defendant’s claim/s (no more than 3 sentences)

The defendant, Maurice McLoughlin, claimed that during his stay he
allegedly placed US$15,000 and AUS$10,000 as well as credit cards,
bankbooks, and a checkbook, arranged side by side inside the safety deposit
box of Tropicana Copacabana Apartment Hotel owned by the petitioner but
after going on multiple business trips, he noticed that some of his items had
gone missing, and his money was short. Maurice McLoughlin asserted that
only the hotel's administration has the other key to his safe, leading him to
believe that there is someone who is liable for his safety box. The defendant
 argued that the hotel should be held accountable for any damages he
suffered while keeping his money in the safety deposit box at the Tropicana
Copacabana Apartment Hotel.

4. Decision of the lower courts

The RTC of Manila rendered judgment in favor of McLoughlin, the
dispositive portion of which (1) Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiff the sum of US$11,400.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency of
P342,000.00, more or less, and the sum of AUS$4,500.00 or its equivalent in
Philippine Currency of P99,000.00, or a total of P441,000.00, more or less, with
12% interest from April 16, 1988 until said amount has been paid to plaintiff (Item
1, Exhibit CC); (2) Ordering defendants, jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the
sum of P3,674,238.00 as actual and consequential damages arising from the
loss of his Australian and American dollars and jewelries complained against and
in prosecuting his claim and rights administratively and judicially (Items II, III, IV,
V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX, Exh. "CC"); (3) Ordering defendants, jointly and severally,
to pay plaintiff the sum of P500,000.00 as moral damages (Item X, Exh. "CC");
(4) Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of
P350,000.00 as exemplary damages (Item XI, Exh. "CC"); (5) And ordering
defendants, jointly and severally, to pay litigation expenses in the sum of
P200,000.00 (Item XII, Exh. "CC"); (6) Ordering defendants, jointly and severally,
to pay plaintiff the sum of P200,000.00 as attorney's fees, and a fee of P3,000.00
for every appearance; and (7) Plus costs of suit. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the disquisitions made by the lower court except as to the amount of damages
awarded. The appellants are directed jointly and severally to pay the
plaintiff/appellee (1) P153,200.00 representing the peso equivalent of
US$2,000.00 and AUS$4,500.00; (2) P308,880.80, representing the peso value
for the air fares from Sidney [sic] to Manila and back for a total of eleven (11)
trips; (3) One-half of P336,207.05 or P168,103.52 representing payment to
Tropicana Apartment Hotel; (4) One-half of P152,683.57 or P76,341.785
representing payment to Echelon Tower; (5) One-half of P179,863.20 or
P89,931.60 for the taxi . . . transportation from the residence to Sidney [sic]
Airport and from MIA to the hotel here in Manila, for the eleven (11) trips; (6)
One-half of P7,801.94 or P3,900.97 representing Meralco power expenses; (7)
One-half of P356,400.00 or P178,000.00 representing expenses for food and
maintenance; (8) P50,000.00 for moral damages; (9) P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and (10) P200,000 representing attorney's fees.

ISSUE:

5. Issue/s (one sentence) Whether or not the “Undertaking for The Use of
Safety Deposit Box” admittedly executed by private respondent is valid.
HELD:
 6. Disposition of the case (one sentence)
Foregoing premises considered; the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
19 October 1995 is affirmed.
7. Dictum (no more than five sentences addressing the issue relevant to the
topic under discussion)
No, the “Undertaking for The Use of Safety Deposit Box” admittedly executed
by private respondent is null and void. Under Article 2003, incorporated in the
New Civil Code as an expression of public policy precisely to apply to
situations such as that presented in the case, the hotelkeeper cannot free
himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is not liable
for the articles brought by the guest. The hotel business like the common
carrier's business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public,
hotelkeepers are bound to provide the twin duty to provide lodging for hotel
guests and security to their persons and belongings. The law in turn does not
allow such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary
stipulation in so-called "undertakings" that ordinarily appear in prepared
forms imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature

5) Manliclic et.al. vs. Calaunan G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007

FACTS: 

1. Petitioner's/Plaintiff's Claim/s 
When petitioner Manliclic hit the rear left side of respondent Calaunan’s
owner-type jeep while driving a Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. (PRBLI) bus
headed to Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac, the respondent filed a claim for
damages against both Manliclic and PRBLI, with Manlilic criminally charged with
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Property Damage with Physical Injury.
However, Manlilic’s party was adamant in claiming that the Calaunan was to
blame for the collision, while the respondent argued that Manliclic should be held
accountable. The petitioners requested a review of the Court of Appeals’ (CA)
ruling due to the following errors: (1) CA erred on a legal issue by upholding the
trial court’s dubious admission of the transcripts of stenographic notes and other
documents into evidence in the criminal case; (2) CA overstepped the mark on a
legal issue by upholding the trial court’s reliance on the respondent’s version of
how the accident allegedly occurred; (3) CA erred on a question of law in
affirming the trial court’s unfair disregard of PRBLI’s defense of exercising due
care in the selection and regulation of its employees; and (4) CA erred on a
question of law in affirming the trial court’s dubious award of damages and
attorney’s fees. 
 2. Respondent's/Defendant's Claim/s

According to Calaunan, his jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70

kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine
Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the buss
hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. This testimony was corroborated by
Fernando Ramos, a driver on another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus
and the jeep, in which he testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right
because it was bumped by the bus from behind. Because of the collision, the
respondent then filed a criminal case against Manliclic for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Property Damage with Physical Injury and a separate civil case
against both petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. 

3. Decisions of the Lower Courts (e.g. RTC, CA) 

The trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and
against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI on July 22, 1996. The dispositive portion
of its decision orders the petitioners to pay the respondent jointly and solidarily
the amount of (1) PhP40,838.00 as actual damages for the towing as well as the
repair and the materials used for the repair of the jeep in question; (2)
PhP100,000.00 as moral damages; another (3) PhP100,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and (5) PhP15,000.00 as attorney's fees, including appearance fees
of the lawyer. 

ISSUE: 
4. Issue/s 
Whether or not petitioners Manlilic and PRBLI share solidarity
responsibility and several other liabilities for the aforementioned accident-related
damages.

ASSIGNMENT NO. 1: MODULE 1: INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND GENERAL

PROVISIONS ON LAW ON OBLIGATIONS 

HELD: 
5. Disposition of the Case 
The Court of Appeals' ruling in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is affirmed,
however with the revisions that (1) the moral damages award shall be decreased
to PhP50,000.00; and (2) the award of punitive damages shall also be
decreased to PhP50,000.00. 
 6. Dictum 
Yes, petitioners Manlilic and PRBLI shall be held solidarily liable and
share responsibilities for the aforementioned damages in the collision incident. 

This is due to the said incident resulting in damage to the respondent’s

party through the act of negligence by Manlilic, and is held responsible in its
compensation, as there were no initial contractual relations between the parties
when the incident took place, as per Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code. Likewise,
Art. 2180 stated that the employer shall also be held liable for the damages
contributed by their employee due to the inability to perform required tasks
caused by the company’s lack of proper examination on worker qualifications,
procedures, and discipline. In this case, the respondent party possessed the
right to demand compliance from PRBLI, who shall share responsibilities with
Manlilic, who was present during the incident as the employee and
representative of the company.

6) Barredo v. Garcia 73 Phil. 607

7) Mendoza vs. Arrieta 91 SCRA 113

FACTS: 
1. Petitioner’s/Plaintiff’s claim/s (no more than 3 sentences) 
Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza testified in a joint trial that  jeep-
owner-driver Salazar overtook the truck driven by Montoya,  swerved
to the left going towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit  his car which
was bound for Manila. Mendoza further testified that  before the
impact, Salazar had jumped from the jeep and that he  was not aware
that Salazar's jeep was bumped from behind by  the truck driven by
Montoya. 

2. Respondent’s/Defendant’s claim/s (no more than 3 

sentences) 
Jeep-owner-driver Salazar contended that after overtaking the
truck driven by Montoya, he flashed a signal indicating his  intention to
turn left towards the poblacion of Marilao but was  stopped at the
intersection by a policeman who was directing  traffic. He further
explained that while he was at a stop position,  his jeep was bumped
 at the rear by the truck driven by Montoya  causing him to be thrown
out of the jeep, which then swerved to  the left and hit petitioner's car,
which was approaching from the  opposite direction. 

3. Decision of the lower courts

SHAILA MARIE B. BUMANGLAG, 2021-30941; ANGELICA M.  LANGIT,
2015-20393; ANNA KATHRINE L. PASCUAL, 2021-32570;  JANNAH
WYNONAH W. PASCUAL, 2019-80292 

ASSIGNMENT NO. 1: INTRO TO LAW ON OBLIGATIONS AND 

CONTRACTS 

The court of 1 instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta. Maria  finds

st

the accused Freddie Montoya guilty, while Rodolfo Salazar  was

acquitted. The truck driver Freddie Montoya was found guilty  beyond
reasonable doubt under the crime Reckless imprudence  causing
damage to property. Docketed as Criminal Case no. SM 
227, in which Freddie Montoya was sentenced to pay P972.50  and to
indemnify Rodolfo Salazar in the same amount of P972.50  as actual
damages, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of  insolvency, both
as to fine and indemnity, with cost. Rodolfo  Salazar is hereby
acquitted from the offense charged in Criminal  Case No. SM-228,
with cost de oficio, and his bond is ordered  cancelled.  

ISSUE 

4. Issue/s (one sentence) 

Whether or not the truck driver, the truck owner, or the  driver of
the jeep may be held liable for the damages done to the  petitioner’s
vehicle. 

HELD 

5. Disposition of the case (one sentence) 

The Order dated September 12, 1970, dismissing Civil  Case
No. 80803 against private respondent Felino Timbol is set  aside, and
 respondent Judge, hereby ordered to proceed with the  hearing on the
merits; but the Orders dated January 30, 1971, and  February 23,
1971, dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No.  80803 against
respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.

6. Dictum (no more than five sentences addressing the issue

relevant to the topic under discussion) 
In so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, the answer is
yes; the negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner or of Timbol’s
employee, Montoya, in driving the truck, causing  Salazar's jeep to
swerve and collide with petitioner's car consisting 
the cause of action is based on quasi-delict. Respondent judge
committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the
truck-owner, as further observed that in as much as Articles  2176 and
2177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and  different from
the civil action arising from the offense of negligence  under the
Revised Penal Code, no reservation, therefore, need be  made in the
criminal case. In sum, the Court finds Civil Case No.  80803 not barred
by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his
right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict. 
But in so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is
concerned, the answer is no; considering that the collision  between
the jeep driven by Salazar and the car owned and driven  by Mendoza
was the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by  the truck driven
by Montoya. In this case, accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot be held
liable for the damages sustained by the  petitioner’s car.

8) Amadora vs. CA 160 SCRA 315

9) Spouses Dumlao v. Marlon Realty Corp., G.R. No. 131491, August 17, 2007
10) Perez v. Pomar, G.R. No. 1299, November 16, 1903 (Presumptive Consent)