Defending Christianity's Rationality

Table of Contents
Introduction
Chapter 1 - Can We Know that Christianity is True?

Chapter 2 - Powerful Evidence for God’s Existence

Chapter 3 - An Updated Contingency Argument

Chapter 4 - How to Respond to Street Epistemology

Chapter 5 - Do Other Religions Show Christianity is Unreliable?

Chapter 6 - If God Exists, Why is There so Much Suffering?

Conclusion

Appendix - A Dozen Don’ts for Christian Apologists
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Introduction
Christianity’s critics are legion. With attacks coming from many different places, Christians in
the 21st century must be prepared to meet intellectual challenges. I didn’t always realize this.
About 6 years ago, my brother became an atheist and it really took me by surprise. I thought it
would be easy to meet with him and resolve his difficulties.

When we met up initially, about a year into his atheism, it didn’t go at all how I planned. He had
objections to everything I said. He asked about the African child who has never heard of Jesus,
he said the story of Jesus was based on Pagan myth, and he thought Noah’s Ark was completely
bogus. Now, I no longer believe these objections are any good, but during the course of our
discussion, I quickly learned that I simply wasn’t equipped to answer. My answers were
basically all shot from the hip. This sent me on a journey.

I set out to learn the rational basis for Christian truth claims. Not only to respond to the
objections he raised, but to know for myself whether Christianity can be rationally defended. I
needed to know. Was my faith futile? Was I worshipping a God that didn’t actually exist? I
honestly had no idea what I would find when I first set out. Attending bible school after high
school hadn’t helped much. There we learned other important things, like the number of books
in the Bible and how to play ping pong.

During this discovery period, I uncovered things that completely took me by surprise. Culturally,
I had been lead to believe there isn’t really much evidence for God’s existence. What I learned is
that, in addition to there being good evidence for God’s existence, Christianity has an incredibly
rich intellectual heritage. The “you’ve just gotta have faith” response to tough questions is a
relatively recent phenomenon. Rational defenses of Christianity stretch back hundreds of years
(e.g., see Thomas Aquinas and his “5 Proofs”).

My passion is to empower the Christian church with the evidence I’ve discovered. I want to
expose Christianity’s intellectual heritage. I want to answer objections and help break down
tough material into bite size pieces. This will not always be easy, but it is something I am
incredibly passionate about.

Capturing Christianity aims to expose the intellectual side of Christian belief. This eBook is a great
start to that end. Continue to visit the website, podcasts, and live discussions to learn more
about the rational basis for Christianity. I hope to provide you with valuable content that you
can share with others, starting with this eBook.

Oh, and btw, Christianity is true.

-Cameron Bertuzzi

Part 1
There are two sorts of objections to Christian belief. On the one hand there are objections to
the truth of Christianity. These attempt to show that belief in Christianity is false. Some atheists
have argued that evil disproves God’s existence. This would be an objection to the truth of
Christianity. On the other hand there are objections to the rationality of Christianity. Here the
claim is not that Christianity is false but rather that belief in Christianity is irrational,
unjustified, foolish, or unwarranted. The next series of posts address the second kind of
objection.
Science
A very popular objection to the rationality of Christian belief is that, while it has been rational in
the past, given developments in modern science (e.g.: evolution), Christianity is no longer
rational to believe. As we saw in a previous post, this objection is completely without
justification. In fact, the opposite is true; if science is in conflict with anything, it is in conflict
with naturalism (the view that nothing like God exists).
Arrogance
A second – perhaps more interesting – objection is that it is arrogant to believe something you
know others do not believe. It is highly arrogant for the Christian to think that what seems
obvious to her is more likely correct than what seems obvious to others. Christians are
therefore guilty of arrogance. Is this a convincing argument?
Well, it seems obviously true to me that torturing infants for fun is wrong. I believe this very
strongly. And I know that some people disagree. Some believe that nothing is really wrong.
Suppose I’ve thought pretty hard about this belief. I’ve considered serious objections to it. In
the end, however, it remains abundantly clear to me that it is wrong to torture an infant for fun.
Could I really be accused of arrogance for maintaining my belief in this case? It’s not clear how.
Furthermore, the claim is self-refuting; it shoots itself in the foot. For anyone that believes it
would be rendered “arrogant” (since not everyone agrees with it).For these reasons, this
objection is not a very good one.


Warrant
Karl Marx famously remarked that religion “is the opium of the people”. He held that, as a result
of societal influence, believers find themselves with brains that are not working properly.
If their brains were working properly, then they’d come to believe as Marx does. Freud, on the
other hand, argued that belief in God offers something to the believer. Namely an ability to live
out this cold, miserable world. In other words, our brains may be working properly, but religious
belief is aimed at wish-fulfillment rather than truth. Fundamentally, Marx and Freud argued
that religious belief lacks warrant.1 Here at least we seem to have found a worthy objection.
What interests us in the next sections is whether or not Christian belief lacks warrant. We will
begin by taking a closer look at warrant and then set out to discover whether Christian belief
has warrant.
Part 2
Before addressing the objection arrived at in Part 1 of this chapter, it would be prudent to spend
a little extra time discussing warrant – what it is and how it works. There are certain words in
English we are intimately familiar with yet have a difficult time analyzing. For instance, what is a
photographer? Is a photographer merely someone that takes pretty pictures or do they need to
get paid for their work? At what point does one become a “photographer”?
Knowledge is a bit like the word photographer. Everyone knows what it means until they
actually sit down and try to analyze it. Knowledge has historically been thought of as justified
true belief. However, in 1963 a guy named Edmund Gettier showed (in 3 short pages) that the
standard analysis of knowledge is inadequate; it is open to various counterexamples. Much of
the philosophy since has been aimed at avoiding this problem.
In Knowledge and Christian Belief, Alvin Plantinga offers a set of conditions he thinks avoids the
Gettier problem. These conditions (if successful) establish warrant. Plantinga uses the term
warrant to mean the following: “the property enough of which is what distinguishes knowledge
from mere true belief”. So what are these magical conditions?
1
Warrant will be looked at in depth in the following sections, but it can be defined briefly like this: “warrant is the property
enough of which is what distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief”.

1. Proper Function
The first step, says Plantinga, is to ensure that one’s beliefs are being produced by a brain that is
functioning or working properly. Beliefs that are the result of brain malfunction or serious
defect do not have much warrant at all. A brain inhibited by alcohol could lead one to believe all
sorts of wacky things. So first and foremost, warrant requires proper function.
2. Correct Environment
Secondly, our brains are suited to a particular kind of environment. For instance, being
subjected to intense radiation can affect the production of memory beliefs. So in addition to
proper function, we must also be in the right kind of environment.
3. Aimed at True Belief

Thirdly, our brains must be purposed or a
imed at producing true beliefs. From Part 1, we saw
that Freud’s objection to religious belief is it is aimed at wish-fulfillment rather than at truth.
Our cognitive faculties (our brains) must have as their goal the production of true beliefs (as
opposed to something like survival or wish-fulfillment).
4. Successfully Aimed at True Belief

We are not there yet. It is not enough to be aimed at true belief, the process must be successfully
aimed at truth, “one such that there is a high probability that a belief produced according to that
plan will be true”.
To summarize, a belief has warrant for a person if (and only if) that belief is produced by a brain
that is functioning properly in an appropriate environment and is operating according to a
design plan that is successfully aimed at truth. We have Gettier to thank for that mouth full.
However much it is worth, I personally think that this analysis is a good one. At the very least, it
is a step in the right direction. With Plantinga’s account in hand, we can begin to provide a

response to the objection arrived at in Part 1.


Part 3
The claim under investigation is that Christian belief is unreasonable, unjustified, or
unwarranted. We saw in Part 1 this objection is understood best as the claim that Christian
belief lacks warrant; it is produced by brains that are malfunctioning (Marx), or functioning
properly but aimed at something other than truth (Freud). In Part 2 we examined the concept of
warrant more closely – what it is and how it works. Part 3 offers a way in which theistic belief
could have warrant. Theistic beliefs are general beliefs about God (like the general belief that
God exists, that the universe was designed by God, etc.).
As a reminder, this series is based in large part on Plantinga’s Knowledge and Christian Belief (144
pages). For a further treatment of these ideas, look there. For an even more in-depth treatment,
see his magnum opus Warranted Christian Belief ( 528 pages).
Sensus Divinitatis
In answering the question, we seek a model that, if true, grants warrant to generic theistic
belief. The French reformer John Calvin held that, “There is within the human mind, and indeed
by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity.” Calvin called this our “sensus divinitatis”. This
capacity in humans doesn’t show up immediately; it occurs with maturity. We likewise don’t
understand arithmetic in infancy; such knowledge comes with age. The idea is that this sense of
God, our sensus divinitatis, produces belief in God under a variety of circumstances.

Colorful sunsets are part of what drew me to photography. There’s just something about them –
they’ve got that quality that makes you want to stop everything and stare. In these moments I
often find myself thankful to God, thankful for allowing me to be a part of such a world, for
allowing me to witness such beauty. In addition to the glories of nature, there is also an
awareness of being sinful and condemned before God (or even forgiven). So this divine sense,
our sensus divinitatis, produces theistic belief in a variety of circumstances.
Here it is important to note two things. First, these beliefs are not arrived at by way of argument.
One does not look at a beautiful sunset and then infer that such a person as God exists. That is
not how the model works. Instead, theistic belief is directly produced in the context of such
experiences. The belief naturally arises; it occasions itself in us. It isn’t an inference or the
conclusion of an argument. Second, according to the model, our sensus divinitatis is damaged or
weakened by sin. The effects of sin have caused our innate sense of God to malfunction. Sin
would be analogous to a brain defect (like an inability to tell right from wrong). The model flips
the Marx/Freud objection on its head; it’s really the unbeliever that has a cognitive defect with
respect to religious belief.
Is Theistic Belief Warranted?

If theism is false – if God does not exist – then there is no such being or person as God. As a
result, there is no such thing as a sensus divinitatis. If God does not exist, “it is unlikely that belief
in God is produced by a process that is functioning properly . . . according to a design plan
successfully aimed at the production of true belief.”2 So, if theism is false, theistic belief likely
does not meet the conditions of warrant mentioned in Part 2.
However, if theism is true – if God does exist – then there is a benevolent creator and designer
of the universe. Given that this being loves and wants us to know Him, the chances are excellent
He would create us with the ability to do so. It is natural to suppose that He would give us a
sensus divinitatis or something similar. But then theistic belief would meet the conditions of
warrant. So if theism is true, theistic belief likely is warranted.
An Interesting Conclusion
As a consequence of this, warrant with respect to theistic belief depends upon the truth or
falsity of theism. The question of whether theistic belief has warrant is not independent of
whether theistic belief is true.

2
Plantinga, Alvin (2015-04-13). Knowledge and Christian Belief (p. 39). Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.. Kindle Edition.

Hence, the atheist that claims theistic belief is irrational or unwarranted must be claiming that
theism is false. To that we might be inclined to say, “May the odds be ever in your favor.”

The question of whether theistic belief has
warrant is not independent of whether theistic
belief is t rue.

In summary, we saw that, if God exists, we were designed with a divine sense that, when
working properly, produces belief in God in various situations (like gazing upon the glories of
nature). Then we saw that, if theism is true, something like this model is probably true. Lastly we
saw that objections to theistic belief reduce to arguments against the truth of theism.
In Part 4 we will attempt to extend this model to include belief, not only in generic theism, but
full-blown Christian theism.
Part 4
In Part 3 of this chapter we saw that generic theistic belief–general beliefs about God–can be
warranted. The basic idea is that, if theism is true, God would have likely created within us a
sensus divinitatis (a mechanism that produces beliefs about God). Beliefs produced in this way
meet the conditions of warrant outlined in Part 2. So then generic theistic belief can be
warranted. The next question we want to tackle is whether full-blown Christian belief can be
warranted, beliefs about sin, atonement, the resurrection, and so on.
Setting up the Account

Here’s how the story goes. According to Christianity, God is a rational being with intellect
(beliefs and knowledge), affections (love and hate), and has the ability to form aims and
intentions. We humans are created in God’s image; that is, we were created with these
attributes in varying degrees. However unfortunate, we have fallen into sin and require
redemption. The consequences of sin are tragic. Firstly, our affections toward God are
warped–instead of loving God above all, we now love ourselves. Secondly, our sense of the
divine (our sensus divinitatis) is broken and in need of repair.3
3
On this account, the “condition of sin involves damage to the sensus divinitatis, but not obliteration; it remains partially
functional in most of us.”

Since we cannot overcome sin on our own, we are in need of a savior, someone to save us from
the effects of sin. Fortunately, God sent a remedy into the world through His divine Son, Jesus
Christ. Jesus came, in part, to restore and repair the broken image of God in us.
Now, God could have conveyed this message of salvation a million different ways but this is how
He did it according to the Christian story. First, He supervised and divinely inspired the
collection of writings we call the Bible. Second, He sent us the Holy Spirit. Third, through the
inner witness of the Holy Spirit, we come to see that the central Christian claims are true.
More on Sin
A common question that arises in this context is how sin originated. Was it through Adam
(Original Sin) or is it some sort of disposition inherent in human nature? This question, while
interesting, is not relevant. All that is relevant for our purposes is that we are currently in such a
predicament. One need only look to the twentieth century for a confirmation of how sinful we
as a species really are. Instead of seeking first the Kingdom of God, we seek first the Kingdom of
Me, Myself, and I.
Warranted Christian Belief

Recalling the Christian story outlined above, we see that God has communicated His message
to us by a 3-step process. First, he supervised and inspired the Bible, a collection of books or
writings that has both a human and divine author. The second element in the process is the
action of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit restores or repairs the damages of sin (both affectual
and intellectual). It is by the work of the Holy Spirit that Christians come to believe in the great
truths of the Gospel.
The third element is the production of faith. On this account, faith is principally the work of the
Holy Spirit; it is a supernatural gift from God. Beliefs about the truth of Christianity, therefore,
are not brought about by way of any natural process. They involve the work of the Holy Spirit.
Given this model, Christian belief will meet the conditions of warrant: they are produced by a
belief producing process that is functioning properly in an appropriate environment according
to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true beliefs.
In summary, Christian belief can be warranted and likely is warranted if Christianity is true.

Part 1
Theism is something like the view that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and
omnibenevolent God. When I was in high school and college, I became interested in philosophy
largely because I wanted to know whether theism was true. I had been raised as a Christian, but
as a teenager, I was unsettled by arguments like those given by the “New Atheists” and their
internet adherents. These arguments were mostly awful, but I didn’t see this at the time, and
their proponents were so confident. At times, the arguments seemed so persuasive that I was
nervous even about talking to other people about them. I thought that if I explained them to a
pastor, say, and asked for guidance, they might say “Huh, I never thought of that” and convert to
atheism themselves.

In principle, I guess I could have just ignored the arguments which bothered me. I didn’t. It
would sound better to say that I didn’t because I bravely chose to value seeking truth over all
else, even if it meant giving up comforting falsehoods and coming face to face with devastating
truths about reality. But I think that, really, I’m just not temperamentally well-suited to being a
theist–I am extremely skeptical, critical and pessimistic4–and this meant that, once the issue
was raised, I couldn’t help second-guessing this belief which seemed so wonderful and on which
I’d staked so much, and abandoning it if the reasons weren’t convincing.5

I suspect that the temperament I describe isn’t healthy, psychologically speaking, but it’s the
one I have. Like many people with unhealthy temperaments, I wound up becoming a
professional philosopher. My interests eventually expanded to include ethics and political
philosophy, rather than just philosophy of religion. But along the way, I came to think that there
was a good philosophical case to be made for theism after all. I’ll sketch part of that case in a
series of three posts.
Caveats
Before beginning, I will issue three caveats. The first is that this is only a sketch o
f part of the
case. Each of the major points I make has had entire books, sometimes entire libraries, written
about it. In my presenting my case, I will have to leave a lot unsaid, and to simplify, gloss over, or
ignore certain details.
4
I don’t mean to suggest that atheists tend to be those things. But being those things makes it harder to be a theist.

5
In fact, people often assume that I am a militant atheist. When I told a member of my department who I’ve been friends with
for many years that I was working on a series of blog posts about arguments for the existence of God, he was shocked to hear
that I was defending them–despite the fact that I’ve told him before that I go to church! I think people get this impression for a
number of reasons (such as my politics, which are very left-wing), but that among these reasons is the temperament I describe.

Further, there are some arguments which I won’t go into, such as the cosmological argument,
the argument from religious experience, and the argument from consciousness.6 (I think that
the argument from consciousness, in particular, is interesting and important, but it probably
requires that some form of dualism be true, and I am currently not sure how to present the
arguments for dualism in an accessible, succinct, and persuasive way.)
This is therefore, as much as anything, an invitation to consider certain lines of thought.

Interested readers can find some additional resources on the topics I cover by clicking the
hyperlinks I’ve embedded throughout.
The second is that I won’t address some important arguments against theism, most notably the
problems of evil or divine hiddenness. My own research in philosophy of religion has mostly
focused on these problems–either responding to them or exploring what it would take to solve
them or even, in true skeptical fashion, trying to strengthen them. I think these are serious
problems which provide some (not decisive, obviously) evidence against theism. I understand
why some people find arguments based on them persuasive. While they need to be addressed,
doing so isn’t my purpose here. (If you’re concerned about the problem of evil, I encourage you
to read this. I have serious disagreements with it, but I think it is the one genuinely great book
on the problem of evil which analytic philosophy–the kind of philosophy I do–has produced.)

Finally, a complete case would also involve a more thorough investigation of alternatives to
theism than I can undertake here. Such alternatives involve philosophical naturalism–the view
that the natural world is all there is–but also, for instance, the views of fundamental reality
found in various non-theistic religions. Each of these views has its own merits and problems,
and a complete case would involve identifying these and evaluating how they compare to the
merits and problems of theism. But, again, this would be a massive project.

That being said, I think the case I outline is quite strong. I don’t expect it to convince everyone:
evaluating philosophical arguments requires making subtle judgment calls, and there’s no
getting around the fact that reasonable people of good will can wind up disagreeing. But when
fleshed out and combined with some other things I would say if I had more time and space, it’s
enough to convince even someone as temperamentally skeptical as myself. Perhaps it can also
help convince others.
6
Another interesting statement of the argument from consciousness is Robert Adams’ “Flavors, Colors, and God,” found in this
book.

In the rest of this post, I will consider the intrinsic probability of theism–the probability we
should assign to God’s existence before c onsidering the evidence–and argue that it should not
be too low. In the Part 2, I will consider some important lines of evidence provided by science. In
Part 3, I will consider further evidence from our ability to obtain moral knowledge and from the
events surrounding Jesus’ death and purported resurrection.
Intrinsic Probability
To see how probable theism is, we need to consider the evidence for and against it. But we also
need to consider its intrinsic p
robability–its probability before taking any evidence into account.
7
To illustrate the idea of intrinsic probability, consider two theories, A and B. Theory A is that
the fundamental physical equations which govern how matter behaves are the same, all
throughout the universe. Theory B is that they are the same throughout the vast majority of the
universe, but there is one tiny patch somewhere which, for no particular reason, is governed by
totally different equations (maybe there is a planet where humans would float unsupported,
where clapping two erasers together would cause a nuclear explosion, etc.).

Most of us think that accepting A would currently be much more reasonable than accepting B.
But consider: our scientific evidence is about equally good for both A and B. If there is just one
tiny patch governed by different equations, then it is (literally) astronomically unlikely that we
would have found it, so our observations of unity are only astronomically weak evidence for A
against B. If we really are justified in thinking A is much more probable than B, it must be
because of something about A which A possesses prior to taking any empirical evidence into
account, since the empirical evidence only negligibly favors A over B. In other words, A’s
advantage is primarily because its intrinsic probability is higher.

7
Two notes. First, we also need to consider how it fits with what’s called our “background knowledge;” it will be simpler to just
paper over this and, for slightly technical reasons, it won’t make an important difference. Second, if it is the case, as many people
(including me) think, that if God exists, then God exists necessarily, then the objective p
robability of God’s existence is either 1
or 0: either God must exist or God cannot exist. But what I am concerned about is the epistemic probability we should assign to
theism prior to taking evidence into account. It is clear that sometimes we should assign an epistemic probability between 0 and
1 to a proposition’s being true, even when, in fact, it must be either necessarily true or necessarily false. For instance, suppose I
think I vaguely remember hearing that a certain mathematical conjecture had been proven. Since the conjecture will
presumably be either necessarily true or necessarily false, its objective probability will be either 0 or 1. However, my credence
in the conjecture should be somewhere above, but not too f ar above, .5. If I have no evidence about the truth of the conjecture
either way, it’s harder to say what my credence should be–maybe .5?–but it clearly shouldn’t be 0 or 1.


Intrinsic Probability and Theism
To see more specifically how claims about intrinsic probability are relevant to the existence of
God, consider that several popular lines of argument for atheism rely on claims about the
intrinsic probability of theism. I can think of at least three types of arguments like this. One
involves directly arguing that the intrinsic probability of theism is very low, so that we can be
justified in believing it only if the evidence for it is very strong (if even then). Richard Dawkins’
so-called “Ultimate Boeing 747 Gambit” is an instance of this kind of reasoning. As far as I
understand it, Dawkins’ idea is that God would need to be maximally complex, and theories are
less intrinsically probable to the extent that they posit unexplained complexity. Accordingly,
appealing to God to explain some phenomenon will always or nearly always be illegitimate,
since theism will always or nearly always be less likely than other explanations, or than the
phenomenon to be explained just existing without any explanation.

A more serious and sophisticated version of this type of argument comes from the philosopher
Paul Draper, perhaps the keenest philosophical critic of theism today. Roughly speaking,
Draper claims that theism is extremely immodest, in the sense, roughly, that it rules out very
many other possibilities (it rules out naturalism, but also every possible form of polytheism,
etc.). All else being equal, being compatible with fewer possibilities makes a theory less
intrinsically probable. (For instance, all else being equal, it’s more likely that I draw a heart than
that I draw a jack from a standard deck of cards, since there are more hearts, and therefore
more ways the heart hypothesis can be true.) For theism to be rational, the evidence for it
would then need to overcome both the evidence against it and its intrinsic improbability, which
Draper thinks is implausible.

A second form of argument involves attempting to parody t heism by arguing that some
intentionally stupid alternative (the Flying Spaghetti Monster, etc.) both predicts the evidence
for theism equally well and is no less intrinsically probable. Since we shouldn’t believe in the
intentionally stupid alternative, and have no more reason to accept theism than to accept it, we
shouldn’t believe in theism, either. If these intentionally stupid alternatives really do predict the
evidence equally well, then showing the superiority of theism would require showing that it is
more intrinsically probable than they are.


A third type of argument involves appealing to parsimony. The claim is something like this:
theists believe in everything naturalists believe in (namely, the natural world), but they also
believe in an additional thing (God). Because the naturalistic picture involves one less thing, it is
simpler, and therefore intrinsically more probable. (Notice that, unlike the Ultimate 747
Gambit, this doesn’t require the claim that God would be immensely complex and therefore
improbable, just the claim that the overall theistic worldview is more complex than the
naturalistic one in virtue of containing an additional thing, regardless of how complex that
additional thing is.) The objector claims that, because the theistic worldview is intrinsically less
probable, the “burden of proof” is therefore on the theist to produce evidence for theism strong
enough to overcome this improbability.
An Assessment
When I was younger, I worried a lot about arguments like these. (Well, I never worried about
the flying spaghetti monster, but I worried about the others.) They made it seem like theism
could be adopted only as a last resort, like every other alternative, no matter how intrinsically
implausible or how bad a fit for the evidence, should be preferred if at all possible.
And since, of course, it is always possible t o reconcile just about anything with anything, this
made it seem like any arguments for theism were doomed from the start. I had a strong a priori
bias against theism, but I thought it was rationally justified. Was it?

In thinking about how to evaluate the intrinsic probability of theism, it may help to consider
how we evaluate the intrinsic probability of A (that physics is uniform) and B (that there’s a
weird patch out there somewhere). First, recall Draper’s point about modesty. A is far less
modest than B, since there are many, many more ways that B could be true than that A could be
true. Suppose we know which set of equations governs things around these parts; given that,
there is only one way A could be true (that set of equations holds everywhere), whereas there
are an infinite number of ways B could be true. This fact counts against A, but it clearly isn’t a
decisive consideration. There must be something about A which is epistemically powerful
enough to outweigh the fact that A is much less modest than B.

Unfortunately, there is philosophical disagreement about exactly which feature or features of A
this might be, and I don’t plan to offer any very detailed account here. But it’s plausible that it
has something to do with the fact that A is simpler than B, which I understand, roughly, as
meaning that it takes much less to completely describe the fundamental elements of the theory
in A’s case than in B’s. (Roughly, the fundamental elements are those taken as given by the
theory, rather than explained by other elements of it.)

Describing physics on A requires just one set of physical equations. Unless there is some way of
subsuming the two sets of laws posited by B under some deeper set of laws, then describing
physics on B requires describing the set of laws posited by A plus another set which governs
some small patch plus a description of which set governs which place.

Another (possibly related)8 point is that B seems to contain features which are arbitrary i n a way
which A doesn’t. If someone suggested that there was a patch of the universe governed by
different equations, the natural question would be something like, “What’s so special about that
area?” If the answer was “nothing, the laws are just different for no reason,” this seems like a
good reason to reject that view. A deviation of the sort posited by B seems to cry out for
explanation in a way that the uniformity posited by A does not.9
Analyzing Theism
What happens when we apply these criteria to theism? Draper is correct that theism is
immodest, and that this lowers its intrinsic probability. But remember that simplicity and
non-arbitrariness were more than enough to outweigh this feature in A.
And I claim that theism possesses simplicity and non-arbitrariness in a way similar to A. Contra
Dawkins, theism is extremely simple. It begins by positing a single being (God) with just one
property (being absolutely perfect) which entails all of the being’s other essential properties
(omnipotence, omniscience, etc.). It then suggests that all of contingent reality can be explained
in terms of decisions God makes in light of these essential properties.

Perhaps Dawkins understands simplicity somewhat differently than I do. He elsewhere says
that an object is complex insofar as its “constituent parts are arranged in a way that is unlikely
to have arisen by chance alone,” and where that way has significance which is “specifiable in
advance.”10
8
It may be that the second criterion is ultimately just a part of the first–that what I’m calling arbitrariness makes a hypothesis
less simple, and this is the reason it makes the hypothesis less likely. It doesn’t matter for our purposes whether this is true.

9
If someone rejects the claim that something like these criteria are fundamental determinants of intrinsic probability, they face
the question of how we can justify employing criteria like these in science, and of explaining why investigating the world using
these criteria works so well. Since God would have some reason to make an orderly and elegant world, theism probably
provides a better explanation of this than many other views, so that it might then constitute evidence for theism. Cf. this.

10
The thought is that, if a tornado tears through a junkyard and creates a 747, this may not be less likely than its scattering the
parts in any other, equally specific way. But the creation of the 747 has significance which is “specifiable in advance,” in a way
that its scattering the parts in some equally specific but uninteresting way does not. So the 747 is complex in a way that
another, equally specific and equally unlikely arrangement of parts is not.

Elsewhere he phrases the issue, not terms of the arrangement of parts, but in terms of having
“some quality, specifiable in advance, that is highly unlikely to have been acquired by random
chance alone.” The complexity of a theory would then presumably have something to do with
the complexity of the objects it posits.

Employing this definition in the Ultimate Boeing 747 Gambit raises some worries. One is
circularity: God is unlikely because complex, and complex because unlikely? Another is that it’s
not clear how this could explain why A is simpler than B: what are the “parts” posited by B which
are “unlikely to have arisen by chance alone?” What “quality” were the laws posited by B
unlikely to “acquire?” But the funniest problem is that God isn’t actually complex according to
this definition, either, since God isn’t supposed to have parts or to have “acquired” the divine
properties.

Similarly, like A, theism posits uniformity rather than arbitrariness. Suppose someone put
forward the following theory: there exists a being who is omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and
knows about everything except water chestnuts, about which this being is mostly in the dark.
There are a lot of things one might say to this, but an obvious one is, “What’s so special about
water chestnuts?” If the answer is “nothing,” and the limitation is just being posited as an
unexplained fact, this would be a major reason to favor theism over this theory. But just as
there is nothing special about water chestnuts, neither is there anything special about positing a
limitation in God’s knowledge concerning water chestnuts: positing any l imits on divine power,
knowledge, or goodness (apart from those which can be explained, such as God’s inability to
make contradictions actual) raises the question of why God has precisely that a mount of power,
knowledge, or goodness in a way that traditional theism does not (both links are worth reading).
Serious Theistic Advantages
Considerations like these suggest that theism has a substantial advantage over intentionally
stupid competitors, and that the popular parody arguments therefore fail.
The Flying Spaghetti Monster, for instance, would be extraordinarily complicated and arbitrary.
11
It’s not surprising that these competitors possess theoretical vices, since they are
intentionally stupid. But the fact that theism doesn’t p
ossess these vices means they aren’t
effective parodies of it after all.

11
Of course, the Flying Spaghetti Monster can be given a fairly short description–i.e., he’s a flying spaghetti monster. But this
isn’t a complete description. It doesn’t tell us–and what a world we live in, that I should have to write this–what sort of spaghetti
he’s made of, how much spaghetti there is, the precise configuration of the spaghetti, etc., nor anything about his personality or
intentions or history, and so on.

In addition, the points made above similarly suggest that theism has an advantage over some
serious hypotheses. For instance, they favor theism over forms of polytheism which begin by
positing multiple gods with very arbitrary characteristics. Plausibly, they also favor theism over
forms of naturalism which, for instance, trace all of contingent reality back to an initial
singularity, but treat that singularity as a brute fact. While that singularity was much simpler
and less arbitrary than the universe as it currently stands, it nonetheless must have had a
number of diverse and quite arbitrary properties.

But wait–what about the parsimony argument, which claimed that the theistic worldview must
be less parsimonious, since theists believe in the same physical world which naturalists do, but
also believe in at least one additional thing? Notice that, if this argument worked, it would also
be an extremely powerful argument for solipsism, the view that only I (or you, or whoever’s
considering solipsism) exist: were I a solipsist, I would believe in nothing but my mind and my
conscious experiences, whereas I presently believe in those plus all sorts of other stuff. We
shouldn’t be tempted by arguments like this. I think the problem is that the person who claims
that the theistic picture must be more complicated on these grounds misunderstands the kind
of simplicity which is relevant to determining intrinsic probability. As I’ve said, this kind of
simplicity has at least primarily to do with the simplicity of the fundamental elements of the
theory.

It’s worth noting that Dawkins recognizes this. He writes that the goal of the biologist, in
attempting to explain the existence of complex lifeforms, is to show how they could arise “from
primordial objects sufficiently simple to have come into being by chance”–in other words, the
biologist’s goal is to come up with an empirically adequate theory whose fundamental e lements
are quite simple, and can explain the complex ones. One of the virtues of evolutionary theory is
that it can do this. I claim that something similar might hold true for theism.
Last Thoughts
So: theism is both simple and non-arbitrary, and that insofar as this is true, it has some of the
theoretical virtues we should be looking for in attempting to account for evidence. Its intrinsic
probability is not too low, and is probably higher than that of many of its competitors. There are
therefore some reasons to place bets on theism right out of the starting gate.12 But, of course,
we do also need to consider the evidence. I will consider some of it in the next sections.

12
For more on the intrinsic probability of theism, see ch. 6 of Joshua Rasmussen’s forthcoming book How Reason Leads to God.

Part 2
In the previous section, I considered the intrinsic probability of theism, arguing that it was not
too low. In this post, I consider some important lines of evidence for theism provided by science,
mostly by physics. When I was younger, the progress of science seemed like a threat to theism.
It’s not that I had a problem reconciling science with my beliefs, as might be the case with, say,
someone who thinks it’s very important to interpret Genesis literally. The problem was instead
that it seemed like science threatened to render God an “unnecessary hypothesis.” As science
explained more and more, it seemed that God was needed to explain less and less. One could s ay
that God had created a mostly self-sufficient cosmos, but there didn’t seem to be much reason
to s ay it, and parsimony considerations like those discussed in my last post seemed to tell
against it.

I don’t think this way any more. I am still impressed by science’s ability to explain what goes in
the world–it still seems to me that the world God created is mostly self-sufficient. But I now
think that certain features of the world which science has helped discover, along with the fact
that science has been as successful as it has, are much more likely if theism is true, and are
therefore powerful evidence for theism.
Fine-Tuning
One of the most striking pieces of relevant evidence is the so-called “fine-tuning” of the
universe for life. Recent science has provided strong evidence that even tiny variations in the
form of the laws of nature, the values of the constants which appear in those laws, or in the
initial conditions of the universe would have resulted in a universe incapable of sustaining life.
So, to take an example of each type:
○ Without the Pauli Exclusion Principle, complicated chemistry would not be possible;
○ If the strength of gravity had been one part in 1060 stronger, the universe would have
collapsed back in on itself after the Big Bang, whereas if it was one part in 1060 weaker,
stars would not form;
○ If the entropy of the initial conditions was not extraordinarily low, stars would not have
been able to form. Roger Penrose calculates that the states allowing life to arise
represent 1 in 1010^123 of the possible states. If 1010^123 were written out in the ordinary
way, it would be a 1 followed by 10123 zeros–by contrast, the entire universe has only
around 1080 particles. (However, Penrose’s calculation isn’t uncontroversial, so don’t
treat it as too exact.)

There are many, many other examples; some can be found on pages 211-222 here. It could turn
out that some of these examples will be explained away by future science, but it seems very
unlikely that they will all b
e explained away like this, given that there are many examples of
many different types.

In light of these facts, if our universe is the only one which exists, then it seems extraordinarily
unlikely that it would just happen to be able to support beings like us. On the other hand, it
seems like there’s at least some chance that a good God would create a universe which could
support beings like us–we have at least a few positive qualities, after all. Accordingly, the
existence of fine-tuning initially seems to be many, many times more likely on theism than it
would otherwise be, and so seems to be powerful evidence for theism.
A Multiverse?
The most serious response to this line of reasoning involves claiming that we live in a multiverse.
If there exists a tremendous number of universes, each with different laws and constants, then
perhaps it is not surprising that one or another might be able to support life. And it is hardly
surprising that we would find ourselves in one of the life-permitting universes. (After all, we’re
alive.) For all I know, we may well live in a multiverse.

However, it’s not clear that this really succeeds in explaining away the fine-tuning problem. We
might distinguish, as Robin Collins does, between physical a nd metaphysical multiverse theories.
Physical multiverse theories, which tend to have been developed by physicists, posit some
physical thing–such as a quantum vacuum–which generates the various universes involved in
the multiverse. Some such theory may well be true, but the most plausible of these multiverse
generators themselves tend to require a form of fine-tuning (both to produce life at all and to
avoid the conclusion that we should have been so-called “Boltzmann brains”), and so only push
the problem back a step rather than eliminating the need for theistic fine-tuning (see, e.g., pages
262-271 here). (Of course, Dawkins’ “Ultimate Boeing 747” argument is meant to show that
theism pushes the problem back in an even worse way, but I explained before why I don’t think
that’s right.)

Meanwhile, metaphysical t heories, which tend to have been developed by philosophers, suggest
that the multiverse itself makes up the fundamental structure of physical reality, without the
universes being generated by any physical mechanism. However, these theories face other
severe problems.

The most prominent form of a view like this is David Lewis’ “modal realism,” which asserts that
every possible universe concretely exists. But there are many devastating objections to modal
realism. (For instance, in a paper in progress, Nevin Climenhaga and I argue that the success of
inductive reasoning provides powerful evidence against modal realism. For further arguments,
see Part III of this book.)

These thoughts illustrate my general sense of the state of multiverse-based replies to
fine-tuning. Some multiverse theories face powerful independent objections, and so are
unlikely to be true. Meanwhile, others may well be true, but the most plausible of these
themselves require a form of fine-tuning. A multiverse theory like the latter might be true, but if
so, it, too, might provide evidence for theism. Further, note that naturalistic multiverse
hypotheses don’t s eem to provide a ready explanation for the other two pieces of data to which
I’ll appeal, for reasons we’ll see.
Beauty
Another striking fact is the beauty of the universe. There is, of course, beauty in various
macro-level objects–in stars, galaxies, etc. But there is also tremendous beauty woven into the
laws of nature themselves, which orchestrate the myriad workings of matter according to
extremely elegant mathematical principles. Indeed, at times , mathematicians have developed
abstruse systems of mathematics for purely aesthetic or intellectual reasons, only to later
realize that these systems described the behavior of actually existing physical systems (so, for
instance, Riemannian geometry was developed in the nineteenth century for aesthetic reasons,
but was discovered, after the development of the theory of relativity, to describe the curvature
of space-time).

This is confirmed by Steven Weinberg, an atheist and Nobel-prize winning physicist, when he
writes that “mathematical structures that confessedly are developed by mathematicians
because they seek a sort of beauty are often found later to be extraordinarily valuable by the
physicist,” and even that “we are beginning to suspect that” the appearance of beauty in our
fundamental physical theories “is not merely an accident, that there is a beauty in these laws
that mirrors something that is built into the structure of the universe at a very deep level.”


(As an atheist, Weinberg thinks the “uncanny” implications of this can ultimately be explained
away, but nonetheless does “have to admit that sometimes nature seems more beautiful than
strictly necessary.”)13 I suggested earlier that the best objection to the claim that the universe is
fine-tuned for the existence of life was to suggest that there were very, very many universes;
perhaps very few of these are life-permitting, but, obviously, it’s not surprising that we find
ourselves in one of the life-permitting ones. The same move doesn’t seem to work here; there is
no clear reason why we couldn’t have found ourselves in a universe that wasn’t beautiful. But
we can see why a good and powerful God might value beauty in God’s creations, and bring it
about that those creations were beautiful; the probability of such beauty on theism is higher
than it would otherwise be.
Discoverability
Another striking feature is the discoverability o f the universe–the fact that it is structured in
such a way that we are able to understand its fundamental workings. It seems that in principle,
the universe might have been very chaotic–too disorderly and unintelligible for us to be
comprehensible. Even apart from this possibility, going in, one would not particularly expect
beings like us, with minds evolved to help us survive the kinds of practical challenges faced by
our ancestors, to be able to discover such astonishing things as the composition of far-off stars
or the conditions present during the universe’s earliest moments.

The discoverability of the universe is made even more striking by work from Robin Collins, who
suggests that it, too, requires a particular kind of fine-tuning. So, for instance, Collins calculates
that the baryon to photon ratio could have had any one of a wide range values without
compromising the ability of the universe to support life, but that, within this range, it is
finely-tuned to maximize the intensity of the cosmic microwave background radiation–the
feature of the universe which allowed us to discover the Big Bang. Collins’ work is cutting-edge,
and the evidence of fine-tuning for discoverability is not yet as well-established as that for
fine-tuning for life. But it is nonetheless intriguing.
13
If you’re wondering why Weinberg rejects theism, only one of his reasons (as he acknowledges) has particularly to do with
physics: he thinks that “though we shall find beauty in the final laws of nature, we will find no special status for life or
intelligence.” Apart from the question of exactly what this means or the theological significance of it, I take it that the other
considerations I raise in this post call it into question. His other reasons are fairly standard statements of fairly standard
objections, some of which are serious (evil, religious disagreement) and some of which aren’t (“the lessons of religious
experience seem to me indelibly marked with the stamp of wishful thinking.”).

Again, there doesn’t seem to be any particular reason why we couldn’t exist in a universe which
wasn’t discoverable; indeed–especially if Collins is right–it seems much more likely that we
would find ourselves in such a universe than in one like ours. On the other hand, we can see why
a good God would have reason to favor the intellectual goods involved in learning and
comprehending the fundamental workings of the world, along with the ability to appreciate the
beauty God had instilled in the deepest workings of creation, so that we have more reason to
expect these features if the universe is created by God. Discoverability, too, therefore provides
powerful evidence for theism.

In the next section, I will discuss evidence from moral knowledge and miracles.
Part 3
In the previous section, I surveyed some evidence for theism provided by physics. In this post, I
consider further evidence from our ability to obtain moral knowledge and from the events
surrounding Jesus’ death and purported resurrection, and then offer some concluding
reflections. (Also make sure to check out Part 1 in this series; it dealt with the probability of
theism before looking at the evidence.)
Moral Arguments
For quite a long time, I haven’t been particularly impressed by what we might call the “standard”
moral argument for theism, which claims that God’s existence is necessary to explain the
existence of objective moral rules. To put the point in an extremely rough way: I think my
obligations to other people, and to the other animals, have primarily to do with how they a re,
taken on their own, with the kind of value and standing they possess just in virtue of being
fellow sentient creatures, and that claiming that I would have no obligations if God did not exist
fails to adequately respect this fact.14 I feel similarly about arguments which claim, for instance,
not that the mere existence of moral obligations depends on God, but that we wouldn’t have any
decisive reasons to comply w
ith these obligations if God didn’t exist. (Essentially, I agree with
nearly everything Shelly Kagan said in his debate on the moral argument with William Lane
Craig.)

14
Saying I’ve thought this way for a long time is actually an oversimplification; there have been brief periods where I flirted with
other views, but I always come back around to the view expressed in the main text. More specifically, at present, I am some kind
of contractualist, although I think standard forms of contractualism require some important modifications.

At times, I’ve thought this meant that there was no good moral argument for theism. I don’t
think this now. For it’s possible that though the moral standing of our fellow creatures does not
depend on God (except in the sense that God is responsible for their existence), our ability to
know that they have t his moral standing does. And, in fact, there are some good reasons to think
this is the case.
Moral Knowledge
Let’s begin by clarifying the state of affairs which this version of the moral argument takes to be
in need of explanation. Suppose we encounter a race of benevolent, peaceful, intelligent aliens.
Call them the Vulcans. If someone claimed it would be a good thing to launch an unprovoked,
genocidal attack against them, that person would (barring very odd extenuating circumstances)
be wrong, and we would know that they were wrong. This entails that there are truths a bout
morality–morality is the sort of thing people can be right or wrong about. It also entails that we
have some knowledge about morality. Most of us think, in fact, that we know quite a lot about
morality, even though we’re not sure about everything. Of course, we recognize that our moral
intuitions sometimes steer us wrong, but we learn that fact, ultimately, by evaluating certain
intuitions in light of others, so we must think that our intuitions are at least fairly reliable, at
least under the right conditions, if any kind of moral reasoning is to get off the ground.

Suppose we meet another alien race. Call them the Klingons. Their homeworld was much
harsher and had fewer resources than ours, and evolutionary pressures favored extreme
xenophobia. The clans that survived were those which were most ruthless in exterminating
other clans. The Klingons came to take it as a moral axiom that exterminating those outside
your tribe is a moral duty, just as, say, we take it to be the case that providing for your children
or not causing unnecessary pain is a moral duty. Eventually, one clan destroyed the others, and
now the Klingons live in relative peace with each other. However, encountering humans and
Vulcans and recognizing us as outsiders, they now take it to be their duty to destroy us.
I take it that we have, to put it mildly, a disagreement w
ith the Klingons. When they say “It is
good for us to exterminate you” and we say “it is bad for you to exterminate us,” we can’t both
be right, and it would make sense for us to argue about who is right. This shows that the
fundamental moral truths don’t vary depending on the views or preferences of individuals,
societies, or even species. If you put me in check and I say “That’s bad!” while you say “That’s
good!,” we probably don’t have a real disagreement.

All I mean is something like “That’s bad for me” or “That’s bad from my perspective” or “I don’t like
that,” and all you mean is “That’s good for me,” etc. We don’t really express disagreement, since
we can both be right; in fact, I agree that it’s good for you and from your perspective that you put
me in check, so I think we both are right. That our dispute with the Klingons is not like this shows
that, in making claims about fundamental moral principles, we are not expressing how things
look relative to our perspective, or how we feel about something, or whatever; instead, we are
invoking an objective set of moral facts which don’t depend on what we think about them.

This state of affairs–our possession of a large amount of knowledge of moral truths which are
objective in the sense that they don’t depend on how things look to us, etc.–is what’s puzzling.
Here’s why. Like the Klingons’, our own moral intuitions have been formed through
evolutionary pressures and various other natural forces. If we had evolved on the Klingons’
homeworld, or if, say, lions or bees or wolves had become the sapient species on earth, it seems
that the resulting morality might have been mostly different. Darwin realized this point, writing
that:

If, for instance, to take an extreme case, men were reared under precisely the same
conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would,
like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would
strive to kill their fertile daughters; and no one would think of interfering.

If we think our moral intuitions are even just fairly w ell-correlated with the objective moral
facts, this might seem like a stunning coincidence. As Sharon Street puts the point, if there is no
explanation of why natural processes would lead to our having reliable moral judgments, then:

…allowing our evaluative judgements to be shaped by evolutionary influences is
analogous to setting out for Bermuda and letting the course of your boat be determined
by the wind and tides: just as the push of the wind and tides on your boat has nothing to
do with where you want to go, so the historical push of natural selection on the content
of our evaluative judgements has nothing to do with evaluative truth….Of course it’s
possible that as a matter of sheer chance, some large portion of our evaluative
judgements ended up true, due to a happy coincidence between the realist’s
independent evaluative truths and the evaluative directions in which natural selection
tended to push us, but this would require a fluke of luck that’s not only extremely
unlikely, in view of the huge universe of logically possible evaluative judgements and
truths, but also astoundingly convenient to the realist.

Notice that, while both Street and I have focused on the threat posed by evolutionary influences
on our intuitions, the argument might well be able to work even if there had been no such
influences. If naturalism is true, our moral faculties were formed by natural processes of one
sort or another, and it’s not clear why any of these would have been aimed at producing moral
truth.
Naturalistic Response?
The only response which I think has a prayer of working for the naturalist who accepts that we
have a substantial amount of knowledge of objective moral reality says something like this:
evolution didn’t aim at moral accuracy, but it did aim at making us think things were good if they
promoted reproductive success, and reproductive success requires survival, and, fortunately,
things that help us survive do in fact tend to be good, so it’s not too surprising that we wound up
with mostly accurate intuitions. I think there are two main problems with this view. One is that
it’s not clear that the value of survival actually does make it not too surprising that our
intuitions are as reliable as they are: the evolutionary paths mentioned above don’t seem
particularly unrealistic. But another problem is that, even if this succeeds in explaining the
correlation between our judgments and moral truth, it would still be the case that nothing in the
moral domain played any role in explaining why we hold the moral judgments we do. Arguably,
this fact alone is enough to make it the case that we wouldn’t have knowledge o f the moral
domain, that, when accurate, we would be accurate merely by luck (see this paper, which was
brought to my attention by Andrew Moon, and especially the examples given in section 7).

Ultimately, Street thinks that there is no plausible naturalistic account of why we would have
reliable moral intuitions. As a naturalist, she thinks this means we should give up on the idea
that we have knowledge about any kind of objective moral reality. However, the theist has
another option: the theist can say that the reliability of our faculties is no coincidence, but is
instead the result of God designing or guiding natural processes so that we would have the
ability to discover moral truths. (This doesn’t require rejecting the evolutionary explanation of
the development of our faculties, just the claim that this process was totally unguided.)

If our having as much moral knowledge as we do is much more likely given theism, then this is
strong evidence in theism’s favor.15 (For more on this argument, see my and Philip Swenson’s
paper “God and Moral Knowledge” in a forthcoming volume edited by Joshua Rasmussen and
Kevin Vallier.)
Miracles
I know many people who think they have experienced miracles. If we have good evidence for
the occurrence of events which violate, or are rendered extraordinarily unlikely by, the laws of
nature, but which would be much more likely to occur if God exists, then this would be good
evidence for theism. Unfortunately, I have to admit that I’m not particularly impressed by most
of the miracle stories I hear. It usually seems, on the one hand, too easy to think of some natural
explanation for what’s happened, and, on the other hand, too hard to see why God would
intervene in this case when God doesn’t intervene in other, apparently similar cases. (The
second point is illustrated by the infamous trope of someone who attributes their survival in a
deadly disaster to miraculous intervention–leaving open the question of why God didn’t
intervene to save the other p eople affected.) I don’t necessarily mean that I disbelieve the
ordinary miracle stories that I hear: if you already believe in God, it’s hard to rule out a miracle
even if another explanation seems possible, and God might always have some unknowable
reason for acting here and not there. But I don’t think atheists should be particularly troubled
by most miracle stories.

I say all this to indicate that, when I do f ind a miracle claim impressive, that means something.
And one which I do find impressive is the claim that Jesus was resurrected from the dead by
God. I will not be able to survey the full range of historical evidence here, though interested
readers are welcome to look into it for themselves (note: there are five different links).
15
It’s reasonable to ask why our moral faculties aren’t more reliable than they are if theism is true. Of course, I don’t know why
they aren’t, but if I had to speculate, I might say that part of the answer is something like this: I think the faculties of ordinary
people are reliable enough that they can, in principle, obtain the truth about the vast majority of important moral questions, but
that human moral faculties are nonetheless weak enough to give us responsibility for developing our own moral knowledge, and
for helping others do the same, and that there is something valuable in this responsibility. So, for instance, many people in the
United States currently do not worry much about factory farming. But it isn’t hard for a non-psychopath to see that factory
farming is a horrific atrocity, given even cursory exposure to the empirical facts and reflection on their moral significance. That
people do not have such exposure, and do not engage in such reflection, is generally the result of culpable wrongdoing on the
part of themselves or other people: of attempts by people in the agricultural industry to cover up the empirical facts, or moral
apathy on the part of many people, etc. This instance of failing to apprehend an important moral truth is therefore, the story
would go, not ultimately because the moral faculties of these people weren’t up to the task, but because of abuses of
responsibility with which humans had been entrusted by God for good reasons. My response to this problem therefore bears an
important similarity with a response I have defended to the problem of divine hiddenness. But even if that isn’t particularly
convincing–for instance, it may well be insufficient, on its own, to account for the terrible evil that moral ignorance brings
about–note that it could also be that our moral faculties being as reliable as they are might be very unlikely on theism (since
we’d expect them to be more reliable) while still being powerful evidence for theism if it’s even more unlikely on what are
otherwise the most plausible alternative views that we’d have as much knowledge as we do (since we’d have even more reason
to expect ourselves to have even less moral knowledge).

But my impression is that the historical grounds for believing that something like the following
happened are extremely strong: Jesus was executed; very shortly afterwards, Jesus’ disciples
began claiming that he had appeared to them after death, and, in fact, that he had appeared to
them when they were in groups (a fact which would tell against the possibility of hallucinations);
James, Jesus’ brother, who had not been a follower of Jesus and so had no reason to expect this,
similarly saw Jesus and converted; so did Paul, who was not only vehemently opposed to
Christianity, but who had everything to lose by converting; none of these people ever recanted,
but instead, they, being in a position to know whether the Christian message was true,
continued preaching it even in the face of persecution. Though the historical grounds for
establishing this are not quite as decisive, it also seems to me that there is a very good case for
thinking that Jesus was buried in a tomb, and that the tomb turned up empty.

This is essentially the course of events we would expect if Jesus really was resurrected, and
then walked out of his tomb and appeared to the people in question. Otherwise, it’s clear that
something extremely bizarre must have happened–some incredibly unlikely confluence of
events. Of course, if one thinks it is unlikely enough that Jesus would have been resurrected,
one might ultimately conclude that, despite the evidence for the resurrection, some extremely
bizarre series of events must have happened after all. As I mentioned in my first post, when I
was younger, I was tempted by the view that this something like this was true–that a theistic
explanation should always be avoided, no matter how implausible the alternatives. I think this
view is much harder to defend in light of what I’ve said. But in any event, none of this changes
the fact that the evidence for the resurrection is there.

If Jesus was resurrected, this is clearly extraordinarily powerful evidence for theism. We can
see why God might have reasons to resurrect Jesus: namely, the various reasons given by
Christian theology. Meanwhile, the odds of Jesus being resurrected on any non-goofy
alternative hypothesis are likely to be vanishingly small. Of course, Jesus’ resurrection would
provide powerful evidence, not just for theism, but specifically for Christian t heism–a fact,
clearly, with important implications.
Conclusion
I mentioned at the beginning of this series that I think I have a psychological bias against theism.
Theists and atheists often accuse one another of being biased against the opposing view due to
not wanting it to be true. They therefore accuse their opponents of a kind of wishful thinking.
And no doubt, for both sides, the accusation is sometimes true, though seldom helpful.

But it’s also possible to be biased against something because you want it to be true, if you are
also overly pessimistic and distrustful of good things. And while, as I said earlier, I do think there
is some important evidence for atheism (most notably in the form of evil and hiddenness) and I
understand why it convinces people, I also think I have the bias described, and that this is a
source of some of the skeptical worries I’ve had.

I certainly do want my religious views to be true. The form of Christianity which I accept entails
that something like the following is true: there’s a community which is now still only in its
faintest beginnings, but which is going somewhere stunning. It’s being formed by a being of
perfect love and beauty and goodness, one who wants to have relationships with you and I, of all
people, and has even proven willing to undergo terrible suffering to bring that about. It’s a
community in which you’ll again see your departed loved ones, in which people whose lives
consisted of nothing but suffering will have their wounds healed and will be able to go on, a
community without death, without oppression, without degradation, without hurt (even the
little animals won’t get hurt, if you can believe it), one in which we’ll relate to God and to one
another without fear or anxiety or shame or pretense–in which, as St. Paul says, for the first
time, we’ll see each other face to face. And it is our job, here and now, to help this community be
realized. “Repent, for the Kingdom of God is at hand.”

This is a beautiful and inspiring picture of the world–about the most beautiful and inspiring one
which there could be. Sometimes it seems too good to be true. But when I rationally reflect on it,
I think the case I have sketched here provides the beginning of a very powerful case in its favor.
My arguments suggest that the universe was created by someone or something to exemplify
beauty, order and comprehensibility, as well as to give rise, in addition to the other sentient
animals, to conscious, embodied agents such as ourselves who have the ability to comprehend
right and wrong. The intrinsic probability of theism, I claim, is not too low, and is higher than
that of other views which also account for the evidence in question. My final argument
argument further suggests that the creator had an interest in vindicating the person and life of
Jesus; this would, in turn, provide strong evidence, not just for theism, but for Christianity. So,
there are powerful reasons to hope the worldview I described above is true. If I’m right, there
are also powerful reasons to think that it is.

As the title suggests, what I’ll be presenting is an updated version of the contingency argument.
This version is heavily inspired by the work of Joshua Rasmussen, so, if this piques your interest,
I recommend looking into his two papers on the subject. See here and here.

Why an updated contingency argument? Two reasons. First, the version I give utilizes weaker
premises and is therefore easier to hold and defend (weaker, not in the sense of being less true,
but in that it requires less assumptions). For instance, the version I will be defending does not
entail that the universe as a whole is contingent. So that premise–while I think it true–does not
need to be defended. Secondly, updating an argument causes those that have previously
rejected it to reassess. So a new group of people might come to hold the contingency argument.

We start, as any contingency argument does, with a causal principle. It goes like this:
(1) Necessarily, every set of contingent concrete objects possibly has an explanation for
why it, rather than some other set of objects, exists.

The careful reader will see right away that this causal principle is weaker than other versions. It
doesn’t say every contingent state of affairs has an explanation (Alexander Pruss/Richard Gale
[1]), nor does it say that contingent states of affairs actually have explanations (Robert Koons
[2]). The upshot is that popular objections (ie: modal collapse) are immediately avoided. I’ll now
turn to motivate (1).


The desk I’m writing on has a number of objects sitting on it (see above). There’s a computer, a
fan, several hard drives (I’m a photographer after all!), pens, a James Harden bobblehead, and
many other things. It’s natural to think there’s possibly a reason that particular set of objects is
sitting on my desk instead of some other group of objects. Not only that, it’s natural to think
there’s possibly a reason those objects have the properties they do. For instance, one might
think Harden’s jersey is painted red instead of blue because he left the Thunder for a better
team (a friendly jab at Tim Stratton). It’s completely natural to think that it’s metaphysically
possible the objects on my desk, along with their contingent properties, are causally explained.

Moving on, let L be the set of all contingent objects in the actual world (for advanced readers,
see [3]). From this it follows that:
(2) L possibly has an explanation for why it, rather than some other set of objects, exists.

If (1) is true, (2) follows necessarily. Taking issue with (2), apart from (1), isn’t much of an option.
Moving on:
(3) No contingent object in the actual world could explain L.

Think about this one. The James Harden bobblehead sitting on my desk doesn’t explain why all
the objects on my desk exist. After all, Harden is part of that set of objects! Moreover, he would
have to explain, not only all of the other objects and their various properties, he would have to
explain his own existence! Now, Harden is god-like at basketball, but not even he can explain his
own existence. Likewise, since L includes every contingent object in the actual world, it can’t be
explained by a contingent object not included in L. It would have to be explained by something
outside of L, in other words, something non-contingent. This brings us to the next premise.
(4) If no contingent object in the actual world could explain L and (2) is true, L is possibly
explained by a necessary being or group of necessary beings (N).

As alluded to above, if L can’t be explained by a contingent object outside of L, which it clearly
can’t, then it follows that the explanation for L must be a non-contingent, necessary being (or
group of beings).
(5) If L is possibly explained by N, N exists.

This step relies on modal logic. If the set of all contingent objects in the actual world is explained
in some possible world by N, then, given S5, N exists in all possible worlds and hence exists in
the actual world.
(6) If N exists, God exists.

This premise, in my mind, is the most challenging part of the argument. I’ll begin by establishing
that N is infinitely powerful.
Infinite Power
Recall the James Harden bobblehead sitting on my desk. It takes a certain amount of power to
create one bobblehead. It takes more power to create 5, more power to create 100, much more
to create 1,000,000, and so on ad infinitum. Assuming there is always one more bobblehead
that can be added, our “bobblehead creator” must not be limited in power. A power limit would
eventually restrict the size of the collection the creator could bring about. Now, replace the
collection of bobbleheads with L. For every L, there is another L (in some other world) that
requires more power to bring about. However, if N is limited in power and there’s always
another L that requires more power, then eventually we’re going to reach an L that N can’t
causally explain [4]. However, given (1), this is impossible. So, N must not be limited in power,
and hence, N is omnipotent.

Secondly, Richard Swinburne has argued that “a finite limitation [of power] cries out for an
explanation of why there is just that particular limit, in a way that limitlessness does not.” [5] So,
for instance, if N exemplified 1,000 units of power, one might wonder why N has that amount
and not some other amount (perhaps 200 units or 1,001 units). N’s having 1,000 units of power
therefore seems to be a contingent property of N (sort of like Harden’s jersey being red instead
of blue is a contingent property of Harden). However, there can’t be any explanation for N’s
contingent properties outside of N. But, given (1), N’s contingent properties are possibly
explained and so we’ve run into a contradiction. The solution is to say that N’s power is
essentially infinite.
Volition
In his work, Swinburne argues that there are two kinds of explanations: scientific and personal
[6]. Scientific explanations explain by means of initial conditions (or causes) and some law of
nature which together make probable the resulting event.

Personal explanations explain in terms of a person’s desires and beliefs (see [6] for examples of
each). However, as Pruss notes, “As far as we can tell, science explains things in terms of
contingent causes.” So, if these two types of explanations are the only kinds there are and it
can’t be scientific, then the explanation of L must be personal. That conclusion follows
deductively. Some might object and say that science in fact does explain in terms of necessary
beings, namely, the universe. For a response to this, see objection 4 below.

Secondly, Alexander Pruss and Kenneth Pearce have demonstrated that an omnipotent being
must be personal. They argue that, in order to avoid various problems brought about by the
concept of omnipotence (e.g.: omnipotence paradoxes, McEar, etc.), omnipotence ought to be
defined in terms of perfect freedom and perfect efficacy of the will [7]. Efficacy is the ability to
actualize what one wills. Perfect efficacy means that S’s will is never frustrated. However, that
is not sufficient for omnipotence; my computer’s will is never frustrated, but clearly my
computer is not omnipotent. So we must add perfect freedom, the ability to will anything that
isn’t a necessary falsehood [8]. If their analysis of omnipotence is correct, omnipotence entails
that N is personal.
Unity
If Occam has taught us anything, it’s that we shouldn’t multiply causes beyond necessity.
There’s no need to posit more than one being, and hence we shouldn’t. Simplicity clearly favors
unity. Now you might not put much stock in simplicity–perhaps you’re a photographer like me
and know that multiplying camera gear beyond necessity is one of the greatest possible
goods–so we’ll briefly survey another argument. Let’s assume N is a collection of beings. Given
the above understanding of omnipotence, N has perfect efficacy of will. But what happens when
one being wills p and another wills ~p? Assuming the universe doesn’t explode, neither being’s
will is satisfied and hence the group isn’t omnipotent. Thus, it’s a requirement of omnipotence
that all beings in N are in unity of will. But then why not just say N is a single being with a single
will? Moreover, one might argue that having a will essentially is a feature of one being and not
many.
Infinite Knowledge
It’s plausible to think that if N is an agent, then she has at least some knowledge. But how much?
Following Pruss and Pearce, one of the necessary conditions of omnipotence is perfect
rationality because “someone lacking in rationality is suffering from a constraint on freedom.”

They go on to say, “Ignorance is often a constraint on freedom. In fact, it may well be that
nothing short of omniscience will do for a perfectly free being’s knowledge. It would be a
constraint not to know something that is rationally relevant to deciding what to will . . . In fact,
just about every fact is relevant to some decision.”

Moreover, as a friend of mine pointed out, we can take this a bit further. The contents of any
world that N can actualize will be rationally relevant to the act of will N takes in actualizing a
world. So if N is perfectly rational, N will know the contents of every possible world, which is
just another way of saying that N is omniscient. Also note that the Swinburnian argument for
infinite power would apply here as well.
Perfect Goodness
Supposing there are moral facts, in virtue of omniscience, N will know all moral facts and, in
virtue of being perfectly rational, act in accord with those facts. This is true whether moral facts
exist independently of N or if moral facts are brought about by N. If N brings about moral facts, N’s
will determines what is morally obligatory [9]. Since N’s will is a reflection of N’s nature, N’s
nature is perfectly good. We know this upon reflection. Simply think about the nature of moral
facts. It is moral to love one’s neighbor, to care for the poor, to love those that persecute you, to
care for those that can’t care for themselves, to sacrifice one’s time and resources for the
benefit of others, etc. If these facts are a reflection of N’s nature, then N has an unsurpassably
good nature.

If you’ve been tracking the argument thus far, you’ll notice that the truth of the previous six
premises entails the existence of God. Here are the steps laid out in order:
(1) Necessarily, every set of contingent concrete objects possibly has an explanation for
why it, rather than some other set of objects, exists.
(2) L possibly has an explanation for why it, rather than some other set of objects, exists.
(from 1)
(3) No contingent object in the actual world could explain L.
(4) If no contingent object in the actual world could explain L and (2) is true, L is possibly
explained by a necessary being or group of necessary beings (N).

(5) If L is possibly explained by N, N exists.
(6) If N exists, God exists.
(7) God exists. (from 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 via modus ponens and hypothetical syllogism)
Objections
O1: The universe is probably eternal and so doesn’t need a cause.
It’s certainly not obvious that the universe is probably eternal. In fact, many argue the universe
began to exist. This objection therefore requires a defense of the universe’s being eternal.
Moreover importantly however, while the appeal to the eternality of the universe is a common
response to cosmological arguments, it does not constitute a defeater for any premise of my
argument. Notice that it doesn’t actually render any of the premises false. A better objection
would be to question whether the universe is contingent. For a response to that, see objection 4
below.

O2: Premise (1) entails the existence of a necessary being and so no one can believe the
conclusion without begging the question.
This objection is also too quick. It’s false that (1) entails the existence of a necessary being; we
still need a premise about contingent objects. Furthermore, as Rasmussen points out, believing
(1) doesn’t entail believing the conclusion. One might find (1) true and then later come to find
out this rationally commits them to believing the conclusion. So this is only a problem if one
believes (1) is true solely on the basis of already believing the conclusion true. But that isn’t
necessary. The charge of begging the question is easily avoided.

O3: This would seem to entail that the objects on your desk are explained by a necessary
being, but clearly that is false.
This is a misunderstanding of the argument. The set of objects on my desk does not contain
every contingent object in the actual world, so this group can be explained by a contingent
being or group of beings. N is only inferred when the set to be explained contains every
contingent object in a given world.
O4: Why can’t the universe be a necessary being?

I’ve already argued that N has infinite power, infinite knowledge, and volition; this rules out the
universe as a candidate. However, there are two other reasons to doubt this. First, (1) entails
that a world consisting only of contingently existing angels and demons is possibly explained by
N. However it’s rather unlikely the material universe could causally explain a world consisting
of such objects. So, N is not the universe. Second, it’s analytically true that there is no state of
affairs in any possible world that describes the non-existence of N. However, if it’s
metaphysically possible the universe came into being, which it clearly is, then there is a state of
affairs in some possible world that describes the non-existence of the universe. So the universe
is not N.

Maybe you’re here because you’ve recently come in contact with a Street Epistemologist
(online or in person) and you weren’t sure how to answer. The questions they asked were
difficult, maybe even confusing, and you weren’t sure how to respond to Street Epistemology
(SE). What you’ll learn after reading this blog post is that SE is incredibly easy to answer, so long
as you know what you’re getting into.
Setting the Scene

Before we begin, let me make a few preliminary remarks. First, the ultimate goal of SE
nowadays is to instill doubt in people, not just about Christianity, but about any belief. A
successful intervention occurs when the interlocutor exits the discussion with a lower
confidence than when they came in. They do this by continually asking “how do you know that”
questions. They’ll ask how you know and how you know until eventually you’ve hit rock-bottom
and aren’t sure how to answer.
SE-type questions appear difficult to answer simply because they are difficult questions. In
epistemology (the formal study of knowledge and justified belief) there’s disagreement on how
we should even get started in our theorizing about knowledge. Do we start out knowing some
propositions or do we have to have an account of knowledge first16? Moreover, what is
knowledge? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of warrant17? These are the kinds
of rock-bottom questions that professional philosophers have a tough time answering. It’s no
wonder they also perplex the average person on the street. Street Epistemology exploits this
confusion18.
Second, keep in mind that Street Epistemologists are not epistemologists. Most haven’t even
picked up a single book on the subject. Their training materials focus on the psychology of belief
rather than on the epistemology behind it. As such, they are in no position, whatever, to
disparage your reasons for belief in God. They might ask you questions you don’t know the
answer to, but that says absolutely nothing about whether your reasons are actually valid or
invalid. Don’t make the mistake of conflating ‘not having a good on-the-spot answer’ with ‘not
having warrant for belief in God.’ The latter doesn’t follow from the former.
Lastly, for an extended example of how I personally engage SE, see my Conversation with a
Street Epistemologist. With all this in mind, let’s get started!
16
See the problem of the criterion.
17
This is one of the most fundamental questions in epistemology, and one that professionals are split on.
18
In the transcript of Reid Nicewonder’s discussion with Tia, at the 5:30 mark, Reid asks the question, “Does just believing in
something give you knowledge?” This is a question about the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge. He’s asking
whether “just believing” is a sufficient condition, or if knowledge requires something in addition (like evidence). This is a valid
epistemological question, but not one that Tia can be expected to have a good answer for. Reid uses this to his advantage.

Question 1: What do you believe?
The first step of the contemporary SE method is to locate a specific belief someone holds.
They’ll give examples like belief in God, Karma, ghosts, and so on. Many of the conversations
they have revolve around belief in God. That’s the one we’ll be discussing.
Your Response
The answer to this question for Christians is going to be fairly straight forward. If you
believe in God, say that. The SE might want to get more specific, so if you want, you can
say something like you affirm the Nicene Creed (which is what I did in my conversation
with a Street Epistemologist). This leads us directly to question two.
Question 2: What’s your level of confidence?

Step two of the method involves obtaining a degree of confidence. They want to know on a
scale of 0-100 how confident you are that your belief is true. Often they’ll point out that this
question isn’t that important. But from what I’ve found, it ties in crucially to the method. For
example, they’ll ask, “How can X give you such a high degree of confidence your God is true?” or,
“Is faith a reliable method for believing something to be true with 99% confidence?” The
confidence level question is actually pretty important, answer it carefully.
Your Response
Instead of giving a numerical figure, say something like “I strongly believe it,” or, “I firmly
believe that Christianity is true.” Avoid talk of numerical figures. Why? Primarily because
assigning numerical figures to credence levels is problematic. People tend to
overestimate in social situations; they give the answer they think they should give,
instead of the answer that is accurate or defensible. Avoid this confusion by avoiding
numbers.
Question 3: How did you determine your belief is true?

This question is the heart of Street Epistemology. Their ultimate goal is to locate the “real
reason” you believe whatever you believe, and lower your confidence that that reason or that
method is reliable. If you believe in Christianity because of faith, their end-game is to get you to
doubt that faith is reliable (and therefore to make you doubt Christianity).


Your Response
The answer to this question will be autobiographical. If you grew up in a Christian home
and that’s why you believe, say it. If you came to believe in Christianity because of the
evidence, say it. If you believe in God because you have faith that it’s true, say it. Give
your honest answer.

Note: If you answer by citing the evidence (this includes miracle reports and so on), be
prepared for the follow up question: “If someone could show you that your evidence
didn’t actually support the truth of Christianity, would that lessen your confidence that
Christianity is true?” The response to this question should be obvious: Yes. It’s a bit like
asking, “If someone could show you that the evidence for Abraham Lincoln didn’t
actually support his existence, would that lessen your confidence that he existed?”

The reason this question is asked is because they are wanting you to say that your
confidence level wouldn’t change. This shows (in their minds) that your “real reasons” for
belief aren’t due to the evidence (since taking away the evidence wouldn’t change your
confidence). So if you came to believe in Christianity because of the evidence, answer
this hypothetical question in the affirmative: “Yes, taking away literally all of the evidence
would lessen my confidence that Christianity is true, just like taking taking away all of the
evidence would lessen my confidence that Abraham Lincoln existed.”
Question 4: Is faith a reliable method of determining

that a belief is true?
Instead of using the term “faith,” they might ask, “Does just believing in something give you
knowledge?” or, “If a Muslim came up to me and told me that they believe in Allah because of
faith, how could we determine which belief is true?” These are all variations of the same
question. The idea here is that “just believing something” can’t tell us which belief is true, only
reason and evidence can do that. What’s funny is that they are actually right, but not in a way
that impugns the Christian response.
In philosophy, there’s a lot of discussion around the existence of other minds. Do other minds
exist? It might surprise you to learn that philosophers agree there’s really no good evidence that
other minds actually exist. For all we know, other people are philosophical zombies that look
and act like real people but aren’t. Nevertheless, it certainly seems to us that other minds exist.
It’s a perfectly rational and sensible thing to believe, despite our not having good evidence.

Notice, however, that having the seeming that other minds exist doesn’t determine that other
minds exist [4]. That was never the intention. Instead, our seeming is being used a means of
justification. The same is true for belief in God.
Your Response
Here’s how I suggest you respond: “That’s a little like asking if my intuition that other minds
exist determines or makes it the case that other minds exist. Intuitions were never intended to
operate like that. My seeming that Christianity is true doesn’t determine that God exists, but it
can be used to justify or warrant belief in God [ 5]. There’s a difference.”

Street Epistemologists that ask this question imagine that one’s reasons for belief should
determine what’s true. But that’s by no means obvious. If the reason I believe the past is
real is because it just seems that way to me, obviously that seeming doesn’t determine
that the past is actually real and not an illusion. My seeming that I have two hands
doesn’t determine that I have two hands. My seeming that modus ponens is a valid rule of
inference doesn’t determine that modus ponens is a valid rule of inference. The list goes
on and on.

The work that the seeming is doing is providing justification. It’s a sort of
non-propositional evidence. Evidence itself doesn’t even determine that something is
true. Instead what it does is gives us the right, epistemically speaking, to believe
something. That’s just another way of saying it provides justification.
Honorable Mentions
The previous four questions are the most common questions you’ll encounter in a session with a
Street Epistemologist. However, there are a number of ways they could take the conversation.
As it happens, I’ve written blog posts that cover virtually any route they could take.

Should they ask how seemings or intuitions could justify belief in God, check out my four-part
series on knowledge and Christian belief. Should they ask if wish-fulfillment always leads to
truth, check out my article on Christianity and wish-fulfillment. If they ask, in a different way,
about what to do with competing religious claims, check out my article on whether religious
diversity is a problem for Christianity. Also relevant is my 3-part series responding to The
Outsider Test for Faith (OTF). The OTF pops up quite frequently; I recommend checking it out.

The objection from religious diversity is one of the most common questions that come up in
SE-type conversations. It’s their go-to in discussions with Christians. However, as I argue in my
article, the person that thinks religious diversity poses a serious threat to faith must be
prepared to argue that Christianity is false. Street Epistemology, by its very nature, can’t
accomplish such a thing.
Concluding Remarks
Last of all, if after having read all this, you are still stumped by a question they’ve raised, please
do not hesitate to reach out. Best way to contact me is through the website or by sending a
direct message on our Facebook Page. I would be happy to dialogue with you about any
unanswered question you have. And if I don’t have an answer, we can together find someone
that does. You might be surprised how easy it is to get in contact with brilliant Christians.

A popular objection to Christian belief comes from religious diversity. The objection goes
something like this: Christianity is not the only world religion. Many other religions–Judaism,
Mormonism, Islam, Hinduism, etc.–cite their own religious experience in support of their
beliefs. But they all can’t be true. The mechanism that produces religious belief is therefore
unreliable; it produces all sorts of false beliefs (even assuming one of them is true). It follows that
religious belief can’t be trusted19.
What are we to make of this objection?
Arguments & Evidence

A very natural response, and one that Christian apologists often give, is to provide arguments
and evidence for the unique truth of Christianity. The reason that Christianity is justified, so they
say, is because we have sufficient reason to think that it’s true and subsequent reason to think
other religions are false. Christian thinkers like Tim McGrew, Richard Swinburne, Calum Miller,
and many others defend something like this. Christian belief is justified in the same way that
belief in atomic theory is justified: through good arguments and evidence.
Skeptics and Freethinkers are likely to object at this point that Christianity is still unjustified
because the arguments in favor of Christianity are weak. That’s false, but notice the objection
has shifted. Instead of being an argument from religious diversity, the objection is now that the
arguments in favor of Christianity are bad. That’s a very different argument.
A Further Worry
A worry that might arise at this point is that most Christians do not believe in Christianity by
way of argument and evidence. So, even if we grant that someone like Tim McGrew is justified
in his belief, the vast majority of Christians are unjustified.
One response is to simply bite the bullet and admit that most Christians are not justified,
epistemically speaking, in their belief. The only thing that would follow from this is that these
Christians aren’t fulfilling their epistemic duties; it wouldn’t follow they aren’t saved or that
they aren’t real Christians. Philosophers like Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and Pascal would
openly embrace this form of epistemic rebellion.
Phenomenal Conservatism
A second response is to say that, actually, most Christians aren’t familiar with the objection
from religious diversity–they don’t know it, haven’t heard of it, haven’t thought about it–and
hence don’t have a defeater for their belief.
19
For anyone that would like to read an academic treatment of this argument, see this recent paper by McNabb and Baldwin.

Thus, most Christians enjoy at least some justification. This follows from a popular epistemic
principle called phenomenal conservatism(PC). Here’s what PC says:
If it seems to S that P, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some
justification for believing that P.
The absence of defeaters clause is essential to this response. Many Christians that believe in
Christianity apart from argument and evidence haven’t heard of this objection from religious
diversity. One might argue they should have heard of it, but that’s a separate worry. Given PC
(and assuming an absence of other defeaters), they have at least some justification believing in
what seems to them to be the case.

Of course the question is now: But what about those that (i) believe in Christianity not on the
basis of argument and evidence and (ii) have heard the objection from religious diversity?
Doesn’t it follow that they are unjustified? I will argue that the answer to this question depends
on whether Christianity is true. If Christianity is true, then Christian belief is probably reliable,
but if Christianity is false, then it probably isn’t reliable (note that this is essentially identical to
the thesis of Reformed Epistemology).

Before doing that, let’s get clear on the Christian picture of justification and warrant.
Christianity
On Christianity, humans have fallen into sin and require redemption. The mechanism that was
originally designed to engender belief in God is now damaged and in need of repair. Fortunately,
God sent a remedy into the world through His divine Son, Jesus Christ.

Now, God could have conveyed this message of salvation a million different ways but this is how
He did it according to the Christian story. First, He supervised and divinely inspired the
collection of writings we call the Bible. Second, He sent us the Holy Spirit. Third, through the
inner witness of the Holy Spirit, we come to see that the central Christian claims are true.

The Holy Spirit restores or repairs the damages of sin. It is by the work of the Holy Spirit that
Christians come to believe in the great truths of the Gospel. Christian belief, therefore, is not
brought about by way of any natural process; it involves the work of the Holy Spirit.
Howard’s Hosts
With that concept in mind, consider an analogy I’ve dubbed Howard’s Hosts. It’s loosely based
on the HBO series “West World.”

Howard, a mad scientist, has decided to increase his productivity by designing a race of
conscious cyborgs, or “hosts.” Unfortunately, the hosts suffer a peculiar cognitive defect.
The mechanism responsible for producing beliefs about their creator is broken. Some of
the hosts believe that Howard’s name is George, others believe his name is Patrick, and
so on. It’s natural to think the host’s ‘naming mechanism’ is unreliable. Now, suppose
Howard locates the problem and installs a firmware update into the cyborgs. He designs
the update such that it can be rejected by the hosts. And as it turns out, 70% of the hosts
end up rejecting it. With this in mind, it appears that, despite the large percentage that
have rejected the update, the remaining 30% of hosts that accepted the update have had
their naming mechanism repaired. Their naming mechanism is no longer unreliable.

Notice the two-stage process: Stage One is the ‘Defect’ stage. Here we learn that some
cognitive faculty or mechanism is broken. The second stage is ‘Repair.’ Howard introduces a
firmware update that can either be rejected or accepted. For those that accept the update, their
beliefs about Howard are reliable.
Full Circle
Here’s how the argument works: For any host that accepts the update, their naming mechanism
is no longer unreliable. And obviously, for any host that does not accept the update, their naming
mechanism remains damaged. Similarly, if Christianity is true, then there is such a person as the
Holy Spirit that is constantly repairing the damages of sin. However, if Christianity is not true,
then there is no such person, nor is there any sin.

The upshot is that the objection from religious diversity constitutes a defeater for Christian
belief only if Christianity is false. If Christianity is true, then Christian belief is probably reliable
(through the inner witness of the Holy Spirit). So one can’t say that Christian belief in particular
is unreliable unless one is prepared to argue that Christianity is false.
Conclusions
In summary, many Christians offer arguments and evidence for the unique truth of Christianity.
That’s the first response. The second response is to say that a defeater from religious diversity
affects only a tiny number of Christians and so many of them, given PC, enjoy at least some
amount of justification. The third and last response is to say that this objection only constitutes
a defeater for Christian belief if Christianity is false. In other words, the epistemological
question isn’t separate from the metaphysical question. The person that seeks to argue that
Christian belief is either unreliable or unjustified must, in reality, argue that Christianity is false.
To the skeptic that seeks to establish that: God speed.

Just the other night my 1.5 year old daughter must have suffered the worst teething pains
imaginable. She was completely inconsolable, kicking and screaming if anything so much as
touched her. And this is just my story. The Lisbon Earthquake of 1755 crushed or burned to
death roughly 50,000 people. All across human history, people have suffered and died from
debilitating diseases, natural disasters, and at the hands of other people. A natural question
arises: if God exists, why is there so much suffering? Most of it seems pointless.

God is traditionally defined as all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good. But if God is all-powerful,
then surely He has the power to prevent pointless suffering. If God is all-knowing, He knows,
infallibly, when suffering will occur. And if God is all-good, He will protect His children from pain
and suffering (as any loving parent does). So, why is there so much suffering?
God’s Ways > Our Ways

Theists (Jews, Christians, and Muslims) have been wrestling with the question for millennia. A
very popular response20 to this question is to say that perhaps God has a reason for permitting
the suffering in the world, but this reason is beyond our comprehension. Isaiah 55:9 says, “As
the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts
than your thoughts.” God is unlimited in knowledge, but we humans are finite beings, limited in
time and space, knowledge and intelligence. It’s not implausible to suppose that the reason God
has for permitting the evil in the world lies just beyond our ability to see.

Some atheists try to turn this question into an argument against God’s existence. They say that
since we can’t imagine a reason God has for permitting the Holocaust, God therefore probably
has no reason (and therefore probably doesn’t exist). But notice, our inability to think of a
reason God has for allowing the suffering in the world, doesn’t mean there is no reason. Again,
maybe that reason is beyond what we can see or comprehend. Making an inference about what
God knows from what we know is not very wise. So instead of concluding that God has no
reason, we should say, “I don’t know why God allows all the suffering in world.”
Admitting one’s ignorance is not exactly a bad thing. It’s a sign of intellectual humility.21
Suffering Builds Character

Maybe you’re not satisfied with this response. It seems too much like a cop-out.
20
The response is popular in the literature (see Bergmann, Hudson, et al).
21
Skeptical Theism is not without serious criticism. Many (including theists, like Dougherty) argue that skeptical theism entails
global skepticism (skepticism about all of ones beliefs, including the commonsense belief that I have hands). This is sort of where
the debate currently sits: whether or not Skeptical Theism entails global skepticism. I currently lean toward no; the theist that
holds skeptical theism can be rational and warranted in holding commonsense beliefs

Sure, God’s ways are higher than our ways, but like Job, we still want to see a reason. Fair
enough. Theists have been offering theodicies, reasons God has for permitting the suffering in
the world, for a very long time. In what follows I will briefly lay out one such theodicy
(theologians call this the “Soul-Building Theodicy” though there are many others22).

The basic idea in this theodicy is that suffering is necessary to achieve the greatest goods. And
since we’ve already granted that God is all-knowing, He is going to know that which is best. So
what are the best goods? Here it will help to consider some examples. Consider the case of Saint
Damien of Moloka’i. He spent 16 years in the Hawaiian islands serving lepers before
succumbing to the disease himself. In a letter to his brother he wrote, “I make myself a leper
with the lepers to gain all to Jesus Christ.” Next, consider Saint Maximilian Maria Kolbe. He was
eventually taken to Auschwitz by the Germans for sheltering thousands of Jews. While in
Auschwitz, he volunteered to take the place of a man being lead to his death in a pit through
starvation23. Look these men up if you have never heard of them, incredibly inspiring.

The goods represented in these examples are love-manifesting virtues. The participation of
suffering in their lives was integral to the production of virtues like self-sacrifice, courage,
empathy, and so on. They did not wish away their suffering, they embraced it. In this way, their
suffering was defeated. We often say things like, “The past made me what I am today.” Suffering
builds character; it makes us who we are.

But what about those that die prematurely and aren’t able to recognize the value of suffering?
Remember that the Christian worldview includes an afterlife. It is in the afterlife that most
come to recognize what the men in the examples above recognized. One shouldn’t wish away
trials, for they build character. They make us more like Christ. But if the problem of suffering
can be defeated in the afterlife, we’ve reached the complete defeat of evil and suffering and the
problem disappears.
There is obviously much more to say on the subject. However, I hope this has at least opened
the aperture of your mind. Even if we can’t think of a reason God might have for permitting the
suffering in the world, that doesn’t mean there isn’t one.
22
This is one I personally find plausible, mostly due to Dougherty’s book The Problem of Animal Pain: A Theodicy for All Creatures
Great and Small. There are, however, other theodicies I find plausible. Most notably the Free Will Defense and
Supralapsarianism.
23
“According to an eye witness, an assistant janitor at that time, in his prison cell, Kolbe led the prisoners in prayer to Our Lady.
Each time the guards checked on him, he was standing or kneeling in the middle of the cell and looking calmly at those who
entered. After two weeks of dehydration and starvation, only Kolbe remained alive. “The guards wanted the bunker emptied, so
they gave Kolbe a lethal injection of carbolic acid. Kolbe is said to have raised his left arm and calmly waited for the deadly
injection.”

Moreover, suffering builds character. Courage, compassion, empathy, perseverance,
forgiveness, etc., cannot be produced in the absence of significant trials.
For those interested, I’ve recently debated atheist Justin Schieber where I defend these ideas
much more rigorously.

Conclusion
I hope this little eBook has helped you in your journey. Speaking of, apologetics is a journey, not
a destination. Don’t treat this book as the final word on the rationality of Christianity. Serious
thinkers know that there are always deeper questions. For more resources to help you along
your way, make sure to check out our extensive list of Free Christian Apologetics Resources, as
well as our post The Top 3 Apologetics Books Christian Philosophers Say You Should Read.
To learn more about what we do visit our website. Also make sure to follow us on Facebook,
Twitter, YouTube, and SoundCloud.

Donate?
I definitely don’t want you to feel pressured to do so, but if you’d like to donate and help support
Capturing Christianity, the easiest way to do so is to visit this link. Together we can expose the
intellectual side of Christian belief!


Appendix: A Dozen Don’ts for
Christian Apologists

For better or worse, I’ve spent countless hours over the years debating atheists in online
forums. I was there when the Reasonable Faith Facebook Page had around 11,000 likes (it’s
currently at 670,000). RF had less trolls back then, but still required a lot of work. Over the
years I’ve learned what to do and what not to do. I sort of wish I didn’t have all this experience in
online debating to be giving you all this information, nevertheless, my hope is that if you find
yourself in such a situation, this list of don’ts for Christian Apologists will be helpful.
A Dozen Don’ts
1. Don’t take internet atheists very seriously.
Atheists that make a career out of debating Christians online are generally not going to be
experts in the field of religion. As such, we shouldn’t take them, or their opinions, very seriously.
The arguments they regurgitate, if they have any merit at all, are only loosely based on the work
of professionals. Philosophers of religion are much more careful in what they say and how they
say it. An amateur is more likely to make little errors an expert will not. For this simple reason,
the claims of internet atheists shouldn’t be taken very seriously.
Here’s what I’m not saying. I’m not saying we should unreflectively dismiss anything a
non-expert believes. Rather, I’m saying we should be careful not to overvalue the opinions of
lay-people. This principle doesn’t just apply to religion – it applies across the philosophical
spectrum. The claims and ideas we should be taking seriously (on a regular basis) are those put
forth by competent authorities.
2. Don’t get sucked in.

Some atheists are highly skilled at baiting Christians into debate. They’ll say things like,
“Christianity is obviously irrational,” or, “There’s no evidence Jesus even existed,” or, “Jesus was
a zombie,” or, “All of the arguments for God are terrible and have been debunked over and
over.” Our natural inclination is to refute such nonsense, but let me suggest a different kind of
response.

One of the deadliest tools in our arsenal is knowing when and how to ignore people. There are
of course times when a response to these claims is appropriate, but we should only join a
discussion we consciously choose to join, knowing full-well the ramifications of our doing so.
Don’t get sucked in.
3. Don’t shoot from the hip.

This is one of my biggest pet peeves. In the online debating world, I’ve seen people make all
sorts of unsubstantiated claims. Instead of admitting ignorance, they begin shooting from the
hip, hoping that something, anything, sticks. If you don’t know what extra-biblical evidence
exists for the martyrdom of early Christians, don’t just blurt out that said evidence exists (or
doesn’t exist). Bluffing to save face is completely embarrassing. Bluffs eventually get called; you
will be exposed for the charlatan you are – either in this life or the next. The saddest part is that
there’s so much evidence in favor of Christianity, we aren’t forced to shoot from the hip in order
to defend it.
Don’t. Do. It.
4. Don’t have the last word.

This is another peeve of mine. Truth is not reserved for the person that has the last word. If your
atheist interlocutor wants to stay up till 4am responding to every comment you make, let him.
Better yet, learn when the discussion is no longer fruitful and end it. Here’s an easy and
respectful way to bow out of a discussion:
“I can see we aren’t making any progress. I’ve enjoyed our conversation thus far but will be
bowing out after this comment. Feel free to have the last word.”
This doesn’t convey ignorance or ineptitude. Quite the opposite. It shows that you value
substantive discussion and aren’t interested in wasting either you or your interlocutor’s time.
5. Don’t let your insecurities own you.

Here’s a theory of mine: Online debating is largely the result of unchecked insecurities.
Christians, atheists, agnostics, whatever, we are insecure about our beliefs and intelligence and
thus engage our peers in debate so we can be validated and feel better about ourselves. I am
insecure about my intellect so I’ll go online and incessantly debate people I deem less smart
than me. I’m insecure about my beliefs, so I’ll go and debate this person that hasn’t read all the
papers I’ve read and show them how uninformed they are. The act of debating is an outward
expression of deeply rooted insecurities.

These unchecked insecurities can–if we let them–rule over our thoughts and actions. Defending
Christianity shouldn’t feel like a “Who’s Smarter” or “Who can quote more philosophers”
competition. Before logging on, make it a habit to ask yourself this question: “Why am I going
online to debate today?” If ever you can’t think of a good answer to this question, perhaps it’s
time to take a step back and reassess your motivations.
6. Don’t waste your time.

You should be reading at least twice as much as debating. For every hour you spend debating
online, you should spend at least two hours reading books, papers, journals, listening to
lectures, and growing in knowledge. Call this Bertuzzi’s Maxim. If you think that’s too much
studying, you’re simply not taking Christian Apologetics seriously. Don’t spend the majority of
your time engaging non-experts, spend it with seasoned professionals. Learn how scholars
express and defend their arguments. Learn how to accurately articulate and soundly refute
objections to your view.
“For every hour you spend debating online,

you should spend at least two hours reading
books, papers, journals, listening to lectures,
and growing in knowledge.”
If I could go back and do things over, marrying this rubric is exactly where I’d start. The number
of hours I’ve wasted debating random people online could have been replaced with reading
good philosophy. Here’s a question to ask yourself before each comment you post: “Do I have
one good reason to spend another second doing this rather than reading?” Virtually every time I
ask myself this, the answer is no.
7. Don’t be disorganized.
This one is extremely important. Don’t go into a Facebook or online debate forum without some
kind of game plan. Why are you going in in the first place? Is it to change the cultural perception
of Christians? Is it to get a better understanding of how atheists think? Keep these goals
plastered on your mind before, during, and after going in. They will guide your interactions and
lead to more productive discussions.

Once you’ve got a goal in place, it’s a good idea to limit your interactions to posts and topics you
are well-versed in. Don’t go challenging atheists on a subject you don’t know anything about.
Also, very important, keep track of your time. Some of these discussions can go on for hours,
even days, some even weeks. Be cognizant of how much of your time is being devoted to each
conversation. Last organizational tip: Try your best to engage in one conversation at a time.
Multiple dialogue strings can get confusing and even overwhelming. Don’t.
8. Don’t do it alone.
This is also super important. If you are new to Apologetics, stop whatever you’re doing and
forge relationships with seasoned Christian apologists. Create solid friendships with smarter
and more informed Christians than you. This has been instrumental in my growth as an
apologist (both intellectually and spiritually). It’s unfortunate but some of the most substantive
and thought-provoking critiques of my arguments have come from other Christians. The same
is true in the academic arena (see this and this).
There are Facebook groups dedicated to Christian fellowship for apologists. Seek them out and
begin forging relationships. The Bible also encourages this kind of fellowship (see Hebrews
10:24-25 and 1 Thessalonians 5:11).
9. Don’t limit your audience.

The atheists I’ve met online generally haven’t been very open to Christianity. That isn’t to say
there were never any, but over the years I could probably count on one hand the ones I
considered open. If your main goal with apologetics is to win people to Christ, debating with
people on the internet is probably the last place to start. Don’t limit your audience to people
that are systematically closed off to considering alternative views.

Find ways to engage people at work, engage your friends and family members. Strike up little
conversations with a waiter or cashier. Don’t limit your audience.
10. Don’t forget to pray.

I’ll be honest. Prayer is something I don’t do often enough. I’m often so immersed in the
literature or my projects I forget to slow down and pray (what a sorry excuse!).
“For this reason, since the day we heard about you, we have not stopped praying for you.
We continually ask God to fill you with the knowledge of his will through all the wisdom
and understanding that the Spirit gives, so that you may live a life worthy of the Lord and

please him in every way: bearing fruit in every good work, growing in the knowledge of
God, being strengthened with all power according to his glorious might so that you may
have great endurance and patience, and giving joyful thanks to the Father, who has
qualified you to share in the inheritance of his holy people in the kingdom of light.” –
Colossians 1:9-12
The importance of prayer in the life of a Christian Apologist can’t be overstated. Opening our
hearts and focusing our minds on God will literally alter the way we engage atheists. If you are
feeling irritated or frustrated with a conversation, take a moment and focus your attention on
the Creator of the Universe.
11. Don’t neglect the Bible.

Some of you already know how I feel about taking the Bible seriously. Christian Apologists have
done a great job so far in terms of defending God’s existence, but we’ve got a long way to go
when it comes to defending the Bible. Knowing, for instance, that non-chronological narration
was common in the ancient world can help squash concerns that the Gospels disagree on the
order of events. The first step to combating culture is taking the Bible seriously, for yourself. You
must take the bible seriously. Seek to understand its historical and canonical context, learn the
literary genres, ask the questions that biblical scholars are asking.
It goes without saying, Bible reading is essential for spiritual growth. If this is an area you’ve felt
stagnant in, I would highly suggest listening to a podcast like The Naked Bible or Timothy Keller
Sermons by Gospel in Life. Both are amazing resources. The latter being instrumental in my
spiritual growth as of late.
12. Don’t reject Christ.

There are two ways in which one can reject Christ in doing apologetics. First, one can
completely fail to be Christ-like. Consider the following passage:
“If you have any encouragement from being united with Christ, if any comfort from his
love, if any common sharing in the Spirit, if any tenderness and compassion, then make
my joy complete by being like-minded, having the same love, being one in spirit and of
one mind. Do nothing out of selfish ambition or vain conceit. Rather, in humility value
others above yourselves, not looking to your own interests but each of you to the
interests of the others. In your relationships with one another, have the same mindset as

Christ Jesus: Who, being in very nature God, did not consider equality with God
something to be used to his own advantage; rather, he made himself nothing by taking
the very nature of a servant, being made in human likeness. And being found in
appearance as a man, he humbled himself by becoming obedient to death—even death
on a cross!” – Philippians 2:1-8

How would you rate your online interactions? How Christ-like are they really? Are you using
your intellect to put others down or are you being humble, preferring others above yourself? If
we’re being honest, most of us do a very poor job at reflecting Christ through our writings.

Second, apologists can utterly fail to ever present the Gospel. This is a travesty. In his advice to
preachers and teachers, Tim Keller argues that we should be preaching Christ every time. Every
sermon, every talk, every debate, every time we have the opportunity to speak about
Christianity, we should be sharing the Gospel message. It’s no accident that every sermon in
Acts centers on the Resurrection of Jesus. As Paul said, “If Christ has not been raised, your faith
is futile.” Recenter your interactions on what matters most: The Good News of Jesus Christ.

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1​ - Can We Know that Christianity is True?

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3. Aimed at True Belief

4.​ Successfully​ Aimed at True Belief

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Is Theistic Belief Warranted?

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Setting up the Account

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Warranted Christian Belief

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This is therefore, as much as anything, an invitation to consider certain lines of thought.

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(3) No contingent object in the actual world could explain L.

(5) If L is possibly explained by N, N exists.

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(6) If N exists, God exists.

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(3) No contingent object in the actual world could explain L.

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(6) If N exists, God exists.

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Setting the Scene

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Question 2: What’s your level of confidence?

Question 3: How did you determine your belief is true?

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Question 4: Is faith a reliable method of determining

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Arguments & Evidence

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God’s Ways > Our Ways

Chapter 1 - Can We Know that Christianity is True?

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4. Successfully Aimed at True Belief

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