Philosophical Review

The Philosophical Work of Herbert Spencer

Author(s): John Dewey
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Mar., 1904), pp. 159-175
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
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 THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORK OF HERBERT
SPENCER.

I DO not know whetherit may have occurredto any one else

to associate the workof ElmileZola in fictionand of Herbert
Spencer in philosophy. I findmyself,however,mentallyrunning
together the careersof these two men, different as they were in
surroundings, aims,and personalities.The two somehow
interests,
associate themselvesin my mind,at least to such an extent that
I find no words of my own so apt to characterizethe larger
featuresof the work of HerbertSpencer as these borrowedfrom
the remarkable critical appreciation by Henry James of Emile
Zola, published in the August, 1903, number of the Atlantic
Monthly. Mr. James begins by referringto " the circumstance
that,thirtyyearsago, a young man of extraordinary brainand in-
domitablepurpose,wishingto give the measure of these endow-
ments in a piece of work supremelysolid, conceived and sat
down to Les Rougon-Macquart,ratherthan to an equal task in
physics,mathematics,politics,economics. He saw his under-
taking, thanks to his patience and courage, practically to a
close. . . . No fineract of courage and confidence,I think,is
recorded in the historyof letters. The criticin sympathywith
him returnsagain and again to the great wonderof it, in which
somethingso strangeis mixed with somethingso august. En-
tertainedand carriedout almost fromthe thresholdof manhood,
the high project,the work of a lifetime,announces beforehand
its inevitableweakness,and yet speaks in the same voice for its
admirable,its almost unimaginable,strength."
With fewverbal changes,this surelysets forththe case of Mr.
Spencer; and in saying the word of criticismwhich must inevit-
ably shadow all mortal attempts,I again find nothingmore ap-
propriatethan some furthersentences of Mr. James. " It was
the fortune,it was in a mannerthe doom, of Les Rougon-Mac-
quart to deal with things almost always in gregarious form,to
be a picture of numbers,of classes, crowds, confusions,move-
I59

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 i6o THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. XIIIh

ments.... The individuallifeis, ifnot wholly absent,reflected

in coarse and common, in generalized terms; whereby we-
arrive . . . at the circumstancethat,lookingout somewhere,and
oftenwoefullyathirst,forthe tasteof fineness,we findit notin the
fruitsof our author's fancy,but in a different matteraltogether.
We get it in the very historyof his effort, the image itselfof his
lifelongprocess, comparativelyso personal, so spiritual even
. . . throughall its patienceand pain."
The point that seems to me so significant(and, indeed,sot
absolutely necessaryto take into the reckoning),when we bal-
ance accounts with the intellectualwork of Mr. Spencer,is this
sittingdown to achievea preconceivedidea, - an idea, moreover,
of a synthetic,deductiverenderingof all that is in the Universe.
The point stands forthin all its simplicityand daringeverytime
we open our First Principles. We find there republishedthe-
prospectus of i86o, the program of the entire SyntheticPhi-
losophy. And the more we compare the achievementwith the
announcement,the more we are struck with the way in which
the whole scheme stands complete,detached,able to go alone
fromthe verystart.
Spencer and his readers are committed in advance to a
definitelywrought out, a rounded and closed interpretation of
the universe. Further discovery and intercourse are not to
count; it remainsonly to fillin the cadres. Successive volumes
are outlined; distinctivesections of each set forth. All the
fundamentalgeneralizationsare at hand, which are to apply to
all regions of the Universe with the exception of inorganic
nature,attentionbeing especiallycalled to this exceptionas a gap
unavoidablebut regrettable. There is but one thing more ex-
traordinarythan the conceptionwhich this program embodies:
the factthatit is carriedout. We are so accustomedto whatwe
call systems of philosophy; the 'systems' of Plato, Aristotle,
Descartes, Kant, or Hegel, that I suspect we do not quite grasp
the full significanceof such a projectas this of Mr. Spencer's.
The othersystems are such afterall more or less ex postfacto.
In themselvesthey have the unityof the development of a single
mind,ratherthanof a predestinedplannedachievement.They are

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No. 2.] PHILOSOPHICAL WORK OF SPENCER. i6i

systemssomewhatin and throughretrospect. Theircompleteness

owes somethingto the mind of the onlooker gatheringtogether
parts which have grown up more or less separatelyand in re-
sponse to felt occasions, to particularproblems. Our reflection
helpsbind theirpartsinto one aggregativewhole. But Spencer's
systemwas a system fromthe verystart. It was a system in
conception,not merely in issue. It was one by the volition
of its author,complete, compact, coherent,not in virtue of a
single personalitywhich by ways mainly unconscious continu-
ally and restlessly reattempts to attain to some worthyand
effective embodimentof itself. We are almost inclinedto believe
in the identification of conscious will withphysicalforceas we
followthe steady,unchangingmomentumof Spencer's thought.
It is this fore-thought,foreclosed scheme which makes so
ominous thatphraseof Jamesto the effectthat ' the high project
announcesbeforehandits inevitableweakness.' It is this which
makes so unavoidablethe appropriationof the phrase regarding
absence of the individual life. It is this fact which gives
jurisdictionto the furtherremark that "vision and opportunity
reside in a personal sense, and in a personal history,and no
shortcutto them has ever been discovered." It is this same
fact that moves me to transferto Spencer a furtherphrase,
that the work went on in "the region that I qualify as that
of experience by imitation." It may seem harsh to say Spen-
cer occupies himselfin any such way as to justifythe phrase
" experienceby imitation." Or, on the otherhand,one may say,
howeverthe case stands in arts and letters,that in philosophy
one must perforceworkin and witha regionof experiencewhich
it is but praise to call "experience by imitation,"since it is
experiencedepersonalized,fromwhich the qualities of individual
contact and career, with their accidents of circumstance,and
correspondingemotional entanglements,have been intentionally
shut out. But whetherone regard the phrase as harsh,or as
definingan indispensabletrait of all philosophizing,it remains
true that one who announces in advance a system in all its
characteristicconceptionsand applications has discounted,in a
way whichis awfulin its augustness,all individualcontingencies,

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i62 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. XIII.

all accidentsof timeand place, personal surroundingsand per-

sonal intercourse,new ideas fromnew contactsand new expan-
sions of life. It is upon the revelationsthat arise from the
eternal mixture of voluntary endeavor with the unplanned,
the unexpected, that most of us learn to depend for shaping
thought and directingintellectualmovement. We hang upon
experience as it comes, not alone upon experience as already
formulated,into which we can enterby "imitation." To assure
to the world a comprehensivesystem of the universe,in a way
whichprecludesfurther developmentand shapingsofthispersonal
sort,is a piece of intellectualaudacityof the most commanding
sort. It is this extraordinaryobjectivityof Spencer's work,
this hithertounheard of eliminationof the individual and the
subjective,which gives his philosophyits identity,which marks
it offfromotherphilosophic projects,and is the source at once
of its power and of its " inevitableweakness."
The austere devotion,the singleness,simplicity,and straight-
forwardnessof Spencer's own life,and its seclusion,its remote-
ness, its singular immunityfromall intellectualcontagion,are
chaptersin the same story. Here, we maywell believe,is the re-
venge of nature. The elementof individuallifeso lacking in the
philosophy,both in its contentand in its style,is the thingthat
strikesus in the historyof Spencer's personal effort. No system,
after all, has ever been more thoroughlyconditionedby the
intellectualand moral personalityof its author. The impersonal
contentof the systemis the registerof the personal separationof
its author fromvital participationin the movingcurrentsof his-
tory.
The seclusion and isolation necessary to a system like Spen-
cer's appear fromwhatever angle we approach him. Doubt-
less his autobiographywill put us in possession of one of the
most remarkableeducationaldocumentsthe world has yet seen.
But even withoutthis,we know that his intellectuallifewas early
formedin a certain remoteness. The relative absence of the
social elementin his education,and his own laterconscious predi-
lection for non-institutionalized instruction,
for educationof the
tutorialsortapartfromschools and classes, at once constituteand

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No. 2.] PHILOSOPHICAL WORK OF SPENCER. i63

reflecthis aloofnessfromthe ordinarygive and take processes of

development. The lack of universityassociations is another
markon the score. The lack of knowledgeof ancientlanguages
and comparativeignorance of modern languages and literature
have to be reckoned with. Nor was Spencer (in this unlike
Bacon, Locke, Berkeley,Hume, and JohnMill) a man of affairs,
one who continuallyrenewed the regionof " experience by imi-
tation," of formulatedknowledge,by engagingin those compli-
cations of life which force a man to re-think,re-feel,and re-
choose; to have, in a word, first-hand experience. It would be
hard to findanotherintellectof firstclass rank so devoid of his-
torical sense and interestas was Spencer's; incredibleas is this
fact taken alongside authorshipof a systemof evolution! Cer-
tainly the world may wait long for another example of a man
who dares to conceive and has the courage and energy to
execute a systemof philosophy,in almost total ignoranceof the
entire historyof thought. We have got so used to it that we
hardlypause, when we read such statementsas that of Spencer,
that afterreading the firstfew pages of Kant's Critiquehe laid
the book down. " Twice since then the same thing has hap-
pened; for,being an impatientreader,when I disagreewiththe
cardinalpurposes of a work I can go no further."1
It is not Spencer's ignoranceto whichI am calling attention.
Much less am I blaminghim for his failure to run hitherand
yon through the fieldsof thought; there is somethingalmost
refreshing, in these days of subjugationby the mere overwhelm-
ing mass of learning,in the naive and virginattitudeof Spencer.
What I am tryingto point out is the absence in Spencer of
any interestin the historyof human ideas and of acts prompted
by them,considered simplyas history,-as affairsof personal
initiation,discovery, experimentation,and struggle. His in-
sulation fromthe intellectualcurrentsof the ages as moving
processes (apart, that is, from their impersonal and factual
deposit in the form of ' science') is the mirrorof the secluded-
ness of his early education, and of his entire later personal
life. I do not think it necessaryto apologize even forreferring
1 Essays Scientific,
Political,and Speculative,Vol. III, p. 206, note.

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i64 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. XIII.

to the little device by which,when wearied of conversation,he

closed his ears and made himselfdeaf to what was going on
about him. There are not two facts here,but only one. His
isolation was necessary in carryingout his gigantic task, not
merely as a convenience for securing the necessary leisure,
protectionagainst encroachment,and the nursing of inadequate
physicalstrengthagainst great odds; but it was an organicpre-
conditionof any projectwhichassigns the universeto volumesin
advance, and then proceeds steadily,irresistibly, to fillthem up
chapter by chapter. Such work is possible only when one is
immuneagainst the changingplay of ideas,the maze of pointsof
view,the cross-currents of interests,whichcharacterizethe world
historicallyviewed,- seen in process as an essentiallymoving
thing.
We have to reckon with the apparent paradox of Spencer's
rationalistic,deductive, systematic habit of mind over against
all the traditionsof English thought. How could one who
thought himselfthe philosopher of experience par excellence,.
revive,under the name of a " universal postulate," the funda-
mental conception of the formalrationalism of the Cartesian
school, which even the philosopherswhom Spencer despised as
purelyapriori, had foundit necessary,underthe attacks of Kant
(whom Spencer to his last day regarded as a sort of belated
supernaturalist), long since to abandon ? It is too obvious to
need mentionthat Spencer is in all respects a thoroughgoing
Englishman,- indeed what, without disrespectand even with
admiration,we may terma 'Britisher.' But how could the em-
piricaland inductivehabit of the English mindso abruptly,so
thoroughly,withoutany shadow of hesitationor touch ofreserve,
cast itselfin a systemwhose professedaim was to deduce all the
phenomenaoflife,mind,and societyfroma singleformularegard-
ing the redistributionof matterand motion?
Here we come within sight of the problemof the technical
origins and structureof Spencer's philosophy,a problem,how-
ever, which may still be approached from the standpoint of
Spencer's own personal development. We must not forgetthat
Spencerwas by hisenvironment and educationinitiatedintoall the

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No. 2.] PHILOSOPHICAL WORK OF SPENCER. i65

characteristic tenetsof English politicaland social liberalism,with

theirindividualisticconnotations. It is significant that Spencer's
earliest literarycontribution,- writtenat the age of twenty-

two,-was upon the proper sphere of government,and was in-

tended (I speak only fromsecond-handinformation, neverhaving
seen the pamphlet) to show the restrictionsupon governmental
action required in the interestsof the individual. I know no
more strikingtributeto the thoroughnessand success withwhich
earlier English philosophicthought did its work than the fact
thatSpencer was completelysaturatedwith,and possessed by, the
characteristictraditionsof this individualisticphilosophy,simply,
so to speak, by absorption,by respirationof the intellectual
atmosphere,with a minimumof study and reflectiveacquaint-
ance with the classic texts of Hobbes, Hume, and (above all)
John Locke. So faras we can tell, Spencer's ignoranceof the
previoushistoryof philosophyextendedin considerablemeasure
even to his own philosophicancestry; and I am inclined to be-
lieve that even such reading as he did of his predecessors left
him still witha delightfulunconsciousnessthat in them were the
originand kin of his own thought. The solid body and sub-
stantialityof Spencer's individualismis made not less but more
comprehensible on the supposition that it came to him not
through conscious reading and personal study, but through
daily draftsupon his intellectualenvironment;the resultsbeing
so unconsciouslyand involuntarily wroughtinto the fibreof his
being thatthey became withhim an instinctratherthan a reflec-
tion or theory.
It is this complete incorporationof the results of prior in-
dividualisticphilosophy,accompanied by total unconsciousness
that anythingwas involved in the way of philosophicprelimi-
naries or presuppositions,which freed Spencer fromthe lurking
scepticism regarding systems and deductive syntheses which
permeate the work of Locke, Berkeley,Hume, and JohnStuart
Mill. It was this thoroughgoingunconscious absorption that
gave him a confident,aggressive, dogmatic individualism,
which enabled him to employ individualismas a deductive in-
strument, instead of as a point of view useful in the main for

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 i66 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. XIII.

criticizingundue intellectual pretensions.and for keeping the

ground cleared for inductive,empirical inquiries. The eigh-
teenthcentury,indeed, exhibitsto us the transformation of the
sceptically colored individualism of the seventeenthcentury,
taking effectmainly in a theory of the nature and limits of
human knowledge,and employed most effectively to get rid of
dogma in philosophy,theology,and politics,-the transformation
of this, I say, into an individualismwhich aims at social reform,
and thereby is becoming positive,constructive, rationalistic,op-
timistic.
Spencer is the heir not of the psychologicalindividualismof
Locke direct,but of this individualismafterexportationand re-
importation fromFrance. It was the individualismof the French
Encyclopedist,withitsunwaveringfaithin progress,in theultimate
perfection of humanity, and in 'nature' as everywherebeneficently
workingout this destiny,if only it can be freedfromtrammels
of churchand state, which in Spencer mingleswithgeneraliza-
tions of science, and is therebyreawakened to new life. Seen
in this way, thereis no breach of continuity. The paradox dis-
appears. Spencer's work imposes itself upon us all precisely
because it so remarkablycarriesover the net resultof that indi-
vidualismwhich (contend against it as we may) representsthe
fineachievementof the seventeenthand eighteenthcenturies. It
preserves it in the only way in whichit could be conserved,by
carryingit over,by translatingit into the organic,the systematic,
the universaltermswhich report the presenceof the nineteenth
centuryspirit. And ifa certainconstitutional incoherenceresults,
ifthe compound of individualismand organicismshows cleavages
of fundamentalcontradictions, none the less withoutthis restate-
ment the old would have been lost, and a certainthinnessand
remotenesswould characterizethe new. The earlier and more
thorough-goingformulationsof the organic standpointin post-
Kantian thoughtwere,and had to remain,transcendental(in the
popular, if not technicalsense of the term)in language and idea
just because the expression,though logicallymore adequate,was
socially and psychologicallypremature. It did not and could
not at once take up into itselfthe habits of thoughtand feeling

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No. 2.] PHILOSOPHICAL WORK OF SPENCER. i67

characteristicof earlier individualismand domesticatethem in

the social and moral attitudeof the modernman.
In the struggleof adjustment,Spencer is withouta rival as a
mediator,a vehicle of communication,a translator. It is, as we
shall see, the successfulway in which he exercises this function
that gives him his hold upon the cultureof our day, and which
makes his image stand out so imposinglythat to many he is
not one creatorwithmany othersof the theoryof evolution,but
its own concrete incarnation. In support of the idea that
Spencer's work was essentiallythat of carryingover the net
earlier social and ethical individualisminto the more organic
conceptionscharacteristicof the nineteenthcenturyscience and
action,we can here only referto the Social Statics of i850,-
this being in my judgment one of the most remarkabledocu-
ments,fromthe standpointof tracing the origins of an intel-
lectual development,ever produced. This book showswithcon-
siderabledetail the individualisticmethodof the English theory
of knowledgein process oftransformation intosomethingwhichis
no longer a methodof regulatingbelief,but is an attained belief
in a methodof action,and hence itselfa substantialfirstprinciple,
an axiom, an indisputable,absolute truth,having within itself
substantialresources which may in due order-that is, by use
of a deductivemethod-be deliveredand made patent. It shows
the individualisticcreed dominant,militant; no longer a prin-
ciple of criticism,but of reformand constructionin social life,
and, therefore, of necessitya formulaof constructionin the intel-
lectual sphere. In this document,the world-formulaof 'evolu-
tion' of laterphilosophyappears as the social formulaof ' prog-
ress.' It repeats as an article of implicitfaiththe creed of
revolutionary liberalismin the indefinite of mankind.
perfectibility
" Man has been, is, and will long continue to be, in process of
adaptation,and the belief in human perfectibility
merelyamounts
to the beliefthatin virtueof these processes,man will eventually
become completelysuitedto his mode of life. Progress,there-
fore,is not an accident,but a necessity."1
In this characteristicsentencewe have already present the
1 Social Statics,pp. 31 f., edn. of 1892.

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i68 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VoL. XIII.

conception: first,of evolution; second, of the goal of the evolu-

tion as adaption of human lifeto certainconditionsbeyonditself;
and third (although implicitly-the notion, however, being
made explicitin otherportionsof the same book), the conception
thatit is the conditionsto which lifeis to be adapted which are
the causally operatingforcesin bringingabout the adaptation,and
hence the progress. The ' organism'of the SyntheticPhilosophy
is the projectionof the individual man of the thoughtof I850.
The 'environment' of the lattersystem appears in the earlier
sketch as ' conditionsof life.' The 'evolution' of later syste-
matic philosophy is the 'progress' figuringin the early social
creed as the continual adaptation of human life to the neces-
sitiesof its outward conditions. In all, and through all, runs
the idea of ' nature,'-that nature to which the social and
philosophicalreformation of the eighteenthcenturyappealed with
such unhesitatingand sublimefaith. Load down the formulaby
filling' nature' withthe concreteresultsof physical and biolog-
ical science,and the transformation scene is complete. The years
between i85o and i862 (the date of the First Principles)are
the record of this loading. 'Nature' never parts withits eigh-
teenth centuryfunctionof effectingapproximationto a goal of
ultimateperfectionand happiness,but natureno longer proffers
itselfas a pious reminiscenceof the golden age of Rousseau, or a
propheticinspirationof the milleniumof Condorcet,but as that
most substantial,most real of all forcesguaranteedand revealed
to us at every turn by the advance of scientificinquiry. And
' science' is in turnbut the concrete renderingof the 'reason'
of the Enlightenment.
Spencer's faith in this particular article of the creed never
faltered. Eighteenthcenturyliberalism,afterthe time of Rous-
seau, was perfectlysure that the only obstacles to the fulfillment
of the beneficentpurpose of naturein effectingperfectionhave
theirsource in institutions of stateand church,which,partlybe-
cause of ignorance,and partlybecause of the selfishnessof rulers
and priests,have temporarilyobstructedthe fulfillment of nature's
benign aims. The laissez-faire theoryand its extremetypical
expression,anarchism,did not originatein the accidentsof com-

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No. 2.] PHILOSOPHICAL WORK OF SPENCER. i69

merciallife,much less in the selfish designs of the tradingclass

to increaseits wares at the expense of othersectionsof society.
Whetherrightor wrong,whetherforgood or forevil, it took its
originfromprofoundphilosophicalconceptions;the belief in na-
ture as a mightyforce,and in reasonas havingonly to cooperate
withnature,insteadof thwartingit withits own petty,voluntary
devices, in order to usher in the era of unhinderedprogress.
Spencer's insistentand persistentoppositionto the extensionofthe
sphereof governmentalactionbeyondthatof police duty,prevent-
ing the encroachmentof one individualupon another,goes back
to this same sublimefaithin nature. The goal of evolution of
Spencer's ethics,the perfectindividual adapted to the perfect
state of society,is but the enlarged projectionof the ideal of a
fraternalsociety,which made its way into the Social Staticsfrom
the same creed of revolutionaryliberalism. His " Absolute
Ethics," deductivelyderived from a firstlaw of life,has in its
originnothingto do with science,but everythingto do withthe
reason and natureof the Enlightenment. It has, of course,been
oftenenough pointedout that the mainfeaturesof Spencer's later
ethics were alreadywell along beforehe came to thatconception
of evolutionupon whichhis sociology and ethicsare professedly
based. This pointhas, however,generally been employed as a
mode of castingsuspicion upon the contentof his moralsystem,
suggestingthat afterall it has no veryintimateconnectionwith
the theoryof evolutionas such. But I am not aware thatatten-
tion has been called to thisconversefactof greatermoment: that
Spencer's entireevolutionaryconception and scheme is but the
projectionupon the cosmicscreenof the spectrumof the buoyant
a prioriideals of the later eighteenthcenturyliberalism.
Certainessays, now mostlyreprintedin threevolumes,entitled
Essays Scientific, Political,and Speculative,put before our eyes
the links of the transformation, the instrumentsof the projection.
We may referparticularlyto the essays on " Progress: Its law
and Cause," "Transcendental Physiology" (both dated i857);
" The GenesisofScience" ( 8 54), and " The NebularHypothesis"
(I 8 58), togetherwith " The Social Organism" ( I860). What we
findexposed in these essays is the increasinglydefiniteand solid

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 170 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. xiir.
body of scientific particularsand generalizations,gettingthem-
selves read intothepoliticaland social formula,and therebyeffect-
ing transformation into the system outlined by the prospectus
of I 86o. This fusion is, indeed, already foreshadowedin the
Social Staticsitself
This is not the time or place to go into detail,but I think I
am well withinthe bonds of verifiablestatementwhen I say that
Spencer's final system of philosophy took shape through his
bringing into intimate connectionwith each other the dom-
inatingconceptionof social progress,inheritedfromthe Enlight-
enment,certainlarger generalizationsof physiology(particularly
that of growth as change fromhomogeneityto heterogeneity,
and of 'physiological divisionof labor' with accompanying in-
terdependenceof parts) and the idea of cosmic change derived
fromastronomyand geology,- particularlyas formulatedunder
the name of the nebularhypothesis. Social philosophyfurnished
the fundamentalideals and ideas; biological statementsprovided
the definingand formulatingelements necessary to put these
vague and pervasiveideals into somethinglike scientificshape;
while the physical-astronomicspeculations furnishedthe causal,
efficientmachineryrequisite forgettingthe scheme underway,
and supplied still more of the appearance of scientificdefinite-
ness and accuracy. Such, at least, is my schematic formulaof
the originof the Spenceriansystem.'
I If our maininterest
herewerein thehistory of thought,it wouldbe interesting to
notethedependenceof the development of Spencer'sthought,as respectsthesecond
of theabove factors,upon factorsdue to thepost-Kantianphilosophyof Germany. I
can onlyreferin passingto some pages of the Social Statics(255 to 261i, in which,
aftermakingthe significant statementthat " moralityis essentiallyone withphysical
truth-is, in fact,a speciesof transcendentalphysiology,"he refersin supportof his
doctrineto " a theoryof lifedevelopedby Coleridge." This theoryis thatof tend-
encytowardsindividuation, conjoinedwithincreaseof mutualdependence,- a fun-
damentalnotion, of course,of Schelling. An equally significant foot-note(page
256) tellsus thatit was in i864, whilewriting" The Classification of theSciences,"
thatSpencerhimselfrealized thatthis truthhas to do with" a traitof all evolving
things,inorganicas well as organic." In his essayon " TranscendentalPhysiol-
ogy," Spencerrefersto theimportance of carrying
over distinctionsfirstobservedin
societyintophysiologicalterms,so thattheybecome pointsof view forinterpretation
and explanationthere. The conceptionalso dominatesthe essayon " The Social
Organism." In fact,he makes use of the idea of divisionof labor, originally
workedout in politicaleconomy,in his biological speculations,and thenin his cos-

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No. 2.] PHILOSOPHICAL WORK OF SPENCER. 17r

We are now, I think,in a position not only to understandthe

independenceof Spencer's and Darwin's work in relationto each
other,but the significanceof this independence. Because Spen-
cer's thoughtdescended fromthe social and politicalphilosophy
of the eighteenthcentury(which in turnwas a renderingof a still
more technicalphilosophy),and employed the conceptionsthus
derivedto assimilateand organize the generalizedconceptionsof
geology and biology,it needed no particularaid fromthe special-
ized orderof scientificmethodsand considerationswhich control
the work of Darwin. But it was a tremendouspiece of luck for
both the Darwinian and Spenceriantheoriesthat they happened
so nearlyto coincide in the time of their promulgation. Each
mological,in verymuch the same way in which Darwin borrowedthe Malthusian
doctrineof population. The social idea firstfoundbiologicalformforitself,and then
was projectedintocosmologicalterms. I have no doubtthatthisrepresents thegeneral
courseof Spencer'sideas. In theessayon " Progress,"Spencerspecifically refersto
thelaw of theevolutionof the individualorganismas established" by theGermans-
the investigationsofWolff,Goethe,and von Baer." The law referred to hereis that
developmentconsistsin advance fromhomogeneity to heterogeneity. He there
transfers it fromthe life historyof theindividualorganismto therecordof all life;
while,in thesame essay,he expresslystatesthat,if the nebularhypothesis could be
established,thenwe shouldhave a singleformulafortheuniverseas a whole,inorganic
as well as organic. And upon page 36 he speaksof that "which determinesprog-
ress of everykind- astronomic,geologic, organic,ethnological,social, economic,
"
artistic.
One need only turnto some of the methodologicalwritingsof Spencer to see
how conscioushe was of themethodwhichI have attributed to him. The littleessay
entitled" An Elementin Method," and certainportionsof his essayentitled," Pro-
fessorTait on the Formulaof Evolution,"are particularly significant.The latterin-
dicates the necessityof makinga synthesis of deductivereasoning,as exhibitedin
mathematicalphysics,withtheinductiveempiricism characteristicof the biological
sciences; and chargesbothphysicistand zoologistwithone-sidedness. The former
essayindicatesthat,in forming anygeneralizationwhichis to be used fordeductivepur-
poses,we oughtto take independent groupsofphenomenawhichappearunallied,and
whichcertainlyare veryremotefromeach other. I am inclinedto thinkthat Spen-
cer's methodof takinggroupsof facts,apparently whollyunlike each other,such as
thoseof theformation of solarsystems,on one side, and factsof presentsociallife,on
the other,with a view to discoveringwhat he calls "some commontrait,"has,
indeed,more value forphilosophicmethodthanis generallyrecognised. In a way,
he has himselfjustifiedthe method,since his SyntheticPhilosophyis, speaking
fromtheside ofmethod,preciselythissortof thing,astronomy and sociologyforming
the extremes,and biologythemean term. But, of course,Spencer'serectionof the
"common trait" into a force,or law, or cause, which can immediatelybe used
deductivelyto explain otherthings,is quite anothermatterfromthis heuristicor
methodological value. But thisnotehas alreadyspunitselfout too long.

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I72 THE PHILOSOPRICAL REVIEW. [VOL. XIII.

got the benefitnot merely of the disturbance and agitation

aroused by the other, but of psychological and logical rein-
forcement, as each blended into and fusedwiththe otherin the
minds of readers and students. It is an interestingthough
hopeless speculationto wonderwhat the particularfateof either
would have been, ifit had lacked this backingup at its own weak
point, a support all the more effectivebecause it was so sur-
prisinglyunplanned,-because each in itselfsprang out of,and
applied to, such differentordersof thoughtand fact.
This explains, in turn,the identification of the very idea of
'evolution,' with the name of Spencer. The days are gone by
whenit was necessaryto iteratethat the conceptionof evolutionis
no new thing. We know that upon the side of the largerphilo-
sophic generalizations, as well as upon that of definiteand de-
tailed scientificconsiderations,evolutionhas an ancientancestry.
From the timeof the Greeks,when philosophyand science were
one, to the days of Kant, Goethe,and Hegel, on one side, and
of Lamarck and the author of The Vestig-es of Creation,on the
other,the idea of evolutionhas neverbeen withoutits own vogue
and career. The idea is too closely akin both to the processes
of human thinkingand to the obvious factsof lifenot to have
always some representativein man's schemes of the universe.
How, then,are we to accountforthe peculiar,the uniqueposition
occupied by Spencer? Is this thorough-goingidentification in
the popular mind of Spencer's system with the very idea and
name of evolution an illusion of ignorance? I thinknot. So
massive and pervasivean impositionof itselfis accountable for
only in positive terms. The genesis of Spencer's system in
fusionof scientificnotions and philosophic considerationsgives
the systemits actual hold, and also legitimatesit.
Spencer's work is rightfullyentitledto the place it occupies in
the popular imagination. Philosophyis naturallyand properly
technical and remote to the mass of mankind,save as it takes
shape in social and politicalphilosophy,-in a theoryof conduct
which,being more than individual,serves as a principleof criti-
cism and reformin corporate affairsand communitywelfare.
But even social and political philosophy remain more or less

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No. 2.] PHILOSOPHICAL WORK OF SPENCER. I73

speculative,romantic,Utopian, or 'ideal,' when couched merely

in termsof a programof criticismand reconstruction;only 'sci-
ence' can give it body. Again, the specializationsof science are
naturallyand properlyremote and technical to the interestsof
the mass of mankind. When we have said theyare specialized,
we have describedthem. But to employ the mass of scientific
material, the received code of scientificformulations,to give
weight and substance to philosophical ideas which are already
operative,is an achievementof the very firstorder. Spencer
took two sets of ideas, in themselvesabstractand isolated, and by
theirfusion put them in a shape wheretheirnet result became
available forthe commonconsciousness. By such a fusionSpen-
cer provideda language, a formulation,an imagery,of a reason-
able and familiarkind to the masses of mankindforideas of the
utmostimportance,and forideas which,withoutsuch amalgama-
tion,musthave remainedout of reach.
Even they who - like myself- are so impressed with the
work of the philosophers of Germany in the firsthalf of the
nineteenthcenturyas to believe that they have furnishedideas
which in the long run are more luminous, more fruitful, pos-
sessed of more organizingpower,than those whichSpencer has
made current,must yet rememberthat the work of German
philosophyis done in an outlandishand alien vocabulary. Now,
this is not a mereincidentof the use of language,-as ifa man
happened to choose to speak in Greek ratherthan in French.
The very technicalityof the vocabulary means that the ideas
used are not as yet naturalizedin the common consciousnessof
man. The 'transcendental' character of such philosophy is
not an inherent,eternalcharacteristic of its subject-matter,but is
a sign and exponent that the values dealt in are not yet thor-
oughly at home in human experience,have not yet foundthem-
selves in ordinarysocial life and popular science, are not yet
workingtermsjustifyingthemselvesby daily applications.
Spencer furnishedthe common consciousnessof his day with
termsand images so that it could appropriateto its ordinaryuse
in mattersof "life, mind, and society,"the most fundamental
generalizationswhich had been worked out in the abstract

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I74 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. XIII.

regions of bothphilosophyand science. He did thiseven though

he failedto deduce " life,mind,and society" froma singleformula
regarding' force.' This is a work great enough forany man,
even thoughwe are compelledto add that the gross obviousness
withwhich it was done shows that Spencer afterall measuredup
to the level ofthe intellectuallifeof his timeratherthan,through
sympathywithmore individualizedand germinal forces,initiated
a new movement. Here, again, Spencer's own aloofness,his own
deliberate self-seclusioncounts, Spencer is a monument,but,
like all monuments,he commemoratesthe past. He presents
the achieved culminationof ideas already in overtand external
operation. He winds up an old dispensation. Here is thesecret
of his astounding success, of the way in which he has so thor-
oughlyimposedhis idea thateven non-Spenceriansmusttalkin his
termsand adjust theirproblemsto his statements. And herealso
is his inevitableweakness. Only a systemwhich formulatesthe
accomplishedcan possiblybe conceivedand announcedin advance.
Any deductivesystem means by the necessityof the case the
organizationof a vast amountof materialin such a way as to dis-
pose of it. The systemseemsto fixthe limitsof all furthereffort,
to defineitsaims and to assignitsmethods. But thisis an illusion
of the moment. In realitythis wholesale disposal of material
clears the groundfornew,untriedinitiatives. It furnishes capital
for hithertounthoughtof speculations. Its deductive finalities
turnout but ships of adventureto voyage on undiscoveredseas.
To speak less metaphorically,Spencer's conception of evolu-
tion was always a confinedand bounded one. Since his 'en-
vironment' was but the translation of the ' nature' of the
metaphysicians,its workingshad a fixed origin,a fixed quality,
and a fixed goal. Evolution still tends in the minds of Spen-
cer's contemporariesto "a single, far-off, divine event,"- to a
finality,a fixity. Somehow, there are fixed laws and forces
(summed up underthe name ' environment') which controlthe
movement,which keep it pushing on in a definitefashionto a
certain end. Backwards,there is found a picture of the time
when all this was set agoing, when the homogeneousbegan to
differentiate.If evolutionis conceivedof as in and of itselfcon-

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NO. 2.] PHILOSOPHICAL WORK OF SPENCER. I75

stant,it is yet evolutionby cycles,- a never-endingseries of de-

parturesfrom,and returnsto, a fixed point. I doubt not the
time is comingwhen it will be seen that whateverall this is, it is
notevolution. A thoroughgoingevolution must by the nature
of the case abolish all fixed limits,beginnings,origins,forces,
laws, goals. If there be evolution,then all these also evolve,
and are what they are as pointsof originand of destinationrela-
tiveto some special portionof evolution. They are to be defined
in termsof the process, the process that now and always is, not
the process in termsof them. But the transferfromthe worldof
set external facts and of fixed ideal values to the world of free,
mobile, self-developing, and self-organizing realitywould be un-
thinkable and impossiblewere it not for the work of Spencer,
which,shot all through as it is with contradictions, therebyall
the more effectually served the purposeof a mediumof transition
fromthe fixedto the moving. A fixedworld,a world of move-
mentbetweenfixedlimits,a movingworld,such is the order.
JOHN DEWEY.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

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