Cheongsan Assignment No1

ASSIGNMENT NO.
1: INTRO TO LAW ON OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
[G.R. No. L-3756. June 30, 1952.]

SAGRADA ORDEN DE PREDICADORES DEL SANTISIMO
ROSARIO DE FILIPINAS, plaintiff-appellee, v s. NATIONAL
COCONUT CORPORATION, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner's/Plaintiff's claim/s (no more than 3 sentences)
On January 4, 1943, the property owned by the plaintiff, a
land with warehouses in Pandacan, Maila, was acquired by
Taiwan Tekkosho (Japanese Corporation). After liberation, the
Alien Property Administrator of the USA took possession,
control, and custody over the property, which was later on
occupied by the defendant by virtue of the custodianship
agreement of the prior occupant. Plaintiff now claims to recover
the possession of the property and the rentals for its occupation
and use for Php 3,000 a month from August 1946, the date when
the corporation began to occupy the property, to the date it
vacated it, arguing that the said property belongs to the plaintiff
as the sale to Taiwan Tekkosho was null and void being
executed under threats, duress, and intimidation
2. Respondent's/Defendant's claim/s (no more than 3

sentences)
National Coconut Corporation argued that (1) Want of
"ownership rights" of the Philippine Alien Property Administrator
did not render illegal or invalidate its grant to the defendant of the
free use of the property; (2) The decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila declaring the sale by the plaintiff to the
Japanese purchaser null and void ab initio and that the plaintiff
was and has remained as the legal owner of the property, without
legal interruption, is not conclusive; (3) Reservation to the plaintiff
of the right to recover from the defendant corporation not binding
on the latter; (4) Use of the property for commercial purposes in
itself alone does not justify payment of rentals; (5) Defendant's
possession was in good faith; and (6) Defendant's possession in
the nature of usufruct.
ASSIGNMENT NO. 1: INTRO TO LAW ON OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
3. Decisions of the lower courts

The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment
releasing the defendant and the intervenor from liability but
reserving to the plaintiff the right to recover from the National
Coconut Corporation reasonable rentals, the sum of P3,000 a
month from August 1946 to the date the defendant vacates the
premises, for the use and occupation of the premises. The
judgment declares that plaintiff has always been the owner, as
the sale to the Japanese purchaser was void ab initio; that the
Alien Property Administration never acquired any right to the
property, but that it held the same in trust until the determination
as to whether or not the owner is an enemy citizen. The trial court
further declares that the defendant cannot claim any better rights
than its predecessor, the Alien Property Administrator, and that
as the defendant has used the property and had subleased
portion thereof, it must pay reasonable rentals for its occupation.
ISSUE:
4. Issue/s (one sentence)
Whether or not the National Coconut Corporation
(defendant) is obliged to pay rentals to Sagrada Orden de
Predicadores del Santisimo Rosario del Filipinas (plaintiff) for
commercial use of the lot.
HELD:
5. Disposition of the case (one sentence)
The judgment is affirmed in all other respects except the
part of the judgment appealed from, which sentences defendant-
appellant to pay rentals from August 1946 to February 28, 1949.
6. Dictum (no more than five sentences addressing the issue

relevant to the topic under discussion)
No, defendant is not liable to pay rentals absent any privity
of contract or obligation.
A party allowed by the United States Alien Property

Custodian to occupy and use the enemy property is not liable to
pay rentals therefore to the pre-war owner prior to the annulment
of the enemy's title to the property even when the enemy

acquired it by duress, because there was no privity (of contract
or obligation) between the Alien Property Custodian and the
enemy owner, the former's title being based, by legal provision,
on the right to seize enemy property. The occupant's obligation
to pay rentals, like any other obligation, must arise from law,
contract, quasi-contract, crime, or negligence (article 1089,
Spanish Civil Code). If occupant took possession of the property
with the permission of the Alien Property Custodian, without any
express or implied agreement between them, that rentals would
be paid for the use and occupation of the enemy property, none
may be recovered by the pre-war owner. As to the rentals
collected by said occupant from its lessee, the same should
accrue to it as a possessor in good faith.
[G.R. No. 125041. June 30, 2006.]

MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, for and on behalf of her minor
children REBECCA ANGELA DELGADO and REGINA ISABEL
DELGADO, petitioner, v s. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge, RTC
Makati, Branch 149, FEDERICO C. DELGADO and FRANCISCO C.
DELGADO, respondents.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner's/Plaintiff's claim/s (no more than 3 sentences)
Ma. Belen B. Mangonon, on behalf of her then minor
children Rica and Rina, claimed that she was constrained to seek
support pendente lite from private respondents, Federico and
Francisco C. Delgado, who are millionaires with extensive assets
both here and abroad, given the imminent opening of classes,
the possibility of protracted litigation, and Rica and Rina's lack of
financial means to pursue their college education in the USA.
She also alleged that Rica and Rina are her legitimate daughters
by respondent Federico since the twin sisters were born within
seven months from the annulment of her marriage to respondent
Federico, and so are entitled to general and educational support
under Articles 174 and 195(b) in relation to Articles 194(1 and 2)
and 199(c) of the Family Code. When the trial court ordered
monthly support (pendente lite) of Php 5,000 each from the
respondents, she argued for reconsideration on the grounds of
the seventh and eleventh exceptions on Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Respondent's/Defendant's claim/s (no more than 3

sentences)
Respondent Francisco C. Delgado claimed that
responsibility should rest on the shoulders of the petitioner, Ma.
Belen B. Mangonon and her second husband, the latter having
voluntarily assumed the duties and responsibilities of a natural
father, while respondent Federico C. Delgado claimed that he did
not tell Rica and Rina that he could not be their father and instead
assumed that the two are, indeed, his daughters, but alleged that
he could not give them the support they were demanding as he
was only making P40,000.00 a month. Both agreed to the trial
court decision, and when reconsidered, respondents claimed

that they have the option under the law (Art. 204 of the Family
Code) as to how they could perform their obligation to support
Rica and Rina, respondent Francisco insists that Rica and Rina
should move here to the Philippines to study in any of the local
universities.
3. Decisions of the lower courts

The trial court rendered a decision that directs respondents
to provide a monthly support (pendente lite) of P5,000.00 each
or a total of P10,000.00 for the education of Rebecca Angela and
Regina Isabel Delgado to be delivered within the first five days of
each month without need of demand. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the holding of the trial court and disposed the petition of
Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Francisco C. Delgado be held
liable for his granddaughters' financial needs.
HELD:
Premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated March 20, 1996, and Resolution dated May 16, 1996
affirming the Order dated September 12, 1995 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati, fixing the amount of support
pendente lite to P5,000.00 for Rebecca Angela and Regina
Isabel, is modified in that respondent Francisco Delgado is held
liable for support pendente lite in the amount to be determined
by the trial court.
6. Dictum (no more than five sentences addressing the issue

Yes, defendant Francisco C. Delgado is obliged to support
his granddaughters, Rica, and Rina, in default of the father,
Federico C. Delgado.
Article 199, the pertinent provision of the Family Code on

these subject states: Whenever two or more persons are obliged
to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following
persons in the order herein provided: (1) The spouse; (2) The
descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The ascendants in the
nearest degree; and (4) The brothers and sisters. An eminent
author on the subject explains that the obligation to give support
rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient.
However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the
responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called
upon to provide support do not have the means to do so. In this
case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held
respondent Federico C. Delgado, owner of Citadel Corporation
and majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors
of Citadel Commercial, Incorporated, Citadel Shipping, Isla
Communication Co., and Citadel Holding share of stocks owner,
liable to provide support pendente lite to his granddaughters,
Rica, and Rina.
[G.R. No. 84698. February 4, 1992.]

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D.
LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL.
PEDRO SACRO, AND LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila,
SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA, and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA,
respondents.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner’s/Plaintiff’s claim/s (no more than 3 sentences)
A stabbing incident on August 30, 1985, which caused the
death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of
the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA)
prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Branch 47) presided over by Judge (now
Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoñez-Benitez, for damages
against the petitioners, PSBA and its corporate officers. The
petitioners argued to have the suit against them dismissed,
alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180
of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against
them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that
academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit
of the rule in the afore-stated article.
2. Respondent’s/Defendant’s claim/s (no more than 3

sentences)
The respondents sought to adjudge the plaintiffs liable for
the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged negligence,
recklessness, and lack of security precautions, means, and
methods before, during, and after the attack on the victim.
3. Decision of the lower courts

The respondent appellate court primarily anchored its
decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine School of Business
Administration and its corporate officers may be free from liability
for the death of Carlitos Bautista under quasi-delicts.
HELD
The foregoing premises considered, the petition is denied.
6. Dictum ( no more than five sentences addressing the issue

No, the petitioners are not exculpated from liability under
quasi-delicts.
Conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be

an insurer of its students against all risks. This is especially true
in the populous student communities of the so-called "university
belt" in Manila where there have been reported several incidents
ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would
not be equitable to expect schools to anticipate all types of violent
trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security
measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual
or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school
premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may
still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual
obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here
statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place.
[G.R. No. 126780. February 17, 2005.]

YHT REALTY CORPORATION, ERLINDA LAINEZ and ANICIA
PAYAM, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MAURICE
McLOUGHLIN, respondents.
FACTS:
YHT Realty Corporation, Brunhilda Mata-Tan (Tan),Erlinda
Lainez (Lainez), and Anicia Payam (Payam) petitioned for review
of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 19, 1995,
finding them jointly and solidarily liable for damages inan action
filed by Maurice McLoughlin (McLoughlin) for the loss of his
American and Australian dollars deposited in the safety deposit
box of Tropicana Copacabana Apartment Hotel, owned and
operated by the said corporation. Petitioners submit for
resolution the following issues: (a) whether the appellate court's
conclusion on the alleged prior existence and subsequent loss of
the subject money and jewelry is supported by the evidence on
record; (b) whether the finding of gross negligence on the part of
petitioners in the performance of their duties as innkeepers is
supported by the evidence on record; (c) whether the
"Undertaking For The Use of Safety Deposit Box" admittedly
executed by private respondent is null and void; and (d) whether
the damages awarded to private respondent, as well as the
amounts thereof, are proper under the circumstances.

sentences)
Maurice McLoughlin argued for the damages he incurred
in keeping his money in the Tropicana's safety deposit box.

The RTC of Manila rendered judgment in favor of
McLoughlin, the dispositive portion of which (1) orders
defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of
US$11,400.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency of
P342,000.00, more or less, and the sum of AUS$4,500.00 or its
equivalent in Philippine Currency of P99,000.00, or a total of
P441,000.00, more or less, with 12% interest from April 16, 1988,
until said amount has been paid to plaintiff (Item 1, Exhibit CC);
(2) orders defendants, jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the
sum of P3,674,238.00 as actual and consequential damages
arising from the loss of his Australian and American dollars and
jewelries complained against and in prosecuting his claim and
rights administratively and judicially (Items II, III, IV, V, VI, VII,
VIII, and IX, Exh. "CC"); (3) orders defendants, jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of P500,000.00 as moral
damages (Item X, Exh. "CC"); (4) orders defendants, jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of P350,000.00 as exemplary
damages (Item XI, Exh. "CC"); (5) orders defendants, jointly and
severally, to pay litigation expenses in the sum of P200,000.00
(Item XII, Exh. "CC"); (6) orders defendants, jointly and severally,
to pay plaintiff the sum of P200,000.00 as attorney's fees, and a
fee of P3,000.00 for every appearance; and (7) plus costs of suit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the disquisitions made by

the lower court except as to the amount of damages awarded. It
was modified as follows: The appellants are directed jointly and
severally to pay the plaintiff/appellee (1) P153,200.00
representing the peso equivalent of US$2,000.00 and
AUS$4,500.00; (2) P308,880.80, representing the peso value for
the airfares from Sidney [sic] to Manila and back for a total of
eleven (11) trips; (3) One-half of P336,207.05 or P168,103.52
representing payment to Tropicana Apartment Hotel; (4) One-
half of P152,683.57 or P76,341.785 representing payment to
Echelon Tower; (5) One-half of P179,863.20 or P89,931.60 for
the taxi . . . transportation from the residence to Sidney [sic]
Airport and from MIA to the hotel here in Manila, for the eleven
(11) trips; (6) One-half of P7,801.94 or P3,900.97 representing
Meralco power expenses; (7) One-half of P356,400.00 or
P178,000.00 representing expenses for food and maintenance;
(8) P50,000.00 for moral damages; (9) P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and (10) P200,000 representing attorney's fees.
.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the "Undertaking for the Use of Safety
Deposit Box" admittedly executed by private respondent is valid.
HELD
Foregoing premises considered, the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated October 19, 1995, is affirmed.

No, the "Undertaking for the Use of Safety Deposit Box"
admittedly executed by private respondent is null and void.
Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an

expression of public policy precisely to apply to situations such
as that presented in this case. The hotel business like the
common carrier's business is imbued with the public interest.
Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only
lodging for hotel guests and security to their persons and
belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the
business. The law in turn does not allow such duty to the public
to be negated or diluted by any contrary stipulation in so-called
"undertakings" that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed
by hotel keepers on guests for their signature.
[G.R. No. 150157. January 25, 2007.]

MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.,
petitioners, vs. MODESTO CALAUNAN, respondent.
FACTS:
While driving the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI)
bus going to Manila, Mauricio Manliclic bumped the rear left side
of the owner-type jeep of the respondent, Modesto Calaunan,
which then led to him being criminally charged with reckless
imprudence brought by the damage to property with physical
injuries, and a damage suit against him and PRBLI. Petitioner
Manliclic was acquitted of the criminal charges against him, but
in the civil case, the petitioners were still made to pay damages
to the respondent. They then claimed to have the decision of the
Court of Appeals be reviewed under the following errors: (1) The
court of appeals erred on a question of law in affirming the trial
court's questionable admission in evidence of the TSN's and
other documents presented in the criminal case; (2) The Court of
Appeals erred on a question of law in affirming the trial court's
reliance on the version of the respondent on how the accident
supposedly occurred; (3) The Court of Appeals erred on a
question of law in affirming the trial court's unfair disregard of
herein petitioner PRBL's defense of exercise of due diligence in
the selection and supervision of its employees; (4) The Court of
Appeals erred on a question of law in affirming the trial court's
questionable award of damages and attorney's fee.

sentences)
Modesto Calaunan claimed that his jeep was cruising at
the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the
expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep,
and, in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit
Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. Fernando Ramos, a
driver of another jeep, corroborated his testimony by saying that
his jeep swerved to the right because it was bumped by the
Philippine Rabbit bus from behind. The respondent then sued
Manliclic for the petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence
in causing the collision, while he sued petitioner PRBLI for its

failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection
and supervision of its employees.

On 22 July 1996, the trial court, with the affirmation in toto
of the Court of Appeals, rendered its decision in favor of
respondent Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic and
PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision orders the
petitioners to pay the respondent jointly and solidarily the amount
of P40,838.00 as actual damages for the towing as well as the
repair and the materials used for the repair of the jeep in
question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and another
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as
attorney's fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In
addition, Manliclic and PRBLI are also to pay costs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manlilic and PRBLI can be held solidarily
liable for damages because of the collision.
HELD
The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
55909 is affirmed with the modification that (1) the award of
moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the
award of exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00.
6. Dictum ( no more than five sentences addressing the

issue relevant to the topic under discussion)
Yes, Manliclic and PRBLI are held solidarily liable for
damages because of the collision.
Under Article 2176, whoever by act or omission causes

damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Furthermore, under Article 2180
of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of

the master or employer either in the selection of the servant
or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both.
[G.R. No. L-48006. July 8, 1942]

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and
TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
FACTS:
Fausto Barredo’s defense is that the negligence of Pedro
Fontanilla is governed by the Revised Penal Code but there has
been no civil liability sued against Fontanilla, the person
criminally liable. Hence, Barredo claims that he cannot be held
responsible arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that
the separate civil action should have been filed against the latter
and not him.

sentences)
The deceased parents, Garcia and Almario, filed a civil suit
against Barredo to be liable for the damages after the court in the
criminal case granted them the right to bring a reserved separate
civil action. Under the provisions of Article 1903 of the civil code,
Barredo must indemnify plaintiffs by reason of his negligence in
the selection of his employees.

The Court of First Instance of Rizal convicted and
sentenced Fontanilla of one year and one day to two years
of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the
parents the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower

court in the criminal case. The parents of the deceased, Severino
Garcia and Timotea Almario, brought an action in the Court of
First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole
proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro
Fontanilla.
The Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in

favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date
of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of
Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest

from the time the action was instituted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parents can file for a separate civil
action against Fausto Barredo making him primarily and directly
responsible under Article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer.
HELD
The Court of Appeals’ judgment is affirmed that the
defendant-petitioner, Barredo, is primarily liable under Article
1903 and responsible with the costs and damages for his
negligence in selecting his employee.
6. Dictum ( no more than five sentences addressing the

issue relevant to the topic under discussion)
Yes, authorities render it inescapable to conclude that the
employer — in this case the defendant-petitioner — is primarily
and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
A quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a separate legal

institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own,
and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a
delict or crime. Upon this principle, and on the wording and spirit
of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct
responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
[G.R. No. L-32599. June 29, 1979]

EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner vs. HON. ABUNDIO Z.
ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance
of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR,
respondents.
FACTS:
At the joint trial, petitioner testified that jeep-owner- driver
Salazar overtook the truck driven by Montoya, swerved to the left
going towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit his car which was
bound for Manila. Petitioner further testified that before the
impact, Salazar had jumped from the jeep and that he was not
aware that Salazar's jeep was bumped from behind by the truck
driven by Montoya.

sentences)
Jeep-owner-driver Salazar, on the other hand, tried toshow
that, after overtaking the truck driven by Montoya, he flashed a
signal indicating his intention to turn left towards the poblacion of
Marilao but was stopped at the intersection by a policeman who
was directing traffic; that while he was at a stop position, his jeep
was bumped at the rear by the truck driven by Montoya causing
him to be thrown out of the jeep, which then swerved to the left
and hit petitioner's car, which was coming from the opposite
direction.

The Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta.
Maria finds the accused Freddie Montoya guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of damage to property thru
reckless imprudence in Crime Case No. SM-227, and sentences
him to pay a fine of P972.50 and indemnify Rodolfo Salazar in
the same amount of P972.50 as actual damages, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, both as to fine and
indemnity, with costs. Accused Rodolfo Salazar is acquitted from
the offense charged in Crime. Case No. SM-228, with costs de

oficio, and his bond is ordered canceled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the driver of the jeep, the truck driver, or the
truck’s owner shall be held liable for the damages ensued to the
vehicle of the petitioner.
HELD
The order dated September 12, 1970, dismissing Civil
Case No. 80803 against private respondent Felino Timbol is set
aside, and respondent Judge ordered to proceed with the
hearing on the merits; the Orders dated January 30, 1971, and
February 23, 1971, dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No.
80803 against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are upheld.

Insofar as Salazar is concerned the answer is no and in
view of what has been proven and established during the trial,
accused Freddie Montoya would be held able for having bumped
and hit the rear portion of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo
Salazar; considering that the collision between the jeep driven by
Salazar and the car owned and driven by Mendoza was the result
of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by
Montoya, the trial court behaves that accused Salazar cannot be
held able for the damages sustained by Mendoza's car.
Insofar as Timbol is concerned the answer is yes; the

petitioner’s cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is
based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint,
wherein the respondent Judge committed reversible error when
he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, assaid case
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter. Further observed that
inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a
civil liability distinct and different from the civil
action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised

Penal Code, no reservation, therefore, need be made in the
criminal case. Thus, the Civil Case No. 80803 is not barred by
the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his
right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.
[G.R. No. L-47745. April 15, 1988]

JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA
JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA,
PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A.
AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-
RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR.,
CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru
his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR
GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A.
FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high school principal, the
dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and
two other students, through their respective parents. The
petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his
physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence,
he was then under the custody of the private respondents.

sentences)
The private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had
gone to the school only for the purpose of submitting his physics
report and that he was no longer in their custody because the
semester had already ended. The respondents say, however,
that there is no proof that the gun was the same firearm that killed
Alfredo.

The complaint against the students was later dropped.
After trial, the CFI of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable
to the plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00, representing death
compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral
expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's

fees. The Court of Appeals on appeal to the respondent court,
however, the decision was reversed, and all the defendants were
completely absolved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents may be held liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
HELD
The plaintiff’s petition is denied without anypronouncement
as to costs.

No. The rector, the high school principal, and the dean of
boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the
teacher-in-charge as previously defined; each of them was
exercising only a general authority over the student body and not
the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in
charge of particular classes. In the absence of a teacher-in-
charge, the dean of boys who should be held liable considering
the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an
unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned it to him
without taking disciplinary action was clearly negligence on his
part, but it does not necessarily link him to the shooting of
Amador. The Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held
directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the
damage caused by the student or apprentice. In sum, the Court
finds under the facts as disclosed that none of the respondents
is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo
Amadora that resulted in the latter's death.
[G.R. NO. 131491. August 17, 2007]

SPOUSES ELVIRA AND CESAR DUMLAO, Petitioners, vs.
MARLON REALTY CORPORATION, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioners insist that they are not liable to pay interest
since the loan proceeds were released, not to petitioners, but
directly to respondent; and that pending the release, no interest
should accrue.

sentences)
Marlon Realty Corporation, pursuant to the Compromise
Agreement, executed a Deed of Sale in favor of petitioners. But
they refused to pay the interest agreed upon despite
respondent's repeated demand. Respondent filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 78, Parañaque City a
complaint for a sum of money against petitioners.

The decision of Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)dated
June 17, 1996, dismissed the complaint, holding that it is for
specific performance cognizable by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC).
The RTC, Branch 258, Parañaque City rendered its

decision dated November 19,1996 affirming the MTC judgment
dismissing the complaint “not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
but for lack of cause of action.”
The Court of Appeals decided to reverse and set aside the

assailed decision of the RTC of Parañaque, Branch 258 dated
November 19, 1996, and its Order dated February 4, 1997,
denying plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, as well as the
decision the MTC of Parañaque, Branch 78 dated June 17, 1996.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are liable to pay interest on
the balance of the purchase price.
HELD
The petition is denied, the Court of Appeals’ Decision and
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 43366 are affirmed, costs charged
to the petitioners.

Yes, the petitioners are bound to comply with its terms and
conditions in good faith. The respondent is faithful to its part of
the bargain; thus, fairness demands that petitioners also fulfill
their obligation to pay interest on the balance of the purchase
price.
Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law

between the contracting parties and should be complied with in
good faith. We must look into the terms of the contract to
determine the respective obligations of the parties thereto.
Stated in the Article 1370 that if the terms of a contract are clear
and leave no doubt upon the contracting parties' intention, the
literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.
[G.R. No. L-1299. November 16, 1903]

VICENTE PEREZ, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUGENIO POMAR, Agent
of the Compañia General de Tabacos, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
Don Vicente Perez filed in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna a complaint asking that the court determine the amount
due to the plaintiff, at the customary rate of compensation for
interpreting in these Islands, for services rendered in the
Tabacalera Company.
It was alleged that Don Eugenio Pomar, as general agent

of the Compañia General de Tabacos in the said province,
verbally requested the plaintiff on the 8th of December, 1901, to
act as interpreter between himself and the military authorities;
that after the date mentioned the plaintiff continued to render
such services up to and including May 31, 1902; that the plaintiff
during this period held himself in readiness to render services
whenever required; to the end that such services might be
punctually rendered, Pomar, assured him that the Tabacalera
Company always generously repaid services rendered it and that
these statements were made in the absence of witnesses;
therefore his only proof as to the same was Mr. Pomar's word as
a gentleman.
It was added that the defendant, on behalf of the company,

offered to renumerate the plaintiff for the services rendered in the
most advantageous manner in which such services are
compensated, in view of the circumstances under which they
were requested; and that the plaintiff, by rendering the company
such services, was obliged to abandon his own business, and
thereby suffered damages in the sum of $3,200.

sentences)
The defendant denied the allegation of the complaint,
stating that it was wholly untrue that the company, and the
defendant as its agent, had solicited the services of the plaintiff

as interpreter before the military authorities for the period stated.
He especially denied the complaint, as it was absolutely

untrue that the plaintiff had been at the disposal of the defendant
for the purpose of rendering such services; that he therefore had
not been obliged to abandon his occupation or his soap factory,
and that the statement that an offer of employment with the
company had been made to him was false.
The defendant stated that the former borrowed from him

from time to time money amounting to $175 for the purposes of
his business, and that he had also delivered to the plaintiff 36
arrobas of oil worth $106, and three packages of resin for use in
coloring his soap; and that the plaintiff accompanied the
defendant for the purpose of extending his business and
mercantile relations; thus the plaintiff in these conferences acted
as interpreter of his own free will, without being requested to do
so by the defendant and without any offer of payment or
compensation; that therefore there existed no legal relation
between the company and the plaintiff, and that the defendant,
when accepting the spontaneous, voluntary and officious
services of the plaintiff, did in his private capacity and not as
agent of the company.

The judge of the Sixth Judicial District, deciding a case
brought by Perez, the plaintiff, against Pomar, the defendant, for
the recovery of wages due and unpaid, gave judgment against
the latter for the sum of $600 and the costs of suit, less the sum
of $50, Mexican.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is obliged to pay the
continued service rendered by the petitioner.
HELD
The judgment should be rendered against Don Eugenio
Pomar for the payment to the plaintiff of the sum of 200 Mexican
pesos, from which will be deducted the sum of 50 pesos is made
as to the costs of this instance, thus the judgment stated is
accordingly affirmed in so far as it agrees with this opinion and
reversed in so far as it may be in conflict therewith.

Yes, the fact remains that Perez rendered to Pomar
services as interpreter. As it does not appear that he did this
gratuitously, the duty is imposed upon the defendant, having
accepted the benefit of the service, to pay a just compensation
therefor, by virtue of the innominate contract of facio utdes
implicitly established. The supreme court of Spain in its decision
of February 12, 1889, holds, among other things, "that not only
is there an express and tacit consent which produces real
contract but there is also a presumptive consent which is thebasis
of quasi contracts, this giving rise to the multiple juridical relations
which result in obligations for the delivery of a thing or the
rendition of a service." The tacit agreement and consent of both
parties with respect to the service rendered by the plaintiff, and
the reciprocal benefits accruing to each, are the best evidence of
the fact that there was an implied contract sufficientto create a
legal bond, from which arose enforceable rights and obligations
of a bilateral character.

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ASSIGNMENT NO.

1: INTRO TO LAW ON OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

[G.R. No. L-3756. June 30, 1952.]

2. Respondent's/Defendant's claim/s (no more than 3

3. Decisions of the lower courts

6. Dictum (no more than five sentences addressing the issue

A party allowed by the United States Alien Property

of the enemy's title to the property even when the enemy

[G.R. No. 125041. June 30, 2006.]

2. Respondent's/Defendant's claim/s (no more than 3

court decision, and when reconsidered, respondents claimed

3. Decisions of the lower courts

6. Dictum (no more than five sentences addressing the issue

Article 199, the pertinent provision of the Family Code on

[G.R. No. 84698. February 4, 1992.]

2. Respondent’s/Defendant’s claim/s (no more than 3

3. Decision of the lower courts

6. Dictum ( no more than five sentences addressing the issue

Conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be

[G.R. No. 126780. February 17, 2005.]

2. Respondent’s/Defendant’s claim/s (no more than 3

3. Decision of the lower courts

The Court of Appeals aﬃrmed the disquisitions made by

6. Dictum ( no more than five sentences addressing the issue

Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an

[G.R. No. 150157. January 25, 2007.]

2. Respondent’s/Defendant’s claim/s (no more than 3

in causing the collision, while he sued petitioner PRBLI for its

3. Decision of the lower courts

6. Dictum ( no more than five sentences addressing the

Under Article 2176, whoever by act or omission causes

presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of

[G.R. No. L-48006. July 8, 1942]

2. Respondent’s/Defendant’s claim/s (no more than 3

3. Decision of the lower courts

The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower

The Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in

Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest

6. Dictum ( no more than five sentences addressing the

A quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a separate legal

[G.R. No. L-32599. June 29, 1979]

2. Respondent’s/Defendant’s claim/s (no more than 3

3. Decision of the lower courts

the offense charged in Crime. Case No. SM-228, with costs de

6. Dictum ( no more than five sentences addressing the issue

Insofar as Timbol is concerned the answer is yes; the

action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised

[G.R. No. L-47745. April 15, 1988]

2. Respondent’s/Defendant’s claim/s (no more than 3

3. Decision of the lower courts

expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's

6. Dictum ( no more than five sentences addressing the issue

[G.R. NO. 131491. August 17, 2007]

2. Respondent’s/Defendant’s claim/s (no more than 3

3. Decision of the lower courts

The RTC, Branch 258, Parañaque City rendered its

The Court of Appeals decided to reverse and set aside the

6. Dictum ( no more than five sentences addressing the issue

Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law

[G.R. No. L-1299. November 16, 1903]

It was alleged that Don Eugenio Pomar, as general agent

It was added that the defendant, on behalf of the company,

2. Respondent’s/Defendant’s claim/s (no more than 3