The Spanish Journal of Psychology (2020), 23, e5, 1–13.

© Universidad Complutense de Madrid and Colegio Oficial de Psicó logos de Madrid 2020
doi:10.1017/SJP.2020.5

“Why are the Corrupt, Corrupt?”: The Multilevel

Analytical Model of Corruption

João Gabriel Modesto12 and Ronaldo Pilati3

1
Centro Universitário de Brasília (Brazil)
2
Universidade Estadual de Goiás
(Brazil) 3 Universidade de Brasília
(Brazil)

Abstract. Corruption is a global problem. Despite the importance of this theme, a shortage of theoretical models in both
psychology and related areas that favor its understanding and investigation is noted. Due to this scarcity of theoretical
models, in addition to the need to systematize studies on the topic, this theoretical article aims to describe the Analytical
Model of Corruption (AMC) as an interdisciplinary and multilevel proposal aimed at corruption analysis. To achieve this
goal, the concept of corruption was analyzed using related phenomena as reference. Similarities and differences in
corruption have been identified with dishonest behavior and unethical behavior. Subsequently, theoretical models on
corruption identified in the literature were presented, and their main characteristics and limitations were pointed out.
After describing the models, the AMC was presented and its advantages over the previous models were discussed. Finally,
it was
concluded that the AMC could be configured as a theoretical model that guides interdisciplinary studies on corruption,
allowing for a more complete analysis compared to previous theoretical models identified in the literature.

Received 16 March 2019; Revised 17 March 2020; Accepted 19 March 2020

Keywords: corruption, dishonest behavior, multilevel model, unethical behavior

Corruption is a global problem and its occurrence has
been identified in various countries during various
periods (Tanzi, 1998). Nevertheless, despite the impor-
tance of this subject, very few theoretical models exist
that help understand corruption (Judge et al., 2011).
From a psychological standpoint, even though this
subject has much to contribute, proposals for systema-
tization are few or non-existent. From a broader per-
spective, when taking other scientific disciplines into
account, and even though systematization exists on a
larger scale as opposed to psychology, no models may
yet be found the seek to integrate the various factors
that can assist in understanding corruption. Psychology,
through its premise of multiple determinants of behav-
ior, provides various relevant contributions on this sub-
ject, such as the multilevel approach (Pettigrew, 2018),
when the interaction of contextual factors with individ-
ual and group variables are fundamental to understand
human behavior.
With this scenario as a backdrop, the lack of integra-
tive models and the pressing need for work that sys-
tematizes corruption, dishonesty and behavioral ethics,
the objective of this theoretical study was to propose
the Analytical Model of Corruption (AMC). To achieve
this
objective, the first step was to define the concept
of corruption based on correlated phenomena. The
improved definition of the phenomenon was used for
a more precise proposition of the AMC. Models relating
to corruption found in human and social sciences are
also described. Finally, the potential of AMC is indi-
cated, in comparison to other models, as a theoretical
perspective that, although based on psychological sci-
ence, may contribute with interdisciplinary research on
corruption.
The Concept of Corruption
For the proposal of the AMC as a theoretical model
for corruption, it is necessary to identify the concep-
tual limits and similarities of corruption with corre-
lated constructs. In this work, this conceptual analysis
of corruption was developed through a comparison
between unethical and dishonest behavior due to con-
ceptual overlap.
(Un)ethical behavior may be defined as the conduct of
an individual that is subject to the moral norms of a
certain group (Treviñ o et al., 2006). Based on revisions
and meta-analysis (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Treviñ o
et al., 2014), it can be seen that the construct has been

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to João

How to cite this article:
Gabriel Modesto. Centro Universitário de Brasília, Faculdade de
Modesto, J. G., & Pilati, R. (2020). “Why are the corrupt,
Psicologia. 70790–075. Brasília, DF, Brazil. E-mail:
corrupt?”: The multilevel analytical model of corruption. The
jg.modesto@gmail.com
The study was supported by the Grant 308268/2016-4 of the Spanish Journal of Psychology, 23. e5. Doi:10.1017/SJP.2020.5
National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq)
for the second author.

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 2 J. G. Modesto & R. Pilati

systematically applied in psychology, especially in the

many cases, an individual may just not be aware that
field of organizational psychology, by which Rest’s
certain behavior is dishonest (Darley, 2005). To under-
(1986) four-component model has been widely used
stand dishonesty it is therefore necessary to evaluate
by researchers interested in the ethical decision-
the relationship between intrinsic, extrinsic rewards,
making process (Lehnert et al., 2015; Treviñ o et al.,
and possible biases in judgment and decision-making
2006). Cur- rent psychological research on unethical
of a dishonest decision.
behavior seeks to identify, from an interactionist
In light of the above, dishonest behavior may thus be
perspective, individ- ual and contextual factors to
considered as the action (not necessarily conscious) of
understand the phenome- non (Lehnert et al., 2015).
an individual that, when breaking a rule, may generate
On the other hand, dishonest behavior consists of, as
a reward (directly or indirectly) for that individual, as
does unethical behavior, the violation of norms, allow-
well as generate loss (directly or indirectly) for
ing for dishonesty to be seen as a form of expression of
someone else (e.g.: a person, organization, the State),
unethical behavior. In support of this, after a meta-
in addition
analysis of unethical behavior, the authors chose the
to losses to oneself (intrinsic or extrinsic). This definition
term “dishonesty” to be one of the keywords to inves-
merges typical elements of economic cost-benefit the-
tigate the construct as they considered dishonest behav-
ories (i.e., extrinsic rewards and gains) as well as psy-
ior to be a specific type of unethical behavior (Kish-
chological theories (i.e., the absence of a conscious
Gephart et al., 2010). Although understood to be an process, intrinsic rewards) (Mazar & Ariely, 2006, for
expression of unethical behavior, dishonest behavior
a comparison between psychological theories and eco-
has some characteristics that differentiate it from other
nomic theories).
unethical actions. In general, to understand dishonesty,
Corruption, like unethical and dishonest actions, is
it is necessary to consider an author, the act, the victim
associated with the violation of rules and norms (based
and the expected results (Scott & Jehn, 1999).
on a legalistic definition of the phenomenon Peters &
It is possible to identify the contributions of various
Welch, 1978). It is also assumed, as in dishonesty, that
fields towards understanding dishonest behavior,
there is a possibility of obtaining rewards. However,
examples of which are economy and psychology
corruption has one characteristic that differentiates
(Mazar & Ariely, 2006). In cost-benefit models, typical
it from other behaviors: Abuse of power. Generally,
in the economy, it is assumed that human beings are
corruption is defined as the abuse of entrusted power
rational and deliberative. As such, dishonesty would
for private gain (Transparency International, 2018).
occur based on a comparison between possible risks
Although this definition is widely used, it has been
and extrinsic rewards. If the benefits outweigh the
criticized. The concept of “entrusted power” does not
risks, it is more likely the dishonest behavior will take include, for example, those who have risen to power
place (Becker, 1968).
without the express confidence of all or of a majority to
On the other hand, psychological theory, aside from
legitimate that power, as is the example of dictatorships.
extrinsic rewards, include factors that are linked to
Additionally, the idea that the gain would be
intrinsic rewards. For example, there is neuroscientific
“private” allows us to infer that corruption is restricted
evidence indicating that actions based on socially
to individual gains (private) and does not take into
accepted norms, such as cooperation, stimulate areas
account wider dimensions such as benefits to groups,
of the brain that are linked to pleasure, in a way that is
organizations, political parties or even countries. As a
similar to the stimulation that occurs due to extrinsic
result of these and other limitations, based on the adap-
reward (Rilling et al., 2002). As such, an honest action,
tation of the original Transparency International defini-
by itself, may generate (intrinsic) rewards for the indi-
tion, corruption can be defined as the misuse of power
vidual. This finding has contributed towards studies
to obtain illegal gains (Andersson & Heywood, 2009).
that seek to understand the rationalization strategies This definition overcomes the limitations of the
that favor the legitimation of dishonest actions and
previous definition and has a more generic nature,
reduce intrinsic discomfort (Mazar et al., 2008), as well
covering var- ious behaviors that can be understood
as the development of interventions aimed at reducing as corrupt. The
dishonest actions (Ayal et al., 2015). causes and consequences of corruption have been stud-
Additionally, psychological theory posits that the ied mainly at the macro level, where negative effects on
process of involvement in dishonest actions may not various sectors of society have been verified, as is the
be overall conscious, seeing that there are various example of education and health (Tanzi, 1998).
cognitive biases limiting rationality (Kahneman & Conceptually, the relationship between unethical
Tversky, 1979). For example, there is evidence that loss behavior, dishonest behavior and corrupt behavior
aversion, a cognitive bias, may favor dishonest behav- can be seen in Figure 1.
ior (Schindler & Pfattheicher, 2017). Furthermore, in As can be seen in Figure 1, unethical behavior encom-
passes dishonest behavior where, in turn, corrupt
behavior is included. The common ground among all

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Figure 1. Diagram of the relationship between unethical behavior, dishonest behavior and corrupt behavior.
of these is the violation of norms or rules. In the dia-
gram, corruption is stated as a more specific phenome-
non, especially due to its characteristic of abuse of
power, which is dispensable from the definition of the
other constructs.
It is important to point out that, although only the
relationship between these three constructs is repre-
sented in the diagram, each one may include various
subtypes. Corrupt behavior, for example, despite being
more specific in the diagram, has different aspects and
forms of expression, as is the example of cronyism,
bribery and white-collar crime, among others that will
not be specifically considered in this work.
It should also be emphasized, with regards to the
conceptual proposal, that, although it is admitted that
the violation of norms and rules is the common element
to the three phenomena (unethical behavior, dishonest
behavior and corrupt behavior), one should bear in
mind that this concept is based on a broader
perspective relating to the evaluated norms and rules.
Situations exist where dishonest behavior and
corruption are jus-
tified within small groups or organizations by descrip-
tive norms (norms about what people effectively do),
however, injunctive norms (what is known to be the
correct thing to do) are still being violated on a social
dimension.
It is further emphasized that the dashed lines used in
the diagram indicate that, in spite of the conceptual
effort, those limits are not always clearly perceived
when the phenomena occur naturally. This, however,
does not mean the researchers should not consider this
differentiation. The conceptual difference between each
phenomenon contributes to better implementation and,
consequently, results in improved research.
It was found that the level of concern among
researchers in differentiating corruption from related
topics was low. The difficulty in defining and delimiting
the constructs results in greater difficulty in implement-
ing them for the research and development of theoret-
ical models. We have drawn up a proposal for the
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Corruption Analytical Model 3
differentiation and convergence between concepts that
seeks to overcome this conceptual challenge and con-
tribute towards the proposition of the AMC.
Theoretical Models on Corruption
Despite the rising interest in the study of corruption
since the 1990s, a multitude of studies on this subject
seem to exist without real corroboration between
related fields and lacking the development of
theoretical models to guide research. Among the 42
studies used to
compile a meta-analysis, 26 do not provide a theoretical
model to substantiate them (Judge et al., 2011). One of
the theoretical models used, which was an exception in
the meta-analysis, was the Corruption Institutional
Choice Analytic Frame (CICAF) (Collier, 2002).
CICAF is an interdisciplinary proposal to understand
corruption. It is assumed that corruption is a phenom-
enon that takes place in institutions (or tangentially to
them) and that can be explained by assessing an indi-
vidual decision restricted by various political, economic
and cultural factors (Collier, 2002). CICAF is shown in
Figure 2.
As can be seen in Figure 2, CICAF proposes “two
worlds” for the understanding of corruption. An “inter-
nal world”, referring to the micro-level of analysis, that
includes the individual decision-making process to act
in a corrupt manner. Analysis of this “world” is influ-
ence by typical economic models (see Becker, 1968),
seeing that the author considers that decision-making
is based on the deliberative assessment of the cost-
benefit expectations of the action. If the expectation
of benefits is greater than the expectation of costs,
there is a greater probability the action will take place
(Collier, 2002).
Nevertheless, according to the author, this individual
decision-making process is related to the “external
world”. The individual decision is influenced by polit-
ical, economic, and sociocultural norms that exist in the
individual’s “external world”. In this “world”, aside
 4 J. G. Modesto & R. Pilati
Figure 2. Corruption Institutional Choice Analytic Frame (adapted from Collier, 2002).
from the corrupt behavior predictors, is where the main
economic, political and social corruption consequences
can be found. If the corrupt actions were legitimated
instead of punished (Collier, 2002), these conse-
quences, in turn, result in the creation of new norms,
thus contributing towards the emergence of a “culture
of corruption”.
Although CICAF allows for some progress to be
made by proposing an interdisciplinary perspective,
its approach is open to criticism. In the “internal world”,
the author presents a decision-making model based on
the cost-benefit models that are typical in economics.
Various studies focusing on the decision-making pro-
cess in finance (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), as well
as research into dishonesty (Mazar & Ariely, 2006),
all point to that approach as being restrictive, seeing
that there are various biases that interfere with the
decision- making process that surpass a deliberate
choice between cost and benefit expectations. Another
element that may
be criticized is the “inner” and “outer” dichotomy as a
basis to explain behavior. There is a tradition in
psychol- ogy literature that seeks to understand
behavior based on different levels of analysis (Doise,
1980), taking into account biological, cultural and
interpersonal factors,
overcoming a dichotomy between the individual and
society. Furthermore, the restrictive “internal world”
and “external world” proposal does not take into
account, for example, the influence of groups on behav-
ior, which has been systematically studied under the
scope of social psychology. Another limitation of the
model is that the concept of abuse of power, essential to
the concept of corruption, is not included in the under-
standing of the phenomenon.
Aside from CICAF, Dimant and Schulte (2016) also
propose an interdisciplinary perspective to analyze
corruption. Notwithstanding the “external world” and
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“internal world”, also discussed in CICAF, the authors
point to the existence of a “meso world”. Despite the
inclusion of this dimension, according to Dimant and
Schulte (2016), the proposal should be seen as an
“inner- to-outer-world approach” (p. 58). It should be
noted that, although terminology more closely related
to the
typical debate regarding levels of analysis is used, the
authors also seem to analyze behavior from an internal-
external dichotomy perspective. Despite this criticism,
the proposal favors the understanding of corrupt
behavior in an interdisciplinary and, to some extent,
multilevel manner. Figure 3 shows the proposed
perspective.
According to Dimant and Schulte (2016), the “internal
world”, aside from taking into account rational
decision-making processes, also considers a “behavioral
perspective” that, according to the theoretical frame-
work of behavioral economics, favors the analysis of
less deliberate corruption processes. On this subject,
we can see progress when compared to CICAF, insofar
that less conscious processes are included in the pro-
posal. It can, therefore, be construed that corrupt
actions are not as completely rational and deliberate as
pre- sumed in the traditional economics “homo
econom- icus” that supports CICAF.
On the other hand, in the “meso world”, Dimant and
Schulte (2016) point to the importance of evaluating
criminal and social factors, such as social norms, values,
culture and education. The authors argue that the
“meso
world” analyses social interaction, however, the descrip-
tion provided involves, to a greater extent, the variables
commonly referred to in social psychology as macro
variables (an example of which is culture). Although
social interaction is mentioned, the role played by
groups is not highlighted in this dimension proposed
by the authors. As such, the “meso world” is thus
considered
 Corruption Analytical Model 5

Figure 3. Interdisciplinary Perspective of Corruption (adapted from Dimant & Schulte, 2016).

to be just another extension of the “external world” concern in indicating that the notion of abuse of power
rather than an analysis of social interaction and group is essential to the understanding of corruption.
processes. Regarding the “external world”, extrinsic
Seeing that corruption is a procedural and systemic
factors that may influence corruption are considered. phenomenon, by which its understanding cannot be
Dimant and Schulte (2016) focus on history, geography, restricted to an “internal world” and “external world”
economics,
dichotomy, Ashforth et al. (2008) propose that corrup-
politics and legal aspects as factors to be considered in
tion be investigated, at organizational level, according
this dimension. For example, the effects of bureaucratic
structures, the role played by political and legal institu- to five views: Micro view, macro view, wide view, long
tions, and even the repercussions of colonization on view, and deep view.
corruption are analyzed. This dimension, conceptually, The micro view refers to an analysis of individual
processes, such as demographic variables and dis-
is related to the “external world” of CICAF.
positional factors that explain corrupt behavior. The
Although more complete than CICAF, and showing
authors, contrary to CICAF, highlight the existence of
significant improvement such as the consideration of
biases in individual decision-making as an important
less rational and deliberate processes, the proposal
element towards the understanding of corruption. Ash-
undertaken by Dimant and Schulte (2016) has limita-
forth et al. (2008) further argue that an exclusively
tions. In spite of the term “meso world”, its description
intraindividual analysis would favor the simplistic
does not seem to focus on group processes, appearing
more to be an extension of the “external world” rather understanding that removing “the bad apples” would
be enough to end corruption. However, the other levels
than a specific dimension to analyze the impact of
of analysis indicate that the phenomenon, and conse-
groups on corrupt behavior. Additionally, the authors,
quently the fight against it, tends to be more complex.
although seeking to understand the phenomenon by
In the macro view, it is assumed that the organiza-
means of levels of analysis, to a certain extent still seem
tional context may contribute towards corruption, inso-
to treat the phenomenon as an internal-external dichot-
far as social norms exist that are capable of creating
omy, seeing that they define the “external world” as the
corrupt organizations that reach beyond the individuals
location for the “extrinsic opportunities” (p. 66) of the
that constitute them. For example, organizations
individual, as well as stating that the proposal should
be seen as an “inner-to-outer-world approach” (p. 58). may create objectives that are difficult to achieve by
Furthermore, as in CICAF, there doesn’t seem to be any honest means and that, in conjunction with a culture

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 6 J. G. Modesto & R. Pilati

Figure 4. The Multilevel Analytical Model of Corruption.

of strong competitiveness, may favor corrupt prac-

we hereby propose the Analytical Model of Corruption
tices. The macro-level also includes, according to the
(AMC) that takes into account the various views that
authors, studies that assess national and international
should be considered when studying this subject
corruption indexes.
(Ashforth et al., 2008) as well as concern in linking
Seeing that corruption widely affects the social sys-
levels of analysis (Dimant & Schulte, 2016). The model
tem, Ashforth et al. (2008) propose that corruption also
can be seen in Figure 4.
be studied from a wider perspective consisting, for
According to the definition endorsed in the present
example, the understanding of the supply and demand
theoretical study, corruption should be construed as the
of corrupt actions. After all, where there are corrupted,
abuse of power for illegal gains (Andersson & Hey-
there are corruptors and a more extensive system that
wood, 2009). In light of this understanding, the analysis
favors the existence of these social roles.
of corrupt behavior should begin by looking at the
For Ashforth et al. (2008), researching corruption
positional dimension, which includes the opportunity
from a long-term view means understanding that cor-
to undertake an action due to the position occupied
ruption is an old phenomenon, by which it is necessary
by the individual. It should be noted that this concern
to consider its historical factors. Finally, corruption can
with the notion of position of power does not seem to
also be researched from a deep view, which means
have been included in previous models found in the
assuming an interdisciplinary proposal that includes
literature and is, nevertheless, an essential aspect of
contributions from different areas.
the AMC.

Analytical Model of Corruption

Positional Dimension
Considering the lack of theoretical perspectives to guide
Once in a position of power, potential corruption situ-
the study of corruption in an interdisciplinary manner
ations may occur by which the individual may, or may
(Judge et al., 2011), as well as the importance of under-
not, act in a corrupt manner. Taking the positional
standing the psychosocial processes necessary for
dimension into account, therefore, means accepting that
appropriate research of corruption (Zaloznaya, 2014),
the position an individual occupies in a particular case,
within a certain context, is relevant to the analysis of

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psychosocial processes (Pereira & Araú jo, 2013). For
example, in the case of corruption, the differences and
similarities between processes that interfere in the cor-
rupt act may be tested when evaluating the corrupted
(someone in a position of power that allow themselves
to be corrupted) and the corruptor (individual that
benefits from the illegal actions of the corrupted). In
some studies, this difference has already been consid-
ered at the time the scenarios being researched are
elaborated (Bai et al., 2016), pointing to the existence
of possible specific psychosocial processes for under-
standing corrupt behavior when analyzing the various
positions occupied. Another aspect in the analysis of
this phenomenon, taking into account the positional
dimension, involves researching to what level power
itself, inherent to the position occupied, is capable of
specifically favoring corrupt acts, as well as antisocial
practices in general. In this regard, there is evidence that
power may favor behavior aimed at obtaining personal
gains. However, this effect tends to occur among indi-
viduals with low moral identity (DeCelles et al., 2012). It
can also be seen that in circumstances where power is
perceived to be a way of influencing others, the position
of power may favor higher levels of aggressiveness and
exploitation towards subordinates (Cislak et al., 2018).
It is important to note that, although the analysis of
the positional dimension is considered to be the “gate-
way” to understanding corrupt behavior, it should be
considered as a common factor between all dimensions
of the model (as indicated by the two-way arrows in the
image). For example, when personality traits and their
impact on corruption are analyzed, we recommend that
this impact be researched taking into account the posi-
tion of the corrupted and the corruptor. This is also
valid for the group dimension: Will group impact will
be similar when the situation involves corrupted when
compared to corruptors? We believe that the positional
dimension will offer greater clarity to corruption pre-
dictors, which represents an important advantage of
the AMC over previous models.
Micro-level: Intraindividual Aspects of Corruption
After understanding the positional dimension, let's
analyze the AMC intraindividual factors (micro-level)
which consist of elements that are equivalent to the
micro view of Ashforth et al. (2008) and the internal
world of CICAF (Collier, 2002) and Dimant and Schulte
(2016). In this dimension, we propose that individual
characteristics (dispositional traits) be analyzed, together
with the understanding of the mechanisms by which
persons evaluate a potential corruption situation (infor-
mation processing).
Regarding individual characteristics, an element that
is commonly investigated is gender. There is evidence
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Corruption Analytical Model 7
that women are less corrupt than men (Breen et al., 2017;
Swamy et al., 2001). According to the lower indexes of
corruption identified in certain studies, some authors,
and even the World Bank, suggest that the presence of
women in positions of power would be a good strategy
for better governance and a better approach to the fight
against corruption (Swamy et al., 2001; World Bank,
2001). Not only researchers, but also the general popu-
lation seem to agree that women in power may contrib-
ute towards the fight against corruption, especially
because of the belief that women are more averse to
risk, aside from being considered as outsiders in politics
(Barnes et al., 2018). However, when analyzing gender
together with the opportunity for corruption in the
public sector, facts do not seem to be enough to state
that women are effectively less corrupt (Alhassan-
Alolo, 2007). In truth, it can be argued that
governments that have more women in positions of
power are only less corrupt due to a liberal democracy
that favors their election, and that, in truth, its liberal
democracy itself that is associated with lower
corruption indices (Sung, 2003). Research on gender
seems to point towards the need to identify moderators
for the relationship between gender and corruption,
as well as if more
“typical” forms of corruption exist when taking gender
into account.
Aside from gender, other individual characteristics
may be evaluated to understand the dispositional fac-
tors of corruption. In a research paper on white-collar
crime, it was found that those who committed a crime
showed higher indices of hedonism, narcissism and
conscientiousness, and lower indices of self-control
(Blickle et al., 2006). White-collar criminals also seem
to have lower indices of social consciousness when
compared to an individual in a position of power that
did not commit the same crimes (Collins & Schmidt,
2006).
Still, regarding intraindividual factors, researchers
have also evaluated the just world beliefs as predictors
of corruption. It was found that a greater perception of
justice, based on the belief of a just world, was associ-
ated with lower intention of corruption indices (Bai
et al., 2016).
Despite evidence originating from specific research
on corruption, results from unethical behavior and dis-
honesty studies that point to possible variables relevant
to understanding corrupt behavior may also be consid-
ered (see Lehnert et al., 2015; Treviñ o et al., 2006). It
can be seen that, for example, the lower an
individual’s
moral cognitive development, the greater the probabil-
ity they will behave unethically (Knoll et al., 2016),
where individual differences in the perception of guilt
moderate that relationship (Johnson & Connelly, 2016).
Aside from the referred dispositional factors, some
research has also attempted to identify the skills of a
 8 J. G. Modesto & R. Pilati

dishonest person. For example, there is evidence that intuitive and automated decisions. Although efficient
more creative people have higher indices of dishonest
behavior (Gino & Ariely, 2012). According to the
authors, creative people have a greater capacity to
justify their actions, thus increasing their chances of
behaving dishonestly.
Together with research on individual characteristics,
the AMC micro-level assumes that it is important to
analyze how information relating to a potential corrupt
act is processed and, consequently, how it influences
decision-making. Based on the tradition of research into
the dual process model of information processing
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013), the AMC foresees that a
corrupt action may be governed by controlled and/or
automatic processes. In this aspect, the AMC is aligned
with research into moral cognition that has been used
to analyze to what extent behavior for personal gain is
more intuitive or deliberate (Hallsson et al., 2018).
There is evidence suggesting that, in situations
where an individual has sufficient time and cognitive
resources to make a careful decision, the controlled
processes will prevail (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). In
such a case, an individual can carefully analyze the risks
and benefits of a corrupt act. This understanding is
consis- tent with what is posited by CICAF, and the
decision-
making cost-benefit models in general. Based specifi-
cally on the General Theory of Crime (Becker, 1968), it
is expected that, among other factors, when making
a
rational decision, the individual assesses the gains that
may be obtained by corruption in comparison to those
obtained by legal means; the risks of being found out
and punished; as well as the degree of punishment
should he/she be found out. In this sense, there is
evidence that greater perception of the risk will
decrease the intention of acting corruptly (Bai et al.,
2016).
In addition to the risks and benefits analysis, a more
controlled and conscious process may favor dishonest
practices according to the use of justifications that legit-
imate the behavior. In situations where the individual
can justify his/her actions as “legal” or by considering
them as broader moral benefits (Gino & Pierce, 2009) it is
more probable that the dishonest behavior will occur.
According to the Theory of Self-concept Maintenance,
the use of justifications is favorable since the individual
keeps the external rewards obtained through
dishonesty and at the same time they reduce the
intrinsic discomfort of having acted dishonestly (Mazar
et al., 2008).
Although it is relevant to evaluate the variables
linked to a more deliberate and controlled process, the
decision in a political or economic scope is not always
conscious as assumed in the cost-benefit models. There
is evidence
that our rational capacity is limited during the financial
decision-making process (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979),
and on certain occasions may contribute with more
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 in many circumstances, automatic processes may be
associated with errors in judgment and perception,
see- ing that, for example, people do not always have
the capacity to perceive a certain situation as unethical
as they lack the cognitive resources for a more
systematic evaluation (Darley, 2005), or the individual
may not have been capable of deliberately applying
self-control due to psychological exhaustion (Mead et
al., 2009).
Another important aspect regarding automatic pro-
cesses in corruption evaluation involves the analysis of
cognitive biases. Loss aversion, for example, is consid-
ered to be a cognitive bias that may favor the
occurrence of automated dishonest decision-making
(Schindler & Pfattheicher, 2017). Individuals, due to
loss aversion, will be more inclined to act
dishonestly to avoid
financial loss.
Furthermore, when processing information, empha-
sis should be placed on the importance of emotions
when analyzing decision-making in risk situations
(Reyna, 2004). More specifically, regarding
dishonesty, there is evidence that individuals that
act dishonestly
tend to gradually escalate their dishonest actions
seeing that repeated exposure to these actions
influences the amygdala, a region of the brain that is
directly linked to emotions (Garrett, Lazzaro, Ariely,
& Sharot, 2016).
In this sense, according to the authors, repeated expo-
sure to dishonest actions reduces emotional response
to those same actions, which may favor an increase in
dishonesty. Other studies also point to a relationship
between the amygdala and immoral acts (Shenhav &
Greene, 2014), which restates the importance of emo-
tions in the processing of information and decision-
making in the broader scope of unethical behavior.
The intraindividual process dimension of the
AMC proposes that cognitive processes should be
evaluated, and not only the demographic and
dispositional vari- ables, which may be predictors of
corrupt decision- making. It is necessary to
understand which factors influence corrupt behavior
when an automatic process
prevails and when the controlled processing of infor-
mation prevails. It is also necessary to understand
how dispositional variables influence the types of
cognitive processing, and as a result of this produce a
model that
includes intraindividual factors as the antecedents of
corrupt behavior.

Meso level: Group Processes and Corruption

The group process dimension is related to the
intraindi- vidual dimension and refers to the meso-
level of analy- sis. At this level, it is possible to
investigate the role played by groups in corrupt
decisions, which is some- thing that has been
neglected in empirical research and previous
theoretical models, as has already been mentioned.
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Concerning the role of groups, some researchers con-
sider the possibility (Schikora, 2011) that the existence of
groups inhibits corrupt behavior. This understanding
favored the development of the Four Eyes Principle
(4EP), which posits that a corrupt individual will be less
inclined to act dishonestly in front of other people.
Thus,
the name “four eyes”, indicating the existence of “more
eyes” would favor inspecting and the inhibition of cor-
rupt behavior. Although intuitive, there is evidence that
4EP is not efficient (Schikora, 2011). Some phenomena
typically researched under the scope of social psychol-
ogy contribute towards the understanding of the non-
effectiveness of 4EP.
One of the group processes that helps in understand-
ing the reason behind the non-effectiveness of 4EP is
social influence. In cases where a strong group identity
exists and one of the members of the group acts dishon-
estly, that could create a group norm and cause the
other members of the group to also act dishonestly
(Gino et al., 2009). Furthermore, under circumstances
where it is possible to act dishonestly under the pretext
of increased benefits for the group, there is a greater
prob-
ability of dishonesty taking place (Gino et al., 2013; Gino
& Pierce, 2009). In other words, the group may, under
certain circumstances, contribute towards dishonest
behavior instead of inhibiting it.
Group influence is one of the ways of understanding
what drives an individual to act dishonestly. According
to the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1981), we have
various social identities according to the groups we
integrate. In light of this, an individual may have a
moral personal identity and still act in a corrupt
manner in certain situations based on other identities
that are called upon depending on the context and the
group in question (Darley, 2005).
As such, the AMC meso-level allows group corrup-
tion processes to be investigated. In that respect, a
research design that compares individual and group
decisions, studies that evaluate pressure to conform,
intergroup bias, among other group processes that fall
under the scope of corruption, can be developed. A
specific line of research into this dimension is
important,
considering that many corrupt actions take place within
the context of groups and teams, as is the case of orga-
nizations and politics.
Macro-level: Contextual Aspects of Corruption
There is a proximity of the AMC macro-level to the
external world of CICAF, to the meso and external
world of Dimant and Schulte (2016), as well as to the
macro and long-term view of Ashforth et al. (2008), to
the extent that it gives context to the contextual factors of
corruption. Based on a more advanced stage of econom-
ics in the study of the phenomenon (when compared to
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Corruption Analytical Model 9
social psychology), the greatest body of evidence can
be found in the contextual factors dimension, relating
to the causes and consequences of corruption (Tanzi,
1998), considering the proposed distinction between
corruption, unethical behavior and dishonest behavior.
One can highlight, for example, how the political and
economic system and cultural aspect influence corrupt
practices.
Concerning the political system, there is evidence
that a democratic government is associated with lower
indi- ces of corruption (Pellegrini, 2011). It can,
however, be seen, that this effect tends to occur in more
consolidated democracies, with democratically elected
governments that have been in power during a
minimum uninter- rupted period of 10 years for the
impact on corruption to be perceived. One of the ways
to understand these
findings is that, in mature democracies, there is an
expectation that corrupt politicians are not get re-
elected, which, consequently, would reduce the general
corruption indices of the country. Additionally, the
impact democracy has in reducing corruption tends to
occur only in countries where the per capita Gross
Domestic Product is approximately more than 2,000
dollars. In countries that fall below this level, democra-
tization does not reduce corruption insofar as it arises
as an opportunity to obtain more concrete gains in light
of the economic situation of the country (Jetter et al.,
2015). Aside from the direct effect of economy, there is
evidence of interaction between a democratic system
and a liberal economic model with regards to the reduc-
tion of corruption (Saha et al., 2009), seeing that a
liberal structure would reduce the opportunity public
agents have of obtaining gains by means of kickbacks
and bribes. Nevertheless, this data should be analyzed
with caution considering that there is evidence that
compet- itiveness, which is typical of a liberal
economic model,
may favor corruption (Søreide, 2009).
In addition to the analysis of political and
economic models, commonly investigated within the
field of polit- ical science and economics, it is important
to understand the impact culture has on corruption.
Based on Hostede’s Model (Hofstede, 1980), various
studies have focused on the impact of the model’s
cultural dimensions on corruption, especially with
regards to the individualism-
collectivism, power distance, masculinity-femininity,
and uncertainty avoidance dimensions.
The individualism/collectivism dimension applies to
the understanding of the relationship pattern of the
individuals with the groups to which they belong. In
societies with higher indices of individualism, there is a
greater tendency for individuals to establish personal
goals and to consider themselves to be responsible
for their actions. There is also an understanding, as
opposed to countries with higher indices of
collectivism, that rules and laws should apply in general
 to the whole

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 10 J. G. Modesto & R. Pilati
of society, and not vary for the benefit of certain groups.
Based on the understanding that laws apply to every-
one, aside from the fact that collectivist societies tend to
prioritize informal relationships (which may contribute
towards personal advantages such as corruption), var-
ious studies have shown that countries with higher
indices of individualism tend to have lower levels of
corruption (Davis & Ruhe, 2003; Jha & Panda, 2017;
Yeganeh, 2014).
The power distance dimension refers to the degree to
which people accept the fact that power is unevenly
distributed. We are thus dealing with the acceptance
of the hierarchy of social structures as if it were a
natural and “unchangeable” process. Therefore, higher
indices
of power distance tend to be related to higher indices of
corruption (Soeharto & Nugroho, 2018) seeing that,
based on structured hierarchies, it will not be likely that
individuals will oppose the behavior of those in power
(even if this behavior is corrupt). Aside from this,
greater power distance favors the exchange of favors,
kickbacks and bribes by those in power in detriment of
those who it is unlikely will have access to those posi-
tions (Davis & Ruhe, 2003; Yeganeh, 2014). Neverthe-
less, there is evidence of a positive relationship
between the power distance levels of a country and the
perceived degree of reputation of its organizations
(Deephouse et al., 2016).
The masculinity-femininity dimension involves the
evaluation of aspects such as the degree of competitive-
ness and obtaining material rewards in detriment of
cooperation and quality of life. The higher the mascu-
linity index, the greater the competitiveness and mate-
rialism, while higher levels of femininity are associated
with being careful and cooperative. In masculine cul-
tures success and money are thus prioritized, which
favors its association with corruption (Davis & Ruhe,
2003; Yeganeh, 2014).
The uncertainty avoidance dimension deals with the
cultural aspect, which involves the degree to which
people in certain places are tolerant of the fact that the
future is unpredictable. Countries with higher indices of
uncertainty avoidance tend to seek out ways of “con-
trol” that allow for greater predictability in the world.
In light of this, the development of bureaucratic
structures
that favor corruption is observed (Davis & Ruhe, 2003).
Furthermore, corruption can be seen as being safer in
such a context, providing immediate rewards and guar-
antees, which also helps to understand the relationship
between this cultural dimension and corrupt practices
(Park, 2003).
Still at a macro level, aside from culture, another
variable of interest to social psychology that
contributes towards the understanding of corrupt
behavior is the social norm. Despite the limitations
already discussed regarding CICAF (Collier, 2002), the
impact of the
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social, political and economic norms on corruption
was already explicitly shown in the model, to the extent
that the norms, especially descriptive norms, guide the
behavior according to the context. In this regard, it can
be seen that descriptive norms influence the intention
of
corruption, by which this relationship is partially medi-
ated by the level of moral disengagement of the indi-
vidual (Zhao et al., 2019). According to the authors,
descriptive norms tend to indicate that acting in a cor-
rupt manner is something normal within that context.
This understanding activates moral disengagement
mechanisms that serve to justify and legitimate a
corrupt act.
The macro level, therefore, favors the understanding
of contextual factors of corruption. On this level, studies
can be developed to compare different political and
economic models and their impact on corruption.
How corruption is expressed (i.e.: Cronyism, bribery,
white-collar crime) within different cultural contexts
may also be analyzed, in order to identify whether or
not more typical forms of expression exist depending
on the culture. Furthermore, from a macro perspective,
it is essential to undertake studies that analyze the
repercus- sions of corruption. The analysis of this
dimension, to the extent found in literature, has
been privileged by researchers, especially when
research in economics and political science was taken
into account, and was included in the AMC multilevel
proposal.
Concluding remarks
The objective of this work was to propose the Analytical
Model of Corruption as a multilevel model for interdis-
ciplinary research. The main advantages of the AMC,
when compared with the few previous models found in
literature, are that its structure is based on a clear defi-
nition of corruption that, in that sense, take into account
the importance of analyzing the positional dimension to
understand corruption. Moreover, contrary to previous
models, it highlights the role played by groups in cor-
ruption, which is an aspect that was neglected in other
models.
It is also important to emphasize the multilevel
aspect of the AMC. Despite the distinction made
between the positional, micro, meso and macro
dimensions, the model proposes a mutual interaction
between them. As such, it is foreseen in the model
that an individual
in a position of power should make decisions. The
tendency to make a corrupt decision is influenced by
dispositional factors, as well as by how a situation is
evaluated. Should it be evaluated in a rational and
deliberate manner, if the benefits outweigh the risks, it
is more likely that the corrupt behavior will take place.
When automatic processes prevail, some biases also
tend to favor corrupt behavior, as is the case with loss

aversion. However, this decision is limited by group
and contextual factors. The presence of a group may
inhibit corrupt behavior, as long as the group has
norms to prevent corrupt behavior and some level of
group identity exists. However, if the group has norms
that induce corrupt behavior, the presence of more
indi- viduals may favor corruption. This interaction
is also
influenced by contextual factors. Social, political and
economic, as well as cultural norms will influence the
tendency to behave corruptly. Even though the context
does not favor corrupt behavior, excuses may be used
to justify the behavior, breaking with the social norm.
Based on the interactive nature of the AMC, despite
the influence of groups and contextual factors on indi-
vidual behavior, individuals also influence group and
contextual dynamics. A single individual is capable of
influencing an entire group, a typical process in the
phenomenon of leadership (see Tanzi, 1998, regarding
how the role of a leader may be an example to prevent
corrupt behavior). Additionally, various corrupt indi-
vidual behaviors, if they go unpunished, may gradually
become the norm, thus creating a “culture of corrup-
tion”. This perspective of interaction favors the AMC to
be used as a structure that could guide interdisciplinary
studies, which is essential for a comprehensive and
efficient analysis of the antecedents of corruption
(Ashforth et al., 2008; Judge et al., 2011).
The AMC was not developed with the intent to
exhaust the relevant variable set used to understand
corrupt behavior. Its purpose is to help guide and orga-
nize large sets of variables relating to corruption and
dishonest behavior antecedents. As already mentioned,
it is based on a multilevel premise and on the under-
standing of the multideterminism of human behavior,
the analysis of factors in isolated levels of analysis is
not sufficient to fully understand corrupt behavior. As
such, the AMC proposes an organizational structure
that serves as a means for researchers and
professionals interested in fighting and preventing
corruption to develop strategies aimed at
understanding the factors
and variables of specific situations or, otherwise,
develop strategies to prevent and mitigate undesirable
conduct related with dishonesty. Thus, the AMC proves
to be, from a multilevel standpoint, as a useful contrib-
utor to the fields of expertise of various professionals,
such as lawyers, political scientists, sociologists, econo-
mists and psychologists that are involved in research-
ing, preventing and fighting corruption.
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