Journal of Cleaner Production 244 (2020) 118761

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Journal of Cleaner Production

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jclepro

A novel Fuzzy Bayesian Network approach for safety analysis of

process systems; An application of HFACS and SHIPP methodology
Akbar Rostamabadi a, b, Mehdi Jahangiri c, *, Esmaeil Zarei d, Mojtaba Kamalinia c,
Moslem Alimohammadlou e
a
Department of Occupational Health Engineering, Ashtian Health Care Center, Arak University of Medical Sciences, Arak, Iran
b
Student Research Committee, School of Health, Shiraz University of Medical Sciences, Shiraz, Iran
c
Research Center for Health Science, Institute of Health, Department of Occupational Health, School of Health, Shiraz University of Medical Sciences, Shiraz,
Iran
d
Department of Occupational Health and Safety Engineering, Faculty of Health, Mashhad University of Medical Sciences, Mashhad, Iran
e
Department of Management, Faculty of Economic, Management and Social Science, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Chemical process industries (CPI) are inherently hazardous complex systems where large inventory of
Received 3 May 2019 extremely flammable and explosive chemicals are processed and stored in a highly congested process
Received in revised form area. A reliable safety analysis method plays a significant role to measure risks and to develop preventive
4 October 2019
strategies in process industries. This paper proposed a novel Fuzzy Bayesian Network for dynamic safety
Accepted 5 October 2019
Available online 7 October 2019
analysis of process systems by incorporating Bayesian network (BN) with Fuzzy Best Worst Method
(Fuzzy-BWM). In the proposed approach a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of human and orga-
Handlig editor: Prof. Jiri Jaromir Kleme
s nizational factors (HOFs) involving in the accident scenario occurrence was also provided by integrating
Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) and System Hazard Identification, Prediction
Keywords: and Prevention (SHIPP) methodology into the model. An ethylene storage tank was selected to verify the
Bayesian network applicability of the proposed approach and its application potential. The study also explained a com-
Fuzzy best worst method parison between the results of the proposed Fuzzy-BWM approach with the conventional BN approach
Process industries and a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) conventional technique such as bow-tie (BT). The findings
Safety analysis
revealed the capability of the proposed Fuzzy-BWM approach to provide high reliable results and to
detect risks that using the BT and BN approaches were not identified.
© 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Chemical process industries (CPI) are much prone to cata-
strophic accidents because containing large quantities of extremely
combustible and explosive chemicals. The intense operating con-
ditions, the complex interactions among system components (Roy
et al., 2015), and issues related to human and organizational fail-
ures make CPI susceptible to process deviations and failures, which
if not properly managed, may escalate small mishaps into cata-
strophic events (Al-Shanini et al., 2014).
The reliable risk analysis methodology plays a fundamental role
to develop prevention plans and to control the failures during
process operations in the CPI. The qualitative and quantitative
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: Jahangiri_m@sums.ac.ir, ja_me59@yahoo.com (M. Jahangiri).
methods are two important aspects of risk assessment (Han and
Weng, 2011), widely applied in chemical industries. Despite their
popularity as more adaptable and cost-effective tools for decision-
making purposes than the qualitative methods (Roy et al., 2014),
quantitative risk assessment (QRA) conventional methods (e.g. FTA,
FMEA, …) have been criticized in presenting the accurate results
due to disadvantages such as being static (unable to update the
probability of events), using generic failure data (unable to handle
data uncertainty), and incapability to consider complex de-
pendencies between system components (Zarei et al., 2017a).
In order to overcome the above mentioned limitations, during
the last years many attempts have been undertaken to develop
dynamic risk assessment (DRA) approaches (Villa et al., 2016). The
Bayesian networks (BNs) are one of the well accepted methods for
DRA that their superiority over QRA conventional methods has
been well proven in many of the previous studies (Zarei et al.,
2017a). Recently, in a comparative study on FTA and BN in

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.118761
0959-6526/© 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
2 A. Rostamabadi et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 244 (2020) 118761

Nomenclature PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis

RoV Ratio of Variation
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment
Acronyms SHIPP System Hazard Identification, Prediction and
BN Bayesian Network Prevention
BT Bow-tie TFNs Triangular Fuzzy Numbers
CPTs Condition Probabilistic Tables WS Weight Score
CPI Chemical Process Industry WF Weight Factor
CREAM Cognitive reliability & error analysis method
DAGs Directed Acyclic Graphs Process Symbols
DIB Delayed Ignition Barrier CWR Cooling Water Return
DRA Dynamic Risk Assessment CWS Cooling Water in Supply
ED&AB Early Detection and Alarm Barrier EV Emergency Valve
ERB Emergency Response Barrier LT Level Transmitter
ESDa Automatic Emergency Shut down ME-in Methanol inlet
ESDm Manual Emergency Shut down ME-out Methanol outlet
ETA Event Tree Analysis MOV Motor Valve
FANP Fuzzy Analytic Network Process PSV Pressure Safety Valve
FBN Fuzzy-Bayesian Network PT Pressure Transmitter
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis TSV Temperature Safety Valve
FST Fuzzy Set Theory
FTA Fault Tree Analysis Mathematical Symbols
Fuzzy-BWM Fuzzy Best Worst Method ~
AB Fuzzy best-to-others vector
JPD Joint Probability Distribution ~
AW Fuzzy others-to-worst vector
HAZOP Hazards and Operability Study CB Best criteria
HFACS Human Factors Analysis and Classification System CW Worst criteria
HOFs Human and Organizational Factors FPr Fuzzy Prior Probability
HRA Human Reliability Analysis FPs Fuzzy Possibility
IIB Immediate Ignition Barrier ~
w Optimal fuzzy weight
MCDM Multi-Criteria Decision-Making ~j Þ
Rða Graded mean integration representation
OREDA Offshore and Onshore Reliability Database

process safety analysis, Khakzad et al. (2011) explained various
modeling features of BN helping to incorporate multi-state vari-
ables, dependent failures, functional uncertainty, and expert
opinion which are frequently encountered in safety analysis, but
cannot be considered by FTA. Li et al. (2016) developed a risk-based
accident model established based on a BN to analysis leakage fail-
ure of submarine oil and gas pipelines. Their investigation findings
revealed that BN can provide a more case-specific and realistic
analysis consequence compared to bow-tie (BT) method, since it
could consider the common cause failures and conditional de-
pendency in the accident evolution process. Shan et al. (2017) have
reported that while reasoning approaches in the QRA conventional
methods such as BT, FTA, and Event Tree Analysis (ETA) are strictly
one way, BN also can provide a inversely inference or a two-way
analysis, not only to find the results from the causes, but also to
find causes from the results.
Recent investigations, however, revealed a limited capability of
BNs to handle all dimensions of uncertainty. According to Oztekin
and Luxhøj (2008), while there are three dimensions of uncer-
tainty in real-world applications including vagueness, ambiguity,
and randomness, BNs only address the uncertainty in the form of
randomness. Furthermore, conventional BN analysis usually re-
quires too much precise information and such information is
available as crisp probabilities (e.g., prior probability and condi-
tional probability of node variables) that are very difficult and often
challenging to obtain (Kabir et al., 2016).
Fuzzy Set theory (FST) has been proposed as an appropriate
alternative to introduce the ambiguity (Oztekin and Luxhøj, 2008)
and vagueness (Ren et al., 2009) dimensions of uncertainty to the
classical framework of BNs. Hence, in recent years, some of the
researchers have focused on developing models that is called Fuzzy
Bayesian Networks (FBNs). For instance, Hou and Zhao (2016)
developed a new approach by combining a Fuzzy Analytic
Network Process (FANP) decision-making method and BN to assess
fire and explosion risks of oil wharf handling. Kabir et al. (2016)
proposed a safety assessment model to evaluate oil and gas pipe-
line failure by incorporating fuzzy logic into BN. Shan et al. (2017)
presented a practical risk assessment method based on a FBN
approach incorporating BT model, fuzzy logic method and BN to
quantitatively analysis the probability of the failure and corre-
sponding consequences related to a natural gas pipeline leakage.
Yazdi and Kabir (2018) combined fuzzy set theory, expert knowl-
edge, and evidence theory with BN to develop a QRA methodology
through FTA for risk assessment of process systems. Zhou et al.
(2018) integrated BN, fuzzy logic theory and Cognitive Reliability
& Error Analysis Method (CREAM) to develop a quantitative Human
Reliability Analysis (HRA) model for the shipping industry. Zarei
et al. (2019) developed a FBN framework combining BT model,
expert elicitation and fuzzy theory with BN for safety analysis of a
city gate natural gas station.
However, what is important is the fact that most of the
mentioned previous studies have obtained the probability of the
event failure using fuzzy linguistic terms and have calculated the
fuzzy weights without considering pair-wise comparisons of the
events probability that may lead to false or unrealistic fuzzy
weights. Furthermore, the above mentioned previous models have
applied conventional methods such as FTA and BT for accident
scenario modeling. These conventional methods have been mainly
designed to identify process and technical failures and are not able
alone to well consider role of the other important accident
 A. Rostamabadi et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 244 (2020) 118761
contributory factors such as human and organizational factors
(HOFs) which play a signification contribution in accident occur-
rence. It seems that integrating other methods, designed specif-
ically to analyze HOFs, into the mentioned models can provide a
clearer and more comprehensive model of the accident occurrence.
Considering the important role of HOFs in accident occurrence,
70%e90% of accidents in the chemical and process industries (Zarei
et al., 2017b), developing safety analysis models providing an
comprehensive analysis of HOFs leading to the occurrence of acci-
dents is an essential priority to prevent catastrophic accidents in
the CPI. Thus, developing new FBN models characterized by a
powerful capability in reducing uncertainties and a detailed
analytical property in analyzing human and organizational failures
is a crucial task in order to present more objective results and to
design corresponding effective preventive safety strategies more
accurately.
In this context, the present study aimed to propose a novel FBN
model taking advantage of Human Factor Analysis and Classifica-
tion System (HFACS) and System Hazard Identification, Prediction
and Prevention (SHIPP) methodology to overcome the limitations
of the previous models on analyzing HOFs in both of the occurrence
of accidents and their consequences. Furthermore, in the proposed
model a new fuzzy Multi-Criteria Decision-Making (MCDM)
method called Fuzzy Best-Worst Method (Fuzzy-BWM) is used to
remedy uncertainties raised from application of crisp probabilities
in BN. Fuzzy-BWM (Guo and Zhao, 2017) is an extended method
from a new MCDM approach called Best Worst Method (BWM)
proposed by Rezaei (2015). It is a comparison-based approach and
has been proven to provide more reliable and consistent results as
compared to other MCDM methods (Rezaei, 2015) applied in the
previous models.
Literature review shows that there is no a study on application
of BNs combined with Fuzzy-BWM in safety analysis of process
systems. Considering the mentioned unique properties of Fuzzy-
BWM in providing higher reliable results and the robust potential
of HFACS and SHIPP in analyzing the HOFs, it is expected that the
proposed model in this research can be an appropriate base to
overcome the difficulties associated with the lack of an in-depth
and comprehensive analysis of HOFs and the further reduction of
a high level of vagueness and uncertainties found in the previous
models.
The rest of this article is arranged as follows. Section 2 dem-
onstrates the used materials and methods in the study. Section 3
provides a description of the methodology application. A case
study is presented on safety analysis of an ethylene storage tank to
explain the feasibility of the proposed approach and its application
potential. Through the case study a comparison between the results
of the proposed FBN approach with the conventional BN approach
and a QRA conventional technique such as BT has been also pro-
vided. In section 4, results and discussion are presented. Section 5 is
dedicated to the conclusion.
2. Material and method
In this section a briefed description of the used tools in the study
and a detailed description of the proposed methodology are
presented.
2.1. Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)
HFACS is a popular method in the field of accident analysis due
to its ability in detecting the contributing latent and active failures.
HFACS is based upon Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model, and have a
hierarchical based framework structured within main four levels
including: (1) unsafe acts of operators (2) preconditions for unsafe
3
acts (3) unsafe supervision, and (4) organizational influences
(Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003). Each level in the HFACS frame-
work has a set of sub-levels and each sub-level is consisted of the
classification codes (nano-codes).
In this study, the developed HFACS version by Aas (2008) for oil
and gas (O&G) industry, O&G HFACS, was used to identify and to
categorize human and organizational failures leading to the acci-
dent scenario occurrence. The mentioned O&G HFACS framework is
a merged version of the developed HFACS from the US Naval Safety
Center and the US DoD which is consisted of four main levels with a
number of the specific sub-levels and nano-codes, considered
specifically for oil and gas industry. The O&G HFACS has been
successfully validated and applied in analysis of the Norwegian
offshore accidents (Aas, 2008).
2.2. Bayesian networks (BNs)
BNs belong to a family of probabilistic graphical models, called
directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) (Nielsen and Jensen, 2009). The
network is composed of nodes, directed arcs, and condition prob-
abilistic tables (CPTs). Nodes representing the random variables,
directed arcs describing conditional dependencies among the cor-
responding random variables, and CPTs determining the quantita-
tive dependency strength from one random variable to others. The
nodes are including parent and child nodes. Parent nodes acting as
independent variables which have a prior probability distribution,
and child nodes acting as independent variables that each of them
have a conditional probability distribution in condition of the
parent nodes.
In BNs, the conditional dependencies between variables are
determined by joint probability distribution (JPD). The relation-
ships represented by DAG allow JPD to be specified by the CPTs for
each node (Zhang et al., 2014). Considering “pa (Ai)" as parent
nodes of “Ai” in DAG, the CPTs of “Ai” is denoted by P(Ai|pa(Ai)).
Thus, the JPD a set of variables U ¼ {A1, A2,A3,…, An} can be written
as Eq. (1). (Nielsen and Jensen, 2009):
Yn
PðUÞ ¼ PðAijpaðAiÞÞ (1)
i¼1
BN is a flexible tool capable to make a two-way inference
including both predictive and diagnostic reasoning. The predictive
reasoning is performed by calculating the prior probability of Ai as
Eq. (2):
X
P ðAiÞ ¼ PðUÞ (2)
U\Ai
Diagnostic reasoning is performed by updating the prior prob-
abilities of variables. Prior probabilities of variables are updated
using Bayes theorem when new evidences or information of vari-
ables E are given (Zarei et al., 2017a). Accordingly, the posterior
(updated) probabilities can be calculated as Eq. (3):
PðU; EÞ PðU; EÞ
P ðUjEÞ ¼ ¼P (3)
PðEÞ U PðU; EÞ
2.3. Fuzzy Best Worst Method (Fuzzy-BWM)
Best worst method (BWM) is the latest MCDM technique which
is based on a systematic pair-wise comparison of the decision
criteria (Rezaei, 2015). The technique uses two vectors of pair-wise
comparisons to determine the weights of criteria. First, the best
(e.g. most desirable, most important) and the worst (e.g. least
desirable, least important) criteria are identified by the decision-
4 A. Rostamabadi et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 244 (2020) 118761
makers. Then the weights of criteria are determined by deter-
mining preference of the best criterion over other criteria and
preference of all criteria on worst criterion.
Fuzzy-BWM is a extended model of BWM, proposed by Guo and
Zhao (2017). In the Fuzzy-BWM, the reference comparisons in BWM
are expressed in Triangular Fuzzy Numbers (TFNs). The nonlinearly
constrained optimization problem is then built to calculate the
optimal fuzzy weights of criteria and alternatives. The fuzzy
ranking scores of alternatives can be derived from the fuzzy
weights of alternatives with respect to different criteria multiplied
by fuzzy weights of the corresponding criteria, and then the crisp
ranking score of alternatives can be calculated by employing the
Graded Mean Integration Representation (GMIR) method for
optimal alternative selection (Guo and Zhao, 2017).
2.4. Proposed methodology
Fig. 1 depicts an overview of the proposed methodology ar-
ranged into five steps. In the first step, a hazard analysis is con-
ducted based on the Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP). The
primary objective of the hazard analysis is to identify all potential
hazards and analyze how these hazards would lead to an accident.
In order to identify the worst case accident scenarios, the identified
hazards are then categorize in terms of severity and consequence
by using American Military Standard (MIL-STD-882E).
In the second step, accident scenario modeling is performed by
using BT diagram, in which casual factors leading to the worst case
accident scenario and consequences resulting from the accident
scenario occurrence are analyzed based on FT and ET model,
respectively. In the FT model, according to Kidam and Hurme
(2013), process failures, mechanical failures, and human and
organizational failures are considered as the main casual factors
leading to the worst case accident scenario.
In order to perform an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of
HOFs involving in the accident occurrence, we decided to integrate
HOFs into both of the FT and ET parts of the BT model. We believe
that this provides a BT model characterized by strong and
comprehensive analytical properties, since HOFs have been recog-
nized not only as the most important contributing causal factors
leading to the accident occurrence (Wang et al., 2011), but also as
the most critical factors influencing on all stages of the accident
process including both initiate and propagate stages (Rathnayaka
et al., 2011).
In the third step, BN/FBN modeling is conducted by mapping BT
into BN framework and estimating the crisp and the fuzzy proba-
bilities. The crisp probabilities extracted from literature and failure
rate databases such as Offshore and Onshore Reliability Database
(OREDA) (OREDA, 2002) are used in the BN probability estimating
whereas the fuzzy probabilities obtained from the expert opinions
based on Fuzzy-BWM approach are used in the FBN probability
estimating. The purpose of the BN modeling is to overcome limi-
tations of the BT technique in considering conditional de-
pendencies of events and probability updating, as well as to provide
a comparison between results of the BN with those obtained by FBN
modeling. On the other hand, the purpose of the FBN modeling is to
overcome deficiencies of the BN model on uncertainties and
vagueness.
The fourth step allocates to the Bayesian/fuzzy Bayesian infer-
ence including both of the predictive and diagnostic reasoning. The
predictive reasoning is used to calculate the occurrence probability
of the accident scenario and its potential consequences while by
the diagnostic reasoning the probability updating analysis is per-
formed. Finally, in fifth step, the ranking of critical events and
sensitivity analysis are carried out.
3. Application of the methodology
This section describes an application of the proposed method-
ology for safety analysis of a liquid ethylene storage tank located in
a petrochemical plant in southern areas of Iran.
Ethylene, C2H4 is an extremely hazardous material that forms
the major production of petrochemical industries. Ethylene is easily
ignited and can undergo a violent chemical reaction at elevated
temperatures. Depending on its physical state, gas or liquid,
ethylene is generally stored in specific tanks under high or atmo-
spheric pressure. Because of its unique physical features such as a
high vapor pressure, a low flash point and a low explosive limit,
even a little release of ethylene from a storage tank can form an
extremely flammable and explosive vapor cloud.
3.1. Process description
Fig. 2 depicts a simplified flow diagram of the ethylene storage
tank.
The desired tank is a single containment with a total capacity
50,000 m3, designed to store liquid ethylene at atmospheric con-
ditions at 104  C. The system is designed for ship loading through
two submerged loading pumps A/B. A pressure at the ships mani-
fold of 3 bars is required, and a differential elevation between ship
and tank bottom of 30 m has been considered. Any increase of gas
volume, referred to as boil-off vapours, shall be exhausted to
maintain the normal operating pressure in the storage tank. The
boil-off vapours are recompressed by Ethylene Boil off Compressors
A and B (C-951 A/B). The ethylene vapours from ship are routed to
the tank to avoid higher than design compressor suction temper-
ature. The two compressors are in operation during loading, and
return the boil-off vapours to the ethylene export pipeline after de-
superheating in the Ethylene Boil off Cooler E951. In order to
balance the compressor output in regards of the true instantaneous
boil-off flow, the pressure control acts in split range between the
compressors recycle valve and also a hot gas valve which admits gas
from the vaporizer E952 to prevent from vacuum.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Hazard analysis
A HAZOP study was conducted to identify the potential hazards
leading to tank failure. To do this, at first, an experienced multi-
disciplined team was formed, including two process and instru-
mentation engineers, three operation and maintenance managers,
two chemical engineers, a process safety engineers, and a design
consultant. In the second step, each element of the system and its
parameters were identified. This was performed by holding several
meetings with presence of the mentioned team members to review
condition of the process operations and components of the desired
system. For each component, the team identified the planned
operating parameters of the system such as flow rate, temperature,
pressure, addition, reaction, and so on. In the third step, the effects
of deviations were evaluated. For each parameter, the effects of
deviations from design intent were determined by applying guide
words such as No, More than, Less than, and so on. Finally, in the
forth step, hazards and failure points of the system were identified.
In this step, the potential causes and consequences of each devia-
tion were identified using brain storming, and then the resultant
sequence of events including safeguards that protect against the
events and the consequences were determined. Each sequence of
events was considered as a hazardous scenario. At the end, based
on the HAZOP study’s findings, six hazardous scenarios were
identified as the major reasons of tank failure. According to Zarei
 A. Rostamabadi et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 244 (2020) 118761 5

Fig. 1. The framework of the proposed method.

et al. (2017a), the likelihood and severity of each the identified
scenario was then specified and a qualitative risk analysis was
conducted by means of the MIL-STD-882E to identify the worst case
accident scenario. Based on the risk analysis findings, ethylene
release due to the leakage from the tank body was selected as the
highest risk scenario (Table 1).
4.2. Accident scenario modeling (BT model)
A BT model (Fig. 3) was developed by several meetings to
interview a group of the experienced specialists including inspec-
tion and maintenance engineers, academicians active in human
factor engineering, and process and instrumentation engineers in
order to identify the potential casual factors and consequences of
the accident scenario occurrence.
As mentioned in the methodology section of this article, HFACS
was used to make a comprehensive analysis of HOFs involving in
the accident scenario occurrence. To this end, we used two re-
sources to identify the main HOFs that may lead to failure of the
desired storage tank. At the first, the reports of near misses and
accidents over five last years were reviewed and the main HOFs
contributed to the tank failure were extracted. Then a compre-
hensive interview was conducted to chairmen, managers, site-men,
board-men, and operators who working on repair, maintenance,
6 A. Rostamabadi et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 244 (2020) 118761

Fig. 2. The simplified flow diagram of the ethylene storage tank.

Table 1
Results of the hazards analysis using HAZOP and MILeSTDe882E techniques.

Scenarios Probability Severity QRRa

Tank rupture due to implosion Remote Catastrophic Serious

Ethylene release due to leakage of the tank body Probable Critical High
Ethylene release due to rupture of the tank body Remote Catastrophic Serious
Ethylene release due to leakage of the inlet/outlet loading lines Probable Marginal Serious
Ethylene release due to rupture of the inlet/outlet loading lines Occasional Critical Serious
Tank rupture due to external events Remote Catastrophic Serious
a
Qualitative risk ranking (MILeSTDe882E).

and management of processes associated with the desired storage
tank. They were asked to describe the main human errors and
organizational failures leading to tank failure which they had
experienced over their carrier. Finally, based on the interview
findings and the extracted results from the near misses/accident
reports, the identified HOFs were categorized into each of the O&G
HFACS levels, their corresponding sub-levels and classification
codes (nano-codes) by two academicians who were active in hu-
man factor engineering and familiar to the O&G HFACS approach.
In the next step, the O&G HFACS was mapped into the FT part of
the BT model. In the mapping procedure, the first level of O&G
HFACS, unsafe act level, was considered as top event of the FT
model and its two sub-levels including “errors” and “violation”
were considered as intermediate event. Each other level of O&G
HFACS and its sub-levels were considered as intermediate event
and at the lowest level, the O&G HFACS’s nano-codes, were
considered as basic event of the FT model. For example a human
and organizational failure that may cause release of ethylene from
the tank by overfilling is failure of warning systems such as failure
of a high level alarm (HLA) in combination with fail to take the
required action in a timely manner by operators. In this case, as is
shown in Fig. 3.h, failure of warning systems (X55 in Fig. 3.h) was
categorized as a nano-code at level of ‘precondition for unsafe act’
and sub-level of ‘environmental factors’, and delayed an necessary
action (X46 in Fig. 3.h) by operators was categorized as nano-codes
at level of ‘unsafe acts’ and sub-level of ‘error’, respectively. Fig. 3.h
depicts the FT model developed from O&G HFACS framework. The
symbols and descriptions related to each of the basic events in the
developed FT model (the O&G HFACS’s nano-codes), X42-X89, are
also presented in the Table 2.
The ET part of the BT model was established based on the
sequential failure of safety barriers and the potential consequences
resulting from the occurrence of accident scenario. In order to
integrate HOFs into the ET part of the BT model, safety barriers of
the ET model were developed based on the suggested conceptual
accident model in the SHIPP methodology (Rathnayaka et al., 2011).
The SHIPP methodology is a new process accident model that uses a
sequential modeling approach by applying safety barriers to
describe the accident process. The SHIPP’s framework is consisted
of safety barriers, in which human factors and management and
 A. Rostamabadi et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 244 (2020) 118761 7

Fig. 3. Accident scenario modeling using BT method.

organizational factors serve as a special barrier which affects the
whole process of accident evolution (Rathnayaka et al., 2011).
Fig. 4 shows the developed safety barrier model for the desired
ethylene storage tank.
The model was set up according to Rathnayaka et al. (2011) by
locating six main safety barriers in sequential order together with
two additional safety barriers including human factor barrier and
management and organization barrier located common to all of the
main safety barriers to prevent escalation of the leakage event to
catastrophic accident.
In this paper, according to Li et al. (2016) and based on judgment
of safety engineers and human factors specialists, it was concluded
that because of the necessity of finding and diagnosing alarm sig-
nals, as well as judging and verifying the leakage occurrence, role of
the human, management and organization factors is more promi-
nent when early detection and alarm barrier (ED&AB) fails.
Therefore, an independent barrier called human and organizational
(H&O) responses was defined and located between the ED&AB and
automatic emergency shutdown (ESDa) barrier, as shown in Fig. 3.a.
As can be seen from Fig. 3.a, the failure or function of the safety
barriers can lead to different consequences from a simple near miss
(C1) to a catastrophic event (C21) which involves undesirable
outcomes such as catastrophic pool fire, vapor cloud explosion
(VCE), sever causalities, and catastrophic property damage.
8 A. Rostamabadi et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 244 (2020) 118761

Fig. 3. (continued).
A. Rostamabadi et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 244 (2020) 118761 9

Fig. 3. (continued).
10 A. Rostamabadi et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 244 (2020) 118761
Fig. 3. (continued).
4.3. BN/FBN modeling
4.3.1. Mapping BT into BN framework
The proposed algorithm by Khakzad et al. (2013) was used to
map BT into the BN framework. The mapping procedure was
including directly transform the basic events, intermediate events,
top event, safety barriers, and consequences of the BT into the
corresponding nodes in BN including root nodes, intermediate
nodes, pivot node, safety nodes and consequence nodes, respec-
tively. Software GeNIe 2.0 was applied to simulate and run the
desired BN. Fig. 5 depict the established BN framework. In Fig. 5,
symbols X indicate the root nodes (green circles); symbols IE
indicate the intermediate nodes (purple circles); the pivot node is
marked by red circle; and the blue and yellow circles marked the
safety nodes and consequence nodes, respectively.
4.3.2. BN/FBN probability estimating
In this study, we used both of the crisp probabilities and fuzzy
probabilities to determine prior probabilities of the root nodes and
safety nodes. Crisp probabilities extracted from literature and fail-
ure rate databases such as OREDA (OREDA, 2002) were used in both
of the BT and BN probability estimating while the fuzzy probabili-
ties obtained from the expert opinions based on Fuzzy-BWM were
used in the FBN probability estimating. The obtained crisp proba-
bilities of root events/nodes and safety nodes using BT and BN
approaches are presented in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
In order to describe how Fuzzy-BWM was used in the current
work, an example on the calculation of fuzzy prior probabilities of
parent nodes of a child node, “external corrosion” for instance (see
Fig. 5) is explained in the following section. A step by step
description of the Fuzzy-BWM details for estimating the prior
probability of root events/nodes can be also found in our recent
study (Rostamabadi et al., 2019).
Step 1: Determine a set of decision criteria (C1, C2.....Cn).
Considering external corrosion (IE.5) as a child node (see Fig. 5),
four its parent nodes including anti-corrosion protective coating
failure (C1), erosion (C2), poor detection of corrosion (C3), and
cathodic protection failure (C4) were determined as the decision
criteria (factors leading to external corrosion of the ethylene stor-
age tank).
Step 2: Determine the best (CB) and the worst (CW) criteria from
n alternatives by an expert or an expert team.
To do this, a group consisted of five experts with different pro-
fessional position, service time, and education level were asked to
from the defined criteria in the step 1, determine the most probable
factor and the least probable factor leading to external corrosion of
the ethylene storage tank.
Step 3: Execute the fuzzy reference comparisons regarding the
best criterion.
 A. Rostamabadi et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 244 (2020) 118761 11

Table 2
The symbols and descriptions of human and organizational failures.

Symbol Description

X42 Omitting checklist items when inspect tank and its auxiliary facilities
X43 Ignoring warning alarms related to leakage sensing devices, overfilling/overpressure prevention instrumentation, and etc
X44 Not follow procedures when operate with tank
X45 Misreading gauges and dials of related to the tank pressure or ethylene level
X46 Delaying an necessary action such as long delay in the tank maintenance and inspection schedule
X47 Wrong response to a multitude of alarms based on an incomplete understanding of the actual problem
X48 Failure to set control switch
X49 Poor decision during operation
X50 Inadvertent operation of operator
X51 Poor teamwork
X52 Poor physical fitness of operator to work conditions
X53 Inadequate rest due to working in unscheduled hours or continuous night work
X54 Inadequate procedural/technical knowledge of system to operate with the tank and to quickly identify the specific causes leading to a leakage
X55 Failure of warning/control systems such as leakage detectors, overfilling/overpressure prevention instrumentation, etc.
X56 Unreliable measurement of instrumentation
X57 Workplace incompatible with human, for example visibility restrictions, presence of gases or lack of oxygen
X58 Personal equipment interference
X59 Inadequate instrument such as lack of manual actuators, not existing tank gauging redundancy, inadequate sensory feedback systems, and etc.
X60 Noise inference
X61 Uncomfortable temperature extremes
X62 Mental psychological fatigue of operator
X63 Operator awareness failure
X64 Disqualified medical condition of operator, e.g., drug effects, hangover, fatigue, etc.
X65 Task/informational overload
X66 Fail to replace worn-out auxiliary equipment in a timely manner
X67 Poor personnel management
X68 Inadequate operation management
X69 Fail to find hidden dangerous timely
X70 Fail to report unsafe work practices
X71 Limited recent experience
X72 Fail to provide correct data
X73 Fail to identify risky practices
X74 Inadequate supervisory response to critical situation
X75 Inadequate provided guidance/policy
X76 Authorized unqualified person
X77 Authorized unnecessary hazards
X78 Directing individual to violate regulations
X79 Provided substandard equipment
X80 Fail to provide required training
X81 Lack of equipment/facility resources
X82 Poor informational resources
X83 Inadequate upgraded organizational policies
X84 Poor organizational safety culture
X85 Unclear organizational structure
X86 Inadequate risk management
X87 Poor working permit system
X88 Inadequate maintenance and inspection program
X89 Poor management of change

Fig. 4. Safety barrier model for ethylene storage tank failure.

12 A. Rostamabadi et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 244 (2020) 118761
Fig. 5. The Bayesian network of ethylene storage tank failure.
In this step, the experts were asked to determine their prefer-
ence of the most probable factor (best criterion) over the other
factors (criteria) according to linguistic terms presented in Table 5.
Table 6 shows the linguistic terms of one of the experts for fuzzy
preferences of the most probable factor (best criterion) over other
factors (criteria).
Then, the fuzzy Best-to-Others vector was obtained according to
Table 5 and Eq. (4) as follows:
~ ¼ ½ð1; 1; 1Þ; 7  2; 4; 9  2; 5  2; 3; 7  2;
AB
   
3 2; 2; 5 2
Step 4. Execute the fuzzy reference comparisons for the worst
criterion.
The fuzzy reference comparisons for the least probable factor
(worst criterion) were also executed, and the linguistic evaluations
of one of the experts for the fuzzy preference of the other factors
(criteria) over the worst criterion are shown in Table 7.
Then, the fuzzy Others-to-Worst vector was obtained according
to Table 5 and Eq. (5) as follows:
~ ¼ ½7=2; 4; 9=2Þ; ð1; 1; 1Þ; ð2=3; 1; 3=2Þ;
AW
ð3=2; 2; 5=2Þ (5)
(4)
~ 1, w
Step 5. Determine the optimal fuzzy weights (w ~ 2, $ $ $, w
~ n).
For getting the optimal fuzzy weights of all the criteria, the
following nonlinearly constrained optimization problem was built
according to Eq. (6):
 A. Rostamabadi et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 244 (2020) 118761 13

Table 3 Table 6
Crisp probabilities of root events/nodes using BT and BN approaches. Linguistic terms for fuzzy preferences of the best criterion over the other criteria.

Root Events Crisp probabilities Root Events Crisp probabilities Criteria C1 C2 C3 C4

BT BN BT BN Best criterion (C1) EI AI VI FI

X1 2.46E-04 2.46E-04 X46 1.00E-04 1.00E-06

X2 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 X47 1.00E-04 5.80E-03
X3 1.84E-05 1.84E-05 X48 2.00E-04 2.00E-04 Table 7
X4 1.00E-05 1.00E-05 X49 1.00E-03 1.12E-02 The linguistic terms for fuzzy preference of the other criteria
X5 1.00E-05 1.00E-05 X50 1.00E-05 1.00E-05 over the worst criterion.
X6 2.45E-04 2.45E-04 X51 2.00E-04 5.00E-04
X7 2.78E-04 2.78E-04 X52 4.00E-04 6.00E-04 Criteria Worst criterion (C2)
X8 5.00E-04 5.00E-04 X53 2.20E-03 2.20E-03
C1 AI
X9 5.00E-04 2.50E-03 X54 3.00E-04 2.70E-03
C2 EI
X10 1.00E-03 2.50E-06 X55 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 C3 WI
X11 1.00E-02 1.00E-02 X56 1.80E-04 2.80E-04 C4 FI
X12 3.00E-04 8.00E-04 X57 2.00E-04 2.00E-04
X13 1.80E-03 2.30E-03 X58 3.80E-04 3.80E-04
X14 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 X59 1.00E-04 1.00E-04
X15 1.80E-03 2.30E-03 X60 5.40E-04 5.40E-04
X16 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 X61 1.00E-03 1.00E-03 min k 
X17 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 X62 1.20E-03 1.20E-03 8
X18 3.00E-04 3.00E-04 X63 4.00E-04 4.00E-04 >
>
>
> l1  3:5*u2  k*u2 ; l1  3:5*u2  k*u2;
X19 2.00E-04 2.00E-04 X64 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 >
>
>
>
X20 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 X65 2.00E-04 2.00E-04 >
>
>
>
X21 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 X66 2.00E-04 3.00E-04 >
> m1  4*m2  k*m2 ; m1  4*m2  k*m2 ;
X22 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 X67 1.00E-04 2.00E-04 >
>
>
>
X23 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 X68 1.00E-04 3.00E-04 >
>
>
> u1  4:5*l2  k*l1 ; u1  4:5*l2  k*l2 ;
X24 2.30E-04 2.30E-04 X69 5.80E-04 8.00E-04 >
>
>
>
X25 2.30E-04 2.30E-04 X70 1.00E-04 4.00E-04 >
>
X26 1.00E-04 2.00E-04 X71 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 >
> l1  2:5*u3  k*u3 ; l1  2:5*u3  k*u3 ;
>
>
X27 2.60E-04 2.60E-04 X72 2.00E-04 2.00E-04 >
>
>
>
X28 3.40E-04 4.40E-04 X73 8.00E-04 5.00E-04 >
> m1  3*m3  k*m3 ; m1  3*m3  k*m3 ;
>
>
X29 3.00E-04 8.00E-04 X74 4.00E-05 1.00E-04 >
>
X30 3.00E-04 8.00E-04 X75 1.00E-05 2.10E-04 >
>
>
> u1  3:5*l3  k*l3 ; u1  3:5*l3  k*l3 ;
X31 1.80E-03 2.30E-03 X76 1.00E-05 1.00E-05 >
>
>
>
X32 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 X77 3.00E-06 1.00E-05 >
>
>
> l1  1:5*u4  k*u4 ; l1  1:5*u4  k*u4 ;
X33 1.80E-03 2.30E-03 X78 1.00E-06 1.00E-06 >
>
X34 3.00E-04 8.00E-04 X79 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 >
>
>
>
X35 3.00E-04 8.00E-04 X80 2.40E-03 2.40E-03 >
>
> m1  2*m4  k*m4 ; m1  2*m4  k*m4 ;
>
X36 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 X81 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 >
>
>
>
X37 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 X82 5.00E-04 5.00E-04 >
> u1  2:5*l4  k*l4 ; u1  2:5*l4  k*l4 ;
X38 2.30E-04 2.30E-04 X83 2.00E-04 2.00E-04 >
>
>
>
X39 3.00E-04 8.00E-04 X84 3.00E-04 3.00E-04 >
>
>
>
X40 2.30E-04 2.30E-04 X85 1.00E-05 1.00E-05 >
> l3  0:67*u2  k*u2 ; l3  0:67*u2  k*u2 ;
X41 2.55E-04 2.55E-04 X86 4.00E-04 7.00E-04 >
>
>
>
X42 1.00E-03 1.00E-03 X87 4.00E-03 4.30E-03 >
>
X43 5.00E-04 5.00E-04 X88 5.00E-05 5.00E-05
> m3  1*m2  k*m2 ; m3  1*m2  k*m2 ;
<
X44 4.00E-04 4.00E-04 X89 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 s:t:
>
> u3  1:5*l2  k*l2 ; u3  1:5*l2  k*l2 ;
X45 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 e e e >
>
>
>
>
>
>
> l4  1:5*u2  k*u2 ; l4  1:5*u2  k*u2 ;
>
>
>
>
Table 4 >
>
>
>
Crisp probabilities of safety barriers/nodes using BT and BN approaches. > m4  2*m2  k*m2 ; m4  2*m2  k*m2 ;
>
>
>
>
>
>
Safety barrier Crisp probabilities >
> u  2:5*l2  k*l2 ; u4  2:5*l2  k*l2 ;
>
> 4
BT BN >
>
>
>
>
>1 1 1 1 1
ED&AB 3.00E-03 3.10E-03 >
> *l þ *4*m1 þ *u1 þ *l2 þ *4*m2 þ
>
> 6 1 6 6 6 6
H&O response barrier 1.00E-02 1.00E-02 >
>
ESDa 3.00E-02 1.40E-04 >
>
>
>
IIB 6.00E-02 1.03E-04 >
> 1 1 1 1 1 1
>
> *u þ *l þ *4*m3 þ *u3 þ *l4 þ *
ESDm 3.00E-02 1.40E-04 >
> 6 2 6 3 6 6 6 6
>
>
DIB 6.00E-02 1.03E-04 >
>
ERB 5.50E-03 5.60E-03 >
>
>
> 1
>
> 4*m4 þ *u4 ¼ 1
>
> 6
>
>
>
>
>
>
Table 5 >
> l  m1  u1 ; l2  m2  u2 ; l3  m3  u3 ; l4  m4  u4
> 1
>
Linguistic terms of decision-makers. >
>
>
>
Linguistic terms Membership function >
> l1 > 0; l2 > 0; l3 > 0; l4 > 0
>
>
>
>
Equally importance (EI) (1,1,1) >
>
>
> k0
Weakly important(WI) (2/3,1,3/2) :
Fairly Important (FI) (3/2,2,5/2)
Very important(VI) (5/2,3,7/2) (6)
Absolutely important(AI) (7/2,4,9/2)
By solving the above problem, the optimal fuzzy weights of four
14 A. Rostamabadi et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 244 (2020) 118761

criteria (parent nodes of the external corrosion node) including respectively. In this study, these obtained crisp weights were also
anti-corrosion protective coating failure (C1), erosion (C2), poor called as fuzzy possibilities (FPs). Similar calculations were per-
detection of corrosion (C3), and cathodic protection failure (C4) formed to obtain the FPs values of the above mentioned criteria
were calculated as w ~ 1¼ (0.466085, 0.510555, 0.524799); w ~2 ¼ from other experts. Finally, FPs for each criterion was calculated as
(0.095418, 0.170185, 0.170185); w ~ 3 ¼ (0.127639, 0.127639, the following equation:
0.228456); and w ~ 4 ¼ (0.085092, 0.170185, 0.32799), respectively.   
The obtained optimal fuzzy weights were then transformed to EPs ¼ GMIRExpert1  WSExpert1 þ GMIRExpert2Þ þ
crisp weights by the Graded Mean Integration Representation  
(GMIR), Rða~j Þ, as Eq. (7): þ GMIRExpert n  WSExpert n
(10)
  li þ 4mi þ ui
~j ¼
R a (7) Considering Eq. (10), the FPs values of criteria C1, C2, C3, and C4
6
were calculated as 0.39687, 0.21697, 0.17003, and 0.20614,
Finally, the crisp weights obtained for C1, C2, C3, and C4 were respectively. At last, these FPs values for each criterion were con-
calculated as 0.505517, 0.157724, 0.144441, and 0.182303, verted to fuzzy prior probability (FPr) by using the following
respectively. equations proposed by Onisawa (1988):
The above crisp weights were then multiplied by a weighting
8
factor representing the relative quality of the response of the ex- >
< 1 ; FPss0
perts. The weighting factor was calculated based on previous FPr ¼ 10k (11)
studies (Renjith et al., 2010; Zarei et al., 2019) by estimating weight >
:
0; FPs ¼ 0
scores each expert divided by weight scores all experts, as
following equations:
 1
ð1  FPsÞ 3
k ¼ 2:301  (12)
Weight score of expert i FPs
Weight factor of expert i ¼ Pn 
i¼1 Weight score of experts
Where K is a constant value.
(8)
Based on the Eq. (11) and Eq. (12), FPr for criteria C1, C2, C3, and
C4 were calculated as 2.26E-03, 3.00E-04, 1.30E-04, and 2.50E-04,
Weight score of Expert i ¼ Score of PP þ Score of E þ Score of respectively. It is noteworthy that criteria C1, C2, C3, and C4 are
EL þ Score of A (9) according to symbols of X10, X9, X11, and X8 (see Fig. 5), respec-
tively. The obtained FPs, K, and FPr values for other root nodes and
Where PP is professional position of expert i, E is experience time of safety nodes are presented in Table 10 and Table 11, respectively.
expert i, EL is education level of expert i, and A is age of expert of
expert i.
Score of each expert was calculated according to Table 8, as 4.3.3. BN/FBN inference
proposed by Renjith et al. (2010). Bayesian inference was conducted using predictive and diag-
Table 9 reveals corresponding weighting factors for the selected nostic reasoning. The results of predictive reasoning of the accident
experts. scenario occurrence and its main contributing factors using BT, BN,
Considering the weighting factor of the Expert No.4 (0.203; see and FBN approaches are presented in Table 12 (2, 3, and 4th col-
Table 9), the final crisp weights of criteria including C1, C2, C3, and umns) and Fig. 6.
C4 were calculated as 0.102817, 0.032079, 0.029378 and 0.37079, A comparison on the obtained probability values using the BT,

Table 8
Experts’ scores (adopted from Renjith et al. (2010)).

Constitution Classification Score Constitution Classification Score

Title Professor, GM/DGM, Chief Engineer, Director 4 Age >50 4

Asst. Prof., Manager, Factory Inspector, Controller of Explosives 3 40e50 3
Supervisors, Foreman, Graduate Apprentice 2 30e40 2
Operator 1 <30 1
Educational qualification Ph.D./M.Tech. 5 Experience >30 4
M.Sc./B.Tech. 4 20e30 3
Diploma/B.Sc. 3 10e20 2
ITI 2 5e10 1
Secondary school 1

Table 9
Experts’ weighting score.

Expert No. Title Experience Education level Age WSa WFb

1 Chief Engineer 11 Ph.D 37 13 0.220

2 Offsite Manager 16 M.S.c 36 11 0.186
3 Reservoir Inspector 15 M.S.c 39 10 0.169
4 Chief Engineer 10 M.S.c 37 12 0.203
5 Chief Engineer 18 M.S.c 50 13 0.220
a
Weighting score.
b
Weighting factor.
 A. Rostamabadi et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 244 (2020) 118761 15

Table 10 well treated in the form of common failure causes using BN, a
FPs, K, and FPr values for corresponding root node/nano-code. unique capability that BT does not have (Li et al., 2016; Zarei et al.,
Root Events Fuzzy probabilities Root Events Fuzzy probabilities 2017b). On the other hand, the observed significant differences
FPs K FPr FPs K FPr
between the results of the FBN with BT and BN is due to the fact that
the BN (and the BT) approach can only deal with crisp sets (Ren
X1 0.301 3.044 9.00E-04 X46 0.207 3.599 2.51E-04
et al., 2009), whereas using the FBN approach the domain experts
X2 0.169 3.907 1.30E-04 X47 0.168 3.919 1.20E-04
X3 0.284 3.131 7.40E-04 X48 0.183 3.781 1.65E-04 can define ranges rather than crisp values under “vague” conditions
X4 0.141 4.198 6.33E-05 X49 0.202 3.634 2.32E-04 (Zhang et al., 2016). Therefore, while BT and BN approaches suffers
X5 0.093 4.902 1.25E-04 X50 0.101 4.768 2.70E-05 from uncertainty and insufficient data on the failure data, FBN
X6 0.351 2.821 1.50E-03 X51 0.329 2.916 1.21E-03
approach makes it possible for decision makers to have more
X7 0.638 1.903 1.24E-02 X52 0.170 3.902 1.25E-04
X8 0.206 3.606 2.50E-04 X53 0.308 3.012 9.42E-04 detailed and more accurate data on the failure probability.
X9 0.216 3.529 3.00E-04 X54 0.182 3.795 1.60E-04 In this study, the probability of tank failure using FBN (8.24E-02)
X10 0.396 2.645 2.26E-03 X55 0.225 3.470 3.40E-04 was more than triple, when compared with the BN (2.43E-02) (see
X11 0.170 3.903 1.30E-04 X56 0.199 3.655 2.20E-04 Table 12). These results are almost similar to findings of a recent
X12 0.307 3.017 9.55E-04 X57 0.101 4.755 1.75E-05
research conducted by Zarei et al. (2019) which found a fourfold
X13 0.257 3.272 5.34E-04 X58 0.100 4.769 1.70E-05
X14 0.173 3.870 1.35E-04 X59 0.181 3.801 1.60 E04 increase in the calculated probability values using FBN than BN on
X15 0.321 2.950 1.12E-03 X60 0.080 5.171 6.74E-06 safety analysis of a Iranian natural gas station.
X16 0.215 3.536 2.91E-04 X61 0.099 4.797 1.59E-05 According to the Table 12, the predictive reasoning results reveal
X17 0.207 3.594 2.54E-04 X62 0.238 3.387 4.10E-04
that near misses (C1) were the most likely consequences resulting
X18 0.543 2.170 6.76E-03 X63 0.303 3.033 9.26E-04
X19 0.446 2.473 3.36E-03 X64 0.109 4.629 2.34E-05
from the scenario occurrence using BT, BN, and FBN approaches.
X20 0.221 3.497 3.18E-04 X65 0.308 3.011 9.74E-04 However, comparing the obtained probability values (see 2, 3, and
X21 0.268 3.211 6.14E-04 X66 0.211 3.569 2.69E-04 4th columns), it can be concluded that FBN represents a higher
X22 0.148 4.117 7.63E-05 X67 0.202 3.632 2.38E-04 probability value for near misses (C1) and a lower probability value
X23 0.155 4.041 9.38E-05 X68 0.212 3.560 2.75E-04
for all other consequences (C12eC14, and C17) than BT and BN
X24 0.157 4.027 9.38E-05 X69 0.277 3.164 6.84E-04
X25 0.176 3.848 1.41E-04 X70 0.086 2.348 4.49E-03 approaches. This may be due to a high level of the implemented
X26 0.087 5.033 9.26E-06 X71 o.454 2.446 3.57E-03 safety preventive measures in place that by means of the experts’
X27 0.057 5.857 1.39E-06 X72 0.535 2.193 6.41E-03 opinion well reflected in FBN approach, whereas the probability of
X28 0.093 4.905 1.24E-05 X73 0.474 2.381 4.15E-03
consequences in the BT and BN are based on generic databases such
X29 0.113 4.560 2.75E-05 X74 0.260 3.258 5.51E-04
X30 0.352 2.817 1.52E-03 X75 0.255 3.289 5.14E-04
as OREDA which are constant over time and by means of them it is
X31 0.268 3.216 6.07E-04 X76 0.208 3.593 2.55E-04 not possible to consider the recent improvements in the reliability
X32 0.269 3.208 6.19E-04 X77 0.534 2.196 6.35E-03 of the system components and the real conditions of the system
X33 0.098 4.809 1.55E-05 X78 0.247 3.334 4.63E-04 safety (Zarei et al., 2019).
X34 0.124 4.406 3.92E-05 X79 0.184 3.772 1.69E-04
Results of the diagnostic reasoning revealed that in both the FBN
X35 0.095 2.115 7.67E-03 X80 0.353 2.813 1.53E-03
X36 0.097 2.098 7.97E-03 X81 0.137 4.243 5.71E-05 and the BN approaches, HOFs were the most contribution factor to
X37 0.101 2.071 8.47E-03 X82 0.313 2.986 1.03E-03 the ethylene storage tank failure while different results was found
X38 0.208 1.560 2.75E-02 X83 0.294 3.077 8.37E-04 regarding mechanical failures and process failures (Table 12). In
X39 0.105 2.039 9.12E-03 X84 0.427 2.537 2.90E-03 other word, using BN approach, process failures were identified as
X40 0.257 1.424 3.76E-02 X85 0.267 3.217 6.06E-04
X41 0.548 2.156 6.70E-03 X86 0.337 2.879 1.32E-03
the second highest contributing factor whereas by means of FBN
X42 0.319 2.961 1.09E-03 X87 0.164 3.951 1.12E-04 approach, mechanical failures were the second highest contrib-
X43 0.162 3.975 1.05E-04 X88 0.247 3.334 4.63E-04 uting factor, a result that has been also found in the Zarei et al.
X44 0.508 2.275 5.30E-03 X89 0.239 3.380 4.17E-04 (2019) study.
X45 0.127 4.374 4.22E-05 e e e
In this research, the obtained higher probability values for me-
chanical failures in FBN approch can be explained by the nature of
the desired industry where various extremely corrosive and reac-
Table 11
tive materials are present and most of the process equipment
FPs, K, and FPr values of safety barriers/nodes.
operate under rigorous operating conditions, including extremely
Safety barrier Fuzzy probabilities low temperature and high pressure conditions that may because of
FPs K FPr or accelerate various mechanical failure modes such as fracture,
ED&AB 0.064 5.60 2.49E-06
creep, corrosion, wear, fatigue and so on. On the other hand, pro-
H&O response barrier 0.234 3.415 3.84E-04 cess operations in petrochemical plants are performed under rigid
ESDa 0.142 4.185 5.62E-05 controlled conditions. Various high reliable control systems are
IIB 0.122 4.442 3.61E-05 used to make sure industrial processes are carried out within
ESDm 0.147 4.127 7.46E-05
specified limits and with as little deviation as possible. Therefore, in
DIB 0.128 4.351 4.44E-05
ERB 0.149 4.106 7.83E-05 such a situation, process operations are often carried out safely and
a lower rate of the process failures than mechanical failures is
expected.
BN and FBN reveals that while there is a little different in the
4.3.4. Criticality analysis
calculated prior probabilities values by BN than those by the BT, the
As a crucial step to provide an effective safety decision-making,
calculated prior probabilities values by FBN are significantly
it is necessary to determine the most critical basic (root) events
different from those calculated by the BN and by the BT. The reason
contributing to the occurrence of the top event (Kabir et al., 2016).
for the different probability values using BT and BN is related to the
To this end, the determination of the posterior probabilities of basic
conditional dependencies among variables (nodes). As can be seen
events given the scenario occurrence has been used in most of the
from Fig. 5, in the developed BN model, most of the root nodes have
previous studies. However, new investigations (Zarei et al., 2017b,
conditional dependencies to each other. Such dependencies can be
2019) have explored that focusing on the posterior probabilities for
16 A. Rostamabadi et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 244 (2020) 118761

Table 12
The Results of the predictive and diagnostic reasoning.

Critical event and consequences BT Predictive reasoning Diagnostic reasoning

BNa FBNa BNb FBNb

Ethylene release 2.97E-02 2.43E-02 8.24E-02 1.00Eþ00 1.00Eþ00

Human and organizational failures 2.11E-02 1.85E-02 4.36E-02 7.56E-01 5.29E-01
Process failures 2.72E-03 2.45E-03 1.92E-02 1.10E-01 2.33E-01
Mechanical failures 5.90E-03 3.40E-03 2.17E-02 1.56E-02 2.63E-01
C1 2.84E-02 2.39E-02 8.23E-02 9.87E-01 9.99E-01
C2 7.98E-04 0 0 0 0
C3 4.41E-06 0 0 0 0
C4 2.47E-05 0 0 0 0
C5 1.36E-07 0 0 0 0
C6 4.79E-05 0 0 0 0
C7 2.65E-07 0 0 0 0
C8 3.07E-06 0 0 0 0
C9 1.48E-06 0 0 0 0
C10 8.19E-09 0 0 0 0
C11 9.50E-08 0 0 0 0
C12 2.77E-04 2.33E-04 3.16E-05 9.61E-03 3.83E-04
C13 1.53E-06 3.68E-06 1.46E-08 1.51E-04 1.77E-07
C14 1.66E-05 2.39E-06 1.20E-08 9.83E-05 1.45E-07
C15 9.19E-08 3.76E-08 0 1.54E-06 0
C16 1.07E-06 2.51E-08 0 1.03E-06 0
C17 8.33E-05 7.48E-05 2.17E-07 3.07E-03 2.63E-06
C18 4.61E-07 4.45E-07 0 1.83E-05 0
C19 5.00E-06 5.38E-08 0 2.21E-06 0
C20 2.77E-08 0 0 2.58E-08 0
C21 3.21E-07 0 0 1.46E-08 0
a
Prior probability.
b
Posterior (updated) probability.

Fig. 6. Predictive reasoning for the accident scenario and its main contributing factors
using BT, BN, and FBN.

determining critical basic events may lead to imprecise results.

Instead, the ratio of variation (RoV) has been proved to be a more
reliable measure of importance in system failure analysis. Hence, in
the present study, the RoV was used to identify the most critical
root events leading to the top event occurrence. For a basic event,
the RoV was determined by Eq. (13):

p ðXi Þ  q ðXi Þ
RoV ðXi Þ ¼ (13)
q ðXi Þ

where p ðXi Þ and q ðXi Þ represent posterior and prior probabilities

of Xi, respectively.
Fig. 7 shows RoV of the basic event probability for both the BN
Fig. 7. (a) RoV of the basic event probability using BN model, and (b) FBN model.
and FBN models, respectively.
As can be seen, in the BN approach, the most critical basic events
 A. Rostamabadi et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 244 (2020) 118761
Fig. 8. (a) BIM of the basic events using BN model, and (b) FBN model.
contributing to the failure of the ethylene storage tank were X1-
X11, X15, X18-X29 and X72-X89. The same finding was also ob-
tained using fuzzy probabilities in the FBN approach with some
differences in the RoV value, especially, for X36, X37, and X39-X41.
This indicates the fact that the FBN approach can identify some of
the critical basic events that using BT and BN approaches may not
be detected.
In this study, based on the previous studies (Zarei et al., 2017b;
Yazdi and Kabir, 2018) Birnbaum Importance Measure (BIM) was
used to assess sensitivity of RoV in identifying of the critical basic
events. BIM of an event was calculated as the difference of the
occurrence probability of the tank failure given the function and
malfunction of each basic event Xi. Mathematically, BIM can be
written as:
I BIM
BEi ¼ P ðTE ¼ failj Xi ¼ failÞ  P ðTE ¼ failj Xi ¼ workÞ
(14)
Where I BIM
BEi is the BIM of the Xi, TE ¼ fail| Xi ¼ fail is the probability of
the top event (TE), tank failure, given the basic event malfunc-
tioning, and TE ¼ fail| Xi ¼ work is the probability of the TE given the
basic event functioning.
Results of the BIM analysis of the basic events for both the BN
and FBN approaches are depicted in Fig. 8. As can be seen, the re-
sults obtained from BIM analysis is in agreement with those ob-
tained from RoV analysis (Fig. 7), indicating a good reliability and
sensitivity of RoV in identifying the most critical basic events
leading to the failure of the ethylene storage tank.
17
5. Conclusion
This study presented a novel FBN approach for dynamic safety
analysis of process systems. In this approach, first, the worst case
accident scenario was identified using a HAZOP study and then the
accident scenario modeling was performed by using a BT model. In
order to provide a comprehensive analysis of HOFs involving in the
accident scenario occurrence, HFACS was integrated into the FT part
of the BT model while in the ET part, safety barriers were developed
based on the suggested conceptual accident model in the SHIPP
methodology. The model was then converted into a BN to overcome
limitations of the BT in considering conditional dependencies of
events and probability updating. Furthermore, deficiencies of the
BN model on uncertainties and vagueness were relaxed by incor-
porating Fuzzy-BWM into the BN. An ethylene storage tank was
selected to verify the applicability of the proposed approach and its
application potential. A comprehensive comparison was also per-
formed on the obtained results using different approaches applied
in the study including BT, BN, and FBN.
The proposed FBN model revealed an effective and flexible
framework for analyzing the HOFs involving in the accidents sce-
nario occurrence and reducing the vagueness and uncertainties
raised from insufficient data and application of crisp probabilities in
BN. According to the study results, while the probability of tank
failure (ethylene release) using BT and BN was 2.97E-02 and 2.43E-
02, respectively, it was more than triple using FBN (8.24E-02). Re-
sults of both predictive and diagnostic reasoning revealed that
HOFs were the most contribution factor leading to the tank failure.
Furthermore, the probability of H&O response barrier failure using
BT (1.00E-02), BN (1.00E-02), and FBN approach (3.84E-04) was
significantly higher than the other barriers, indicating H&O
response barrier as the most important safety barrier to prevent
escalation of the leakage event to catastrophic accident. The study
findings also revealed that the proposed FBN approach was able to
detect risks that using the BT and BN approaches were not identi-
fied. A comparison on the calculated probability values using the
BT, BN and FBN approaches highlighted the priority of the proposed
FBN approach over the BT and BN in safety analysis of process
systems.
There may be some possible limitations with this study that
should be acknowledged when interpreting the results. These are
including: (1) In the current research, mechanical, process, and HOF
factors were considered as the main contributing factors leading to
the accident scenario occurrence while other casual factors such as
external hazards (landslide, earthquake, flood, etc) were not part of
the model. (2) It is necessary to the validity and applicability of the
model to other process and non-process industries be examined,
since the current research focused on a specific process system. (3)
Other important limitation of this study was the fact that although
application of the FBN in the proposed model made it possible to
overcome some limitations on considering conditional de-
pendencies and non-linear interactions between variables and to
remedy some difficulties related to vagueness and insufficient data,
however, the developed model was not able to consider other dy-
namic properties including positive or negative interactions, feed-
back loops and time-delays between variables that are significant
aspects constructing dynamic behavior of the studied system. It
seems that System Dynamics (SD) methodology can be an appro-
priate alternative to compensate these deficiencies of the model.
Therefore, our subsequent research will focus on the feasibility of
applying the SD methodology into the proposed model and
developing a SD-FBN model integrating SD, Fuzzy-BWM, and BN as
an effective approach for dynamic safety analysis of process
systems.
18 A. Rostamabadi et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 244 (2020) 118761
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that there is no conflict of interests
regarding the publication of this paper.
Acknowledgement
This article was extracted from the thesis written by Akbar
Rostamabadi, a PhD student of Occupational Health Engineering
and was financially supported by the Shiraz University of Medical
Sciences, Iran (Grant No.1396-01-04-15176).
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