TC 29 Respondent

TEAM CODE: 29
RAJIV GANDHI NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF LAW, PUNJAB
INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021
BEFORE
THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICUS
Jurisdiction arising out of Article 32 of the Constitution of India
W.P. (Crl) No. __/ 2021
IN THE MATTER BETWEEN
SATASHA SABAR
…PETITIONER
VERSUS
STATE OF INDICUS …
RESPONDENT
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
RGNUL INTRA-MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Abbreviations IV
Index of Authorities V
Statement of Jurisdiction IX
Statement of Facts X
Issues Raised XII
Summary of Arguments XIII
Arguments Advanced 1
I) THE BASIS/PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINATION OF SEDITION ON THE BASIS OF
CONTENT OF LANGUAGE WHICH CAUSES DISAFFECTION AND HATRED IS VALID 1
A) Determining sedition on the basis of content of language is valid 1
B) § 124-A of IPC is not vague and arbitrary and is in accordance with Art. 14 3
i) The § 124-A is Reasonable and sets ‘clear’ Standards 3
ii) §124 A is not Arbitrary and the possibility of misuse does not render it
unconstitutional 4
II) SEDITION CAN BE DETERMINED SO FAR AS SEDITIOUS SPEECH TENDED TO INCITE

PUBLIC DISORDER 6
A) § 124-A of IPC is a reasonable restriction under Art. 19(2) 6
i) Restrictions under § 124-A are in the interest of public order 6
ii) The threshold for conviction under sedition is violence 8
B) Tendency to incite Public Disorder is a valid condition 9
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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
III) KEDARNATH RULING’S INTERPRETATION IS VALID AND COMPATIBLE WITH
ARTICLE 19(1)(A)
11
A) Rationale and interpretation of Kedarnath judgment is valid 11
B) Compatibility of Kedarnath judgement with Art. (19)(1)(A) 13
C) In arguendo, Presumption of Constitutionality renders § 124-A valid 14
Prayer XV
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AIR All India Reporter
All Allahabad
Art. Article
Const. Constitution
Cri Criminal
CLR Criminal Law Reporter
IPC Indian Penal Code
ILR Indian Law Report
JLJ Jabalpur Law Journal
NGO Non-Government Organisation
RCR Recent Criminal Reports
§ Section
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reports
UP Uttar Pradesh
U.S. United States
Ors Others
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
AG v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus, (1957) 1 All ER 49 15
A.K. Roy v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 711 3
Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1955 SC 504 4
Amrit Banaspati Ltd v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 1340 15
Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, [1970] 3 S.C.R. 288 7
Asit Kumar Sen Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh, Cri App No. 86 of 2011 (Chh) 7
Attorney-General v. Corporation of the City of Adelaide, (2013) 249 CLR 1 6
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 12
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 2301 6
Bhikasu Yamasa Kshatriya v. Sangamner Akola Taluka Bidi Kamgar Union, AIR 1963 SC
806 4
Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318 15
Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129 13
Captain Subhash Kumar v. The Principal Officer, Mercantile Marine Deptt., 1991(2) SCC
449 15
Charanjit Lal Chowdhary v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41 15
Chief Justice, Andhra Pradesh v. LVA Dikshitulu, AIR 1979 SC 628 15
Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118 6
CIT v. S. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352 15
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57 15
~6~
Common Cause v. Union of India, AIR 2014 SC 1556 12
Debi Soren & Ors. v. The State (1954 CriLJ 758) 8
Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101 15
Federation of Railway Officers Association v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 1344 4
Girdharilal & Sons v. Balbirnath Mathur, AIR 1986 SC 1099 15
India v. Elphinstone Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd., AIR 2001 SC 724 5
Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 179 8
Jyoti Prasad v. Union Territory, AIR 1961 SC 1602 4
Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 6
Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 2, 14
M. Pentiah v. Veeramallappa Muddala, AIR 1961 SC 1107 15
Madhu Limaye v. The State Of Maharashtra, 1978 SCR (1) 749 9
Mahant Moti Das v. S.P. Sahi, AIR 1959 SC 942 15
Management of Advance Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Gurudasmal, AIR 1970 SC 1126 15
Matajog v. Bhari, AIR 1955 SC 44 4
ML Kamra v. New India Assurance, AIR 1992 SC 1072 15
Municipal Committee v. State of Punjab, (1969) 1 SCC 475 4
Municipal Council, Madurai v. Narayanan, AIR 1975 SC 2193 15
Maunsell v. Olins, (1975) I All ER 16 (HL) 15
Nationwide News v. Wills, (1992) 177 CLR 1 6
Nand Lal v. State of Haryana, AIR 1980 SC 2097 3
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Naraindas v. State of M.P., AIR 1974 SC 1232 5
Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 461 6
Niharendu Majumdar v. K.E. 1942 F.C.R. 38

______________________________________6
Osmania University Teacher’s Association v. State of A.P., (1987) 4 SCC 671 15
Pannalal v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397 5
People’s Union of Civil Liberities v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 1442 5
Philips India Ltd. v. Labour Court, (1985) 3 SCC 103 15
Prithi Pal Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1413 15
R.K Karanjia v. Emperor, AIR 1946 Bom 322 9
R.K. Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 2138 5
R.M.D.Chamarbaugwal v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628 14
Ram Nandan v. State of UP, AIR 1959 All 101 8
Ramji Lal Modi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 620 9
Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Tendolkar, AIR 1957 SC 532 4, 5
RMD Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628 15
Romesh Thapar v. State Of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 1, 6, 13
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523 4, 8
Sukhwinder v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 63 5
Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 633 6
T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 8
Tara Singh Gopi Chand v. The State, 1951 Cri LJ 449 2
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Tika Ramji v. State of U.P., AIR 1956 SC 676 5
Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, AIR 1990 SC 123 15
Tinsukhia Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, (1989) 3 SCC 709 8
Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. (2001) 4 SCC 139 15
Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd., (1978) 1 All ER 948 (HL) 15
The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, (1979) 2 EHRR 245 9
STATUTES
Constitutional Assembly Debates, December 01, 1948, speech by S.H. Singh 9
PEN. CODE § 124 A (1860) 1
The First Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1951, Acts of Parliament, India (1951) 10
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
INDIA CONST. art. 19 2
INDIA CONST. art. 19, cl.2 10
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioner has approached the hon’ble Supreme Court of Indicus through a Writ Petition,
under Article 32 of the Constitution.1 The hon’ble Supreme Court of Indicus has the inherent
jurisdiction to adjudicate the present case by virtue of Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
Article 32 of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to hear any writ petition alleging
the violation of any Fundamental Rights under Part III.
The Respondent humbly submits to the jurisdiction of this hon’ble Court.
1 Article 32: Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part,

(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred
by this Part is guaranteed;
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
~BACKGROUND~
In 1947, the Republic of Indicus gained independence from the colonial rule of Pax
Britannica and on the eve of independence, a new Bawali language speaking state i.e.,
Republic of Bawalistan was carved out of the State of Indicus. As per their respective
censuses conducted in 1951, the multilingual Republic of Indicus had 56% Indi speakers,
24% Inqilabi, 2% Bawali, 14% Yrdu & remaining 4% Cucci, Zucchi, & Dodo speakers; and
the Republic of Bawalistan had 75% Bawali speakers, 10% Inqilabi, 15% Indi speakers. In
the census of 2021, it was revealed that the Republic of Bawali had 95% Bawali speakers,
and just 5% Inqilabi and Indi speakers. This data accompanied with the reports testifying
large scale discrimination against the Indi and Inqilabi communities in Bawalistan led the
Government of Indicus to take action and provide relief to the persecuted communities. The
legislature passed the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2021 to allow all the persecuted
language speakers who migrated from Bawalistan easier citizenship and provided that all
these people who entered before December, 2019 will not be recognised as illegal migrants as
they had no choice but to escape their country.
~CAA AND THE PROTESTS~
However, the Act wasn’t accepted by all citizens and some protests took place as a result. On
January 01, Ms. Satasha Sabar initiated a protest with the help of an NGO: CEC.
Sloganeering and road-blocks ensued. On January 15, protests rose against the Bawali
speakers protests and as a result of the clash, 53 citizens died, 100 were injured, fire arms and
petrol bombs caused destruction of property. Large-scale rioting and arson were the result of
the protests. Cases were filed against Mr. Indi Bhushan and Ms. Satasha and others. Ms.
Satasha was arrested for her speeches and social media posts under § 124 A, 120 B, & 153 A
and was convicted by the Trial Court and the High Court and her appeal is now pending in
the Supreme Court.
~SEDITION~
Ms. Satasha has, however, challenged the Sedition Law through a Writ Petition under Art. 32
saying that it is constitutionally ultra vires on the grounds: § 124 A is violative of Art. 19(1)
~ 11 ~
(a) and that § 124 A does not constitute a Reasonable restriction under Art. 19(2). This raises
the doubts regarding the centuries old law. While the government sees the sedition law as a
must safeguard, many activists accuse the law of being draconian and colonial. Ms. Satasha
has also accused the law of being violative of freedom of speech and expression. This also
raises doubts about the interpretation in Kedarnath judgment. Her petition was accepted by
the Supreme Court and the matter is set for hearing.
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ISSUES RAISED
[I]
WHETHER SEDITION CAN BE DETERMINED ONLY ON THE BASIS BY THE CONTENT OF

THE LANGUAGE USED TO CAUSE DISAFFECTION, HATRED OR CONTEMPT?
[II]
WHETHER SEDITION CAN BE DETERMINED ONLY INSOFAR AS SEDITIOUS SPEECH TENDED
TO INCITE PUBLIC DISORDER?
[III]
WHETHER KEDAR NATH SINGH RULING OF SUPREME COURT OF INDIA LIMITING
INTERPRETATION OF SEDITION TO PUBLIC DISORDER-CAUSING SPEECH MAKES IT EASY
FOR IT TO BE INVOKED AGAINST ALL DISSENTERS? WHETHER SUCH AN INTERPRETATION

IS COMPATIBLE WITH FREE SPEECH GUARANTEED UNDER ART 19 (1)(A) OF THE
CONSTITUTION?
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
(I)
THAT SEDITION CAN BE DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF LANGUAGE USED TO CAUSE

DISAFFECTION, HATRED OR CONTEMPT
It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble Court that Sedition can be determined on the basis
of Language that has been used due to cause unrest and there exists no ground to declare
Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code as Ultra Vires of the Constitution of India. It is
submitted that [A] Determining Sedition on the Basis of Expression and Speech does not
violate Art. 19(1)(A); because words and language used plays a major role in inciting people
[B] Section 124A of IPC is not Vague and Arbitrary and is non-violative of Art. 14; the
words used in the Section are not vague and there exists no arbitrariness or discrimination
which can be practiced by the government and is complying with Art. 14.
(II)
THAT SEDITION CAN BE DETERMINED INSOFAR AS SEDITIOUS SPEECH TENDED TO INCITE

PUBLIC DISORDER
It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble Court that the Sedition Law is not absolute and is
subject to ‘reasonable restrictions’ under the Indian Constitution. It is humbly submitted that
the considition laid down by § 124-A in accordance to the Kedar Nath precedent regarding
‘speech tending to incite violence’ is valid. Speech is the prime way of leading rebellion or
overthrowing a state. What seems a minor spark and snowball into a major revolution. In
light of this reasoning, it is submitted that [A] the restrictions under Sec. 124 -A are imposed
in the interest of both public order and state security, hence, reasonable; and [B] the threshold
for its applicability i.e., tendency to incite violence is valid.
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(III)
THAT KEDARNATH RULING RIGHTLY INTERPRETS SEDITION AND IS COMPATIBLE WITH

RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH PROVIDED UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(A)
It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble Court that the Sedition Law is not absolute and is
subject to Reasonable Restrictions under the ambit of Indian Constitution. It is submitted that
there must be a [A] Rationale and Interpretation concluded in the Kedarnath Judgment is
Valid because the hon’ble Court gave the decision keeping in mind the merits of the case and
the law and [B] Kedarnath Ruling is also compatible with Art. 19(1)(A); as it is within the
limits of Reasonable Restriction and [C] In Arguendo, Presumption of Constitutionality.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I) THE BASIS/PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINATION OF SEDITION ON THE BASIS OF CONTENT
OF LANGUAGE WHICH CAUSES DISAFFECTION AND HATRED IS VALID
1. It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble Court that Sedition can be determined on
the basis of Language that has been used which causes unrest and there exists no
ground to declare § 124 A of the Indian Penal Code as Ultra Vires of the Constitution
of India. It is submitted that [A] Determining Sedition on the Basis of content of
language does not violate Art. 19(1)(A); because words and language used play a
major role in inciting people [B] §. 124 A of IPC is not Vague and Arbitrary and is
non-violative of Art. 14; the words used in the Section are not vague and there exists
no arbitrariness or discrimination which can be practiced by the government and is
compliant with Art. 14.
A) DETERMINING SEDITION ON THE BASIS OF CONTENT OF LANGUAGE IS VALID
2. It is submitted that language is the only way of communicating intentions, thoughts,

ideas, commands, requests etc. And wherever there is an attempt to topple the state/
the government or undermine its authority by way of contempt, or spreading
disaffection and hatred leading to violence, it will amount to sedition. Therefore, it is
pertinent to note that speech and expression are powerful tools and if not regulated for
the purposes of protection public order or security of state, then the state will have no
authority and a lack of authority results in failure towards responsibility. The only
way to apprehend a potential threat to state security or public order or subversion of
the government is to determine sedition on the basis of content and nature of
language.
3. § 124 A states that:
“Whoever, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible
representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or
contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards, the
Government established by law in India, shall be punished…”2
2 PEN. CODE § 124 A (1860).

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4. As per the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar,3
disaffection hatred and contempt do not alone cause sedition, but the tendency to
incite public disorder is what’s restrained. This was deduced from the explanations
attached with the provision. For this very reason, § 124 A was concluded to be a
reasonable restriction despite the omission of the term by the Constituent Assembly
under the then Art. 13(2) [now, Art. 19(2)].
5. Where the intention of the Constituent Assembly is concerned, it must be noted that
Sedition law was never removed or altered despite discussions. Further, when the
courts in cases like Tara Singh Gopi Chand v. The State4 etc., the Parliament made
its 1st amendment to clear the doubts over interpretation and any law which protected
public order and state security by imposing reasonable restrictions was a valid
restriction over the fundamental rights.5 In Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar (hereinafter
“Kedar Nath”)6, the Court made it clear that sedition will have violated Art. 19(1)(a)
when a broad view is taken and a mere disaffection, hatred or contempt is punished.
The Court made it clear that criticism will not amount to Sedition and that instances
where public order is threatened by speech, only in that case will sedition apply.
6. It is submitted that Sedition, in its narrow interpretation, does not violate the Freedom
of Speech and Expression. Neither does it punish disaffection, hatred, contempt nor
criticism.7 While the issue rises regarding determining sedition on the basis of
‘incitement of public disorder’, it must be noted that there are bound to be cases
where police official might register an FIR because he is convinced that sedition law
would be applied, but in such a case, the person is not punished and an FIR is not
Conviction. The punishment follows conviction and is given by a Court of Law only.
The purpose of the statute is to neutralize potential threats against the democratically
elected government or the State and it is submitted that such a purpose is not colonial
but a matter of stability of the nation. The difference between colonial sedition and
Indian sedition is that the former was implemented by a judiciary which wanted to
suppress and the latter is implemented by the judiciary that wants to protect speech
and expression.
3 Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955.

4 Tara Singh Gopi Chand v. The State, 1951 Cri LJ 449.
5 INDIA CONST. art. 19.
7 Id.
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7. Henceforth, it is submitted that neither is the law a problem nor the interpretation and
that §124 A is completely valid under Art. 19(1)(a) and only imposes reasonable
restrictions. If not, what shall protect the collective good from the individual wants? It
is a precautionary measure for safeguarding immediate potential threats to the State/
Government. It is further added that the issue is not the law but the fear of misuse.
Indeed, sedition is a sharp weapon which can either be used or misused. It will be
contended later that a law cannot be struck down on the basis of possibility of misuse.
Concluding the first argument, it is submitted that disaffection, hatred and contempt
are not the scales to measure Sedition anymore, it is the intention to disrupt public
order which is the condition. Further, it must be noted that as per the interpretation in
Kedar Nath case, only the narrow-view of § 124 A is recognised as a reasonable
restriction and as per that, the Sedition Law is not violative of Art 19(1)(a).
B) § 124 A OF IPC IS NOT VAGUE AND ARBITRARY AND IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ART. 14
8. It is submitted that the sedition law does not violate Part-III of the constitution. For a
law to be violative of Art. 14, the onus is on the petitioner to prove that the law is
arbitrary and discriminatory. While a law might have different interpretations and
some provisions are capable of being misused, the court must not judge the law on its
wisdom and possibility of misuse but the presumption of constitutionality and
consider the legislative’s assembly’s action as bona-fide. It is submitted that § 124 A
is not [i] unreasonable and vague; [ii] arbitrary and discriminatory; & [iii] possibility
or susceptibility of wanton abuse does not render it unconstitutional.
I) The § 124 A is Reasonable and sets ‘clear’ Standards
9. The Supreme Court has observed that no enactment can be struck down under Art. 14
by a mere reasoning that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some constitutional infirmity
has to be found before invalidating an Act. It cannot be declared invalid on the ground
that it contains vague, uncertain, ambiguous or mutually inconsistent provisions.8
Whether the standard offered by the statute is vague or not, has to be decided and is to
be determined upon an examination of the Act read as a whole.
10. In Municipal Committee v. State of Punjab,9 it was held that a law cannot be struck
down as violative of a Fundamental Right merely ‘on the ground that it is vague’.
8 Nand Lal v. State of Haryana, AIR 1980 SC 2097; A.K. Roy v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 711.
9 Municipal Committee v. State of Punjab, (1969) 1 SCC 475.
~3~
With respect to the Shreya Singhal10 case it was held that a law must lay down
explicit standards in order to avoid ambiguity. It is therefore, clear that until and
unless the law sets clear standards, it cannot be struck down for vagueness.
11. It is submitted that § 124 A sets clear restrictions and is not ambiguous or vague. The
provision has been extensively interpreted by the Kedar Nath Bench. It sets out as a
defence against potential threats against the government and its authority. If the such a
protection is not granted, toppling the government would become valid and
disobeying laws will become prevalent. The very idea of a democracy would fail. The
object of the law is in nexus with the purpose it was created.
II) §124 A is not Arbitrary and the possibility of misuse does not render it
unconstitutional
12. It is submitted that § 124 A does not allow arbitrariness. It is many times contended
that a police officer who files an FIR against sedition is exercising a discretion which
results in many wrong arrests and sometimes a minor criticism is exaggerated by the
police due to such arbitrariness or an intentional misuse.
13. In light of such arguments by scholars, it is submitted that discretionary powers are
not arbitrary and are necessary for the functioning of any justice system. In
Federation of Railway Officers Association v. Union of India 11, the SC held that
controlled discretion, exercisable according to a policy for a purpose clearly
enunciated by a statute, does not suffer from the vice of conformant of unrestricted
discretion. Discretionary power is not necessarily discriminatory when the legislative
policy12 is clear from the statute and the discretion is vested in the Government or
other high authority as distinguished from a minor official, 13 or when the Rules
framed under the Act lay down principle or factors to be taken into consideration in
exercising discretion14; or there are other safeguards against its improper use, such as
limitation in duration, appeal.15
10 Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523.

11 Federation of Railway Officers Association v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 1344.
12 Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Tendolkar, AIR 1957 SC 532; Bhikasu Yamasa Kshatriya v. Sangamner Akola
Taluka Bidi Kamgar Union, AIR 1963 SC 806; Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1955 SC 504; Jyoti
Prasad v. Union Territory, AIR 1961 SC 1602.
13 Matajog v. Bhari, AIR 1955 SC 44.
14 Tika Ramji v. State of U.P., AIR 1956 SC 676.
15 Sukhwinder v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 63.
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14. In Naraindas v. State of M.P. 16

the Court held that discretionary power is not
necessarily a discriminatory power and abuse of power is not easy to be assumed. A
statute carries with it a presumption of constitutionality. Such a presumption extends
also in relation to a law that has been enacted as a reasonable restriction on a
fundamental right. Further, a presumption may also be drawn that the statutory
authority would not exercise the power arbitrarily.17 The presumption is that public
officials will discharge their duties honestly and in accordance with the law.18
15. It is further added that the possibility that a discretionary power may be abused,
despite the guidelines, in the provisions providing for such power cannot be held to be
arbitrary and unreasonable. Once the policy is laid down by law it cannot be held
invalid merely on the ground that the discretion conferred by it may be abused in
some cases and may be exercised in a manner that is in fact discriminatory. 19 In the
case of R.K. Garg v. Union of India,20 it was held that the bare possibility that the
discretionary power may be abused is no ground for invalidating a statute.21
16. It is, therefore, submitted that § 124 A is neither ambiguous nor arbitrary and thus, not
violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The sedition law has a clear set of standards
which are in a reasonable nexus with the object of the provision. The possibility of
misuse of this provision cannot and should not render it unconstitutional. Moreover, it
is submitted that § 124 A, in the context of content of language, is valid as there is no
other way that an uprising or potential threat will originate. The sedition law is a
safeguard for the government elected by the majority in Indicus and removing such a
safeguard is allowing for political instability and threat to democracy itself.
II) SEDITION CAN BE DETERMINED SO FAR AS SEDITIOUS SPEECH TENDED TO INCITE

PUBLIC DISORDER
17. It is humbly submitted that the considition laid down by § 124-A in accordance to the
Kedar Nath precedent regarding ‘speech tending to incite violence’ is valid. Speech is
the prime way of leading rebellion or overthrowing a state. What seems a minor spark
16 Naraindas v. State of M.P., AIR 1974 SC 1232.
17 People’s Union of Civil Liberities v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 1442.
18 Pannalal v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397.
19 Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Tendolkar, AIR 1957 SC 532.
20 R.K. Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 2138.
21 Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Tendolkar, AIR 1957 SC 532; India v. Elphinstone Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd.,
AIR 2001 SC 724.
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and snowball into a major revolution. In light of this reasoning, it is submitted that
[A] the restrictions under Sec. 124 -A are imposed in the interest of both public order
and state security, hence, reasonable; and [B] the threshold for its applicability i.e.,
tendency to incite violence is valid.
A) SECTION 124A OF IPC IS A REASONABLE RESTRICTION UNDER ARTICLE 19(2)
18. The Freedom of speech is a fundamental right, 22 but this right is not unfettered and
reasonable restrictions may be placed on it. For instance, content that undermines a
state's security or is against public order can be restricted. 23 The crime of sedition is to
incite people to insurrection and rebellion. It basically includes all endeavours to
promote public disorder.24 Restrictions imposed by § 124-A are valid and within the
limits of Art. 19(2)
I) Restrictions under Sec. 124-A are in the interest of public order
19. Sedition is made an offence to tackle the anti-national elements who intend to disrupt
public harmony and incite violence.25 This offence is called upon when the accused
incites disaffection towards the government established by law.26 The restriction under
Sec. 124-A serves the purpose of protecting public order. The restriction has a direct
and proximate nexus with the same as it punishes those actions which have a tendency
to disrupt public peace and tranquility.27 “Public order is an expression of wide
connotation and signifies that state of tranquility which prevails among the members
of a political society as a result of the internal regulations enforced by the government
which they have established.”28 The meaning given to the Public Order in the
22 Nationwide News v. Wills, (1992) 177 CLR 1; Attorney-General v. Corporation of the City of Adelaide,
(2013) 249 CLR 1.
23 Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124; Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR
1951 SC 118.
24 Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 461.
25 Niharendu Majumdar v. K.E., 1942 F.C.R. 38.
26 Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 2301.
27 Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955; Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Dr.
Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 633.
28 Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
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Murray's Dictionary, is “absence of insurrection, riot, turbulence, unruliness or crimes

of violence.”
20. The hon’ble SC has held that “a line of demarcation has to be drawn between serious
and aggravated forms of breaches of public order which affect life of the community
or forms of breaches of public order which endanger the public interest at large, from
minor breaches of peace which do not affect the public at large.” 29 The importance of
Sedition was highlighted in the case of Asit Kumar Sen v. the State of
Chhatisgarh,30 where the Court said that:
“Each nation has its own peculiarity and demographic composition and its own
areas' specific problems. No other country in the world is facing naxal
violence of the magnitude which our country is facing. Promoting an
ideology and advocating for different form of Government is always
acceptable as it is a valid means of criticizing the policy of the incumbent
Government, however, exciting the people to armed rebellion, promoting
contempt and disrespect for the Government, supporting banned
organizations in the act of terrorism is never acceptable in our
constitutional set up.”
21. Problems like these are rare situations and a law with rare application is required to
solve them. § 124-A might seem unessential to a common citizen but it is of great
importance to public order, health and state security.
22. It is humbly submitted that in the case of Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, it
was observed
“that similar acts in different context may affect law and order in one case and
public order in the other. It is always the degree of harm and its effect on the
community. The test which is to be examined in each case is whether the act
would lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount
to disturbance of public order, or does it affect merely an individual leaving the
tranquility of the society undisturbed.” 31
29 Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, [1970] 3 S.C.R. 288.
30 Asit Kumar Sen Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh, Cri App No. 86 of 2011.
31 Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, [1970] 3 S.C.R. 288.
~7~
The latter is not covered under and restriction must meet the test of ordre publique(public
order) affecting the community in the locality.
23. It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that in the case of Ram Nandan v.
State of U.P.32 held that
“Any reasonable restriction can be imposed on the right to freedom of speech
and expression in the interests of public order. Any restriction that helps to
maintain public order or prevents an apprehension of public disorder is in the
interests of public order.”
Therefore, public disorder or the reasonable anticipation or the likelihood of public disorder
is the gist of the offence and punishable.33 The alleged act or speech must either incite
public disorder or must satisfy reasonable men of the existence of intention or tendency.
§ 124-A condemns, amongst other things, such speeches as bring or attempt to bring into
hatred or contempt or excite or attempt to excite disaffection towards, the Government
established by law in India. Sedition can only be determined by speech or acts that either
lead to subversion of government authority or public disorder. The objective is to remove
potential threats. § 124-A clearly falls within the ambit of preventing public disorder and
by virtue of the same, is a reasonable restriction to free speech.
II) The threshold for conviction under sedition is violence
24. Primarily, it is submitted that the legal maxim ut res magis valeat quam periat34
implies that courts should strongly lean against any construction which renders a
statute futile. The construction given by courts should further the object of
incorporation of that provision.35 Courts in common law jurisdictions have employed
the standard of violence or public disorder, in dealing with sedition.36
25. It is put forward, firstly, that advocacy is not punishable under § 124-A and only
incitement. The SC drew a clear distinction between ‘advocacy’ and ‘incitement’,
stating that only the latter could be punished. The court held that
32 Ram Nandan v. State of UP, AIR 1959 All 101.

33 Debi Soren & Ors. v. The State, 1954 CriLJ 758.
34 Tinsukhia Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, (1989) 3 SCC 709.
35 T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481; Indian Medical Association v. Union of
India, (2011) 7 SCC 179.
36 Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523.
~8~
“It is only when such discussion or advocacy reaches the level of incitement that
Art. 19(2) kicks in. It is at this stage that a law may be made curtailing the
speech or expression that leads inexorably to or tends to cause public disorder
or tends to cause or tends to affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the
security of the State friendly relations with foreign States, etc.”37
The U.S. Supreme Court laid down ‘imminent lawlessness’ as the threshold for sedition.
Disturbance of society can fall under broad spectrum ranging from disturbance of serenity
of life to jeopardy of state38. Hence, violence is the standard for conviction under §. 124-
A, and the said section is neither vague nor overbroad.
26. Secondly, it is advanced that §. 124-A was enacted to curb public disorder and
violence. While its origin is colonial, the law was not repealed so that the future
generations could decide upon it as per requirement. 39 Moreover, the law is not
applied as it was in the regime of British and previously in light of this rationale, the
objective underlying the said provision demanded it to contemplate several
eventualities that might occur. This was the rationale by the Privy Council behind the
employment of overarching language which is nevertheless comprehensive in nature.40
Thus, mere overbreadth of the provision does not merit striking down the same when
the enactment was directed to contemplate several eventualities to safeguard national
interest.41
27. It is submitted that § 124-A is a reasonable restriction under Art. 19(2) because it is in
the interest of public order and has a high threshold. It is more than just law and order
and only encroaches Art. 19(1)(a) in the least way possible.
B) TENDENCY TO INCITE PUBLIC DISORDER IS A VALID CONDITION
28. Any law which is enacted in the interest of public order may be saved from the vice of
constitutional invalidity.42 It is worthy of note that the expression used in Clause (2) of
Art. 19 is “in the interests of public order” and not “public order” simpliciter. The
expression “in the interests of public order” has a wide connotation and should not be
confined to only one aspect of public order, viz., incitement to violence or tendency to
37 Id.
38 Madhu Limaye v. The State Of Maharashtra, 1978 SCR (1) 749.
39 S. H. Singh, Constitutional Assembly Debates (01 Dec, 1948) available at http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/
constituent/vol7p21.pdf.
40 R.K Karanjia v. Emperor, AIR 1946 Bom 322.
41 The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, (1979) 2 EHRR 245.
42 Ramji Lal Modi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 620.
~9~
violence. Public order can be affected in other ways also; and creating disaffection,
hatred or contempt towards the Government established by law (not merely comments
which express disapprobation of Governmental measures or administrative and other
action of Government) may seriously affect the interests of public order, even though
there may be no tendency or incitement to violence.
29. It is further advanced that the framers of the constitution initially did not did not
accept the Irish formula of ‘undermining the public order and security of the state.’
Subsequently, it was accepted by way of the first amendment. The object behind the
amendment was to enlarge the field of reasonable restrictions and not to differentiate
between existing law and future law. As Art. 19(2) as it originally stood in the
Constitution of India said,
“Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing
law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law
relating to, libel, slander, defamation, contempt of court or any matter which
offends against decency or morality or which undermines the security of, or
tends to overthrow, the State.”43
30. By the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which was made on the 18th of
June 1951, with retrospective effect, clause (2) of Art. 19 was altered to read as
follows,
“Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing
law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-
clause in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign
States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court,
defamation or incitement to an offence.” 44
31. The difference is that clause (2) of Art. 19 as it originally stood mentioned the
security of the State or overthrow of the State and the amendment widened its scope
and referred to, inter alia ‘public order’. Hence, the limitation placed by clause (2) of
Art. 19 upon the freedom of speech, is real and substantial. Disturbance of society can
fall under a broad spectrum, ranging from disturbance in the serenity of life to
jeopardy of state. Therefore, the journey travels first through pubic tranquillity, then
43 INDIA CONST. art. 19, cl.2.
44 Id. First (Amendment) Act, 1951, Acts of Parliament, India (1951).

~ 10 ~
through public order, and lastly to the security of the state. When coupled with the
Kedar Nath precedent, it can be easily concluded that wherever, public order or
subversion of government authority can directly take place due to some speech, §
124-A would be applied.
32. It is then, submitted that the condition imposed by the Kedar Nath judgement is valid
as it helps limit the scope of § 124-A. Otherwise, it would have a wider application if
it was only seen through the lens of Art. 19(2). The Court took care to emphasise that
freedom of speech should not be encroached due to the broad interpretation. Rather
the SC said that the narrow interpretation must be followed and it must be taken care
that the tendency to incite public disorder or threaten the authority of state must be
equivalent to that of inspiring a revolution or rebellion. It is very clear therefore, that
§ 124-A has stricter boundations than the word ‘public order’ and easily falls under
the ambit of Art. 19(2).
III) KEDARNATH RULING’S INTERPRETATION IS VALID AND COMPATIBLE WITH

ARTICLE 19(1)(A)
33. The constitutionality of §. 124-A cannot be questioned as it is the fundamental duty of

the State to maintain peace and public tranquillity as envisaged by the drafters of the
Constitution. The security of the State depends upon the maintenance of law and order
and offences against the State need to be punished. The legislation in question has
fully protected the freedom of speech and expression which is the sine qua non of a
democratic form of Government. Moreover, the judgement laid down the precedent
that freedom of speech cannot be overstretched to include freedom to rebel against the
country or incite disharmony and disaffection. The impugned provision was
considered essential in the national interest as threat perception had acquired more
propensities than before and accordingly the same was upheld and retained. It is
further submitted that [A] The Kedarnath ruling is constitutionally valid and [B] the
judgement is in consonance with Art. 19 and Art. 14.
A) RATIONALE AND INTERPRETATION OF KEDARNATH JUDGMENT IS VALID
34. The five-judge Constitutional Bench, while upholding the provision of §124-A in the
present case, interpreted that freedom of speech cannot be overstretched to include
freedom to rebel against the country or incite disharmony and disaffection. The
provision was considered essential in the national interest as threat perception had
~ 11 ~
acquired more propensities than before and accordingly, the same was upheld and
retained. Furthermore, the court opined the view that the line of demarcation between
freedom of speech and sedition remains subject to the security of the state and it was
held that seditious speeches will not attract the charge of sedition unless it is
established that these incite violence or create disaffection or public disorder. Even
though Art. 19 refers to public order and security of State as reasonable restrictions
and this being the position, freedom of expression speech cannot be an unbridled
license to work against the interests of the country.
35. It is advanced that the rationale behind the judgment in Kedar Nath is valid. The
Constituent Assembly did not repeal sedition laws, and moreover, introduced public
order as a reasonable restriction. By virtue of these actions, the Supreme Court was
right to interpret that the Sedition Law was necessary. They knew, however, that the
words, disaffection, hatred and contempt will cause problems and observed that
‘explanation-3’ in § 124-A must be given value; and speech causing disaffection etc.,
will be criticism and not sedition. Only where it is coupled with an intention or
tendency to cause violence, shall § 124-A be invoked.
36. It is advanced that this hon’ble Court in various cases has accepted the same
interpretation laid down in Kedarnath. In Common Cause v. Union of India,45 the
SC held that authorities while dealing with offence under § 124-A IPC, shall be
guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Kedar Nath Singh. In
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab,46 the SC acquitted persons from charges of
sedition for shouting slogans such as "Khalistan Zindabaad" outside a cinema after
Indira Gandhi's assassination. The Court held that mere sloganeering which evoked
no public response did not amount to sedition. This shows that the rationale in Kedar
Nath judgment is accepted and relied upon. Moreover, there are very rare cases where
conviction for Sedition has taken place which shows that the Bench in Kedar Nath
was successful in limiting its use.
37. It is humbly submitted that the Kedar Nath interpretation of § 124-A is well-thought
and in consonance with the intentions of the Constituent Assembly. The Bench also
recognised that sedition is a necessary law but gave precedence to the fundamental
rights as it imposed strict limitations on § 124-A. Henceforth, it is advanced that the
reasoning given by the Kedar Nath Bench is constitutionally valid.
45 Common Cause v. Union of India, AIR 2014 SC 1556.

46 Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214.
~ 12 ~
B) COMPATIBILITY OF KEDARNATH JUDGEMENT WITH ARTICLE (19)(1)(A)
38. It is humbly submitted that while it is necessary to maintain and preserve freedom of
speech and expression in a democracy, however in order to maintain ‘public
tranquility’, ‘law and order’ and ‘subversion’ of State authority, the law of Sedition
imposes ‘reasonable’ restrictions. The Constitution of India guarantees the right to
freedom of Speech and Expression, under Art. 19(1)(a), but the same are subject to
reasonable restriction imposed under Clause (2) of Art. 19. No right is an absolute
right in a welfare state, all individual rights are subservient to the rights of the public
at large.
39. It is set forth that the Kedarnath judgement upheld the constitutionality of Sedition
law and an attempt was made in order to restrict the scope of Sedition. The court said
that there exist two intepetations, one good and the other bad, and the one that is
constitutional shall be retained.
40. It is humbly submitted that specific reference is made to the dissenting opinions of
Justice Fazl Ali, in Romesh Thappar47 and Brij Bhushan48 , where he had held that
the concept of ‘security of State’ was very much allied to the concept of ‘public order’
and that restriction on the freedom of speech and expression could validly be imposed
in the interest of public order. It was elutriated that criticism and comments on
Government's action in howsoever strong words would not attract penal action as they
would fall within the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression.
41. It may be noted that the Kedarnath judgement tried to protect freedom of speech and
expression and is complimentary to the Romesh Thappar and Brij Bhushan
judgements. In both the judgements the concepts of ‘public order’ and ‘security of
state’ is talked about which in turn is one of the basic reasonable restrictions in Art.
19(1)(a). Kedarnath allows for criticism of government and its policies, and only
allows sedition to restrict free speech in extreme cases i.e, ‘subversion of state
authority’, ‘state security’, and ‘public disorder.’ It clearly mentions that violence or
speech inspiring a revolutionary movement, will only be punished and in no other
case shall sedition be used.
47 Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
48 Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129.
~ 13 ~
42. Furthermore, according to Kedarnath judgement, penal provision of the impugned

section only catches up when the word, written or spoken, etc. have the ‘pernicious
tendency’ or ‘intention of creating public disorder’ . This condition strikes the correct
balance between individual fundamental rights and the interest of public order and
state’s security.
43. It is submitted that §124A of the IPC satisifies the ‘test of ordre publique’. Sedition is
a very broad offence but has been limited by Kedarnath judgement. The SC in this
judgement removed ‘disaffection, ‘hatred’, and ‘contempt’ as sole reasons for
conviction and rather, laid stress on safeguarding public order and state security only.
The only reason that Kedarnath overruled judgements like ‘Debi Soren’, ‘Tara Singh’
etc, was to protect the public order by means of Sedition and fill the lacuna left by
those judgements.
44. Kedarnath judgement protected sedition because it was essential but also limited the
restriction to least possible encroachment on Art. 19 (1)(a). “It is pertinent to observe
that the security of the State, which depends upon the maintenance of law and order is
the very basic consideration upon which legislation, with a view to punishing offences
against the State, is undertaken. Such a legislation has, on the one hand, fully to
protect and guarantee the freedom of speech and expression, which is the sine quo
non of a democratic form of Government that our Constitution has established.”49
45. Thus, very narrow and stringent limits have been set to permissible legislative
abridgement of the right of free speech and expression which is in turn essential for
the proper functioning of the processes of popular government, is possible, freedom of
such amplitude might involve risks of abuse.
46. Therefore, It has been made clear through judicial interpretation over the past 50 years
that §124A of the IPC is constitutional and is required to ensure the stability of the
state and give the government the tools to effectively combat anti-national,
secessionist terrorist elements. Hence, it is humbly submitted that given the focus on
national security. It would be perilous to abolish this section as it is too important.
C) IN ARGUENDO, PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY RENDERS § 124-A VALID
47. It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that there is always a presumption in
the favor of the Constitutionality of the statute 50 and the onus to prove that it is

50 R.M.D.Chamarbaugwal v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628.
~ 14 ~
unconstitutional lies upon the person who is challenging it. 51 The allegations
regarding the violation of a constitutional provision should be specific, clear and
unambiguous and it is for the person who impeaches the law as violative of the
constitutional guarantee to show that the particular provision is infirm for the reasons
stated by him.52
48. The hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ML Kamra v. New India Assurance, 53
held that “If the provisions of a law or the rule is construed in such a way as would
make it consistent with the Constitution and another interpretation would render the
provision or the rule unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former
construction.
49. Furthermore, Lord Finlay in Bowman v. Secular Society while considering the
constitutionality of the statute, opined the view that ‘time cannot abolish it nor
disfavor make it obsolete'. Moreover, it is a well settled principle of interpretation that
a statute must be interpreted in the light of the intention of the legislature 54 – the mens
or sentential legis,55 as a whole in its context – ex visceribus actus56 and in way to
make it effective – ut res magis valeat quam pereat.57
50. Hence, it is humbly submitted that a change in the spirit of the time cannot justify a
change in a principle of law by judicial decision 58, though changes in public opinion
may lead to legislative interference and substantive alteration of the law. But where
two interpretations can be given to the words of an existing law, the Court should
51 Charanjit Lal Chowdhary v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41; Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318;
Mahant Moti Das v. S.P. Sahi, AIR 1959 SC 942; Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress,
AIR 1991 SC 101.
52Amrit Banaspati Ltd v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 1340.
53 ML Kamra v. New India Assurance, AIR 1992 SC 1072.

54 Maunsell v. Olins, (1975) I All ER 16 (HL); Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd., (1978) 1 All ER 948 (HL).
55 RMD Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628; Chief Justice, Andhra Pradesh v. LVA
Dikshitulu, AIR 1979 SC 628; Prithi Pal Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1413; Girdharilal & Sons v.
Balbirnath Mathur, AIR 1986 SC 1099.
56 Philips India Ltd. v. Labour Court, (1985) 3 SCC 103; Osmania University Teacher’s Association v. State of
A.P., (1987) 4 SCC 671; Captain Subhash Kumar v. The Principal Officer, Mercantile Marine Deptt., 1991(2)
SCC 449; Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., (2001) 4 SCC 139; AG v. HRH
Prince Ernest Augustus, (1957) 1 All ER 49.
57 CIT v. S. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352; M. Pentiah v. Veeramallappa Muddala, AIR 1961 SC 1107;
Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, AIR 1990 SC 123.
58 Management of Advance Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Gurudasmal, AIR 1970 SC 1126; Municipal Council,
Madurai v. Narayanan, AIR 1975 SC 2193; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3
SCC 57.
~ 15 ~
accept that interpretation which is in favour of constitutionality rather than an

interpretation which will make the law unconstitutional. Therefore, by applying the
doctrine of presumption of constitutionality, §124 is constitutionally valid hence it
should not be struck down.
~ 16 ~
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced, and authorities cited, this
hon’ble Court may be pleased to:
Declare that Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code as constitutional and non- violative of
Part-III of the Constitution as it does not violate Articles 14 & 19,
and any other relief that the hon’ble Court may be pleased to grant in the interest of justice,
equity, and good conscience, all of which is respectfully submitted.
Sd /-
Counsels for the Respondent
~ 15 ~

TC 29 Respondent

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TEAM CODE: 29

RAJIV GANDHI NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF LAW, PUNJAB

INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021

Jurisdiction arising out of Article 32 of the Constitution of India

W.P. (Crl) No. __/ 2021

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN

Issues Raised XII

Summary of Arguments XIII

I) THE BASIS/PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINATION OF SEDITION ON THE BASIS OF

CONTENT OF LANGUAGE WHICH CAUSES DISAFFECTION AND HATRED IS VALID 1

A) Determining sedition on the basis of content of language is valid 1

i) The § 124-A is Reasonable and sets ‘clear’ Standards 3

II) SEDITION CAN BE DETERMINED SO FAR AS SEDITIOUS SPEECH TENDED TO INCITE

A) § 124-A of IPC is a reasonable restriction under Art. 19(2) 6

i) Restrictions under § 124-A are in the interest of public order 6

ii) The threshold for conviction under sedition is violence 8

B) Tendency to incite Public Disorder is a valid condition 9

III) KEDARNATH RULING’S INTERPRETATION IS VALID AND COMPATIBLE WITH

A) Rationale and interpretation of Kedarnath judgment is valid 11

B) Compatibility of Kedarnath judgement with Art. (19)(1)(A) 13

C) In arguendo, Presumption of Constitutionality renders § 124-A valid 14

AIR All India Reporter

CLR Criminal Law Reporter

IPC Indian Penal Code

ILR Indian Law Report

JLJ Jabalpur Law Journal

NGO Non-Government Organisation

RCR Recent Criminal Reports

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Reports

U.S. United States

AG v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus, (1957) 1 All ER 49 15

A.K. Roy v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 711 3

Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1955 SC 504 4

Amrit Banaspati Ltd v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 1340 15

Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, [1970] 3 S.C.R. 288 7

Attorney-General v. Corporation of the City of Adelaide, (2013) 249 CLR 1 6

Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 12

Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 2301 6

Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318 15

Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129 13

Charanjit Lal Chowdhary v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41 15

Chief Justice, Andhra Pradesh v. LVA Dikshitulu, AIR 1979 SC 628 15

Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118 6

CIT v. S. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352 15

Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57 15

Common Cause v. Union of India, AIR 2014 SC 1556 12

Debi Soren & Ors. v. The State (1954 CriLJ 758) 8

Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101 15

Federation of Railway Officers Association v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 1344 4

Girdharilal & Sons v. Balbirnath Mathur, AIR 1986 SC 1099 15

Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 179 8

Jyoti Prasad v. Union Territory, AIR 1961 SC 1602 4

Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 6

Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 2, 14

M. Pentiah v. Veeramallappa Muddala, AIR 1961 SC 1107 15

Madhu Limaye v. The State Of Maharashtra, 1978 SCR (1) 749 9

Mahant Moti Das v. S.P. Sahi, AIR 1959 SC 942 15

Management of Advance Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Gurudasmal, AIR 1970 SC 1126 15

Matajog v. Bhari, AIR 1955 SC 44 4

ML Kamra v. New India Assurance, AIR 1992 SC 1072 15

Municipal Committee v. State of Punjab, (1969) 1 SCC 475 4

Municipal Council, Madurai v. Narayanan, AIR 1975 SC 2193 15